ARCIGA vs.

MANIWANG
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981

Disbarment case on the grounds of grossly immoral conduct FACTS: In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to Arcigas hometown to tell the latters parent about the pregnancy. They also made Arcigas parents believe that they were already married but they would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license. In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwangs wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries against Arciga. Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arcigas child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arcigas shady past because apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born. ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred. HELD:

No.
The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwangs case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwangs refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court entitled Attorneys and Admission to Bar says that Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds . A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Moreover, in Garrido vs Garrido, A.C. No. 6593, citing the case of St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 6010, a more elaborate definition has been given. The latter case mentioned that Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. Lastly, the breach of promise to marry is never an actionable wrong so as to compel the promisor to make good his promise as this would be unfair to unsuspecting men. This breach of promise might, in some civil cases award damages to the one who was given such promise, but this is not sufficient enough to constitute a grossly immoral conduct which subjects one to disbarment.

CAYETANO vs. MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 Parties: Petitioner: RENATO CAYETANO Respondents: CHRISTIAN MONSOD HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner

opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that Confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Main Issue: Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution on the qualification of being engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years? Decision: Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners and a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar and has been paying his dues since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Before such appointment, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He has also worked for Human Development with the under privileged sectors. He has also been part of the Constitutional Commission as Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law, particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

ULEP VS. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

FACTS: Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: Annex A SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla. Annex B GUAM DIVORCE. DON PARKINSON an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Nonquota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767 It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted. In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case ofJohn R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

ISSUE: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of practice of law is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined: Black defines "practice of law" as: "The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory

prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal byproduct of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

PEOPLE VS. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA

In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice. ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice. HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather hes doing it for free for his friend who happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual

exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of Justice approved Fules appearance for his friend should be given credence.

BLANZA VS. ARCANGEL

(En Banc), Bengzon, J.P., J. Facts: In April 1955, Atty. Agustin Arcangel, herein respondent, volunteered his legal services to petitioners Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion in making their pension claims for the deaths of their husbands who were both P.C. soldiers. They handed him pertinent documents, but after six years, Arcangel refused to surrender them. Blanza and Pasion then filed a case of professional malfeasance against Arcangel. Arcangel responded that his failure to return the documents was because respondents refused to hand him money for photostating costs, thus the documents remained with the photostating service. Arcangel advanced the photostating expenses and turned over the documents to the fiscal. Arcangel submitted that he was not obliged to follow up complainants pension since there was no agreement as to his compensation as counsel. Issue: Whether or not Arcangel was obliged to follow up the case when he volunteered his legal services Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that having established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend to complainants' claims with all due diligence. Since Arcangel volunteered his professional services, he is not however, entitled to recover fees. The Court found insufficient evidence to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against Arcangel. Since Arcangel asked petitioners for money to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him money therefore, complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing their respective claims. While the case against Arcangel was dimissed, the Court reminded Arcangel of the role of a lawyer in the community. The Court held that As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension

claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith terminated their professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely.

IN RE: ALMACEN VS. YAPTINCHAY

Facts: Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution. This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb. The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to Actually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing. He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant, prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic.

ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion. On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

6. In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the

name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. Issue: WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? Held: No. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

DIAO VS. MARTINEZ

FACTS: DIAO was admitted to the Bar. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects: Did not complete his high school training Never attended Quisumbing College Never obtained a diploma. DIAO admitted to the first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma o Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. o No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious:

Never obtained his diploma from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949 o He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

ISSUE: WON DIAO can gain admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing pre-law requirements? HELD: No. The Supreme Court ordered to STRIKE OUT NAME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS LAWYERS DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS. Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable. o Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 19481949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. o He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests: Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.). Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorneyat-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

IN RE: ARTHUR CUEVAS, JR.

Facts: In 1991, a neophyte died during the initiation rites of Lex Talionis Fraternitas in the San Beda College of Law. Arthur Cuevas Jr was one of the persons charged (with murder) for the death of the neophyte. He pleaded guilty and was later convicted to the lesser crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. Thereafter, Cuevas was granted

probation and he continued taking up law. In 1995, he was discharged from probation. In 1996, the Supreme Court allowed Cuevas to take the bar on the condition that in case he will pass, his oath taking will have to be approved by the Supreme Court first. Cuevas did pass the 1996 bar exams and in 1997, he filed a petition before the Supreme Court asking the latter to allow him to take the Lawyers Oath. ISSUE: Whether or not Cuevas may be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. Cuevas participation in the senseless killing of the neophyte is highly reprehensible however, the Supreme Court is willing to give him a chance considering that Cuevas has received various certifications regarding his good behavior while on probation. The Supreme Court also stressed that the lawyers oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. As a lawyer, Cuevas shall be expected to abide by the oath strictly and to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO

FACTS A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published. An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isnt served in any way by the prohibition. ISSUE Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest. Worse, advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyers name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazineetc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.

PEOPLE VS. LUNA

Facts: Well knowing that Luna has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts by then and there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer before a notary public and making manifestations to that effect before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES whether the acts charged in the amended information constitute contempt of court

DECISION

The appellees, accordingly, disobeyed the order implied, in said resolution, thus violating section 232 of Act No. 190, which declares in part: A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt: 1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge. and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, which is identical. Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in the amended information, appellees herein expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular. Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice," in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64. . . . Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt of court. . . . (12 Am. Jur. 395.). The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "'the oath of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had for all intents and purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-at-law

CANOY VS. ORTIZ

(A.C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005)

Before the institution of the present case, herein petitioner CANOY was allegedly dismissed from his former employer Coca Cola Bottlers Incorporated. Aggrieved of being illegally dismissed, CANOY brought a complaint to the National Labor Relations Commission in order to determine whether or not Coca Bottlers Incorporated had sufficient grounds of dismissing him. On the other hand, herein respondent attorney ORTIZ was the legal counsel hired by CANOY. CANOY hired Attorney Ortiz as his lawyer in the year 1998, the very same year by which a complaint was brought to the NLRC. Feeling abandoned by his lawyer, herein petitioner CANOY went to the law office of respondent ORTIZ to make a follow-up with the status of his submittedcomplaint. To no avail, despite making several follow-ups, particularly from the years 1998 2000, he was merely told by the staff of respondent ORTIZ law office that he should try some other time because maybe, the next time he will visit the said law office, respondent might already be there. Tired of making these follow-ups, petitioner CANOY made an attempt to go to the NLRC and inquire from them the status of his complaint. To petitioner CANOYs dismay, he was told by the NLRC that the complaint filed by him, with the assistance of his counsel, has already been decided in the year 1998. It was only in the year 2000 that petitioner CANOY was informed of this 2 years after the filing of the complaint and 2 years after said complaint was decided. The NLRC stated that petitioner CANOYs lawyer was unable to submit a position paper which was required of by them because of respondents failure to submit said position paper to the NLRC, the complaint was deemed submitted for resolution. Hence, the complaint was denied. As a defense, respondent ORTIZ said that he was unable to submit the required position paper because he ran for the position of Councilor in the City of Bacolod. Petitioner CANOY now comes to the Supreme Court alleging in the main that respondent ORTIZ unwittingly failed to represent the formers cause. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent failed represent his clients cause. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent ORTIZ actuation cannot be countenanced. Respondent has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canons 17, 18 & 22 thereof. Further, the Supreme Court held that the relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended. Respondent-Attorney ORTIZ was suspended to practice the law profession for a period of (1) one month.

BOLIVAR VS. SIMBOL

Facts: -Bolivar and Simbol met while the latter was still in Law School and became a couple -Bolivar, being employed, supported Simbol in his studies -They lived as common-law husband and wife for over 5 years -Simbol promised to marry Bolivar but has been excusing himself and postponing the marriage for various reasons (i.e. the marriage license was expired; he needs to graduate first; the baby needs to be delivered first; upon graduation and securing employment as a lawyer, cases were piling up and he was busy at work; etc.) -Bolivar delivered their baby on April of 1957 -On November later that year, the couple went their separate ways after Bolivar confirmed her suspicion that her common-law husband has been legally married to one Lydia Lingat, a churchmate of Simbol in Iglesia Ni Kristo on January of 1957 -Bolivar filed this disbarment case against Simbol on moral grounds -Both later on settled the matter extrajudicially and as a result, Bolivar withdrew her complaint -Upon review of the case, the OSG found the original complaint sufficient of attention and suggested to this court calling for Simbols suspension from the practice of law for 5 years -Notices were sent to Simbol in his Manila and Dumaguete addresses, and also to his legal counsel but Simbol did not heed the call and his legal counsels backed out on the reason that this case was already settled extrajudicially and they lost contact with Simbol since then ISSUE -WON the original complaint is sufficient to grant punishment of disbarment to respondent Simbol HELD Yes. -The case is a disbarment case and the court ruled that even though the complainant withdrew her complaint, the case will have to proceed since and affirmed that any person may bring to this Court's attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant". The power to discipline lawyers officers of court may not be cut short by a compound of compromise and withdrawal of charges.

The court ruled thus that respondent "has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar".9 He is, indeed, guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" within the meaning of Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court. With this, the proposal of the OSG in suspending respondent is upheld and Simbol was suspended from the practice of law for 5 years.

OCCENA VS. MARQUEZ

Facts: Petitioners Atty. Jesus Occena and Atty. Samuel Occena have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against intervenor Atty. I. V. Binamira charging the latter of having made false averments in this Court. Intervenor Atty. I. V. Binamira allegedly made a deliberate false allegations before the Court which tend to impede or obstruct the administration of justice

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violaetd the lawyers oath.

Ruling:
We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring by dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to do so might work to the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his oath.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, is hereby declared guilty of contemp