ART.

VI Sec 24
TOLENTINO vs. SEC OF FINANCE 1994

After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two houses. Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. (4) WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject-one bill rule. NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were already included. PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided for the removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL and that it was only made after the meeting of the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of RA 7166 Held: No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also in the power of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public utility when the common good so requires. One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not know of their situation not because of any defect in title but because they might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its existence. (5) Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and Religious Freedom whether the registration provision of the law, 37 although of general applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its essential freedom. NO. the fee in 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. (6) Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Impairment of Contracts Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress. These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. 47 Such is not the case of PAL.

ALVAREZ vs GUINGONA 1996 -In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR. -In May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate. -In January 1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. -In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. -Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720). ISSUES: 1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said st nd rd SB while the HB was on its 1 , 2 and 3 reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well). The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipationof its receipt of the bill from the House, does notcontravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not actthereupon until it receives the House bill. 2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs income. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes) Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House Bill Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2 the Bill on the same day
nd

and 3 reading of

rd

Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law. ISSUES (1) WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in accordance with sec 24, art 6 of Consti YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the House of Rep, but the revenue bill which was required to originate from the House of Rep. The inititiative must come from the Lower House because they are elected in the district level meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to the needs of the locality. Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in the Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower House proposed. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the House bill. The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. (2) WoN the Senate bill violated the three readings on separate days requirement of the Consti NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential certification dispensed the requirement not only of printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the Senate accepted the Pres. Certification It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual condition in this country. (3) Power of the Bicameral Conference Committee it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.

ART. VI Sec 25

GARCIA vs. MATA 1975 Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments. Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is in violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57). Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain a rider in an appropriation bill? Held: INVALID RIDER. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. it was A NON-APPROPRIATION

ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect. SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

on the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose HELD: even assuming arguendo that "provision" is beyond the executive power to veto, it is not "provision" in the budgetary sense of the term, they are "inappropriate provision" that should be treated as "item" for the purpose of the President's veto power. The vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation. Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general appropriation bill with - VETO-PROOF "LOGROLLING MEASURES", special interest provisions which could not succeed if separately enacted, or - "RIDERS", substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto In order to obviate any misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso therein requiring that "any payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC's .- VALID In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds. all income earned by all Government offices and agencies shall accrue to the General Fund of the Government in line with the One Fund Policy enunciated by Section 29 (1), Article VI and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution. There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the "one-fund policy" Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.- INVALID While Congress expressly laid down the condition that only 30% of the total appropriation for road maintenance should be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a comprehensive study, believed that contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of 70% would be more efficient, economical and practical.

The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance.

Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP. -INVALID The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an "appropriate" provision. it is a mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an existing law, the Generics Act of 1988. Presidents belief that it is more prudent to provide for a transition period cannot justify his veto of the provision. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment -VALID a congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of legislative control in the implementation of particular executive actions. The form may be either negative, that is requiring disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the executive action. A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of separation of powers. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto Other ground: Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds -VALID President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law. Veto of Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's -VALID Congress has required the deactivation of the CAFGU's when it appropriated the money for payment of the separation pay of the members of thereof.The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval. The Solicitor General contends that it is the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who should determine when the services of the CAFGU's are no longer needed IMPOUNDMENT refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to implement the project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.

DEMETRIA vs ALBA 1987

first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977) infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

PHILCONSA vs. ENRIQUEZ 1994

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling-VALID President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt service in said Article for the reason that the GAA is not the appropriate legislative measure to amend the provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No. 1177 and E.O. No. 292. Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to these laws. Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision

Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the President's role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners herein. We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR -VALID Special Provisions Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law.

Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act. NO We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally. the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. purpose of requirement that subject be expressed in title (Cooley): (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. PRADO 1993

Facts: Section 35 of RA 7354 An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, withdrawing the franking privilege (privilege of sending mail without payment of postage) from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. ISSUE :WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the followinggrounds:

TIO vs VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD 1987 PD No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government. Issue: Is Sec 10 of PD No 1987 a RIDER? Held: NO. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Taxation is sufficiently related to the regulation of the video industry. The provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonable necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry as expressed in its title. The Supreme Court thus provided the following standards whether or not a provision is embraced in the title: (1) Title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. (2) If all parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter expressed in the title. (3) So long as they are not inconsistent or foreign to the general subject to the title. (4) Regardless of how diverse it is so long as it maybe considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object. (5) Should not be construed as to cripple legislative power. (6) Given PRACTICAL rather that a technical construction.

(1)WON its *title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes? NO. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all theprovisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the case at bar, the repealing clause which includes the withdrawal of franking privileges is merely the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. (2) WON it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage? The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution NO. While a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It may propose an entirely new provision.

ART. VI Sec 26
PHILCONSA v. GIMENEZ 1965 RA 3836 allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned. Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution - ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office. whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution Yes. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members. - includes in the term compensation other emoluments. Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional. Equal protection Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic Act 3836 are patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

(3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary. YES. the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. TOLENTINO vs. SEC OF FINANCE 1994 REFER TO PAGE

TOBIAS vs. ABALOS 1994 Republic Act No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. "one subject-one bill" the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of valueadded tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: xxx The case is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. Secretary of Finance As Agent Of Legislature; Presidents Power Of Control Not Applicable In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

TAN vs DEL ROSARIO 1994 RA7496 (Simplified Net Income Taxation) Article VI, Section 26(1) one title one subject Article VI, Section 28(1) uniform and equitableand progressive system of taxation. Petitioners contend that public respondents exceeded their rulemaking authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" when the full text of the title actually reads, 'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process. The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one who practice his profession and not to those who are engaged to single proprietorship. One subject-one bill The allowance for deductible items, it is true, may have significantly been reduced by the questioned law in comparison with that which has prevailed prior to the amendment; limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross income is neither discordant with, nor opposed to, the net income tax concept. The fact of the matter is still that various deductions, which are by no means inconsequential, continue to be well provided under the new law. objectives of Article VI, Section 26(1), appear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate. Equal Protection It is neither violative of equal protection clause due to the existence of substantial difference between one who practice his profession alone and one who is engaged to proprietorship. Uniformity of taxation uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of equal protection, merely require that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated alike both privileges and liabilities. Uniformity, does not offend classification as long as it rest on substantial distinctions, it is germane to the purpose of the law. It is not limited to existing only and must apply equally to all members of the same class.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. ERMITA 2005

ART. VI Sec 27
>>>the vat reform law (RA 9337) is entirely constitutional Courts generally denied the power to inquire into congress failure to comply with its own rules Even the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of Congress. BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE (BCC) All the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to subjects of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. No Amendement Rule Not Violated By Bcc There is no reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . . Extent of No Amendment Rule The No-Amendment Rule must be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. Bills Which Must Exclusively Originate In The House Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value-added tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House? YES. In the Tolentino case. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. No Delegation of Legislative Power To The President In This Case That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of GONZALES v. MACARAIG, JR. 1990

December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the president. December 29, 1988 President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a general provision. February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution decided to contest the constitutionality of the veto of the president of SEC 55 and SEC 16 (Gab for FY 1990 or RA 6831) Veto Message: -SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in the GAB thereby violation CONSTI ART VI SEC 25 (5) -SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and the reason for veto remains the same with the additional legal basis of violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as amended by RA 6670 that authorizes the president and the heads of depts. To use saving to augment any item of appropriations in the exec branch of government. ISSUE:Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an Appropriations Bill. HELD: The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the mandate of the line-veto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.)

The provisions are inappropriate because They do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations Disapproved or reduces items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress SHOULD resort to their constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1)

represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law. Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary The attempt to use the veto power to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary.The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. fiscal autonomy contemplates a guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. QUEZON CITY 2004

Lung Center is a non-stock and non-profit. It owned a lot erected therein is a hospital. The space at the ground floor of hospital is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces and to medical or professional practitioners who use their clinics for their patients. A big portion of the said lot is being occupied by a private enterprise known as Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. Petitioner accepts both paying and non-paying patients. It also receives annual subsidies from the government. claiming that it is a charitable institution. It contended that 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the hospitals operation is for charity patients. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Lung Center is a charitable institution YES.To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its constitution and bylaws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of the properties. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption for taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the hospitals, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. 2. Whether or not the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes. Partly: Real Property That Are Leased To Private Entities Are Not Exempt From Real Property Taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or nonpaying, are exempt from real property taxes.

BENGZON vs. DRILON 1992

Facts: R.A. No. 1797 authorizes monthly pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals. R.A. No. 1797 was repealed by President Marcos. The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A. to restore said retirement pensions and privilege. President Aquino, however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY 1992) because We should not permit the grant of distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement pensions under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil servants."The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. Issue: whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act NO. What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. ITEM in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the Government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded by the specific items for the different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government. The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due. the augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved. Pocket Veto Power Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill

ART. VI Sec 28
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS, INC. VS. TAN 1988

Executive Order No. 273 amended certain sections of the NIRC and adopted the VAT. EO 273 merely increased the VAT on every sale to 10%, unless zerorated or exempt. Issue: Whether or not EO 273 is constitutional Held: YES petitioners claim that EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive are not supported by facts and circumstances to warrant their conclusions. Petitioners merely rely upon newspaper articles which are actually hearsay and have evidentiary value. As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. A tax is considered UNIFORM when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found." The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%. The disputed sales tax is also EQUITABLE. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engage in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.

PROVINCE OF ABRA vs. HERNANDO 1981

The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions differ in language as to the exemption of religious property from taxes. The present Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of ":lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually and "directly" used for religious or charitable purposes. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed were the words "actually" as well as "directly" not added.

Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of the Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is compliance with the provision that allows an exemption. There was an allegation of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action, which should have compelled the judge to accord a hearing to the province rather than deciding the case immediately in favor of the Bishop. Exemption from taxation is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. There must be proof of the actual and direct use of the land, buildings, and improvements for religious (or charitable) purposes to be exempted from taxation. The case was remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.

HELD: NO. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money." the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals." "The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. * * * ." The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. The fact the DECS appropriation is the highest budgetary appropriati on amongall department budgets is a clear and sufficient compliance with the constitutionalmandate according highest priority to education The Constitution mandates the assignment of highest budgetary priority to educationin order to insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the bestavailable talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfactionand fulfillment Whether or not subject laws has been impliedly repealed by the 1987 Constitution NO. The legislative intention is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay loans when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The requirement of Sections 24 and 27, which requires appropriations and bills tooriginate from the House of Representatives and be approved by the President, applies only to bills that are still to be passed by Congress W/N they are unconstitutional by violating Sections 24 and 29(1), Article 6 of the Constitution NO. Section 29(1), Article 6 merely states that appropriation should be made by law It does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals inwhich authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be done by law In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed whether in the past or in the present.

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE vs AQUINO 1988

Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning. the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential purposes; the ground floor was used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes. HELD: 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the director).

AGLIPAY vs RUIZ 1937 issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of stamps constitutional. YES. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people

ART. VI Sec 29
PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS 1960 In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig. ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

GUINGONA vs. CARAGUE 1991 The 1990 budget: total P233.5 Billion; with P86.8 Billion for debt service and while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27 Billion The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, by P.D. No. 1177, and by P.D. No. 1967 issued by Marcos. ISSUES Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary

OSMEA vs. ORBOS 1993

1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil. Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.

Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance. The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created." ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the creation of Trust Fund in the books of account of the Ministry of Energy is contrary to Section 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution? No. The OPSF is a special fund plain from the special treatment given to it by E.O. 137. The funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as trust liability account, the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a special fund. Indeed, the practice is not without precedent. while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. 2. Whether or not Section 8 Paragraph 1of P.D. 1956 as amended by E.O. 137 is unconstitutional for being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to the Energy Regulatory Board. RULING: No. With regards to the alleged delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fun

legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress. The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of Congress. The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project. pork barrel system, particularly the procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or activities, described as imaginative as it is innovative. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses - VALID Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated. Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Highest Priority for Debt Service - VALID Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), where this Court held that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution (highest budgetary priority to education), is merely directory.

Petitioners argues that the Members of Congress do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually funded by PDAF. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. The DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the 33 Executive." This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget. As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils propagated by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep constitutional limits and arbitrarily annul acts of Congress. Again, all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality."

ART. VI Sec 30
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS vs. CA 1994 The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 provided that appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments(BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987), the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, CircularNo. 1-91 which confirmed the jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from the decisions of the BOI. SCs Second Division, relying on saidCircular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case. Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the Second Divisions ruling which provided: They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).

PHILCONSA vs. ENRIQUEZ 1994 House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 Countrywide Development Fund - CONSTITUTIONAL The GAB authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets (Countrywide Development Fund). Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT 2012 assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).

Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from the Board of Investments? Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect February 2, 1987. Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and therefore never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was no sought in its enactment. Thus, the OmnibusInvestments Code of 1981 as amended still stands. The exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993 , requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC of 1991. On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum

Morong to legislate. Furthermore, petitioner adds, the specific conditionalities included in the questioned municipal resolution are beyond the powers of the Council to impose. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented there under. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. Constitution concurrently vested such prerogatives in the electorate by expressly recognizing their residual and sovereign authority to ordain legislation directly through the concepts and processes of initiative and of referendum. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: 'The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or rejectany act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body x x x'. An act includes a resolution. (Enrique T. Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on Elections) Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular sovereignty.

DIAZ V. CA 1994 On 2 February 1987, the New Constitution took effect (Sec. 30.) On 8 May 1987, the President promulgated E.O. No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to replace the Board of Energy transferring appellate review from CA to SC. Issue: whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution Held: Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains. If the appeal is brought to either Court (Supreme Court or Court of Appeals) by the wrong procedure, the only course of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal. There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, 12 November 1990).

ISSUE: 1.WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 YES. FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislativeassembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electorsbecome a law. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.These law-making powers belong to the people, hence therespondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or thecontent of legislation.

ART. VI Sec 32
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs.COMELEC 1996

RA. 7227(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports, airport, buildings, houses and otherinstallations left by the American navy. On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10 ,Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993 The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economic Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i .e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law." After the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong and the other municipalities concerned (Olongapo, Subic and Hermosa) gave their resolutions of concurrence, and by reason of which the SSEZ had been created, whose metes and bounds had already been delineated by Proclamation No. 532 issued on February 1, 1995 in accordance with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the power to withdraw such concurrence and/or to substitute therefor a conditional concurrence is no longer within the authority and competence of the Municipal Council of

STEPS IN MAKING A LAW 1. Filing/Calendaring for First Reading To initiate the law-making process, the proposed bill is signed by its author and filed with the Secretary of the either the Lower House (for congressmen) or the Senate (for senators). 2. First Reading The bill will go through three readings. On the First Reading, the number and title of the bill is read, followed by its referral to the appropriate committee for study. 3. Committee Hearings/Report Committee conducts hearings and consultation meetings. It then either approves the proposed bill without an amendment, approves it with changes, or recommends substitution or consolidation with similar bills filed. 4. Calendaring for Second Reading The Committee Report with its approved bill version is submitted to the Committee on Rules for calendaring for Second Reading. 5. Second Reading On the Second Reading, the bill is read in full along with amendments proposed by the committee who studied it. Bill author delivers sponsorship speech on the floor. The bill is then subjected to debates and discussion by the members of the House where it was filed. After extensive discussion, the bill will be voted on. If approved, it would go through a third reading. 6. Third Reading Printed copies of the bills final version are distributed to the members. This time, only the title of the bill is read on the floor. Nominal voting is held. If passed, the approved bill is referred to the other house for concurrence. The other House will go through the same process of having three readings. 7. Bicameral Conference Committee If a house-approved version is compatible with that of the other houses, the final versions enrolled form is printed. If there are certain differences, a Bicameral Conference Committee is called to reconcile conflicting provisions of both versions of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. Conference committee submits report on the reconciled version of the bill, whose recommendations will have to be

approved by both Houses. Followed by the printing of the reconciled version in its enrolled form. 8. Submission to Malacaang Once the bill is approved, it is transmitted to the President of the Philippines for signature. The President may then either sign the bill to indicate approval, or veto the bill to indicate disapproval. If approved, the bill officially becomes a law. 9. Veto If the President decides to exercise his veto powers, the Congress may re-pass the vetoed bill if two-thirds of both Houses, voting separately, approve its enactment. In this case, the bill also officially becomes a law.