Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology Author(s): Josephine L. Burroughs Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr.

, 1944), pp. 227-242 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707387 Accessed: 28/07/2010 21:39
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Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology' Translated by JosephineL. Burroughs (Bryn Mawr College) Book III, Chapter 2. degree of all things,and connectsall superiorand Soul is the intermediate degreesinto one by both ascendingto the superiorand descending inferior to theinferior. Finally, to cometo the point,we again collectall Being into fivedegrees, puttingGod and Angel in nature's highestplace, Body and Quality2in the lowest,and Soul rightin the middle betweenthese highestand lowest degrees. We rightlycall it, in Platonic fashion,the third or intermediate betweenthe othersand in everysense essence,since it is both intermediate third. In descendingfrom God, Soul is found in the third grade of the descent; and in ascendingfromBody it is also found in the thirdgrade of the ascent. In our opinion it is exceedinglynecessaryfor there to be an essence of this kind in nature, since Angel indeed, as the Platonists say, possesses true Being, that is, remains at all times unchanged; whereas that is, changesfromtimeto time. Clearly Quality is Quality is Becoming, fromAngel. While Quality changes,Angel remains completelydifferent unchanged; and while Quality comes into being fromtime to time,Angel exists at all times. There must thereforebe something intermediate (medium) which may agree partly with Angel, and partly with Quality. that has true Being, that is, What is this thing? Is it perhaps something unchanged for a time. No, for nothingof this kind remainsintrinsically can be discovered,since anythingwhich remains at any time intrinsically to unchanged,eitherbecause of its own nature,or because of its proximity or all The mean, so at times. intermediate the principle of rest,3remains that is always cominginto being,that is, that will be something therefore, is always changing. It agrees withAngel in that it always has Being, with Quality in that it is changing. From this it followsthat there must be a betweenthe other degrees,an essence which is third essence intermediate life into always changingand alive, and which,by its own motion,diffuses Body. The Platonistsrightlysay that above that whichexistsin a part of time,is that which exists throughall time; and above this in turn,is that above this,eternity itself. But which exists througheternity;and finallyr betweenthe thingswhich are eternal only, and those which are temporal only,thereis Soul, a kind of link, as it were, betweenthem. Indeed, the similarto the mostexcellentparts of the body of the universeare somewhat Soul in this respect. There are some who place the Empyrean,since it is
1 Text based on the editionof Paris, 1559 (a). This editionhas been at times collatedwiththe editionof Plato (Venice, 1491) (b). a. 2 qualitatemb, quantitatem 3 vel ex statu proximemanet a b.

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in in eternity;the remainingspheres,simultaneously whollyunchanging,4 eternity and in time; lastly,the compositebodies in time alone. Similarly in the first belongingto degree,the intellects also, theyplace pure intellects souls in the second,and lastly,souls belongingto bodies in the thirddegree. of But let us returnto our original problem. Every work constructed many elementsis most perfect when all its membersare closely bound in order and harmony so that it becomesone in all respects,firm together, withinitself,and not easily dissolved. Corporealnature showsthis clearly where earth and mixtureof the four elements, in the rightlyproportioned fire, far distantfromeach other,are joined throughair and water. To an of parts mustbe assumed in the unieven higherdegree,such a connection versal workof God,in orderthat the workof the one Deity may also be One. God and Body are extremesin nature, and absolutelyunlike each other. for surelyit is entirely directedtowards Angel does not bind themtogether, this most and supremeof and perfect Body. Appropriately God, neglects towards and inclines is made God. Further, creatures divine, God's entirely it declines the for toward Body, relinextremes, Quality does not connect quishing the highestthings. Abandoning incorporeal things,it becomes corporeal. and the higherand lowerthings Thus far all thesedegreesare extremes, flee from each other,lacking any bond to unite them. But if the third essence5 is placed betweenthem,then it is of such kind that it holds fast to higher things withoutforsakingthe lower, and thus binds togetherthe higherwith the lower. It is both unchangedand changing. Because it is withthe it agreeswiththe higherthings;because it is changing, unchanged, lower. If it agrees with both,it desires both. On this account it ascends and similarlyit descends to to higherthingsby a certain natural instinct, and in lower things. And in ascending it does not forsake the inferior, descendingit does not relinquishthe sublime. For if it relinquishedeither and would not trulybe the of the two,it would inclineto the otherextreme, bond of the world. the same functionas does the air betweenfireand Indeed, it performs and withwater in moistness. On water,for air agrees withfirein warmth, on the other, it is always moistlike the one hand, it is always warmlike fire, water. On the one hand, it becomesfineand brightlike fire,on the other, it becomesdull in appearance like water. Again, this thirdessencehas the as the lightof the sun. The lightdescendsfromthe sun into same function fire,and fillsfire,withoutleaving the sun. At all times it adheres to the theair, and is not infected sun, and at all timesit fillsfire. Again it perfects In the the same the third essence mnust of air. the fashion, by corruption 4 immobile a. b, mobile 5 essentia a. b, essentiali
6

hebescita b.

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and fillmortalthings. By adheringto divinethings adhereto divinethings, it comesto know them,for it is united spirituallywith them,and spiritual union causes knowledge. By fillingbodies and movingthemfromwithin, of divinethings, thethirdessenceis the mirror it animatesthem. Therefore betweenthe two. and the connection the life of mortalthings, But in what manneris Soul united withbodies? When for instanceit entersinto a body,does it touchthat body at one particularpoint,and is it thusthat it is said to be united withbody? By no means,forit would then be united with a point,not withthe whole body; nor would it animate the whole body, for only one point would then live, and the body as a whole if Soul were always concentrated at one point, would lack life. Moreover, which as Angel, be the same itself, it would unity with remained thus at and in to divine things would adhere from or at least it Body; is very different not Soul is the same manner as Angel, and relinquishBody. Therefore, joined withBody at one point only,but at many,and thus fillsthe parts of a body. Does it then filla body in the same way that whitenessfillswhiteflesh, ? Not in the least, and as in general any quality fillsits own propermatter for then it would be the same as Quality; and relinquishingdivine things, towardsBody. Whitenessis in the whole fleshin would incline completely such a way that it is extendedequally along with fleshand divided into its many parts; and in such a way that,accordingto the natural philosophers, a larger part in a larger,and a a part of whiteness existsin a part of flesh, becomescorporeal. Clearly the smallerpart in a smaller. Thus whiteness same would happen to that essence whichwe believe to be third,if it were poured into body in the same manneras Quality. And thus being dragged to theotherextreme of nature,it would cease to be thebond of the world. On that account,when Soul entersBody, it is presentas a wholeto each part of a body; nor does it need to be divided or dispersedintoparts in order to penetratethe parts of body which are distant fromeach other; for the thirdessencetouchesbody throughan indivisibleforce,not throughthe exentireand simple,it is present remaining tensionof its quantity. Therefore, to theindividualparts of bodyas an undividedwhole; just as an entireword and its meaningis somehow presentat the same timein the individual parts of a house, since as a whole it is heard and understoodin all parts almost simultaneously. Nor is it impossiblethat this essence,since it is something existingin itself,should be thus whollypresentin the mass of a indivisible, since it is indivisibleand not limitedto any great body. On the contrary, all that is in place, it is able as a wholeto penetrateand whollycomprehend it is found precludesthis kind of a place. Extensionof quantitywherever power and presence,so that anythingquantitativelyextended cannot be wholly present in many parts at the same time. Even a thing which, somehowjoined to corporealquanis nevertheless althoughit is indivisible,

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tity,such as a point located on a line as the limit of that line, cannot be all theparts of body. Thus a point wholly presentat thesame timethrough placed anywhere on theradius of a circleis neithercontainedin all the other the wholeradius or circle. But the point which radii,nor diffused through is the centerof the circledoes not belongto any particularradius; it is in a sense located on all the radii drawn from it to the circumference. And is equally relatedto the whole whereasno pointlocatedon the circumference circle,the centeris equally related to the whole circle, althoughit is not limitedto any particular circumference. Thereforeit is impossiblefor a thingwhichis divisibleto be whollypresentin many parts simultaneously; locathisis also impossible for a thingwhichis indivisiblebut has a definite tionin anotherdivisiblething. Hence that thirdessenceis not extended,for then it would be Quality; in extension, for if it did not subsist through nor is it placed somewhere itself,it would not be moved throughitselfand freely. Whence the third and entirely freefromall quantityand essenceis like a pointlivingin itself, location. Therefore soul penetrateseverypart of a body equally, and when it entersinto a body, is not bound to any point of the quantity of body, because it is not itselfa point belongingto a particular quantity. Indeed, since it falls outsidethe genus of quantity,it is not bound to touch any particular point of quantity,but is presentas the centeris in all radii and in the whole circle. Hence it also followsthatthis essenceis at once divisibleand indivisible. It is divisible,forit diffuses the shadow of its own life throughthe division of body,by communicating itselfto the diverseparts of body. It is indivisible, for it is simultaneously present as a whole and simple entity. It is divisible, I say,because its shadowis in the wholedivisiblebody; indivisible, because it is itselfwhollypresentin an indivisiblemannerin everypart of body. Again, it is indivisible, because it has a stable and unifiedsubstance; it is divisible,because it is divided into many parts throughits operation, in so far as it operatesthrough motionand time. It is indivisible, because it inclinestowardthe higherthingswhichare completely unified; divisible, because it declines toward the lower things which are divided into many parts. A nature of this kind appears exceedingly necessaryin the order of the world,so that afterGod and Angel, whichare divisibleneitheraccordingto timenor accordingto extension, and above Body and Quality,whichare dispersed in time and in extension,there is an appropriate mean, which is indeed divided in a certainmannerby the successionof its acts in time,yet not divided in its extension. Further,it neitherremains foreverconcentratedin its own naturelike the higherbeings,nor is it separated into parts like thelower; but is at the same timeindivisibleand divisible. This is that same essencewhichtheLocrian Timaeus,and Plato in his book on the world,

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say is compoundedof the indivisibleand the divisible.7 This is the nature withoutitselfbecomingmortal. For itselfin mortalthings, whichimmerses itselfas a itselfas a whole,not in parts,so it withdraws just as it immerses whole,not in dispersedparts. And because, while it rules bodies, it also adheres to that which is divine, it is the mistress of bodies, not their attendant. This is the greatestwonderin nature. All otherthingsunder God are of one certainkind of being; this essenceis at once all always in themselves of them. It possesses in itself images of the divine thingsupon which it depends. It also possesses the reasons and models of the inferiorthings whichit in a sense bringsforth. Since it is the mean of all things,it positself into all things. And sesses the powers of all; hence it transforms because it is itselfthe truebond of the universe,in passing into somethings but entersinto individual things,and at the it does not forsakethe others, same timepreservesall things. Thereforeit can with justice be called the centerof nature,the middle point of all that is, the chain of the world,the face of all, and the knotand bond of the universe. explained the nature of this third essence. I thinkwe have sufficiently is Moreover, that this essence itselfthe proper seat of the rational soul is of the rational soul as a life whichthinksin easily seen fromthe definition successiveacts, and animates the body in time (vita et intelligensdiscurtempore). This is just the conditionof the third rendoet corpusvivificans and giveslife to thebody. That it lives is apparforit lives,thinks, essence, bodies are alive which move by their ent,for we say that those terrestrial backwards,to up and down,forwards, own internalforcein all directions, the rightand to the left. This is theway plants and animals move. Therefore,whereverthereis internaland commonmotion,there is life. Life, I say, is a thing's internalpower of movingitself. Such a forcemust be in thehighestdegreepresentwherewe findthe sourceand originof all motion, motion. For motionis in the highestdegreeinternaland common and first motion. But first motionis said to residein thisthirdessence. whenit is first Therefore life is there,life I say of such a kind that by participatingin it bodies live and move; for life is by its very nature as close as possible to bodies. then,is the lifewhichanimatesbodies. It also thinks. This thirdessence, Clearly if motionis ever perfect,it is surely most perfectwhen it is first in posterior motions not derivedfromfirst motion;forthereis no perfection the motionin thethirdessenceis the mostperfectof all motion. Therefore motions. But this is the motionwhich departs fromits source as little as possible; which is most closely united to its foundation; which is in the unto itself; and whichimihighestdegreeone and equal; whichis sufficient to all that circular motionis like is tates the most perfectform. It plain
7 Plato, Timaeus 35 a.

Pseudo-TimaeusLocrus,De anima mundi95 e.

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this. Certainly it alone of all motions is perpetual. Clearly, all other motionsreach an end beyondwhichit is not possible to advance, for in no directionis space infinite. But circular motionreturnsto the same point once and likewisetwice,and threeand four times. In it the beginningand it is beginningagain. the end are thesame; just whenit seemsto be finished, perpetual circular motionbelongs to the third essence,so that Therefore, into itself. Since it thus throughmotionin a circle, it may be reflected moves out of itself, it also quite properly moves into itself,so that the determinateend of motion may be where its determinatebeginning is. Surely the cause of motionin a sense produces motionfor its own sake. fromitself, thisessence,beginning perpetuallyreturnsinto itself, Therefore the middleto the lowest, unfoldingits own powersfromthe highestthrough themfromthe lowestthrough the middleto the highest. and again resuming If this is the case, then it perceivesitself and what it possesseswithin it certainlyknows. But it knowsby "intellection" itself. If it perceives, or pure thoughtin so far as it recognizesits own essence as spiritual and free fromany material limits; for the knowledgeof such objects is indeed that knowledgeis nothing called intellectio. In ourselveswe see perfectly else than a spiritualunion with some spiritual form. Vision, being joined throughits own spiritusto the spiritual images of colors,sees them. Yet as is shownwhenwe place a solid whenit is joined to matterit sees nothing, mind also knows things in themselves body directlyupon the eye. Our its own spiritualforce,it is united to the incorporealspecies when,through and principlesof things. Similarly,when the third essence (which is certainly spiritual) is joined to itself,turningattentiontoward itself,then it recognizesand knows itself in a spiritual manner. It likewiseknows the divine thingsto whichit adheres most closelyin a spiritual fashion. And it also knowsthe corporealthingstowardswhichit declinesby nature. I say it "thinks" in a temporalsuccessionof acts, since in its operationit is subof ject to change (mobile). From all this results the followingdefinition thethirdessence: it is "life" whichby its natureanimatesbodies,and which discursivethought. also knowsitself,and divine and natural thingsthrough is also that of the rational soul, Whoever does not see that this definition the rational soul has its seat in the third lacks a rational soul. Therefore, essence,holds the middleregionof nature,and connectsall thingsinto one. Book XlII, Chapter 3. taken fromthe activitiesof the arts and of The thirdsign of immortality, government. All otheranimals live eitherwithoutart, or each with one single art to the use of whichtheyare not directedby theirown will, but to whichthey are drawn by a law of fate. This is shownby the fact that they make no

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progressin timewithrespectto the skill applied in the productionof their arts and of innumerable works. On the otherhand, men are the inventors practice themaccordingto their own free will. This is evident fromthe fact that individualmen practicemanyarts,changethemand over a period of timebecomemoreskillfulin theiruse of them. whathuman arts produce by themselves And what is quite wonderful, ever nature itselfproduces,as if we were not the slaves, but the rivals of nature. Thus, Zeuxis painted grapes in such mannerthat the birds flewto them. Apelles painted a steedand a she-dogin such mannerthat in passing by horseswould neigh and dogs bark. Praxiteles shaped a marble Venus for an Indian temple8whichwas so beautifulthat it could hardly be kept safe and undefiledfrom the lascivious ones who passed by. Archytasof skill,poised it in the Tarentummade a woodenpigeonwithhis mathematical air, filledit with breath and thus made it fly. As Hermes Trismegistus the Egyptiansmade statuesof the gods whichwere able to talk and reports, of Syracuse made a heaven of brass in whichall the to walk. Archimedes as in the heavens, of the seven planets could be trulyperformed movements and the wholethingmovedlike the heavens.-Not to mentionthe pyramids of the Egyptians, the buildings of the Greeks and Romans, the workshops wheremetalworkand glass are made. corThus man imitatesall the worksof the divine nature,and perfects, the power of rects and improvesthe worksof the lower nature. Therefore man is almostsimilarto that of the divine nature,for man acts in this way without himself. Throughhis own wit and art he governshimself, through beingbound by any limitsof corporealnature; and he imitatesall the works of the highernature. Much less than the animals does he need the support for his of the lowernature,since he has receivedfromnature less protection he produces body than have the animals. Throughhis own resourcefulness and weapons. Althoughhe supinstruments, bedding,shelter, food,clothes, by his own power,he supportshimselfmoreabundantlythan portshimself nature supportsthe animals. varietyof pleasures whichdelightthe five Hence arises the inexhaustible senses of this body and which we procure for ourselvesthroughour own genius.9 The animals are kept in the most narrow limitsof nature. Our of the body,as do the animals which minddoes not aim onlyat the necessity aims at manifolddelightsof the It also are subjectedto the rule of nature. senses,as at somefoodforour imagination. Our minddoes not only flatter whenit soothesimagination variousblandishments, through our imagination also, the thinking gamesin a kind of play; but sometimes, daily by different and eager to bringforthits products,leaps forth reasonacts moreseriously, and visiblyshows the power of its genius in the manifoldtexturesof wool 8 Indorum a b. 9ingenio a b.

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and silk and in pictures,sculptures,and buildings. In producing these things, our mindoftendoes not take into consideration any physicalcomfort or pleasure of the senses, for sometimesit even endures discomfort and troublefromthemof its own free will. It ratheraims at an amplification of its eloquenceand at a proofof its power. In theseworksof art we may noticehow man handles all materialsof the world and in all manners,as if they were all subjected to him. I say, he handles elements, stones,metals,plants and animals, and transforms them into many forms and figures,an achievementof which the animals are incapable. Nor is he contentwith one elementor withsome of themas are the animals,but he uses themall as if he were the lord of all. He treads on the earth,sails on the water, ascends into the air by means of very high not to mention the wingsof Daedalus or Icarus. He lightsthe fire, towers, uses the flameconfidently on the hearth,and is the onlybeingthat enjoys it. the celestialcreaturealone enjoys the celestial element. Quite appropriately With celestialpowerhe ascends into the heaven and measuresit. With his supercelestialmind he transcendsheaven. Man not only makes use of the elements, but also adorns them,a thingwhich no animal ever does. How is the cultivation of the soil all over the earth,how marvelousthe wonderful construction of buildings and cities,how skillfulthe controlof the waterways! Man is really the vicar of God, since he inhabitsand cultivatesall elementsand is presenton earthwithout being absentfromthe ether. He uses not onlythe elements, but also all the animals whichbelongto the elements, the animals of the earth,of the water,and of the air, for food,convenience, and pleasure,and thehigher, celestialbeingsforknowledgeand the miracles of magic. Not only does he make use of the animals, he also rules them. It is true,withthe weaponsreceivedfromnaturesomeanimals may at times attack man or escape his control. But with the weapons he has invented himself man avoids theattacksof wild animals,puts themto flight and tames them. Who has ever seen any humanbeingskept under the controlof animals, in such a way as we see everywhere herds of both wild and domestitheirlives? Man not only rules the cated animals obeyingmen throughout animalsby force, he also governs, keeps and teachesthem. Universalprovidencebelongsto God, who is the universalcause. Hence man who provides is a kind of god. Certainly bothlivingand lifeless, generallyforall things, he is thegod of the animals,forhe makesuse of themall, rules themall, and instructsmany of them. It is also obvious that he is the god of the elements,for he inhabitsand cultivatesall of them. Finally, he is the god of all materialsfor he handles,changes and shapes all of them. He who governs the bodyin so many and so important ways,and is the vicar of the immortalGod, he is no doubt immortal. But these arts, althoughthey shape the material of the world,rule the to those animals and thus imitateGod the artisan of nature,are yet inferior

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thedivinerule,take care of humangovernment. Indiimitating arts which, vidual animals are hardly capable of taking care of themselvesor their that he first rules himself, young. Man alone abounds in such a perfection rules the family,administers something that no animals do, and thereafter the state,governsnationsand rules the wholeworld. As if he were born to rule, he is unable to endure any kind of slavery. Moreover,he undergoes death for the commonweal, a thing which no animal does. For man dein the firmness of the common being confident spises thesemortalblessings, and eternalgood. Some may thinkthat these arts pertain to the presentlife, and that so much care is not necessaryfor the presentlife,but should be devotedto the imitationof the divine providence. Let us thereforeconsider those arts which are not only unnecessaryfor bodily life,but are mostharmfulto it, such as all theliberal arts,the studyof whichweakensthe body and impedes the curiousdrawingof of numbers, the comfort of life: the subtlereckoning consonanceof of lines and the awe-inspiring figures, the obscuremovements of the stars,the inquiryinto natural observation music,the long-continued of thingslong past,10 the eloquence of oratorsand causes, the investigation the madnessof poets. In all thesearts the mind of man despisesthe service of the body,since the mind is able at timesand can even now begin to live withoutthehelp of the body. One point above all should be noted,that not everyman can understand how and in what mannerthe skillfulworkof a cleverartisan is constructed, but only he who possesses a like artistic genius. Certainly no one could his brazen spheresand gave them understandhow Archimedes constructed unless he were endowed with a similar motionslike the heavenlymotions, genius." He who can understand it because he has a like genius could doubtless,as soon as he has understoodit, also constructanother,provided he did notlack thepropermaterial. Now, since man has observedthe order of the heavens,when theymove,whithertheyproceed and with what measures,and what theyproduce,who could deny that man possessesas it were almostthesame geniusas theAuthorof the heavens? And who could deny that man could somehowalso make the heavens, could he only obtain the and the heavenly material, since even now he makes them, instruments but still witha verysimilarorder? material, thoughof a different

Book XIV, Chapter3.

to becomeeverything. Sixth sign,because the soul attempts We have shownthat our soul in all its acts is tryingwith all its power to attainthefirst giftof God, thatis, the possessionof all truthand all goodness. Does it also seek His second attribute? Does not the soul try to '0 Diuturnorum a b. investigatio "ingenio a b.

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way; becomeeverything just as God is everything? It does in a wonderful for the soul lives the life of a plant when it serves the body in feedingit; the senses; the life of a man, when it the life of an animal,when it flatters deliberatesthrough reason on human affairs;the life of the heroes,when it investigates natural things; the life of the daemons,when it speculates on mathematics;the life of the angels, when it enquires into the divine mysforGod's sake. Every man's teries; thelifeof God,whenit does everything soul experiencesall these things in itself in some way, although different ways, and thus the human species strivesto become souls do it in different all thingsby livingthelives of all things. This is what HermesTrismegistus was admiringwhenhe said: Man is a greatmiracle,a livingcreatureworthy of reverenceand adoration,for he knowsthe genus of the daemonsas if he himself into God as if he were by nature relatedto them, and he transforms wereGod himself. Moreover, all thingsthatexist,in so far as theyexist,are true; and in so far as theypossess someforce,orderand purpose,theyare good. We have alreadyshownthatthesoul seeksall trueand all good things. Hence it seeks all things. What else does the soul seek except to know all thingsthrough the intellectand to enjoy themall throughthe will? In both ways it tries to becomeall things. One of the senses,forinstance,sight,cannotperceive colorsunless it assumesthe formsof those colors,and unless a single thing is producedfromthepowerof seeingand the actualizingof the visibleform, just as a singlethingis producedfromair and light. In the same way, the unless it is clothedwith the forms intellectdoes not knowthingsthemselves of the thingsto be known,and unless a single thingresultsfromthe power of thinking and the actualizing of the intelligibleform,and theirunion is belongs accompaniedby a singleaction. For a single operationof thinking who would deny that a single thingresultsfrom to themboth. Moreover, corporeal matter and the form given it, since one actualization and one ? Much more,accordingto the Platonists motionarise fromthat composite and Averroes, musta singlethingresultfromthe powerof the intellectand arises theformof thethingto be known. For oftena morestable composite from them,since they often remain togetherfor a longer time than do corporealmatterand its form. Moreover,the intellectitself is a kind of form,I mean a formwhich,like matter,longs for a furtherform. Hence it agreesmorewiththeformto be receivedthan corporealmatteragrees with its own form. For all formsdescendinto the mattersof the world froma highermind. Thereforethey agree much more with our mind than with matter. it also receivesand Finally, sincethemindis moreexcellentthanmatter, than does matter. We unitesto itselfthedesiredformmuchmoreeffectively mustnot believethat the mind is less able to unite to itselfwhat it takes in the mostdiversefoods,the soul than is the body. For the body transforms

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into itself what it receivesor digestingthem. The mind also transforms conceives,and much more so. For corporealextensionpreventsa mutual union in bodies,whereasspiritual thingsare much more adapted to union. Hence, accordingto Plotinus, the ideas (rationes) of things intellectually knownpass intothe substanceof the intellectmuchmorethan do foodsinto thesubstanceof thebody. Thus it is obviousthat a singlethingresultsfromour mind and the form else in of the thingto be known. Whateverassumesthe formof something almost form, such a way that it makes a single thingout of itselfand that becomestheverythingwhoseformit assumes. Who does not knowthat the or fiery ? Hence becomesfire, matterof air,whenit receivestheformof fire, I say, actually almostbecomeswhatit is thinking. The intellect, theintellect and in a sensein a still implicitbut more forpotentially, becomesthatthing, developed state (habitu) the intellect really was that thing even before a circle at it, as Plotinus held. Certainlythe intellectis thinking thinking thetimewhenit has itselfactuallybecome,as it were,the idea (ratio) of the circle. In fact, to be actualized in this way is to think. The intellectwas withrespectto the first potentially, that same idea of the circleeven before, in its moredevelopedstate and secondly, substantialidea of the circleitself, (secundum habitum), with respect to the formula we have of the idea. the truthof particular thingsconsistsin the firmidea of them. Moreover, Hence the mind becomeseach true thingwhen it thinksthingsthemselves, turningtoward their perpetual ideas (rationes). But of this elsewhere. For the presentit is enoughto understandthat,since the intellectseeks to clothedwith it is completely and sincein the act of thinking thinkall things, it followsthat it seeks to become all things. Hence in trying theirforms, to become all thingsthe intellecttries to become God, in whom all things exist. So muchof theintellect. Our will has the same desire,for it ever desiresto enjoy all good things. it unitesitselfto what it enjoys. Yet thereis a differWhen it enjoysthings, theintellect all that and will. Both becomeall things, encebetweenintellect with is united the But intellect are true, and the will all that are good. transby theminto itself; the will, on the contrary, thingsby transforming itselfinto the things. In what way? Our intellectknows things forming in its own mannerratherthan accordingto the nature of the things. The in matter, divided,confused, whichare particular,immersed corporealforms taintedand subject to change,the intellectthinksin a mannerwhichis unipure,and stable. God and the angels who versal,absolute,simple,distinct, in a changingand multiple are stable and simple,the intellectcomprehends act of thought. Thus our intellectgrasps in its own mannerthe thingsthat all things exist both above and below itself. Hence it is said to transform that the into its own nature. Thus Plato's saying seems to be confirmed, since it thinksin the mannerof its own mind thinksthroughinnate forms,

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nature. However,thewill does not remainwithinitselfas does theintellect, moves soul and body to action in order that theymay but on the contrary the will does not desirethe things approach the desiredobjects. Moreover, in the soul, but ratheras theyexist in themselves. To as theyare inherent speciesof gold whenit thinksgold,theuniversaland incorporeal theintellect is sufficient.To the will this species is not sufficient.Since the will is concerned with human life, it wants this particular and corporeal gold as it existsin itself. To conclude,our soul by means of the intellectand will as by thosetwin Platonic wings fliestoward God, since by means of themit fliestoward all things. By means of the intellectit attachesall thingsto itself; by means of the will,it attachesitselfto all things. Thus the soul desires,endeavors, everyday. Every movement and beginsto becomeGod, and makesprogress directedtoward a definiteend firstbegins, then proceeds,then gradually increases and makes progress, and is finallyperfected. It is increased throughthe same power throughwhich it was begun; it makes progress it is throughthe same power throughwhich it was increased; and finally, throughthe same power throughwhichit made progress. Hence perfected our soul will some timebe able to becomein a sense all things; and even to becomea god. Chapter 4. Seventh and eighthsigns, because the soul attemptsto make all things. all thingsand also to overcome of God: the third,that He is the authorof There followotherattributes that He is above all things. These our soul likewise all things; the fourth, attemptsto reach. Elsewhere we have describedhow the soul throughits various arts imitatesall the worksof God, and thus makes all things,after the model of God. We have also said that man strivesto rule over himself menas well as animals; and thathe is unable to bear and all othercreatures, any kind of slavery. Even if he is forcedto serve,he hates his lord, since he striveswithall his strength he servesagainst his nature. In everything to overcome others; and he is ashamed to be defeatedeven in small matters and the most trifling games,as if this were against the natural dignityof sense of shame and reverenceis proper to the human the In man. general, in to be respectedwhich it is a crime to us something race, and denotes of violate,and whichis mostworthy reverence. About this elsewhere. we can easily recognizethe immeasurable As for our desire for victory, splendorof our soul fromthe fact that even dominionover this world will not satisfyit, if afterhaving subdued this world,it learns that thereis still anotherwhichit has not yet subdued. Thus when Alexander heard Anaxarchus the followerof Democritus asserting that there are innumerable worlds,he exclaimed: How miserableam I who have not yet subdued even one world. Thus man wants neithersuperior,nor equal, and he does not

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suffer that anythingbe excluded fromhis rule. This conditionbelongs to God only. Hence man desires the conditionof God. This can be easily inferredfrom the fact that many philosophersand princes have sought divine honorsfor themselves. It did not satisfythemto be consideredas good men unless theywere consideredalso as divine. They even wanted to be worshipedlike gods. Innumerablemen have made the attempt;in parEmpedoeles,among the princesAlexander ticular,among the philosophers of Macedonia, are said to have had this desire. But all men have the same desire,and would make the attemptif theycould but hope to succeed,as if theycould as a natural rightclaim divinityfor themselves.

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Pietro Pomponazzi,Or theImmortality of the Soul' Translatedby William Henry Hay II (Washington,D. C.) ChapterOne, in whichit is shownthat man is of a twofoldnature,halfway betweenmortaland immortal things. Now, I hold that the beginning of our considerationshould be made here: man is plainly not of simple but of multiple,not of certain but of ambiguousnature,he is to be placed halfwaybetweenmortaland immortal things. This is plain to see if we examine his essential operations; for essencesare always made knownby essentialoperations. For in performing the operationsof the vegetativeand the sensitivesoul, which,as is said in the secondbook of De anima and in the thirdchapterof the second book of De generationeanimalium,cannot be performedwithouta corporeal and man assumes mortality. However, in knowingand perishableinstrument, willing,operationswhich throughout the whole book of De anima and in book of De partibus animaliumand in the third the first chapterof the first chapter of the second book of De generationeanimatium,are held to be performed a corporealinstrument, without since theyprove separabilityand and these prove immortality, man is to be numberedamong immateriality, the immortal things. From whichthe whole conclusioncan be drawn,that man is plainly not of a single nature, since he includes three souls, as it the sensitive,and the intellective;and that he claims were,the vegetative, a twofoldnature for himself,since he exists neitherunqualifiedlymortal nor unqualifiedlyimmortal,but embraces both natures. Therefore the ancientsspokewell whentheyestablishedhim betweeneternaland temporal forthe reason thathe is neitherpurely eternalnor purely temporal, things, since he partakes of both natures; and to him whose place is thus in the middle,power is given to assume whichever nature he wishes. Therefore, there are three kinds of men to be found. Some are numberedwith the Gods,althoughtheseare but few; and theseare thosewho,havingsubjugated the vegetativeand the sensitive,have become almost completelyrational. Some,fromcomplete neglectof the intellectand fromoccupyingthemselves withthevegetative and sensitive alone, have changed,as it were,intobeasts. And perhaps this is what the Pythagoreanfable means when it says that men's souls pass into different beasts. Some are called normal men: and these are those who have lived tolerablyaccording to the moral virtues; devotethemselves to the intellect, theydo not,however, entirely nor entirely to the corporealfaculties. Each of thesetwo latter sortshas a wide range, as is plain to see. With this agrees what is said in the Psalm: "Thou hast made himbut a littlelowerthan the angels," etc.
1 Reprinted, with the translator's permission, from Petrus Pomponatius, De Immortalitate Tr'actatus Animae, translatedby William Henry Hay II (Haverford,1938), pp. 1-2 and 57.

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Chapter Fourteen. thisopinionwe mustknowthat,as Aristotleteachesin thebooks To complete animalium,nature proceedsstep by step, and in an orderly De generatione with an extreme, fashion,so that it does not join an extremeimmediately but an extremewith a mean. For we see that between grasses and trees shrubsexist as a mean,betweenplants and animals are immovableanimate things,like oystersand other things of that sort; and so on ascending further. The blessed Dionysius supports this in the seventh chapter of when he says that the divine wisdomjoins the ends De divinis nominibus, to the beginningsof lower things. But man, as has been of highertlhings since the human soul obtains said, is the mostperfectof animals; therefore, first place among materialthings,it will be joined with immaterialthings, things. But a mean comand is halfwaybetweenmaterialand immaterial compared is called the otherof the extremes;therefore pared to the extremes to immaterialthings the soul can be called material, and in respect to material things,immaterial. Nor does it deserve the names only, it also participatesin the propertiesof the extremes:for green comparedto white is not only called black, it also gathers sight like black, although not so the human soul also has some of the propertiesof the intensely. Therefore intelligencesand some of the propertiesof all material things. Hence it whichit agrees withthe intellithrough functions is that,whenit performs gences,it is said to be divine and to be changed into Gods; but when it functiollsof the beasts,it is said to be changed into a beast; for performs by reason of its malice it is called a serpentor a fox,by reason of its cruelty a tiger,and so on. For there is nothingin the world that by reason of not undeservedly some propertycannot agree withman himself;wherefore or the little world. Thereforesome have said is man called the microcosm into that man is a great marvel,since he is the wholeworld and convertible everynature,since powerhas been given him to assume whateverproperty the ancientswere telling wise mythswhen they he may prefer. Therefore said that some men had been made Gods, some lions, some wolves, some someplants,somerocks,and so on; since some men have eagles,somefishes, followedtheintellect, somethe senses,and somethe powersof the vegetative soul, and so on. Thereforeall those who place bodily pleasures before moral or intellectual virtuesmake man a beast ratherthan a God; those who put riches are to be called beasts,the latter first turn man into gold: hence the former even if the soul be mortal,the virtues are not to be insensate. Therefore, despised,and pleasures sought,unless one prefersto be a beast ratherthan a man, and deprived of sense ratherthan endowed with sense or knowing. we ought to know that howevermuch man thus participates Nevertheless in the materialand the immaterial, yet he is properlysaid to participatein

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theimmaterial, because he lacksmuchofimmateriality; buthe is notpropsaidtoparticipate in animals erly and plants, butrather to"contain"them, forhe is belowimmaterial things and abovematerial things. Therefore he cannot arriveat theperfection of immaterial things: whence menare not called Gods,but god-like or divine. But man can not onlymakehimself equal to thebeast,nay he can evenexcellthebeast; for thereexistsome menfar crueller thanany beast,as Aristotle says in the seventh bookof Ethica: "an evilmanis tenthousand times worse thana beast." Andwhat we havesaid of cruelty maybe said of the other vices. Since,therefore, viceis so foul,and thelifeof a viciousmanso unjust,whilethe contrary is trueof virtue, who,therefore, evenif the soul be mortal, wouldrather sin thanvirtue, unlesshe preferred choose to be a beast or worsethana rather beast, thana man?

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