International Relations

Libyan-American Relations, 1948-1969 by Hasan Karayam

Under supervision Dr. Moses Tesi

Fall - 2012

World War II led to the United States becoming heavily involved in the Middle East, including Libya, which was an Italian colony during the war. The end of the Second World War also marked the beginning of a new era, which came to be known as the Cold War in modern political history and which lasted more than four decades. It featured the conflict between Capitalism (practiced and advocated by the United States and its allies) and Communism (practiced and advocated by the Soviet Union). Therefore, Libyas political and military relations with the United States reflected the conflict in this period. The objective of this paper is to explain U.S. foreign policy toward Libya during the Cold War. I will identify the international and domestic variables that created, drove, and promoted these relations. I will also explore the behavior of the two countries and the interests that drove their behavior. In the other words, what are the interests that led to cooperative relations despite of huge gap between the two countries in terms of political, economic, and military power? And how did these interests eventually drive these two countries apart? Initially, both countries believed the relationship would yield mutual benefits, which created the basis for their cooperation. Cooperation occurs when common interests exist. Indeed, the basis of U.S. hegemonic power during the Cold War (based in its military bases) was cooperation, as America sought to reach its goals. Robert Keohane, political theorist, pointed to the model of hegemonic cooperation that we would see in the postwar Middle East. In his book After Hegemony, he states, American leaders did not construct hegemonic regimes simply by commanding their weaker partner to be behave in prescribed ways. On the contrary, they had to research for mutual interests with their partner, and they had to make some adjustments

themselves in addition to demanding that others conform to their design.1 I will utilize this theory in analyzing the case study of Libyan-American relations, paying particular attention to the main concepts of mutual benefits and cooperation. By the end of World War II, Italy had lost all its colonies overseas, including Libya, which were transferred to the management of an Anglo-French administration (this situation was maintained until Libya obtained its independence in 1951). This transition from colonial possession to trusteeship for Libya issue was an international issue managed through the United Nations, which was tasked with managing these trustee colonies. However, the United States had its own goals in Libya, seeing it as an important country for American interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The United States foreign policy toward Libya after the war reflected broader trends in American foreign policy toward the Middle East and the world as whole in the postwar world. These broad goals, which were reflected in U.S foreign policy toward Libya, were access to oil, the security of Israel, containment of Communism and Soviet expansionism, and adherence to the principles of self-determination and the peaceful settlement of disputes. So, American policymakers adapted their decisions depending heavily on these goals.2 Consequently, the United States found itself as a victorious state after World War II and had great opportunities to exploit the political development in Libya and the Libyans desire to achieve independence. To this end, the United States supported Libya in achieving its independence. U.S. policymakers sought the political and economic stability of the Eastern

Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 138. 2 Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 1-2

Mediterranean, and the Middle East played a crucial role in U.S. plans to preserve American interests in the region against its enemies.3 Given the security objectives of the western powers, the United States and Great Britain sought to construct military bases in Libya, which required that areas independence. By supporting Libyan independence through the United Nations, the U.S. was able to advocate its support for self-determination as well as seek to advance its Cold War security goals.

Libya Independence, 1951

The issue of Libyas independence presented a clear and sharp rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War; it also demonstrated American interests in Libya and how these interests drove U.S foreign policy toward Libya. After the Big Four (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States) finished with the Italian colonies issue in Potsdam conference , they had to reach for solution for Libyan issue and they put the Libyan question before the U.N. General Assembly in 1948. A four- power commission of investigation was appointed by the UN to ascertain what the Libyan people desired. Although the various regional parties (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan) split over the question of the future statues of their respective provinces, the majority of Libyans favored independence. In 1948 the Libyan question placed on the agenda of the UN general Assembly. In the final session of the council of foreign ministers, which opened in Paris on 13 September 1948, the Soviet delegate, in an astonishing shift of policy position, proposed placing the colonies under a UN trusteeship. The administration of the trusteeship, according to Soviet plan, would then be responsible to a

Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife, 58.

trusteeship council assisted by an advisory board that would include the members of the council of foreign ministers. The Soviet initiative reproduced almost verbatim the 15 September 1945 proposal of American secretary of state James Byrnes and thus returned the council to its starting point. The American, British, and French representatives on the council quickly rejected the Soviet plan as imperial, transferred responsibility for the Italian colonies to the United Nations, and ceased to function.4 The main reason the Western powers refused the Soviet proposal was to exclude Soviet influence from Libya to lay the foundation for western dominance in the region. British foreign minister Ernest Bevin and Italian foreign minister Carlo Sforza concluded an agreement (Bevin- Sforza Plan) in London in 1949 that called for U.N. trusteeship of Libya.5 The agreement was a plan based on dividing sovereignty of the state into three different regions: the British had administrative responsibility in the Cyrenaica region, the Italians in Tripolitania, and the French in Fezzan. In addition, the agreement mandated independence within ten years. This plan was advocated initially by the U.N in May 1949, but was voted down by the General Assembly on the grounds that three different administrative entities would cause problems in forming a single sovereignty state within ten years.6 The United States and Great Britain desired to create states (actors) in international relations in order to craft bilateral relations that facilitated their interests, especially military bases. For this purpose, the United States and Britain seemingly concluded, in the context of the Cold War, that an independent Libya would best serve their interests. An independent Libya would be able to negotiate treaties and agreements to establish military bases in its sovereign Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife, 50. Majid Khadduri, Modern Libya: A Study in Political Development (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), 128-33. 6 Geoff Simons, Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie (Oxford: Center for Libyan Studies, 2003), 21-25.
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territory that could not be done under a United Nations trusteeship, especially with the Soviet Union as a leading member in the U.N. Henry Villard, the first U.S ambassador to independent Libya, noted A glance at the map shows the strategic value of Libya without which there might have been little interest in the emergence of an Arab kingdom in North Africa. If Libya had passed under any form of United Nations trusteeship, it would have been impossible for the territory to play a part in the defense arrangements of the free world.7 This clear sign about U.S interests in early Libya independent. Consequently, debates about the Libyan independence issue in U.N endorsed proposals for immediate independence including the United States as favor solution for Libyan people to self-determination. As result of unanimity, a subcommittee of seventeen that met between October 11, and November 1, 1949, decided on a series of compromises that stated Libya would receive its independence as soon as possible and no later than January 1, 1952. Then, indeed Libya declared independence on December 24, 1951, as the United Kingdom of Libya under the monarchy of King Idris Sanusi.8 The United States recognized Libyan independence as soon as it was announced, because it realized the importance of Libya as a sovereignty state in international relations that could serve American interests in the Mediterranean specifically and in Middle East as whole, especially providing military access. The United States, in case of Libya, hoped to limit Soviet influence by establishing military bases through bilateral relations with the United Kingdom of Libya. As the independence of Libya was due to Western influence, its subsequent economic and political development was inexorably also drawn into the western

As quoted in Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 39-40. 8 Khadduri, Modern Libya, 134.

camp. Initially, these developments were also seen as mutually beneficial, as Libya really needed and faced enormous political and economic challenges. The U.S. National Security Council called on the United States to be prepared to increase its responsibility toward Libya to serve American interests: The United States should be ready to provide promptly appropriate economic, technical and possibly military assistance, if necessary to prevent the development of any political vacuum that might result from failure or inability of the interested Western European powers to assure the Western orientation of Lib ya.9 This commitment ensured that the United States would pursue a policy of hegemonic cooperation in the first decade of Libyas independence. The Western powers provided all of the new countrys expertise and aid during the first decade after independence. These warm relations between the United States and Libya seemed to serve the interests of the both sides.10 Libyas cooperation with the United States was initiated military bases agreements that drove U.S behavior toward Libya and led Libya to ignore national interests in the 1950s.

Military Bases Agreement

The United States recognized Libyas military access to the Middle East as a way to protect its interests in the area. Therefore, the U.S. desired to establish military bases in Libya even before its independence. President Dwight D. Eisenhower assured Libyan Prime Minister Ben Halim that Libya would be in the Middle East what the Philippines were to America in the

10

As quoted in St. John, Libya and the United States, 68. Vandewalle, History of Modern Libya, 44-45.

Far East.11 But how the cooperated, between the two countries, was driven and what are Libyan benefits beyond this cooperation through this agreement? The main objective of this cooperation from the American perspective was to maintain the military bases that were established during World War II, especially Wheelus base in Tripoli. The United States had already signed a temporary agreement for bases before independence in the early 1951, trying to grant its existence after independence. In this context, James T. Hill, General Counsel to the Secretary of the U.S Air Force, explained in a recently declassified, topsecret memorandum dated July 11, 1951, that U.S policy and plans before Libyan independence, included these military bases: As you know, it is contemplated that in connection with negotiating United States requirements for bases in Libya, the United States will have to agree to make some contribution to the Libyan economy. Estimates indicate that Libyas annual deficit will be in the nature of twelve million dollars. The state department estimates that in addition to funds which may be made available under the foreign aid program, the United States will have to pay between three-quarters of a million and one and one-half million dollars annually for base rights.12So, the United States took the early steps for military access in Libya. The strategic interests of the United States in Libya led the Department of State to emphasize cooperation with Libya. The Department of State recommended that the United States secure a series of air base facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean that would be anchored by the facility at Wheelus field, highlighting that it was highly important that we be able to work out

Veronica Nmoma, Power and Forces: Libyas Relations with the United States Journal of Third World Studies 26:2 (2009): 156. 12 As quoted in St. John, Libya and the United States, 62.

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satisfactory arrangements for continuing our right to use this important airbase when a solution in the UN has been attained as regards disposition of the Italian colonies.13 In 1954 Libyan Prime Minister Mustafa Bin Halim played a key role in LibyanAmerican relations. He especially focused on cooperation with the United States. He recognized the importance of U.S. cooperation and criticized the previous prime minister, Mahmud alMuntasir (1951-1953) for playing the game of foreign policy with one card only-- Libyas alliance with Great Britain. Bin Halim, on the other hand, was determined to play with another card--the establishment of a firm friendship and cooperation with the United States.14 According to Bin Halim, Libyan interests lay in cooperating with the United States, not in gaining economic development aid for Libya. Bin Halim sought instead American diplomatic support against other western governments, such as France and Italy, as well as neighboring powers. Bin Halim also believed to demonstrate Libyas independent stand in foreign affairs by its ally with great power in the context of cold war. So, the cornerstone of Bin Halims foreign policy was Libyas friendship and cooperation with the United States. Consequently, a new agreement on base rights and economic assistance was concluded on 20 July 1954 in Washington, and was signed in Libya in September. Villard depicted the agreement as an important bridge for cooperation between the two countries: The United StatesLibyan Agreement of 1954, regulating the conditions under which American armed forces are stationed in Libya, is the keystone of the bridge between the two countries and the best example of Libyas orientation toward the west.15 The agreement was regarded as great victory for U.S foreign policy in the Middle East in general and in Libya in particular. It helped both to exclude

13 14

As quoted in ibid., 59. Khadduri, Modern Libya, 253. 15 As quoted in St. John, Libya and the United States, 69-70.

Communism from the region and reflected the pinnacle of cooperation between the two countries in this early period in Libyas modem history. The agreement provided mutual benefits to both countries in the context of international relations and was deemed by the United States a contribution to the maintenance of peace and security around the world. The preamble of agreement summarized its purposes: The government of the United States of America and the government of the United Kingdom of Libya, desiring to strengthen the firm friendship and understanding now existing between them; confirming their determination to cooperate amicably and to support each other mutually in the international field, and to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations; and being of the opinion that cooperation within the territory of Libya will assist in achieving these objectives.16 Negotiations over Wheelus base lasted for two years after independence and were finally completed when Bin Halims visited the United States in July 1954. The negotiations concentrated mainly on financial arrangements and the uses of the base. They also debated the status of Americans who would be residing on the base along with other matters, including American authority to administer the base and the taxes on American imports relating to the base.17 In terms of American benefits, the agreement provided permission to the United States to use Wheelus base for military purposes for twenty years. The United States had full rights over aircraft, ships, and other water-borne vehicles entering, leaving, and within the agreed areas. In addition there were several regulations related to the rights of soldiers who would live on the base, including free transit, and exemptions relating to taxes on imports. Majid Khadduri, scholar was as witness defined the Wheelus objectives as a link in the overseas base system which the
16 17

Khadduri, Modern Libya, 254. Ibid., 254.

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United States has erected against the Soviet Union, an important military transit stop in the Mediterranean area, and a training base for air personnel in the Mediterranean area.18 Libyan benefits included funds for technical cooperation and jobs for those who would be hired on the military facilities at Wheelus. The United States agreed to pay seven million dollars in the first year for development assistance and delivered 24,000 tons of grain during drought years. The United States also pledged to pay four million dollars within six years, and one million annually for the eleven years, until 1970. The U.S. also pledged to help Libya to develop its healthcare, educational, and agricultural programs. The Libyan parliament approved the agreement on October 30, 1954, and the king ratified it the same day.19

The Eisenhower Doctrine

As result of increasing of communist activities in the Middle East, especially when Egypt entered in arms negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1955, and culminating by establishing diplomatic relations between Libya and Soviet Union in the same year20, American policy makers recognized the political vacuum in the Middle East that was appeared by the end of 1956 because the shrinkage of British role in the region after Suez war immediately.21 Conversely, Eisenhower Doctrine after the Suez crisis presented the extent of cooperation between Libya and the United States that built on mutual benefits in the context of the Cold War Khadduri, Modern Libya, 255. Ibid., 255, 257. 20 Libyas needs to Soviet Union to be a member at UN by Soviet vote. Furthermore, the Libyan government justified diplomatic relations with Soviet Union by Bin Halim that Libya wanted to grantee soviet advocate for its joining to the United Nations because the Soviet Union was cause of its late to be member in the United Nations. Indeed, Libya was scared about its interests with the United States and the same time it was needed to join to the United Nations. In order to that, Libya stipulated that the Soviet Union could not undertake any Communist activities inside of Libya for its relations with the United States. Khadurri, 261-63. 21 Khadduri, Modern Libya, 280.
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and explained the behavior of the two countries toward each other that given the cooperation a new push. So, Libya had casted itself into the western camp through mutual benefits that coincided with Eisenhower Doctrine. At the U.S. level, President Eisenhower asked the Congress of the United States on January 5, 1957, to counter communist activities in the Middle East including Libya and Egypt by launching American economic programs to key regional states. . Eisenhower asked for $200 million in economic and military assistance for the nations of the Middle East that needed U.S. support against Communist domination (much like the earlier Truman administrations aid to Greece and Turkey). His proposal to Congress concentrated on three objectives: cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength for the maintenance of national independence, undertake programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desire such aid, and employ armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of Middle East nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.22 Congress approved this program of aid, which came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.23 In line with the objectives of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the President appointed James P. Richards on January 7, 1957, to visit North Africa and the Middle East to explain the Eisenhower Doctrine to the governments of the region and clarify the misunderstanding that prevailed over

Khadduri, Modern Libya, 281. As quoted in Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975: Survey (City?, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1977), 204-5.
23

22

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the Eisenhower Doctrine. He also to measure to what extent each country was willing to participate in the program.24 Similarly, On March 15, 1957, Vice President Richard M. Nixon visited Tripoli. He negotiated with Bin Halim over American aid and discussed the security of the Middle East. Their negotiations focused on the necessary role that they played in each others interests and mutual benefits both countries enjoyed as a result. Bin Halim explained Libyas position on the Doctrine, highlighted their shared interests, and elucidated the Libyan position toward the Eisenhower Doctrine. At dinner given in honor of Nixon, Bin Halim explained that the American people know, from their own history, how difficult the first years of independence can be [America] understands by her own experience the difficulties facing us and as a result is determined to help us. That is the main reason why Libya welcomes the Eisenhower Doctrine in principle, the details of which are to be discussed with Ambassador [provide a first name if possible] Richards. We are convincedthat this doctrine is aimed at assisting us to maintain our independence in [the] face of anyattempt to sabotage that independence we, like the American people, abhor international communism-- it is contrary to the principles of our faithit is fortunate indeed that the United States takes the long view in her assistance to the under-developed countries; that these America really believes that in helping such countries and people America is also helping herself. We, too, believe in that far-sighted policy, and we people of Libya will be eternally grateful to America for her generous assistance in helping us to regain our national pride [until] we can standas equal partners in the community of free nations of

24

Khadduri, Modern Libya, 282.

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the world.25 Thus, the United States could contain Libya and prevent it from soviet extension through Eisenhower Doctrine. Nixon, mirroring these goals, said, We deeply appreciate the very generous comments that you have made with regard to the policy of the United States internationally, and in particular the comments that you have made with regard to the Eisenhower Doctrine, one which has a direct relationship to the problems of this countryI was impressed by the fact that you, Mr. Prime Minister, recognized a very fundamental fact, and that is that the Eisenhower Doctrine, and this, may I say, applies to all of the aid programs of the United States, is designed to assist nations to maintain their independence, and in no way is designed to compromise that independence I can assure you that as far as the devotion to the principle of independence and freedom for people and peace for humanity is concerned, that our hearts and the hearts of the people of Libya and people like us throughout the world are as one we know that when the independence of other nations is threatened that our own is threatened. It is for that reason that we welcome the opportunity to work with you and to work with other nations to build up the strength which will enable you to maintain your independence against any form of aggression. Through these talks, the United States sought to promote its position against the communism and assure its interests in Libya.26 On March 17, 1957, Ambassador James Richards came to Tripoli as part of his mission to North Africa and the Middle East. The Richards mission lasted three days and included negotiations with Libyan statesmen including Bin Halim over economic aid being offered to Libya. Although economic aid that offered by the United States to Libya was insufficient, Bin Halim announced his acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine. His purpose in doing so was to
25 26

As quoted in Khadduri, Modern Libya, 282-83. Ibid., 283.

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maintain Libyas independence, since it needed political support and additional economic aid, however, the Prime Minister did seek to increase American aid during his negotiations with Richards.27 The negotiations between Libyan statesmen and American delegation, (Richards Mission), concentrated on Eisenhower Doctrine and its goals in Libya and Middle East. On the other hand, how this mission could operate through the cooperation with Libyan government. Libyan press published a communiqu that issued by the committee summarized the points which discussed; on his visit to Libya from March 17 to 20, the special Assistant to president Eisenhower, Ambassador James P. Richards, has conferred with prime minister of the government of Libya. They have reached agreement on the meaning and purpose of President Eisenhowers proposals for the Middle East. This exchange of views revealed an identity of interests of the two nations and agreement to work together for the successful applications of the Middle East plan, which provides: if requested, defense against of any armed aggression by forces of international communism which may be directed at any nation of the Middle East; assistance in developing the security forces of countries of the Middle East which request help for the purpose of protecting their freedom and independence; aid in strengthening the economic systems of middle East countries as the best defense against the threat of subversion. The government of Libya and the special mission of Ambassador Richards agreed that the aggressive intentions of international communism offer the greatest present threat to national independence and the peace and security of the word community. They also confirmed that it is the general cry of both countries to oppose any aggression from any source. The government of Libya received with approval Ambassador Richards assurance that the United States Middle East policy does not seek to establish spheres of influence or special positions of power in the Middle East but is

27

Khadduri, Modern Libya, 283-84.

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devoted to strengthening the nations of the area so that they may be masters of their own destinies. In support of the principles enunciated above, it was agreed that additional economic aid to Libya is needed and will be forth coming from the United States.28 Bin Halims acceptance of Eisenhower Doctrine reflects the extent of convergence between the two countries. Richards returned to Tripoli, after his tour to Middle East, on his way back to the United States on May 4, 1957, to pledge additional aid to Libya as Bin Halim demanded. Therefore, the United States provided economic assistance in a variety of different fields: a general survey of Libyan development needs, the development of broadcasting, assistance in education (including scholarships and instructional material), aid for electrical power development, improvement of telecommunications infrastructure, and development of domestic water supplies. To these ends, Libya received seven million dollars from America, which was increased by the end of 1957 to reach $23 million.29 Throughout this period, on the basis of mutual benefits, the United States and Libya could create a useful cooperation in a vital Cold War theater.

The Oil Discovery

The discovery of oil in Libya in the late of 1950s presented a new aspect of cooperation between Libya and the United States regardless of many challenges that encountered hegemonic cooperation over the Arab oil, including Suez crisis and the national extent of Arab nationalism that flooded the younger Libyan generation throughout the 1950s and the 1960s. But the Libyan needs and interests overcame like these challenges and facilitated this cooperation with the United States by opening the doors to American oil companies to play a key role in producing oil

28 29

Khadduri, Modern Libya, 284. Ibid., 285.

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in Libya during the 1950s and 1960s. Basically, the American strategy was based on ensuring American oil interests equal access to Middle East oil by supporting American oil companies in the region. As a result, the United States became the dominant factor in the development of the regions oil after World War II; by 1956, American investment of oil in the Middle East reached $4.35 billion.30 Libyas economic situation was not conducive to spending a lot of money for carrying out geological explorations across the Libyan Desert. Therefore, the Libyan government enacted a petroleum law in 1955. Under this law, the government could attract foreign oil companies by offering them concessionary rights on a competitive basis. The government also established an autonomous body what called Petroleum Affairs in 1955. For organizing the concessions, the country was divided into four zones: two to the north of the 28th parallel (Zone I and II) and two to the south (Zone III and IV). Although the divisions were allegedly based on geological and geographical characteristics of importance to the petroleum industry and in order to control and balance the concessions in order to avoid domination by certain companies.31 As result to the petroleum law, Libya granted more than 80 concessions to nineteen companies; American investment represented 90% of these concessions. The American oil companies that acquired concessions included Esso International (a subsidiary of Jersey Standard Oil), Standard Oil of California, Mobile, Texaco, and the Occidental Petroleum Corporation.32 These companies started exploratory work and operations, and Esso first struck oil in commercial quantities in 1959. It then completed a 100-mile, thirty-inch pipeline connecting the newly discovered Zelten oil field with an oil terminal built at Marsa al-Burayqa on costal of
30 31

Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations, 149-50. Vandewalle, History of Modern Libya, 55. 32 Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations,159; Vandewalle, History of Modern Libya, 58.

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Mediterranean. On October 25, 1961, the pipeline was completed and began operations. The ceremonial opening was attended by King Idris and representatives of the American Esso Oil Company. By 1968, the production of oil across the country had increased to roughly 2.6 million barrels per day; 90% of this production was conducted by American companies. This U.S. hegemony helped to compensate for U.S failure in other areas.33 Libyan oil was particularly valuable to the U.S. because of its location west of the Suez Canal and the high quality of its crude oil. Libyas location is very close to the European market, especially the southern European ports that were provided by American oil companies during the Suez crisis. This advantage made the cost of transportation very low and meant that this oil did not need to be shipped through the Suez Canal. In addition, Libyas oil export pipelines (unlike some of the Arab Gulf states) ran solely across the countrys own territory, making them less likely to be damaged or closed down. All of these advantages pushed hegemonic cooperation and increased Libyan oils value; this cooperation lasted until the Qudhafi revolution in 1969.

33

Keohane, After Hegemony, 150-58; Khadduri, Modern Libya, 329.

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Figure: Libyas oil fields Ultimately, relations between Libya and the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, despite the unequal balance between the two countries, presented a significant and productive level of cooperation. Bin Halims term as prime minister (1954-1957) can be considered the golden era of Libyan-American relations, because he recognized the importance of cooperation with the United States and played a crucial in facilitating these relations. The discovery of oil in the late 1950s gave U.S foreign policy a new dimension in its behavior toward Libya, irrespective of Anglo-American competition about concessions, especially after the Suez Crisis. This behavior resulted in increasing levels of U.S. economic aid and investment that rose to reach 90% of the nations total oil investments.

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