You are on page 1of 133

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 1 -
NOTICE
Document Code:
Zach Coughlin,Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473 (susp).
1471 E. 9
th
St.
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Reno, NV 89512
Pro per suspended attorney.


IN THE SECOND J UDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA


Zachary coughlin;

appellant,

vs.
CITY OF RENO

respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)


Case No: CR13-0011

Dept No: 8

NOTICE OF FILINGS IN CR13-1331, CR13-0552, 63342, 62821, 63041

Couglin declares everything he asserts herein is true and correct made under penalty of
perjury with the the caveat that some of the dollar figures and dates as to his finances during oct 2011
through april 2012 are from memory and likely not exact and that such assertions are based upon his
own personal knowledge except those matters stated upon information and belief and as to those
matters Coughlin believes them to be true:
Coughlin can report that WCDA Assistant District Attorney Bruce Hahn sat both on the Board
of Directors of Washoe Legal Services and Coughlins NNDB Screen Panel in April 2012, an
unimaginable conflict that Hahn failed to recuse himself from, especially in light of Coughlins
lawsuits against WLS, and Washoe Countys culpability (and the WCDAs accessory stance thereto)
vis a vis the systematic burglaries of tenants dressed up as summary eviction lockouts, of which
F I L E D
Electronically
09-29-2013:06:58:18 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 4029275
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 2 -
NOTICE
Coughlin has been subjected to at least three such burglaries by the WCSO (11/1/11 in Rev2011-
001708 (resulting in Coughlins arrest in RMC 11 CR 26405), 3/15/12 in rev2012-00374, and
rev2012-001048 on 6/28/12, resulting in Coughlins arrest in rcr2012-067980).
This Courts 8/22/13 Order granted Coughlins Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperisas such,
the state or city (or county) is required to prepare at public expense the transcript of the 11/30/11 trial
(and, arguably the less than five minute 10/11/11 arraignment in RMC 11 CR 22176, now on appeal
(and arguably the subject of a Petition for Extraordinary writ (possibly one of the Habeas Corpus
variety), Motion for New Trial, appeal of any order deny such Motion for New Trial), whether the
2J DC ever had jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal in cr11-2064 or not (compliance with NRS
189.030(1) arguably being a jurisdictional prerequisite and or NRS 189.035 made void for lack of
jurisdiction any orders from the 2J DC beyond remanding for new trial based upon the materially
defective transcript forwarded to the 2J DC by the RMC (not forwarding one at all still qualifies as
being materially defective).
Coughlin does not even need an order granting publication of transcript at public expense
given he has an order granting his motion to proceed informa pauperis, which makes law of the case
the issue of whether or not Coughlin is indigent. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100
L. Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1956) (why can collateral estoppels constantly be applied against
Coughlin, yet none of the IFPs granted in other cases ever provided a basis for applying collateral
estoppels in Coughlins favor2J DC J udge Steinheimmer granted Coughlins 6/27/11 Motion to
Proceed IFP in CV11-01896, yet J udge Howard is permitted to sidestep the issue in his 10/27/11 and
12/15/11 orders now on appeal in cr11-2064? 01896 was a civil case and the case Howard presided
over was a criminal case. IFPs are universally more readily granted in criminal cases.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 3 -
NOTICE
Also, Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming misstates NRS 4.410(2), as such was amended in 2011
to direct the depositing of the down payment in a civil case with the court reporter rather than
the clerk of court that Elliott references. As such, Pam Longonis angrily hanging up the phone on
Coughlin on multiple occasions and refusal to indicate to Coughlin as to where he may make such
deposit (refusing to provide any mailing or contact information) becomes much, much more relevant.
Also the TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL/OTHERS handout provide to Coughlin and others by the
RMC is arguably further not in compliance with Nevada law in that it purports to required criminal
defendants to pay for not just their copy of the transcript, but a copy for the court and one for the
Respondent as well: 2.'Cost. Appeal transcripts are billed at $4.10 per page, which includes an original (to be filed
with District Court), one copy for the appeilant, and one copy for the opposing counsel.. Remuneration for transcripts is
statutorily set and heavily dependent on the numbers of days it takes the CCR to prepare such under NRS 3 compared to
when it was ordered, and the number of hours involved in the proceeding to be recording (in Coughlins case the 11/30/11
trial consists of 6 hours of audio, and the 10/11/11 arraignment consists of four minutes of audio). And, actually, that
RMC/Longoni handout needs to be looked over with a fine tooth comb, its on RMC letterhead (listing CASSANDRA
J ACKSON Interim Court Administrator) and provided to the public (and provided to Coughlin at all relevant times
herein) by the RMCs filing office, and such reads: http://www.scribd.com/doc/169461777/Rmc-Transcript-Rules-in-
Violation-of-Nrs-Longioni
TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL/OTHERS:
If you wish to order a transcript of your proceedings in the Reno Municipal Court, you may do so by contacting
Pam Longoni at (775) 530-5251.
The following information is provided to assist you in placing an order for a transcript:
1. Orders will require the date of the court appearance, type of proceeding, (trial, arraignment, etc.), department
number in which the proceeding was held, and also include the appropriate deposit as indicated below. Payment may be
made by check or money order. No transcript will be prepared until the required deposit is received.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 4 -
NOTICE
2. Cost. Appeal transcripts are billed at $4.10 per page, which includes an original (to be filed with District
Court), one copy for the appellant, and one copy for the opposing counsel. Transcripts ordered for purposes other than
appeal, where only one copy and original transcript is required, are billed at $3.00 per page.
3. Deposits. Deposits required are as follows: $75.00 for arraignment/sentencing; a minimum deposit of $200.00
for any trial transcript; and a minimum deposit of $500.00 for very lengthy trials (those lasting more than three hours).
NO TRANSCRIPT IS CONSIDERED TO BE OFFICIALLY ORDERED, AND COMMENCEMENT OF
TRANSCRIPTION WILL NOT BEGIN, UNTIL RECEIPT OF THE REQUIRED DEPOSIT.
4. Follow-up on Transcript Preparation. You will be notified when your transcript has been prepared. If the actual
cost of the transcript is less than the amount of the deposit paid, a refund will he issued with the transcript. And, likewise,
any outstanding balance due after completion of the transcript must be paid before the Original is filed with District
Court or any copies released. No refunds of deposits will be given for transcripts once they have been prepared and no
responsibility will be taken for the dismissal of any appeal by District Court because no Original was filed due to non
payment of an outstanding balance due.
5. Pam Longoni will be happy to answer any questions you may have regarding the above information.
With regard to the problem of determining whether any given defendant is indigent, so as to entitle him
to a free transcript or other record for use in appealing his conviction, which is the subject of this annotation, the
statement has frequently been made that the determination of indigency is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the
trial court, and therefore (impliedly or expressly) is reviewable only for abuse of such discretion.
8
However, it has also
been said that a lower courts determination in this regard, though entitled to great weight, will nonetheless be subject to
review upon appeal, for the reason that it involves a basic constitutional right relating to the administration of criminal
justice.
9



3
, infra.



State v Rutherford (1964) 63 Wash 2d 949, 389 P2d 895.

Law Reviews and Other Periodicals
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 5 -
NOTICE
Note, Criminal ProcedureFree Transcripts for Indigents. 51 NC L Rev 621 (1973)

Also relevant to this Courts 8/25/13 Order (Coughlin respectfully seeks leave of court to exceed the 15 page
limit referenced therein and in addition, respectfully submits that there is no valid oblivation to so limit his advocacy, and,
as such, submits this open refusal respectfully made, pursuant to RPC 3.5(d), especially in light of the statutory
provisions in NRS 178.600, and .610, and the ambiguity over what rules apply to these criminal appeals to the district
court (it does not seam that NRAP applies were NRAP Rule 3B Criminal Actions: Rules Governing specifically
identifies only appeals from district court deteriminations in criminal actions shall be governed by these rules..(NOTE:
NRAP RULE 3B. CRIMINAL ACTIONS: RULES GOVERNING Appeals from district court determinations in
criminal actions shall be governed by these Rules and by NRS 177.015 to 177.305 and NRS 34.575. All appeals in
capital cases are also subject to the provisions of SCR 250. Rule 3C applies to all other direct and post-conviction
criminal appeals, except those matters specifically excluded from the fast track by Rule 3C(a). [As amended;
effective J uly 1, 2009.] its not exactly clear what is meant by Rule 3c applies to all other direct and post-conviction
criminal appeals
i

though the all other phrase would tend to reference all criminal appeals that are not appeals from
district court determinations and thus make NRAP 3C applicable to these NRS 189 appeals from the justice and
municipal courts to the district courts.? A problem arises, however, where NRAP Rule 3C contradicts NRS
189.030(1), seemingly, and other rules.. and the WDCR do not limit criminal appeal briefs while they do limit civil
appeal briefs. )allowing Coughlin to file a Supplemental Brief speaking to the issue of whether this Court still has
jurisdiction in cr11-2064: STATE v. EIGHTH J UDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 396 P.2D 680 (1964) Were Harris
financially responsible, he could purchase a copy of the transcript; unfortunately he is without money. The district court
granted his motion. The transcript was ordered to be prepared at county expense and a copy thereof delivered to counsel
for Harris. By this proceeding in certiorari the district attorney challenges the validity of that order, contending that the
court lacked power to make it. His argument is based upon the absence of any statute authorizing such a charge against
the county. The argument has no merit.
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/NRAP.html NRS 177.165 Preparation of record and papers on
appeal. All appeals from a district court to the Supreme Court shall be heard on the original papers and the reporters
transcript of evidence or proceedings. The form and manner of preparation of the record and of other papers filed may be
prescribed by the Supreme Court, and to the extent not otherwise so prescribed shall conform to the practice in civil cases.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 6 -
NOTICE
(Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
NRS 177.155 seems to make quite clear that J udge Stiglichs jurisdiction in these criminal appeals to the district court is
vast, and not affected by anything in 60630 (the appeal of 2064 to the Nevada Supreme Court) nor by J udge Elliotts
purported remittitur in his 3/15/12 OARRMC (which purports to adjudicate on appeal a ruling which would necessarily
be interlocutory in natureas such, maybe that is why J udge Elliotts Order Affirming indicates such remand is made
back to the RMC for all future proceedings, which implies there is some proceeding in the RMC that are to take place
or were at the time of that 3/15/12 Order (perhaps a reference to the fact that RMC J udge Howard was precluded from
presiding over a contempt trial of Coughlin (which is what Howard made the petty larceny trial less than ten minutes into
such when he found Coughlin in contempt the indicated he was, rather than perform the immediate action necessary to
protect the dignity of the court that such a summary contempt ruling would requireJ udge Howard instead proceeded to
hold nearly six hours of trial, indicating that he would determine Coughlins punishment on such purported summary
contempt finding after the petty larceny trial was concluded (therefore impermissibly, to much prejudice to Coughlin,
mixing the two). Pengilly and McCormick v. Sixth J udicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County, 218 P.2d 939, 67
Nev. 318, make quite clear that pursuant to NRS 22.030(3), J udge Howard was not permitted to preside over any portion
of such contempt proceedings upon the motion to disqualify/objection to Howards so presiding that Coughlin
immediately made upon Howards contempt ruling less than ten minutes into the trial (ie, J udge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order tip
toed around the fact that J udge Howard violated Nevada law yet again in such respect, and that future proceedings
necessarily were required in the RMC and that Elliotts 3/15/ Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC purports to do
just that, affirm a ruling, not affirm a J udgment of ConvictionNRS 177.155 Supervision of appeal. The
supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in the appellate court from the time the notice of appeal is
filed with its clerk, except as otherwise provided in this title. The appellate court may at any time entertain a motion to
dismiss the appeal, or for directions to the trial court, or to modify or vacate any order made by the trial court or by any
judge or justice of the peace in relation to the prosecution of the appeal, including any order fixing or denying bail.
(Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)

NRS 22.030(3) provides: 22. 030. Summary punishment of contempt committed in immediate
view and presence of court; affidavit or statement to be filed when contempt committed outside immediate view
and presence of court; disqualification of judge3. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, if a contempt
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 7 -
NOTICE
is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, the judge of the court in whose contempt the person
is alleged to be shall not preside at the trial of the contempt over the objection of the person. The provisions of this
subsection do not apply in: see , Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Assoc., 116 Nev. 646, at 650, 5 P.3d
569 (2000); it was a mandatory duty of the judge not to preside at the trial of the contempt charges after the
objection under NCL 8943 (cf. NRS 22.030), a writ issued to prevent the judge from presiding. McCormick v.
Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 318, 218 P.2d 939 (1950)
Judge Howard violated NRS 22.030(3) where he continued to preside over the trial of the
contempt over Coughlins objection where such portion of such alleged contempt occurring after the point ten
minutes into the 11/30/11 trial in 11 CR 22716 (see cr11-2064) necessarily did not occure in the immediate view and
presence of court given such alleged contemptuous behavior (specifically referenced, somewhat, in Howards
11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt) patently, manifestly from the record, did not occur until after such
point ten minutes into the 11/30/11 trial when J udge Howard found Coughlin in contempt (at which point Coughlin
requested the appoitnement of defense counsel, which howard denied,..). Howard presided over the trial over contempt
that had not even occurred yet (to the extent his 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt patently references alleged
behavior occurring beyond the first 10 minutes of the trial.obviously that which will allegedly only occur in the future
is not immediate.
NRS 5.073 Conformity of practice and proceedings to those of justice courts; exception;
imposition and collection of fees.
1. The practice and proceedings in the municipal court must conform, as nearly as practicable, to the
practice and proceedings of justice courts in similar cases. An appeal perfected transfers the action to the district court for
trial anew, unless the municipal court is designated as a court of record as provided in NRS 5.010. The municipal court
must be treated and considered as a justice court whenever the proceedings thereof are called into question.
2. Each municipal judge shall charge and collect such fees prescribed in NRS 4.060 that are within the
jurisdictional limits of the municipal court.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 903; A 1991, 455; 1997, 115)
NRS 5.075 Form of docket and records. The Court Administrator shall prescribe the form of the
docket and of any other appropriate records to be kept by the municipal court, which form may vary from court to court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 8 -
NOTICE
according to the number and kind of cases customarily heard and whether the court is designated as a court of record
pursuant to NRS 5.010.


NRS 3.320(3) relating to the duties of court reporters in criminal cases provides, in part, that the reporter "if
directed by the court * * * must, within such reasonable time after the trial of such case as may be designated by law or,
in the absence of any law relating thereto, by the court, write out the same, or such specific portions thereof as may be
requested, in plain and legible longhand, or by typewriter or other printing machine, and certify to the same as being
correctly reported and transcribed, and, when directed by the law or court, file the same with the clerk of the court." NRS
3.370(2) reads, in part, that "in criminal cases the fees for reporting and for transcripts ordered by the court to be made
must be paid out of the county treasury upon the order of the court." These provisions embrace the order of which the
district attorney complains.
However, we wish to mention that in this case the judicial power to make the order in question does not rest
primarily upon the statutory provisions which we have related. The demands of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution compel that a copy of the transcript of the first trial be
furnished Harris. The mentioned statutes merely implement the constitutional mandate. Griffin v.Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76
S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, involved an indigent's right to a transcript for the purpose of appellate review. Illinois had not,
by statute, authorized an indigent appellant to obtain the transcript at state expense. The United States Supreme Court
held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment prevent a state from denying appellate
review to an indigent because of his poverty. J ustice Black wrote: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of a trial
a man gets depends upon the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate
review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts. * * * Plainly, the ability to pay costs in advance bears
no rational relationship to the defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of
a fair trial." The Griffin principle has been subsequently applied by the high court to closely related situations. In Burns v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209, it was held that Griffin applied to state collateral proceedings even
where a criminal appeal was discretionary and not a matter of right. In Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6
L.Ed.2d 39, the court held that a state may not require a payment of statutory filing fees by an indigent before his appeal
would be docketed. In Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 9 -
NOTICE
L.E.2d 1269, the Griffin principle was given retrospective application. See also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83
S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899; Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892.
As already stated the Griffin doctrine involved fundamental fairness to one seeking appellate review of his
conviction. He was no longer clothed with the presumption of innocence. In the case before us we are concerned with
fundamental fairness to one who is about to stand trial for a capital offense. He presently enjoys the presumption of
innocence. We believe that the Griffin principle has greater need for application here than it did in Griffin itself, for we
know that everyone accused of crime has a constitutional right to a fair trial. On the other hand, we are not at all certain
that a convicted defendant has a constitutional right to appeal; the United States Supreme Court has never said so. Indeed,
that court stated in McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867, that "a review by an appellate court of
the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at common
law and is not now a necessary element of due process of law." In the light of Griffin v. Illinois, the order made below was
compelled.
We would reach the same result quite apart from any consideration of the particular statutory and constitutional
demands which we have discussed. The inherent power of a court to exercise reasonable control over a criminal
proceeding cannot seriously be questioned. In Marshall v. District Court, 79 Nev. 280, 382 P.2d 214, we held that the
district court in a murder case had the power to order the district attorney to produce for the inspection of the defendant
the autopsy report of the victim any and all photographs relevant to the case, all statements of all persons who testified at
the preliminary hearing or who will be witnesses at the trial, and a certain tape recording given by the defendant. In
Pinana v. District Court, 75 Nev. 74, 334 P.2d 843, we held that the district court had the power to deny the defendant's
request for pre-trial inspection of statements made by her to the district attorney. In neither case was certiorari available to
control judicial discretion or to review the propriety of judicial action. In each case the state had incurred an expense in
obtaining the information sought by the defendant's pre-trial discovery motions, and in each instance the court possessed
power to enter the order in question.
It is important to note that J udge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC (OARMC)
misapplies NRS 4.410(2) to NRS 189.030(1) in characterizing Coughlin as the one ordering the transcript. That is a
three card monty approach. Coughlin merely filed a Notice of Appeal in the RMC, which triggered the statutory
requirement that the RMC necessarily, order the transcript as the RMC, under NRS 189.030(1) shall transmit such to
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 10 -
NOTICE
the district court within 10 days of Coughlins 12/11/11 filing of a Notice of Appeal (unless the 2004 ADKT makes a post-
Rust application required whereby the filing by Coughlin at the same time of a Motion for New Trial made such Notice of
Appeal premature and tolling the requirements of NRS 189.030(1)but regardless, what actually occurred in Elliotts
3/15/12 OARRMC is completely inappropriate and voidSo, actually, under Elliotts analaysis (especially if the RMC
wants to keep its NRS 5.010 court of record designation or be made to answer for the fraud attendant to enforcing the
local ordinance
But, really, the RMC and Longoni makes this quite easy were their own handout admits that the preparation of
the transcript will not begin (whether a civil or criminal case (and the RMC handles barely any civil cases at all
anyways) until the money deposit outlined is made:
Reno MUNICIPAL COURT
GENERAL PROVISIONS
NRS 5.010 General requirements for court; designation as court of record. There must be in each city a
municipal court presided over by a municipal judge. The municipal court:
1. Must be held at such place in the city within which it is established as the governing body of that city may by
ordinance direct.
2. May by ordinance be designated as a court of record.
[35:19:1865; B 940; BH 2454; C 2535; RL 4855; NCL 8397](NRS A 1983, 899; 1985, 671; 1991, 161)


Sec. 2.16.040. Court of record; recording.
The Reno Municipal Court is hereby designated as a court of record in accordance with NRS
5.010. Proceedings in the municipal court may be recorded by any method recognized by the
Nevada Supreme Court.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Editors noteOrd. No. 3099, 1, adopted J une 27, 1983, repealed former 2.16.040
2.16.060, concerning the office of the marshal, which sections derived from Code 1966,
2.32.0102.32.030.
Sec. 2.16.050. Recording; operation of equipment; transcription of
recordings; use of transcript.
(a) Each judge shall appoint a suitable person, who need not be a certified shorthand reporter
and may have other responsibilities in the court to operate the recording equipment. The
person so appointed shall subscribe to an oath that he or she will so operate it as to record
all of the proceedings.
(b) The municipal court may designate any certified person to transcribe the recording into a
written transcript. The person so designated shall subscribe to an oath that he or she has
correctly transcribed it. The transcript may be used for all purposes for which transcripts
are used and is subject to correction in the same manner as other transcripts.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Sec. 2.16.060. Recording; preservation; destruction.
The recording of each proceeding in municipal court must be preserved until at least 30 days
after the time for filing an appeal expires. If no appeal is taken, the judge may order the
destruction of the recording at any time after that date. If there is an appeal to the district court,
the recording must be preserved until at least 30 days after final disposition of the case on
appeal. The municipal court may order the destruction of the recording at any time after that
date.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Sec. 2.16.070. Filing of appeals.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 11 -
NOTICE
An appeal in a civil or criminal case must be taken and perfected in the same manner as the
same type of appeal from the justice's courts, as provided in the Nevada Revised Statutes.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Sec. 2.16.080. Recording; payment of fees.
(a) The fees for transcripts, processing an appeal, and copies must be paid by the party
ordering them in accordance with the municipal court procedures.
(b) In a civil case the preparation of the transcript need not commence until the fees have been deposited.
(c) In a civil case, upon a finding of a party's indigency by the court, such fees shall be waived
or paid by the court.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Sec. 2.16.090. Transmission of transcript, other papers, recording
and copy of docket to district court.
(a) The court shall transmit to the clerk of the district court the recording and/or transcript of
the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified copy of his or her docket in
accordance with the Nevada Revised Statutes, District Court Rules, and the Washoe
County District Court Rules.
(b) The judge shall give notice to the appellant or his or her attorney and to the other party that the recording and/or
transcript, all other papers relating to the case, and a certified copy of
the docket have been filed with the clerk of the district court.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)

So, Reno Municipal Code Sec 2.16.080 becomes pretty important, huh? Sec. 2.16.080. Recording; payment of fees.
(a) The fees for transcripts, processing an appeal, and copies must be paid by the party
ordering them in accordance with the municipal court procedures.
This is true, especially considering that the RMC provided Coughlin in obstructing his attempts to get the transcript made
and even to obtain a copy of the audio from this alleged court of record a handout on RMC letterhead that reads:
RENO MUNICIPAL COURT
TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL/OTHERS
If you wish to order a transcript of your proceedings in the Reno Municipal Court, you
may do so by contacting Pam Longoni at (775) 530-5251.
The following information is provided to assist you in placing an order for a transcript:
I. Orders will require the date of the court appearance, type of proceeding, (trial,
arraignment, etc.), department number in which the proceeding was held, and also
include the appropriate deposit as indicated below. Payment may be made by check or
money order. No transcript will be prepared until the required deposit is received.

3. Deposits. Deposits required are as follows: $75.00 for arraignment/sentencing; a
minimum deposit of$200.00 for any trial transcript; and a minimum deposit of$500.00
for very lengthy trials (those lasting more than three hours). NO TRANSCRIPT IS
CONSIDERED TO BE OFFICIALLY ORDERED, AND COMMENCEMENT OF
TRANSCRIPTION WILL NOT BEGIN, UNTIL RECEIPT OF THE REQUIRED
DEPOSIT.
5. Questions. Pan Longoni will be happy to answer any questions you may have
regarding the above information.
P.O. BOX~cn,l, Nevada 89505 (715) 3342290, Fax (775) 3343824

Additionally, the 8/22/13 Order of this court uses the same term, ruling that J udge Elliott
used in his 3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMCwhere such 8/22/13 order refers to its
tentative rulingthe term ruling necessarily connotes lack of a final order or judgmentas
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 12 -
NOTICE
such, where such 3/15/12 Order Affirming purports to remand jurisdiction back to the RMC, such is
void, as a remand is not appropriate until a final judgment has been entered as to Coughlins appeal
(where such appeal should encompass, for judicial economies sake, Coughlins appeal of all of the
Orders and J udgments by J udge Howard (including, but not limited to Howards 10/27/11 denial of a
continuance and denial of court appointed defender, obviously the 11/30/11 judgment of conviction
and court order, as well as the 11/30/11 Order Punishinng Summary Contempt, in addition to the
12/15/11 Order (which purports to refuse to adjudicate Coughlins Motion for New Trial (or Motion
to Vacate/Set Aside, which is obviously the functional equivalent of such and where the file name of
the motion filed via email (with written permission to by RMC Ballard) list a Motion for New
Trial, etc., etc) which arguably made premature Coughlins 12/12/11 and or 12/13/11 Notice of
Appeal, meaning the 2J DC never really had jurisdiction for the appeal in the first place, not until
Howard rules on Coughlins tolling motion NRS 176.515 Motion for New Trialand really it
would be appropriate to combine into this matter coughlins Petition for extraordinary writs.
Please consider this a supplement to Coughlins 9/18/13 Motion (or motion for leave to
submit such) and or motion for extension of time to file the Supplemental Brief not to exceed fifteen
(15 pages) solely on the issue of whether this court has jurisdiction over this case referenced in
the 8/22/13 Order in Cr11-2064. Coughlin believes the transcript in the matter on appeal in cr11-
2064 (at least of the 11/30/11 trial date, though the misconduct by J udge W. Gardner at the 10/11/11
arraignment is of salient importance to the denial of Coughlins Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
issues)Indeed, J udge Elliotts own invocation of NRS 4.410(2) in his fn1 in his 3/15/12 Order
Affirming in cr11-2064 brings into place Braham and the mandatory authority establishing that an
criminal defendant/petitioner/appellant whom has been declared indigent may not be charged for the
transcript of the trial. See NRS 189.030(1).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 13 -
NOTICE
The 8/27/12 Order granting the Citys Motion to Dismiss should be vacated. Coughlin is
entitled to rely upon J udge Elliotts written pronouncement that the deadline in NRS 189.010 (and
therefore in all of TITLE 14PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES (NRS 169 to 189, which
necessarily includes NRS 189.010, NRS 176.515, NRS 178.482 computation of time standard
specifying that NRCP 6(a) and 6(e) apply.
Given Nevada law pursuant to NRS 189.030(1), Coughlin was absolutely entitled to the transcript of the
trial of 11/30/11, making Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in excess of his jurisdiction, so
much so that he arguably should be prevented from availing himself of any judicial immunity. U. S. v. MacCollom
Supreme Court of the United States June 10, 1976 426 U.S. 317 96 S.Ct. 2086 .
Although under some authority, the mere oral pronouncement of judgment without an entry on the trial
docket is not a rendition of judgment. Nev.-Division of Child and Family Services, Dept. Of Human Resources,
State of Nevada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 120 Nev. 445, 92 P.3D 1239 (2004).
RULES OF COURT
NRS 178.608 Rules of justice courts and district courts not to be inconsistent with this title. Rules made by
justice courts and district courts for the conduct of criminal proceedings shall not be inconsistent with this title. (Added to
NRS by 1967, 1458)
NRS 178.610 Where no procedure specifically prescribed court may proceed in lawful manner. If no
procedure is specifically prescribed by this title, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with this
title or with any other applicable statute. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1458).
BOYLE et al.,V. CertainTEED CORPORATION, 40 Cal.Rptr.3D 501 (2006): "[1] Courts 78 106k78 Sources of
authority for local judicial rulemaking include express legislative grants of power to adopt local rules for the judicial
management of cases, standards of judicial administration recommended by the J udicial Council, and the inherent power
of courts to control litigation before them.
[2] J udgment 183 228k183 [2] J udgment 184 228k184 Local court rule providing for expedited summary
judgment on 60 days notice and no supporting papers in asbestos cases impermissibly conflicted with statewide statute
requiring 75 days notice and supporting evidence for summary judgment motions; thus, local court rule was invalid.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 14 -
NOTICE
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. 437C. See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Proceedings Without Trial, 192; Weil &
Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2005) 10:54 et seq (CACIVP Ch. 10-B).
[3] Courts 78 106k78 Trial judges have no authority to issue courtroom local rules that conflict with any statute
or are inconsistent with law.
[4] Appeal and Error 232(.5) 30K232(.5) Plaintiffs in wrongful death asbestos case did not waive their claim that
local court rule providing for expedited summary judgment on 60 days notice and no supporting papers in asbestos cases
conflicted with statewide statute requiring 75 days notice and supporting evidence for summary judgment motions;
plaintiffs's summary judgment brief stated at the outset that the expedited summary judgment procedure provided by the
local court rule violated the summary judgment statute, and therefore they fully stated the nature and specific grounds for
the challenge." BOYLE et al.,V. CertainTEED CORPORATION, 40 Cal.Rptr.3D 501 (2006).
("A. Introduction [1] There are several sources of authority for local judicial rulemaking. (Rutherford v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4Th 953, 966-967, 67 Cal.Rptr.2D 16, 941 P.2D 1203.) Those sources of authority include
express legislative grants of power to adopt local rules for the judicial management of cases, standards of judicial
administration recommended by the J udicial Council, and the inherent power of courts to control litigation before them.
(Ibid.) The J udicial Council has recognized that complex civil litigation requires " 'specialized management to avoid
placing unnecessary burdens on the trial courts or litigants.' " (Id., Citing Cal. Standards J ud. Admin., 19 (Deering's Cal.
Ann.Codes, Rules (Appen.) (1988 Ed.) Pp. 620-621.)) The San Francisco Superior Court has designated cases involving
death and injury from asbestos exposure as complex litigation under J udicial Council standards, and has established a
procedure for the issuance of general orders applicable to asbestos cases filed in that court. (Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4Th
at pp. 966-967, 67 Cal.Rptr.2D 16, 941 P.2D 1203.) The San Francisco Superior Court's authority to issue those general
orders in asbestos cases is not questioned on this appeal. It is the validity of one of those general orders that is challenged
by plaintiffs. *504 [2][3] Plaintiffs argue that General Order No. 157, Allowing expedited summary judgment, conflicts
with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. It is well established that, whatever the source of authority for a local judicial
rule, " 'trial judges have no authority to issue courtroom local rules which conflict with any statute' or are 'inconsistent
with law.' " (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., Supra, 16 Cal.4Th at p. 967, 67 Cal.Rptr.2D 16, 941 P.2D 1203.) If
General Order No. 157 Conflicts with a statewide statute, then it is an inappropriate exercise of that court's rulemaking
powers. (Id.)"
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 15 -
NOTICE
Woerner v. J ustice Court of Reno Tp. Ex rel. County of Washoe, 1 P.3D 377, 381 , Nev.; Courts 106k78. Westlaw
Key Number Search: 106K78. C.J .S. Courts 7, 124 to 127.
Trial court exceeds its inherent authority to enforce the court's rules of practice by prohibiting the state from
seeking the death penalty in a first-degree murder prosecution, as a sanction for the state's failure to timely file a petition
for a special pretrial conference, where such an order impermissibly conflicts with the legislative mandate and with the
district attorney's constitutional obligations. State v. Rorie, 348 N.C. 266, 500 S.E.2D 77 (1998).
A state supreme court has the inherent power to adopt measures essential to due administration of justice and to
exercise general superintending control over inferior courts. Goldman v. Bryan, 104 Nev. 644, 764 P.2D 1296 (1988).
Courts may have some inherent authority to discipline attorneys. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S. Ct.
2123, 115 L. Ed. 2D 27, 19 Fed. R. Serv. 3D 817 (1991); Morrison v. International Programs Consortium, Inc., 240 F.
Supp. 2D 53 (D.D.C. 2003) (Imposing monetary sanctions); Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2D 243 (Utah 1993); Chevron
Chemical Co. V. Deloitte & Touche, 176 Wis. 2D 935, 501 N.W.2D 15 (1993). Correct errors in a record. State v. Old,
271 N.C. 341, 156 S.E.2D 756 (1967). As to correcting or amending the court's record, generally, see 27. 28. Right to
inspect record, generally West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Courts k 117 Court records are generally
open to inspection by the public.[FN1] Members of the press have no greater right than members of the general public to
inspect public court records.[FN2] The right of access to a judicial document begins when the document is filed.[FN3]
The right to inspect includes the right to make copies from the record.[FN4] Where the record consists of an
audiotape,[FN5] it is open to inspection by the public.[ FN6] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: In assessing claim
for public access to judicial documents, weight to be given presumption of access must be governed by role of material at
issue in exercise of Article III judicial power and resultant value of such information to those monitoring federal courts.
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. Of Onondaga, 435 F.3D 110 (2d Cir. 2006). [END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Pantos v. City and County of San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 3D 258, 198 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1St Dist. 1984);
Green v. Drinnon, Inc., 262 Ga. 264, 417 S.E.2D 11 (1992); In re J ohn Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 Misc. 2D 269,
366 N.Y.S.2D 93 (Sup 1975); In re Robertson, 7 N.C. App. 186, 171 S.E.2D 801 (1970); Cohen v. Everett City Council,
85 Wash. 2D 385, 535 P.2D 801 (1975). As to public records, generally, see Am. J ur. 2D, Records and Recording Laws.
20 Am. J ur. 2D Courts 28 [FN2] Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3D 777, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (2D Dist. 1977); C. V. C.,
320 A.2D 717, 84 A.L.R.3D 581 (Del. 1974); Sentinel Communications Co. V. Smith, 493 So. 2D 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 5Th Dist. 1986) (Disapproved of on other grounds by, Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2D 113
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 16 -
NOTICE
(Fla. 1988)) (Holding, however, that the news media should be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
court orders the sealing of the record); State ex rel. Bingaman v. Brennan, 98 N.M. 109, 645 P.2D 982 (1982). [FN3]
Atlanta J ournal v. Long, 258 Ga. 410, 369 S.E.2D 755 (1988), opinion corrected, 377 S.E.2D 150 (Ga. 1989). [FN4]
Keko v. Lobrano, 497 So. 2D 353 (La. Ct. App. 4Th Cir. 1986), Writ denied, 497 So. 2D 1003 (La. 1986). [FN5] 25.
[FN6] Smith v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 261 Va. 113, 540 S.E.2D 878 (2001).
Judge Stiglich absolutely has jurisdiction to correct the errors of Judge Elliott in taking over these cases from
him (such address the provision in the 8/25/13 Order allowing Coughlin to provide authority in to Department 8 in
support of his contention that CR11-2064 is not a closed cases or presenting of a situation where Judge Stiglich has no
jurisdiction any longer): 27. Correction or amendment; generally West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number
Digest, Courts k 116 to 116(6) A court may, upon its own motion[FN1] or that of an interested party,[FN2] correct[FN3]
or amend[FN4] its record in a civil[FN5] or criminal[FN6] case, where the record contains an incorrect entry or fails to
record a substantial occurrence in the proceeding.[FN7] Factual determinations made by a court are correctable if the
judge who heard the evidence believes that they are necessary and capable of being made without the grant of a new
trial.[FN8] The incorrect rate of prejudgment or post-judgment interest is a "clerical error" that a court may correct at any
time on its own initiative.[FN9] However, the court may not, under the guise of correcting or amending the record,
change the substance of what is correctly recorded.[FN10] Thus, while the record may be amended nunc pro tunc,[FN11]
the order can only be used to place in the record evidence of judicial action that had actually been taken and cannot
correct an error or supply the record with action that the court failed to make.[FN12] A court may correct or amend its
records at any time after it has created the record.[FN13] The court may also amend or correct the record where the case
is already in the appeal or review stage.[FN14] On a motion to correct or amend a court record, the court may consider
any relevant, competent evidence but must exercise great caution where the only evidence offered on which to base the
order is parol evidence or the judge's memory.[FN15] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: When there is a conflict
between the docket entries and the transcript, the transcript, unless shown to be in error, takes precedence over the docket
entries, and additionally, if necessary, the docket will be corrected. Caldwell v. State, 164 Md. App. 612, 884 A.2D 199
(2005). 20 Am. J ur. 2D Courts 27 [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Ankner v. Napolitano, 764 A.2D 712 (R.I. 2001);
J efferson v. Com., 269 Va. 136, 607 S.E.2D 107 (2005). [FN2] State v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399, 94 S.E.2D 339 (1956).
[FN3] Ankner v. Napolitano, 764 A.2D 712 (R.I. 2001); J efferson v. Com., 269 Va. 136, 607 S.E.2D 107 (2005). [FN4]
State v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399, 94 S.E.2D 339 (1956). [FN5] Ankner v. Napolitano, 764 A.2D 712 (R.I. 2001); Bales v.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 17 -
NOTICE
Brome, 56 Wyo. 111, 105 P.2D 568 (1940). [FN6] Teasley v. Com., 188 Va. 376, 49 S.E.2D 604 (1948) (overruled in part
on other grounds by, Council v. Com., 198 Va. 288, 94 S.E.2D 245 (1956)). [FN7] State v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399, 94
S.E.2D 339 (1956). [FN8] Padilla v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 2D 479 (M.D. Pa. 2001). [FN9] Ankner v. Napolitano, 764 A.2D
712 (R.I. 2001). [FN10] Interstate Printing Co. V. Department of Revenue, 236 Neb. 110, 459 N.W.2D 519 (1990);
Council v. Com., 198 Va. 288, 94 S.E.2D 245 (1956). [FN11] Interstate Printing Co. V. Department of Revenue, 236 Neb.
110, 459 N.W.2D 519 (1990). [FN12] First Midwest Bank/Danville v. Hoagland, 244 Ill. App. 3D 596, 184 Ill. Dec. 250,
613 N.E.2D 277 (4th Dist. 1993); Harden v. Com., 885 S.W.2D 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994). [FN13] State v. Old, 271 N.C.
341, 156 S.E.2D 756 (1967). [FN14] 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation and Development Com'n, 301 Or.
622, 724 P.2D 805 (1986). [FN15] State v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399, 94 S.E.2D 339 (1956).
Also, integral to the analysis of the 4/13/09 Order After Trial in DV08-01168 at issue in Coughlins wrongful
termination lawsuits against WLS in CV11-01896 and CV11-01955, as well as supportive of the arguments Coughlin
made during the 8/19/13 and 8/22/13 status conferences in cr11-2064 relative to the peculiar use of the term Ruling in
J udge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC is the following from CJ S (and such is awfully relevant to
the analysis of whether NRS 69.050s prevailing party attorneys fee award in the appeal of a judgment applies to
summary eviction orders):
S 4. Distinguished from rules and orders West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, J udgment k
22 J udgments generally are distinguished from rules or orders in that a judgment is the final determination of the rights of
the parties ending the suit whereas a rule or order is an interlocutory determination of some subsidiary or collateral matter,
not disposing of the merits. A judgment in the most general sense is a judicial act that establishes rights and liabilities to
the extent possible in a particular suit, while orders, opinions, verdicts, and other declarations in a trial court are the
building blocks for a judgment.[1] A judgment is an order, but an order is not necessarily a judgment.[2] However, certain
orders have sometimes been termed judgments,[3] and it has been held that the character of an instrument, whether a
judgment or an order, is to be determined by its contents and substance, and not by its title.[4] As distinguished from a
judgment, an order is the mandate or determination of the court on some subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an
action, not disposing of the merits, but adjudicating a preliminary point or directing some step in the proceedings;[5] and
the term is commonly defined in codes of procedure as every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and
not included in a judgment.[6] A judgment, on the other hand, is the determination of the court on the issue presented by
the pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in the particular suit with relation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 18 -
NOTICE
to the subject matter in litigation, and puts an end to the suit.[7] The distinguishing characteristic of a judgment is that it is
final,[8] while that of an order, when it relates to proceeding in an action, is that it is interlocutory.[9] A decision
sustaining or overruling a demurrer ordinarily is an order, not a judgment,[10] although there is also some authority to the
contrary.[11] An order or rule ordinarily is not founded on the whole record in the case, but is granted on a special
application to the court called a "motion;" the determination of such motion is an order, not a judgment.[12] A special
proceeding regularly terminates in a final order, not a judgment,[13] although the final order in a special proceeding is in
effect a judgment and is sometimes referred to as such.[14] An order on a motion for sanctions is not a judgment.[15] It
has been held that an order for restitution does not authorize the entry of civil judgment.[16] It has been held that to
equate a judgment in a criminal case with an order that does not adjudicate guilt is not technically correct.[17] Order for
judgment. An order merely directing or authorizing the entry of judgment in the case does not constitute a judgment; to
have this effect it must be so worded as to express the final sentence of the court on the matters contained in the record
and to end the case at once, without contemplating any further judicial action.[18] Order for an execution. An order of a
judge to the clerk to issue execution for a specific sum with costs has been held equivalent to a judgment,[19] although
there is also authority to the contrary.[20] "J udgment order." It has been said that the phrase "judgment order" is
inherently contradictory[ 21] and courts should not use the phrase to dispose of a case requiring a "judgment."[22] ---------
----------------------------------------------------------------------- [FN1] Miss.-Gordon v. Gordon, 929 So. 2D 981 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2006). [FN2] Fla.-Centennial Ins. Co. V. Life Bank, 953 So. 2D 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2D Dist. 2006). [FN3] Mont.-
State ex rel. Meyer v. District Court of Fourth J udicial Dist. In and for Missoula County, 102 Mont. 222, 57 P.2D 778
(1936). Ohio-Continental Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. V. J acksick, 46 Ohio App. 344, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 203, 188 N.E. 662 (5Th
Dist. Stark County 1933). [FN4] Ark.-White v. Mattingly, 89 Ark. App. 55, 199 S.W.3D 724 (2004). Idaho-State v.
McNichols, 62 Idaho 616, 115 P.2D 104 (1941). Or.-In re McLeod's Estate, 143 Or. 233, 21 P.2D 1084 (1933). [FN5]
Iowa-Whittier v. Whittier, 237 Iowa 655, 23 N.W.2D 435 (1946). Nev.-Elsman v. Elsman, 54 Nev. 20, 2 P.2D 139 (1931).
Tex.-Lindley v. Flores, 672 S.W.2D 612 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1984). [FN6] N.C.-Curry v. First Federal Sav. And
Loan Ass'n of Charlotte, 125 N.C. App. 108, 479 S.E.2D 286 (1997). Okla.-Foreman v. Riley, 1923 OK 2, 88 Okla. 75,
211 P. 495 (1923). S.D.-Western Bldg. Co. V. J .C. Penney Co., 60 S.D. 630, 245 N.W. 909 (1932). Wis.-Newlander v.
Riverview Realty Co., 238 Wis. 211, 298 N.W. 603, 135 A.L.R. 383 (1941). [FN7] Mo.-Koch v. Meacham, 233 Mo. App.
453, 121 S.W.2D 279 (1938). Tex.-Lindley v. Flores, 672 S.W.2D 612 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1984). [FN8] Nev.-
Elsman v. Elsman, 54 Nev. 20, 2 P.2D 139 (1931). N.Y.-In re Kennedy's Estate, 156 Misc. 166, 281 N.Y.S. 278 (Sur. Ct.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 19 -
NOTICE
1935). Final determination (1) An order which is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action is the
"judgment." Cal.-Passavanti v. Williams, 225 Cal. App. 3D 1602, 275 Cal. Rptr. 887 (4Th Dist. 1990). (2) An order which
has effect of finally determining rights of parties, and finally disposing of case is "judgment." Mont.-State ex rel. Meyer v.
District Court of Fourth J udicial Dist. In and for Missoula County, 102 Mont. 222, 57 P.2D 778 (1936). As to the
distinction between final and interlocutory judgments, see s 10. [FN9] N.Y.-In re Kennedy's Estate, 156 Misc. 166, 281
N.Y.S. 278 (Sur. Ct. 1935). As to distinction between final judgment and final order, see C.J .S., Motions and Orders s 2.
[FN10] Wyo.-Greenawalt v. Natrona Imp. Co., 16 Wyo. 226, 92 P. 1008 (1907). Interlocutory judgments on demurrer, see,
infra s 10. [FN11] N.Y.-Bentley v. J ones, 4 How. Pr. 335, 1850 WL 5291 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1850). [FN12] Mo.-Pence v.
Kansas City Laundry Service Co., 332 Mo. 930, 59 S.W.2D 633 (1933). Okla.-French v. Boles, 1927 OK 429, 128 Okla.
90, 261 P. 196 (1927). [FN13] N.Y.-People ex rel. Rochester, S. & E.R. Co. V. Moroney, 224 N.Y. 114, 120 N.E. 149
(1918). Wis.-In re Wisconsin Mut. Ins. Co., 241 Wis. 394, 6 N.W.2D 330 (1942). [FN14] N.Y.-In re Kennedy's Estate,
156 Misc. 166, 281 N.Y.S. 278 (Sur. Ct. 1935). [FN15] Tex.-J obe v. Lapidus, 874 S.W.2D 764 (Tex. App. Dallas 1994),
writ denied, (Sept. 15, 1994). [FN16] Federal court order Federal court order requiring defendant to make restitution to
mail fraud victim pursuant to Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) could not be sole basis for derivative
civil fraud judgment in favor of victim and against defendant in state court. Minn.-CNA Ins. Companies v. Caswell-Ross
Agency, 497 N.W.2D 633 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). [FN17] Mont.-State ex rel. Torres v. Montana Eighth J udicial Dist.
Court, Cascade County, 265 Mont. 445, 877 P.2D 1008 (1994). [FN18] Cal.-Bastajian v. Brown, 19 Cal. 2D 209, 120
P.2D 9 (1941). Okla.-Lee v. Epperson, 1934 OK 229, 168 Okla. 220, 32 P.2D 309 (1934). Or.-Grant County Federal
Credit Union v. Hatch, 98 Or. App. 1, 777 P.2D 1388 (1989). Purport An order for a judgment is not a judgment, because
it does not purport of itself to determine the rights of the parties. Cal.-Ericson v. Steiner, 119 Cal. App. 305, 6 P.2D 298
(3d Dist. 1931). [FN19] Ga.-Klink v. Steamer Cusseta and Owners, 30 Ga. 504, 1860 WL 2182 (1860). Ill.-Sears v. Sears,
8 Ill. 47, 3 Gilman 47, 1846 WL 3815 (1846). Including A judgment is the act of the trial court finally adjudicating the
rights of the parties including a decision by the court that a party shall recover a sum certain. Mass.-Karellas v. Karellas,
54 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 766 N.E.2D 102 (2002). [FN20] Colo.-Hoehne v. Trugillo, 1 Colo. 161, 1869 WL 125 (1869).
[FN21] Or.-State v. McDonnell, 306 Or. 579, 761 P.2D 921 (1988). [FN22] Or.-State v. McDonnell, 306 Or. 579, 761
P.2D 921 (1988).
As to rendition in open court see s 19. (There is some issues with J udge Howard's holdign the 11/30/11 trial
through the night, concluding at 8:30 pm (overtime pay, so much for budget crisis "soundbyte"): III. Essentials of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 20 -
NOTICE
Existence, Validity, and Regularity of J udgment A. Introduction 2. Duly Constituted Court Topic Summary References
Correlation Table s 19. Court sitting in authorized place at authorized time West's Key Number Digest West's Key
Number Digest, J udgment k 10 West's Key Number Digest, J udgment k 11 It has been held to be essential to the validity
of a judgment that it be rendered by a court sitting at the time and also in the place authorized by law; however, there is
some authority to the contrary. According to some authorities, it is essential to the validity of a judgment that it be
rendered by a court sitting in the place[1] and also at the time[2] authorized by law, the tribunal not being otherwise a
court in any legal sense,[3] and the proceedings being, therefore, coram non judice.[4] However, this is not the universal
view. Thus, it has been held that the mere fact that the court was held at a place other than that directed by law will not of
itself render the judgment void,[5] as where the court errs with respect to the location of the county seat.[6] It has also
been held that the fact that a term of court at which a judgment was rendered was held at a time other than that prescribed
or authorized by law, while rendering the judgment erroneous and constituting ground for its reversal, does not render the
judgment void;[7] however, there is contrary authority on this specific point, holding a judgment rendered under such
circumstances to be void.[8] Signature and entry. In cases in which the trial judge signs a judgment but fails to authorize
its entry before vacating his or her office, it would not be within the authority of the clerk to authorize the entry of the
judgment, and the judgment would be void.[ 9] A revised judgment is void where it is signed after the trial court loses its
plenary power following the filing of a notice of appeal.[10] J udgments rendered in chambers. J udgments should be
rendered in open court and not in chambers,[11] and it has been held that judgments rendered in chambers are void,[12] in
the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions authorizing such action at chambers.[13] However, whether a
judgment was signed at chambers or in open court is immaterial, since the signing of a judgment involves no judicial
consideration.[14] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [FN1] Ala.-Polytinsky v. J ohnston,
211 Ala. 99, 99 So. 839 (1924). Okla.-City of Clinton ex rel. Richardson v. Keen, 1943 OK 165, 192 Okla. 382, 138 P.2D
104 (1943). Tex.-British General Ins. Co. V. Ripy, 130 Tex. 101, 106 S.W.2D 1047 (Comm'n App. 1937). [FN2] Ala.-
Polytinsky v. J ohnston, 211 Ala. 99, 99 So. 839 (1924). Ark.-Magnolia Petroleum Co. V. Saunders, 192 Ark. 783, 94
S.W.2D 703 (1936). Ga.-Hicks v. Hicks, 69 Ga. App. 870, 27 S.E.2D 10 (1943). Tex.-British General Ins. Co. V. Ripy,
130 Tex. 101, 106 S.W.2D 1047 (Comm'n App. 1937). Validity of judgment on holiday, see C.J .S., Holidays s 10. Validity
of judgment on Sunday, see C.J .S., Sunday s 79. [FN3] Ariz.-Meade v. Scribner, 10 Ariz. 33, 85 P. 729 (1906). [FN4] Ga.-
Hicks v. Hicks, 69 Ga. App. 870, 27 S.E.2D 10 (1943). [FN5] Minn.-Ellis v. Ellis, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N.W. 1056 (1893).
Improper county A judgment is not invalidated if tried in an improper county unless there is something in statute to
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 21 -
NOTICE
indicate its requirements are jurisdictional. Ark.-Mark Twain Life Ins. Corp. V. Cory, 283 Ark. 55, 670 S.W.2D 809
(1984). [FN6] Ill.-Robinson v. Moore, 25 Ill. 135, 1860 WL 6520 (1860). [FN7] S.D.-Lockard v. Lockard, 21 S.D. 134,
110 N.W. 104 (1907). [FN8] Ala.-State v. Thurman, 17 Ala. App. 656, 88 So. 61 (1921). [FN9] Ala.-Rollins v. Rollins,
903 So. 2D 828 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). [FN10] Tex.-United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Croft, 175 S.W.3D 457 (Tex. App.
Dallas 2005). [FN11] Tex.-Bridgman v. Moore, 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W.2D 705 (1944). [FN12] Colo.-Scott v. Stutheit, 21
Colo. App. 28, 121 P. 151 (1912). Neb.-Shold v. Van Treeck, 82 Neb. 99, 117 N.W. 113 (1908). [FN13] Wash.-Williams v.
Briley, 137 Wash. 262, 242 P. 370 (1926). [FN14] Idaho-Baldwin v. Anderson, 52 Idaho 243, 13 P.2D 650 (1932).
As such, the ROA in both 1262 and 2064 failed to demonstrate that Coughlin was personally served such
11/30/11 and 6/18/12 J udgment of Conviction and Court Order in 2064 and 1262 respectively, so NRCP 6(e)s three
days for mailing for constructive service must be added on to all deadlines, including those under NRS 176.515 and NRS
189.010. The trial court's oral pronouncement must clearly indicate the intent to render judgment at the time the
words are expressed. In re A.B., 125 S.W.3D 769 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2003), review denied, (Mar. 19, 2004).
As to rendition and entry of judgment generally, see ss 136 to 154. Also, it has been stated that a written
judgment must agree with the written record of the rendition.Tex.-Burgess v. Burgess, 834 S.W.2D 538 (Tex. App.
Houston 1st Dist. 1992). Order or memoranda for judgment. It must appear that that which is offered as the record of a
judgment is really such, and not an order for a judgment or mere memoranda from which the judgment is to be drawn.
Utah-Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73 Utah 563, 276 P. 159 (1929). Order in memorandum as judgment Although there was no
formal judgment in sense of docketed separate piece of paper, order for judgment in judge's memorandum met test for
judgment and disposed of all claims in case. Mass.-Computer Systems of America, Inc. V. Western Reserve Life Assur.
Co. Of Ohio, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 475 N.E.2D 745 (1985).
Coughlin touches on the import of the term rendition in NRS 189.010 at page 253 of the 12/23/11 ROA in
2064. However, J udge Elliots 3/15/12 Order in 2064 8/27/12 Order in 1262 remixes NRS 189.010 to involved entry of
order rather than rendition and Coughlin is entitled to rely upon such. It does not appear there is any law in Nevada as
to just what the term rendition meanshowever, both J udge Howard on 11/30/11 and J udge Sferrazza (even though
rendition is not used at all in any of the statute relevant to a summary evictionJ udge Sferrazza, in dictum at the
12/20/11 hearing purported his order evicting Coughlin to be entered in open court verbally on 10/25/11) on 10/25/11
both indicated their judgments were not being rendered at such time, but J udge Howard referenced such would take
effect upon Coughlins release from the three days summary incarceration (ie, the NRS 189.010 and NRS 176.515
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 22 -
NOTICE
deadlines would run therefromand Sferrazza indicated the eviction would be effective on 10/31/11 at 5 pmthe fact
that neither were entered as such time as the were orally pronounced means they had to be served in the mail, and that
entails and NRCP 6(e) analysis relative to the the various deadlines attendant thereto. II. Rendition 59. Manner of
pronouncement Federal Civil Procedure 2621
A. Rendition Topic Summary References Correlation Table s 136. Generally West's Key Number Digest West's
Key Number Digest, J udgment k 191 West's Key Number Digest, J udgment k 192 The rendition of a judgment is the
judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law on the facts in controversy as ascertained by the pleadings
and verdict or findings, as distinguished from the ministerial act of entering the judgment. The rendition of a judgment is
the judicial act of the court[1] in pronouncing the sentence of the law on the facts in controversy as ascertained by the
pleadings and verdict or findings,[2] as distinguished from the official entry of the judgment.[3] "Rendition" of judgment
is the act by which the court declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue[4] and it is the substance and effect
of an adjudication that is determinative of whether it is a judgment, not the form of the decree.[5] On its rendition, and
without entry, a judgment is final, valid, and enforceable as between the parties[6] in the absence of a statute to the
contrary.[7] Under some authority, the court's practice does not favor the termination of proceedings without a
determination of the merits of the controversy where that can be brought about with due regard to necessary rules of
procedure.[8] Accordingly, the law does not favor the termination of proceedings without a determination of the merits of
the controversy when that can be brought about with due regard to necessary rules of procedure, and for that reason, the
trial court should make every effort to adjudicate the substantive controversy before it and, when practicable, should
decide a procedural issue so as not to preclude hearing the merits of an appeal.[9] ------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------- [FN1] Ala.-Smith v. J ackson, 770 So. 2D 1068 (Ala. 2000). Cal.-People v. Frontier Pacific Ins.
Co., 83 Cal. App. 4Th 1289, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2D 433 (3d Dist. 2000). Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365
(1994). Mo.-Cozart v. Mazda Distributors (Gulf), Inc., 861 S.W.2D 347 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1993). Neb.-National Account
Systems of Omaha, Inc. V. McIntyre, 2 Neb. App. 884, 518 N.W.2D 158 (1994). Okla.-Peoples Elec. Co-op. V.
Broughton, 1942 OK 233, 191 Okla. 229, 127 P.2D 850 (1942). [FN2] Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365
(1994). Neb.-National Account Systems of Omaha, Inc. V. McIntyre, 2 Neb. App. 884, 518 N.W.2D 158 (1994). Okla.-
Presbyterian Hosp., Inc. V. Board of Tax-Roll Corrections of Oklahoma County, 1984 OK 93, 693 P.2D 611 (Okla. 1984).
Tenn.-Christopher v. Spooner, 640 S.W.2D 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). Tex.-Arriaga v. Cavazos, 880 S.W.2D 830 (Tex.
App. San Antonio 1994). W.Va.-Echard v. City of Parkersburg, 187 W. Va. 350, 419 S.E.2D 14 (1992). Decision or
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 23 -
NOTICE
findings by court, generally, see C.J .S., Trial ss 602 to 606, 609 to 612. Verdict or findings by jury, generally, see C.J .S.,
Trial s 485. [FN3] Ariz.-American Sur. Co. Of N.Y. V. Mosher, 48 Ariz. 552, 64 P.2D 1025 (1936). Mo.-In re Marriage of
Huey, 716 S.W.2D 479 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1986). Tenn.-Christopher v. Spooner, 640 S.W.2D 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
Tex.-Bakali v. Bakali, 830 S.W.2D 251 (Tex. App. Dallas 1992). W.Va.-Echard v. City of Parkersburg, 187 W. Va. 350,
419 S.E.2D 14 (1992). As to entry, generally, see s 143. [FN4] Tex.-Stallworth v. Stallworth, 201 S.W.3D 338 (Tex. App.
Dallas 2006). Va.-J efferson v. Com., 269 Va. 136, 607 S.E.2D 107 (2005). [FN5] Cal.-Otay River Constructors v. San
Diego Expressway, 158 Cal. App. 4Th 796, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3D 434 (4th Dist. 2008). [FN6] Ala.-Du Pree v. Hart, 242 Ala.
690, 8 So. 2D 183 (1942). Cal.-Bank One Texas v. Pollack, 24 Cal. App. 4Th 973, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2D 510 (2d Dist. 1994).
Ill.-Wickiser v. Powers, 324 Ill. App. 130, 57 N.E.2D 522 (3d Dist. 1944). Neb.-Pontiac Imp. Co. V. Leisy, 144 Neb. 705,
14 N.W.2D 384 (1944). As to execution before entry see C.J .S., Executions s 13. As to necessity of entry, see s 144. [FN7]
Ark.-McConnell v. Bourland, 175 Ark. 253, 299 S.W. 44 (1927). Del.-Hazzard v. Alexander, 36 Del. 512, 178 A. 873
(Super. Ct. 1935). Or.-Haberly v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Relief Ass'n, 135 Or. 32, 287 P. 222 (1930). [FN8] Conn.-Rocco v.
Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 848 A.2D 352 (2004); Pietraroia v. Northeast Utilities, 254 Conn. 60, 756 A.2D 845 (2000).
[FN9] Conn.-Fedus v. Planning and Zoning Com'n, 278 Conn. 751, 900 A.2D 1 (2006); Olympia Mortg. Corp. V. Klein,
61 Conn. App. 305, 763 A.2D 1055 (2001).
VII. Rendition, Entry, Record, and Docketing A. Rendition Topic Summary References Correlation Table s
138. Mode and sufficiency; necessity of notice West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, J udgment k 215
Whether a judgment has been rendered in a particular case is an inquiry that must be made on a case-by-case basis and
which focuses upon the actions and statements of the court and judgments should be tailored to meet the needs of each
case. Statutory provisions with respect to the mode and sufficiency of rendering judgment are controlling.[1] Where there
are no formal requirements regarding the rendition of a judgment,[2] the question of whether a judgment has been
rendered in a particular case is an inquiry that must be made on a case-by-case basis.[3] In general, the rendition of
judgment occurs when the court pronounces judgment in intelligible language[4] which fully determines the rights of the
parties.[5] An announcement, merely intended to acquaint the parties with the judgment which may be entered in case
particular evidence appears, does not amount to the rendition of a judgment.[6] Although under some authority, the mere
oral pronouncement of judgment without an entry on the trial docket is not a rendition of judgment.[7] Generally, a
judgment is rendered and exists as such when it is orally announced from the bench, and before it has been reduced to
writing and entered by the clerk.[8] Such an announcement must declare a present intent to render rather than an intent to
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 24 -
NOTICE
render in the future.[9] Under other authority, what a judge orally declares is not a judgment until it has been put in
writing and entered as such.[10] The custom of drawing a formal judgment and having the judge sign it is usually
observed,[11] particularly where it contains special provisions requiring settlement by the court unless agreed on by the
parties.[12] The subsequent issuance of a formal written order does not preclude a finding that judgment was actually
orally rendered on an earlier date.[ 13] However, the mere act of signing a judgment does not constitute a rendition of
judgment.[14] In the absence of a rule requiring a judgment to be embodied in a separate document, when it is clear that a
competent tribunal intended a minute entry or a docket sheet entry to be a determination of the rights of the parties to an
action and shows in intelligible language the relief granted, the minute or docket entry may be considered the
judgment.[15] Accordingly, while judgment may be rendered by a docket entry,[16] the docket entry of summary
judgment does not constitute rendition of judgment.[17] However, a trial docket entry alone, unaccompanied by an oral
pronouncement in open court, does not amount to a rendition of judgment.[ 18] Thus, "announcement" of a decision or
final order of the trial court can come, inter alia, orally from the bench, from trial docket notes, from file-stamped but
unsigned journal entries, or from signed but not file-stamped journal entries.[19] Settlement on notice is not required
unless specially directed.[20] The return and recording of a general verdict under the direction of the court are generally a
sufficient rendition of judgment; no further action on the part of the court is necessary,[21] and it is the ministerial duty of
the clerk to enter the proper judgment on the verdict.[22] Where a special verdict or special findings are returned, the
announcement of the decision in open court and its entry in the minutes constitute the rendition of the judgment.[23]
Letter to counsel. While a letter to counsel may be considered rendition of judgment[24] if it is in sufficient detail to state
the court's decision on all matters at issue and is filed with the clerk,[25] a letter is not a rendition of judgment if it only
indicates the court's intention to render judgment in a certain way and sets out guidelines by which counsel are to draw a
judgment.[26] Notice of rendition. Notice of rendition of judgment is unnecessary[27] except where required by
statute.[28] The purpose of notice required by a statute before rendition of judgment, in a case wherein judgment is not
rendered at the hearing, but taken under advisement, is to give an opportunity to attorneys to make objections and
exceptions to the decision.[29] The notice must be given by the court[30] which has authority to direct the manner of
service consistent with existing rules.[31] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Notices of judgment required by rule
of civil procedure to be served by court clerk are mandatory, and are indispensable to the right of parties to receive timely
information from state trial courts concerning significant judicial actions in civil matters in litigation. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 77(d). In re Dunn, 84 So. 3D 4 (Miss. 2010). J udgment is "rendered" as of the date on which the trial judge declares
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 25 -
NOTICE
in open court his decision on matters submitted to him for adjudication; an oral pronouncement by the court of its
decision is sufficient for rendition of judgment. Westwood Shores Country Club v. Hendrickson, 395 S.W.3D 298 (Tex.
App. Tyler 2013), reh'g overruled, (Feb. 21, 2013). The rendition of judgment and the signing of a written judgment are
not synonymous. Greene v. State, 324 S.W.3D 276 (Tex. App. Austin 2010), reh'g overruled, (Oct. 15, 2010). [END OF
SUPPLEMENT] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [FN1] N.C.-Draughon v. Harnett
County Bd. Of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 580 S.E.2D 732, 177 Ed. Law Rep. 608 (2003), Aff'd, 358 N.C. 131, 358 N.C.
381, 591 S.E.2D 521 (2004). Okla.-Miller v. Miller, 1983 OK 64, 664 P.2D 1032 (Okla. 1983). Effect of rule Aside from
its definition in rules, rendition of judgment generally refers to judicial act of court in giving, returning, pronouncing, or
announcing, orally or in writing, its conclusions and decision on matter submitted to it for adjudication, and is distinct
from signing of subsequent formal judgment and from later recording or filing of writing or entry of judgment in minutes
of court. Fla.-Gaines v. Sayne, 764 So. 2D 578 (Fla. 2000). [FN2] Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365
(1994). [FN3] Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994). [FN4] Mo.-Grantham v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.,
721 S.W.2D 242 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1986). [FN5] Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994). Mo.-In re
Marriage of Huey, 716 S.W.2D 479 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1986). [FN6] Mo.-Serfass v. Warner, 707 S.W.2D 448 (Mo. Ct.
App. S.D. 1986). [FN7] Neb.-State v. McPherson, 1 Neb. App. 1022, 510 N.W.2D 487 (1993). Nev.-Division of Child and
Family Services, Dept. Of Human Resources, State of Nevada v. Eighth J udicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 120
Nev. 445, 92 P.3D 1239 (2004). [FN8] Ariz.-Griffith v. State Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 46 Ariz. 359, 51 P.2D 246 (1935).
Ill.-In re Marriage of Gurin, 212 Ill. App. 3D 806, 156 Ill. Dec. 877, 571 N.E.2D 857 (1st Dist. 1991). Ind.-Bailer v.
Dowd, 219 Ind. 624, 40 N.E.2D 325 (1942). Iowa-Street v. Stewart, 226 Iowa 960, 285 N.W. 204 (1939). Kan.-Gates v.
Gates, 160 Kan. 428, 163 P.2D 395 (1945). Md.-J ones v. Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 740 A.2D 1004 (1999). Neb.-Hornig v.
Martel Lift Systems, Inc., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2D 764 (2000). Okla.-Miller v. Miller, 1983 OK 64, 664 P.2D 1032
(Okla. 1983). Tex.-Garza v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Com'n, 89 S.W.3D 1 (Tex. 2002). Wis.-Zbikowski v. Straz, 236
Wis. 161, 294 N.W. 541 (1940). As to necessity of writing, generally, see s 106. [FN9] Tex.-Garza v. Texas Alcoholic
Beverage Com'n, 83 S.W.3D 161 (Tex. App. El Paso 2000), judgment aff'd, 89 S.W.3D 1 (Tex. 2002); Brim Laundry
Machinery Co., Inc. V. Washex Machinery Corp., 854 S.W.2D 297 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1993), writ denied, (Nov. 17,
1993). Special care where rendered orally Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994). [FN10] Ga.-Huffman
v. Armenia, 284 Ga. App. 822, 645 S.E.2D 23 (2007), cert. Denied, (J uly 12, 2007). Ga.-In the Interest of L.H., 242
Ga.App. 659, 660, 530 S.E.2D 753 (2000). As to necessity that judgment be in writing, see s 106. [FN11] Ark.-
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 26 -
NOTICE
McConnell v. Bourland, 175 Ark. 253, 299 S.W. 44 (1927). As to signature by judge, see s 129. [FN12] Ark.-McConnell
v. Bourland, 175 Ark. 253, 299 S.W. 44 (1927). As to settlement of orders, generally, see C.J .S., Motions and Orders s 56.
[FN13] Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994). [FN14] Tex.-Stephens v. Henry S. Miller Co., 667
S.W.2D 250 (Tex. App. Dallas 1984), writ dismissed by agreement, (J uly 11, 1984). As to signing of judgments, see s
129. [FN15] Mo.-Cozart v. Mazda Distributors (Gulf), Inc., 861 S.W.2D 347 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1993). [FN16] Mo.-
Weinbaum v. Weinbaum, 679 S.W.2D 384 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1984). [FN17] Tex.-Harper v. Welchem, Inc., 799 S.W.2D
492 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1990). [FN18] Neb.-Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, Inc., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2D
764 (2000). Tex.-Bailey-Mason v. Mason, 122 S.W.3D 894 (Tex. App. Dallas 2003). [FN19] Neb.-Rosen Auto Leasing,
Inc. V. J ordan, 15 Neb. App. 1, 720 N.W.2D 911 (2006). [FN20] Colo.-Graybill v. Cornelius, 79 Colo. 498, 246 P. 1029
(1926). As to notice of entry see s 148. [FN21] Or.-Haberly v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Relief Ass'n, 135 Or. 32, 287 P. 222
(1930). Tex.-Bridgman v. Moore, 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W.2D 705 (1944). Wyo.-State v. Scott, 35 Wyo. 108, 247 P. 699
(1926). [FN22] As to ministerial duty of the clerk to enter judgment see s 145. [FN23] Cal.-Benway v. Benway, 69 Cal.
App. 2D 574, 159 P.2D 682 (3d Dist. 1945). [FN24] Tex.-Estes v. Carlton, 708 S.W.2D 594 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1986),
writ refused n.R.E., (Oct. 1, 1986). [FN25] Tex.-Mixon v. Moye, 860 S.W.2D 209 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1993). [FN26]
Tex.-Mixon v. Moye, 860 S.W.2D 209 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1993). [FN27] Mo.-McCormick v. Stephens, 141 Mo. App.
236, 124 S.W. 1076 (1910). [FN28] N.M.-R. V. Smith Supply Co. V. Black, 43 N.M. 177, 88 P.2D 269 (1939) . [FN29]
N.M.-R. V. Smith Supply Co. V. Black, 43 N.M. 177, 88 P.2D 269 (1939) . [FN30] N.M.-R. V. Smith Supply Co. V.
Black, 43 N.M. 177, 88 P.2D 269 (1939) . [FN31] N.M.-R. V. Smith Supply Co. V. Black, 43 N.M. 177, 88 P.2D 269
(1939)
J udgment 191, 215 A rendition of judgment can occur in more than one manner.[1] In some jurisdictions,
rendition of judgment is the court's pronouncement by spoken word in open court or by written order filed with the clerk
of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication.[2 ] It is also said that rendition of judgment occurs when
the court makes an oral pronouncement in open court and accompanies that pronouncement with a notation on the trial
docket or, in the alternative, when some written notation of the judgment is filed in the records of the court.[3]
Accordingly, in some jurisdictions an oral manifestation of the decision is regarded as sufficient for a judgment at law to
become operative.[4] For the trial court to effectively render judgment in open court, it must do so in spoken word, not in
mere cognition,[5] and the trial court's oral pronouncement must clearly indicate the intent to render judgment at the time
the words are expressed. [6] Where oral rendition of a judgment is proper, if the trial court signs a judgment on an issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 27 -
NOTICE
without first making an oral pronouncement in open court, the act of signing the judgment is the official act of rendering
judgment.[7] When a trial court orally renders a judgment that disposes of some of the issues in a party's pleading, but is
silent on others, a later signed judgment that disposes of an additional issue, while only a "written memorandum" of the
oral judgment, is a rendition of judgment on the issue addressed for the first time in the written judgment.[8] Caution: An
announcement of judgment in open court merely constitutes a rendering of the judgment, not an entry of judgment.[9] 46
Am. J ur. 2D J udgments 59 In other jurisdictions, however, mere oral pronouncement by the court of its decision is not
the rendition of a judgment,[10] and it has been said that a trial court's oral pronouncement is not a judgment until it is put
in writing and entered as the judgment,[11] that a judge does not render the judgment until he or she signs a written
notation of the relief granted or denied,[12] and that a judgment is not rendered until it is signed.[13] Among the reasons
stated for not recognizing an oral pronouncement by the court as the rendition of judgment are that: (1) there is no
practical manner in which to execute an oral judgment; (2) an oral judgment cannot be filed in the court of another county
or state; and (3) there is no mechanism by which an oral judgment can become a lien on the property of the judgment
debtor.[14] Observation: Prior to the entry of a final judgment, a court remains free to reconsider and issue a written
judgment different from its oral pronouncement.[15] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: The mere oral
announcement of a judgment without an entry on the trial docket is not the rendition of a judgment, for the purposes of
appeal; for a final judgment to exist, there must be an order that is both signed by the court and filed stamped and dated
by the clerk of the court. Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. Of Health and Human Services, 277 Neb. 456, 763 N.W.2D 77
(2009). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, Inc., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2D 764 (2000).
[FN2] J ones v. Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 740 A.2D 1004 (1999); Barton v. Gillespie, 2005 WL 1540156 (Tex. App.
Houston 1st Dist. 2005). [FN3] Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, Inc., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2D 764 (2000). Although a
judgment is rendered and exists as such when it is orally announced from the bench, and before it has been reduced to
writing and entered by the clerk, as a general rule a judgment must be reduced to writing. Bauman v. Maple Valley
Community School Dist., 649 N.W.2D 9 (Iowa 2002). [FN4] U.S. V. Hunt, 513 F.2D 129 (10th Cir. 1975); Gordon v.
Gordon, 390 S.W.2D 583 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Wittau v. Storie, 145 S.W.3D 732 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004). [FN5]
J ames v. Hubbard, 21 S.W.3D 558 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2000). [FN6] In re A.B., 125 S.W.3D 769 (Tex. App.
Texarkana 2003), review denied, (Mar. 19, 2004). [FN7] Wittau v. Storie, 145 S.W.3D 732 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004).
[FN8] Wittau v. Storie, 145 S.W.3D 732 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004). [FN9] Santana v. Santana, 614 S.E.2D 438 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2005). As to entry of judgment distinguished, see 60. [FN10] Rust v. Clark County School Dist., 103 Nev. 686,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 28 -
NOTICE
747 P.2D 1380, 44 Ed. Law Rep. 736 (1987); Montano v. Encinias, 103 N.M. 515, 709 P.2D 1024 (1985); Sparkle
Laundry & Cleaners, Inc. V. Kelton, 595 S.W.2D 88, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). [FN11] Stoker v.
Bellemeade, LLC, 272 Ga. App. 817, 615 S.E.2D 1 (2005), cert. Denied, (Sept. 19, 2005). [FN12] Mumin v. Hart, 9 Neb.
App. 404, 612 N.W.2D 261 (2000). [FN13] State ex rel. A.S.K., 775 So. 2D 1101 (La. Ct. App. 4Th Cir. 2000). [FN14]
McAteer v. Stewart, 696 P.2D 72 (Wyo. 1985). As to judgment liens, see 342 to 384. [FN15] Rust v. Clark County
School Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 747 P.2D 1380, 44 Ed. Law Rep. 736 (1987). AMJ UR J UDGMENTS 59

A court's inherent power extends to all matters reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction, subject to or not in conflict with valid existing laws and constitutional provisions. Veilleux v.
State, 635 So. 2D 977 (Fla. 1994). A court's inherent powers do not increase its jurisdiction; rather, they include only
those powers that are necessary to the court's existence and to the effective and orderly exercise of its jurisdiction. State v.
Rorie, 348 N.C. 266, 500 S.E.2D 77 (1998). Courts invested with the judicial power of the United States have certain
inherent authority to protect the courts' proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging the courts' traditional
responsibilities, although: (1) in many instances the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by
statute or rule, (2) principles of deference counsel restraint in resorting to inherent power and require its use to be a
reasonable response to the problems and needs that provoke it, and (3) a court's inherent power is limited by the necessity
giving rise to its exercise. Degen v. U.S., 517 U.S. 820, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 135 L. Ed. 2D 102 (1996).
Additionally, the 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC is void and or should be vacated in cr11-2064:
Late filing: Late filing of transcript of record of original proceedings against defendant by justice's court on
defendant's appeal of conviction to the district court did not warrant dismissal of underlying criminal charges against
defendant. State v. O'Donnell, 1982, 646 P.2D 1217, 98 Nev. 305. Criminal Law 260.7
J udge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064 purporting to deny Coughlins appeal based upon the alleged failure of
Coughlin to provide a transcript is violative of ODonnell.
Additionally, at page 16 of the 12/23/11 roa in cr11-2064 is proof that the RMC and RCA serve upon each other
documents via email, making further impermissible the RMCs failure to comply with NRS 189.030(1), even should one
not view the written permission to file by email provided to Coughlin by RMC Ballard as not effective (or effective only
until the RMC served an order upon Coughlin revoking such permission to file via email, and there exists no such
revocation until, perhaps, the Administrative Order 2013-01 made in his Administrative J udge capacity by RMC J udge
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 29 -
NOTICE
Gardner on 1/16/13and J udge Howards 12/16/11 Order fails to operate as any such revocation, and even if it did, the
signature thereon fails to indicate such is done in any Administrative J udge capacity sufficient to make it applicable to all
of Coughlins cases in the RMC.
Additionally, J udge Howards 12/22/11 Appeal Bond Order, in seeking to recharacterize the $360.00 cash bail by
Coughlin that Howard had already converted to a fine on 11/30/11, effectively granted Coughlin IFP statuts (even further
requiring transmission of the transcript within 10 days of the 12/12/11 Notice of Appeal under NRS 189.030(1)) where
the bond set at $360 was never required of Coughlin: http://www.scribd.com/doc/171738850/12-22-11-Appeal-Bond-
Order-by-RMC-J udge-Howard-Declaring-Coughlin-Indigent-Further-Requiring-Transmission-of-Transcript-Per-NRS-
189-030-1-22176-2064
Such 12/22/11 order at page 7 of the 12/23/11 ROA in cr11-2064 reads: "APPEAL BOND ORDER Pursuant to
NRS 177.105, 177.115,178.488, And 178.498, This Court orders at Bail or Bond on Appeal is: (X) GRANTED and set in
the amount of $ 360.00 , With the condition that II I e Defendant: DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011 /s/ Kenneth
R. Howard, J udge Department Four"
J udge Howard denied all stays requested by Coughlin, including those Coughlin made verbally during the
portion of the proceeding held in absentia of the City Atttorney at 8:30 pm on 11/30/11 in the matter at issue in cr11-
2064. He is not able to recharacterize such rulings on 11/30/11 in his 12/22/11 Appeal Bond Order, and the transmission
of Coughlins appeal where Coughlin paid no such further $360.00 bond on appeal operates as an order finding Coughlin
indigent.
NRS 177.105 Stay of execution upon sentence of imprisonment. NRS 177.115 Stay of
execution upon fine.
NRS 177.105 Stay of execution upon sentence of imprisonment. A sentence of imprisonment shall be
stayed if an appeal is taken and the defendant is admitted to bail. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
NRS 177.115 Stay of execution upon fine. A sentence to pay a fine or a fine and costs, if an appeal is
taken, may be stayed by a Justice Court, district court, or by the Supreme Court upon such terms as the court
deems proper. The court may require the defendant pending appeal to deposit the whole or any part of the fine and
costs in the registry of the court appealed from, or to give bond for the payment thereof, or to submit to an
examination of assets, and it may make any appropriate order to restrain the defendant from dissipating the
defendants assets. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 30 -
NOTICE
There certainly seems to be widespread confusion over just what rules and statutes apply to criminal
appeals to the district courtand Judge Elliott certainly exhibited a great deal of jurisdictional largesse in his
various ordersespecially that of 3/15/12 affiriming in 2064especially where NRS 189.030(1) directly conflicts
with the application of NRAP 28 and 32 to an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court that Judge Elliott relied on in
citing to Thomas v. States footnote 4 as a basis for denying Coughlins appeal.
Further, this court still has jurisdiction where there is not corollary applicable to the district courts to
NRS 177.305 Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to cease after certificate of judgment remitted. See Palmer v. Del
Webbs High Sierra, 108 Nev. 673, 680 (1992) (Young, J., Concurring) (explaining that [t]he legislature could have
easily provided that an occupational disease means, is or is defined as any disease which arises out of and in
the course of the employment, but that the legislature did not, in fact, do so). Likewise, the legislature could have easily
included district courts jurisdiction within that NRS 177.305 requires to cease upon remand to a justice or municipal
court, but failed to do so, arguably, in light of the higher degree of many of the very peculiarities Coughlin has reference
herein occurring in such courts.
See, e.G., County of Clark ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. V. Upchurch, 114 Nev. 749, 753 (1998) (Citing Cleghorn
v. Hess, 109 Nev. 544, 548 (1993)). See also Willis v. State, 488 A.2D 171, 177 (Md. 1985) ([T]he cardinal rule of
statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent.). See, e.G., State v. Allen, 118 Nev. 842, 847 (2002)
(Citing Washington v. State, 117 Nev. 735, 738-39 (2001)) (Explaining that the plain meaning of a statute is
intended to reflect legislative intent). See also Monterey Coal Co. V. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review
Commn, 743 F.2D 589, 595 (7th Cir. 1984) ([T]he language of the statute is the most reliable indicator of
congressional intent.).
N.R.S. 178.602 Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the court. Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming in CR11-2064 and 8/27/12 Order
Dismissing Appeal in cr12-1262 are reveal plain error where the requirement that a transcript be transmitted,
regardless of any down payment for such being paid (particularly for an indigent criminal defendant like
Coughlin) is mandatory under NRS 189.030(1), as was the appointment of counsel, which was denied, and where
the 6/26/12 tolling Motion for New Trial was clearly not considered by Judge Elliott in his Order, especially where
the timeliness of Coughlins Motion for New Trial was law of the case considering RMC Judge W. Gardners
7/11/12 Order deny Coughlins motion failing to find such untimely, in addition to where Coughlin absolutely
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 31 -
NOTICE
entitle to rely upon Judge Elliotts characterization of NRCP 6 as applying to post-conviction filings in the
computation of time, meaning Coughlins Motion for New Trial would have been due on 6/28/12, which,
incidentally, is the day Coughlin filed by facsimile that which the RMC only file stamped as filed on 7/25/12 (which
is arguably a supplemental to his 6/26/12 Motion for New Trial at page 229 (Notice of Appeal; Motion to vacate
and or Set Aside. JCRCP 59. JCRCP 60; Motion for Reconsideration: Motion for Recusal: Motion For Publication
Of Transcript at Public Expense Petition (or In Forma Pauperis Status) of the 7/26/12 ROA in CR12-1262
(Coughlins 8/15/12 and 8/27/12 filings in CR12-1262 produced the fax confirmation proof that the RMC received
such on 6/28/12, and regardless of whether the RMC chose to place a file stamp on such, NRS 189.030(1) requires
all related papers be transmitted in the ROA, where Whitman, Donoho, Gray, Barnes, and Sullivan clearly place
a duty on RMC Clerks to, at the very least, maintain a record of such submission (shades of the 7/22/13 WDCR 18
violation by 2JDC Asst. Clerk of Court Wise and Unit Manager Michelle Purdy at to the extraordinary writ
Coughlin submitted, which he still has not received the copy of that Judge Stiglich agreed to provide him upon
Coughlin indicating that he would prefer not to take back possession of such submission in response to Judge
Stiglichs attempting to return such to him unfiled, and, apparently, undocumented, as well as the cd/dvd disc
attached thereto and all the materials thereon.
Coughlin hereby requests the district court order the RMC to transmit all related papers to it, filing
such so they will be available to Coughlin, including those materials Coughlin filed via email per Ballards written
permission to, and ESPECIALLY important, to please require the RMC to transmit the COMPLETE 10/27/11
Application for Appointment Defender (IFP) that Coughlin filed with the RMC, as at page 20 of the 12/23/11 ROA, only
a partial (pages missing) reproduction thereof is included (which is telling considering the 2008 Indigent Defense Order
made mandatory appointing Coughlin counsel, and the 2008 Court of Limited J urisdiction Bench Book references
Aigersinger specifically as to the mandatory appointment where the mere possibility of jail time is involved, and
Howards own 10/27/11 Order denying Appointment of Legal Defender fails to rule there was no possibility of
incarceration.
Determination of indigency of accused entitling him to transcript or similar record for purposes of appeal.
66 A.L.R.3d 954 (Originally published in 1975)
3 Determination of "indigence" as a discretionary matter
4 "Indigence" as a relative term
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 32 -
NOTICE
5 Rule that "indigence" does not require complete destitution
6 Rule that burden is on defendant to show his indigence
III Relevance of particular factors
7[a] Possibility of aid from others; friends or relatives-View that possibility of such aid is not
determinative of "indigence"
7[b] Possibility of aid from others; friends or relatives-View that possibility of such aid precludes
finding of "indigence"
8 Private charitable agencies or groups
9[a] Accused's status as regularly employed-As insufficient to negate indigence
9[b] Accused's status as regularly employed-As suggesting nonindigence
10[a] Earning power of accused-Potential
10[b] Earning power of accused-Present earnings
11[a] Unencumbered assets of accused-Generally
11[b] Unencumbered assets of accused-Effect of transfer of such assets prior to trial or appeal
12[a] Retention of counsel for trial or appeal-As suggesting nonindigence
12[b] Retention of counsel for trial or appeal-As not precluding finding of indigence
13[a] Filing of bail or appeal bond-As suggesting nonindigence (NOTE: Howards 12/15/11
Order indicates: B. MOTION FOR PUBLICATION OF TRANSCRIPT AT PUBLIC EXPENSE and MOTION
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Defendant Coughlin cites to NRS 12.015 as authority for allowing him to issue "any, necessary writ,
process, pleading or paper without charge, with the exception of jury fees because I lack sufficient financial ability to
proceed without this waiver".
Appellant Coughlin's reference to NRS 12.015 is misplaced as that provision refers to civil procedure. He cites
no other authority for his request.
This case has gone to verdict and the defendant was found guilty. It is difficult to see what additional costs will
be incurred by Appellant Coughlin other than the trial transcript. This is not a complex case with numerous factual or
legal issues.
Mr. Coughlin is a licensed attorney-at-law who implied during trial that his incarceration for contempt would
adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in his "affidavit of poverty" does not indicate any income from his practice
of law. Of note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the litigation of the instant matter.
Coughlins employement as a solo practitioner with exactly one employee, himself, throughout October
2011 through June 2012 in no way establishes his non-indigence. Such is, particulary for Coughlin whose first paying
client came in late J uly 2011, a highly tenuous operation and position to be in, particularly in washoe county during the
through of 3 straight years of 15% unemploymentWhat little income Coughlin had from the practice of law the justice
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 33 -
NOTICE
court was busy requiring Coughlin to deposit such under an unlawful application of NRS 118a.355(5) to a no cause
summary eviction against a commercial tenant (which is forbidden under NRS 40.254) Coughlin was forced to deposit
some $2,275 in rent escrow on 10/17/11, which the RJC only finally returned to Coughlin upon Coughlin bailing out of
jail on 11/15/11, Coughlin only able to post the cash only $1,315 bond required for the 8/20/11, 9/9/11, and 11/13/11
arrests where his client Peter Eastman (out of total necessity to avoid prejudice to Coughlins client, including Eastmans
affairs and Coughlins family and friends either refusing to or being unreachable due to the jails obstructionist telephone
system and tier time rules) put up such $1,315 to bail Coughlin out on 11/15/12, at which point Coughlin retrieved the
rent escrow $2,275 the RJC returned to him via certified mailing from the Washington st. USPS postal station and went
directly to the bank with Eastman to cash such, and gave Eastman $1,315 in cash that day. AT such point Coughlin was
forced to buy a temporary computer, scanner, printer, and clothes due to the burglary by Hill and the WCSO and the
wrongfull arrest of Coughlin for trespassing by the RPD on 11/13/11, and Coughlin secured a monthly rental from the
Silver Dollar Motor Lodge for $600 per month studio that included internet, phone, etcCoughlin received a check from
Eastman on or about 9/9/11 for $1,000 pursuant to a flat fee of $3,500 agreed to handle Eastmans case. Case was never
paid anything further by Eastman (though Eastman watched Coughlins dog, and was very helpful throughout nearly all
of the wrongful summary incarcerations of his attorney, Coughlin by local judges, that prejudiced the defense of Eastman
and kellers cases. Coughlin received a $900 check from Keller on 11/10/11 pursuant to a flat fee arrangement for $4,500
to be payable thereafter in monthly installments of $1,000 until paid in full. Keller fulfilled that obligation in a timely
manner. Coughlin received approximately a $500 check from the Carpentiers on or about 10/20/11 pursuant to a a flat fee
agreement of of around $1,000 that was contingent upon if the Carpentiers wished to pursue their matter through various
stages. Coughlin ultimately received around another $500 from the carpentiers (Coughlin is forced to do most of this
from memory at this point, but might have more documentation to support such later)Coughlin had no money in his
bank account in J uly 2013 until getting his first client, Robert Bell, whom paid him $250. Coughlin received $1,000 in
August 2011 from client Parmenter, and approximately $500 from client Gessin in August 2011, another $250 from client
Charles Thomas in a divorce/custody matter.the point is, Coughlin had practically no money whatsoever at all relevant
times considering the confluence of the justice courts illegal rent escrow demands, required monies for bail, money
required to buy new items to run his law practice due and cloth himself due to Hill applying an unlawful rent distraint
under NRS 118A.520 incident to Hills and the RPD, WCSO burglary of Coughlins former home law office in
November 2011. Coughlin did not receive one red cent from any friends or family throughout J une 2007 (other than
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 34 -
NOTICE
maybe a birthday check for $100.00 or something like that from his mother or father) through late April 2012to the best
of his memory
Coughlin also received around $1,000 sometime prior to his 11/1/11 eviction from a client name Gary Dawson
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=25379 (of Fairfield, California) (in Coughlins opinion Hill
and Baker owe Mr. Dawson a lot of money) and there is some issues relative to whether client timely paid an installment
in November 2011 incident to a contingent representation agreement and Hills obstruction of Coughlins mail an burglary
of his office.
Coughlns business at the time he applied for court appointed counsel on 10/26/11 and at the time of his filing an
IFP motion on 12/14/11 in the RMC in 22716 was highly, highly unstable, unpredictable, fraught with unforeseen
expenses, impossible to gauge income wise, and rife with a multitude of professional responsibilities and rules of conduct
that greatly limited his earning capacity or ability to do anything else for a living. Coughlin was working 80 hour weeks
for less than minimum wage, getting fleeced by the government, courts, and opposing counsel in the process. Clearly, a
transcript at public expense in RMC 11 CR 22716 was warranted, and J udge Hardys 3/8/12 Order requiring Coughlin to
submit two years worth of tax returns was entirely too invasive and burdensome given the circumstances (and J duge
Stiglich arguably does not have jurisdiction to enter the 9/19/13 order denying coughlins ifp motion therein in light of
NRS 12.015 and local rules making such a chief judge issue. Such is further evidence of the extent to which the federal
court here should not apply younger abstention. J udge Stiglich is being placed in an entirely unfair situation here, and on
top of that, the 2J DC throws the Mirch v. Clifton case her way. Federal intervention is entirely warranted.
13[b] Filing of bail or appeal bond-As not precluding finding of indigence
14 Ability of accused to pay filing fees not paid
15[a] Cost of transcript or other record in relation to defendant's resources-Relatively high cost
of document as suggesting indigence
15[b] Cost of transcript or other record in relation to defendant's resources-Relatively low cost
of document as suggesting nonindigence
IV Particular determinations
16 Indigence held established or supportable
17 Nonindigence held established or supportable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 35 -
NOTICE
Supreme Court may consider sua sponte plain error which affects the defendant's substantial rights, if
the error either: (1) had a prejudicial impact on the verdict when viewed in context of the trial as a whole, or (2)
seriously affects the integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Rowland v. State, 2002, 39 P.3d 114,
118 Nev. 31, habeas corpus denied 2009 WL 2152325, affirmed 467 Fed.Appx. 703, 2012 WL 289241, certiorari
denied 2012 WL 1599318. Criminal Law1030(1)
NRS 177.305 Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to cease after certificate of judgment remitted. After the
certificate of judgment has been remitted, the Supreme Court shall have no further jurisdiction of the appeal or of
the proceedings thereon, and all orders which may be necessary to carry the judgment into effect shall be made by
the Court to which the certificate is remitted. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1447)
NRS 177.145 Application for relief pending review. If application is made to a district court or to a
justice of the Supreme Court for bail pending appeal or for an extension of time for filing the record on appeal or for any
other relief which might have been granted by the trial court, the application shall be upon notice and shall show that:
1. Application to the court below or a judge thereof is not practicable;
2. Application has been made and denied, with the reasons given for the denial; or
3. The action on the application did not afford the relief to which the applicant considers himself or herself to be
entitled. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)

NRS 177.155 Supervision of appeal. The supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in
the appellate court from the time the notice of appeal is filed with its clerk, except as otherwise provided in this title. The
appellate court may at any time entertain a motion to dismiss the appeal, or for directions to the trial court, or to modify or
vacate any order made by the trial court or by any judge or justice of the peace in relation to the prosecution of the appeal,
including any order fixing or denying bail. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
Pursuant to NRS 177.155, Coughlin request the district court to enter an Order requiring the preparation of the
transcript from the 11/30/11 trial at issue in cr11-2064 at public expense. The district courts merely allowing for citation
to the audio is not sufficient. There is a benefit to a written transcript and the lack thereof plus the concomitant alleged
requirement to cite to specific portions of the audio is entirely prejudicial and unconstitutional. It takes much long to
listen to a transcript (especially the numerous amounts of times an effective brief requires) than it does to read one. The
District Court still has jurisdiction (if it ever did) despite the 3/15/12 Order Affirming purported to remand such to the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 36 -
NOTICE
municipal court where such 3/15/12 Order was void, fails to indicate which ruling it is affirming (ie, if Coughlins
Motion for New Trial (and arguably there was one based on the clear error standard required filed within 7 days under
NRS 176.515 and another based on newly discovered evidence filed within the two years required thereunder as well)
was denied by the RMC (its hard to tell, actually, see Howards 12/15/11 Order and his concomitant failure to enter any
order as to Coughlins 2/27/12 Motion for New Trial, and see J udge Holmes summary incarceration of Coughlin for five
days in 11 TR 26800 (this court may order the record therefrom transmitted as well, both under superintending control
and NRS 177.155 aspect in either 2064 or 1262, but pursuant to Coughlins Petition for Writ in Coughlin v Nash Holmes,
or incident to CR13-1332, etc, etc) Also, NRS 177.045 Intermediate order or proceeding may be reviewed on
appeal provides this court with authority to review the 2/28/12, 3/12/12, 3/13/12 Orders in 11 TR 26800 by Judge
Nash Holmes and the 9/18/12 Order in RMC 13 cr 3913 by RMC Judge W. Gardner and the 6/18/13 and 9/24/13
Orders by RJC Judges Pearson and Clifton, especially where such are so patently violative (along with all three of
the Admin Orders referenced herein) of NRS 178.600 and NRS 178.610, not to mention NV Const. Art. 4 Sec. 21.

Right of indigent defendant in criminal case to aid of state as regards new trial or appeal, 55 A.L.R.2d 1072.
Arguments of attorney to jury, free transcript of, . 10 Insufficient means to procure transcript, showing of, .
12[b] Materiality of transcript to decision on appeal, showing of, . 12[b]
Past conviction as affected by failure to furnish the transcript, . 3[b] Preliminary hearing, right to transcript of
testimony at, . 19[a] Refusal to furnish transcript as ground for new trial, . 12[c] Stenographic transcript of
trial proceedings, furnishing without cost, . 3[a] Transcript of proceedings, furnishing without cost, . 3[a]
Nevada
McRoy v. Warden, Nev. State Prison, 88 Nev. 267, 496 P.2d 162 (1972) 4
Teeter, State ex rel. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court in and for Clark County, 64 Nev. 256, 180 P.2d 590 (1947) 18
Ninth Circuit
Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1958) 4, 6[a]
Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) 4
Boyden, In re, 230 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1955) 6[f]
Brown v. U S, 270 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1959) 6[c]
Burdix v. U S, 15 Alaska 493, 220 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1955) 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 37 -
NOTICE
Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1958) 5
Davis v. Wilson, 278 F. Supp. 852 (C.D. Cal. 1968) 4
De Groot v. U S, 88 F.2d 624, 5 Alaska Fed. 881 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1937) 6[g]
Dinerstein, Application of, 258 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1958) 6[f]
Doyle v. U.S., 366 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1966) 3[b], 4
Forgona, In re, 221 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1955) 1
Gargano v. U.S., 137 F.2d 944 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1943) 4
Garrison v. Johnston, 104 F.2d 128 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1939) 4, 6[c]
Gilbert v. U.S., 278 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1960) 6[f]
Harders v. State of Cal., 373 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1967) 4
Jefferson v. U.S., 277 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1960) 6[a]
Kyle v. U.S., 199 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1952) 1
Mason v. Cranor, 227 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1955) 3[c]
Mitchell, In re, 230 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955) 6[f]
Osborne v. Johnston, 120 F.2d 947 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1941) 4
Richards v. Townsend, 444 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1971) 3[b]
Richards v. Townsend, 300 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Cal. 1969) 3[b]
Richardson v. U.S., 267 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959) 6[g]
Schlette v. King, 258 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1958) 6[g]
Territory of Guam, People of v. Olsen, 462 F. Supp. 608 (D. Guam 1978) 6[c]
Tucker v. U.S., 308 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1962) 4
Tweedy v. United States, 276 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1960) 6[g]
U.S. v. Garcia, 412 F. Supp. 281 (D. Ariz. 1976) 3[b], 4
U.S. v. Geise, 167 F. Supp. 775 (Terr. Alaska 1958) 6[f]
U.S. v. Schmitz, 525 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1975) 5
U.S. v. Taylor, 223 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1963) 6[g]
U.S. v. Tucker, 213 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1954) 1
Winhoven v. U.S., 209 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1953) 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 38 -
NOTICE
Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules
United States
U.S. Const. Amend. 14. See 9.1
U.S. Const. Amend. 6. See 4
U.S. Const. Amend. VI. See 4, 11, 15, 25[e]
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. See 4, 5
U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV. See 14.07
18 U.S.C.A. 924(c). See 6[a]
18 U.S.C.A. 3006A. See 6[c]
18 U.S.C.A. 3006A(c). See 6[b]
28 U.S.C.A. 753(f). See 6[a]
28 U.S.C.A. 832. See 6[a], 6[c]
28 U.S.C.A. 1915. See 6[a], 6[f], 6[g]
28 U.S.C.A. 2255. See 6[a]
Supreme Court
Anders v. State of Cal., 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967) 4
Arsenault v. Com. of Mass., 393 U.S. 5, 89 S. Ct. 35, 21 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1968) 4
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977) 3[b], 4
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 92 S. Ct. 431, 30 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1971) 3[b]
Burns v. State of Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S. Ct. 1164, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1209, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 570 (1959) 3[b]
Coppedge v. U.S., 369 U.S. 438, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962) 6[f], 6[g]
Dennett v. Hogan, 414 U.S. 12, 94 S. Ct. 18, 38 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1973) 6[b]
Doherty v. U.S., 404 U.S. 28, 92 S. Ct. 175, 30 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1971) 6[a]
Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192, 80 S. Ct. 1048, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1142, 85 Ohio L. Abs. 31 (1960) 5
Douglas v. People of State of Cal., 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963) 4, 13.05, 14.07
Draper v. State of Wash., 372 U.S. 487, 83 S. Ct. 774, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899 (1963) 26
Ellis v. U. S., 356 U.S. 674, 78 S. Ct. 974, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (1958) 6[g]
Entsminger v. State of Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 87 S. Ct. 1402, 18 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1967) 3[b], 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 39 -
NOTICE
Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521, 77 S. Ct. 1371, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1529 (1957) 6[g]
Farley v United States (1957) 354 US , 1 L ed 2d 1529, 77 S Ct 6[c], 6[d], 6[g]
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1956) 3[b], 3[c], 4, 9
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S. Ct. 2582, 162 L. Ed. 2d 552 (2005) 5, 14.07
Hardy v. U.S., 375 U.S. 277, 84 S. Ct. 424, 11 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1964) 6[c], 6[g]
Hill v. U.S., 356 U.S. 704, 78 S. Ct. 1139, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1145 (1958) 6[g]
Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 77 S. Ct. 550, 1 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1957) 6[f], 6[g]
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 83 S. Ct. 768, 9 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1963) 12[a]
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996) 3[b], 4


ARTICLE OUTLINE
I Introduction
1 Scope
2 Summary
II Rules applicable in absence of statutes providing for aid to indigent appellants
3[a] Indigent's rights other than to aid of counsel; rule of Griffin v IllinoisThe holding in Griffin v Illinois
3[b] Indigent's rights other than to aid of counsel; rule of Griffin v IllinoisCases decided after Griffin v Illinois
3[c] Indigent's rights other than to aid of counsel; rule of Griffin v IllinoisCases decided prior to Griffin v
Illinois
4 Indigent's right to aid of counsel
III Rules applicable under statutes providing for aid to indigent appellants
5 Generally
6[a] Federal statuteGenerally
6[b] Federal statutePersons entitled to statutory benefits; sufficiency of application for relief
6[c] Federal statuteNature of benefits accorded by statute
6[d] Federal statuteCourt to which application for statutory benefits must be made
6[e] Federal statuteTime for application for relief
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 40 -
NOTICE
6[f] Federal statuteNecessity that appeal be taken in good faith
6[g] Federal statuteGood faith as requiring that appeal have merit
6.5 Alabama statute
18 Nevada statute
NRS 177.045 Intermediate order or proceeding may be reviewed on appeal. Upon the appeal, any
decision of the court in an intermediate order or proceeding, forming a part of the record, may be
reviewed. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1444)
NRAP RULE 3B. CRIMINAL ACTIONS: RULES GOVERNING
Appeals from district court determinations in criminal actions shall be governed by these Rules and by NRS 177.015
to 177.305 and NRS 34.575. All appeals in capital cases are also subject to the provisions of SCR 250. Rule 3C applies to
all other direct and post-conviction criminal appeals, except those matters specifically excluded from the fast track by
Rule 3C(a).
[As amended; effective J uly 1, 2009.]
RULE 3C. FAST TRACK CRIMINAL APPEALS
(a) Applicability.

(1) This Rule applies to an appeal from a district court judgment or order entered in a criminal or post-conviction
proceeding commenced after September 1, 1996, whether the appellant is the State or the defendant. A proceeding is
commenced for the purposes of this Rule upon the filing of an indictment, information, or post-conviction application in
the district court.

(2) The Supreme Court may exercise its discretion and apply this Rule to appeals arising from criminal and post-
conviction proceedings that are not subject to this Rule
It is far from clear that NRAP applies to appeals from the municipal or justice courts to the district courts.
Indeed, the Court in Brahams refrained from commenting on the applicability of NRAP 38 thereto vis a vis the transcript
cost analysis. (NOTE: further muddling the applicability of Braham is the fact that it involved a petition for writ of
certiorariBraham v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 644 (1987), 747 P.2d 1390: Fn1 We express no opinion
as to whether petitioner, as a prevailing party in this court, may recover the cost of the transcript in the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 41 -
NOTICE
district court. Cf. NRAP 39(e) (costs on appeal taxable in the district courts).
RS 177.165 Preparation of record and papers on appeal. All appeals from a district court to the Supreme
Court shall be heard on the original papers and the reporters transcript of evidence or proceedings. The form and
manner of preparation of the record and of other papers filed may be prescribed by the Supreme Court, and to the
extent not otherwise so prescribed shall conform to the practice in civil cases. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
DISMISSAL OR ARGUMENT OF APPEAL
NRS 177.205 Dismissal by Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may, on its own motion or on motion
of the respondent, dismiss an appeal:
1. If the appeal is irregular in any substantial particular.
2. If the appellant has failed to comply with the requirements for docketing of the record on appeal or filing
briefs, unless for good cause shown an extension is granted. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1446; A 1985, 63)
The above two statutes do not apply to appeals to the district court.
in conjunction with NRS 178.482

The RMC accepted Coughlins filing via email, as show in the following:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/171731158/11-29-11-Subpoena-and-Duces-Tecum-on-WalMart-Filed-Email-Only-After-
Written-Permission-File-by-Email-RMC-Ballard-Fraudulent-Excision-Per-NRS-189-030-1
Further, the RJCs has filed purported transcripts in CR12-2025, apparently pursuant to NRS 4.400(2),
however, the oaths such persons purported subscribe to fail to include a last name for such individuals, and as
such, are completely invalid. Take, for instance the 11/20/12 purported transcript from RCR2011-063341 now on
appeal in CR12-2025, which, at page 1 provides: (JAVS ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED) Transcribed By:
Cathy W..
For instance, the oath by Cathy W. goes: I, CATHY W, do hereby state: That I am not a relative,
employee or independent contractor of counsel to any of the parties, or a relative, employee or independent
contractor of the parties involved in the proceeding, or a person financially interested in the proceedings: That I
was NOT present in Department No. 2 Of the above-entitled Court on November 20, 2012, but transcribed the
proceedings had and the testimony given upon the matter captioned within from the JAVS electronically recorded
audio media; That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1 through 125, is a full, true and correct
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 42 -
NOTICE
transcription of said JAVS electronically recorded audio media. DATED: at Reno, Nevada, this 24th day of April,
2013./S/ Cathy W." (At page 126).
If Cathy W. is the RJCs Cathy Wood, whom Coughlin had made allegations of gross misconduct
against on numerous occasions, including as relates to the coverup of the disappearance of the discs Coughlin
attached to his 11/15/12 filings with Judges Sferrazza and Clifton in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630, and
her making Robbin Baker cry in the filing office incident to Baker being forced to recant the indication she had
made to Coughlin moments before when Baker admitted that she clearly remember Coughlins filings in those
cases on that 11/15/12 date having discs attached to them as exhibitsthen, clearly, Cathy W. is amongst those
who qualify as a relative, employee or independent contractor of the parties involved in the proceeding, or a
person financially interested in the proceedings and such transcripts should be stricken from the record in CR12-
2025.
NRS 4.400 Operation of equipment; transcription of recordings; use of transcript. 2. The justice
of the peace may designate the same or another person to transcribe the recording into a written transcript. The
person so designated shall subscribe to an oath that the person has correctly transcribed it. The transcript may be
used for all purposes for which transcripts are used and is subject to correction in the same manner as other
transcripts. (Added to NRS by 1979, 1511; A 1993, 1410)
Further, the RMC simply failed to order the preparation of the transcript in CR11-2064. It is manifestly
violative of Nevada law, and RMC Judge Kenneth Ray Howards knows that very well, for Judge Howard to have
failed to have ordered the preparation of the transcript to begin within 10 days of Coughlins 12/13/11 Notice of
Appeal in RMC 11 Cr 221176.
Further as to all the shenanigans by the well compensated Bailiffs Reyes, Medina, Ramsey, and Heibert
and Chief Bailiff Sexton and RMC Marshals Coppa, Harley, Thompson, etc, and all their purporting to serve
documents on Coughlin, in ever more increasingly coercive and hostile fashions, often in conjunction with the
terms of the unlawful Administrative Orders 2012-01 and 2013-06 in the RJC and 2013-01 in the RMC and the
refusals by both sets to file in documents Coughlin submits for filing or to allow Coughlin simple access to the
courts, including refusing to allow Coughlin to view files for any length of time, refusing to answer basic questions
over the phone, telling Coughlin he must present in person to ask such question, then upon Coughlin so presenting,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 43 -
NOTICE
telling Coughlin he must mail in a written request and refusing to take a written request Coughlin then attempts to
hand deliver:
NRS 3.310 Bailiffs and deputy marshals: Appointment; duties; qualifications; compensation.
3. Each bailiff or deputy marshal shall:
(a) Preserve order in the court.
(b) Attend upon the jury.
(c) Open and close court.
(d) Perform such other duties as may be required of him or her by the judge of the court.
4. The bailiff or deputy marshal must be a qualified elector of the county and shall give a bond, to be
approved by the district judge, in the sum of $2,000, conditioned for the faithful performance of his or her duty.
7. The provisions of this section do not:
(a) Authorize the bailiff or deputy marshal to serve any civil or criminal process, except such orders of the
court which are specially directed by the court or the presiding judge thereof to him or her for service.
And, along with NRS 3.310(7) goes RCA Wongs entire case in both 13 CR 3913 and 3914 as the TPO in 3913
that the EPO in 3914 necessarily relies upon for notice of such 1/4/13 hearing to extend the 12/20/12 Workplace
Harassment TPO granted the State Bar of Nevada against Coughlin in RCP2012-000607 was purportedly served by RJ C
Bailiff Anthony Englishand such 12/20/12 Order specifically provides, in writing, that it is to be served by certain law
enforcement agencies, the RJ C Bailiff not listed amongst those specified therein.
Of course, RCA Chief Wong will not drop his prosecutions in 3913 and 3914, set for trial on 10/29/13, where
RMC J udge W. Gardner has continued his rampage upon NRS 178.600 and 178.610 (with fellow RMC J udges Nash
Holmes, Howard, and Dilworth and RJ C J udges Pearson, Clifton, and Sferrazza providing a stunning greek chorus
thereto) in entering orders that expressly contradict many sections of Title 14 of NRS (including, but not limited to:
countenancing WCPD Dogans failure to appear at a gross misdemeanor arraignment (NRS 178.397) on 2/14/12 and then
retaliating against Coughlins 2/21/12 filing in RCR2012-065630s pointing that out (only after Dogan smugly refused to
seek to avoid a fta warrant going out for Coughlins arrest) via a 4/11/12 email from RJ C J udicial Secretary Lori
Townsend attaching such in an email to the SBNs Patrick King,, the multitude of violations of the mandatory stay
required by NRS 178.405 vis a vis Orders for Competency Evaluations, NRS 178.484 (see 4/19/12 summary eight day
incarceration incident to DDA Young, WCPD Dogans and 2J DC J udge Elliotts violations of NRS 178.405), RMC J udge
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 44 -
NOTICE
W. Gardners 7/5/12 violations of NRS 178.498 Amount. NRS 178.499 Increase in amount. NRS
178.502 Form of bail; extension of bond or undertaking to proceedings in other courts; exoneration; place of
deposit, in 12 CR 12420, taking Coughlins bondable $1,415 bail (which was entirely dubious in the first place
given Coughlin provide RPD Officer Alan Weaver the required proof of his car insurance upon being pulled over
on a 4.7 inch high definition pdf of his USAA insurance card, where such represented some $850 of the $1,415 bail
that was initially bondable, only for Judge W. Gardner to then, without any notice to Coughlin whatsoever and
without providing Coughlin an opportunity to be heard or cross examine RPD Officers Dye and Weaver during
the 7/5/12 bail increase hearing, summarily increased Coughlins bail to a cash only $3,000, purporting to base
such misconduct on a public health and safety rationale that is not amongst the basis for imposing bail under
Nevada law.
Additionally violative of NRS 178.600, .610 is Judge Sferrazzas 11/19/12 failure to grant a continuance an
or institute contempt proceedings against the witnesses Coughlin properly subpoenaed under NRS 174.375 based
upon Sferrazza contention that Coughlin (whom Sferrazza had ruled was indigent and where at the 10/22/12
hearing Sferrazza ruled that Coughlin did not have to pay such witnesses fees in advance of trial, and, perhaps, not
at alland where the 11/13/11 hearing wherein Judge Sferrazza purports to have ordered that Coughlin need have
done so was improperly and insufficiently noticed to Coughlin, and fraudulently so, where RCA Skau purports
that Judge Sferrazza authorized him to serve Coughlin notice of such 11/13/12 hearing on the various Emergency
Ex Parte Motions to Quash Coughlins subpoenas via email (and where Judge Sferrazza accepted the purportedly
served only via fax (Coughlin swears he did not even receive any such 11/8/12 fax by WCPD Dogan of his
purported Motion to Quash Coughlins 11/6/12 subpoena on Dogan) Motion to Quash by WCPD Dogan that was
not properly served where, if the RJC and RMC want to take the position that Coughlin is not an attorney and
therefore, quash any subpoenas attorney whose Nevada law license is suspended Coughlin issue himself (whether
issued prior to or after the 6/7/12 order in 60838 suspending Coughlins law license in Nevadathen Dogans
attempts to serve Coughlin via facsimile on 11/8/12 with his Motion to Quash are not permissible under SERVICE
AND FILING OF PAPERS NRS 178.589 Use of facsimile machine.
Additionally, these garbage Administrative Orders and those of 11/28/12 by Judge Sferrazza in ALL
CASES ALL DEPARTMENTS and of 5/8/12 and 9/18/12 by RMC Judge W. Gardner, and of 11/27/12 by Judge
Clifton in RCR2012-065630 (which even prohibited Coughlin from fax anything to the WCDAs Office in
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 45 -
NOTICE
RCR2012-065630, even if such was a filing in a different case wherein matters in RCR2012-065630 were of
relevance.) are further violative of NRS 178.588 Filing of papers.
NRS 178.588 Filing of papers. Papers required to be served must be filed with the court. Except as
otherwise provided in NRS 178.589, papers must be filed in the manner provided in civil actions. (Added to
NRS by 1967, 1457; A 1999, 52)
NRS 178.588 provides that NRCP applies (according to Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order in CR11-
2064)especially where JCRRT 2 specifically provides that the JCRRT do not apply to criminal mattersbut
even if they did, JCRRT 2 still prohibits the Administrative Order 2013-06 in the RJC and Judge Sferrazzas
11/28/12 Order in the RJC from threatening Coughlin with 25 days incarceration for contempt for each instance
of Coughlin submitting a filing via facsimile (or submitting even a letter to the court, arguably) in one of
Coughlins many (due to RJC misconduct) landlord tenant cases (where such misconduct resulted in more and
more summary evictions of Coughlin through no fault of Coughlins).
http://www.scribd.com/doc/160451812/8-14-13-0204-62337-71437-72675-Complete-With-Attachments-
RJC-Judge-Pearson-Administrative-Order-2013-06-1048-374-1708-67980-63341-65630-Ocr-A9
http://www.scribd.com/doc/168477431/7-31-13-0204-RJC-Pears-Notice-of-Receipt-of-Document-Not-
Considered-by-Court-65630-63341-67980-Requests-for-Audio-71437-72675
NRS 178.600 and 178.610 are under assault by the judges of inferior tribunals.
ii




:
Further the RMC and its official CCR, Pam Longoni carry on the tradition of applying Nevada law
applicable only to district courts to inferior tribunals such as the RMC and RJC where the RMCs written policies
relative to transcripts seek to enforce a statute applicable only to district courts: (CHAPTER 3 - DISTRICT
COURTS) NRS 3.370 Official reporter: Compensation. 6. Where a transcript is ordered by the court or by
any party, the compensation for the transcript must be paid to the reporter before the furnishing of the transcript.
The RMC and RJCs Administrative Orders =
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 46 -
NOTICE
Coughlin actually filed his Motion for New Trial in RCM 11 CR 22176 (permission to file via email, etc.)
on 12/12/11, but, regardless, the 7 day deadline under NRS 176.515 began to run from the point at which Judge
Howard indicated his judgment was to be rendered (ie, following the conclusion of Coughlins serving the three
days incarceration incident to Howards 8:30 pm 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt (and where such
rendition did not take effect in Coughlins presence, but in the future, such arguably requires entry of such
orderand Coughlin is entitled to rely upon, in all of these criminal cases, the initial written expression by
Judge Elliott as to the applicability of NRCP 6 to these mattersmeaning, 7 days from the rendition (at the
earliestand there still has arguably yet to be any entry of such, much less notice of entry) of the 11/30/11
Judgment of Conviction and Court Order taking effect, on 12/3/11 at 8 pm (a Saturday), means 7 judicial days (in
light of Elliotts pronouncement of the applicability of NRCP to all of Title 14, would have run on, at the earliest,
the very 12/13/11 date that Coughlins Motion for New Trial is file stamped by the RJC. Further, Judge Howards
too early (ie, prior to the RCA even responding to such) 12/15/12 Order purporting dispose of such Motion for New
Trial of 12/13/11, arguably makes voids such 12/15/11 Order, and, therefore, Judge Elliott lacked jurisdiction to
even enter his 3/15/11 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in cr11-2064.
"FW: RMC said I could file this by email? From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.Com) Sent:
Mon 12/12/11 7:34 PM To: fiskm@reno.Gov 1 attachment 12 11 11 final motion for new trial city of
reno v coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176.Pdf (12.9 MB) Zach Coughlin, Esq. 817 N. Virginia St. #2 Reno, NV 89501 tel:
775 338 8118 fax: 949 667 7402 Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
http://www.scribd.com/doc/171624940/12-11-11-Final-Motion-for-New-Trial-City-of-Reno-v-Coughlin-
RMC-11-CR-22176-12-11-11-Final-Motion-for-New-Trial-City-of-Reno-v-Coughlin-RMC-11-CR-221
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.Com To: renomunirecords@reno.Gov Subject: RMC said I could file this
by email Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 19:27:57 -0800 Dear RMC, I called an wrote earlier and received approval to file
the attached pdf and media files by email rather than fax or other submission. This filing is large, as such, it must
be broken down into segments. This is part one, part two will be in the next email. I will pay whatever filing fee or
bond or whatever I have to pay to access justice in this here case. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq. 817 N. Virginia
St. #2 Reno, NV 8950 fax: 949 667 7402 Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
Further, the RMCs Ballard represented to Coughlin that his filings submitted via email would be file
stamped the day such emailed filings were sent such that a filing emailed by Coughlin to the RMC at 11:59 p.m.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 47 -
NOTICE
would be assigned a file stamping date of the same date. Additionally, Judge Howards 11/30/11 Judgment of
Conviction and Court Order bares a file stampe of 11/30/11 such only being rendered at 8:20 p.m.
As such, Coughlins filing of 12/12/11 a Motion for New Trial was timely under NRS 176.515 (and
regardless, Coughlins filing of a Motion for New Trial during his three day summary incarceration between
11/30/11 and 12/3/11, under the prisoners mailbox rule, is timely as well). Judge Howards 12/15/11 Order refused
to adjudicate such Motion for New Trial (the RMC does a lot of refusing to adjudicate, refusing to file things in,
refusing to transmit that required by NRS 189.030(1), refusing to respond to an NRS 1.235 Motion to Disqualify at
all, much less within 5 days by affidavit, refusing to appoint counsel to per se indigents where incarceration was a
possibility, etc., etc.), as such, either or both the 12/1/11 Motion for New Trial Coughlin submitted in jail or the
12/12/11 Motion for New Trial Coughlin filed via email after receiving RMC Ballards permission to, continue to
be tolling motions, an d the deadline for Coughlin to file an appeal in 22176 has yet to even begin running.
The RMCs violation of NRS 189.030(1) in failing to transmit Coughlins 901 page 12/11/11 Motion for
New Trial (http://www.scribd.com/doc/171630269/12-13-11-0204-2064-22176-Motion-for-New-Trial-Notice-of-
Appeal-NRS-189-030-1-Requires-RMC-Add-to-ROA-in-CR11-2064-RMC-Deficiencies-Opt-a9 )dcfwas highly
prejudicial especially where such Motion contained voluminous support for Coughlins contention that the RMCs
refusal to grant Coughlin even one continuance was clear error, particularly where the materials within such 901
page Motion for New Trial detail the circumstances of Coughlins wrongful summary eviction in Rev2011-001708,
Coughlins wrongful criminal trespass arrest and three day incarceration in RMC 11 CR 26405, and thet attendant
difficulties connected thereto, in addition to Hills applying an unlawful rent distraint to exculpatory material
necessary to Coughlins defense where it was Hill, actually, whom had burglarized Coughlins law office and
arguably intended to and did deprive Coughlin and his clients of the contents of such a whole lot longer than
Coughlin could be said to have and or have intended to deprived Cory Goble of the iPhone Goble falsely purported
to be his.





1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 48 -
NOTICE

Also, especially with respect to cr11-2064 and the 3/15/12 order purporting affirm the rmc
ruling based on Coughlin allegedly failing to cite to the the transcript that the RMC fraudulently
failed to have prepared in the City of Renos con game where they pass an ordinance calling
themselves and NRS 5.010 court of record then fail to repeal those ordinances that conflict with the
requirements under Nevada law for so being a court of record, specifically with respect to NRS
189.030 and 189.035, where even Elliott had to admit NRS 4.14(a) and Brahams application thereof
are just worth mentioning, but not applicable in a criminal setting in his 3/15/12 order affiriming rmc
ruling in cr11-2064. http://www.scribd.com/doc/170863766/3-15-12-2J DC-J udge-Elliott-Order-
Affirming-Ruling-of-the-Reno-Municipal-Court-RMC-Violating-NRS-189-035-J udicial-Misconduct
Also, all this non-sense where RMC J udge W. Gardner, Holmes and Howard, and RJ C J udges
Clifton, Pearson, and Sferrazza openly violate NRS 178.610 (not to mention NV Const Art. 4 Sec
21which is also violated where the WCSO insists on dressing up burglaries on tenants as
lockouts where, to avoid the extreme inconvenience of making two trips (one to post the summary
removal order, and another to conduct the lockout 24 hours later) the Sheriff violates NRS
40.253(5)(a)s requirement that tenants be given 24 hours from receipt (see Brahamswhich is
also a good case for showing the fraud by the RMC and Reno City Attorney that 2J DC J udge Elliott
co-signed in his 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC (see 60838 and 62337) in allowing the
RMC to masquerade as a court of record (fun! No trial de novo in District Court!) per NRS 5.010,
yet avoid all the inconvenience of actually complying with NRS 189.030 and NRS 189.035 (and
Elliotts rationale in his 3/15/12 Order in cr11-2064 is beyond questionable (one, Thomas v. State in
no way allows Elliott to simply deny Coughlins appeal, especially where Elliott claims the lack of
the very transcript that the RMC was required by law to order prepared even without Coughlin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 49 -
NOTICE
putting up the deposit that the RMC and the CCR it demands appellants use (Pam Longoni) and, two,
the Court in Thomas still decided that appeal on the merits, three NRAP 28 and 32 dont apply in
criminal appeals from the justice and municipal courts (otherwise, Coughlins briefs would not be
limited to 5 pages, rightoh wait, thats a local rule, right? Yeah, only its a local rule that applies to
civil cases only, though some judges in the 2J DC (hopefully not those whom are purported to have
a background in indigent defenseas, one would expect all the lifelong prosecutors turned judges to
fudge the rules in applying such civil rules to indigent criminal appellantslike, well, like J udge
Elliott did in applying NRS 4.414 in enacting all these house rules that apply only to Coughlin,
especially to indigent Coughlin, and especially where such purports to subject Coughlin to contempt
charges threatening to incarcerate Coughlin for 25 days for each fax he sends to, say, the RJ Cand
J udge Cliftons 11/27/12 Emergency Ex Parte Order in RCR2012-065630 (now on appeal in CR13-
0614a case so troubled that Coughlin has yet to even been afforded Eflex privileges to it despite
collateral estoppel from cr12-2025s 1/9/13 and 8/25/13 Order seemingly supporting suchwhere the
RJ C now refuses to give Coughlin dockets in his cases, even his criminal cases (J udge Cliftons
approach at the 9/24/13 hearing in RCR2013-072675 (the Bailiff Reyes throwing Coughlin over a
bench casefunny, if one is resisting the public officers order to go to the lobbywhy not just
arrest one at the bench in front of coffee shop in the Mills Lane J ustice Center? Why attack
Coughlin, gang up on him, twist both his arms behind his back and hurriedly run over the metal
detector, knocking it over, before throwing Coughlin over the bench in the lobby? Hows that an
SCR 111(6) serious crime (aka NRS 199.280 resisting a public officer (see one of the In Re Beckett
cases) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yllvEBtk6C4 5 23 13 0204 long behind magnetom
heibert and reyes 72675 71437
NRS 189.070 Grounds for dismissal of complaint on appeal. Any complaint, upon motion of the defendant, may be
dismissed upon any of the following grounds:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 50 -
NOTICE
1. That the justice of the peace did not have jurisdiction of the offense.
2. That more than one offense is charged in any one count of the complaint.
3. That the facts stated do not constitute a public offense. (this is especially true in the case of the 11/13/11 Complaint
in the criminal trespass case in 26405 where such simply reads: I, Richard G. Hill, on behalf of Matthew Merliss hereby
complain and say that Zachary B. Coughlin has committed the crime of trespass to wit: That said defendant on or
about Nov 13, 2011, in the City of Reno, State of Nevada, @ 121 River Rock St., the Def was found on the property
after being evicted on 11/1/11. All of which in in violation of 8.10.010 of the Reno Municipal Code. I therefore
request that said Defendant be dealt with according to law. I hereby declare upon information and belief under penalty of
perjury pursuant to NRS 171.102, that the foregoing is true and correcdt to the best of my knowledge. /s/ Richard G. Hill
11/13/11 (Complainant) (Dated) 11/13/11.
Simply put, ones being found on the property after being evicted does not constitute a public offense, as
such, the Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to NRS 189.070(3).
NOTE CITED TO AS PRECEDENT (unlike Hazlett-Stevens citing to an unpublished TN case in Lovins v.
State: Sufficiency of grounds
Cumulative effect of alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct did result in unfair trial so as to amount to
reversible plain error; defendant alleged that prosecutor alluded to facts not in evidence, injected opinion, misrepresented
the evidence, disparaged defendant and defense counsel, and misstated the law on robbery and reasonable doubt. Reed v.
State, 2012, 2012 WL 1302785 Criminal Law 1037.1(2)
Regardless, such Complaint was completely insufficient from a due process standpoint to put Coughlin on notice
as to what he needed to defend against. Any change in the charging document that effectively alters the act or acts
alleged, particularly when made after jeopardy has attached, violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of
the accusation in time to prepare his or her defense. Thanos v. State, 282 Md. 709, 387 A.2D 286 (1978). Where such
complaint can only be interpreted to alleged the failure to leave after being warned type of trespass under RMC
8.10.010, and not the going on property with the intent to vex and annoy type that RMC J udge W. Gardners judgment
as rendered ultimately relied upon, Coughlins due process rights were violated. Coughlin filed his Motion to Dismiss
with the
Furthermore, both 2064 and 1262s complaints should be dismissed as the 11/14/11 complaint in
1262 fails to alleged facts constituting a public offense as there is no warning referenced anywhere
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 51 -
NOTICE
therein sufficient to notice-plead a criminal trespass under rmc 8.10.010, and where in 2064, there
was no jurisdiction established (the City and RMC completely failed to address Coughlins race and
whether he has any tribal blood for that arrest on tribal land by tribal police officers violative of NRS
171.1255 http://law.justia.com/codes/nevada/2010/title14/chapter171/nrs171-1255.html
ERROR
NRS 178.598 Harmless error.
NRS 178.602 Plain error.
RECORDS
NRS 178.606 Docket kept by deputy clerk of justice court; contents.
RULES OF COURT
NRS 178.608 Rules of justice courts and district courts not to be inconsistent with this title.
NRS 178.610 Where no procedure specifically prescribed court may proceed in lawful manner.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537783/Rmc-Transcript-Rules-in-Violation-of-Nrs-Longioni-Ocrd-
and-Tagged-J big2-Lossy
Determination of indigency of accused entitling him to transcript or similar record for purposes of
appeal, 66 A.L.R.3d 954 (Originally published in 1975):
Supreme Court
Draper v. State of Wash., 372 U.S. 487, 83 S. Ct. 774, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899 (1963)
2[a]

Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S. Ct. 1061, 2 L. Ed. 2d
1269 (1958)
2[a]

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1956)
1[a]
,
2[a]
,
2[b]
,
7[a]

Hardy v. U.S., 375 U.S. 277, 84 S. Ct. 424, 11 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1964)
4
,
5
,
13[b]

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S. Ct. 410, 30 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1971)
2[a]

Seals v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 254, 85 S. Ct. 943, 13 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1965)
8
,
16


Ninth Circuit U.S. v. Schmitz, 525 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1975)
11[b]
,
17

Nothing in Nevada
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 52 -
NOTICE
California March v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. 3d 422, 102 Cal. Rptr. 597, 498 P.2d 437, 66 A.L.R.3d 945
(1972)
2[a]
,
5
,
7[a]
,
10[a]
,
15[a]
,
16

Alabama Wilson v. State, 280 Ala. 167, 190 So. 2d 720 (1966)
6
,
11[a]
,
11[b]
,
12[a]
,
15[b]
,
17

Nevada being so very comparable to Alabama, though Nevada is a model of diversity in the judiciary
compared to Alabama. Also, perhaps of some utility: Nikander v. District Court In and For First J udicial Dist., 711 P.2d
1260 (Colo. 1986)
5
,
6
,
10[a]


Humberto-Mauricio v. State leslies' failure to argue nrs 171.136 Exclusionary at supression hearing.
Humberto-Mauricio v. State Citation: 124 Nev. 1476 178.608. Rules of justice courts and district
courts not to be inconsistent with this title Currentness Rules made by justice courts and district
courts for the conduct of criminal proceedings shall not be inconsistent with this title.Courts 78 to 86.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k78 to 106k86. C.J .S. Courts 7, 124 to 134. Right of indigent
defendant in criminal case to aid of state as regards new trial or appeal Citation: 55 A.L.R.2D 1072
(Originally published in 1957). Determination of indigency of accused entitling him to transcript or
similar record for purposes of appeal Citation: 66 A.L.R.3D 954 N.R.S. 189.035 189.035.
Procedure where transcript defective Currentness 1. Except as provided in subsection 2, if the district
court finds that the transcript of a case which was recorded by sound recording equipment is
materially or extensively defective, the case must be returned for retrial in the justice court from
which it came. Criminal Law 260.7. Westlaw Key Number Search: ?110K260.7. N.R.S. 189.030
189.030. Transmission of transcript, other papers, sound recording and copy of docket to district
court Currentness 1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the
clerk of the district court the transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified
copy of the docket. 2. The justice shall give notice to the appellant or the appellants attorney that the
transcript and all other papers relating to the case have been filed with the clerk of the district court.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 53 -
NOTICE
3. If the district judge so requests, before or after receiving the record, the justice of the peace shall
transmit to the district judge the sound recording of the case. The use of the term "shall" in NRS
189.030(2) Makes the RMC's failure to transmit (or eve order it prepared) the transcript in 11 CR
22176 most definitely not something 2J DC J udge Elliott was entitled to mischaracterize Thomas v.
State to in his 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling (what ruling? Which one? The contempt order? The
judgment of conviction? RMC J udge Howards Order or ruling of 12/15/11 refusing to adjudicate
Coughlins 12/12/11 and or 12/13/11 Motion for New Trial, or Motion to Set Aside? The order of
12/16/11 ordering coughlin not to email the RMC? The 12/22/11 Appeal Bond Order wherein RMC
J udge Howard finds Coughlin indigent, and thus provides even further authority requiring the RMC
to transmit the transcript of the 11/30/11 trial in 22176, the doing of which being a jurisdictional
prerequisite lacking in 2064 making void J udge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the
RMC? Where's the order denying Coughlin's Motion for New Trial? Does the 2J DC even have
jurisdiction until such Motion(s) for New Trial filed by Coughlin are adjudicated? Does not the
prisoner's mailbox rule and the Washoe County J ail's refusals of Coughlin's filings (and they are
filings, whether the court puts a stamp on them or not) mean Coughlin's 12/13/11 notice of appeal
was premature?
Http://www.Lawlessamerica.Com/index.Php?Option=com_content&view=article&id=510:judges-
and-court-clerks-violate-the-law-when-your-court-filings-are-denied-or-
disappear&catid=98:litigation-help&Itemid=225 Mailed documents To be filed, a document must be
received. Merely mailing a notice of appeal within the 10-day period is not sufficient to meet the
filing requirement, since filing requires the actual receipt of the notice by the court within the time
allowed by law. Even though the filing may not be timely, the magistrate has the duty to forward the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 54 -
NOTICE
case to the district court under NRS 189.030. Op.Atty.Gen. Opinion No. 79-4 (Feb. 16, 1979), 1979
WL 34680.
Likewise, RMC Court Administrator J acksons merely including some of the related papers
in 22176, and fraudulently tip toeing around the requirement to order and forward the transcript to the
2J DC under NRS 189.030 is required, and whether or not the RMC feels Coughlin was required to
pay it or the RMCs official CCR Longoni some down payment, the RMC was required to transmit
that transcript to the 2J DC within 10 days of Coughlins 12/13/11 filing of a Notice of Appeal (to
whatever extent the filing by Coughlin of a tolling motion obviates such need until such time as
J udge Howard can be bothered to adjudicate such).
Braham v. Fourth J udicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 644 (1987) 747 P.2D 1390: "[5] Braham
claims that the district court erroneously required him to pay for a transcript of the justices court
proceeding. Concerning appeals from justice to district court, NRS 189.030(1) Provides: The justice
shall, within 10 days after the notice Of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court the
transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified copy of his docket.
However, NRS 4.410(2) Provides: The fees for transcripts and copies [of justices court
proceedings] must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case the preparation of the transcript
need not commence until the fees have been deposited with the deputy clerk of the court. The lower
court did not err by requiring Braham to pay for the justices court trial transcript. NRS 189.030(1)
Establishes the time frame for transmitting transcripts of appealed cases. It says nothing about
costs. NRS 4.410(2) Establishes who pays for the transcript. Therefore, when a justices court
decision is appealed, the justice of the peace sends the case to the district court within ten days
and costs of transmission can properly be assessed to the non-indigent appellant.1 We hold that
NRS 484.385(3), In conjunction with NRS 178.482, Provides that an order of revocation becomes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 55 -
NOTICE
effective eight days after mailing. Braham was arrested while driving prior to the effective date of
revocation. His conviction, therefore, must be vacated. Accordingly, we grant the petition for a writ
of certiorari. The clerk of this court shall issue a writ of certiorari, forthwith, directing the respondent
district court to vacate the conviction and issue a new judgment consistent with this opinion." Braham
v. Fourth J udicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 644 (1987) 747 P.2D 1390.
So, Braham in no way whatsoever makes contingent the requirement in NRS 178.030(1) that
the RMC transmit the transcript within 10 days of the filing of Coughlins 12/12/11 Notice of Appeal
upon anything whatsoever. Braham may have provided support for the contention that Coughlin
would have ultimately been responsible for paying for the transcript, had J udge Howards 12/22/11
Appeal Bond Order not operated to declare Coughlin indigent, where Braham merely provides that:
NRS 189.030(1) Establishes the time frame for transmitting transcripts of appealed cases. It
says nothing about costs. NRS 4.410(2) Establishes who pays for the transcript. Therefore,
when a justices court decision is appealed, the justice of the peace sends the case to the district
court within ten days and costs of transmission can properly be assessed to the non-indigent
appellant.1
Cost of transcripts: Petitioner for writ of certiorari was required to pay for justice's court trial
transcript. N.R.S. 189.030, Subd. 1. Braham v. Fourth J udicial Dist. Court, 1987, 747 P.2D 1390, 103
Nev. 644. Certiorari 71
Late filing: Late filing of transcript of record of original proceedings against defendant by
justice's court on defendant's appeal of conviction to the district court did not warrant dismissal of
underlying criminal charges against defendant. State v. O'Donnell, 1982, 646 P.2D 1217, 98 Nev.
305. Criminal Law 260.7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 56 -
NOTICE
J udge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064 purporting to deny Coughlins appeal based upon
the alleged failure of Coughlin to provide a transcript is violative of ODonnell.
To be filed, a document must be received. Merely mailing a notice of appeal within the 10-
day period is not sufficient to meet the filing requirement, since filing requires the actual receipt of
the notice by the court within the time allowed by law. Even though the filing may not be timely, the
magistrate has the duty to forward the case to the district court under NRS 189.030. Op.Atty.Gen.
Opinion No. 79-4 (Feb. 16, 1979), 1979 WL 34680. 1. Braham v. Fourth J udicial Dist. Court 747
P.2D 1390, 1390+, Nev. Motorist filed petition for writ of certiorari contending that revocation of his
license did not become effective prior to his arrest for driving with revoked license. The... Dec. 31,
1987 2. Cost of transcripts Case 2. State v. O'Donnell 646 P.2D 1217, 1218+, Nev. State petitioned
for writ of mandamus, challenging district court's order dismissing criminal complaint against
defendant on ground of late filing of transcript of record of... J un. 25, 1982 3. Late filing Case 3. The
Honorable Paul Freitag Attention: Tom Perkins, Esq. 1979 Nev. Op. Atty. Gen. 20 +Criminal
Appeals From Municipal CourtNRS 189.010 And 189.020 Must be read in pari materia so that an
appeal from a municipal court in a criminal matter must be filed with the... 1979 1. Mailed documents
Administrative Decision Context and Analysis (2) Library References (2) Criminal Law 260.7.
Westlaw Key Number Search: ?110K260.7.
2J DC J udge Elliott's 3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064 mangles Thomas v. State, co-signs the
Canon 1 Rule 1 violations of the RMC and J udge Howard per the violations of NRS 189.030 (And
Elliott's invocation Thomas is further misplaced given the very footnote 4 thereof Elliott cites to
references the fact that per NRAP 28, the very "record" that the RMC was required to transmit to the
2J DC under NRS 189.030 Is not transmitted in appeals from the district courts to the Nevada
Supreme Court...Further, Elliott's chicanerous order keeps referencing some "record" it is Coughlin's
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 57 -
NOTICE
responsibility to "cite" to (where the RMC fails to bates stamp the very "record" that it transmits (ie,
all the papers the RMC cares to characterize as a "filing" in 22176, but not the transcript it is required
to transmit, whether Coughlin puts up a down payment or not (and Coughlin was told to pay
Longoni, and Longoni refused to accept such from Coughlin, and hung up the phone on Coughlin
twice...Real screen and roll combo they got goin', Longoni and the RMC)...To say nothing of the
RMC's Ballard and Cassandra J ackson's fraud in failing to include in the 12/23/11 ROA the very
filings Coughlin submitted via email upon receiving written permission from Ballard herself allowing
Coughlin to submit filings via email (http://www.scribd.com/doc/158810840/10-4-11-to-1-10-12-
0204-2064-22176-Relevant-Emails-With-Missing-Filings-Interlineated-Between-Coughlin-RCA-
and-Renomunirecords-Reno-gov-ROA ), which, even if the RMCs position is that such are not
filings, regardless, the RMC is required to transmit such given they would still fall within the
purview of N.R.S. 189.030(1), which provides: The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of
appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court the transcript of the case, all other papers
relating to the case, and a certified copy of the docket. Amongst the other papers relating to the
case is a voluminous exhibit to Coughlins ).. Elliott's wrote:
"Although Appellant's arguments on appeal are unclear, Appellant raises a wide variety of
issues, including, inter alia: that he was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, that the
Municipal Court erred in failing to grant him a continuance, that the prosecution engaged in
misconduct, that he was refused an opportunity to testify on his own behalf, that certain evidence
should have been suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, and that "[f]urther improprieties and due
process deficiencies" occurred.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 58 -
NOTICE
Unfortunately, Appellant neither supports his arguments with relevant authority nor citations
to relevant portions of the record. Most importantly, Appellant has failed to provide this Court with
a copy of the transcript of relevant proceedings in the Reno Municipal Court. The Nevada Supreme
Court has held that an "[a]ppellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide this court with
'portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal'" Thomas
v. State, 120 Nev. 37 N. 4, 83 P.3D 818 (2004) (citing NRAP 30(b)(3). Further, NRAP 28(e) provides
that "[e]very assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be supported by a reference to
the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found." While Appellant
did provide this Court with a Compact Disc containing a recording of the Municipal Court
proceedings, Appellant did not cite to the portions of the Compact Disc that he felt supported his
arguments, and it is not theresponsibility of this Court to guess which portions of the Compact Disc
might support Appellant's arguments.
In short, Appellant did not satisfy his responsibility to supply and cite to relevant portions of
the record merely by producing a Compact Disc recording of the entire Municipal Court proceeding.
In light of Appellant's failure to provide this Court with an adequate appellate record, and
Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record, this Court is unable to conduct a
meaningful review of Appellant's appeal. Thus, Appellant has failed to meet his burden in providing
an adequate appellate record, and this Court must affirm the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court.1
(Fn 1: 1 It is worth noting that, pursuant to NRS 4.410(2), "[T]he fees for transcripts and copies [of
municipal court proceedings] must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case the preparation
of the transcript need not commence until the fees have been deposited with the deputy clerk of the
court." Accordingly, NRS 189.030, Which requires the municipal court to transmit various
papers to the district court upon appeal, does not require action until such fees have been paid.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 59 -
NOTICE
Here, it appears that Appellant never paid the requisite fees to secure the transcription of the
proceedings. For this reason, the appellate record is incomplete. ) NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that this matter is remanded back to the Reno Municipal Court for all further
proceedings. Dated this 15th day of March, 2012 /s/ Steven P. Elliott District J udge
It is simply breathtaking to witness a district court judge like J udge Steven P. Elliot of the
2J DC go from one sentence to the next essentially lying about what a statute entails (his
characterization of what NRS 189030 requires is limited to noting such requires the municipal
court to transmit various papers to the district court and so brazenly edits out the fact that such
statutory section specifically (shall) requires the municipal court to transmit the very transcript that
Elliott in the preceding sentence alleges the lack thereof justifies his asserting Coughlins allegedly
failing to meet Coughlins burden to provide the transcript as a rationale supporting Elliotts 3/15/12
Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC. Further, Elliott is therein remixing the plain language of
such statutory section he cites to, NRS 189.030 where such makes expressly clear it is the courts
burden to provide such
Only in appeals from the district court to the Nevada Supreme Court, the burden is on the
appellant to provide an adequate record enabling this court to review assignments of error. Thomas v.
State, 120 Nev.37, 43 N.4, 83 P.3D 818, 822 n.4 (2004); See also Greene V. State, 96 Nev. 555,
558,612 P.2D 686, 688 (1980); J acobs v. State, 91 Nev. 155, 158, 532 P.2D 1034, 1036(1975).
However, appeals to district court from inferior tribunals such as municipal and justice courts
have entirely different sets of rules attaching therein. Chief amongst these differences is the manner
in which the transcript is kept, where district courts have CCRs and in the overwhelming majority
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 60 -
NOTICE
of instances, those inferior tribunals take advantage of the statutory sections allowing for audio
recording of such matters (NRS 5.010, etc., etc..).
To get an idea of how wrongheaded (fraudulent, even) and misplaced 2J DC J udge Elliotts
citation to Thomas v. State is compare the exact characterization of such in Elliotts 3/15/12 Order
Affirming alongside the portion he refers to and cites to from Thomas v. State, alongside NRS
189.030 (which, unbelievably, Elliott manages to cite to in the sentence immediately after his
specious citation to Thomas v. State, though Elliott is careful to misrepresent the text of NRS
189.030, in, arguably, a Sierra Glass violation that Elliotts leaving his judicial position in sua sponte
(in violation of the limits to his adjudicatory boundaries that Breliant defines (Due to the adversarial
nature of the judicial system, a court's function is generally limited to adjudicating the issues raised by the parties on the
proof they have presented and applying appropriate procedural sanctions on motion of a party. Somers v. Chan, 110 Conn.
App. 511, 955 A.2d 667 (2008).
VERTEX, INC. v. CITY OF WATERBURY, 898 A.2d 178 (2006), 278 Conn. 557. We note that due to the
adversarial nature of our judicial system, "[t]he court's function is generally limited to adjudicating the issues raised by
the parties on the proof they have presented and applying appropriate procedural sanctions on motion of a party."
(Emphasis added.) F. J ames, G. Hazard & J . Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure (5th Ed. 2001) 1.2, p. 4. The parties may, under
our rules of practice, challenge the legal sufficiency of a claim at two points prior to the commencement of trial. First, a
party may challenge the legal sufficiency of an adverse party's claim by filing a motion to strike. Practice Book 10-39.
Second, a party may move for summary judgment and request the trial court to render judgment in its favor if there is no
genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book 17-44, 17-49. In
both instances, the rules of practice require a party to file a written motion to trigger the trial court's determination of a
dispositive question of law. The rules of practice do not provide the trial court with authority to determine dispositive
questions of law in the absence of such a motion.
In two recent decisions, we considered the boundaries of a trial court's discretion to determine dispositive
questions of law on the eve of trial and in a manner inconsistent with the procedures established in the rules of practice.
First, in Krevis v. Bridgeport, supra, 262 Conn. at 815, 817 A.2d 628, the trial court, on the day jury selection was to
commence, heard oral arguments on the defendant's motion in limine to prohibit references to punitive damages and
attorney's fees because of the defendant's governmental immunity as a municipality. During the course of the oral
argument, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the governmental immunity statute. Id., at 820,
817 A.2d 628. The trial court granted the defendant's motion in limine because it determined that the governmental
immunity statute applied. Id. The court emphasized that it was not ruling on the legal validity of the plaintiff's claim, but
notedthat it would be willing to expand its ruling to consider this issue. Id. After a recess, the plaintiff asked the court to
rule on the legal sufficiency of its claim. Id., at 821, 817 A.2d 628. The parties, at defense counsel's suggestion, agreed
that the plaintiff's request should be treated as an oral motion for summary judgment. Id. Thereafter, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. Id., at 821-22, 817 A.2d 628. On appeal, we concluded that, by deciding "a
dispositive question of law that the parties ... [submitted] to the court orally, without a written motion or compliance with
certain applicable provisions of the Practice Book"; id., at 818, 817 A.2d 628; the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Id., at 824, 817 A.2d 628. We determined that, although the plaintiff's oral motion for summary judgment violated the
rules of practice, the plaintiff's counsel knowingly had waived the procedural requirements for a motion for summary
judgment. Id.; cf. Mamudovski v. BIC Corp., 78 Conn.App. 715, 721-25, 829 A.2d 47 (2003) (trial court abused its
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 61 -
NOTICE
discretion when it ruled on defendant's oral motion for summary judgment in violation of procedural requirements of
rules of practice because plaintiff objected to this procedure), appeal dismissed, 271 Conn. 297, 857 A.2d 328 (2004).
We also considered the scope of a trial court's discretion to consider dispositive questions of law outside the
boundaries of the rules of practice in McNamara v. Tournament Players Club of Connecticut, Inc.,270 Conn. 179, 851
A.2d 1154 (2004). In that case, the trial court at first denied the defendant's request for permission to file a motion for
summary judgment after the case had been assigned for trial, but it reconsidered its decision during jury selection. Id., at
186-87, 851 A.2d 1154. After a recess to give the parties time to review the briefs previously filed, the parties argued the
defendant's motion for summary judgment and the trial court made a preliminary ruling granting the defendant's motion
on all but one of the counts of the plaintiff's complaint. Id., at 188-91, 851 A.2d 1154. During argument on the motion, the
trial court granted the plaintiffs' request to present to the court written opposition to the defendant's motion by the next
morning. Id., at 190, 851 A.2d 1154. The court reconvened the hearing the next morning, and the plaintiffs offered
additional argument on the lone count on which the trial court had not issued a preliminary ruling. Id., at 191, 851 A.2d
1154. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendant on all counts. Id. On appeal, we rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that the trial court could not sua sponte raise and decide a motion for summary judgment in violation of
the rules of practice. Id., at 192-93, 851 A.2d 1154. We concluded in McNamara that, under our decision in Krevis, the
trial court has discretion to decide a dispositive question of law that previously had been presented to it, without
complying with the procedural provisions in the rules of practice. Id., at 193, 851 A.2d 1154. We also concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion on the grounds that it did not give the plaintiffs a fair opportunity to respond to the
defendant's motion. Id. First, we observed that the plaintiffs did not voice any objection to the trial court's procedure
either during or after the proceedings on the motion for summary judgment. Id., at 194, 851 A.2d 1154. Second, we noted
that the plaintiffs agreed to decide the legal questions in this manner. The plaintiffs' counsel stated that "if the case were
destined to be subject to a directed verdict for the defendant, `then we might as well save it and litigate the issue' on
appeal." Id. Finally, we reasoned that the plaintiffs had a fair opportunity to respond to the motion because the
plaintiffs'counsel stated that he was ready to argue the defendant's motion, the trial court gave the plaintiffs an opportunity
to submit a written opposition to the defendant's motion, and the plaintiffs had an opportunity to challenge the trial court's
preliminary rulings when the hearing reconvened the next morning. Id., at 194-96, 851 A.2d 1154.
Our decisions in Krevis and McNamara affirming the exercise of the trial court's discretion under its case
management authority to determine dispositive questions of law on the eve of trial outside the procedural provisions of
the rules of practice readily are distinguishable from the facts of the present case in several critical respects. First, in both
of these cases, the dispositive question of law was raised in a written motion filed by one of the parties. In McNamara, the
defendant's motion for summary judgment had been filed previously. In Krevis, the issue of governmental immunity was
raised by the defendant's motion in limine. Second, the parties in both cases agreed that the trial court could decide the
question of law despite noncompliance with the rules of practice. Finally, the trial court provided the nonmoving party,
the plaintiffs in both cases, with a reasonable opportunity to respond to the dispositive motion.
In the present case, none of these important facts was present. First, as noted previously herein, the trial court in
its memorandum of decision acknowledged that no motion to strike or motion for summary judgment had been filed. The
pretrial briefs that led to the dismissal of two counts of the complaint were filed on the trial judge's order and not at the
initiative of either party. Second, the record does not demonstrate that the plaintiff knowingly waived the applicable
procedures under the rules of practice for dispositive motions.
8
Rather, the record shows that the plaintiff expressed its
objection to the trial court's procedure in dismissing its first two counts by filing a notice of intent to appeal the day after
the trial court issued its memorandum of decision and by filing a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial
asserting that the trial court should not have dismissed the first two counts in the manner that it did. Finally, the record
does not reveal that the plaintiff had a fair opportunity to respond to the potential dismissal of claims because it lacked
notice that the trial court intended to use the parties' pretrial briefs to rule on the legal sufficiency of its claims.
See Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir.1996) (even where court may render summary judgment
sua sponte, it must "first [give] the targeted party appropriate notice and a chance to present its evidence on the essential
elements of the claim or defense"). While neither party could recall definitively during oral argument in this court whether
the trial court explained its objective in having the parties submit pretrial briefs, the trial court's memorandum of decision
states that it "requested the parties to brief in advance of the imminent trial the legal theories on which this case has been
brought." Accordingly, it does not appear that the plaintiff had notice that the trial court might dismiss its claims based on
the pretrial briefs.
We conclude that, on these facts, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the first two counts of the
plaintiff's complaint. The trial court's broad case management authority simply does not extend so far as to permit the
court to: (1) initiate the pretrial disposition of a claim based on the court's perception of its legal insufficiency; and (2)
proceed to consider such disposition (a) in disregard of the procedural protections provided in our rules of practice
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 62 -
NOTICE
without the agreement of counsel and (b) without notice to the parties and a reasonable opportunity for the plaintiff to
oppose the disposition of its claims.
The defendant argues that the trial court had ample authority to dismiss sua sponte the plaintiff's first two counts
under Practice Book 15-1
9
and 16-9,
10
and under General Statutes 52-216.
11
We disagree. Both the cited rules of
practice and 52-216 stand solely for the general proposition that, at trial, issues of law should be tried before factual
issues and that the trial court must decide all issues of law. None of these sections authorizes the trial court to act as it did
in the present case, determining, sua sponte, dispositive legal questions without a motion pending, without the plaintiff's
waiver of applicable procedural rules of practice, and without giving the plaintiff a fair opportunity to respond.
12

FN: 8. If the defendant had moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff would have had the opportunity
to file an opposing memorandum of law to the motion. See Practice Book 17-45 (summary judgment motion
must be placed on short calendar no less than fifteen days after it was filed and adverse party may, within ten
days of filing motion, request that motion be placed on short calendar no less than thirty days after filing of
request for extension); Practice Book 11-10 (adverse party may file memorandum of law "on or before the time
the matter appears on short calendar"). In addition, if the defendant had moved for summary judgment, the
plaintiff would have had a right to argue the motion orally. Practice Book 11-18. In the present case, the trial
court required the plaintiff to submit its brief simultaneously with the defendant's, the plaintiff was given
approximately four days to submit its brief to the trial court, and the plaintiff was not provided an opportunity to
argue orally before the trial court dismissed the counts.
9. Practice Book 15-1 provides in relevant part: "Where the pleadings in an action present issues both
of law and of fact, the issues of law must be tried first, unless the judicial authority otherwise directs...."
10. Practice Book 16-9 provides in relevant part: "The judicial authority shall decide all issues of law
and all questions of law arising in the trial of any issue of fact...."
11. General Statutes 52-216 provides in relevant part: "The court shall decide all issues of law and all
questions of law arising in the trial of any issue of fact...."
12. The defendant also argues that, even if the trial court improperly dismissed the first two counts, it
was harmless because the factual underpinnings of the plaintiff's three counts were the same and the trial court
renewed its inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the first two counts during oral argument on the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict. We disagree. Although the core of the factual allegations underlying the dismissed
counts and the remaining unjust enrichment count were essentially the same, there are obvious differences in
what the plaintiff needed to prove to prevail on each count. Specifically, to prevail on its estoppel claim, the
plaintiff had to prove that the defendant did or said "something which [was] intended or calculated to induce [the
plaintiff] to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act on that belief; and the [plaintiff], influenced
thereby, must [have changed] his position or [did] some act to [its] injury which [it] otherwise would not have
done." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J ohn J . Brennan Construction Corp., Inc. v. Shelton, 187 Conn. 695,
711, 448 A.2d 180 (1982). In addition, the plaintiff had to "show that he exercised due diligence to ascertain the
truth and that he not only lacked knowledge of the true state of things but had no convenient means of acquiring
that knowledge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. By contrast, to prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment
the plaintiff had to prove: "(1) that the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the
plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment." (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hartford Whalers Hockey Club v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 231 Conn. 276, 283, 649 A.2d
518 (1994). Further, the facts that the plaintiff would have needed to prove to prevail on its dismissed breach of
contract count stand in even starker contrast to the facts necessary to prove unjust enrichment because proof of
an operative contract would have been incompatible with recovery on an unjust enrichment theory. Meaney v.
Connecticut Hospital Assn., Inc., 250 Conn. 500, 517, 735 A.2d 813 (1999) ("express contract between the
parties precludes recognition of an implied-in-law contract governing the same subject matter" [internal
quotation marks omitted]). Although the trial court gave the plaintiff an opportunity to present oral argument on
the dismissed counts during the defendant's directed verdict motion, nothing in the record shows that the plaintiff
had notice prior to trial that the trial court would renew its inquiry on the legal sufficiency of these counts during
the trial. Moreover, once the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's first two counts prior to the trial, the plaintiff had
no reason to put on its case on these counts. We reject the defendant's claim that the plaintiff was not harmed by
the trial court's dismissal of the first two counts of its complaint. VERTEX, INC. v. CITY OF WATERBURY,
898 A.2d 178 (2006), 278 Conn. 557.
A court speaks only through its written orders. Hernandez v. Com., 281 Va. 222, 707
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 63 -
NOTICE
S.E.2d 273 (2011).) coming up with all these wonderfully fraudulent legal arguments and citations to
inapplicable authority that RCA Roberts in no way came up with on her own in her pathetic
Answering Brief (really, a thorough review of all of Coughlins cases reveal that the judiciary has by
and large given the RCA and WCDAs Office a complete and utter pass, allowing the most tepid of
arrangements (and, many, many times, total Polk v. State, DCR 13(3) failures to file any opposition at
all or otherwise address Coughlins arguments, to carry the day.
J udge Nash Holmes' reverting to her lifelong prosecutor role (an executive function) in
illegally confiscating out of where it was already booked into Coughlin's personal property at the
Washoe County jail, several items) is arguably not deserving of judicial immunity. (enforcing and
arbitrating a state's rules of ethics; Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 74 Ed. Law Rep. 55, 22 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d 580 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, (J uly 2, 1992).
J udge Howard's researching case law as to whether there was some way he could deny
indigent Coughlin his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (and fraudulently applying such where his
10/27/11 Order failed to exclude the possibility of incarceration) arguably does not deserve judicial
immunity, nor does J udge Elliott's doing RCA Roberts job in his 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of
the RMC in cr11-2064 (both prosecutorial/executive functions taken from the bench...which J udge
Clifton does constantly). (researching the law applicable to a plaintiff's tax situation; Christensen v.
Ward, 916 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990).
Such an environment has atrophied the ethics, not to mention legal skills of these prosecutors.
When they are put upon to make some legal argument, it is striking how completely pathetic their
grasp of not only the factual materials is, but, even more alarming, is the extent to which they simply
do not know the law very well (though, for RCA Wong, whom served as an RJ C J ustice of the Peace
for seven and a half years from 1991 to 1998, such is a rather dubious pose he takes, particularly in
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 64 -
NOTICE
the context of the criminal trespass case incident to the very summary eviction law centric 1708 in
26405, especially where Wong was a J ustice of the Peace in such court of limited jurisdiction where
one of those few areas included within that limited jurisdiction is landlord tenant law, and therefore, summary
evictions. Also, Coughlin suspects that these prosecutors know full well some of the very law they feign to be unaware of
(such as Coughlins right to serve them via facsimile, the prohibition against the motions and settings they make in
violations of the stay during the pendency of competency evaluation orders under NRS 178.405, etc., etc., the improper
remarks during closing arguments, DDA Youngs coercive attempts (in chorus with RJ C J udge Sferrazza) to force
Coughlin to waive his Fifth Amendment rights, etc., etc.)
Elliots 3/15/12 Order cites to and refers to the following from Thomas v. State:
[1]
As a preliminary matter, we
note that Thomas's counsel did not adequately cite to the record in his briefs or provide this court with an adequate
record. In support of factual assertions, counsel simply cites the supplemental habeas petition filed below. This is
improper.
3
Additionally, counsel failed to include many necessary parts of the record in the Appellant's Appendix. We
are able to address the merits of a number of claims only because the State provided a seven-volume appendix that
includes necessary parts of the record.
4

3
NRAP 28(e) provides: Every assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be
supported by a reference to the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is
to be found. The rule also prohibits a brief to this court from incorporating by reference
briefs or memoranda filed in district court.

4
In the reply brief, Thomas's counsel states his belief that this court has the direct appeal record
and chastises the State for wasting paper in its appendix. Counsel is mistaken. The clerk of
this court does not retain the direct appeal record. Rather, SCR 250(7)(b) provides that the
clerk of the district court shall retain the original record ... and shall not transmit a record
on appeal to the supreme court. Appellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide this
court with portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in appellant's
appeal. NRAP 30(b)(3); see also Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688
(1980); Jacobs v. State, 91 Nev. 155, 158, 532 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1975).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 65 -
NOTICE
Somehow, Elliott then has the hutzpah to refer to the very NRS 189.030 the makes completely
inapplicable his immediately prior thereto citation to Thomas v. State.
Somehow, Elliot then has the hutpah (or just plain lack of respect for the dignity of the
judiciary much less the intelligence of the people of Nevada) to reference the very NRS 189.030 the
makes completely inapplicable his immediately prior thereto citation to Thomas v. State. (though,
Elliott hedged his bets some by mischaracterizing the ruling in Thomas v. State as well as
misrepresenting the text of NRS 189.030)
NRS 189.030 Transmission of transcript, other papers, sound recording and copy of docket to district
court.
1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court
the transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified copy of the docket.
2. The justice shall give notice to the appellant or the appellants attorney that the transcript and all other
papers relating to the case have been filed with the clerk of the district court.
Now, consider that Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC distorts all of the
above where it reads: Unfortunately, Appellant neither supports his arguments with relevant
authority nor citations to relevant portions of the record. Most importantly, Appellant has failed to
provide this Court with a copy of the transcript of relevant proceedings in the Reno Municipal Court.
The Nevada Supreme Court has held that an "[a]ppellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide
this court with 'portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in appellant's
appeal'" Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37 N. 4, 83 P.3D 818 (2004) (citing NRAP 30(b)(3). Further,
NRAP 28(e) provides that "[e]very assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be
supported by a reference to the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is
to be found." While Appellant did provide this Court with a Compact Disc containing a recording of
the Municipal Court proceedings, Appellant did not cite to the portions of the Compact Disc that
he felt supported his arguments, and it is not theresponsibility of this Court to guess which
portions of the Compact Disc might support Appellant's arguments.
In short, Appellant did not satisfy his responsibility to supply and cite to relevant portions of the record merely
by producing a Compact Disc recording of the entire Municipal Court proceeding. In light of Appellant's failure to
provide this Court with an adequate appellate record, and Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record, this
Court is unable to conduct a meaningful review of Appellant's appeal. Thus, Appellant has failed to meet his burden in
providing an adequate appellate record, and this Court must affirm the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court.1 (Fn 1: 1 It
is worth noting that, pursuant to NRS 4.410(2), "[T]he fees for transcripts and copies [of municipal court proceedings]
must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case the preparation of the transcript need not commence until the
fees have been deposited with the deputy clerk of the court." Accordingly, NRS 189.030, Which requires the
municipal court to transmit various papers to the district court upon appeal, does not require action until such fees
have been paid. Here, it appears that Appellant never paid the requisite fees to secure the transcription of the
proceedings. For this reason, the appellate record is incomplete. ) NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is remanded
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 66 -
NOTICE
back to the Reno Municipal Court for all further proceedings. Dated this 15th day of March, 2012 /s/ Steven P. Elliott
District J udge
Coughlin appealed. He did not order the transcript in the sense J udge Elliott references in
invoking NRS 4.410(2). Rather, Nevada law required the municipal court J udge Howard to order the
transcript prepared and transmit it. J udge Elliott fraudulently focuses on his contention that
Appellant did not cite to the portions of the Compact Disc that he felt supported his arguments
(Coughlin disputes this, anyways) while Elliott completely fails to address the fact that Coughlins
extensive, dense, highly researched and crafter Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Opening Brief, and
the Supplements to Coughlins brief cite to the 452 page ROA filed by the RMC on 12/23/11
extensively (and, if NRAP is going to be invoked, then J udge Elliott might as well sua sponte
mention the RMCs failure to bates stamp the ROA or arrange it into volumes of now more than 250
pages per volume, etc per NRAP 10, 11, etc.) Further, Coughlin went a step beyond that in
attempting to provide to the district court those related papers that the RMCs Howard, Ballard, and
J ackson fraudulently failed to include amongst that transmitted under NRS 189.030(1) (ie, the
emailed filings that the RMC selectively chose not to include, where some were, some were not,
included by the RMC (ie, 11/29/11 Subpoena, and the 12/8/11 Records Request submitted via email
only, where included in the 12/23/11 ROA, whereas Coughlins 901 page 12/12/11 Motion for New
Trial was not, etc., etc).
Regardless, J udge Elliott knew full well he was required to judge the appeal on the record:
NRS 189.050 Action to be judged on record. An appeal duly perfected transfers the action to the
district court to be judged on the record.
The transcript of the trial always going to be relevant, and where, in 22176, the only other
proceeding was the 10/10/11 arraignment in violation of NRS 178.405 (well, actually, Coughlin
hereby requests the district court order the RMC to provide to Coughlin or to Coughlin through the
district court any audio of the 11/14/11 original trial date wherein Coughlin was brought to the court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 67 -
NOTICE
in jail reds, as he was incarcerated incident to the 11/13/11 wrongful trespass arrest, and RMC J udge
Howard wound up revoking Coughlins bail, and raising it to $1,000 despite the fine schedule for a
conviction of petty larceny in the RMC at such time being on $360 (meaning, the RMC converted the
$360 cash bail Coughlin posted on 9/9/11, and then foisted another $1,000 bail on top of that for a
misdemeanor, to which the jurisdiction for fines extends only to $1,000... especially where J udge
Howards original 11/30/11 J udgment of Conviction and Court Order included a community service
requirement that he excised, on the record, in absentia of the city attorney, at 8:30 pm at night on
11/30/11 in admitting to Coughlin he was mistaken in his earlier belief (which he referenced on the
record as justifying his denial of Coughlins motion for a continuance) that Coughlin had caused the
continuance of the original 11/14/11 trial date in 22176 (2064). Howards remedy for his mistake
(he was well aware such continuance of the 11/14/11 date was not Coughlins fault, as Howard had
vacated his original response to such continuance on 11/14/11 where the $1,000 bail requirement was
rescinded.
How funny is this? Coughlins trial before RMC J udge Howard on 11/30/11 occurred on the
very same day as this filing in ADKT410: 11-36708 - Case Search where such filing includes the following:
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=24755
And, actuallyRMC Judge Howard did declare Coughlin indigent, after all, where, having already
converted the $360.00 cash bail Coughlin posted on 9/10/11 for the 9/9/11 arrest to a fine (meaning, given the RMCs
standard practice of crediting an individual with $100 per day (with a day including any part of a calendar day spent in
custody) credit for time served, with absolutely no aggravating circumstances whatsoever, other than Coughlin attempting
to defend himself in accord with his rights as a criminal defendant, J udge Howard fined Coughlin some $560 where the
normal fine would be $360).
J udge Howard so converted Coughlins $360 cash bail to a fine on 11/30/11. As such, J udge Howards 12/22/11
Appeal Bond Order declared Coughlin indigent such that the even the misapplication of NRS 4.410(2) that 2J DC J udge
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 68 -
NOTICE
Elliott attempted to pass of as an excuse for the RMC failing to abide by NRS 189.030(1) fails to operate as an excuse,
particularly in a criminal case and particularly in light of Braham.
Further, RMC Court Administrator Cassandra J acksons Certficate of 12/22/11 is fraudulent in both failing to
include all papers relating to 11CR22176 (especially in light to the written permission to file via email RMC Donna
Ballard provided to Coughlin and the concomitant failure of Ballard and J ackson to include many such items in the ROA
(whilst including some, such as Coughlins 12/14/11 Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis, indicating the RMC was
selective in deciding what emailed filings by Coughlin it wished to see transmitted in the 12/23/11 ROA filed in CR11-
2064). J acksons 12/22/11 Certificate excises the language in NRS 189.030(1) requiring the RMC to transmit the
transcript where such reads: CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMITTAL OF COMPLETE RECORD ON APPEAL I,
CASSANDRA J ACKSON, Interim Court Administrator of the Reno Municipal Court, do hereby certify that the attached
documents include full, true and correct copies of all papers relating to Case Number llCR22176, including a Certified
Copy of Docket. Further, said documents have been transmitted to and filed with the clerk of the Washoe County District
Court. D Dated this,;i.DJ l day of December, 2011. /s/ Cassandra J ackson, Interim Court Administrator SUBSCRIBED
AND SWORN BEFORE ME This 22
nd
day of December, 2011 /s/ Evangelina Cabral, NOTARY PUBLIC
http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537530/12-15-11-22176-2064-Order-by-Howard-on-Transcript-Costs
RMC J udge Howards 12/15/11 Order reads: On November 30, 2011, Defendant Coughlin was found guilty of
the offense of Petit Larceny, a violation of RMC 8.10.040. Thereafter, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on December
13, 2011. Additionally, Defendant Coughlin filed a Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside, Motion for Reconsideration,
Motion for Recusal and Motion for Publication of Transcript at Public Expense. Appellant Coughlin requested that he be
provided the trial transcript at public expense on the basis that he was indigent. On November 14, 2011, Defendant
Coughlin filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis wherein he seeks a waiver of certain fees due to his asserted
indigence.
A. FAILURE TO PROPERLY SERVE CITY ATTORNEY
Written motions are to be served upon each of the parties. NRS
178.582. Service upon the attorney or upon a party must be made in the manner provided in civil actions. NRS
178.584. 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 69 -
NOTICE
Appellant has chosen to serve the City Attorney with these various pleadings via electronic mail. There is no
provision in the Nevada Revised Statutes or the Rules of Court which denotes electronic mail as an appropriate means of
service of process. This alone is a basis for non-consideration/denial of Appellant's various
requests.
B. MOTION FOR PUBLICATION OF TRANSCRIPT AT PUBLIC EXPENSE and MOTION TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Defendant Coughlin cites to NRS 12.015 as authority for allowing him to issue "any, necessary writ, process,
pleading or paper without charge, with the exception of jury fees because I lack sufficient financial ability to proceed
without this waiver".
Appellant Coughlin's reference to NRS 12.015 is misplaced as that provision refers to civil procedure. He cites
no other authority for his request.
This case has gone to verdict and the defendant was found guilty. It is difficult to see what additional costs will
be incurred by Appellant Coughlin other than the trial transcript. This is not a complex case with numerous factual or
legal issues.
Mr. Coughlin is a licensed attorney-at-law who implied during trial that his incarceration for contempt would
adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in his "affidavit of poverty" does not indicate any income from his practice
of law. Of note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the litigation of the instant matter.
This Court has not been provided sufficient information to determine Mr. Coughlin's indigency status and
will not grant him carte blanche authority to continue the fishing expedition he conducted during the trial of this matter.
Appellant's motion to further pursue this matter at public expense is denied.
C. MOTION TO VACATE AND/OR SET ASIDE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION FOR
RECUSAL
These motions will not be addressed as Defendant Coughlin has not submitted a basis for their consideration.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Coughlin's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Motion for
Publication of Transcript at Public Expense is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside, Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for Recusal are presently DENIED.
DATED this 15
th
day of December, 2011 /s/ Kenneth R. Howard, (Municipal Court) J udge
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 70 -
NOTICE
RMC J udge Howards 12/15/11 Order fails to adjudicate Coughlins timely filed tolling, NRS 176.515 Motion
(timely where the time period allowed for such, just like the deadline for the notice of appeal, J udge Howard ruled, would
begin upon running upon the the conclusion of Coughlins three day incarceration for summary contempt, and where
J udge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064 arguably makes NRCP 6(a) applicable, or at least entitles Coughlin to rely
upon such indication. Regardless, even if NRS 178.476 is applied to Coughlins 12/12/11 filed (though file stamped
12/13/11 by the RMC, Coughlin email such to the RMC on 12/12/11, and the RMC has failed, again, to abide by NRS
189.030(1) where such requires the RMC to transmit all related papers not just those which the RMC later decides to
characterize as filings, to the district court):
8.10.040 M Petit Larceny, Value Less than $250 First Offense $ 355 in 22176
8.10.010 Trespassing $305 in 26405 (where Coughlin was in jail from 11/13/11 to 11/15/11, three days credit for time
served at $100 per day, plus a fine of $305, meaning RMC J udge W. Gardner doubled the standard sentence where the
RCA requested absolutely nothing more than the standard sentence and offered no aggravating evidence whatsoever).
Further, where the Duract Cough Melts allegedly recovered from Coughlins pocket upon the search incident to
the arrest by the RSIC Officers (they and Wal-Marts Frontino, and RCA Roberts admit that neither Walmart nor its
associates made a citizens arrest of Coughlin and that the alleged crime did not occur within the presence of the tribal
police officers (where tribal police officers are prohibited from making misdemeanor arrests pursuant to NRS 171.1255)
and that such alleged crime occurred between 7 pm and 7 am) are obviously explained by the entry on the $83.82 receipt
Coughlin produced for the items he purchased minutes prior to the arrest (where Walmarts Frontino admits Coughlin
made such purchasesave the one listed on such receipt for the Duract Cough Melts, as Frontino took his cues from the
forty five minute coaching session she had with him prior to the trial resulting in Frontino testifying that he personally
witnessed every item wrung up at the time made the purchases resulting in the $83.82 receipt, and was absolutely sure an
entry with the UPC of the very Duract Cough Melts Frontino alleged Coughlin to have consumed while shopping was
not listed therein (which is incorrect, as such UPC is, in fact, listed therein). The 9/14/11 file stamped and 9/9/11 signed
Criminal Complaint (Petit Larceny) by Walmarts Frontino alleges that Coughlin did take or carry away Walmart
property where the record contains absolutely no evidence that Coughlin did any such taking or carrying away where
Frontino alleges Coughlin consumed such items while shopping, and, therefore, metabolized such items into something
other prior to any taking or carrying away of such items. Rather, such consuming while shopping would be more
supportive of a destruction of property charge. The petty larceny conviction is not supported by the evidence.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 71 -
NOTICE
RMC 8.10.040. Petit larceny. It is unlawful for any person to take or carry away the property of another with
the intent to deprive the owner of his property therein, in any value less than $250.00, And for his conviction therefor, he
shall be fined in an amount not more than $1,000.00 And/or be incarcerated not more than six months. In addition to any
other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.
NRS 205.445 Defrauding proprietor of hotel, inn, restaurant, motel or similar establishment.
1. It is unlawful for a person:
(a) To obtain food, foodstuffs, lodging, merchandise or other accommodations at any hotel, inn, trailer park,
motor court, boardinghouse, rooming house, lodging house, furnished apartment house, furnished bungalow court,
furnished automobile camp, eating house, restaurant, grocery store, market or dairy, without paying therefor, with the
intent to defraud the proprietor or manager thereof;
(c) After obtaining credit, food, lodging, merchandise or other accommodations at a hotel, inn, trailer park,
motor court, boardinghouse, rooming house, lodging house, furnished apartment house, furnished bungalow court,
furnished automobile camp, eating house, restaurant, grocery store, market or dairy, to abscond or surreptitiously, or by
force, menace or threats, to remove any part of his or her baggage therefrom, without paying for the food or
accommodations.
2. A person who violates any of the provisions of subsection 1 shall be punished:
(a) Where the total value of the credit, food, foodstuffs, lodging, merchandise or other accommodations
received from any one establishment is $650 or more, for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. In addition to
any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.
(b) Otherwise, for a misdemeanor.
3. Proof that lodging, food, foodstuffs, merchandise or other accommodations were obtained by false
pretense, or by false or fictitious show or pretense of any baggage or other property, or that the person refused or willfully
neglected to pay for the food, foodstuffs, lodging, merchandise or other accommodations, or that the person gave in
payment for the food, foodstuffs, lodging, merchandise or other accommodations negotiable paper on which payment was
refused, or that the person absconded without paying or offering to pay for the food, foodstuffs, lodging, merchandise or
other accommodations, or that the person surreptitiously removed or attempted to remove his or her baggage, is prima
facie evidence of the fraudulent intent mentioned in this section.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 72 -
NOTICE
4. This section does not apply where there has been an agreement in writing for delay in payment for a
period to exceed 10 days.
[1:132:1939; 1931 NCL 3333.01] +[1911 C&P 461; A 1917, 35; 1931, 391; 1949, 109; 1943 NCL
10414](NRS A 1967, 505; 1979, 1448; 1989, 1437; 1995, 1226; 2011, 169)
Obviously, the City of Reno had a much tougher case having to prove the specific intent requirement found in
NRS 205.445. Further, as to 60838, the conviction of petty larceny under its incarnation in RMC 8.10.040 lacks a
finding of the specific intent necessary to characterize such a serious crime.
Additionally, where the RCA offered no evidence whatsoever that Coughlin does not have any tribal blood, the
NRS 189.070(1) requires dismissal of the complaint in light of the RCAs admission that the alleged petty larceny in
22176 occurred on tribal land and the misdemeanor arrest was made by tribal police officers. Further, Pursuant to NRS
189.070(3), the facts stated in the 11/13/11 Criminal Complaint (trespass) in 26405 fail to constitute a public offense
where there was never a lockout performed incident to the 10/27/11 summary removal order in light of the fact that the
purported lockout of 11/1/11 was in complete and utter violation of the requirements to accord the tenant 24 hours from
receipt of the summary removal order prior to the sheriff (and only the sheriff or constable, ie, Hill and landlord
Merliss are precluded from subsequently performing another quasi lockout of their own) performing such a lockout. The
City of Reno, v. Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. (so much for the State Bar of Nevada and RMCs lame attempts to
characterize Coughlins 12/14/11 filing of a IFP Motion and Declaration in Support thereof to be somehow fraudulent in
light of the failure of page 1 of such to identify Coughlin as an attorney (never mind the fact that that filing was also filed
via facsimile that did include a cover sheet containing all the information purportedly required by RMC Rule 5 (including
Coughlins NV Bar #, etcwhere the RMC chose to include in the 7/26/12 ROA in CR12-1262 from such 11 cr 26405
trespass case only the faxed version of the 12/14/11 IFP Motion by Coughlin where Coughlin also filed via email (where
such email quite clearly identifies Coughlin as an attorney as had numerous previous filings and emails by Coughlin in
and to the RMC) (and certainly no fax cover sheet) on such filing so so much for RMC Court Administrator J ackson
and Filing Officer Supervisor Ballards fraudulent failure to include Coughlins other email filings (such as the 901 page
12/12/11 Motion for New Trial/Notice of Appeal in 22716 in the 12/23/11 ROA in CR11-2064.at page 25 of the
12/23/11 ROA in CR11-2064, is the 11/29/11 Subpoena and Subpoena Duces Tecum that the RMCs Donna Ballard
printed off from the filing Coughlin submitted via email only to the RMC upon Ballard providing Coughlin with
written permission to submit filings via email. The RMC is stuck with that and now must explain why it failed to obey
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 73 -
NOTICE
NRS 189.030(1)s requirement to transmit all related papers in the ROAs in CR11-2064 and CR12-1262 where some
such filings by email by Coughlin have been selectively excised therefrom, in a fraudulent manner
http://www.scribd.com/doc/171731158/11-29-11-Subpoena-and-Duces-Tecum-on-WalMart-Filed-Email-Only-After-
Written-Permission-File-by-Email-RMC-Ballard-Fraudulent-Excision-Per-NRS-189-030-1 ) Criminal Complaint) filled
out in Richard G. Hill, Esq.s handwriting and signed by Hill in 11/13/11 merely reads: Criminal Complaint
(GENERAL) I
NRS 189.070 Grounds for dismissal of complaint on appeal. Any complaint, upon motion of the
defendant, may be dismissed upon any of the following grounds:
1. That the justice of the peace did not have jurisdiction of the offense.
2. That more than one offense is charged in any one count of the complaint.
3. That the facts stated do not constitute a public offense.

Further, the RMCs Ballard fraudulently refused to allow Coughlin to obtain a copy of the 9/14/11 file stamped
Criminal Complaint in 22176 and the Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause attached thereto until after the
10/10/11 arraignment, which was void in light of its being held during the pending of an Order for Competency
Evaluation per NRS 178.405). The RMC and RCA routinely conspire to prejudice defendants cases by refusing to afford
defendants access to filings and police reports they are absolutely entitled to until an artificially short period of time prior
to the trial, obstructing the defendants ability to prepare their defense and conduct discovery, subpoena witnesses, etc.

records request for incident report urgent please
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent:Tue 10/04/11 3:10 PM
To:renomunirecords@reno.gov
1 attachment
records request to reno city attorneys office oct 4.pdf (66.5 KB)
RenoMuniRecords@reno.gov
Dear Reno City Attorney Records Department.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 74 -
NOTICE
My name is Zach Coughlin. I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to an arrest at the E. 2nd St.
Walmart by the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police on or about Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between approximately
9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and all records, video, audio, paper documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am
representing myself. I have sought these records from the Reno Municipal Court's Records Office and they kept telling
me they didn't have them yet and that I should return sometime soon. Finally, they admitted the do not keep these records
and they must be obtained from your office. The RSIC Police refused to give me a copy of these records. This delay has
unduly prejudiced my case and I request that you provide these records to me at once, with no delay, please. I believe this
case should be dismissed.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin signed electronically and signed in attached PDF. I can come pick the records up with
identification if that is required or I hereby give you permission to email them to me or mail them to the address below:
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
records request
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent:Tue 10/04/11 4:41 PM
To:renomunirecords@reno.gov
2 attachments
RMC subpoena.pdf (67.8 KB) , RECORD_REQUEST_Zach Coughlin to RMC.pdf (20.2 KB)
October 4, 2011
Dear Reno Municipal Court Records Division,
My name is Zach Coughlin. I have now been informed by both the Reno Municipal Court and the Reno City
Attorney's officer, and the Reno Sparks Indian Colony none of these entities can provide my requested records. You have
them, I believe I have a constitutional right to them. If you feel differently, please explain in writing why that is the case.
1
I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to IC110627 at the E. 2nd St. Walmart by the Reno Sparks
Indian Colony Police on or about Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 75 -
NOTICE
and all records, video, audio, paper documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am representing myself. I have
sought these records from the Reno Municipal Court's Records Office and they kept telling me they didn't have them yet
and that I should return sometime soon. Finally, they admitted they do not keep these records and they must be obtained
from your the Reno City Attorney's Office. At the RMC records window I spoke with a supervisor named Karen. She
denied my request for these records today. This delay has unduly prejudiced my case and I request that you provide these
records to me at once, with no delay, please. The RS Indian Colony Police refused to give me a copy of these records
today when I spoke with Sargent Avansino, who was polite and helpful otherwise. I believe this case should be dismissed.
Signed electronically and signed in a signed attached PDF. I can come pick the records up with identification if
that is required or I hereby give you permission to email them to me or mail them to the address below:
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Compare the Certificate of Transmittal of Complete Record on Appeal by RMC Court Administrator Cassandra
J ackson of 7/26/12 in cr12-1262 with that she made in cr11-2064 on 12/23/11, where that of 7/26/12 actually does include
the transcript (or at least promise of) required by NRS 189.030(1): CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMITTAL OF
COMPLETE RECORD ON APPEAL I, Cassandra J ackson, Court Administrator of the Reno Municipal Court, do hereby
certity that the attached documents include full, true and correct copies of all papers relating to Case Number 11 CR
2640521, including a Certified Copy of Docket, Plaintiff's exhibits 1- 3. Further, said documents have been transmitted to
and filed with the clerk of the Washoe County District Court. Transcript to follow. /s/ Cassandra J ackson, Court
Administrator (thereafter notarized by the RMCs Lisa Wagner).
Further, RCA Wongs apparent contention that Coughlins 6/26/12 filing in the trespass case in 26405 was not a
NRS 176.515 Motion is undone by the entry at page 6 of the 7/25/12 ROA in cr12-1262: 26 J une 2012: Motion for New
Trial filed by defendant..
What Richard G. Hill, Esq. and his landlord client Merliss did in the trespass matter in 11 CR 26405 is
tantamount to a violation of the following:
BURGLARY; INVASION OF THE HOME
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 76 -
NOTICE
NRS 205.060 Burglary: Definition; penalties; venue.
NRS 205.065 Inference of burglarious intent.
NRS 205.067 Invasion of the home: Definition; penalties; venue.
NRS 205.070 Commission of another crime while committing burglary or invasion of the home.
NRS 205.075 Burglary with explosives; penalty.
NRS 205.080 Possession of instrument with burglarious intent; making, alteration or repair of instrument
for committing offense; penalty.
Along with the RCAs choice to charge Coughlin under the easier to get a conviction for RMC 8.10.040 than a
corollary in NRS, comes the pricethere is nothing in RMC 8.10.040 that supports destroying property as being
tantamount to petty larceny.
NRS 205.0832 Actions which constitute theft.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, a person commits theft if, without lawful authority, the
person knowingly:
(a) Controls any property of another person with the intent to deprive that person of the property.
(b) Converts, makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, or without authorization controls any property
of another person, or uses the services or property of another person entrusted to him or her or placed in his or her
possession for a limited, authorized period of determined or prescribed duration or for a limited use.
(c) Obtains real, personal or intangible property or the services of another person by a material
misrepresentation with intent to deprive that person of the property or services. As used in this paragraph, material
misrepresentation means the use of any pretense, or the making of any promise, representation or statement of present,
past or future fact which is fraudulent and which, when used or made, is instrumental in causing the wrongful control or
transfer of property or services. The pretense may be verbal or it may be a physical act.
(d) Comes into control of lost, mislaid or misdelivered property of another person under circumstances
providing means of inquiry as to the true owner and appropriates that property to his or her own use or that of another
person without reasonable efforts to notify the true owner.
(e) Controls property of another person knowing or having reason to know that the property was stolen.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 77 -
NOTICE
(f) Obtains services or parts, products or other items related to such services which the person knows are
available only for compensation without paying or agreeing to pay compensation or diverts the services of another person
to his or her own benefit or that of another person without lawful authority to do so.
(g) Takes, destroys, conceals or disposes of property in which another person has a security interest, with
intent to defraud that person.
Similarly, in CR12-2025, lost, mislaid or misdelivered property of another person under circumstances providing
means of inquiry as to the true owner and appropriates that property to his or her own use or that of another person
without reasonable efforts to notify the true owner.
Further, there is no uncontradicted evidence in 2025 that Coughlin did anything to take or carry away the
iPhone, especially where Coughlin produced video and audio of himself pleading with the skateboards to be peaceful and
wait for the police (whom Coughlin had made a 911 call to) to arrive.
Where DDA Young made the tactical decision to charge Coughlin with petty larceny under the WCCs easier to
convict on WCC 53.160 (steal, take, and carry away the personal property of another where there is not intent language
in such code section, just like there is not any intent language in RMC 8.10.040), Young and the State must accept the
downside in that such WCC contains not the NRS 205.0832(d)s lost, mislaid or misdelivered property of another person
under circumstances providing means of inquiry as to the true owner and appropriates that property to his or her own use
or that of another person without reasonable efforts to notify the true owner.
All of these prosecutors are paid well over $100,000 a year to do their job. J udges do not justice when they let
such prosecutors steal money from the taxpayers via such rather tepid arrangements disguised as complaints and
charging decisions and or tactical decisions in deciding whether to charge under local ordinances and codes or state
statutes.
Additionally, the Model Penal Code eliminates the asportation requirement and instead requires that the
defendant "exercise unlawful control."
[22]
The drafters noted that historically the asportation requirement distinguished
larceny (a felony) and attempted larceny (a misdemeanor).
[23]
They reasoned, therefore, that asportation was an irrelevant
requirement because in modern criminal law, like the Model Penal Code,
[24]
the sentencing consequences between an
attempted and completed crime are negligible.
1. ^ Section 223.2(1).
2. ^ Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Comment to 223.2(1), at 164 (1980).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 78 -
NOTICE
3. ^ 5.01
Further, in 2025, where DDA Young knew full well his entire case (consisting of a petty larceny charge and a
possession of stolen property charge premised upon the exact same facts) was meritless and fraudulent in violation of
RPC 3.8 and Brady where the very another required for the NRS 205.275 (Staab/Shepp) possession of stolen
property charge was not identified in Youngs complaint for the very reasons that RPD Duraldes arrest of Coughlin was
wrongful, just as where witness Duraldes testimony, written witness statement at the time of arrest, and the testimony of
Duralde as to what Zarate told him (which, of course, Duralde purports to have supported both his reasonable suspicion
and probable cause analysis sufficient to support the arrest and search incident to (where the exclusionary rule obviously
should have been applied to the iPhone) that was unlawful regardless, in light of the $80 value of the iPhone as testified to
by Goble (less than one third of the then $250 jurisdictional limit for the grand larceny charge Duralde fraudulently
made in a calculated, fraudulent attempt to get around the prohibition against such arrest for an alleged misdemeanor that
Duralde admits occurred outside his presence and between the hours of 7 pm and 7 am (NRS 171.136 prohibits such),
where Duralde smugly referenced his fraud to Coughlin in mentioning the certain benefits to charging it this way upon
Duralde announcing Oooooooh! Thats a felony! to Coughlin, whom identified himself by name and as an attorney, to
which Duralde immediately informed Coughlin I dont respect you at all in a patent display of his juvenile and
vindictive attitude towards attorneys.
The problem for RPD Duralde and DDA Young and witness Zarate is that Duraldes testimony as to
what witness Zarate told him during his investigation directly contradicted both Zarates testimony (who testified that
he said nothing more to any police officer that night than the sentence I was there, I saw everything) and the written
witness statement by Duralde, which, in fact, references the very another that NRS 205.275 requires (though contains
nothing to support the element such requires as to whether Coughlin knew such iPhone to have been stolen by such
another (ie, the still unidentified man whom Coughlin capture Nicole Watson on tape admitting loudly announced he
was going to throw the iPhone in the nearby Truckee river).
DDA Youngs 12/5/12 Amended Complaints fraudulent attempt to get around all that bleeds through the page,
but that is how bad DDA Young wanted to vindictively add another SCR 111(6) serious offense to the Complaint in
2025. Too bad for Young and, some might say, J udge Sferrazza (whom continued the same outrageously legal error
prone jurisprudence he display in the wrongful summary eviction handled by Hills firm in Rev2011-001708), as in flying
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 79 -
NOTICE
to close to the sun, Shepp and Staab made the bookend convictions of Coughlin for both petty larceny and possessing
stolen property equally void.
DDA Youngs Complaint in 2025 read: COUNT II. POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, a violation of
NRS 205.275, a misdemeanor1 in the manner following, to wit:
That the said defendant on or about the 20th day of August, 20111 at Reno Township, within the County of
Washoe1 State of Nevada, did willfully and unlawfully possess or withhold stolen goods having a value less than Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00), to wit: an iPhone, at or near 1 North Center Street, Reno, Washoe CountYI Nevada,
such property being owned by CORY GOBLE, for his own gain or to prevent the true owner from again possessing said
property, knowing that the property was obtained by means of larceny or under such circumstances as should have caused
a reasonable man to know that such goods were so obtained.
Ironically, in his attempt to burden Coughlins defense by stacking on another charge, Young destroyed his case
(and reputation and, arguably, career) as to not only the original petty larceny charge, but the inclusion of a possession of
stolen property charge in the Amended Complaint as well.
So, Richard G. Hill, Esq., landlord Merliss, Thomas Frontino, RPD Chris Carter, J r (lying in his police report in
alleging that Coughlin refused to leave when the very videos Hill and Merliss filmed show Coughlin asking why he was
afforded no opportunity to simply leave upon being issued any such warning to leave (much less simply be issued a
citation) where Coughlin pointed out no one told him to leave prior to his being placed under arrest, and the RPD Sargent
Marcia Lopez admitted both at the time of arrest on 11/13/11 and in a video taped interview by Coughlin on 1/13/12 that
neither she nor RPC Officer Chris Carter, J r. issued Coughlin any warning to leave on 11/13/11. In response to
Coughlins asking if you feel I am trespassing, couldnt you just tell me to leave, Sargent Lopez responded: You were
told not to come back, return to which Coughlin asked who told me to leave to which Sargent Lopez responded The
court (which, combined with the fact that neither Lopez nor Carter made any indication on the videos that they
themselves ever warned Coughlin to leave (Carter initially responded to Coughlins question by indicating we tried
rather than we did and follows such up with We actually feel that you are playing games which indicates that Carter,
Lopez, Hill, and Merliss were playing a game of their own that they must now answer for in light of Russell, Iorio,
Mayes, etc.. Seconds later, upon his Sargent Lopez correcting and aborting Carters attempt to lie about whether the
officers issued Coughlin any warning to leave, where Lopez admits it was the court whom she understands as having
been the one to provide Coughlin the warning to leave that Coughlins alleged disobeyance of would be a necessary
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 80 -
NOTICE
element of a trespass conviction. At such point (2:13) Carter aborts the lies he had not quite told yet (we tried versus
we did) and falls in line with Sargent Lopezs story in chiming in immediately after Lopez indicated it was the court
that told Coughlin to leave, Carter indicates the court. The served you court papers if you feel I am trespassing,
couldnt you just tell me to leave ). to which Coughlin asked When?
At the 1:58 mark:
Coughlin: if you feel I am trespassing, couldnt you just tell me to leave?
Officer Carter: We tried, we actually feel you are playing games.
Coughlin: When?
Sargent Lopez: You were told not to come back (2:04) (NOTE: Sargent Lopez does not say We told you not to
come back, but rather, You were told not to come back which she quickly clarifies as having been something the
court told Coughlin (which Carter then clarifies as having been told to Coughlin via the medium of court papers rather
than any rendition standard which Hill will will argue excuses his and the WCSOs offices failure to abide by Nevada law
per NRS 40.253(5)(a)s requirement that tenants have receipt of the written summary (just days after Coughlins cross
examination of that very Sargent Lopez in 065630 (where Coughlin asserted a vindictive arrest and prosecution motive
for the 1/14/12 misuse of emergency telephone services (911) charge now on appeal in CR12-0614) on 3/19/12 where
Coughlin queried Sargent Lopez as to her video taped admission on 1/13/12
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcVDVjFK64g) that neither she nor Officer Carter warned Coughlin to leave the
former home law office prior to their arresting him for trespass. Such resulted in the RJ C issuing the following:
www.wcbar.org/documents/AdminOrder2013-01.pdf Admin Order 2013-01/Proper Eviction Notice - Washoe County
Bar ...
www.wcbar.org/documents/AdminOrder2013-01.pdf
40.253 required landlords seeking the summary eviction Of a tenant provide notice to the tenant ... Governor,
added the following language to the notice required by NRS ... county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order; ..
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CDkQFjAC&url=http
%3A%2F%2Fwww.wcbar.org%2Fdocuments%2FAdminOrder2013-
01.pdf&ei=0U9GUvqhN4njrAHN04HADg&usg=AFQjCNE4tkVMABRDiOHXLqocldbyh6U7WA&sig2=Ge2J_y6
_jfGKWXE6VUCiOA&bvm=bv.53217764,d.aWM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 81 -
NOTICE
But, really, such 3/22/13 Administrative Order 2013-01 by RJ C Chief J udge Pearson only speaks to the NRS
40.253(3)(b)(2) wrinkle added by the legislature as to eviction notices (rather than the longstanding requirement under
NRS 40.253(5)(a) that every county in Nevada other than Washoe County has been in compliance with: The court may
thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order. (where there is no jurisdiction (see Volpert, Aikins, Davidsohn, J CRCP 81, etc.) for the fraudulent (Mayes v.
UVI invoking fraud, therefore making Coughlins suing the landlords attorneys absolutely based in law and fact and not
meritless) language in the 10/27/11 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Summary Eviction submitted by
Hills associate Baker and signed by J udge Sferrazza attempting to completely excise the burdensome requirement that
such order direct the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order.
Former RJ C Chief Civil Clerk Stancil admitted to Coughlin (newly discovered evidence!) on 8/1/13 that
RJC Judge Clifton ordered her not to comply with Coughlins 10/30/11 SCR 110 subpoena on Stancil both personally
and in her stead as RJ C Custodian of Records for Coughlins 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearingwhere NNDB Chair
Susich is required under SCR 110(3)-(4) to refer such violation of Coughlins SCR 110 subpoena to a district court
judge in the 2J DC for the institution of contempt proceedings (same goes with WCDA Watts-Vials obstruction of the
subpoenas Coughlin had served on the 2J DCs Custodian of Records and Clerks of Court Hastings and Wise and J udges
Flanagan and Elliott, and, maybe, L. Gardner). RJ C J udge Clifton was not then Chief J udge, either) J udge Clifton
(husband to the very AG Ronda Clifton whom Kevin Mirch is now suing CV13-00902 - KEVIN J . MIRCH VS.
RHONDA CLIFTON ETAL (D15) DF - TORTS-DEFAMATION (LIBEL/SLAND) (randomly reassigned to J udge
Stiglich for a minute (no fair, why does J udge Stiglich have to take on all these dumpster fire cases involving such a
legion of instances of misconduct by law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary?
Sure, Chief J udge Hardy has to move these case to someone he can trust to do a professional job rendering fair
and impartial jurisprudence and there is only so many options that are not completely drenched in RCA/WCDA juice,
but, oh, wait, these assignments are random, never mindthing is, pacifying prosecutors and law enforcement
(police, sheriffs, tribal police, bailiffs, etc) is like a bad heroin or meth addictionyou feed it a little and it just grows and
grows until it is this ultra demanding, manipulative, disgusting monster that is never, ever satisfied no matter how much
one throws Thomas v. States footnote 4 at, say, the RMCs patent violation of NRS 189.030, instead of applying NRS
189.035, or, maybe, actually reading the 50-100 pages of specific citations to specific filings in the 452 page record the
RMC is required to transmit under NRS 189.030 (where no such transmittal of the entire record from the district court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 82 -
NOTICE
is provided for in the very NRAP that J udge Elliott then proceeds to claim supports his position that NRAP 28 and 32
provide authority for the miscarriage of justice that is his 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in CR11-2064..
(http://www.ccwashoe.com/public/ck_public_qry_doct.cp_dktrpt_docket_report?backto=P&case_id=CV13-
00902&begin_date=&end_date=) incident to his allegations she cooked up some bogus theft charge (sound familiar?)
to do the bidding of NVB J udge Beesley, the Reno City Attorneys Don Christensen, members of Beesley Peck (Coughlin
suit against Washoe Legal Services name former Beesley Peck partner Karen Sabo, Esq. amongst the defendants, and
(newly discovered evidence) Coughlin can now report that WCDAs Bruce Hahn (to go along with WLS Exec
Directors daughter Tyler Elcano, Esq. getting hired by the WCDAs Office) was on the 4/10/12 and 4/16/12 NNDB
Screening Panels that either fraudulently, or negligently (or, probably, both) green lit SBN Asst Bar Counsel charlatan
Patrick O. Kings filing of an SCR 105 Complaint against Coughlin (resulting in a NNDB Panel recommendation by
J udge Elliotts former employer at Osborne & Echevveria, law firms son, J ohn Echeverria crafting one of the most
fraudulent Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law ever written recommending that Coughlin be permanently disbarred,
now on appeal in 62337) based upon a presentation by
CV13-00902 - KEVIN J . MIRCH VS. RHONDA CLIFTON ETAL: 06-SEP-2013 12:44 PM Case
Assignment Notification Entry: RECUSING - RANDOMLY REASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT 10 FROM
DEPARTMENT 9 ...10-SEP-2013 10:16 AM $Peremptory Challenge MIRCH, KEVIN (guess Mirch didn't feel like
smelling any of what any former WCDA prosecutor turned J udge was cooking either)
(http://www.Scribd.Com/doc/155826069/4-3-13-0204-065630-063341-CR13-0552-Order-by-Former-WCDA-Now-
J udge-Sattler-Striking-Coughlin-s-Mandamus-Petition-Re-Violations-of-Stay-Under-NRS-178-4 )...24-SEP-2013 01:59
PM Case Assignment Notification Entry: RECUSAL - RANDOMLY REASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT 8 (J udge
Stiglich), FROM DEPARTMENT 1 ...No way, Jose! ....27-SEP-2013 03:05 PM Case Assignment Notification
Entry: RECUSUAL - RANDOMLY REASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT 15, FROM DEPARTMENT 8 (because J udge
Peck in Department 13 might have had a conflict as to Mirch).
Further, Hills statements on the videos of the arrest, when view in combination with his sworn testimony at the
6/18/12 criminal trespass trial and 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing, clearly establish that Hill lied not only in
testifying that the RPD Officers warned Coughlin to leave (at any point, much less prior to landlord Merliss further
burglarizing Coughlins former home law office in kicking the door down) (which, again, the RPD Officers that the RMC
would not allow Coughlin to cross examine are caught on tape admitting they did not do), as well as establishing that Hill
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 83 -
NOTICE
lied to the RPD the 11/13/11 date of the arrest where Hill is heard on the video telling the officers in response to
Coughlins asking just who it was whom allegedly warned Coughlin to leave (and when), to which Hill is heard (while
filming, like a complete and utter idiot where Hill then propounded such to the Reno City Attorney, whose prosecutor
Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. then suborned the perjury of Hill amidst his own RPC 3.8 and Brady violations:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537747/6-18-12-0204-26405-Ocr-CR12-1262-3059269-Transcript-Criminal-Trespass-
Testimony-RG-Hill-CD-Baker-RMC-J udge-W-Gardner-a9-Cropped-Hole-Punches-and-Line official audio from 6/18/12
criminal trespass trial in RMC 11 CR 26405 morning then afternoon sessions: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3uG_-
2J 129A http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3W9j0tJ LRvI
Some Google Search Results 13-12021 - Case Search despite Hill's 6/18/12 sworn testimony at the criminal
trespass Trial of ... J udge W. Gardner in 11 CR 26405 and 11 TR 26800 in the Reno Municipal .... Also available at that
link is the transcript from the criminal trespass Trial on 6/18/12 where.
12-36656 - Case Search Nov 19, 2012 - TRANSCRIPT MATERIALS CURRENTLY EXISTS TO BE
RELEASED TO .... the follow sworn testimony by Hill from the 6/18/12 Trial, viewed in .... 11 CR 26405, where Hill
indicates the WCSO attempted to "personally
12-37363 Nov 27, 2012 - ... under oath twice (at the criminal trespass trial in 26405 on 6/18/12 and at ..... (page
10 of unofficial "Transcript" and at 8:52 am on the certified ...It is far from clear denying anything and everything
Coughlin asks for is the wise career move, despite, some might say, the conventional wisdom formerly holding that,
in Washoe County, ya gotta have the WCDA, cops and sheriff endorsing you.
Judge Stiglich could be forgiven if wondering whether she was appointed to the bench or to preside over a
toxic waste dump replete with industrial levels of prosecutorial, police, and judicial misconduct to wade through.

Sargent Lopez subjected Coughlin to a custodial arrest for criminal trespass in Reno Municipal Court case 11
CR 26405, on November 13th, 2011 (which resulted in Coughlin being convicted for criminal trespass following the J une
18th, 2012 Trial (and a SCR 111(4) Petition filed with the Nevada Supreme Court in 61901) wherein Richard Hill
testified as follows: "Anyway, the client gets down to the bottom ofthe stairs. I was 3 or 4 feet behind him, and he pushed
on the door, and I could see that the door was moving, but it was barricaded. And he turned to me and said, "It's
barricaded from the inside." I said, "Okay, that's it. Let's go upstairs." We went upstairs. We called the police. They
arrived about 10 minutes later. Told them what the problem was. They went down. It was a lady sergeant. I believe her
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 84 -
NOTICE
name was Lopez, and an officer. I don't recall his rank. I believe it was Carter. They went down, and banged on the door
with their nightsticks. We were pretty sure who was inside. Didn't know for sure. And I said, "Come on out, Zach."
Nothing. "Come on out, Zach." Nothing. And that went on for 2 or 3 minutes. And they specifically identified themselves
as the police. They said, "Well, that's it, we're going to leave." And both Dr. Merliss and I said, "What do you mean? This
guy is in here. Somebody is in here criminally trespassing. We need to know who it is and get him out of here." And they
said, "Well, we're not going to break down the door." So, Dr. Merliss went down the stairs, and he's the one that kicked
the door open. Broke the door in the process. He then came up. One of the police officers went down with his gun drawn,
flashlight turned down, and the first thing I heard was, "Show me your hands! Show me your hands! Come towards me."
(Page -93) And I don't recall at that time whether Mr. Coughlin identified himself or not. We then proceeded upstairs, and
Mr. Coughlin then came upstairs on his own.... Page -1 12BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Hill, you say the police -you're
testifying under oath that you're sure the police specifically identified themselves as police prior to the door being kicked
down? A l am.... BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Can you tell me exactly what the police said when they identified themselves
as police prior to the door being kicked down? Page -1 13- A We told them that we were pretty sure you were there, so my
best recollection is that they shouted, "Come on out, Zach. Come on out, Zach." Words to that effect. I recall hearing that,
as well as, "Come on out, this is the police." Basement. Q A When did you hear, "Come on out, this is the police." When
they were down banging on the door of the Q A Prior to the door being kicked down? Yes. Q A You're sure? Positive. Q A
Were you videotaping during this period oftime? I wasn't. Q A Q You were not videotaping? Nope...." (Take a look at the
video "Zach's arrest 010" and consider whether Hill was flat out lying in that respect, in addition to many others)
http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537747/6-18-12-0204-26405-Ocr-CR12-1262-3059269-Transcript-
Criminal-Trespass-Testimony-RG-Hill-CD-Baker-RMC-J udge-W-Gardner-a9-Cropped-Hole-Punches-and-Line


As to RCA prosecutor Hazlett-Stevens(for whom Dan Wong, Esq. and J ohn Kadlic have a supervisory duty) then
suborned the perjury of Hill as to the following testimony by Hill at the 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial (Hazlett is another
of the McGeorge Mafia, which includes RCA Chief Dan Wong, J ohn Springgate (see dv08-01168, J oshi case from which
2J DC L. Gardners FHE3 springs), Bruce Hahn, NNDB Panel Member in 62337 Stephen R. Kent, Esq., Z. Young, WLSs
Paul Elcano, RMCs J udge Nash Holmes, RMC J udge Howard, RMC J udge Dilworth, WCDA Gammick presided over
by the very brother of 2J DC J udge Linda Gardner (RMCs W. Gardner) where Linda Gardners vacated 4/13/09 Order
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 85 -
NOTICE
After Trial (vacated by her 6/19/09 Final Decree of Divorce (again, see DV08-01168), which took out the part hitting
Coughlin with $934 worth of attorneys fees via NRS 7.085 while adding an award of the very alimony such then vacated
fee award relied upon (ie, Coughlin allegedly made a vexatious claim for alimony)Somehow, WCDAs Offices
Bruce Hahn, Esq., as a member of the 3 member NNDB Screening Panel in April 2012 deciding whether or not to subject
Coughlin to the awful, awful experience 62337 has put he and his family and clients and clients families through, was not
able to glean that his even sitting on such Screening Panel might lend an appearance of impropriety to the whole thing
(funny, SBN King, whom reneged on his promise to reveal the names of those on such Screening Panel, did, in initially
promising to track down the names he couldnt remember, indicate on 10/12/12, that one of the members was a
femalewhich is bad considering it was three males on the Panel, one of which was Bruce Hahn, tending to indicate
Kings subsequent refusal to divulge the identifies thereof and conspiracy with NNDB Chairman Susich to prevent
Coughlin from obtaining was borne of an admission that Hahn had no business remaining on such panel, especially where
the WCDAs Office will be defending the WCSO and possibly the RJ C in the lawsuits filed against them based upon the
burglaries masquerading as summary removal order lockouts incident to summary evictions in Rev2011-001708,
Rev2012-000374, and Rev2012-001048 (and probably others, too, including the RPDs Soldal style misconduct towards
Coughlin on 9/21/12 at Superior Mini Storage in Rev2012-078432)apparently dealing with tenants it akin to an
afternoon playing paintball to the WCSO and RPD. Or kick the can. Interestingly, neither RPD Duralde nor the WCDAs
Office DDA Young found very relevant or mitigating witnesses Zarate and Lichty calling Coughlin a faggot in a hostile
and threatening tone (with some of such threats capture on video and 911 audio recordings) shortly before the arrest of
8/20/11 at issue in cr12-2025. Apparently such hate speech is not that big a concern to the RPD and DDA Young.
At the 1:58 minute mark: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V6I3t7tTlPI


PERJ URY AND SUBORNATION OF PERJ URY
NRS 199.120 Definition; penalties.
NRS 199.125 Oath and swear defined.
NRS 199.130 False affidavit or complaint to effect arrest or search.
NRS 199.140 Use of fictitious name on affidavit or complaint to effect arrest or search.
NRS 199.145 Statement made in declaration under penalty of perjury.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 86 -
NOTICE
NRS 199.150 Attempt to suborn perjury.
NRS 199.160 Procuring execution of innocent person by perjury or subornation of perjury.
NRS 199.180 Irregularity in administering oath or incompetency of witness no defense.
NRS 199.190 Deposition: When deemed to be complete.
NRS 199.200 Statement of what one does not know to be true.
Also, DDA Young countenanced witness Zarates capture on video and audio tape violations of the following in
his attempts to dissuade witness Nicole Watson from testifying:
NRS 199.230 Preventing or dissuading person from testifying or producing evidence.
NRS 199.240 Bribing or intimidating witness to influence testimony.
NRS 199.305 Preventing or dissuading victim, person acting on behalf of victim, or witness from
reporting crime, commencing prosecution or causing arrest.
NRS 199.310 Malicious prosecution. A person who maliciously and without probable cause therefor,
causes or attempts to cause another person to be arrested or proceeded against for any crime of which that person is
innocent:
1. If the crime is a felony, is guilty of a category D felony and shall be punished as provided in NRS
193.130; and
2. If the crime is a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
RPD Officer Carters statements in his 11/13/11 police report in 11 CR 26405 are criminal misconduct: NRS
197.130 False report by public officer. Every public officer who shall knowingly make any false or misleading statement
in any official report or statement, under circumstances not otherwise prohibited by law, shall be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor. [1911 C&P 84; RL 6349; NCL 10033]


In Braham, the defendant was convicted in a J ustice Court of driving with a revoked driver's license. The
defendant appealed his conviction to the District Court, which required him to pay for a transcript of the J ustice Court's
proceedings. The Nevada Supreme Court found that although N.R.S. 189.030(1) Establishes a timeframe for transmitting
transcripts, it is silent regarding the costs for transmitting transcripts. Id. At 1392. The Nevada Supreme Court found that,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 87 -
NOTICE
in the absence of explicit legislative direction otherwise, N.R.S. 4.41 0(2) Controls who pays for the transcript. Id. 'Since
N.R.S. 4.410(2) Places the burden of paying for transcripts "on the party ordering them",


23. Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, e . G., NRAP 4(b), NRS 34.710, NRS
34.815 , NRS 177.015(2), Or other........MR.AP..... 4.....(H) .............. SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY 24. Specify
statute, rule or other authority which grants this court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order appealed from: NRS
177.015(1)(B) ................ NRS 34.710(3)................ NRS 177.015(2)---------------- NRS 34.710(4)................ NRS
177.055 ................ NRS 34.815 NRS 177.385 ................ Other (specify). VERIFICATION I certify that the information
provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.{
Really, J udge Howards 12/15/11 Order is void given he entered it prior to the City Attorneys Office (in cr11-
2064 and RMC 11 CR 22176) even filing an opposition to the 12/13/11 Motion for New Trial (newly discovered evidence
receipt for $83.82 worth of groceries Coughlin purchase minutes prior to the arrest at Wal-Mart containing UPC for the
very Duract Coughlin Melts Coughlin is alleged to have stolenwhich is especially important considering the perjury by
Wal-Marts Frontino (and perhaps the RSICs Crawford) incident to Frontinos testimony that he personally eye witnessed
all of the items Coughlin was wrung up for by the Wal-Mart associate and that such Duract Cough Melts item was not
amongst those wrung up, nor amongst those to be listed on the receipt of such purchaseso much for beyond a
reasonable doubt, especially where the entirety of the Citys case rest upon the credibility of Wal-Marts Frontino, whom
was caught lying where he alleged he personally eye witnessed Coughlin select and consume the very chocolate candy
bar that Frontino alleges Coughlin consumed while shopping and did not pay for turned out to belong to a regrigerated
item which, obviously, is not amongst those found in the candy isle that Frontino admitted did not contain any
refrigerated items.

Really, 2J DC J udge Elliott's 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC must be read as a
remand back to the RMC for a new trial, if not a complete reversal, consistent with NRS 189.035
given the inapplicability of Thomas v. State to appeals to the district court. Indeed, if Thomas v. State
applies to appeals to the district court, then NRS 177.255 precludes the very rationale J udge Elliott
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 88 -
NOTICE
enunciates for his willful failure to embrace his jurisdiction in refusing to adjudicate Coughlin's
appeal (which is a fraudulent form of adjudicating it in effect).
NRS 177.255 Court to give judgment without regard to technical errors. After hearing the
appeal, the Court shall give judgment without regard to technical error or defect which does not affect
the substantial rights of the parties. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1446).
If Elliott and the RMC are doing this to Coughlin, a trained attorney (suspended or not), can
you imagine what they are doing to J oe Citizen on a daily basis? To indigent J oe Citizen whom is not
a National Merit Finalist who passed the bar examination after his second of three years of law school
where he was ranked tenth in his class? Its not as if Elliott and Howard can claim to be new to the
bench.
The portion of Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in cr11-2064 (which
Elliott knew full well would be included in an SCR 111(6) Petitionwell, maybe he didnt because
the RMC failed to comply with SCR 111(2) in failing to transmit a copy of the conviction to the
NSCT and SBNso, had Coughlin followed Coe Swobes advice (you probably dont need to
report that and had Coughlins initial report of his conviction to the SBNs Asst Bar Counsel Glenn
Machado been treated as Machado indicated it would (this doesnt sound like a big deal..a candy
bar?), and had Richard G. Hill, Esq. not discharged mine and my associates RPC 8.3 duties in his
purported 1/14/12 unsigned, unsworn, emailed grievance (NG12-0204, 62337) to the same Asst.
Bar Counsel Patrick O. King whom was then listed as attorney of record in Milsner v. Carstarphen
opposite the same Richard G. Hill, Esq., then.maybe Elliott really did not think, or even know that
his laughable 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC would be put on this sort of stage.but
here we are. And, so too, is Elliotts (and WCDA DDA Zachary Norman Young and Patricia
Halsteads) misconduct on 4/19/12 in summarily incarcerating Coughlin for eight days whilst
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 89 -
NOTICE
managing to violate both NRS 178.405 and NRS 178.484 (and perhaps NRS 22.030(2) given the
4/18/12 letter by Lakes Crossings Bill Davis, Ph.D. and Sally Farmer, Ph.D. was not in the form of
an affidavit, or even a declaration in lieu of). Elliotts 3/15/12 order cited to and relied upon:
[1]
As a
preliminary matter, we note that Thomas's counsel did not adequately cite to the record in his briefs or provide this court
with an adequate record. In support of factual assertions, counsel simply cites the supplemental habeas petition filed
below. This is improper.
3
Additionally, counsel failed to include many necessary parts of the record in the Appellant's
Appendix. We are able to address the merits of a number of claims only because the State provided a seven-volume
appendix that includes necessary parts of the record.
4

3
NRAP 28(e) provides: Every assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be
supported by a reference to the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is
to be found. The rule also prohibits a brief to this court from incorporating by reference
briefs or memoranda filed in district court.

4
In the reply brief, Thomas's counsel states his belief that this court has the direct appeal record
and chastises the State for wasting paper in its appendix. Counsel is mistaken. The clerk of
this court does not retain the direct appeal record. Rather, SCR 250(7)(b) provides that the
clerk of the district court shall retain the original record ... and shall not transmit a record on
appeal to the supreme court. Appellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide this court
with portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal.
NRAP 30(b)(3); see also Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980); Jacobs
v. State, 91 Nev. 155, 158, 532 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1975).

As to the prisoners mailbox rule and Coughlins submissions to washoe county jail
employees during the three day summary incarceration following the 11/30/11 trial in 22176: t all that
is required on the part of a person filing a paper with an official is 'merely the depositing of the instrument with
the custodian for the purpose of being filed'. (SeePalcar Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8
Cir., 1942, 131 F.2d 210; Schultz v. United States, Ct.Cl.1955, 132 F.Supp. 953, 955; McCord v. Commissioner of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 90 -
NOTICE
Internal Revenue, 1941, 74 App.D.C. 369, 123 F.2d 164, 165;Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
6 Cir., 1952, 199 F.2d 902, 904. (Johansson v. Towson, 177 F. Supp. 729 (M.D.Ga. 02/17/1959).) [emphasis added.]
The filing of a paper takes place upon the delivery of it to the officer at his office. Milton v. United States,
5th Cir. 1939, 105 F.2d 253; Poynor v. Commissioner, 5th Cir. 1936, 81 F.2d 521. When the mails are utilized for the
purpose of filing an instrument, the filing takes place upon delivery at the office of the official required to receive
it. Wampler v. Snyder, 1933, 62 App. D.C. 215, 66 F.2d 195. (Phinney v. Bank of Southwest National Association, 335
F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 08/05/1964).) (See also United States v. Missco Homestead Ass'n Inc., 185 F.2d 283 (8th Cir.
11/01/1950).) (Dienstag v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 164 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 11/18/1957); Thorndal v. Smith,
Wild, Beebe & Cades, 339 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 01/04/1965); Lone Star Producing Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 208 F. Supp. 85
(E.D.Tex. 07/17/1962).) [emphasis added.]
Although Lombardo was decided before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated, courts have
relied on it and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 5(e), and 77 for the same proposition. See, e.g., Milton v. United
States, 105 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1939)("The word 'filed' . . . requires of one filing a suit, merely the depositing of
the instrument with the custodian for the purpose of being filed. Except where specific statute otherwise provides,
and none such is present here, it charges him with no further duty, [and] subjects him to no untoward
consequences."); Greeson v. Sherman, 265 F.Supp. 340, 342 (W.D. Va. 1967)("[I]f rule 3 is read in conjunction with
Rule 5(e) . . . [a complaint is filed when] the complaint is delivered to an officer of the court who is authorized bo receive
it."); Freeman v. Giacomo Costa Fu Andrea, 282 F.Supp. 525, 527 (E.D.Pa. 1968)("[I]t is settled law that delivery of a
pleading to a proper official is sufficient to constitute filing thereof.") In Cintron v. Union Pacific R. Co., 813 F.2d 917,
920 (9th Cir. 1987), the court said: The consensus is that "[p]apers and pleadings including the original complaint are
considered filed when they are placed in the possession of the clerk of the court." C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure 1153 (1969). See United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1986). The
court then discussed earlier cases, including Loya v. Desert Sands Unified School Dist., 721 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1983).
(Stone Street Capital, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 300 F.Supp.2d 345 (D.Md. 11/06/2003).) [emphasis added.]
Filing is complete once the document is delivered to and received by the proper official. United States v.
Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76, 36 S.Ct. 508, 60 L.Ed. 897 (1916). Although Lombardo was decided before the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated, courts have relied on it and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 5(e), and 77
for the same proposition. See, e.g., Milton v. United States, 105 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1939);Greeson v. Sherman, 265
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 91 -
NOTICE
F. Supp. 340, 342 (W.D.Va. 1967) ("If Rule 3 is read in conjunction with Rule 5 (e) . . . [a complaint is filed when] the
complaint is delivered to an officer of the court who is authorized to receive it.");Freeman v. Giacomo Costa Fu Andrea,
282 F. Supp. 525, 527 (E.D.Pa. 1968) ("[I]t is settled law that delivery of a pleading to a proper official is sufficient to
constitute filing thereof."). (Central States, SE & SW Pension v. Paramount Liquor, 34 F.Supp.2d 1092 (N.D.Ill.
02/09/1999).) [emphasis added.]
The docketing of filed documents is a ministerial act that the Office of the Clerk is obligated to perform.
(See Ray v. United States, 57 S. Ct. 700, 301 U.S. 158 (U.S. 04/26/1937).) [emphasis added.]
State Case Law
"The duties of the clerk relating to the filing of complaints are ministerial in nature . . ." Orr v. Culpepper,
161 Ga. App. 801, 804 (288 S.E.2d 898) (1982). "It is the official duty of the clerk of a court to file all papers in a cause
presented by the parties, and to mark them filed, with the date of filing. [Cits.]" (Brinson v. Georgia RR Bank &c. Co.,
45 Ga. App. 459 at 460 (165 SE 321) (1932).) [emphasis added.]
The habeas court clerk's duty to file a notice of appeal is ministerial in nature, and it was beyond her duty
or power to concern herself with the legal viability of a notice presented to her for filing. See Orr v. Culpepper, 161
Ga. App. 801, 804 (288 SE2d 898) (1982). By rejecting Hughes' timely notice of appeal, the clerk of the habeas court, in
effect, determined its legal insufficiency and then undertook to dismiss the appeal. In so doing, she usurped this Court's
authority to determine its own jurisdiction. (Hughes v. Sikes, 273 Ga. 804, 546 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. 05/07/2001).) [emphasis
added.]
Consider: Sullivan v. Eighth J udicial Dist. Court In and For County of Clark, 904 P.2D 1039, 111 Nev.1367
(Nev., 1995): See Bowman v. District Court, 102 Nev. 474, 728 P.2D 433 (1986) (clerk has a ministerial uty to accept and
file documents if those documents are in proper form; clerk must not exercise anyjudicial discretion); Barnes v. District
Court, 103 Nev. 679, 748 P.2D 483 (1987) (prisoner's right ofaccess to court cannot be denied on basis of indigency);
Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 810 P.2D1209 (1991) (clerk must create an accurate record of all pleadings submitted for
filing, whether or notthe documents are actually filed); Whitman v. Whitman, 108 Nev. 949, 840 P.2D 1232 (1992)
(clerkhas no authority to return documents submitted for filing; instead, clerk must stamp documents thatcannot be
immediately filed "received," and must maintain such documents in the record of the case);Donoho v. District Court, 108
Nev. 1027, 842 P.2D 731 (1992) (the clerk of the district court has aduty to file documents and to keep an accurate record
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 92 -
NOTICE
of the proceedings before the court); Grey v.Grey, 111 Nev. 388, 892 P.2D 595 (1995) (clerk of district court admonished
for failure to keepaccurate record of documents submitted for filing)18 U.S.C. 2071 Case Law:
United States v. Conlin, 551 F.2d 534 (2nd Cir. 03/17/1977); United States v. Claypoole, 227 F.2d 752 (3rd Cir.
12/07/1955); United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 05/03/1974); United States v. May, 625 F.2d 186 (8th Cir.
05/30/1980); United States v. Salazar, 455 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 07/24/2006); United States v. Lang, No. 02-4075 (10th
Cir. 04/21/2004). This case has some very good information -- United States v. Rosner, 352 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y.
12/14/1972). 18 U.S.C. 2071 case Law Search Results from versuslaw.com.



This Court need not bother with that analysis. Brahams, NRS 178.482, J udge Elliotts own 3/15/12
Order in Cr11-2064 (and where WDCR 3(1) formed the dubious basis for assigning all of Coughlins
criminal cases to J udge Elliott (made all the more dubious by J udge Elliotts patent misconduct in
failing to divulge (never mind disqualify himself) the fact that he is on CAAWs Executive Board
while presiding over Coughlins wrongful termination suit in CV11-01955, where CAAW is a named
co-defendantsuch is tantamount to an NRCP 60(b)(4) void for lack of jurisdiction basis for setting
aside all orders by Elliott therein (and there is some horrid oneslike granting attorneys fees
premised upon Elliotts view of the merits of Coughlins Complaint when his dismissal order
admits it did not get to the merits but rather dismissed on the specious insufficiency of service of
process and or process). WDCR 3(1) does not justify Elliott sinking his claws in every last criminal
matter involving Coughlin (look at the shameful summary incarceration of then practicing attorney
Coughlin on 4/19/12 for 8 days in plain violation of the statutory notice requirements for such a bail
revocation (which is a form of summary contemptthe Lakes Crossing letter was not an affidavit
per NRS 22.030(2), etc, etc.).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 93 -
NOTICE
Anyways, NRS 189 applies to municipal courts, well, at least to ones that are courts of
record (a de novo trial is required if the RMC is not a court of recordCoughlin can get a straight
answer one way or the other in that regard, ie, whether the RMC is a court of record), NRS
5.071and NRS 189 presents a minefield of problems for the City and the RMC (and coming
attraction, NRS 189.035 procedure when transcript defective makes J udge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order
Affirming Ruling of the RMC in CR11-2064 such clear error to be arguably a manifestation of
judicial misconduct
The RMCs failure to abide by NRS 189.030 (Brahams speaks to a petition for certiorari,
which is different than a criminal case and the appeal thereofregardless, NRS 4.410(2) and
Brahams merely speak to whom has to pay for the transcript.
Where NRS 4.410(2) provides that 2. The compensation for transcripts and copies must be
paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case, the preparation of the transcript need not commence
until the compensation has been deposited with the court reporter. and where NRS 189.030,
In Braham, the defendant was convicted in a J ustice Court of driving with a revoked driver's
license. The defendant appealed his conviction to the District Court, which required him to pay for a
transcript of the J ustice Court's proceedings. The Nevada Supreme Court found that although N.R.S.
189.030(1) Establishes a timeframe for transmitting transcripts, it is silent regarding the costs for
transmitting transcripts. Id. At 1392. The Nevada Supreme Court found that, in the absence of explicit
legislative direction otherwise, N.R.S. 4.41 0(2) Controls who pays for the transcript. Id. 'Since
N.R.S. 4.410(2) Places the burden of paying for transcripts "on the party ordering them", (and does
not apply to an indigent (which 2J DC J udge Steinheimmers 8/9/13 Order in CV11-01896 found
Coughlin to bewhere RMC J udge Howard failed to find Coughlin was not indigent, rather, he
attempted to satisfy Aigersinger by indicating it was not typical for jail time to result from the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 94 -
NOTICE
charges brought in 11 CR 22176 (2064, 60838)which isnt good enough (ie, the threat it still
therewhich Howard found useful when abusing the contempt power and threatening to failed to
completely prevent Coughlin from defending himself against the lies of Wal-Marts Frontino and
RSIC Officers Braunworth and Crawford, a threesome that goes together like bread and meat), and
the RMC never ruled that Coughlin was not indigent, rather, it tried an end run around Aigersinger by
indicating incarceration is not usually seen in similar cases (yet failed to specifically rule such was
not a possibility, and the Sixth Amendment and Aigersinger provide the mere possibility of
incarceration triggers the appointment of counsel) the specifically delineates between criminal and
civil matters in indicating that the preparation in a civil case shall not be ordered until a down payment is
madeie, such preparation must begin in a criminal case regardless, and the RMC grafts such civil rule onto criminal
matters, which is judicial misconduct.they do not absolve the RMCs willful Canon 1 Rule 1.1 violation
in failing to abide by the requirements of NRS 189.030 in failing to order the transcript prepared
(especially with the exclusive CCR Longoni (http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537783/Rmc-
Transcript-Rules-in-Violation-of-Nrs-Longioni-Ocrd-and-Tagged-J big2-Lossy ) hustle being
perpetuated by the RMC), and Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling in CR11-2064 only
compounds the RMCs misconduct in that regard. Coughlin did not stipulate to anything relative to
NRS 189.035, he was denied counsel in the appeal as well, J udge Hardys 3/8/12 Order Denying
indigent Coughlin his IFP veers into 2008 Indigent Defense Order violative territory as wellThe
transcript was defective in that the RMC flat out refused to order it prepared as it is required to due
under NRS 189.030, as such the case must be returned for retrial in the justice court from which it
came. Elliotts citation to authority indicating it is Coughlins responsibility to cite to the transcript
in his brief is non-sense where the RMC willfully refused to follow the law as to the preparation of
transcript (soda and nuggets on a date with the RMC apparently, as one doesnt get counsel, doesnt
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 95 -
NOTICE
get a transcript, no continuance, doesnt get to even save their trial notes on their laptop before the
handcuffs come out).
And, actually, the pros at the City Attorneys office ran this same motion to dismiss hustle in
cr11-2064. Wheres the Canon 2. Rule 2.15 RMC D Nash Holmes 3/14/12 grievance against
Coughlin alleging violations of (amongst others) RPC 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 4.4, 8.4, etc., etc.
especially RPC 3.1 meritorious contentions. In cr11-2064 roberts alleged Coughlins appeal not
timelyyet Howards own 12/15/11 order therein establishes that Coughlins 12/13/11 Motion for
New Trial therein was timely, such is a tolling motion, and regardless, such was double titled as a
notice of appeal anyways. Fine, RCA Roberts alleges she was not present for the additional three
minutes of rendition J udge Howard issue upon having Coughlin brought back into court in cuffs at
8:20 pm on 11/30/11 (at which point J udge Howard announce an NRS 178.476 enlargement (or he
delayed the rendition of his order until after Coughlins 3 day incarceration, either way, and Root
does not preclude that, especially the latter, but, regardless, Root presents no issue at all as to
Coughlins 12/13/11 NRS 176.515 motion for new trialproblem is, that means such order was
made in absentia, and to whatever extent rendition does not require entry the order, notice of
entry of order then becomes required, and the RMC never filed such a notice of entry of
ordermeaning, the 2J DC never rightfully had jurisdiction of cr11-2064, beyond the rubber
stamping of the signature on the 11/30/11 J udgment of Conviction and Court Order issue in cr11-
2064.

November 15, 2011: Notice of Setting Bench Trial date of November 30, 2011, in cr11-2064 was
mailed to an outdate address for Coughlin, trial of 11/30/11 void for lack of notice.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 96 -
NOTICE
December 13, 2011: Coughlins Notice of Appeal, Motion to Vacate and or Set Aside, J CRCP
59, J CRCP 60, Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Recusal. (NOTE: this is a NRS 176.515
Motion for New Trial regardless of Coughlin invoking NRCP 59, 60, etcsee page 110 of 12/23/11
ROA from RMC in CR11-2064.)
December 15, 2011: Order denying Defendant's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Motion for
Publication of Transcript at Public Expense, Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside, Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Recusal.
December 15, 2011: Notice of Denial of Service filed by Reno City Attorney.
December 16, 2011: Defendant Coughlin's Supplemental to Notice of Appeal, Motion to Vacate and
or Set Aside, J CRCP 59, J CRCP 60, Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Recusal; Motion to
Strike.
December 16, 2011: Defendant Coughlin's Notice of Denial of Service; Opposition City of Reno's
Notice of Denial of Service; Request for Clarification Regarding Deadline for Filing Motion for new
Trial, Other tolling Motions, etc., Application for Deferral or Waiver of court Fees and Cost.
Coughlins 12/16/11 Supplemental Notice of Appeal appealed the 12/15/11 Order Denying
Defenants .Motion to vacate and/or Set Aside (an NRS 176.515 Motion for New Trial, and an
order denying itself is an appealable orderyet the 2J DCs Elliott failed to adjudicate such appeal of
the 12/15/11 Order Denying Coughlins NRS 176.515 Motion for New Trial.
And RCA Wongs attempt to argue that RMC Rule 5 rule related to faxing of, allegedly, just
motions somehow overrides NRS 178.589
How reckless was Wal-Mart in its allegations, especially considering the availability of NRS
178.564. Surely Wal-Mart ought be made to have some skin in the game now that its lies have been
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 97 -
NOTICE
exposed. Same with Hill and Merliss, and the Reno City Attorneys Office. Play with someones law
license and reputation, chickens come home to roost when your lies and misconduct bawk that bawk.

There is no way J ordan v State allows for the RJ C and RMC judges to violated NRS
178.608, .610, .589, WDCR 10, J CRRT 10, J CRRT 2 (RJ C keeps asserting rules applicable only to
civil actions to justify its criminal conduct in refusing indigent criminal defendant Coughlins
filingsJ ustice Clifton abusing contempt power in order Coughlin not to fax the WCDAs Officer
filings, etc.
Note: Cf. Hill v. Sheriff, supra, and Stockton v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 94, 482 P.2d 285 (1971). Neither is it a case
where the prosecutor willfully disregarded important procedural rules. Cr. Maes v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 317, 468 P.2d
332 (1970). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor exhibited a conscious indifference to rules of procedure
affecting the accused's rights. Cf. State v. Austin, 87 Nev. 81, 482 P.2d 284 (1971).
Downey v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 88 Nev. 14, 15, 492 P.2d 989, 990 (1972) hicks 5 30 12 72 hours
Note: all the changing the rules vis a vis service faxing, deadline for pre-trial motions etc by rmc rjc
skau, Clifton no faxing on 11/27/12, gardner's altering pretrial 15 days and art 4 sec 21 fourteenth amendment,
WestlawNext - 3 full text Citing References for Stockton v. Sheriff, Clark County
WestlawNext - Stockton v. Sheriff, Clark County no juris criminal
J ordan no faxing for coughlin rmc rule 534.020. Writ may be granted by Supreme Court and district courts; when
writ may issue
Citation: NV ST 34.020
Sent On: September 24, 2013
Sent By: A WestlawNext Researcher
Client ID: PATRON ACCESS
Note: Elliott exceeded jurisdiction in his 3/15/12 order in 2064 where NRS 189.030 required him to not opine
upon the RMC's failure to transmit transcript, not to deny based upon Coughlin's alleged failure to
cite to such Braham v. Fourth J udicial Dist. Court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 98 -
NOTICE
Citation: 103 Nev. 644
Item: 239.Importance and purpose of principle of separation of powers, 16A Am. J ur. 2d Constitutional Law
239. Courts are prohibited from encroaching upon a domain of another branch of the government.
(The executive branch has the authority to prosecute criminal cases in the courts, however, the RJ C
has chosen to rebrand its Administrative Order 2012-01 with a criminal case number in RCR2013-
071437)/ Southworth v. State, 62 A.D.2D 731, 405 N.Y.S.2D 548 (4th Dep't 1978), judgment aff'd,
47 N.Y.2D 874, 419 N.Y.S.2D 71, 392 N.E.2D 1254 (1979).
From: WestlawNext@westlawnext.Com Sent: Tue 9/24/13 12:57 PM To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.Com;
astege@da.Washoecounty.Us; zyoung@da.Washoecounty.Us; wongd@reno.Gov 1 attachment Willmes v Reno Mun
Court.Rtf (263.2 KB) A WestlawNext Researcher sent you content from WestlawNext. Please see the attached file. Item:
Willmes v. Reno Mun. Court Citation: 118 Nev. 831 Sent On: September 24, 2013 Sent By: A WestlawNext Researcher
Client ID: PATRON ACCESS Note: please consider dropping the various prosecutions (and join in seeking to set aside
the convictions) in light of the illegality of the various Administrative Orders and the, at least appearance of impropriety,
attendant to your office's garnering a competitive advantage incident thereto. While the courts generally have not applied
judicial immunity to administrative, legislative, or executive functions. Neither judicial immunity nor Eleventh
Amendment immunity, both of which shielded judges from being sued for damages, applied to bar action against two
state-court judges in which former state-court litigants requested only declaratory relief. Cichowski v. Hollenbeck, 397 F.
Supp. 2d 1082 (W.D. Wis. 2005). ...... The courts generally have distinguished between judicial acts and administrative,
legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. judicial immunity is not
designed to insulate the judiciary from all aspects of accountability,[FN5] and the mere fact that a defendant in a civil
action is a judge does not mean that he or she is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.[FN6] In this regard, judges
generally have no judicial immunity for their administrative, legislative, or executive functions.[FN7] [FN5] Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct. 183, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980). -
[FN6] Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990). -
[FN7] 67.
a judge will loose the cloak of immunity only when he conducts proceedings over which he lacks any semblance of
subject matter jurisdiction. Stiggle v. Tamburini, 467 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D.R.I. 2006).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 99 -
NOTICE
The doctrine of judicial immunity is so expansive that it is overcome only when: (1) the action is nonjudicial, that is, not
taken in the judge's judicial capacity, or (2) the action, although judicial in nature, is performed in the complete absence of
any jurisdiction. Miller v. County of Nassau, 467 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D. N.Y. 2006). 70. Nonjudicial acts West's Key
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, J udges 35, 36
J udges may be exposed to liability for nonjudicial acts[FN1] since they generally have no judicial immunity for
their administrative, legislative, or executive functions.[FN2] J udges acting in an administrative capacity do not have
absolute immunity from suits for damages;[FN3] administrative decisions, even though essential to the functioning of the
court, have not been regarded as judicial acts.[FN4]
Observation: The exception from judicial immunity for legislative and executive acts has sometimes been
referred to as the "discretionary function exception."[FN5]
[FN1] Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir.
1993); Archie v. Lanier, 95 F.3d 438, 1996 FED App. 0297P (6th Cir. 1996); J ohn v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 16 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d 135 (7th Cir. 1990); Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990); J NC Companies v. Ollason, 137 B.R. 46
(D. Ariz. 1991), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1993); Meyer v. Foti, 720 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. La. 1989); Hammond v.
Creative Financial Planning Organization, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Rumfola v. Murovich, 812 F. Supp.
569 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Cintron Rodriguez v. Pagan Nieves, 736 F. Supp. 411 (D.P.R. 1990); Kalmanson v. Lockett, 848 So.
2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2003). - [FN2] Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990). - [FN3] Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988); Mumford v. Zieba, 788 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Ohio 1992),
judgment rev'd on other grounds, 4 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1993). - [FN4] Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,
113 S. Ct. 2167, 124 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1993); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988). - As
to the general rule of nonliability for damages, see 61. - As to judicial acts protected by the rule of nonliability for
damages, see 67. - [FN5] Koelln v. Nexus Residential Treatment Facility, 494 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).

From: WestlawNext@westlawnext.Com Sent: Tue 9/24/13 12:47 PM To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.Com;
astege@da.Washoecounty.Us; zyoung@da.Washoecounty.Us 1 attachment 178608 Rules of justice courts and district
courts not to be inconsistent with t.Rtf (36.6 KB) A WestlawNext Researcher sent you content from WestlawNext. Please
see the attached file. Item: 178.608. Rules of justice courts and district courts not to be inconsistent with this title Citation:
NV ST 178.608 Sent On: September 24, 2013 Sent By: A WestlawNext Researcher Client ID: PATRON ACCESS Note:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 100 -
NOTICE
Dear Mr. Young and Mr. Stege, I am writing to inquire with you as to whether you believe your office's countenancing
(and prosecuting based upon) the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 in RCR2013-071437, and the 8/14/13
Administrative Order 2013-06 Mr. Stege referenced in court today in RCR2013-072675
Item: 239.Importance and purpose of principle of separation of powers, 16A Am. J ur. 2d Constitutional Law
239. Courts are prohibited from encroaching upon a domain of another branch of the government. (The executive branch
has the authority to prosecute criminal cases in the courts, however, the RJ C has chosen to rebrand its Administrative
Order 2012-01 with a criminal case number in RCR2013-071437)/ Southworth v. State, 62 A.D.2D 731, 405 N.Y.S.2D
548 (4th Dep't 1978), judgment aff'd, 47 N.Y.2D 874, 419 N.Y.S.2D 71, 392 N.E.2D 1254 (1979).
N.R.S. Const. Art. 3, 1: 1. Three separate departments; separation of powers; legislative review of
administrative regulations
sions (1) 178.610.?Where no procedure specifically prescribed court may proceed in lawful manner NV ST 178.610
Effective [See Text Amendments] Enacted Legislation Added by Laws 1967, p. 1458 Citing References (1) Title Date
NOD Topics Type 1. Woerner v. J ustice Court of Reno Tp. Ex rel. County of Washoe 1 P.3D 377, 381 , Nev.
CRIMINAL J USTICE - Competency to Stand Trial. Refiling of murder charge against petitioner previously found
incompetent to stand trial was not barred. J un. 05, 2000 - Case Context and Analysis (3) Library References
(3) Courts 78. Westlaw Key Number Search: ?106K78. C.J .S. Courts ?7, 124 To 127.

2J DC J udge Elliots 3/15/12 CR11-2064 (conviction at issue in 60838 and 62337) reads: ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL Pursuant to NRS 189.010, An appellant has ten days following the entry of a
judgment of conviction to file a notice of appeal.... That J udge Elliott referenced the entry of judgment of such
judgment of conviction is important, as it alters any apparent import of the use of the term rendition anywhere in
NRS 189 and NRS 178.
Coughlin is entitled to Reply on J udge Stiglichs predecessor the consolidation of of Coughlins
criminal matter in one department, J udge Elliotts statement of how such will apply NRCP to criminal law:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/169383303/3-15-12-0204-22176-2064-Order-Denying-Motion-to-Dismiss-
Appeal-Applying-NRCP-6-e-Ocr-No-Numbers (see page 2 of such 3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064: Pursuant to
NRS 189.010, An appellant has ten days following the entry of a judgment of conviction to file a notice of appealAs
applied to the instant case, Respondent reasons that because Appellant filed his appeal more than ten calendar
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 101 -
NOTICE
days after the entry of judgment, Appellant's appeal is untimely. Respondent's approach ignores Nevada Rule
of Civil Procedure 6(a), which governs the computation of time. That rule provides that "[w]hen the period
of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and nonjudicial days
shall be excluded in the computation." NRCP 6(a). In other words, NRS 189.010'S ten day rule does not refer
to calendar days, but is calculated based on the passage of judicial days. Thus, Appellant had until December
14, 2011 to file his Notice of Appeal. Because Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on December 13, 2011, his
appeal was timely and this Court will deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.)
Such pronouncement by J udge Elliott operates to make the 6/26/12 filing by Coughlin timely: Courts of appeal
have occasionally excused untimely filings in "unique circumstances."52 Under the "unique circumstances" doctrine, a
late appeal may be deemed timely by the court of appeals "only where a party has performed an act which, if properly
done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that
this act has been properly done."53 Such a situation is most likely to arise when a party was late in filing a motion which
will toll the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(A)(4)(A), but the trial court has assured the party that the motion was
accepted as timely. Under such circumstances, the court of appeals may permit the filing of a notice of appeal at a time
that would have been proper when treating the tardy trial court motion as if it had been timely filed.54...
50. Fed. R. App. P. 4 And 26(b). See also Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315 (1988). 51.
Hernandez-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 630 F.2D 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1980), Citing United States v.
Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960).
Footnotes: 52. The "unique circumstances" doctrine has been criticized in the Seventh Circuit. See Fogel v.
Gordon & Glickson, P.C., 393 F.3D 727, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2004). 53. Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179
(1989). 54. The Seventh Circuit seems to have further narrowed the availability of relief, stating that "[i]n our view, the
unique circumstances exception is available only when there is a genuine ambiguity in the rules to begin with, and the
court resolves that ambiguity in the direction of permitting additional time to appeal." Prop. Unltd., Inc. V. Cendant
Mobility Serv., 384 F.3D 917, 922 (7th Cir. 2004)...
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number of any person.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 102 -
NOTICE
DATED this 9/27/13


_/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant/Petitioner

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 103 -
NOTICE
PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Zach Coughlin, declare:

I, Mr. Zach Coughlin served the foregoing electronically by efiling on efiler dan wong of the
rca and or wcda z young and or wlss jospeh garin, esq.

DATED THIS 9/28/13
BY


/s/ zach coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant/petitioner

i

the immediate presence of the court, an affidavit must be presented to the court of the
facts constituting contempt, the affidavit, was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the
contempt proceeding and the person of the contemner. Phillips v. Welch, 12 Nev. 158 (1877),
cited, Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Ellison Ranching Co., 46 Nev. 351, at 354, 213 Pac. 700 (1923),
State ex rel. Mongolo v. Second J udicial Dist. Court, 46 Nev. 410, at 416, 211 Pac. 105 (1923)
Affidavit must state substantive facts constituting alleged contempt. Under sec. 461, ch.
112, Stats. 1869 (cf. NRS 22.030), which provides that where contempt is committed outside
the immediate presence of the court, an affidavit must be presented to the court of the facts
constituting the contempt, a statement of such facts is necessary in order to give the court
jurisdiction. With no affidavits s actions are illegal null and void as a matter of law.
Term "immediate view and presence" defined. Unless contempt is committed in the
immediate view and presence of the court, meaning ocular view of the court or where the court
has direct knowledge of the contempt, the charge must be made by affidavit and the
contemnor given the right to show cause why he should not be punished before judgment is
passed on him, in accord with secs. 461 and 462, ch. 112, Stats. 1869 (cf. NRS 22.030 and
22.040). Ex parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 352, 90 Pac. 737 (1907), cited, Ex parte Tani, 29 Nev. 385,
at 399, 91 Pac. 137 (1907) The alleged offense MUST be committed in the immediate
presence of the court. Ex parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 352, 90 Pac. 737 (1907), cited, Ex parte
Tani, 29 Nev. 385, at 399, 91 Pac. 137 (1907)
Constitutional or inherent powers of court not abridged by provision of statute. NCL 8943

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 104 -
NOTICE

(cf. NRS 22.030), which provides that in all cases of contempt arising outside of the immediate
view and presence of the court, the judge in whose contempt the defendant is alleged to
be shall not preside at the trial over the objection of the defendant, does not abridge any of
the constitutional or inherent powers of the court, because the legislature has the right to
regulate the exercise of power to punish for contempt. McCormick v. Sixth J udicial Dist. Court,
67 Nev. 318, 218 P.2d 939 (1950), cited, Lamb v. Lamb, 83 Nev. 425, at 428, 433 P.2d 265
(1967), Awad v. Wright, 106 Nev. 407, at 410, 794 P.2d 713 (1990) Judge ignored
this precedent before and appears to be bought and paid for..
Writ of prohibition issued to prevent judge from presiding after objection. On a petition
for a writ of prohibition to prevent a contempt proceeding, where the contempt petition was
sufficient, ... it was a mandatory duty of the judge not to preside at the trial of the
contempt charges after the objection under NCL 8943 (cf. NRS 22.030), a writ issued to
prevent the judge from presiding. McCormick v. Sixth J udicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 318, 218
P.2d 939 (1950)
Where respondent did not file an affidavit with an order to show cause, district court
did not have jurisdiction to hold appellant in contempt of court. The law is clear J udge
had no jurisdiction to hold the Plaintiff in contempt. See. Awed v. Wright, 106 Nev.
407, 794 P.2d 713 (1990), cited, Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Assoc., 116 Nev.
646, at 650, 5 P.3d 569 (2000)
Pg. 19

Page 20
Courts are bound by statute in exercise of their inherent powers of contempt. Where
an alleged contempt of court by the appellant took place outside of the presence of the court
and the respondent failed to file an affidavit with an order to show cause, an order of contempt
issued by the court was in violation of NRS 22.030 and was reversed on appeal.
Failure by a judge to recuse herself was reversible error. Where an alleged contempt
arose outside of the presence of the judge, and the appellant timely filed a peremptory
challenge objecting to the judge presiding over the contempt proceedings, the judge
committed a reversible error when she did not recuse herself (see NRS 22.030). Awad V.
Wright, 106 Nev. 407, 794 P.2d 713 (1990)


J udges
In case of contempt arising outside view of court, judge should have recused herself in response
to peremptory challenge. N.R.S. 22. 030, subd. 3. Awad v. Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d
713, 106 Nev. 407. J udges 51(4)
Where contempt petition was sufficient under circumstances and record to give district court
jurisdiction, and question of inability to comply with court order by reason of interest of
United States was a matter of defense, writ of prohibition would issue prohibiting judge who
issued order from presiding at trial of contempt proceedings. N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick
v. Sixth J udicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318.
Prohibition 5(3)
Where judge voluntarily disqualified himself and called another judge upon request of parties
without requiring payment of fee, change held not change of judge so as to preclude right to
have different judge hear order to show cause upon filing affidavit of prejudice and paying
fee. Comp.Laws, 8943; 8407, as amended by St.1931, c. 153, 1; 8407.02, as added by
St.1931, c. 153, 3. State ex rel. Warren v. Sixth J udicial District Court in and for Humboldt
County, 1936, 61 P.2d 6, 57 Nev. 214. J udges 51(1)
Contempt 51 to 54.
J udges 39 to 56.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 93k51 to 93k54; 227k39 to 227k56.
C.J .S. Contempt 62, 70 to 71.
C.J .S. J udges 62, 98 to 160. 154 ALR 1227, Necessity and Sufficiency of Making and Recording Subsidiary or
Detailed
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 105 -
NOTICE

Findings Supporting Adjudication of Direct Contempt.
Statute providing that in all cases of contempt arising without immediate view and presence of
court, judge of court in whose contempt defendant is alleged to be, shall not preside at such
trial over objection of defendant, is constitutional. N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick v. Sixth
J udicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318. Contempt
31

State ex rel. Warren v. Sixth J udicial District Court in and for Humboldt County,
61 P.2d 6, 57 Nev. 214 (Nev. Oct 02, 1936) (NO. 3157)
Presence of court
2 Ex parte Hedden, 90 P. 737, 29 Nev. 352, 13 Am.Ann.Cas. 1173 (Nev. J un 27,
1907) (NO. 1,718)
Appellate Briefs
21 Ann CHRZANOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. J udge George ASSAD, City of Las Vegas, a
Political Subdivision of the State of Nevada; Marshall R. Saavedra, J ohn Does, IX,
each individually and in their official capacities, Defendants., 2006 WL
2981572, *2981572+(Appellate Brief) (9th Cir. J ul 31, 2006) Answering
27 Yaakov M. VANN, Plaintiff, v. State of Nevada, Honorable Douglas Smith,
Clark County, Nevada Sargent Kosmides Peter Dubowsky Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department Mister Lorne Wyne Aka ""Rabbi Yitz Wyne"" Miss.
Michelle Halabe, Defendant., 2004 WL 3703284, *3703284+(Trial Motion,
Memorandum and Affidavit) (D.Nev. May 20, 2004) Plaintiff's Reply Brief to
Clark County Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Compel Discovery (NO. CVS-
03-0507-PMP(PAL)
28 Yaakov M. VANN, Plaintiff, v. State of Nevada, Honorable Douglas Smith,
Clark County Nevada, Sargent Kosmides, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,
Mister Lorne Wynh aka ""Rabbi Yitz Wyne,"" Miss. Michelle Halabe,
Peter Dubowsky, Defendant., 2004 WL 3703277, *3703277 (Trial Motion,
Memorandum and Affidavit) (D.Nev. Apr 09, 2004) Defendants Justice of the
Peace Douglas Smith, Clark County, Nevada, Sargent Kosmides and Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss/
Opposition to Plaintiff's ... (NO. CV-S-03-0507-PMP(PAL)
At to the rubber stamped signature by RMC J udge Howard on the 11/30/11 J udgment of conviction at issue in
cr11-2064. There is no proof offered that Howard has received approval from the Supreme Court for use of such, nor that
any necessity for so using such arose, and such was combined impermissibly with the signature of another officer (an
RMC marshal, and possibly another, especially if the interlineations of a date next to Howards stampe signature, in a
handwriting other than Howards, is tantamount to a signature: NRS 5.065 Use of facsimile signature: Conditions
and restrictions.
1. Each municipal judge may use a facsimile signature produced through a mechanical device in place of his or her
handwritten signature whenever the necessity arises and upon approval of the Supreme Court, subject to the following
conditions:
(a) That the mechanical device must be of such a nature that the facsimile signature may be removed from the
mechanical device and kept in a separate secure place.
(b) That the use of the facsimile signature may be made only under the direction and supervision of the municipal
judge whose signature it represents.
(c) That the entire mechanical device must at all times be kept in a vault, securely locked, when not in use, to prevent
any misuse of the device.
2. No facsimile signature produced through a mechanical device authorized by the provisions of this section may be
combined with the signature of another officer.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 999)

Griffin v Illinois (1956) 351 US 12, 100 L Ed 891, 76 S Ct 585, 55 ALR2d 1055, reh den 351 US 958, 100 L Ed
1480, 76 S Ct 844. In that case the Supreme Court, while noting that a state is not required by the Federal Constitution to
provide appellate review at all, also indicated that a state that does grant appellate review must do so in a way that does
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 106 -
NOTICE

not discriminate against some convicted defendants by reason of their poverty.
So, if NRAP 3C applies to these criminal appeals to the district court, here is the text thereof:
RULE 3C. FAST TRACK CRIMINAL APPEALS
(a) Applicability.

(1) This Rule applies to an appeal from a district court judgment or order entered in a criminal or post-conviction
proceeding commenced after September 1, 1996, whether the appellant is the State or the defendant. A proceeding is
commenced for the purposes of this Rule upon the filing of an indictment, information, or post-conviction application in
the district court.

(2) The Supreme Court may exercise its discretion and apply this Rule to appeals arising from criminal and post-
conviction proceedings that are not subject to this Rule.

(3) Unless the court otherwise orders, an appeal is not subject to this Rule if:
(A) the appeal challenges an order or judgment in a case involving a category A felony, as described in NRS
193.130(2)(a), in which a sentence of death or imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without the possibility of
parole is actually imposed;
(B) the appeal is brought by a defendant or petitioner who was not represented by counsel in the district court; or
(C) the appeal is filed in accordance with Rule 4(c).

(b) Responsibilities of Trial Counsel.

(1) Definition. For purposes of this Rule, trial counsel means the attorney who represented the defendant or post-
conviction petitioner in district court in the underlying proceedings that are the subject of the appeal.

(2) Responsibilities. Trial counsel shall file the notice of appeal, rough draft transcript request form, and fast track
statement and consult with appellate counsel for the case regarding the appellate issues that are raised. Trial counsel shall
arrange their calendars and adjust their public or private contracts for compensation to accommodate the additional duties
imposed by this Rule.

(3) Withdrawal. To withdraw from representation during the appeal, trial counsel shall file with the Supreme Court
a motion to withdraw from representation. The motion shall be considered only after trial counsel has filed the notice of
appeal, rough draft transcript request and fast track statement. The granting of such motions shall be conditioned upon
trial counsels full cooperation with appellate counsel during the appeal.

(c) Notice of Appeal. When an appellant elects to appeal from a district court order or judgment governed by this
Rule, appellants trial counsel shall serve and file a notice of appeal pursuant to applicable rules and statutes.

(d) Rough Draft Transcript. A rough draft transcript is a computer-generated transcript that can be expeditiously
prepared in a condensed fashion, but is not proofread, corrected or certified to be an accurate transcript.

(1) Format. For the purposes of this Rule, a rough draft transcript shall:
(A) Be printed on paper 8 1/2 by 11 inches in size, double-sided, with the words Rough Draft Transcript
printed on the bottom of each page;
(B) Be produced with a yellow cover sheet;
(C) Include a concordance indexing key words in the transcript; and
(D) Include an acknowledgment by the court reporter or recorder that the document submitted under this Rule is
a true original or copy of the rough draft transcript.

(2) Notification of Court Reporter or Recorder. When a case may be subject to this Rule, the presiding district
court judge shall notify the court reporter or recorder for the case before trial that a rough draft transcript may be required.

(3) Request for Rough Draft Transcript.
(A) Filing and Service.
(i) When a rough draft transcript is necessary for an appeal, trial counsel shall file a rough draft transcript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 107 -
NOTICE

request form with the district court and shall serve a copy of the request form upon the court reporter or recorder and
opposing counsel.
(ii) Trial counsel shall serve and file the rough draft transcript request form on the same date the notice of appeal
is served and filed.
(iii) Trial counsel shall file with the Supreme Court 2 file-stamped copies of the rough draft transcript request
form and proof of service of the form upon the court reporter or recorder and opposing counsel.
(B) Form. The rough draft transcript request shall substantially comply with Form 5 in the Appendix of Forms.
(C) Necessary Transcripts. Counsel shall order transcripts of only those portions of the proceedings that
counsel reasonably and in good faith believes are necessary to determine whether appellate issues are present. In
particular, transcripts of jury voir dire, opening statements, closing arguments, and the reading of jury instructions shall
not be requested unless pertinent to the appeal.
(D) No Transcripts. If no transcript is to be requested, trial counsel shall serve and file with the Supreme
Court a certificate to that effect within the same period that a rough draft transcript request form must be served and
filed under subparagraph (A). Such a certificate shall substantially comply with Form 14 in the Appendix of Forms.
(E) Court Reporter or Recorders Duty.
(i) The court reporter or recorder shall submit an original rough draft transcript, as requested by appellants or
respondents counsel, to the district court no more than 20 days after the date that the request is served.
(ii) The court reporter or recorder shall also deliver certified copies of the rough draft transcript to the requesting
attorney and counsel for each party appearing separately no more than 20 days after the date of service of the request. The
court reporter or recorder shall deliver an additional certified copy of the rough draft transcript to the requesting attorney
for inclusion in the appendix. Within 5 days after delivering the certified copies of the rough draft transcript, the court
reporter or recorder shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court a certificate acknowledging delivery of the completed
transcript and specifying the transcripts that have been delivered and the date that they were delivered to the requesting
party. Form 15 in the Appendix of Forms is a suggested form of certificate of delivery.
(iii) Relevant portions of the trial or hearing that were audio recorded or video recorded shall be submitted in
typewritten form. The Supreme Court will not accept audio- or videotapes in lieu of a rough draft transcript.

(4) Supplemental Request for Rough Draft Transcript.
(A) Opposing counsel may make a supplemental request for portions of the rough draft transcript that were not
previously requested. The request shall be made no more than 3 days after opposing counsel is served with the transcript
request made under Rule 3C(d)(3)(A).
(B) In all other respects, opposing counsel shall comply with the provisions of this Rule governing a rough draft
transcript request when making a supplemental rough draft transcript request.

(5) Sufficiency of the Rough Draft Transcript. Trial counsel shall review the sufficiency of the rough draft
transcript. If a substantial question arises regarding an inaccuracy in a rough draft transcript, the Supreme Court may
order that a certified transcript be produced.

(6) Exceptions. The provisions of Rule 3C(d)(1) shall not apply to preparation of transcripts produced by means
other than computer-generated technology. But time limits and other procedures governing requests for and preparation of
transcripts produced by means other than computer-generated technology shall conform with the provisions of this Rule
respecting rough draft transcripts.

(e) Filing of Fast Track Statement, Appendix, and Fast Track Reply.

(1) Fast Track Statement.
(A) Time for Serving and Filing. Within 40 days from the date that the appeal is docketed in the Supreme
Court under Rule 12, appellants trial counsel shall serve and file a fast track statement that substantially complies with
Form 6 in the Appendix of Forms.
(B) Length and Contents. Except by court order granting a motion filed in accordance with Rule 32(a)(7)(D),
the fast track statement shall not exceed 15 pages in length or shall comply with the type-volume limitations stated in
Rule 3C(h)(2). The fast track statement shall include the following:
(i) A statement of jurisdiction for the appeal;
(ii) A statement of the case and procedural history of the case;
(iii) A concise statement summarizing all facts material to a consideration of the issues on appeal;
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 108 -
NOTICE

(iv) An outline of the alleged error(s) of the district court;
(v) A statement describing how the alleged issues on appeal were preserved during trial;
(vi) Legal argument, including authorities, pertaining to the alleged error(s) of the district court;
(vii) Where applicable, a statement regarding the sufficiency of the rough draft transcript; and
(viii) Where applicable, a reference to all related or prior appeals, including the appropriate citations for those
appeals.
(C) References to the Appendix. Every assertion in the fast track statement regarding matters in a rough draft
transcript or other document shall cite to the page and volume number, if any, of the appendix that supports the assertion.
(D) Number of Copies to Be Filed and Served. An original and 1 copy of the fast track statement shall be
filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court, and 1 copy shall be served on counsel for each party separately represented.

(2) Appendix.
(A) Joint Appendix. Counsel have a duty to confer and attempt to reach an agreement concerning a possible
joint appendix to be filed with the fast track statement.
(B) Appellants Appendix. In the absence of an agreement respecting a joint appendix, appellant shall prepare
and file an original and 1 copy of a separate appendix with the fast track statement. Appellant shall serve a copy of the
appendix on counsel for each party separately represented.
(C) Form and Content. The preparation and contents of appendices shall comply with Rules 30 and 32 and
shall be paginated sequentially.

(3) Fast Track Reply. The appellant may file a reply to the Fast Track Response that shall be entitled Reply to
Fast Track Response. The reply shall be no longer than 5 pages or shall comply with the type-volume limitations stated
in Rule 3C(h)(2). The reply must be limited to answering matters set forth in the Fast Track Response. The reply must be
filed within 14 days of service of the Fast Track Response.

(f) Filing of Fast Track Response and Appendix.

(1) Fast Track Response.
(A) Time for Service and Filing. Within 20 days from the date a fast track statement is served, the respondent
shall serve and file a fast track response that substantially complies with Form 7 in the Appendix of Forms.
(B) Length and Contents. Except by court order granting a motion filed in accordance with Rule 32(a)(7)(D),
the fast track response shall not exceed 10 pages in length or shall comply with the type-volume limitations stated in Rule
3C(h)(2). The fast track response shall include additional authority and factual information necessary to rebut the
contentions in the fast track statement.
(C) References to the Appendix. Every assertion in the fast track response regarding matters in a rough draft
transcript or other document shall cite to the page and volume number, if any, of the appendix that supports the assertion.
(D) Number of Copies to Be Filed and Served. An original and 1 copy of the fast track response shall be filed
with the clerk of the Supreme Court, and 1 copy shall be served on counsel for each party separately represented.

(2) Appendix.
(A) Joint Appendix. Counsel have a duty to confer and attempt to reach an agreement concerning a
possible joint appendix. (NOTE: the WCDAs Office has willfully obstructed Coughlins ability to communicate with
opposing counsel Z. Young, at times refusing to even allow Coughlin to leave Young a voice mail, and WCDA ADA
Helzer has admitted to engineering a process whereby he intercerpts Coughlins written communications to Young and
RJC Bailiffs, including Bailiff Reyes have, in a hostile and threatening manner, prevented Coughlin from
communicating at all with Young at any time (other than, say, indirectly during the record portion of a proceeding).
(B) Respondents Appendix. In the absence of an agreement respecting a joint appendix, respondent shall
prepare and file an original and 1 copy of a separate appendix with the fast track response. Respondent shall serve a copy
of the appendix on counsel for each party separately represented.
(C) Form and Contents. The preparation and contents of appendices shall comply with Rules 30 and 32 and
shall be paginated sequentially.

(g) Filing of Supplemental Fast Track Statement and Response.

(1) Supplemental Fast Track Statement.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 109 -
NOTICE

(A) When Permitted; Length. A supplemental fast track statement of not more than 5 pages or its equivalent
calculated under the type-volume limitation provisions of Rule 3C(h)(2) may be filed when appellate counsel differs from
trial counsel and can assert material issues that should be considered but were not raised in the fast track statement.
(B) Time for Service and Filing; Number of Copies. When permitted under subparagraph (A), an original
and 1 copy of a supplemental fast track statement shall be filed with the Supreme Court, and 1 copy shall be served upon
opposing counsel, no more than 20 days after the fast track statement is filed or appellate counsel is appointed, whichever
is later.

(2) Supplemental Fast Track Response. No later than 10 days after a supplemental fast track statement is served,
the respondent may file and serve a response of not more than 5 pages or its equivalent calculated under the type-volume
limitation provisions of Rule 3C(h)(2).

(h) Format; Type-Volume Limitation; Certificate of Compliance.

(1) Format. Fast track filings shall comply with the formatting requirements of Rule 32(a)(4)-(6), and Rule
32(a)(7)(D) shall apply in computing permissible length.

(2) Type-Volume Limitation. The size of a fast track filing may be calculated by type-volume in lieu of page
limitation. Using a type-volume limitation, a fast track statement is acceptable if it contains no more than 7,000 words or
650 lines of text. A fast track response is acceptable if it contains no more than two-thirds the type-volume specified for a
fast track statement (4,667 words or 433 lines of text); and a fast track reply or supplement is acceptable if it contains no
more than one-third of the type-volume specified for a fast track statement (2,333 words or 216 lines of text).

(3) Certificate of Compliance. Fast track filings must include a certificate of compliance in substantially the form
required by Rule 32(a)(8). A certificate that includes the first two paragraphs under Verification in Forms 6 and 7 of the
Appendix of Forms will be regarded as sufficient to meet the requirements of this Rule.

(i) Extensions of Time.

(1) Preparation of Rough Draft Transcript.
(A) Five-Day Telephonic Extension. A court reporter or recorder may request by telephone a 5-day extension
of time to prepare a rough draft transcript if the preparation requires more time than is allowed under this Rule. If good
cause is shown, the clerk of the Supreme Court or a designated deputy may grant the request by telephone or by written
order of the clerk.
(B) Additional Extensions by Motion. Subsequent extensions of time for filing rough draft transcripts shall be
granted only upon motion to the Supreme Court. The motion shall justify the requested extension in light of the time
limits provided in this Rule, and shall specify the exact length of the extension requested. Extensions of time for the filing
of rough draft transcripts shall be granted only upon demonstration of good cause. Sanctions may be imposed if a motion
is brought without reasonable grounds.

(2) Fast Track Statement and Response; Supplemental Statement and Response.
(A) Five-Day Telephonic Extension. Counsel may request by telephone a 5-day extension of time for filing
fast track statements and responses, and supplemental fast track statements and responses. If good cause is shown, the
clerk of the Supreme Court may grant the request by telephone or by written order of the clerk.
(B) Additional Extensions by Motion. Subsequent extensions of time for filing fast track statements and
responses, and supplemental fast track statements and responses shall be granted only upon motion to the Supreme Court.
The motion shall justify the requested extension in light of the time limits provided in this Rule, and shall specify the
exact length of the extension requested. Extensions of time for the filing of fast track statements and responses, and
supplemental fast track statements and responses shall be granted only upon demonstration of extreme need or merit.
Sanctions may be imposed if a motion is brought without reasonable grounds.

(j) Amendments to Statements and Responses. Leave to amend fast track statements and responses, or
supplemental fast track statements and responses shall be granted only upon motion to the Supreme Court. A motion to
amend shall justify the absence of the offered arguments in the initial or supplemental fast track statement or response.
The motion shall be granted only upon demonstration of extreme need or merit.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 110 -
NOTICE


(k) Full Briefing, Calendaring or Summary Disposition.

(1) Based solely upon review of the rough draft transcript, fast track statement, fast track response, and any
supplemental documents, the Supreme Court may summarily dismiss the appeal, may affirm or reverse the decision
appealed from without further briefing or argument, may order the appeal to be fully briefed and argued or submitted for
decision without argument, may order that briefing and any argument be limited to specific issues, or may direct the
appeal to proceed in any manner reasonably calculated to expedite its resolution and promote justice.

(2) Motion for Full Briefing.
(A) A party may seek leave of the Supreme Court to remove an appeal from the fast track program and
direct full briefing. The motion may not be filed solely for purposes of delay. It may be filed in addition to or in lieu of
the fast track pleading.
(B) The motion must identify specific reasons why the appeal is not appropriate for resolution in the fast track
program. Such reasons may include, but are not limited to, the following circumstances:
(i) The case raises one or more issues that involve substantial precedential, constitutional, or public policy
questions; and/or
(ii) The case is legally or factually complex.
(C) If the issues or facts are numerous but not complex, full briefing will not be granted but an excess page
motion may be entertained.
(D) No opposition may be filed unless ordered by the court.

(3) If the Supreme Court orders an appeal to be fully briefed, and neither party objects to the sufficiency of the rough
draft transcripts to adequately inform this court of the issues raised in the appeal, counsel are not required to file certified
transcript request forms under Rule 9(a). If a partys brief will cite to a transcript not previously included in an appendix
submitted to this court, that party shall file and serve a transcript request form in accordance with Rule 9 within the time
specified for filing the brief in the Supreme Courts briefing order. If a partys brief will cite to documents not previously
filed in the Supreme Court, that party shall file and serve an appropriately documented supplemental appendix with the
brief.

(l) Withdrawal of Appeal. If an appellant no longer desires to pursue an appeal after the notice of appeal is filed,
counsel responsible for the appeal at that time shall file with the Supreme Court a notice of withdrawal of appeal. The
notice of withdrawal of appeal shall substantially comply with Form 8 in the Appendix of Forms.

(m) Court Reporter or Recorder Protection and Compensation.

(1) Liability. Court reporters or recorders shall not be subject to civil, criminal or administrative causes of action
for inaccuracies in a rough draft transcript unless the court reporter or recorder willfully:
(A) Fails to take full and accurate stenographic notes of the criminal proceeding for which the rough draft
transcript is submitted, or willfully and improperly alters stenographic notes from the criminal proceeding, or willfully
transcribes audio- or videotapes inaccurately; and
(B) Such willful conduct proximately causes injury or damage to the party asserting the action, and that party
demonstrates that appellate or post-conviction relief was granted or denied based upon the court reporters or recorders
inaccuracies.

(2) Compensation. Court reporters shall be compensated as follows:
(A) For preparing a rough draft transcript, the court reporter shall receive 100 percent of the rate established by
NRS 3.370 for each transcript page as defined by NRS 3.370 and $25 for costs. Costs include the cost of delivery of the
original and copies of the rough draft transcript. In the event that overnight delivery is required to or from outlying areas,
that cost shall be additional.
(B) In the event a certified transcript is ordered after the rough draft transcript is prepared, the court reporter shall
receive an additional fee equal to 25 percent of the amount established by NRS 3.370 for the already prepared rough draft
portion of the transcript. Any portions not included with the rough draft transcript will be compensated by the amount
established by NRS 3.370.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 111 -
NOTICE

(n) Sanctions. Any attorney, court reporter, or court recorder who lacks due diligence in compliance with this
Rule may be subject to sanctions by the Supreme Court. Sanctionable actions include, but are not limited to, failure of
trial counsel to file a timely fast track statement or fast track response; failure of trial counsel to fully cooperate with
appellate counsel during the course of the appeal; and failure of counsel to raise material issues or arguments in a fast
track statement, response, supplemental statement or supplemental response.

(o) Conflict. The provisions of this Rule shall prevail over conflicting provisions of any other rule.
[Added; effective September 1, 1996; as amended; effective January 3, 2012.]


NOTE: the Form 5 reference above is included here:
Form 5. Request for Rough Draft Transcript of Proceeding in the District Court

No. ........................ Dept. No. .....................

IN THE ................ J UDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF ................

A. B., Plaintiff }
v. }
C. D., Defendant }

REQUEST FOR ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT

TO: [Court Reporter Name]

(C.D.) , defendant named above, requests preparation of a rough draft transcript of certain portions of the
proceedings before the district court, as follows:

Specific individual dates of proceedings for which transcripts are being requested (a range of dates is not acceptable):

Specific portions of the transcript being requested (e.g., suppression hearing, trial, closing argument, etc.):

This notice requests a transcript of only those portions of the district court proceedings that counsel reasonably and in
good faith believes are necessary to determine whether appellate issues are present. Voir dire examination of jurors,
opening statements and closing arguments of trial counsel, and the reading of jury instructions shall not be transcribed
unless specifically requested above.
I recognize that I must serve a copy of this form on the above named court reporter and opposing counsel, and that the
above named court reporter shall have twenty (20) days from the receipt of this notice to prepare and submit to the district
court the rough draft transcript requested herein.

Dated this day of , 20 .

.......................................................................................
(Signature of Attorney)
.......................................................................................
(Nevada Bar Identification No.)
.......................................................................................
(Law Firm)
.......................................................................................
(Address)
.......................................................................................
(Telephone Number)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 112 -
NOTICE

[Added; effective September 1, 1996; As amended; effective J uly 1, 2009.]


Relevant to Longoni, whom the RMC holds out as its official report: NRS 3.320 Official reporter: Appointment;
duties.
1. The judge or judges of any district court may appoint, subject to the provisions of this chapter and other laws as
to the qualifications and examinations of the appointee, one certified court reporter, to be known as official reporter of the
court or department and to hold office during the pleasure of the judge appointing the official reporter. The appointee may
be any business organization licensed by the Board if the person representing the business organization, who actually
performs the reporting service, is a certified court reporter.
2. The official reporter, or any one of them if there are two or more, shall:
(a) At the request of either party or of the court in a civil action or proceeding, and on the order of the court, the
district attorney or the attorney for the defendant in a criminal action or proceeding, make a record of all the testimony,
the objections made, the rulings of the court, the exceptions taken, all arraignments, pleas and sentences of defendants in
criminal cases, and all statements and remarks made by the district attorney or judge, and all oral instructions given by the
judge; and
(b) When directed by the court or requested by either party, within such reasonable time after the trial of the case as
may be designated by law or, in the absence of any law relating thereto, by the court, transcribe the record into a written
transcript. The reporter shall certify that the action or proceeding was correctly reported and transcribed and, when
directed by the law or court, shall file the written transcript with the clerk of the court.
3. As used in this section, Board means the Certified Court Reporters Board of Nevada, created by NRS 656.040.
[1:52:1907; A 1921, 96; NCL 8455](NRS A 1973, 1321; 1981, 245; 1993, 1410; 2007, 1035; 2011, 669)
NRS 3.340 Official reporter: Attention to duties; reporter pro tempore. The official reporter of any district
court shall attend to the duties of office in person except when excused for good and sufficient reason by order of the
court, which order shall be entered upon the minutes of the court. Employment in his or her professional capacity
elsewhere shall not be deemed a good and sufficient reason for such excuse. When the official reporter of any court has
been excused in the manner provided in this section, the court may designate an official reporter pro tempore who shall
perform the same duties and receive the same compensation during the term of his or her appointment as the official
reporter.
[3:52:1907; RL 4910; NCL 8457](NRS A 2011, 670)
NRS 3.350 Official reporter: Oath of office. The official reporter of any court, or official reporter pro tempore,
shall, before entering upon the duties of office, take and subscribe the constitutional oath of office.
[4:52:1907; RL 4911; NCL 8458]
NRS 3.360 Official reporter: Transcript prima facie evidence. The transcript of the official reporter, or official
reporter pro tempore, of any court, duly appointed and sworn, when transcribed and certified as being a correct transcript
of the testimony and proceedings in the case, is prima facie evidence of such testimony and proceedings.
[5:52:1907; RL 4912; NCL 8459](NRS A 2011, 670)
NRS 3.370 Official reporter: Compensation.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, for his or her services the official reporter or reporter pro tempore
is entitled to the following compensation:
(a) For being available to report civil and criminal testimony and proceedings when the court is sitting during
traditional business hours on any day except Saturday or Sunday, $170 per day, to be paid by the county as provided in
subsection 4.
(b) For being available to report civil and criminal testimony and proceedings when the court is sitting beyond
traditional business hours or on Saturday or Sunday:
(1) If the reporter has been available to report for at least 4 hours, $35 per hour for each hour of availability; or
(2) If the reporter has been available to report for fewer than 4 hours, a pro rata amount based on the daily rate
set forth in paragraph (a),
to be paid by the county as provided in subsection 4.
(c) For transcription:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2), for the original draft and any copy to be delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $7.50 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $2 per page
for each additional copy;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, $5.62 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $1.50 per
page for each additional copy;
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 113 -
NOTICE

(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, $4.68 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $1.25 per page
for each additional copy; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, $3.55 per page for the original draft and one copy, and 55 cents
per page for each additional copy.
(2) For civil litigants who are ordering the original draft and are represented by a nonprofit legal corporation or a
program for pro bono legal assistance, for the original draft and any copy to be delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $5.50 per page and $1.10 per page for each additional copy;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, $4.13 per page and 83 cents per page for each additional copy;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, $3.44 per page and 69 cents per page for each additional copy; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, $2.75 per page and 55 cents per page for each additional copy.
(3) For any party other than the party ordering the original draft, for the copy of the draft to be delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $1.10 per page;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, 83 cents per page;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, 69 cents per page; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, 55 cents per page.
(d) For reporting all civil matters, in addition to the compensation provided in paragraphs (a) and (b), $30 for each
hour or fraction thereof actually spent, to be taxed as costs pursuant to subsection 5.
(e) For providing an instantaneous translation of testimony into English which appears on a computer that is located
at a table in the courtroom where the attorney who requested the translation is seated:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, in all criminal matters in which a party requests such a
translation, in addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b), $140 for the first day and $90 per
day for each subsequent day from the party who makes the request. This additional compensation must be paid by the
county as provided pursuant to subsection 4 only if the court issues an order granting the translation service to the
prosecuting attorney or to an indigent defendant who is represented by a county or state public defender.
(2) In all civil matters in which a party requests such a translation, in addition to the compensation provided
pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b) and (d), $140 for the first day and $90 per day for each subsequent day, to be paid by the
party who requests the translation.
(f) For providing a diskette containing testimony prepared from a translation provided pursuant to paragraph (e):
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, in all criminal matters in which a party requests the
diskette and the reporter agrees to provide the diskette, in addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs
(a), (b) and (e), $1.50 per page of the translation contained on the diskette from the party who makes the request. This
additional compensation must be paid by the county as provided pursuant to subsection 4 only if the court issues an order
granting the diskette to the prosecuting attorney or to an indigent defendant who is represented by a county or state public
defender.
(2) In all civil matters in which a party requests the diskette and the reporter agrees to provide the diskette, in
addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b), (d) and (e), $1.50 per page of the translation
contained on the diskette, to be paid by the party who requests the diskette.
2. For the purposes of subsection 1, a page is a sheet of paper 8 1/2 by 11 inches and does not include a condensed
transcript. The left margin must not be more than 1 1/2 inches from the left edge of the paper. The right margin must not
be more than three-fourths of an inch from the right edge of the paper. Each sheet must be numbered on the left margin
and must contain at least 24 lines of type. The first line of each question and of each answer may be indented not more
than five spaces from the left margin. The first line of any paragraph or other material may be indented not more than 10
spaces from the left margin. There must not be more than one space between words or more than two spaces between
sentences. The type size must not be larger than 10 characters per inch. The lines of type may be double spaced or one and
one-half spaced.
3. If the court determines that the services of more than one reporter are necessary to deliver transcripts on a daily
basis in a criminal proceeding, each reporter is entitled to receive:
(a) The compensation set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1 and subparagraph (1) of paragraph (e) of
subsection 1, as appropriate; and
(b) Compensation of $7.50 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $2 per page for each additional copy for
transcribing a proceeding of which the transcripts are ordered by the court to be delivered on or before the start of the next
day the court is scheduled to conduct business.
4. The compensation specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1, the compensation for transcripts in criminal
cases ordered by the court to be made, the compensation for transcripts in civil cases ordered by the court pursuant
to NRS 12.015, the compensation for transcripts for parents or guardians or attorneys of parents or guardians who receive
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 114 -
NOTICE

transcripts pursuant to NRS 432B.459, the compensation in criminal cases that is ordered by the court pursuant to
subparagraph (1) of paragraph (e) and subparagraph (1) of paragraph (f) of subsection 1 and the compensation specified
in subsection 3 must be paid out of the county treasury upon the order of the court. When there is no official reporter in
attendance and a reporter pro tempore is appointed, his or her reasonable expenses for traveling and detention must be
fixed and allowed by the court and paid in the same manner. The respective district judges may, with the approval of the
respective board or boards of county commissioners within the judicial district, fix a monthly salary to be paid to the
official reporter in lieu of per diem. The salary, and also actual traveling expenses in cases where the reporter acts in more
than one county, must be prorated by the judge on the basis of time consumed by work in the respective counties and must
be paid out of the respective county treasuries upon the order of the court.
5. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, in civil cases, the compensation prescribed in paragraph (d) of
subsection 1 and for transcripts ordered by the court to be made must be paid by the parties in equal proportions, and
either party may, at the partys option, pay the entire compensation. In either case, all amounts so paid by the party to
whom costs are awarded must be taxed as costs in the case. The compensation for transcripts and copies ordered by the
parties must be paid by the party ordering them. No reporter may be required to perform any service in a civil case until
his or her compensation has been paid to him or her.
6. Where a transcript is ordered by the court or by any party, the compensation for the transcript must be paid to the
reporter before the furnishing of the transcript.
[6:52:1907; A 1921, 96; 1921, 288; 1955, 189](NRS A 1961, 307; 1967, 1258; 1971, 646; 1975, 1472, 1816; 1981,
404; 1987, 909; 1989, 1271; 1993, 2022; 1995, 1592; 1999, 750;2001, 1705; 2005, 187; 2011, 670)
NRS 3.380 Sound recording equipment: Installation; operation; transcription of recording; use of transcript;
provision by party of certified court reporter; effect.
1. The judge or judges of any district court may, with the approval of the board of county commissioners of any one
or more of the counties comprising such district, in addition to the appointment of a court reporter as in this chapter
provided, enter an order for the installation of sound recording equipment for use in any of the instances recited in NRS
3.320, for the recording of any civil and criminal proceedings, testimony, objections, rulings, exceptions, arraignments,
pleas, sentences, statements and remarks made by the district attorney or judge, oral instructions given by the judge and
any other proceedings occurring in civil or criminal actions or proceedings, or special proceedings whenever and
wherever and to the same extent as any of such proceedings have heretofore under existing statutes been recorded by the
official reporter or any special reporter or any reporter pro tempore appointed by the court.
2. For the purpose of operating such sound recording equipment, the court or judge may appoint or designate the
official reporter or a special reporter or reporter pro tempore or the county clerk or clerk of the court or deputy clerk. The
person so operating such sound recording equipment shall subscribe to an oath that he or she will well and truly operate
the equipment so as to record all of the matters and proceedings.
3. The court may then designate the person operating such equipment or any other competent person to listen to the
recording and to transcribe the recording into written text. The person who:
(a) Transcribes the recording shall subscribe to an oath that he or she has truly and correctly transcribed the
proceedings as recorded.
(b) Operates the sound recording equipment as described in subsection 2 shall:
(1) Subscribe to an oath that the sound recording is a true and accurate recording of the proceedings; and
(2) In the event of an error, malfunction or other problem relating to the sound recording equipment or the sound
recording, report that error, malfunction or problem to the court.
4. The transcript may be used for all purposes for which transcripts have heretofore been received and accepted
under then existing statutes, including transcripts of testimony and transcripts of proceedings as constituting bills of
exceptions or part of the bill of exceptions on appeals in all criminal cases and transcripts of the evidence or proceedings
as constituting the record on appeal in civil cases and including transcripts of preliminary hearings before justices of the
peace and other committing magistrates, and are subject to correction in the same manner as transcripts under existing
statutes.
5. If a proceeding is recorded and a transcript is requested, a copy of the sound recording must, if requested, be
provided with the transcript. The cost for providing the sound recording must not exceed the actual cost of production and
must be paid by the party who requests the sound recording.
6. In civil and criminal cases when the court has ordered the use of such sound recording equipment, any party to
the action, at the partys own expense, may provide a certified court reporter to make a record of and transcribe all the
matters of the proceeding. In such a case, the record prepared by sound recording is the official record of the proceedings,
unless it fails or is incomplete because of equipment or operational failure, in which case the record prepared by the
certified court reporter shall be deemed, for all purposes, the official record of the proceedings.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 115 -
NOTICE

[7:52:1907; added 1949, 506; 1943 NCL 8460.01](NRS A 1995, 1594; 2007, 1036;2011, 673)

NOTE THE changes to such relevant NRS 3 sections made by the 2011 legislature, effective3 10/1/11 (coughlins trial
was 11/30/11 in the matter on appeal in 2064, the first trial of all referenced herein):
Assembly Bill No. 249Assemblyman Oceguera

CHAPTER 138

[Approved: May 29, 2011]

AN ACT relating to court reporters; making various changes pertaining to the appointment, duties and work product of
court reporters in the district courts and justice courts of this State; and providing other matters properly relating thereto.

Legislative Counsels Digest:
Section 1 of this bill provides that a business organization appointed to provide to a district court the services of a
certified court reporter must be licensed by the Certified Court Reporters Board of Nevada. (NRS 3.320) Section 2 of
this bill clarifies that an official reporter pro tempore of a district court is appointed rather than employed and, like the
official reporter he or she replaces, does not have a fixed term of employment. (NRS 3.320, 3.340) Section 3 of this bill
states that prima facie evidence of the testimony and proceedings in a district court is provided by the transcript and not
the report of the official reporter. (NRS 3.360) Section 4 of this bill makes various changes with respect to the
compensation of the official reporter of a district court. (NRS 3.370) Section 5 of this bill provides that, when sound
recording equipment is used to record proceedings in a district court and a transcript is subsequently made: (1) the person
who transcribes the recording shall subscribe to an oath that he or she has truly and correctly transcribed the proceedings
as recorded; and (2) the person who operates the sound recording equipment shall subscribe to an oath that the sound
recording is a true and accurate recording of the proceedings and, in the event of an error, malfunction or other problem
relating to the sound recording equipment or the sound recording, report that error, malfunction or problem to the
court. Section 5 also requires a copy of a sound recording, if requested, to be provided with a requested transcript. The
cost for providing the recording must not exceed the actual cost of producing the recording and must be paid by the party
who requests the recording. (NRS 3.380) Section 6 of this bill states that, with regard to proceedings in a justice court,
compensation for the preparation of a transcript is to be deposited with the certified court reporter and not with the deputy
clerk of the court. (NRS 4.410) Section 7 of this bill provides that: (1) the sound recording of each proceeding in justice
court must be preserved until at least 1 year, instead of 30 days, after the time for filing an appeal expires; and (2) with
respect to certain criminal proceedings in a justice court, sound recordings must be preserved for a period of at least 8
years. (NRS 4.420)

EXPLANATION Matter in bolded italics is new; matter between brackets [omitted material] is material to be omitted.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, REPRESENTED IN
SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. NRS 3.320 is hereby amended to read as follows:
3.320 1. The judge or judges of any district court may appoint, subject to the provisions of this chapter and other laws
as to the qualifications and examinations of the appointee, one certified court reporter, to be known as official reporter
of the court or department and to hold office during the pleasure of the judge appointing the official reporter.


2011 Statutes of Nevada, Page 670 (Chapter 138, AB 249)

qualifications and examinations of the appointee, one certified court reporter, to be known as official reporter of the court
or department and to hold office during the pleasure of the judge appointing the official reporter. The appointee may be
any business organization licensed by the Board if the person representing [it,] the business organization, who actually
performs the reporting service, is a certified court reporter.
2. The official reporter, or any one of them if there are two or more, shall:
(a) At the request of either party or of the court in a civil action or proceeding, and on the order of the court, the district
attorney or the attorney for the defendant in a criminal action or proceeding, make a record of all the testimony, the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 116 -
NOTICE

objections made, the rulings of the court, the exceptions taken, all arraignments, pleas and sentences of defendants in
criminal cases, and all statements and remarks made by the district attorney or judge, and all oral instructions given by the
judge; and
(b) [If] When directed by the court or requested by either party, within such reasonable time after the trial of the case
as may be designated by law or, in the absence of any law relating thereto, by the court, [write out the record, or such
specific portions thereof as may be requested, in plain and legible longhand, or by typewriter or other printing
machine.] transcribe the record into a written transcript. The reporter shall certify [to that copy as being] that the action
or proceeding was correctly reported and transcribed and, when directed by the law or court, shall file [it] the written
transcript with the clerk of the court.
3. As used in this section, Board means the Certified Court Reporters Board of Nevada, created by NRS 656.040.
Sec. 2. NRS 3.340 is hereby amended to read as follows:
3.340 The official reporter of any district court shall attend to the duties of office in person except when excused for
good and sufficient reason by order of the court, which order shall be entered upon the minutes of the court. Employment
in his or her professional capacity elsewhere shall not be deemed a good and sufficient reason for such excuse. When the
official reporter of any court has been excused in the manner provided in this section, the court may designate an official
reporter pro tempore who shall perform the same duties and receive the same compensation during the term of his or
her [employment] appointment as the official reporter.
Sec. 3. NRS 3.360 is hereby amended to read as follows:
3.360 The [report] transcript of the official reporter, or official reporter pro tempore, of any court, duly appointed and
sworn, when transcribed and certified as being a correct transcript of the testimony and proceedings in the case, is prima
facie evidence of such testimony and proceedings.
Sec. 4. NRS 3.370 is hereby amended to read as follows:
3.370 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, for his or her services the official reporter or reporter pro
tempore is entitled to the following compensation:
(a) For being available to report civil and criminal testimony and proceedings when the court is sitting during
traditional business hours on any day except Saturday or Sunday, $170 per day, to be paid by the county as provided in
subsection 4.
(b) For being available to report civil and criminal testimony and proceedings when the court is sitting beyond
traditional business hours or on Saturday or Sunday:


2011 Statutes of Nevada, Page 671 (Chapter 138, AB 249)

(1) If the reporter has been available to report for at least 4 hours, $35 per hour for each hour of availability; or
(2) If the reporter has been available to report for fewer than 4 hours, a pro rata amount based on the daily rate set
forth in paragraph (a),
to be paid by the county as provided in subsection 4.
(c) For transcription:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2), for the original draft and any copy to be delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $7.50 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $2 per page for
each additional copy;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, $5.62 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $1.50 per page
for each additional copy;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, $4.68 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $1.25 per page
for each additional copy; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, $3.55 per page for the original draft and one copy, and 55 cents per
page for each additional copy.
(2) For civil litigants who are ordering the original draft and are represented by a nonprofit legal corporation or a
program for pro bono legal assistance, for the original draft and any copy to be delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $5.50 per page and $1.10 per page for each additional copy;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, $4.13 per page and 83 cents per page for each additional copy;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, $3.44 per page and 69 cents per page for each additional copy; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, $2.75 per page and 55 cents per page for each additional copy.
(3) For any party other than the party ordering the original draft, for the copy of the draft to be delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $1.10 per page;
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 117 -
NOTICE

(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, 83 cents per page;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, 69 cents per page; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, 55 cents per page.
(d) For reporting all civil matters, in addition to the compensation provided in paragraphs (a) and (b), $30 for each
hour or fraction thereof actually spent, to be taxed as costs pursuant to subsection 5.
(e) For providing an instantaneous translation of testimony into English which appears on a computer that is located at
a table in the courtroom where the attorney who requested the translation is seated:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, in all criminal matters in which a party requests such a
translation, in addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b), $140 for the first day and $90 per
day for each subsequent day from the party who makes the request. This additional compensation must be paid by the
county as provided pursuant to subsection 4 only if the court issues an order granting the translation service to the
prosecuting attorney or to an indigent defendant who is represented by a county or state public defender.
(2) In all civil matters in which a party requests such a translation, in addition to the compensation provided
pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b) and (d), $140 for the first day and $90 per day for each subsequent day, to be paid by the
party who requests the translation.


2011 Statutes of Nevada, Page 672 (Chapter 138, AB 249)

(d), $140 for the first day and $90 per day for each subsequent day, to be paid by the party who requests the translation.
(f) For providing a diskette containing testimony prepared from a translation provided pursuant to paragraph (e):
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, in all criminal matters in which a party requests the diskette
and the reporter agrees to provide the diskette, in addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b)
and (e), $1.50 per page of the translation contained on the diskette from the party who makes the request. This additional
compensation must be paid by the county as provided pursuant to subsection 4 only if the court issues an order granting
the diskette to the prosecuting attorney or to an indigent defendant who is represented by a county or state public defender.
(2) In all civil matters in which a party requests the diskette and the reporter agrees to provide the diskette, in
addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b), (d) and (e), $1.50 per page of the translation
contained on the diskette, to be paid by the party who requests the diskette.
2. For the purposes of subsection 1, a page is a sheet of paper 8 1/2 by 11 inches [.] and does not include a condensed
transcript. The left margin must not be more than 1 1/2 inches from the left edge of the paper. The right margin must not
be more than three-fourths of an inch from the right edge of the paper. Each sheet must be numbered on the left margin
and must contain at least 24 lines of type. The first line of each question and of each answer may be indented not more
than five spaces from the left margin. The first line of any paragraph or other material may be indented not more than 10
spaces from the left margin. There must not be more than one space between words or more than two spaces between
sentences. The type size must not be larger than 10 characters per inch. The lines of type may be double spaced or one and
one-half spaced.
3. If the court determines that the services of more than one reporter are necessary to deliver transcripts on a daily
basis in a criminal proceeding, each reporter is entitled to receive:
(a) The compensation set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1 and subparagraph (1) of paragraph (e) of
subsection 1, as appropriate; and
(b) Compensation of $7.50 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $2 per page for each additional copy for
transcribing a proceeding of which the transcripts are ordered by the court to be delivered on or before the start of the next
day the court is scheduled to conduct business.
4. The compensation specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1, the compensation for transcripts in criminal
cases ordered by the court to be made, the compensation for transcripts in civil cases ordered by the court pursuant to
NRS 12.015, the compensation for transcripts for parents or guardians or attorneys of parents or guardians who receive
transcripts pursuant to NRS 432B.459, the compensation in criminal cases that is ordered by the court pursuant to
subparagraph (1) of paragraph (e) and subparagraph (1) of paragraph (f) of subsection 1 and the compensation specified
in subsection 3 must be paid out of the county treasury upon the order of the court. When there is no official reporter in
attendance and a reporter pro tempore is appointed, his or her reasonable expenses for traveling and detention must be
fixed and allowed by the court and paid in the same manner.


2011 Statutes of Nevada, Page 673 (Chapter 138, AB 249)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 118 -
NOTICE


the same manner. The respective district judges may, with the approval of the respective board or boards of county
commissioners within the judicial district, fix a monthly salary to be paid to the official reporter in lieu of per diem. The
salary, and also actual traveling expenses in cases where the reporter acts in more than one county, must be prorated by
the judge on the basis of time consumed by work in the respective counties and must be paid out of the respective county
treasuries upon the order of the court.
5. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, in civil cases, the compensation prescribed in paragraph (d) of
subsection 1 and for transcripts ordered by the court to be made must be paid by the parties in equal proportions, and
either party may, at the partys option, pay the entire compensation. In either case, all amounts so paid by the party to
whom costs are awarded must be taxed as costs in the case. The compensation for transcripts and copies ordered by the
parties must be paid by the party ordering them. No reporter may be required to perform any service in a civil case until
his or her compensation has been paid to him or her .[or deposited with the clerk of the court.]
6. Where a transcript is ordered by the court or by any party, the compensation for [it] the transcript must be paid to
the [clerk of the court and by the clerk paid to the] reporter [upon]before the furnishing of the transcript.
[7. The testimony and proceedings in an uncontested divorce action need not be transcribed unless requested by a
party or ordered by the court.]
Sec. 5. NRS 3.380 is hereby amended to read as follows:
3.380 1. The judge or judges of any district court may, with the approval of the board of county commissioners of any
one or more of the counties comprising such district, in addition to the appointment of a court reporter as in this chapter
provided, enter an order for the installation of sound recording equipment for use in any of the instances recited in NRS
3.320, for the recording of any civil and criminal proceedings, testimony, objections, rulings, exceptions, arraignments,
pleas, sentences, statements and remarks made by the district attorney or judge, oral instructions given by the judge and
any other proceedings occurring in civil or criminal actions or proceedings, or special proceedings whenever and
wherever and to the same extent as any of such proceedings have heretofore under existing statutes been recorded by the
official reporter or any special reporter or any reporter pro tempore appointed by the court.
2. For the purpose of operating such sound recording equipment, the court or judge may appoint or designate the
official reporter or a special reporter or reporter pro tempore or the county clerk or clerk of the court or deputy clerk. The
person so operating such sound recording equipment shall subscribe to an oath that he or she will well and truly operate
the equipment so as to record all of the matters and proceedings.
3. The court may then designate the person operating such equipment or any other competent person to [read] listen
to the recording and to transcribe [it] the recording into[typewriting.] written text. The person [transcribing] who:
(a) Transcribes the recording shall subscribe to an oath that he or she has truly and correctly transcribed [it.] the
proceedings as recorded.
(b) Operates the sound recording equipment as described in subsection 2 shall:


2011 Statutes of Nevada, Page 674 (Chapter 138, AB 249)

(1) Subscribe to an oath that the sound recording is a true and accurate recording of the proceedings; and
(2) In the event of an error, malfunction or other problem relating to the sound recording equipment or the
sound recording, report that error, malfunction or problem to the court.
4. The transcript may be used for all purposes for which transcripts have heretofore been received and accepted under
then existing statutes, including transcripts of testimony and transcripts of proceedings as constituting bills of exceptions
or part of the bill of exceptions on appeals in all criminal cases and transcripts of the evidence or proceedings as
constituting the record on appeal in civil cases and including transcripts of preliminary hearings before justices of the
peace and other committing magistrates, and are subject to correction in the same manner as transcripts under existing
statutes.
5. If a proceeding is recorded and a transcript is requested, a copy of the sound recording must, if requested, be
provided with the transcript. The cost for providing the sound recording must not exceed the actual cost of production
and must be paid by the party who requests the sound recording.
6. In civil and criminal cases when the court has ordered the use of such sound recording equipment, any party to the
action, at the partys own expense, may provide a certified court reporter to make a record of and transcribe all the matters
of the proceeding. In such a case, the record prepared by sound recording is the official record of the proceedings, unless
it fails or is incomplete because of equipment or operational failure, in which case the record prepared by the certified
court reporter shall be deemed, for all purposes, the official record of the proceedings.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 119 -
NOTICE

Sec. 6. NRS 4.410 is hereby amended to read as follows:
4.410 1. If the person designated to transcribe the proceedings is:
(a) Regularly employed as a public employee, the person is not entitled to additional compensation for preparing the
transcript.
(b) Not regularly employed as a public employee and not a certified court reporter, the person is entitled to such
compensation for preparing the transcript as the board of county commissioners determines.
(c) A certified court reporter, the person is entitled to the same compensation as set forth in NRS 3.370.
2. The compensation for transcripts and copies must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case, the
preparation of the transcript need not commence until the compensation has been deposited with the [deputy clerk of the
court.] court reporter.
Sec. 7. NRS 4.420 is hereby amended to read as follows:
4.420 [The]
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section:
(a) The sound recording of each proceeding in justice court must be preserved until at least[30 days] 1 year after the
time for filing an appeal expires.
(b) With respect to a proceeding in justice court that involves a misdemeanor for which enhanced penalties may be
imposed, a gross misdemeanor or a felony, the sound recording of the proceeding must be preserved for at least 8 years
after the time for filing an appeal expires.


2011 Statutes of Nevada, Page 675 (Chapter 138, AB 249)

2. If no appeal is taken, the justice of the peace may order the destruction of the recording at any time after [that
date.] the date specified in subsection 1.
3. If there is an appeal to the district court, the sound recording must be preserved until at least 30 days after final
disposition of the case on appeal, but the justice of the peace may order the destruction of the recording at any time after
that date.
Sec. 8. This act becomes effective upon passage and approval.
________
http://leg.state.nv.us/Statutes/76th2011/Stats201106.html#Stats201106page673
CHAPTER 3 - DISTRICT COURTS
Chapter 3 District Courts
Chapter 4 J ustice Courts
Chapter 5 Municipal Courts

J udge Elliotts 3/15/12 OARRMC invokes NRS 4.410(2), wh ich relates to J ustice Courts as to a municipal court, and
its not at all clear that such is appropriate, though:
NRS 5.073 Conformity of practice and proceedings to those of justice courts; exception; imposition and
collection of fees.
1. The practice and proceedings in the municipal court must conform, as nearly as practicable, to the practice and
proceedings of justice courts in similar cases. An appeal perfected transfers the action to the district court for trial anew,
unless the municipal court is designated as a court of record as provided in NRS 5.010. The municipal court must be
treated and considered as a justice court whenever the proceedings thereof are called into question.
2. Each municipal judge shall charge and collect such fees prescribed in NRS 4.060 that are within the jurisdictional
limits of the municipal court.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 903; A 1991, 455; 1997, 115)
NRS 5.075 Form of docket and records. The Court Administrator shall prescribe the form of the docket and of
any other appropriate records to be kept by the municipal court, which form may vary from court to court according to the
number and kind of cases customarily heard and whether the court is designated as a court of record pursuant to NRS
5.010.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 1997; A 1991, 161)
The RMC had Chief Marshal Roper purport to personally serve Coughlin the 1/16/13 Admin Order 2013-01 in
the Dept Alt. Sentencnign Booth located within or nearto the RJ C filing office, and such admin orders purports to be
provide jurisdiction for it under NV const art 6 sec 6, rather than referencing: NRS 5.060 Process, writs and
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 120 -
NOTICE

warrants.
1. Municipal judges and municipal courts may issue all legal process, writs and warrants necessary and proper to
the complete exercise of their powers.
2. All warrants issued by the municipal court must run to any sheriff or constable of the county, the marshal or any
police officer of the city, or a marshal or park ranger who is part of a unit of specialized law enforcement established
pursuant to NRS 280.125.
3. Any constable or sheriff may serve any process or make any arrest authorized to be made by any officer of a city.
[39:19:1865; B 944; BH 2458; C 2539; RL 4859; NCL 8401](NRS A 1983, 901; 1985, 672; 1995, 159)
Such Admin Order 2013-01 by RMc J udge W. Gardner is in now way necessary to the complete exercise of his
powers"



ii
Chief J udge Pearson's recent "Administrative Order 2013-06" relates to Couglin's cases almost as much as his 3/22/13
Administrative Order 2013-02 related to Coughlin's cross-examinations and arguments made during the 3/19/13 trial date
in RCR2013-065630, where such 3/22/13 Administrative Order 2013-02 essentially announced, nearly 18 months after
the law went into effect, AB226 and the concomitant major changes to the way summary evictions are done in Nevada
(with NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1) being a particularly bone of contention in the 7/31/12 hearing on Coughlin's Motions in
Rev2012-001048 before J udge Pearson incident to a 6/14/12 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice that listed Sparks J ustice
Court as the court, pursuant to the requirement to list the court in NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1), in which Coughlin must file a
Tenant's Answer or Affidavit within 5 days. Coughlin so submitted a Tenant's Answer to Sparks J ustice Court within 5
judicial days of the quasi-constructive service of such Notice on 6/14/12 (Nevada Court Services failed to mail such to
Coughlin in any way, though it did post a copy of the Notice to the door of the "dwelling unit or apartment" that
Northwinds Apartments rented Coughlin upon NCS being unable to gain entry in its attempts to burglarize Coughlins'
rental and commit a trespass in hopes of effecting personal service of such 5 Day Notice on Coughlin.
At such 7/31/12 hearing, J udge Pearson practiced law on behalf of Northwind's Apartments to whatever extent
was necessary to fill in the gaps where he also permitted an unauthorized practioner of law, Nevada Court Services J eff
Chandler, to cross the bar and make arguments on behalf of his "client", and out of state corporation, in violation of
NRCP 11. J udge Pearson roundly rejected Coughlin's NRS 40.253(b)(1) arguments relative to the 5 Day Notice being
deficient for the purposes of obtainin a summary removal order from the Reno J ustice Court where it listed the Sparks
J ustice Court as the place for Coughlin to file a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit. Apparently, in J udge Scott Pearsons
courtroom, unauthorized practitioner's of law have a net to fall in to save them when they commit "malpractice".
Anyways, J udge Pearsons's 8/14/13 Administrative Order 2013-06 is noteworthy where it purports to subject
Coughlin to the threat of imprisonment of up to 25 days for each violation of it order applying J CRRT 10 to "ALL
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN TO THE RENO J USTICE COURT" whether such
are submitted by Coughlin the tenant in a "landlord tenant matter" where J CRRT 2 clearly states that J CRRT 10 does not
apply to "landlord tenant matters" and NJ CRCP 81, and 83 place bright line restrictions on J udge Pearson where the
legislature has enacted a specific statutory scheme in a setting such as those landlord tenants affairs covered by NRS 40
and NRS 118A. Further, J udge Pearsons attempts to abuse the contempt power by, essentially, violating the spirit of
WDCR 18 (no ticky tack civil law procedural rules that violate NRCP 5(e) anyways where someone's liberty is at stake, ie,
in a criminal case):
WDCR Rule 18: "Papers which do not comply with rules. Except in criminal cases and writs arising
from criminal cases, filing office personnel shall refuse to file any document or pleading which is not properly signed by
all persons, or which does not comply with these rules, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court Rules, or
applicable statutes."
J udge Pearsons AO13-06 is further interesting where, despite Pearson and his fellow lifelong prosecutor turned
J udge, J udge Clifton's insistence (along with Sferrazza) that Coughlin is not able to issue his own subpoenas given the
temporary suspension of his law license (Coughlin's law license with the USPTO is not temporarily suspended, and
Coughlin can issue subpoenas in that context, it would seem, which extends to the defense of any disciplinary
investigation ongoing therein in G2033). However, Coughlin is representing himself in a number of criminal cases in the
RJ C where the court appointed conflict counsel that J udge Clifton (and J udge Pearson) admits he directly appointed
himself, in an apparent violation of Canon 2 Rule 2.13's "Administrative Appointments" language given the fallout from
the 2006 L.A. Times articles on such appointments, R. Bruce Lindsay, Esq., whom threatened to murder Coughlin on
3/14/13 upon Coughlin pointing out that Lindsay's announcing his failure to appear at Coughlin's 3/19/13 trial in
RCR2013-065630 would be, according to J udge Clifton's approach with Coughlin's allegedly being late to court on
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 121 -
NOTICE

2/12/13, direct contempt of court, whether Lindsay was appointed to represent Coughlin in such trial (J udge Clifton
would say no) or whether Lindsay agreed to appear as co-counsel and did so in fact appear (the RJ C's Criminal Division
Clerk Robbin Baker and Lindsay's office's Diana Simms play it pretty fast and loose with those appearances as attorney or
record...and sometimes there is fallout to that, and J udge Clifton should not be permitted to will that away with a
dismissive glare). Anyways, where the RJ C judges take the position that Coughlin may not issue his own subpoenas,
J udge Pearson's AO13-06 applies to Coughlin protions of J CRRT 10 that only apply to "attorneys".
Whereas J CRRT 10 reads: "B. No original pleading or paper may be amended by making erasures or
interlineations thereon, or by attaching slips thereto, except by leave of court. C. The following information shall appear
upon the first page of every paper presented for filing: (1) The name, Nevada State Bar identification number, address and
telephone number of the attorney and of any associated attorney appearing for the party filing the paper; whether such
attorney appears for the plaintiff, defendant, or other party; or the name, address and telephone number of a party
appearing in proper person, shall be set forth to the left of center of the page beginning at line 1 and shall be single spaced.
The space to the right of center shall be reserved for the filing marks of the clerk. NAME BAR NUMBER ADDRESS
CITY, STATE, ZIP CODE TELEPHONE NUMB"
Also interesting is J udge Pearson's attempts to apply J CRRT 11(G) (rebranded as (m) of the "PROCEDURAL
RULES FOR ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN TO THE RENO J USTICE
COURT") to even Coughlin's summary eviction cases. Such attempt to apply J CRRT 11(G) therein by J udge Sferrazza
has now become quite a big issue in 61383, the appeal of the initial horrifically handled by J udge Sferrazza and the RJ C,
summary eviction from Coughlin's former home law office in Rev2011-001708 (well, actually, the precursor sister case,
Rev2011-001492 might be considered the "initial" one, especially given the favorable NRS 118A.510(e) analysis such
provides to Coughlin), where J udge Sferrazza "entered" a Post-It Note Order atop one of Coughlin's filings (though such
was never, like, actually mailed to Coughlin or the opposing party or file stamped, etc...) that purported to either deny
Coughlin's Motion for Stay or just plain fail to adjudicate it based upon J udge Sferrazza's contention that J CRRT 11(G)
applied in landlord tenant matters.
Las Vegas has a J CRLV Rule 40 that just so limits the number of motions for stay, and motions to vacate in an
eviction case that a tenant can file. However, to get that Rule 20 on the books, the J ustice Court for Las Vegas Township
had to, and did, comply with NV J CRCP, which required such proposed rule be published and then approved by the
Nevada Supreme Court. (the ghost of Lippis reminds us all of the ills of allowing courts of limited jurisdiction free reign
to decide just how much due process tenant's are to be afforded, r.i.p)
So, where J udge Pearson's AO13-06 purports to enact a rule applicable only to Coughlin (where such analog in
J CRRT 11(G) does not apply to anyone else in a "landlord tenant matter" per J CRRT 2), such is violative of Nev. Const.
Art. 4 Sect. 21, where it reads: "(m) No motion once heard and disposed of shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall
the same matters therein embraced be reheard, unless by leave of the Court."
This echoes J udge Sferrazza's approach as revealed from the transcript of the 11/7/11 hearing before him in
Rev2011-001708: "(10:06 AM)...
Judge: ...I have already denied the motion for stay which once made cannot be made again to the court you can
address that to the District Court Sir. But, what I am willing to consider this morning is what I indicated previously is the
deposit of $2275 With the Court's. And, since Mr. Coughlin this was your motion I will allow you to argue first and then
we will hear from Mr. Baker his response..."
And, really, the wording of J CRLV Rule 40 addresses a lot of the problems that occurred in the summary
eviction's Coughlin was subjected to, especially vis a vis the Motion to Stay, and the RJ C's failure to properly adjudiciate
them, the RJ C Clerks refusal to accept Coughlin's supersedeas bonds, etc., etc. (not to mention the failure to timely
transmit the ROA to the district court, or in any way comply with SCR 10, 11, applicable in light of NRS 40.400).
Similarly, J udge Sferrazza responded to Coughlin's 11/2/11 Verified Complaint for Illegal Lockout in response to
landlord Merliss's attorneys Baker and Hill, along with the WCSO burglarizing Coughlin's property, by scrawling out on a
Post-It Note "Order" that was never served on either party and only uncovered upon the transmission of the incredibly
deficient Record on appeal some seven weeks later "11/3/11 This needs to be transmitted to the District Ct. He appealed.
PS".
Actually, under Nevada law, the justice court needs to give Coughlin a hearing within 3 days of his filing a
Verified Complaint for Illegal Lockout, period. Whether or not Coughlin appealed the matter would not change that.
J udge Sferrazza knows not whether Hill and or Baker told Coughlin they were charging him the same $900 "full rental
value" for the time after their burglary (which the rebrand as a "lockout") that previously entitled Coughlin to "full use
and occupancy" sufficient to create a new lease, or otherwise withdraw the eviction, and, regardless, even were that not
the case, an illegal lockout is an illegal lockout, and just because J udge Sferrazza may think "ah, what's the difference if
they did the lockout too soon, you were going to be locked out soon enough" does not vitiate Coughlin's rights under NRS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 122 -
NOTICE

118A.390(1)(a),(5)(a)-(b)..
A similar Post It Note Order (unserved, of course) by J udge Sferrazza was affixed atop the 12/22/11 Notice of
Posting Supersedeas Bond as Set By Statute, Where is My Stay filing by Coughlin, which the RJ C still refuses to transmit
to the 2J DC and fraudulently failed to include in either the 1/4/12 or 4/1/13 Supplementals so transmitted. That 12/22/11
Post It Note Order by J udge Sferrazza misapplies the plenary NRS 40.380 standard to the appeal of a summary eviction
where NRS 40.385 has not "within 10 days" requirement, where such Post It Note Order reads: "12/22/11 the stay was
denied an no bond was posted within 10 days. Defendnat needs to have District Court address this on appeal. PS". Such
"ruling" is especially rich given J udge Sferrazza's order at the conclusion of the 10/25/11 summary eviction proceeding
where he rebranded the $2,275 he impermissibly required Coughlin to deposit as a NRS 118A.355(5) "rent escrow"
deposit as Coughlin's "bond on appeal". One, the RJ C retaining that $2,275 was plenty sufficient a "deposit" where NRS
40.385 required only $250 be deposited by Coughlin to obtain a stay. Two, even had NRS 40.380 been applicable, such
involves "twice the judgment", and where there was no money judgment against Coughlin in the "no cause summary
eviction proceeding" that J udge Sferrazza kept trying to turn into a non-payment of rent summary eviction, the required
"deposit" would have been twice of nothing.
JCRLV Rule 40. Motions to stay in eviction cases.
(a) A tenant in an eviction case may only file 1 motion to stay or 1 motion to vacate per case, on a form approved
by the court.
(b) Upon the filing of a motion to stay under subsection (a), any pending eviction order shall be stayed until
further order of the court.
(c) A motion to stay will be reviewed by the court within 1 judicial day...
[Added; effective August 11, 2010.]"
Now, why would the J ustice Court of Las Vegas Township need go to the trouble to publish and get approved by
the Nevada Supreme Court J CRLV Rule 40 when it already has a nearly identical analog to J CRRT Rule 11(G) in J CRLV
Rule 11(f): "(f) No motion once heard and disposed of shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall the same matters
therein embraced be reheard, unless by leave of the court."?
NV J CRCP RULE 81. APPLICABILITY IN GENERAL
(a) To What Proceedings Applicable. These rules do not govern procedure and practice in any special statutory
proceeding insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the procedure and practice provided by the applicable
statute. Where the applicable statute provides for procedure under the former statutes governing civil actions, such
procedure shall be in accordance with these rules.
(b) Chief J ustices of the Peace. Rule 84, relating to chief justices of the peace, shall apply to all proceedings in the
justice courts, whether criminal, civil or otherwise."
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice: "The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and Nevada Rules of
Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions
of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections"
Michael J ordan had to deal with the "J ordan Rules". NV J CRCP does not allow the RJ C to subject Zachary
Barker Coughlin alone, in violation of Nevada Constitution Article 4 Section 21 to the "PROCEDURAL RULES FOR
ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN TO THE RENO J USTICE COURT".
NV JCRCP RULE 83. RULES BY JUSTICE COURTS: "Each justice or justice court in a township ...by
action of a majority of the justices thereof, may from time to time make and amend the rules governing its practice not
inconsistent with these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any justice court shall upon their
promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court, but shall not become effective until after approval by the Supreme
Court and publication. In all cases not provided for by these rules the justice courts may regulate their practice in any
manner not inconsistent with these rules."
And the RJ C further violates NV J CRCP 83 where it ignores NRS 40.385's setting the amount required to get a
stay by making the supersedeas bond $250, per statute, in J udge Sferrazza's admission, during the 11/7/11 hearing, that
the RJ C always makes such supersedeas bond "three times the monthly rent" (which also brings to mind the question,
why didn't Coughlin get a stay if J udge Sferrazza had the RJ C hold on to Coughlin's $2,275 as Coughlin's "bond on
appeal" between October 25th, 2011 until such money was finally returned to Coughlin (most of which he had to use to
put up his bail for the criminal trespass arrest he sustained at his former home law office in the meantime) on 11/15/12. It
seems J udge Sferrazza was trying to find a way to get that $2,275 to Hill and his client, and did not realize there is no
"appeal bond" in an appeal of a summary eviction, and that the only thing he could be referring to as a "bond on appeal"
was a supersedeas bond...and upon figuring out that there was no possible way to award Hill and his client the rent escrow
deposit Sferrazza wrongfully ordered pursuant to NRS 118A.355(5) in a no-cause summary eviction, even where the
tenant set out in excruciating detail that he, if at all, invoked only NRS 118A.360, and never did invoked NRS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 123 -
NOTICE

118A.355(5), and that was only because Coughlin completely hammered it home with his analogy to J CRLV Rule 44 vis
a vis the "local rule" referenced in NRS 118A.355(5), which had no applicability anyways, but, hey, its Sferrazza, so
whaddyagonnado? Are you getting an idea of a what a, uh, fluid approach J udge Sferrazza (and add to that Clifton and
Pearson) have to jurisdictional principles in their RJ C day to day activities)?
"Judge: well I did specifically enter an order saying that you were to be evicted no later than 5 PM October 31 I changed
it to say that no earlier. I did review this but the last paragraph provides the sums currently on deposit with the court in
the amount of $2275 are the property of the landlord but shall not immediately be released to him. I am going to modify
that that the $2275 And I will explain this There is no rent due in this case, this was not an action for nonpayment
of rent so I do think it was inappropriate for the court to order that that money go to the landlord. The court had no
jurisdiction over that. And so I am going to order that it be surrendered to Mr. Coughlin. With respect to the appeal, I am
going to order that's if the stay is granted by the District Court that the bond amount shall be three times the rents which
is $2700. The District Court could amend that if they wish but that is what we always charge in this court. Three months
rent. So, if the District Court wishes to modify that that's fine but you'll get your money back and you can proceed with
the appeal however you wish. I did grant you an informal pauperis which I believe applies to the filing fees for the appeal.
All right?
Plaintiff: may I just request clarification Your Honor. So if I understand correctly, the court is modify the order to reflect
that the $2,275 currently on the deposit is going to Mr. Coughlin, that it's going to be released. However, if Mr. Coughlin
ever appeals this case and wants to stay, he needs to post a supersedeas bond in an amount of three months worth of rent
Judge: $2700.
Plaintiff: $2700, that would be a supersedeas bond, understood."
One really has to question whether or not J udges Pearson, Clifton, and Sferrazza (as they have seen fit to group
each other as a triumvirate in both of these embarrassing Administrative Orders) have any conception of how slippery a
slope the concept of making up different sets of rules for different litigants truly is.
NV JCRCP RULE 84. CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE...
"(b) Responsibilities. The chief justice of the peace in a township shall:
(1) Be responsible for the administration of court rules and regulations...
(5) Oversee all administrative and clerical work and functions of the court as set forth in NRS Chapter 4.
(6) Call and preside over meetings with the other justices of that township, ... to discuss and set policy on
procedures, planning, caseload distribution, judicial training, vacations, court improvements, personnel and any other
matters of benefit or concern to the court."
The opinion in Lippis is instructive with respect to Coughlin's criticisms of the manner in which the RJ C and
WCSO's approach avoiding NRS 40.253(5)'s requirement that the tenant have "receipt" of the summary removal order for
at least 24 hours prior to the WCSO conducting a lockout, J ust as "J CRCP 106 is... violative of article 4, section 21,
which provides that "all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the State" (noting "There is no
reason why parties to landlord-tenant law suits should be denied the right of appeal, while all other justices' courts'
litigants are allowed to exercise this right."), so too, is the refusal by the WCSO, WCDA, RJ C, RPD, etc. to follow NRS
40.253(5)'s "directing the sheriff to remove the tenant within twenty-four hours of receipt of the order" language where
every other county in Nevada manages to.
J CRRT Rule 11 also does not apply to "landlord tenant matters" per J CRRT 2 (and if the RJ C wishes to change
its rules, it must cease doing an end run around the requirements of NV J CRCP 84 or otherwise enforcing unwritten
"house rules" like it has in the past) to ALL of Coughlin's cases (including the multitude of summary eviction based
landlord tenant matters (which begat the very wrongful criminal prosecutions of Coughlin that the RJ C is now citing to in
attempts to buttress its judicial misconduct in seeking to enforce now two specious Administrative Orders against
Coughlin whilst a fifth criminal prosecution of Coughlin by the WCDA's office in the RJ C is set for trial on 10/14/13
incident to an alleged violation of such initial Administrative Order of dubious legality by Coughlin on 5/23/13, for which
the out of control RJ C Bailiff J ohn Reyes (whose wife file a domestic violence protection order against him, alleges he
suffers from severe depression and is "off his medications" and becomes hostile and violent when such is the case, and the
Sheriff's deputies have been out to the Reyes home in the past to respond to at least one domestic disturbance (also,
Coughlin filed a Stalking/Harassment TPO application against Reyes in RCP2012-000070 on 2/15/12, just prior to the
5/2/12 TPO application by Cathy A. Reyes)
The increased due to the RJ C J udges own misconduct and failure to abide by Nevada law, and countenancing of
the burglaries the WCSO conducts instead of according tenants the "24 hours" from the tenant's "receipt" of a summary
removal order prior to the WCSO effecting a lockout...all of which the RJ C and WCDA now wish Coughlin to foot the
bill for or otherwise make Coughlin atone for their own sins)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 124 -
NOTICE

IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER OF: DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2013-06 contains some really rich moments:
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is a party to several cases in this Court; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court which fail to include
a case number in the caption or list multiple cases in the caption; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court which fail to
include a certificate of service or clearly state an exception to the ex parte rule; and (this is really rich where there is no
opposing party in these Administrative Order "cases", further, the initial 12/20/12 Admin Order required Coughlin to do
just this to even get a copy of an order or some filing, and now, J udge Pearson, in a fraudulent attempt to get around the
fact that the J CRRT Rule 11(A), requires a "proof of service" for "Motions", not for the "Request for Audio Copy of
Proceedings" that the 8/5/13 "Notice of Document Received but Not Considered by the Court" had attached, served by
Howden...so, now, realizing that J CRRT Rule 11(a) doesn't apply to such ministerial requests, J udge Pearson adds to his
8/14/13 Admin Order: "2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not request a copy of a document or transcript
without first filing a Motion which complies with the attached Rules. Any such motion must be supported by an
affidavit of COUGHLIN which must address the basis for the request, why simply viewing the document is not
sufficient and whether the document has been previously provided to him".

How Coughlin could (and why he should have to is a whole nother story) submit a motion just to request an audio
transcript where "Any such motion must be supported by an affidavit of COUGHLIN which must address the basis for
the request, why simply viewing (NOTE: what does that mean as to "hearing" a audio transcript?) the document
(NOTE: recording?) is not sufficient and whether the document has been previously provided to him"".
The requirement that Coughlin "address the basis for the request" echoes Judge Pearsons instructions to
Coughlin at a 6/16/13 hearing in RCR2011-063341 where he indicated Coughlin would need to explain why he
wanted a copy of something before decision on whether or not to provide (even for purchase) Coughlin with a copy
of such a document or recording in the public record would be permitted. That is proposterous. Judge Pearsons
seems to have spent too long being the only one who gets to decide (or know the basis for his decision) whether to
release Brady material and is applying that approach where it has no business in the judiciary as to ministerial
matters. The answer to Pearson and Clifton's current quandry is not to limit Coughlin's access to items in the
public record, but rather, to avoid violatin NRS 178.405, especially via impermissible extra-judicial
communications, in addition to ceasing the improprer administrative appointments, especially those involving R.
Bruce Lindsay, Esq
The RJC failed to serve a copy of Judge Sferrazza's 7/29/13 Orders denying Coughlin's Motions to Modify,
etc. the Workplace EPOs in RCP2012-000607 and RCP2012-000599, and now is refusing to even allow Coughlin to
purchase copies of such, furhter the RJC will not indicate to Coughlin whether it will issue the subpoena on Bailiff
Reyes wifes Cathy A. Reyes that Coughlin submitted, and other such subpoenas, like the one on former RJC Chief
Civil Clerk now Sparks Justice Court Clerk Karen Stancil whom was one of the last RJC non-Bailiff employees
Coughlin spoke to prior to the implementation of the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01. Coughlin discussed
with Stancil the circumstances of the 6/28/12 eviction in Rev2012-001048 and concomitant arrest in RCR2012-
067980 where the RJC, despite at least two phone calls between Stancil and Coughlin and one 6/26/12 email from
Coughlin to Stancil and RJCWeb@washoecounty.us (which was at one point within the file in 1048, underneath
the docket on the left hand side, but which upon Coughlin's reviewing such on 8/1/13 was no longer to be found)
alerting the RJC to the jurisdictional deficiencies in the 6/14/12 5 Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer allegedly
"personally served" on Coughlin by Nevada Court Serves, which listed, pursuant to NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1), the very
Sparks Justice Court with which Coughlin submitted a Tenant's Answer (Motion to Dismiss) for filing on 6/26/12
at noon, which the SJC failed to file, where the RJC's Judge Schroeder then entered a Lockout Order on 6/27/12
despite the deficieny in the Notice. Upon Coughlin, on 8/1/13, attempting to file a Verified Complaint for Illegal
Lockout as to a rental at "Northwinds Apartments" with the same Karen Stancil, now a counter clerk at the
Sparks Justice Court, Stancil refused such document for filing, in a non-ministerial rejection of such, by noting
that "Northwinds Apartments" is located within the confines of Reno, no Sparks.
Rule 11. Motions: Procedure for making motions; affidavits; renewal,
rehearing of motions.
A. All motions shall contain proof of the service of the same....
F. Factual contentions involved in any pre-trial or post-trial motion shall be
initially presented and heard upon affidavits. Oral testimony may be received at a
hearing with the approval of the court, or the court may set the matter for a hearing at
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 125 -
NOTICE

a time in the future and allow oral examination of the affiants to resolve factual
issues shown by the affidavits to be in dispute.
(NOTE: where was DDA Young's "Affidavit"in his Opposition to Coughlin's Motion to Suppress of 2/21/12 or in
Young's ex parte 11/26/12 emeregency Motion to Prohibit Coughlin form faxing? Also, Biray Dogan's 11/8/13 Motion to
Quash contains a Certificate of Service that is not only fraudulent (Coughlin was never sent any such fax and can prove it),
but regardless, Coughlin never consented, in writing, to the WCPD pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2) to be so served
electronically), and similar to that is Reno City Attorney Skau's fraudulence (perhaps in conjunction with J udge Sferrazza)
in obtaining Coughlin's appearance at an insufficiently noticed 11/13/12 hearing in RCr2011-063341 by alleging
Sferrazza had "authorized service by email")
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court which are copies of
documents previously filed with the Court that have been redacted or edited; (NOTE: what does the WCDA's Office do
when it recycles the same petty larceny criminal complaint over and over? Further, so what, what's wrong with not
reinventing the wheel? Coughlin is not attempting to pull the wool over anyone's eyes here in any way, so what does this
have to do with anything? This is like complaining that Coughlin does not use the right eggshell white type of printing
paper).
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court which are not legible
or otherwise fail to clearly state the relief requested; (NOTE: the WCDA's Office Complaints failing to ever "clearly
state" the facts supporting the charges has never seemed to be much of a problem) and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly requests copies of transcripts or documents from
the Court which have been previously provided; (even if that were true, which it is not, the RJ C is now attempting to
prevent Coughlin from obtaining copies even where he would pay money for them).
WHEREAS, several of the types of documents referenced above are attached hereto; and (it is interesting that
Pearson attaches a simple, ministerial at best "Request for Audio Copy of Proceedings" by Coughlin, which the RJ C's
own unsigned, unattributed 8/5/13 round of ridiculous "Notice of Document Received but Not Considered By The Court",
uh...well, they are on pleading paper, and have a caption, they just lack a signature by a judge, whilst also failing to have
an indication as to whom such Notice should attributed or otherwise indicate whom it was that made the more than
ministerial decision to go about suddenly rejecting Coughlin's filings, refusing to place file stamps on them, in many cases,
weeks after Coughlin submitted them for filing, especially where J udge Pearson then drops this new Administrative Order
on Thursday 8/14/13 (after weeks of the RJ C refusing to indicate to Coughlin if his filings were being file stamped,
refusing to even provide Coughlin's copies of any "received" stamped cover page of his submissions, and refusing to
allow Coughlin to view, or even purchase copies of the dockets in his cases, even in his criminal cases), where he had put
in place a Monday, 8/19/13 deadline for Coughlin to file his pre-trial motions for a trial set for 10/14/13, where Nevada
law under NRS 174.450 accordsa "fifteen days prior to trial" deadline for Coughlin to file such pre-trial motions. Also,
its J udge Elliott's former Administrative Assistant taking over for Lori Townsend, which is arguably another conflict
requiring removing the RJ C from all of Coughlin's cases considering J udge Elliott's gross misconduct in so many of
Coughlin's cases in the last 18 months. Regardless, the "Certificate of Mailing" for such 8/5/13 "Notices" is signed by
Howden, and indicates "a true copy of the atached document" was provided to WCDA DDA Young by "interoffice mail",
which seems a bit off.
WHEREAS, filings by pro se petitioners, "however inartfully pleaded, " are held "to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. " Haines v. 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2D 652 (1972); and (NOTE:
this is interesting, as if Coughlin is not a "lawyer" as J udges Pearson, and Clifton alternately indicates he is or isn't,
depending on the utility to their agenda either characterization provides in the various instances in which they so choose
to make it, then the application of this new set of procedural rules applicable only to Coughlin (applying to Coughlin a
more stringent set of procedural rules than applies to anyone else in "landlord tenant matters" or "criminal cases" by
Pearson's Administrative Order essentially attempting to reduce to a new set of rules or an "Order" that which Coughlin
had been arguing is tantamount to criminal misconduct by the RJ C Bailiff and Clerks (ie, applying J CRRT 10 and 11 to
Coughlin in "criminal cases" and "landlord tenant matters" where J CRRT 2 is quite clear that neither J CRRT 10 nor 11
apply to Coughlin, or anyone else, in those settings).
WHEREAS, frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources (NOTE:
maybe, but probably not as much as J udges Gone Wild legislating away all the protections to tenant's rights the
Legislature reduced into black letter law, as a manifestation of the will of the people, largely motivated by a recognition of
the enormous societal cost to the very approach to summary evictions that the RJ C continues to insist upon...also, clearly
RCR2012-067980 was a "frivolous claim" brought by the WCDA's Office...so where is WCDA DDA Z. Young's own
special set of procedural rules?), hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of
engaging in business and providing professional services to the public; and WHEREAS, the citizens of this
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 126 -
NOTICE

community have a right to a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and this right is infringed if the
Court allows a case, civil or criminal, to consume more than its reasonable share of the Court's time. See, United 93
F.Supp. 190, 191 (D. Mass.1950)("The Court has obligations to other parties who have cases to be heard."); And
WHEREAS, courts possess the inherent power (NOTE: well, J udge Pearson clearly was taking notes when
Coughlin pointed out the fraudulent misstatement by J udge Sferrazza in the initial Admin Order of 12/20/12 vis a vis it
purporting NV Const Art 6 Sec 6 to apply to "Nevada's courts" versus "District Courts"...and really, these new citations to
J ordn and Chambers have no applicability to "courts of limited jurisdiction" because, right along with that "limited
jurisdiction" is an incredibly limited "inherent power" possessed that in no way justifies the judicial hot mess that this
new Administrativ Order 2013-06 is...some might say a tad more constructive approach would consist of ceasing to
coddle immature and irrational bailiffs, avoid playing the limit the County's civil liability game with the WCDA's Office,
and send out the sort of clarion call to local law enforcement of the sort that the exclusionary rule does by ceasing to
tolerate or enable all these stupid, ego driven arrests and harassment of Coughlin and others, and the system-wide
burglarizing of tenant's homes, offices, and other rentals) to manage proceedings and exercise reasonable control of the
conduct of those who appear before them. See, Chambers v. 501 U.S. 32 (1991) And J ordan v. State ex reI. Of Motor
Vehicles & Pub. 110 P.3D 30, 44 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz LLC v. Of N. Las 181 P.3D 670 (2008); and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN was admitted to the Nevada State Bar on March 25, 2005 and
later suspended on J une 7, 2012;
WHEREAS, this Court has previously found in Administrative Order 2012-01 that v. ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN has repeatedly caused a disturbance in the filing office of the Reno Justice Court, disrupted the orderly
business of the Court and overburdened the limited judicial resources of this Court thereby hindering the timely resolution
of meritorious claims and increasing the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public;
and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been the subject of disciplinary hearings before the State
Bar of Nevada Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board wherein the Board found Mr. Coughlin "committed multiple
violations of the Rules of Professional conduct" and that Mr. Coughlin "engaged in bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary process"; and (NOTE: actually, and the the SBN's TPO Application to Pearson contained a complete copy of
the it, the 12/14/12 FOFCOL contains no such "finding" but does contain somewhat similar language in the "Decision and
Recommendation" section, where such reads: "Fifth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin
engaged in a bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process by failing to file the pleading required by SCR 105(2) and
instead filing several lengthy, irrelevant and nonsensical pleadings, mostly pleadings filed in other matters, and refiled in
the disciplinary action under a similar but different caption. In some instances, Coughlin simply crossed out the case
name and hand wrote the names of the parties in the disciplinary proceeding."
One, that is a ridiculous statement, as if that were true, every single attorney who ever defaulted in a disciplinary
matter would be said to have "engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process" merely by "failing to file the
pleading required by SCR 105(2)(c) (Answer not mandatory Under a state supreme court rule governing pleadings in a
formal hearing in investigation of an attorney, an answer to an order to show cause in a disciplinary hearing is only
permissive and not mandatory, and a failure to answer is not in itself grounds for a disciplinary action. Ariz.In re
Kastensmith, 101 Ariz. 291, 419 P.2D 75 (1966).) saying such is "required" is taking it a bit far, its like saying one is
"required" to answer a lawsuit...one might face the spectre of a default being entered if they don't, but they are hardly
"required" in the general sense of the term to file an Answer. SCR 105(2)(c) in no way provides for such a
"establish(ing)" of "bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process" (the fact they are saying that and the RJ C is
repeating is makes one have no respect at all for either, really, some might say,) where such rule reads: "A copy of the
complaint shall be served on the attorney and it shall direct that a verified response or answer be served on bar counsel
within 20 days of service; the original shall be filed with bar counsels office. The time to respond may be extended once
by the chair for not more than 20 days for good cause or upon stipulation of the parties. In the event the attorney fails to
plead, the charges shall be deemed admitted; provided, however, that an attorney who fails to respond within the time
provided may thereafter obtain permission of the appropriate disciplinary board chair to do so, if failure to file is
attributable to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.")
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in both civil and criminal matters before this
Court including cases before the Honorable Peter Sferrazza, the Honorable Scott Pearson, and the Honorable David
Clifton wherein Mr. Coughlin has been admonished for failing to follow the Court's orders and directives; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently the Subject of an Extended Order for Protection
against Harassment in the Workplace requested by the Washoe County Public Defender's Office, his previous counsel in
several cases before this Court; and ,
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently the subject of an Extended Order for Protection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 127 -
NOTICE

Against Harassment in the Workplace requested by the State Bar of Nevada based upon Mr. Coughlin's harassing and
disruptive behavior with employees and officers of the State Bar; and
WHEREAS, to protect the peaceful and effective operation of this Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not submit a document to this Court which does not comply with the
attached PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN TO
THE RENO J USTICE COURT.
2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not request a copy of a document or transcript without first filing a
Motion which complies with the attached Rules. Any such motion must be supported by an affidavit of COUGHLIN
which must address the basis for the request, why simply viewing the document is not sufficient and whether the
document has been previously provided to him.
3. Any violation of this Order may be considered contempt of court and punished pursuant to NRS Chapter 22
by a fine of up to $500 and/or incarceration for up to 25 days in the Washoe County Detention Facility. (NOTE: so what
now, Coughlin is going to have Chief Bailiff Michael Sexton do an encore of his 2/12/13 threats to Coughlin (made in a
holding cell shortly after Coughlin had been taken into custody for allegedly being late to court) where Sexton taunted
Coughlin that "you still have those 5 individual violations of the Administrative Order hanging over your head...that's 25
days in jail for each violation..."). There is no way Coughlin should be subjected to the threat that every time he files
some Request for Audio Copy of Proceeding that some RJ C Bailiff will either arrest him or serve an Order to Show cause
like J udge Pearson's shameful 2/25/13 OSC in connection with the 12/20/12 Admin Order that Pearson subsequently put
through a round of musical case numbers that assisted the RJ C in avoiding processing Coughlin's appeal thereto and in
fraudulently foisting Bruce Lindsay on Coughlin as his "sole counsel" in settings where Coughlin never assented to such,
resulting in more of Coughlin's filing being rejected, Lindsay bilking the system, and Pearson and Clifton violating Canon
2, Rule 2.13 per the "Administrative Appointments" sections...and really, what is this new Admin Order in response to?
Coughlin's requesting to be provide, even once, a copy of the audio transcript of the 2/5/13 hearings in RCR2012-065630
(or "trial"), both portions, and the interlude in RCR2011-063341 occurring shortly after the impermissible extra-judicial
communications between J udges Pearson and Clifton at issue in CR13-0552. "The cover up is worse than the crime"
comes to mind. The RJ C and its Bailiffs playing the "blame it on 'Wendy'" whom they allege is alleging already provided
Coughlin copies of such hearings (finally the RJ C caved and provided at least some of the afternoon portion of the
3/19/13 trial in RCR2013-065630 after months of Coughlin hounding it for such) And really, why not just tell the
Bailiff's to leave Coughlin the hell alone, quit co-signing all the WCDA's Office bs prosecutions and harassment of
Coughlin, dump the probations, and these Admin Orders, and see what sort of jurisdiction was retained where Coughlin
filed tolling motions, and get this ship righted..
3. This Order is effective upon personal service upon Mr. Coughlin.
Dated this of August, 14th, 2013. /s/ J udge Scott Pearson, Chief J ustice of the Peace (NOTE: thereafter J udge
Pearson's Order includes a slightly modified, tailored to Coughlin version of J CRRT 10)"
The RJ C has further, by way of a Notice of Document Received But Not Considered by the Corut that is file
stamped 8/22/13, and which contains a Certificate of Mailing by former 2J DC J udge Elliot's former J udicial Assistant
Heidi Howden indicating such was mailed on 8/22/13 (despite the envelope it arrived in baring a postmark of 8/26/13)
refused to transmit Coughlin's Notices of Appeal of RJ C J udge Sferrazz'a 7/29/13 Order's denying Coughlin's Motions to
Modify/Dissolve the specious Workplace Harassment EPO's RJ C Chief J udge Pearson granted the SBN and Washoe
County in RCP2012-000607 and RCP2012-000599, both of which have caused a terribly prejudicial impact to
Coughlin's ability to, say, personally serve (or have such done) a subpoena on WCPD's Dogan, Leslie, Goodnight, etc.,
much less the SBN (which is rather pressing considering the 8/28/13 trial date in the RMC for the dual prosecutions of
Coughlin for alleged violations of the dubious TPO/EPO granted by RJ C Chief J udge Pearson to the SBN.
Chief J udge Pearsons's recent 8/14/13 (time of filing stamped as 11:13 a.m.) Administrative Order 2013-06
(which lacks a case number, much like the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 the J udge Pearsons subsequently
assigned a criminal case number, RCR2013-071437 to, in a display of a judge making a prosecutor's charging decision")
reads:
" IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER OF: DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN,
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2013-06
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is a party to several cases in this Court; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court which fail to include
a case number in the caption or list multiple cases in the caption; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court which fail to include
a certificate of service or clearly state an exception to the ex parte rule; and
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 128 -
NOTICE

WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court which are copies of
documents previously filed with the Court that have been redacted or edited;
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court which are not legible
or otherwise fail to clearly state the relief requested; and WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly
requests copies of transcripts or documents from the Court which have been previously provided; WHEREAS, several of
the types of documents referenced above are attached hereto; and
WHEREAS, citizens, whether or not indigent, have a constitutional right to access to the courts with the
protection of due process of law; and
WHEREAS, filings by pro se petitioners, "however inartfully pleaded, " are held "to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. " Haines v. 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2D 652 (1972); and
WHEREAS, "a litigant's right to access the courts in proper person and with in forma pauperis status is not
without limits", See J ordan v. State ex reI. Of Motor Vehicles & Pub. 110 P.3D 30, 44 (2005), abrogated on other grounds
by Buzz LLC v. Of N. Las 181 P.3D 670 (2008); and
WHEREAS, pro se litigants must comply with procedural rules. King v. Atiyeh, F.2D 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987);
WHEREAS, frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the
timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional
services to the public; and WHEREAS, the citizens of this community have a right to a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and this right is infringed if the Court allows a case, civil or criminal, to
consume more than its reasonable share of the Court's time. See, United 93 F.Supp. 190, 191 (D. Mass.1950)("The
Court has obligations to other parties who have cases to be heard."); And 814 States v. United States Shoe
WHEREAS, courts possess the inherent power to manage proceedings and exercise reasonable control of the
conduct of those who appear before them. See, Chambers v. 501 U.S. 32 (1991) And J ordan v. State ex reI. Of Motor
Vehicles & Pub. 110 P.3D 30, 44 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz LLC v. Of N. Las 181 P.3D 670 (2008); and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN was admitted to the Nevada State Bar on March 25, 2005 and
later suspended on J une 7, 2012;
WHEREAS, this Court has previously found in Administrative Order 2012-01 that v. ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN has repeatedly caused a disturbance in the filing office of the Reno Justice Court, disrupted the orderly
business of the Court and overburdened the limited judicial resources of this Court thereby hindering the timely resolution
of meritorious claims and increasing the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public;
and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been the subject of disciplinary hearings before the State
Bar of Nevada Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board wherein the Board found Mr. Coughlin "committed multiple
violations of the Rules of Professional conduct" and that Mr. Coughlin "engaged in bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary process"; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in cases before the Reno Municipal Court
including cases before the Honorable Dorothy Nash Holmes and the Honorable Kenneth Howard wherein Mr. Coughlin
was held in contempt of court for failing to follow the Court's orders and directives; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in both civil and criminal matters before this
Court including cases before the Honorable Peter Sferrazza, the Honorable Scott Pearson, and the Honorable David
Clifton wherein Mr. Coughlin has been admonished for failing to follow the Court's orders and directives; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently the Subject of an Extended Order for Protection
against Harassment in the Workplace requested by the Washoe County Public Defender's Office, his previous counsel in
several cases before this Court; and ,
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently the subject of an Extended Order for Protection
Against Harassment in the Workplace requested by the State Bar of Nevada based upon Mr. Coughlin's harassing and
disruptive behavior with employees and officers of the State Bar; and
WHEREAS, to protect the peaceful and effective operation of this Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not submit a document to this Court which does not comply with the
attached PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURT.
2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not request a copy of a document or transcript without first filing a
Motion which complies with the attached Rules. Any such motion must be supported by an affidavit of COUGHLIN
which must address the basis for the request, why simply viewing the document is not sufficient and whether the
document has been previously provided to him.
3. Any violation of this Order may be considered contempt of court and punished pursuant to NRS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 129 -
NOTICE

Chapter 22 by a fine of up to $500 and/or incarceration for up to 25 days in the Washoe County Detention Facility.
3. This Order is effective upon personal service upon Mr. Coughlin.
Dated this of August, 14th, 2013. /s/ J udge Scott Pearson, Chief J ustice of the Peace (NOTE: thereafter J udge
Pearson's Order includes a slightly modified, tailored to Coughlin version of J CRRT 10)
PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURT All documents submitted by Zachary Barker Coughlin must meet the following
rules: (a) All pleadings and papers presented for filing must be flat, unfolded, firmly bound together at the top, on white
paper of standard quality, not less than 16-lb. Weight and 8 112 by 11 inches in size. All papers shall be typewritten or
prepared by some other process that will produce clear and permanent copies equally legible to printing. The print size
shall not be more than 12 points. Carbon or photocopies may not be filed. Only one side of the paper may be used. (B) All
papers presented for filing, receiving, or lodging with the clerk shall be prepunched with 2 holes, centered 2 3/4 inches
apart and 112 inch to 5/8 inch from the top edge of the paper. All original papers shall be stamped ORIGINAL between
the punched holes in red ink. The lines on each page must be double spaced. Pages must be numbered consecutively at the
bottom. Lines of pages must be numbered in the left margm. (C) No original pleading or paper shall be amended by
making erasures or interlineations thereon, or by attaching slips thereto, except by leave of the Court. (D) The following
information shall appear upon the first page of every paper presented for filing: (1) Mr. Coughlin's name, address, and
telephone number shall be set forth to the left of center of the page beginning at line 1 and shall be single spaced. The
space to the right of center shall be reserved for the filing marks of the clerk. NAME ADDRESS CITY, STATE, ZIP
CODE TELEPHONE NUMBER
3) The name of the action or proceeding shall appear below the title of the Court in the space to the left of center
at line 9, e.G.: J OHN DOE, } Plaintiff, } vs. } RICHARD ROE, } Defendant. } (4) In the space to the right of center at
lines 11 and 12 shall appear the case number and the department number as follows: Case No.: RJ C 2000 -00000
(Example) Dept. No.: 1 (Example) (5) The title of the pleading, motion, or other document must be typed or printed on
the page directly below the names of the parties to the action or proceeding. The title must be sufficient in description to
apprise the respondent and clerk of the nature of the document filed, or the relief sought, e.G.: Defendant's Motion for
Summary J udgment Against Plaintiff J ohn Doe; Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories. (E) A pleading
may not be filed listing multiple case numbers in the caption. Each filing must be of an original pleading meeting each of
these rules. (F) All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must be 8 112 by 11 inches in size. Exhibits which are smaller
must be affixed to a blank sheet of paper of the appropriate size. Exhibits which are larger than 8 112 by 11 inches must
be reduced to 8 112 by 11 inches or must be folded so as to appear 8 112 by 11 inches in size. All exhibits attached to
pleadings or papers must clearly show the exhibit number at the bottom or on the right side. Copies of exhibits must be
clearly legible and not unnecessarily voluminous. Original documents must be retained for introduction as exhibits at the
time of a hearing or at the time of trial rather than attached to pleadings. (G) When a decision of the Supreme Court of the
State of Nevada is cited, the citation to Nevada Reports must be given together with the citation to West's Pacific Reporter
and the year of the decision. When a decision of an appellate court of any other state is cited, the citation to West's
Regional Reporter System must be given together with the state and year of the decision. When a decision of the United
States Supreme Court is cited, the United States Reports citation and year of decision must be given. When a decision of
the court of appeals or of a district court or other court of the United States has been reported in the Federal Reporter
System, that citation, court, and year of decision must be given. (H) All motions shall contain proof of the service of the
same. (I) Every motion or opposition thereto shall be accompanied by a memorandum of legal authorities and any
exhibits in support of or in opposition to the motion. G) Except as permitted by the presiding judge, legal memoranda in
support of a motion, opposition, or reply shall not exceed 10 pages, exclusive of exhibits. (K) Factual contentions
involved in any pretrial or post-trial motion shall be initially presented by Coughlin through an affidavit. Oral testimony
may be received at a hearing with the approval of the Court, or the Court may set the matter for a hearing at a time in the
future and allow oral examination of the affiant to resolve factual issues shown by the affidavits to be in dispute. (1) Any
affidavit shall identify the affiant, the party on whose behalf it is submitted, and the motion or application to which it
pertains and shall be served and filed with the motion, or opposition to which it relates. Affidavits shall contain only
factual, evidentiary matter, shall conform with the requirements of NRCP 56(e), and shall avoid mere general conclusions
or argument. Affidavits substantially defective in these respects may be stricken, wholly or in part. (M) No motion once
heard and disposed of shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall the same matters therein embraced be reheard, unless
by leave of the Court (n) Coughlin must file a request for submission if he wishes the Court to consider the merits of his
motion. (0) Coughlin shall not file a request for submission of a motion unless the motion was served on the opposition
and they have been afforded at least 10 days to respond. (P) Decision shall be rendered without oral argument unless oral
argument is ordered by the Court, in which event the individual court department shall set a date and time for hearing. (Q)
All discovery motions shall include the affidavit of Coughlin establishing that after consultation with opposing counsel,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 130 -
NOTICE

he has been unable to resolve the matter""
Then Chief J udge Sferrazza entered an "Administrative Order 2012-01 In re Zachary Coughlin" file stamped
12/20/12 at 4:38 p.m., which purported that Coughlin had been "admonished by J udges including soon to be RJC Chief
Judge Pearson, despite such not being at all true. At such point Coughlin's sole interactions with J udge Pearson
consisted of a 7/31/12 and 10/2/12 landlord tenant matter hearing in Rev2012-001048 and Rev2012-078432. While
J udge Pearson did commit gross judicial misconduct in both hearings, willfully exceeding his jurisdicitonal where
completely inappropriate, whilst also failing to embrace his jurisdiction where he had a duty to, Coughlin was in no way
"admonished". Interestingly, Chief J udge Pearson indicated to Coughlin during a 6/16/13 status conference in a trumped
up probation violation charge that the WCDA's Office had the Department of Alternative Sentencing make against
Coughlin incident to an unlawful warrantless arrest of Coughlin after 7 p.m. in his own home by DAS Officers Wickman
and Ramos in violation of NRS 171.136, in an attempt to intimidate and silence Coughlin, that he, J udge Pearson, had
never had any of Coughlin's landlord tenant cases, when, in fact, his presiding over two just such cases had an extremely
prejudicial impact on Coughlin's defense of his formal disciplinary matter and other associated cases. J udge Pearson is
fond of smiling to one's face while maintaining the status quo, letting J udge Clifton run amuck, and just generally
benefitting from giving local law enforcement everything they want, and they want it all.
Though having been served the arguably more ridiculous Workplace Harassment TPO the same WCDA Watts-
Vial that fraudulently obstructed Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoenas on 2J DC clerks, judges, and the 2J DC Custodian of
Records (http://www.scribd.com/doc/167578177/10-30-12-0204-62337-SCR-110-Subpoen-on-2J DC-J udges-Elliot-and-
Flanagan-and-Clerk-of-Court-Hastings-and-Wise-Custodian-of-Records-Proof-of-Service-by
http://www.scribd.com/doc/154715476/11-13-12-Fax-0204-Wcda-Watts-Vial-Response-to-Subpoena-a9 ) obtained for
Washoe County in RCP2012-000599 where involved a TPO Application WCPD J im Leslie admits to filing for himself,
where such was actually filed by Watts-Vial (with both trying to massage there way around the problems associated with
the requirement in NRS 33.250, .270 that the employer (the WCPD is not employed by Washoe County) file for such
TPO on behalf of an employee (ie, the employee may not file for a Workplace Harassment TPO on their own behalf,
though, obviously, King's language above admits that is just what he did where King asserted so on behalf of the staff
and for our protection, I would ask that the court extend the Order.
However, just like with J im Leslie filling out the application himself for a Workplace Harssment Protection
Order (and WCDA Watts-Vial attempted to pass of his filing of such Workplace TPO Application as a filing by WCPD
Leslie, to get around the odious conflicts of interest that Watts-Vial knows full well make his conduct tantamount to
professional misconduct), Laura Peters actually filled out the Workplace TPO Application in her own handwriting, only to
use white out to obscure her signature and have King add his over it upon the SBN realizing that an employee cannot
apply for such a Workplace TPO on their own behalf, at which point King decided to go with the the women are afraid
angle, though it was Peters whom pushed the TPO Application idea from the beginning upon her growing very
uncomfortable with the extent to which Coughlin was well documenting and exposing the fraudulent conduct she was
engaged in (vis a vis the fraudulent submission in FHE1 by King of Peters 8/23/12 Affidavit of Service of the Complaint,
and failure to serve on Coughlin in a timely manner the odd 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters place in the formal hearing
file http://www.scribd.com/doc/163691392/11-7-12-0204-62337-Index-to-Bates-Stamped-3-200-Page-Scr-105-2-c-
Production-by-Sbn-With-Scribd-Link http://www.scribd.com/doc/163691036/11-7-12-0204-62337-Bates-1-to-3-094-
State-Bar-of-Nevada-Excuse-for-Failing-to-Obey-SCR-105-2-c amongst other pleadings (though, again, in the 11/7/12
3,094 page SCR 105(2)(c) violating production of documents to Coughlin, the bates stamping on such 10/9/12 Affidavit
of Laura Peters places such after the 10/31/12 Order by Chair Echeverria, where such filings within the Formal Hearing
Pleadings file contained filin1213fdd4-6772-46ac-879e-38c493def809general69329gs in chronological This message was
intended for zachcoughlin@hotmail.com. Want to control which emails you receiveorder, and the bates stamps on such
identified Peters 10/9/12 file stamped This message was intended for zachcoughlin@hotmail.com. Want to control which
emails you receivefrom Voxox? Get Voxox: http://download.voxox.com and adjust your Notifications in
theSettings/Preferences window. Voxox by TelCentris, Inc. is located at 10180 Telesis Ct., San Diego, CA92109.Affidavit
of Laura Peters as the last filing in such file, where the bates stamped 10/31/12 Order is immediately preceding such
10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters.
Consider King's contradictory statements as reported by Coughlin in the 10/16/12 file stamped Motion for Order
To Show Cause (Coughlin provided a verbatim transcript of the interactions between King, Peters, and Coughlin therein
at pages 5-8), wherein King disclaims any control of the Court Clerk in response to Coughlin's accusation that King
ordered her not to file Coughlins' 9/17/12 Motion to Dismiss (which King admitted to receiving at the time, only he
did not admit it to be an actual Motion to Dismiss because it doesn't say what it's seeking to have dismissed),
with King's 9/25/12 email to Coughlin, wherein King purports to be the one whom decides how the SBN's Clerk of Court
may have filings submitted and or what qualifies as service of such filings on the SBN, along with King's contradictory
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 131 -
NOTICE

statements on the record in the transcript from the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing.

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number of any person.
DATED this 9/29/13


_/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant/Petitioner












































1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 132 -
NOTICE


PROOF OF SERVICE:
I ELECTRONICALLY SERVED THIS ON REGISTERED EFILERS EITHER WCDA DDA Z YOUNG RCA D.
WONG AND WLSS J GARIN ON 9/29/13
DATED this 9/29/13


_/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant/Petitioner













































1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28




- 133 -
NOTICE

INDEX TO EXHIBITES

1. EXHIBIT 1: VARIOUS RELEVANT MATERIALS 256 PAGES (TWO HUNDRED FIFTY SIX) PAGES.