The Rise of the Opposition in Mexico’s New Democratic Regime:

Electoral Competition and Increasing Success

December 2006

1
Introduction

What are the sources of the recent success of Mexico’s former opposition in national,

regional, and local elections?1 The most obvious though oftentimes overlooked factor is the recent

democratization of the regime. This has made possible the formation of a new party system in the

absence of the previous state’s gross interference in elections that favored only one dominant,

hegemonic party; in other words, the formation of a party system that for the first time corresponds

with democracy. That being said, the first, unavoidable step in order to identify and evaluate the

sources of the recent success of Mexico’s former opposition will be to analyze the underlying

synergy that made possible the democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party

system.

Figure 1 illustrates this process. Starting from the left, the first column identifies changes in

electoral competition and characterizes the different party systems that have emerged since 1977.

The column to the right describes the main role and the predominant behavior of Mexico’s

opposition parties during each period. The upper part of the middle section presents a dynamic

framework that depicts the main events and factors that made possible the democratization of the

regime and the demonopolization of the party system. Correspondingly, the bottom part of the

middle section depicts how the democratization process changed the dynamics of electoral

competition and illustrates the way in which the electorate evolved from being aligned with the PRI

to realigning with Mexico’s former opposition parties: the PAN and the PRD. Finally, the column

to the right lists the parties that at some point in this process have occupied a testimonial position in

the electoral arena.

1
Notice that in this paper I use the terms ‘former opposition’ and ‘opposition’ to refer mainly to the Partido Acción
Nacional (PAN) and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Although during the nearly seven decades of
rule by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) dozens of parties emerged and belonged to the ‘opposition,’ only
these two represented a serious threat and eventually ousted the PRI from the legislative and the executive powers. Not
surprisingly, until today, these two parties along with the PRI are by far the most important political actors in Mexican
politics.

2
 Figure 1
Electoral PRI (Monopolized Party System) Testimonial
Competition Role & Behavior: Political
& Opposition Parties Parties
Party Repression against Student Protesters
System 1968- 1971

PAN
1977
Economic Crises and Electoral PPS
Mainly
Devaluations & PARM
No Genuine Competition

1982 & 1994

One-Party System

Political Reforms PSUM

Symbolic Frauds & Political Violence PSM
Neoliberal 1977, 1986, 1989-1990, 1986-1994 PRT
Development Strategy 1993, 1996 PFCRN
1980s & 1990s PDM
Fruitless
Programmatic NAFTA
&
Catch-All
1994 Demonopolization
PT
Later Of Aligned Electorate PVEM
Party System
Transition Transition

1997/2000 PRI Dealigned Electorate

PRD PAN
Divided Three-Parry System

‘Ins versus Outs Dynamics’ (Indicator) PVEM

PRI vs. PAN PT
Active
PRI vs. PRD PC
Uneven Competition

PANAL
Regional Cleavage (Indicator) PASDC
Left Center Right North and Center-West
Vs. FC
Mainly
South and Federal District PLM
Catch-All
& MP
Subtle PSN
Programmatic PCD
Assets for Electoral Competition DC
Leadership, Party Machinery, Governorships, Underlying Social Cleavages
Legislatures, Protests, Mobilizations, Media,
Campaigning, Political Maneuvering, Negotiating Religious-Secular Class-Economic
Nationalized three-party competition (?)

Catholic Non-Catholic Richer Poorer

2006 Conservative Liberal Educated Undereducated
Three-Party System (?)

Urban Rural
Realignment Process Export-Oriented Non-Export
Active Build Support Bases & Attract New Partisans
1st Stage: Creeping Federalist Strategy
2nd Stage: Programmatic Behavior

Gradually
More
Programmatic Electorate Divided Along
Socioeconomic and Ideological Lines 3
The Increasing Success of Mexico’s Former Opposition: The Numbers

The increasing success of Mexico’s former opposition parties has surprised observers,

academics, journalists, and politicians alike. Due to the opposition’s poor electoral performance

after the general elections of 1988, by the mid-1990s several experts heralded the extension of

the PRI’s hegemonic and monopolistic rule for at least another decade (Morris 1992; Smith 1992;

Davis and Coleman 1994). However, the results of the 1997 midterm elections sweepingly

refuted these forecasts. In what many scholars considered the first fully democratic elections in

Mexico’s history (Schedler 1998; Mainwaring 1999; Lawson 2000), the opposition parties

proved to be not only a viable electoral alternative, but central actors in the country’s incipient

democratic regime.

At stake in 1997 were the entire lower house of the federal legislature, one-quarter of the

federal upper house, the Federal District’s governorship,2 six state governorships, and hundreds

of lesser state and municipal offices. Among these contests, the most notable one was for the

governorship of the Federal District.3 This race went to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, candidate of the

PRD and leader of the Mexican left since the late 1980s. His victory allowed the PRD to take

root in a historical locus of leftist movements, where the party found a loyal electorate that

happened to be the second largest among Mexico’s 32 federal entities (Lawson 1997; 8).4

Moreover, Cárdenas’ ample victory signaled the revitalization of the Mexican left and the

political renaissance of a party that seemed devastated after finishing third in the 1994

2
Although the title is commonly rendered in English as ‘Mayor of Mexico City’ or as ‘Governor of the Federal
District,’ in reality this position does not correspond exactly to either a mayor of a municipality or the governor of a
state. The official though seldom used title is Head of Government of the Federal District. However, to facilitate
the flow of the reading, in this paper I will refer to it as ‘Governor of the Federal District.’
3
Notice that this was the first time in Mexico’s history in which the governorship of the Federal District was
contested in a public election. Before 1997, the Regent (as it was called) was directly appointed by the president.
4
As of 2005, the total number of registered voters in the Federal District was 7.2 million, compared to the 8.9
million registered in the state of Mexico (IFE 2006b).

4
presidential elections.5 Thus, after the 1997 midterm elections it became clear that the Mexican

left was not in the terminal stage that some experts had diagnosed (Davis and Coleman 1994;

Bruhn 1997). To the contrary, the Mexican left belonged to an increasingly important opposition

that was beginning to take root in an electorate that was becoming available as consequence of

the country’s ongoing democratization process.

Despite the prominence of the race for governor of the Federal District, in 1997 the most

important contest was for the legislature’s lower house, the Chamber of Deputies. In Mexico,

Chamber representation is determined by a hybrid system that combines 300 Westminster-style,

single-member districts (SMDs) with 200 seats allocated based on each party’s respective share

of the total vote (Becerra et al., 47-50). The complex formula for assigning those 200

proportional-representation (PR) seats means that one party can achieve a majority by either

winning more than 250 of the SMDs or securing at least 42.2 percent of the overall tally. As

Table 1 shows, in the 1997 midterm elections the PRI fell short of this threshold and thus, for the

first time in history, lost its Chamber majority.

Table 1: 1997 Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies

Party Votes (Percent) Seats Gain/Loss

PRI 39.11 239 -59
PAN 26.61 121 2
PRD 25.71 125 60
PVEM 6 3.82 8 8
PT 7 2.53 7 0
Others 8 0.66 0 -14
Source: IFE 1997

5
In the 1994 presidential election the PRI won 48.69% of the vote, compared to the PAN’s 25.92% and the PRD’s
16.59% (IFE 1994).
6
PVEM: Partido Verde Ecologista de México.
7
PT: Partido del Trabajo.
8
Others: Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM), Partido del Frente Cardenista de
Reconstrucción Nacional (PFCRN).

5
 The positive electoral performance of the opposition continued delivering encouraging

results in the years that followed. The PRD displaced the PRI from the governorships of

Zacatecas and Tlaxcala in 1998 and Baja California Sur in 1999. Similarly, the PAN displaced

the PRI from the governorships of Querétaro and Nuevo León in 1997, Aguascalientes in 1998,

and Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Morelos in 2000. Finally, in coalition with the PAN, the PRD won

the governorships of Nayarit in 1999 and Chiapas in 2000.9

The increasing success of Mexico’s opposition in the late 1990s suggested that the PRI

could be defeated in the 2000 presidential elections. On that occasion, and against many

predictions, the PAN’s Vicente Fox won convincingly over his main rivals, the PRI’s Francisco

Labastida and the PRD’s Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.10 Fox’s victory reflected the emergence over

the previous decade of a profound new cleavage in Mexican politics, centered not on

socioeconomic differences and social issues but on the issue of extending the PRI’s hegemonic

and monopolistic rule (Schedler 2000; 5-7).11 Specifically, the ongoing democratization of the

regime created incentives for opposition parties to behave less according to ideological or

programmatic principles and more according to their capacity to frame an election in anti and pro

government terms (Magaloni and Poiré, 18-19). As a result, in 2000, for the first time in history

the opposition ousted the PRI from the presidency and, as Table 2 shows, for the second

consecutive time stymied the PRI from winning the majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

9
Notice that in these coalitions the PRD occupied a more central position than the PAN, nominating the candidates
and having a greater say during the campaigns and after winning the elections.
10
In the 2000 presidential election the PAN won 42.52% of the vote, compared to the PRI’s 36.11% and the PRD’s
PRD 16.64% (IFE 2000b).
11
It is important to highlight that Fox succeeded in attracting the anti-PRI, anti-regime, anti-status quo, and anti-
government vote, making the 2000 presidential elections seem like a referendum on the continuation of PRI rule. In
fact, Cárdenas received substantially fewer presidential votes than members of his coalition received for the
Chamber of Deputies. According to one exit poll (Reforma 2000), only half of those who supported the PRD in the
legislative elections voted for Cárdenas, and more than 70 percent of those who did not vote for Cárdenas voted for
Fox.

6
 Table 2: 2000 Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies

Party Votes (Percent) Seats Gain/Loss

PRI 36.92 221 -18
PAN & PVEM “Alianza por el Cambio” 38.24 211 90
PRD, PT, PAS, PC, PSN “Alianza por México” 12 16.68 68 -57
Source: IFE 2000a

In 2000, another important success for the opposition was the PRD’s retention of the

governorship of the Federal District.13 This victory was important because it confirmed the

PRD’s electoral supremacy in Mexico City and allowed the opposition to stay in control of one

of the most strategic positions in Mexican politics (Lawson 1997; 9). Specifically, this position

carries immense political significance not only because the governor of the Federal District is in

charge of one of the largest urban areas in the whole world, but because he or she is responsible

for governing the seat of Mexico’s executive, legislative, and judicial powers. This unique

situation gives the governor an unprecedented national visibility, meaning that a successful

tenure combined with high approval ratings could be sufficient credentials for a presidential bid

(Lawson 1997; 13). Finally, and also important, the Federal District represents the second

largest electorate after the state of Mexico, which has allowed the PRD to secure at least 1.3

million votes in every federal election since 1997 (Lawson 2000; 18). Thus, by retaining the

governorship of the Federal District, the PRD strengthened the opposition’s role in Mexico’s

incipient democratic regime and consolidated itself in a strategic position that proved to be

crucial for the party’s success in future elections.

Not surprisingly, the opposition collected new victories in the years that followed. While

the PRD obtained an irrefutable victory in the state of Michoacán in 2001, the PAN won in the

12
PAS: Partido Acción Social; PC: Partido Convergencia; PSN: Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista.
13
In the Federal District’s 2000 gubernatorial election the PRD won 38.3% of the vote, compared to the PAN’s
33.9% and the PRI’s 23.1% (IEDF 2000).

7
states of Baja California and Yucatán in 2001 and in San Luis Potosí and Querétaro in 2003.

However, despite these positive results, Mexico’s opposition suffered a partial setback in the

2003 midterm elections (Lawson 2004; 154). Although on that occasion the PRD recovered 38

of the 57 seats lost in 2000, the PAN lost 60 seats and hence allowed the PRI to become the

largest minority in the Chamber of Deputies. As Table 3 shows, the strategic vote that gave the

PAN a landslide victory in 2000 was absent in 2003 (Magaloni and Poiré, 26). We can interpret

these results in two different ways. On the one hand, they reflected the widespread

dissatisfaction with the first years of Fox’s presidency, while on the other, they reflected the will

of the majority to give the PRD and the PRI a new opportunity in power (Lawson 2004; 144).

Thus, just three years after the historic 2000 presidential elections, the PAN suffered an

important setback that not only eclipsed the PRD’s positive performance, but most importantly,

allowed the PRI to recover control of the Chamber of Deputies.

Table 3: 2003 Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies

Party Votes (Percent) Seats Gain/Loss

PRI 35.6 224 3
PAN 31.9 151 -60
Left (PRD, PT, PAS, PC, PSN) 14 24 106 38
Source: IFE 2003

Nevertheless, despite the setback suffered in the 2003 midterm elections, Mexico’s

former opposition managed to crystallize its increasing success in the years that followed. While

the PRD won the governorships of Zacatecas (2004), Baja California Sur (2005), Guerrero

(2005), the Federal District (2006), and Chiapas (2006), the PAN won in the states of Guanajuato

(2006), Jalisco (2006), and Morelos (2006). These positive results at the state level immediately

translated to the national level, making the 2006 presidential elections the first time in almost 80

years in which the two leadings candidates belonged to Mexico’s former opposition parties and

14
Notice that even though in 2003 the PRD did not forge a formal alliance or coalition with the smaller parties of
the left, it is appropriate to include them within the same category because in practice they tended to behave and
vote as one, single block.

8
not the PRI.15 As expected, the person to run for the PRD was the Federal District’s wildly

popular governor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. With approval ratings topping 80 percent and

widespread name recognition from the national rebroadcasting of Mexico City news, López

Obrador immediately became the frontrunner in the polls (Mitofsky 2005; Parametría 2005).

However, in the end, López Obrador lost the presidency to the PAN’s candidate, Felipe Calderón.

A little-known politician with some experience as Federal Deputy and as Secretary of Energy,

Calderón managed to revert in only 6 months a difference of at least 10 percent between him and

his PRD counterpart (Mitofsky 2005; Parametría 2005).

As Table 4 shows, the 2006 general elections reaffirmed the opposition’s increasing

success. Not only did the PRD had its best electoral performance ever winning a total of 160

seats, but the PAN recovered 55 of the 60 seats lost in 2003, and together, the PRD and the PAN

relegated the PRI to a third, unfamiliar position in the legislature. In this way, the PAN managed

to retain the presidency and the PRD to become the most important opposition party in Mexico,

even leading some experts to suggest the proximate collapse of the PRI (Krauze 2006;

Montemayor 2006).

Table 4: 2006 Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies

Party Votes (Percent) Seats Gain/Loss

PRI & PVEM “Alianza por México” 28.21 121 -103
PAN 33.39 206 55
PRD, PT, and PC “Coalición por el Bien de Todos” 28.99 160 54
Source: IFE 2006a

Finally, although the results of the past four elections illustrate the PRD’s and the PAN’s

increasing competitiveness and central position in Mexico’s incipient democratic regime, they

are insufficient to identify the specific sources of this success and the factors that made it

15
Since the creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929 –PNR was the first name of the party
that in 1946 became known as PRI-, not only did one of the leading candidates in every election belonged to the
‘official party,’ but with the exception of the 2000 presidential elections, these candidates always won the
presidency.

9
possible. Thus, to solve this puzzle, we need to reach beyond the numbers and try to unravel the

intricacies of Mexico’s democratization process. Specifically, we need to analyze the way in

which the party system changed and electoral competition developed. This task is an inherently

complicated one. However, relying on scholarly work concerning political parties, electoral

competition, partisanship, and voting behavior, I will craft a more comprehensive account on the

sources of the recent success of Mexico’s former opposition parties.

Demonopolizing the Party System: Eroding the PRI’s Hegemonic Rule

From the time it was founded in 1929 until the general elections of 1988, the PRI never

lost a presidential, gubernatorial or senatorial race it contested. Moreover, even though the

Constitution’s no reelection clause meant that PRI candidates enjoyed no incumbency effect,16

the PRI seldom won less than 98 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This explains

why political scientists usually described Mexico as a ‘hegemonic party system’ (Sartori 1976;

Schedler 1998; Diamond 2002). By using the term hegemonic, they recognized that while

opposition parties were allowed to exist legally and politically, for the most part, they posed no

genuine challenge to the PRI.

Throughout most of the twentieth century, the PRI’s hegemonic rule was legitimized by

its revolutionary heritage and preserved through a vast corporatist structure that controlled the

political participation of Mexico’s peasants and unionized workers (Garrido, 421). In addition,

PRI leaders had direct access to state resources, which allowed them to build a large clientelist

network useful to secure victories at the local, state, and national level (Garrido, 424). In this

way, Mexico gradually became what the Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa called a ‘perfect

16
When allowed to run for reelection, incumbents are believed to have many advantages over newcomers. Two
pieces of evidence are that voters tend to prefer candidates with prior experience and that incumbents have better
access to funding sources (Krehbiel and Wright 1983).

10
dictatorship.’ It looked like a democracy because officials were regularly elected, power was

usually transferred in a peaceful environment, and overall, it was equipped with the institutional

bells and whistles usually found in democratic regimes –including a liberal constitution.17

However, in reality, elections were nothing but a symbolic procedure, transitions were negotiated

in advance by political elites, and the constellation of institutions was a vacuous arrangement of

hollow rituals used to recreate and reaffirm the legitimacy of the ‘Institutionalized Revolution.’

The regime remained virtually unchanged until the late 1960s, when a wave of repression

launched mainly against student protesters began to erode the legitimacy of the PRI’s hegemonic

rule. Mass mobilizations emerged as result of the violence, demanding the democratization of

the regime and the protection of the social, political, and civil rights of the population (Garrido,

431). The situation deteriorated during the 1970s, until finally in 1977 President José López

Portillo (1976-1982) accepted a first set of political and electoral reforms to alleviate the pressure

(Becerra et al., 21-22). However, although these reforms normalized the electoral and political

participation of the opposition, they failed to provide any real mechanism to divest the PRI from

its legislative majority (Becerra et al., 25-32). Thus, as Table 5 shows, despite the Reforms of

1977, the opposition remained mostly unable to pose a genuine challenge to the PRI’s

hegemonic rule.

However, the exhaustion of the import substitution development strategy pursued by the

government since the late 1930s triggered new problems for the PRI. After the Debt Crisis of

1982, the government was forced to open the economy and adopt the so-called neoliberal

development strategy (Gibson, 339-342). Instead of creating stability, the new economic model

exacerbated the crisis and derived in further devaluations of the peso in 1988 and 1994 (Becerra

17
The Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico was ratified in 1917 to appease and reorganize the
country after the Revolution of 1910. This charter is essentially a compilation of the Constitution of 1857 and other
documents from the nineteenth century; all liberal in inspiration, essence, and content (Niemeyer 1974).

11
et al., 59). The economic tensions were immediately followed by political ones. Domestically, a

series of blatant electoral frauds in the late 1980s unleashed nation-wide protests in demand of

democracy and political freedom (Becerra et al., 64).18 Internationally, the negotiations of the

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States represented

an external source of pressure for the creation of democratic institutions. Thus, in 1986, the PRI

was forced to pass the first of five major political and electoral reforms that made possible the

democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party system (Becerra et al., 97-

99). As Table 5 shows, the reforms that followed in 1989-90, 1993, 1994, and 1996,

substantially increased electoral competition and made possible the formation of a party system

that for the first time would correspond with democracy.

Table 5: Federal Election, Chamber of Deputies, 1979-2006

(Percent of Vote)

Party PRI PCM !PSUM !PMS! PRD 19 PAN

1979 74.20 5.30 11.40
1982 69.30 4.40 16.30
1985 68.20 3.40 18.00
1988 50.40 4.50 17.70
1991 61.40 8.30 26.80
1994 50.30 16.70 25.80
1997 39.11 25.71 26.61
2000 36.92 16.68 38.24
2003 35.60 18.20 31.90
2006 28.21 28.99 33.39
Source: Becerra et al. 2005 and IFE 2006a.

The Party System: Demonopolization and its Effects on Party Nationalization

In order to estimate the real effect that the political and electoral reforms had on the shape

of the party system and the quality of electoral competition, we can calculate the degree of

18
Other important domestic tensions were the appearance of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN)
on January 1, 1994, and the magnicidios, later that year, of the PRI’s presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio,
and the PRI’s president José Francisco Ruiz Massieu.
19
PCM: Partido Comunista de México; PSUM: Partido Socialista Unificado de México; PSM: Partido Socialista de
México.

12
nationalization of each of Mexico’s three main political parties. Using Jones and Mainwaring’s

Party Nationalization Score (PNS) (Jones and Mainwaring 2003), we can identify the types of

issues that have dominated political competition in Mexico since the demonopolization of the

party system in the late 1990s. The degree of nationalization of the three main parties has been

calculated based on their share of the vote in each of Mexico’s 32 federal entities during five

Chamber elections (1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006). Using a scale of 0 to 1, a high

nationalization score indicates that a party wins a relatively even share of the vote across federal

entities, whereas a low nationalization score indicates that a party has widely varying shares of

the vote across federal entities (Jones and Mainwaring, 140). Thus, when the degree of party

nationalization is high, electoral competition follows a roughly similar pattern across the

country’s sub-national units. Conversely, when it is low, the parties that fare well in some sub-

national units are minor electoral competitors elsewhere.

Table 6: Mexico's Party Nationalization

Party Nationalization Score (PNS), 1994-2006*

1994 1997 2000 2003 2006

PRI 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.87
PAN 0.79 0.74 0.84 0.78 0.81
PRD 0.67 0.71 0.69 0.58 0.74
*Author’s calculations using Jones and Mainwaring’s formulae (Jones and Mainwaring, 161).

As Table 6 shows, the difference in the degree of competitiveness among Mexico’s three

main political parties has decreased overtime. Specifically, between 1994 and 2006, Mexico’s

party system transformed from being dominated by a single, highly nationalized hegemonic

party –the PRI–, to a party system with two intermediately nationalized parties –the PAN and the

PRD– and one still highly nationalized –the PRI. This change across time entails that although

electoral competition is far more even in 2006 than it was in 1994, the degree of evenness is not

the ideal one yet. In other words, by carefully analyzing the calculations presented in Table 6,

we come to the conclusion that despite important progress, electoral competition at the sub-

13
national level is still uneven. While the PRI continues being highly competitive in most federal

entities, the PAN and the PRD seem to be competitive only in some specific ones.

Table 7: Federal Elections 2003 & 2006, Chamber of Deputies: PRI, PAN, & PRD (Percent of Vote)

PRI 2003 PAN 2003 PRD 2003 PRI 2006 PAN 2006 PRD 2006
Aguascalientes 12.06 42.47 6.80 27.13 44.76 17.57
Baja California 32.12 41.96 6.33 24.93 44.42 19.39
Baja California Sur 28.96 14.33 43.21 20.00 28.44 43.19
Campeche 40.05 37.94 2.40 34.80 33.02 20.90
Chiapas 39.06 18.26 20.14 37.53 17.06 37.12
Chihuahua 47.35 37.54 6.23 37.93 39.56 13.35
Coahuila 45.98 32.63 6.32 35.44 38.82 17.89
Colima 39.35 39.65 12.19 38.09 43.93 12.87
Distrito Federal 11.77 25.82 42.80 11.68 25.85 51.44
Durango 53.13 27.59 3.98 38.75 37.64 16.95
Guanajuato 31.20 43.60 12.23 21.77 56.49 13.27
Guerrero 41.00 5.97 38.19 30.27 13.43 46.46
Hidalgo 46.25 22.57 16.57 33.15 24.00 31.83
Jalisco 39.34 38.76 6.67 31.95 45.70 12.68
Michoacán 28.65 19.25 35.18 23.29 30.44 38.42
México 35.29 29.48 23.46 23.68 28.58 36.05
Morelos 27.5 29.16 19.97 23.03 32.77 31.64
Nayarit 49.18 23.99 10.37 36.72 18.03 37.04
Nuevo León 50.44 35.71 2.12 36.51 42.55 9.41
Oaxaca 44.49 18.43 17.63 34.23 16.74 41.79
Puebla 44.26 33.18 7.60 28.78 35.27 25.05
Queretaro 37.72 43.22 7.71 24.98 48.20 17.63
Quintana Roo 37.71 23.18 7.78 38.76 24.31 29.99
San Luis Potosí 37.90 41.93 8.40 26.92 46.74 8.40
Sinaloa 50.86 25.10 12.49 37.74 36.30 17.57
Sonora 39.81 39.42 11.21 33.10 46.04 15.30
Tabasco 48.16 6.21 36.77 39.97 4.26 51.39
Tamaulipas 48.61 30.78 7.63 35.35 36.86 20.41
Tlaxcala 35.07 12.19 32.21 18.48 36.28 35.00
Veracruz 36.74 34.22 12.03 32.56 31.98 28.89
Yucatán 29.56 43.00 5.26 35.99 45.30 12.05
Zacatecas 28.40 12.45 45.55 26.59 27.48 35.32
Source: IFE 2003, 2006a

Table 7 presents the share of the vote for the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD in each of

Mexico’s 32 federal entities in the two most recent Chamber elections. These numbers are

helpful for three reasons. First, they confirm that the share of the vote for the PAN and the PRD

14
varies substantially across federal entities. For example, while the PRD receives close to 50

percent of the vote in the Federal District, Tabasco, and Guerrero, it barely wins 10 percent of

the vote in Guanajuato, Nuevo León, and San Luis Potosí. Second, they corroborate that the

share of the vote for the PRI is mostly homogenous across federal entities. Specifically, with the

exception of the Federal District, the share of the vote for the PRI tends to oscillate between 25

and 50 percent. Finally, they indicate that the share of the vote for the three parties is

homogeneous only in few federal entities. Specifically, in the last two elections, only in the

states of Hidalgo, Morelos, and Veracruz the difference between the first and the third place was

less than 10 percent. Thus, although the PAN and the PRD have become increasingly

nationalized as a result of the political and electoral reforms of the past decades, across federal

entities, competition remains uneven.

These findings suggest that the present differences in party nationalization are likely to be

the result of a weakly nationalized vote pattern that falls along regional lines; that is, each party

performs markedly better in some regions than others (Jones and Mainwaring, 144). That being

said, a comprehensive evaluation of each party’s historic development could be an important first

step to explain the varying degrees of support for the PAN and the PRD. Specifically, since each

party’s historic presence in a particular region accounts at least partially for its electoral success

(Dix 1989), a careful description of the origin and transformation of each of Mexico’s three main

political parties would allow us to explain and justify the existing regional differences in

electoral competition, which have not been substantially reduced despite the democratization of

the regime and the demonopolization of the party system.20

20
For example, Loaeza (2000) argues that the PAN’s origin as a party of protest against the government’s
secularization program of the late 1920s is a fundamental reason for its present success in federal entities with a high
density of Catholics. Similarly, Bruhn (1997) argues that the PRD’s origin as a coalition of socialist movements
with historic roots in Mexico City is a fundamental reason for its present success in the Federal District.

15
 Thus, in the following sections, first, I will describe the historic development of the PAN

and the PRD. In this way I hope to find hints that point to the existence of regional bases of

support that developed overtime but did not become visible until after the democratization of the

regime and the demonopolization of the party system. Subsequently, I will describe the historic

development of the PRI. In this way I hope to determine, at least partially, why in spite of

Mexico’s democratic transition, the PRI has maintained a homogeneous presence across federal

entities. This analysis will be done with the overarching objective of finding new evidence on

the sources of the recent success of Mexico’s former opposition parties.

Historic Development of the PAN: Effects on Electoral Competition21

The PAN was founded in 1939 by a group of Catholic activists, businessmen, and

professionals as a reaction to the government’s radical secularization program of the late 1920s

and the subsequent wave of violence against Catholic rebels in the states of Yucatán and Puebla

and in the Center-West (Meyer 1973).22 Even though since its origins the PAN was the strongest

and better organized opposition party in Mexico, throughout most of the twentieth century, it

occupied a merely testimonial position in the political arena (Loaeza, 22). However, the Debt

Crisis of 1982 and the nationalization of the banks in November of that same year sparked a

renewal in the PAN’s internal dynamics. In the years that followed, many infuriated

businesspeople and middle-classmen flocked to the PAN in opposition to a PRI that had become

an overly populistic and anachronistic party (Loaeza, 81).

21
Notice that in the following sections of this paper I will be using the following regional division of Mexico’s 32
federal entities: North: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nayarit, Nuevo León,
San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas. Center-West: Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato,
Jalisco, and Queretaro. Mexico City Area: Federal District and México. South: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero,
Hidalgo, Michoacán, Morelos, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, and Yucatán.
22
This wave of violence against Catholic rebels is historically known as the Guerra Cristera (1926-1929).

16
 The new constituents and militants, who mainly came from the North of Mexico,

generated the much-needed electoral energy among the PAN’s traditional leaders. However, the

political alliance between the so-called neopanistas and the PAN traditionalists produced two

important ideological tensions. First, the neopanistas’ enthusiasm for free market economics

clashed with the traditionalists’ skepticism of radical liberalization (Mizrahi, 51). Second, the

neopanistas did not conform to a merely testimonial role in Mexican politics, and thus, they were

willing to compromise the party’s ideological principles in order to win elections and oust the

PRI from power (Mizrahi, 64). In the end, the neopanistas’ pragmatism won the internal battle

and imposed itself over the PAN’s traditional ideology, pushing the party to adopt a catch-all

behavior that gave it a better opportunity to win elections but deviated it from its original

educational mission.

As a result, since the 1980s, the PAN’s electoral campaigns revolved around the claim

that their candidates would bring honest and competent government to cities and states that had

suffered from the PRI’s corruption, cronyism, and mismanagement (Mizrahi, 86).23 This was

part of a ‘creeping federalist’ strategy that aimed to build the PAN’s regional support bases by

winning local and state level elections (Lujambio, 52). Inevitably, given the monopolized nature

of Mexico’s party system, this ‘creeping federalist’ strategy generated an ‘ins versus outs’

dynamic with the PRI (Díaz-Cayeros, 14). This dynamic took hold particularly in Yucatán,

Puebla, the North, and the Center-West of Mexico, where the PAN found great support among

Catholics, industrialists, and the middle-classes in general.

Thus, these findings confirm that by evaluating the historic development of the PAN, we

can account at least partially for its uneven degree of support across federal entities. Specifically,

23
Notice that before the 1980s, the PAN’s electoral campaigns revolved mainly around educational issues,
representing no real threat to the PRI and functioning more like a ‘loyal’ opposition (Mizrahi, 75).

17
the PAN’s origin as a Catholic party and its development as a party of businessmen and

industrialists shed some light to why it has gathered great support in the states of Puebla,

Yucatán, the North, and the Center-West of Mexico; states with a high density of Catholics and a

high concentration of industrialists and businesspeople in general. Similarly, by evaluating the

history and development of the PAN, we can also partly explain the high variation in the degree

of support for the PRD. Specifically, the emergence of an ‘ins versus outs’ dynamic between the

PAN and the PRI has alienated the PRD from the states and regions in which the PAN has a

historic presence. Naturally, this has frustrated the PRD’s efforts to build a homogeneous

support base across federal entities.

Historic Development of the PRD: Effects on Electoral Competition

As a product of the amalgamation of several independent socialist organizations and a

group of prominent PRI dissenters,24 since its foundation in 1989, the PRD was divided

internally over ideological and strategic issues (Bruhn, 31). In the mid-1990s, there were two

major contending currents within the party. One was a rather social democratic wing headed by

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, which sought to build the party’s support bases

among young professionals, unionized workers, intellectuals, and students (Bruhn, 110-119).

The other was a more radical wing associated with Andrés Manuel López Obrador, which sought

to build the party’s support bases among the urban poor, the elderly, informal workers, and

peasants (Bruhn, 123-128). This internal division stymied the party from making significant

progress in the electoral arena. Thus, in the late 1990s, the PRD decided to pursue something

24
These groups and organizations were the Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT), the Partido Socialista
Unificado de México (PSUM), the Partido Popular Revolucionario (PPR), the Movimiento Revolucionario del
Pueblo (MRP), the Unión de la Izquierda Comunista (UIC), and the Movimiento de Acción y Unidad Socialista
(MAUS). Among the PRI dissenters, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo were the most prominent
members.

18
more akin to the PAN’s ‘creeping federalist’ strategy, which accordingly generated an ‘ins

versus outs’ dynamic of competition with PRI.

The first positive product of the PRD’s ‘creeping federalist’ strategy was Cuauhtémoc

Cárdenas’ election as governor of the Federal District in 1997. This victory significantly

improved the party’s image and signaled that the PRD had acquired greater cohesion along

internal lines (Lawson 1997; 17). Subsequently, the PRD took advantage of the existing tensions

within the PRI at the state level. Several discouraged PRI candidates for gubernatorial

nominations joined the PRD to build coalitions that enabled them to run successful campaigns

and win elections.25 In this way, the PRD displaced the PRI from the governorships of Zacatecas

and Tlaxcala in 1998 and Baja California Sur in 1999. Moreover, in coalition with the PAN, the

PRD won the governorships of Nayarit in 1999 and Chiapas in 2000.

These positive results entailed that the PRD’s version of the PAN’s ‘creeping federalist’

strategy made possible the construction of regional support bases and propelled the party to win

local and state level elections. Accordingly, this has also derived in an ‘ins versus outs’ dynamic

with the PRI; however, there are some subtle variations. Instead of running campaigns that

revolve around claims of honesty and government competency, the PRD has frequently run

confrontational campaigns based on the use of anti-incumbent and anti-system rhetoric (Crespo,

15-17). This has been particularly evident in the South, where the PRD has found great support

among the poor and among those who have been historically excluded from the decision-making

process in the government.26

25
Notice that an important reason why the PRD has been able to absorb former PRI members is that there are few
ideological differences between the PRD and the traditional wing of the PRI. Specifically, the ideological program
of the PRD closely resembles the ideological program of the more traditional wing of the PRI that is usually
associated with the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) (Bruhn, 174).
26
This includes students, the urban poor, the elderly, informal workers, and leftists in general.

19
 Thus, in sum, the PRD has built its regional support bases following a ‘creeping

federalist’ strategy akin to the PAN’s but with four main variations: 1) in the Federal District, by

retaining the governorship and enjoying high approval ratings for the past decade; 2) in states

like Zacatecas, Baja California Sur, and Nayarit, by nominating former PRI members as

candidates in gubernatorial races;27 3) in the South, by running confrontational campaigns based

on the use of anti-system and anti-incumbent rhetoric; and 4) in general, by garnering support

among leftist followers. The PRD’s version of the ‘creeping federalist’ similarly has stymied the

PAN from winning an even share of the vote across federal entities. This explains why in states

and regions where the Mexican left has a historic presence the PAN has been mostly unable to

build support bases, and thus, to win elections.

Historic Development of the PRI: Effects on Electoral Competition

For the PRI, ideology has long ceased to matter or to provide cohesion. Indeed, although

in the past some scholars shoehorned Mexico into the democratic camp discussing the divisions

between left and right within the PRI and postulating a pendulum theory of the presidency

moving back and forth between them, by the late 1970s this view had become widely discredited

(Cline 1962). It was clear that the PRI elites were the most important operative principle in

Mexican politics, basing their actions on recruitment and personal loyalty rather than ideology.

Throughout the twentieth century, the PRI’s most coherent argument for its uninterrupted

rule had been that it was the only agent capable of appeasing all the ‘revolutionary factions’ and

thereby maintaining the country’s stability (Garrido, 425). As such, the PRI was a catch-all party

in one fundamental sense: anyone who aspired to power had to join the PRI. However, in 1987,

27
Notice that the PRD has also nominated former PRI members as candidates in municipal, legislative, and
presidential races (considering that both Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Andrés Manuel López Obrador are former PRI
members).

20
a group of dissenters led by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo produced the first

major schism in the party’s long history (Bruhn, 97). The leaders of the so-called Democratic

Current decided to leave the party after frustrated attempts to reform the PRI’s autocratic internal

procedures that stymied the democratization of the regime and their personal power aspirations.

A second major schism occurred when Ernesto Zedillo chose not to take as active a role in the

party during his presidency (1994-2000) (Crespo, 32). This personal decision hit the core of the

PRI’s discipline, which originated from the combination of one-party, hegemonic rule and

presidential domination (Crespo, 9).

The first sign of these schisms was the erosion of the PRI’s ability to guarantee the

victory of its nominees, which consequently evaporated the party’s capacity to reward supporters

with electoral victories (Crespo, 11-13). The second sign was the abandonment of the PRI’s

historic revolutionary nationalism and the subsequent implementation of the so-called neoliberal

development strategy (Gibson, 340).28 This shift in economic policy divided the PRI in two

ideological camps: those who argued that the party had to pay greater attention to the needs of

peasants and unionized workers, who had historically been the PRI’s primary support base;29 and

those who expressed their approval of the recently implemented neoliberal economic policies

and sought to build new support bases among industrialists, businesspeople, and young

entrepreneurs.30

28
Generally, the PRI’s historic revolutionary nationalism refers to the implementation of an import substitution
development strategy, which encouraged the government’s intervention in the economy and the creation of hundreds
of state-owned enterprises. Conversely, the neoliberal development strategy refers to the radical liberalization of the
economy in the 1980s. The neoliberal economic model was first implemented during the presidency of Miguel de la
Madrid (1982-1988) and deepened during the presidencies of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), Ernesto Zedillo (1994-
2000), and the PAN’s Vicente Fox (2000-2006).
29
The members of this ideological camp have been traditionally associated with the state-sponsored labor unions
and the PRI’s corporatist machinery created in the 1930s by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940).
30
The members of this ideological camp have been traditionally associated with the technocratic-wing that
originated in the 1980s as a result of the Debt Crisis of 1982.

21
 Consequently, and in order to prevent further internal divisions, the PRI leaders decided

to take advantage of the party’s broad ideological spectrum. Strategically, this translated in the

introduction of primary elections to choose candidates at the state and national level (Crespo, 17).

By submitting the nomination of candidates to local and regional supporters, the PRI aspired to

preserve its cohesion and to continue competing evenly with the PAN and the PRD across

federal entities. This strategy proved to be successful in two different ways. On the one hand, it

allowed the PRI to present a renewed image to the electorate, one of a party that abides by strict

democratic internal procedures (Crespo, 25). While on the other, it allowed the party to

nominate the most fitting and potentially competitive candidate in every election. In other words,

by introducing party primaries, the PRI could nominate not only the most popular candidate

within its lines, but also a technocratic candidate in the North and a corporatist candidate in the

South and be equally competitive in both elections.

Thus, the effects on the development of Mexico’s opposition parties have been both

positive and negative. While the PAN and the PRD built their respective regional support bases

through variations of the same ‘creeping federalist’ strategy, the PRI preserved a large part of its

primordial support bases through an incredible flexibility that allowed the party to survive two

major schisms along internal lines. This great adaptability enabled the PRI to continue winning a

homogenous share of the vote across federal entities, stymieing the PAN and the PRD from

making inroads uniformly throughout the country. As a result, although together the PAN and

the PRD have defeated the PRI at the local and national level, independently each party has

made inroads only in those regions where in the previous decades specific support bases were

built. Not surprisingly, these changes in the dynamics of electoral competition have produced a

22
divided three-party system that at least initially created incentives for parties to adopt a catch-all

behavior instead of an ideological or programmatic one.

Supporters and Partisans: General Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics

By describing the history and development of Mexico’s three main political parties we

have confirmed that the present differences in party nationalization are the result of a weakly

nationalized vote pattern that falls along regional lines. Moreover, we have found concrete

evidence that points to the existence of regional support bases for the PAN and the PRD that

began developing several decades ago but did not become visible until after the democratization

of the regime and the demonopolization of the party system. However, identifying these regional

support bases and the conditions under which electoral competition has taken place is not enough

to determine what has motivated millions of Mexicans to vote for the opposition rather than for

the PRI. Thus, in order to identify the sources of the recent success of Mexico’s former

opposition parties we need to look beyond the numbers and the changing dynamics in electoral

competition and focus in the particular effects that the democratization of the regime and the

demonopolization of the party system have had on the electorate.

A first, useful step would be to evaluate the profile of the supporters of each of Mexico’s

three main political parties. To this end, Table 8 presents individual-level data on the general

demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of those who participated in the 2006 general

elections (Consulta Mitofsky 2006a). According to these data, in 2006, the Mexican electorate

divided along the following socioeconomic, demographic, and territorial lines:

23
PAN supporters were equally likely to be male or female, somewhat younger and more

educated than those who supported other parties, mainly concentrated in the North and

Center-West of Mexico, and earned a higher income.

PRI supporters were more likely to be female, older, and less educated than those who

supported other parties, earned a relatively low income, and were more evenly distributed

across regions.

PRD supporters were more likely to be male, equally young or old, less educated than those

who supported the PAN but more than those who supported the PRI, mainly concentrated in

the Federal District and the South, and earned a relatively low income.

Table 8: Consulta Mitofsky Exit Poll (2006)

PAN (Calderón) PRI (Madrazo) PRD (AMLO) Others

Gender
Male 32% 19% 35% 15%
Female 32% 21% 29% 18%
Age
18-29 34% 19% 32% 16%
30-49 33% 20% 32% 15%
50 or More 29% 22% 31% 18%
Education
Primary 27% 25% 31% 18%
Secondary 30% 21% 33% 17%
Preparatory 35% 16% 34% 16%
University 42% 13% 32% 14%
Income
0-3 Times Minimum 26% 23% 33% 17%
7 Times Minimum 35% 17% 34% 14%
7+ Times Minimum 44% 14% 30% 13%
10+ Times Minimum 54% 10% 26% 10%
Region
North 43% 33% 24% -
Center-West 47% 26% 27% -
South 27% 33% 40% -
Federal District 34% 22% 44% -
Source: Mitofsky 2006a

24
 Table 9: Social Characteristics of PAN, PRI, and PRD Partisans (2006)

PAN PRI PRD

Mean Age 37.5 44.7 41.1
Gender
Male 49% 47% 54%
Female 51% 53% 46%
Education
Primary 20% 48% 33%
Secondary 22% 24% 16%
Preparatory 23% 13% 22%
University 35% 15% 29%
Income
0-1 Times Minimum 14% 40% 25%
1-3 Times Minimum 18% 23% 31%
3-5 Times Minimum 22% 15% 18%
5-10 Times Minimum 25% 13% 15%
10 or more Minimum 21% 9% 11%
Area
Urban 91% 69% 78%
Rural 9% 31% 22%
Source: Mitofsky 2006b

However, even though Table 8 presents a good picture of the general demographic and

socioeconomic characteristics of the supporters of each of Mexico’s three main political parties,

we need to analyze yet another sample of individual-level data before reaching final conclusions.

To this end, Table 9 presents the results of a poll on partisanship and support conducted four

months after the 2006 general elections (Consulta Mitofsky 2006b). This type of sample is

useful because it aims to create a general, demographic and socioeconomic profile of those who

confess to be partisans of one specific party, instead of only assessing the demographic and

socioeconomic differences of those who participated in a single, isolated election. According to

these data, as of November 2006, the general demographic and socioeconomic profile of the

partisans of each of Mexico’s three main political parties is the following:

PAN partisans are equally likely to be male or female, are younger, better educated, more

highly concentrated in urban areas, and earn a relatively high income.

25
 PRI partisans are somewhat more likely to be female rather than male, are older, less

educated, more highly concentrated in rural areas, and earn a low income.

PRD partisans are somewhat more likely to be male rather than female, are older than the

PAN’s but younger than the PRI’s, intermediately educated, more highly concentrated in

rural areas than the PAN’s but less than the PRI’s, and earn a low income.

Thus, by jointly evaluating the data presented in Tables 8 and 9, it is now possible to

make a final evaluation of the profile of the supporters and partisans of Mexico’s former

opposition parties. In general, PRD supporters and partisans are more likely to be male rather

than female, are older than the PAN’s but younger than the PRI’s, are intermediately educated,

earn a low income, and live rural areas more often than the PAN’s but less often than the PRI’s.

Contrastingly, PAN supporters and partisans are equally likely to be male or female, are younger

and better educated than the PRD’s and the PRI’s, earn a relatively high income, and live mainly

in urban areas.

That being said, the next step is to determine how the electorate that fits these profiles

evolved from being aligned with the PRI to realigning with the opposition. In the following

sections I describe the mechanisms that made this possible.

Support and Partisanship: From Alignment to Dealignment and Realignment

The analysis presented thus far suggests that the Mexican electorate is becoming

increasingly divided along demographic and socioeconomic lines. From a sociological-

institutional perspective (Eckstein 1963; Lipset and Rokkan 1967), this transformation is the

consequence of an increasing politicization of Mexico’s underlying social cleavages. In other

words, as democracy has taken root in Mexico and electoral competition has increased, the

26
existing differences in class and religion and the historic socioeconomic characteristics endemic

to each federal entity have been politically activated.

The political activation of Mexico’s underlying social cleavages is the product of the

dealignment of an electorate that had been previously aligned with a single, hegemonic party

(Key 1955; Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1983). Specifically, following the demonopolization of

the party system a large sector of the electorate that used to be aligned with the PRI was released,

and thus, became available to be realigned with the opposition or with the PRI, once again (Cox

and Neto 1997). This realignment process has taken place in three broad stages: 1) the

translation of social cleavages into partisan preferences; 2) the translation of partisan preferences

into votes; and 3) the translation of votes into seats in the legislature.

To determine the feasibility of this argument, Table 10 presents the responses from seven

polls on partisanship conducted in Mexico since 1988. Based on this data, PRI partisanship has

declined by more than half during the last two decades, descending from 45 percent in 1988 to

19 percent in 2006. Conversely, PAN partisanship has increased by almost one-third during the

last two decades, ascending from 20 percent in 1988 to 32 percent in 2006. Contrastingly, PRD

partisanship has been rather unstable. Although in 1988 and 2006 PRD partisanship was at 21

percent, throughout most of this period it suffered significant fluctuations, reaching a record low

of 9 percent in 2002 and then increasing to 21 percent in 2006.

Equally significant is the large percent of voters who have remained independent,

ascending from 10 percent in 1988 to 24 percent in 2006. However, it is important to notice the

particular trend in this category. After reaching a record high of 31 percent in 2002, the share of

independents has tended to decline gradually. This steady decline is noteworthy because it might

indicate that a realignment of the electorate is taking place in Mexico. Specifically, as

27
democracy takes root and electoral competition increases, voters might be more inclined to

become partisans of one of the three main political parties, creating new incentives for parties to

adopt a programmatic instead of a catch-all behavior.

Table 10: Partisanship in Mexico 1988-2006

Year Survey PRI PAN PRD Independents Others

1988 Gallup Pre-Election 45 20 21 10 4
1994 Beldon-Russonello Pre-Election 48 16 7 25 4
1997 ITAM Post-Election 30 22 22 23 3
2000 Mexico Panel Study Third Wave 35 23 10 30 2
2002 Mexico Panel Study Fifth Wave 29 27 9 31 4
2003 Reforma Exit Poll 29 25 13 28 5
2006 Consulta Mitofsky Post-Election 19 32 21 24 4

Sources: Gallup 1988; ITAM 1997; Belden and Russonello 1994; Mexico 2000 Panel Study Third Wave 2000; Mexico 2000 Panel Study Fifth
Wave 2002; Reforma 2003; Consulta Mitofsky 2006b.

In this new ballgame, the three broad stages of the electorate’s realignment process are

very much at work. First, the political activation of Mexico’s social cleavages has translated into

different partisan preferences. Specifically, younger, better educated, and wealthier voters are

more likely to support the PAN, whereas older, intermediately educated, and relatively poor

voters are more likely to support the PRD (see Tables 8 and 9). Second, partisan preferences

have translated into votes. Specifically, while the PAN has won more votes in the Catholic states

of Yucatán, Puebla, and the Center-West and in the wealthier states of the North, the PRD has

won more votes in the Federal District, Baja California Sur, and the poorer states of Zacatecas,

Nayarit, and the South (see Table 7). Finally, the votes have translated into seats in the

legislature. Specifically, as of 2006, the PAN and the PRD have relegated the PRI to a third,

unfamiliar position in the Chamber of Deputies, occupying 206 and 160 seats respectively (see

Tables 4 and 5).

28
Realigning the Electorate: Sources of the Success of Mexico’s Former Opposition Parties

What are the sources of the recent success of Mexico’s former opposition parties in

national, regional, and local elections? The most important though oftentimes overlooked factor

is the recent democratization of the regime, which has led to the formation of a party system in

the absence of the previous state’s gross interference in elections that favored only one, dominant

hegemonic party; in other words, the demonopolization of the party system and the subsequent

formation of one that for the first time corresponds with democracy. This long and convoluted

transition was to a great extent the result of a series of electoral and political reforms conceded

by the PRI due to the increasing pressure caused by the political violence of the late 1960s and

early 1970s, the Debt Crisis of 1982, a series of blatant electoral frauds in the late 1980s, the

negotiations of NAFTA in the early 1990s, and the economic crisis of 1994. Specifically, these

political and electoral reforms allowed the PRD to win several governorships and seats in the

legislature and to build regional support bases mainly in the South, the Federal District, and the

states of Zacatecas, Baja California Sur, and Nayarit. Conversely, these reforms allowed the

PAN to win the presidency, several governorships and seats in the legislature, and to build

regional support bases mainly in the North, the Center-West, and in the states of Yucatán and

Puebla.

Both parties made these accomplishments by pursuing a ‘creeping federalist’ strategy that

aimed to build regional support bases by winning elections at the local and state level. However,

given the previous monopolized nature of the party system, each party’s ‘creeping federalist’

strategy derived in an ‘ins versus outs’ dynamic of electoral competition with the PRI. Although

in the beginning these dynamics created incentives to adopt catch-all behaviors, the

consolidation and strengthening of each party’s support bases has gradually created new

29
incentives to adopt ideological and programmatic ones. This shift became particularly evident in

the 2006 presidential elections, in which the candidates of each of Mexico’s three main political

parties adopted a markedly ideological and programmatic behavior to secure votes among

partisans and sympathizers and to win votes among independents (Semo 2006; Krauze 2006).

Thus, based on these findings, we can argue that Mexico’s former opposition parties have

successfully developed support bases in different regions. Accordingly, these support bases have

created new incentives for the parties to change their behavior from a mostly catch-all to a more

ideological and programmatic one. As a result, Mexico’s party system has become increasingly

institutionalized and has acquired a significant degree of stability, with three distinct and

ideologically flexible parties that overtime could make possible the consolidation of a united

three-party system. However, this process will remain incomplete until each of Mexico’s three

main parties is capable of winning a homogeneous share of the vote across federal entities;

something inherently complicated that only with time, dexterous political maneuvering, firm

leadership, and successful administrations could be accomplished.

Conclusions

This paper has argued that since the most fundamental sources of the recent success of

Mexico’s former opposition parties are the democratization of the regime and the

demonopolization of the party system, in order to identify other particular sources, first, we must

have a clear understanding of the underlying synergy of Mexico’s democratization process.

Moreover, in this study we have discovered that Mexico’s political parties, especially the PAN

and the PRD, have specific regional support bases that did not become visible and did not

expand until after the democratization of the regime and the demonopolization of the party

30
system. Needless to say, these developments created new incentives for the former opposition

parties to readjust their behavior to the changing conditions of electoral competition.

The most immediate consequence of the changes in the conditions of electoral

competition was a substantial increase in the degree of nationalization of Mexico’s former

opposition parties. However, this is yet to be translated into a high and homogenous degree of

competitiveness across federal entities. Indeed, while the PAN has made great advancements in

the North, the Center-West, and in the states of Puebla and Yucatán, it has made minimal inroads

in most other regions. Similarly, while the PRD has made great advancements in the South, the

Federal District, and in the states of Zacatecas, Baja California Sur, and Nayarit, it has made

minimal inroads elsewhere.

Nonetheless, in this study, the present unevenness in electoral competition across federal

entities was the indicator that pointed to the political activation of Mexico’s underlying social

cleavages. Specifically, following the demonopolization of the party system, a large sector of

the electorate that used to vote for the PRI became available to be realigned with the PAN, the

PRD, and even with the PRI, once again. This realignment process is still at work and has taken

place in three broad stages: the translation of social cleavages into partisan preferences, the

translation of partisan preferences into votes, and the translation of votes into seats in the

legislature. Specifically, Mexico’s former opposition parties have successfully attracted a large

sector of the electorate previously aligned with the PRI by running campaigns that revolve

around claims of honesty and competency, nominating former PRI members as candidates,

relying on anti-incumbent and anti-system rhetoric, and retaining and successfully administrating

governorships and municipalities.

31
 Thus, today, Mexico’s party system looks profoundly different today than it did in 1988.

Each party has gradually shifted from adopting catch-all behaviors to adopting programmatic

ones. Consequently, and not surprisingly, the regime issue that reshaped Mexico’s party system

in the late 1990s has decreased in importance. This issue has been replaced by new ideological

and programmatic ones that will continue gaining preeminence as those parties that aim to break

into new electoral arenas reemphasize their ideological differences.

However, as the dynamics of two-party competition dictate, third parties inescapably

struggle to break into new arenas (Dahl, 1972). This reality could pose serious challenges to the

PAN and the PRD in the near future, but the particular face of these challenges remains mostly

unknown. Meanwhile, Mexico could be regarded as a thriving and perfectible democracy

characterized by an intense degree of electoral competition in which three main political parties

are fiercely battling to attract an electorate that became available as a result of the recent

democratization process; an encouraging scenario considering that it is the outcome of more than

70 years of authoritarian and monopolistic rule by a single, hegemonic political party.

32
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