Administrative Law

Office of the President and Presidential Anti-Graft Commission vs. Calixto R. Cataquiz,G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. - First, there is a difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed. - Second, there is the principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability. Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 by the Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative action against Cataquiz, as the general manager of Laguna Lake Development Authority.

Administrative Law Administrative offense; exoneration. The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. If the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011. Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required establishing a fact is substantial evidence. Often described as more than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. In this case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had altogether failed to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. Beyond his bare assertion that CSMSI (employer) never gave him referrals to continue his medications as recommended by the foreign doctor despite his call on 8 July 2003 to inform them that he will report the next day in order to submit his medical evaluation abroad, Esguerra did not present any evidence to prove justification for his inability to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician. Thus, he was not awarded disability benefits and sickness allowance. Coastal Safeway Marine Services vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 185352, August 10, 2011. Public officers; No work-no pay principle; Exception. The general rule is that public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service. This is otherwise known as the no work-no pay principle. However, back salaries may be awarded even for unworked days to illegally

dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. In order, however, to fall under this exception, two conditions must be complied with: (a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges; and (b) his suspension must be unjustified. In this case, the two conditions were present. The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with. The second condition was met as the respondents committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand. In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed until his reinstatement to his former position i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.

There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending investigation and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal. Compensation is due only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011. Public official; effect of resignation on filing of administrative complaint. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service. The SC observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the officials resignation. However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public officials subject of the administrative cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutans resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official even if he has been separated from the service for a long time may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011. Public officials; prohibited positions. Respondent in this case was charged with violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713 for solicitation or acceptance of gifts by reason of public

office. The CA found that RA 6713 was repealed by RA 6938; thus, respondent was not liable. The SC found the contrary. There was no repeal. The ban on Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) officials holding a position in a cooperative provided in RA 6938 should be taken as a prohibition in addition to those provided in RA 6713 and specifically applicable to CDA officials and employees. True, RA 6938 allows CDA officials and employees to become members of cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to membership. However, RA 6938 should not be taken as creating in favor of CDA officials and employees an exemption from the coverage of Section 7(d), RA 6713 considering that the benefits and privileges attendant to membership in a cooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to their members. Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011. Public officials; misconduct. The prohibition in Section 7(d) of RA 6713 is malum prohibitum. It is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of RA 6713. Neither is undue influence on respondents part required to be proven as held by the CA. Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA official is of no consequence in the determination of her administrative liability. And considering that respondent admitted having taken two loans from CABMPCI, which is a cooperative whose operations are directly regulated by respondents office, respondent was correctly meted the penalty of suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Section 7(d). Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.

Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is putting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated. The SC agreed. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as noncompliance with it violates the essential requirements of administrative due process of law. If the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately take action and declare the issuance as null and void. Accordingly, there being no question that the CLTs in the instant case were improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted. The same holds true with respect to the EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs on which they were grounded are void. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011. Administrative cases; execution of Ombudsman decisions. Petitioners in this case raise the issue of whether administrative decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalties of dismissal and one-year suspension from office are immediately executory pending appeal. The Supreme Court held that it is immediately executory pending appeal. This is the rule provided

for under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September 15, 2003, which provides among others: An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course Under this provision, a respondent who is found administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman and is slapped with a penalty of suspension of more than one month from service has the right to file an appeal with the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. But although a respondent is given the right to appeal, the act of filing an appeal does not stay the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 & 170510-11. June 1, 2011. Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners argue that they were denied due process because their order of dismissal was not accompanied by any justification from the Board of Directors of Philippine Estates Authority, which merely relied on the findings of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission. The Court dismissed this argument on the basis that petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard in the course of PAGCs investigation. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence a party may have in support of his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Petitioners here actively participated in the proceedings before PAGC where they were afforded the opportunity to explain their actions through their memoranda. The essence of due process is the right to be heard and this evidently was afforded to them. Theron V. Lacson v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al./Jaime R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399 & 165475/G.R. No. 165404 & 165489. May 30, 2011. Administrative proceedings; due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side. He was not denied due process. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011. Administrative proceedings; length of service as an alternative circumstance. Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is not always a mitigating circumstance. It is an alternative circumstance, which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate the penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case. Where the government employee concerned took advantage of his long years of service and position in public office, length of service may not be considered in lowering the penalty. The Court will take this

circumstance against the public officer or employee in administrative cases involving serious offenses, even if it was the first time said public officer or employee was administratively charged. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011. Appeal; doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Supreme Court denied this petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioner here went to the Court of Appeals to appeal the orders of Laguna Lake Development Authority. Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that such appeal was premature since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention. Petitioners contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best speculative and presumptuous. Universal Robina Corp. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 191427. May 30, 2011. Civil service; security of tenure. Career service officers enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution and the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, which provides that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that the dismissal, when warranted, be effected only after notice and hearing. Substantive due process requires, among others, that the dismissal be for legal cause, which must relate to and effect the administration of the office of which the concerned employee is a member and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. Nevertheless, the right to security of tenure is not tantamount to immunity from dismissal. Petitioners cannot seek absolute protection from this constitutional provision. As long as their dismissal was for a legal cause and the requirements of due process were met, the law will not prevent their removal from office. Theron V. Lacson v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al./Jaime R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399 & 165475/G.R. No. 165404 & 165489. May 30, 2011. Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; requirements; examples. The acts of respondent constitute the administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which need not be related to, or connected with, the public officers official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. However, the Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe keep public records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judges act of brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; and a court interpreters participation in the execution of a document conveying complainants property which resulted in a quarrel in the latters family. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.

Government owned and controlled corporation; requisites. The Court here ruled that Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation is a private corporation. It was not created by a special law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Although the Bases Conversion Development Authority owned almost all of the shares of Expocorp at the time of the latters incorporation, the Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed a private corporation to buy its shares constituting 55.16% of its outstanding capital stock two months after incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be characterized as a government-owned or controlled corporation. A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. Since Expocorp is not a GOCC, its officers and employees are private individuals who are outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People of the Philippines v. Luis J. Morales, G.R. No. 166355. May 30, 2011. Misconduct; relation to the official performance of duties. To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to, and must be connected with, the performance of official duties. The duties of respondent here as a member of the GSIS Fund Management Accounting Department do not involve the modification of IP addresses, the offense he committed. The act was considered unauthorized, precisely because dealing with the GSIS networks IP addresses is strictly reserved for personnel of the Information Technology Services Group, who are expectedly knowledgeable in this field. Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Arwin T. Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218. May 31, 2011. Procedural due process; right to cross-examine. While the right to cross-examine is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does not require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise this right if desired by the party entitled to it. In this case, while National Police Commission Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to crossexamination, petitioner missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline for the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the hearing officer considered the case submitted for decision. And even with the grant of his subsequent motion to be furnished with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, he still failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead filed a motion to dismiss. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.

Administrative Law Government Employee; Dishonesty; Misconduct. Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to ones office or connected with the performance of his duty. On the other hand, misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. In this case, petitioners acts were found by the Supreme Court as clearly reflecting his dishonesty and grave misconduct. He allowed the Spouses Abuan to use his position as SSS Senior Member Services Representative to make their clients believe that he could give them undue advantage over others without the same connection by processing their SSS claims faster. Likewise, his acts, according to the SC, imply malevolent intent, and not merely error in judgment. He was aware of what the Spouses Abuan were doing and was complicit in the same. At the very least, according

to the Supreme Court, he failed to stop the illegal trade, and that constitutes willful disregard of the laws and rules.Jerome Japson v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 189479. April 12, 2011. Administrative Proceeding; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that the Supreme Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government. The SC held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not for an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

Administrative Proceedings; findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies. Petitioners argue that the Commission on Audit (COA) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in the contract between Land Bank and Remad Livestock Corporation (REMAD) proscribed by the State Audit Code of the Philippines. The Supreme Court did not give merit to petitioners argument. It emphasized that the COA Auditor noted that nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD. It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction. If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should have produced the document to prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition. However, the Supreme Court was at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as its review of Annex I, the document to which petitioners base their authority to make advance payments, does not contain such a stipulation or provision. In addition, the Supreme Court noted that much reliance was made by petitioners on their allegation that the terms of the Credit Facility Proposal allowed for prepayments or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the supplier REMAD. It appears, however, that a CFP, even if admittedly a pro forma contract and emanating from the Land Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal and not the contract of loan between Land Bank and the cooperatives. It is in the loan contract that the parties embody the terms and conditions of a transaction. If there is any agreement to release the loan in advance to REMAD as a form of prepayment scheme, such a stipulation should exist in the loan contract. There is, nevertheless, no proof of such stipulation as petitioners had failed to attach the CFPs or the loan contracts relating to the present petition. Based on the foregoing, the COA was not faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the commission of the irregular transaction. Ruben Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011.

Administrative remedies; Exhaustion. Respondent in this case filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioners since, according to him, a large amount of money was still due him under the Contract of Agreement involving the construction of a dike, executed between him and petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. The SC held that there

was no need to exhaust administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. The exceptions to these rules are the following: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, the SC found conditions (c) and (e) as present. The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case involved the validity and the enforceability of the Contract of Agreement entered into by the parties. These, according to the SC, are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011. Career Executive Service; Coverage. The Career Executive Service covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Department Manager II of the PEZA does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES. The Third Level of Career Service covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 and those identified by the Career Executive Service Board as of equivalent rank, all of whom are appointed by the President of the Philippines. Modesto Agyao, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182591. January 18, 2011.

Administrative Agencies; Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of the case while it was pending before the Court. The Supreme Court thus deferred to the competence and expertise of the Securities and Exchange Commission to determine whether, given the supervening events, the Second Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence. Nestle Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 174674, October 20, 2010. Government Contracts; Public Bidding. The Court held that public bidding is not required with respect to the procurement of the South Metro Manila Skyway, North Luzon Expressway and South Luzon Expressway projects. Private petitioners maintain that public bidding is required for these projects on the basis that they are in the nature of a build-operate-transfer infrastructure

undertaking under the BOT Law. The Court said that the BOT Law does not squarely apply to Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), which exercised its prerogatives and obligations under its franchise to pursue the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the above toll roads with chosen partners. These tollway projects may very well qualify as a build-operate-transfer undertaking.However, given that the projects have been undertaken by PNCC in the exercise of its franchise under Presidential Decree No. 1113 and Presidential Decree No. 1894, in joint venture with its chosen partners at the time when it was held valid to do so by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and the Department of Justice, the public bidding provisions under the BOT Law do not strictly apply. The above projects are not ordinary contracts for the construction of government infrastructure projects, which require, under the Government Procurement Reform Act or the now-repealed Presidential Decree No. 1594,public bidding as the preferred mode of contract award.Neither are these contracts where financing or financial guarantees for the project are obtained from the government. Rather, the Supplemental Toll Operating Agreements (pursuant to which PNCC is undertaking the projects together with its chosen partners) actually constitute a statutorilyauthorized transfer or assignment of usufruct of PNCCs existing franchise to construct, maintain and operate expressways. The conclusion would perhaps be different if the tollway projects were to be prosecuted by an outfit completely different from, and not related to, PNCC. In such a scenario, the entity awarded the winning bid in a BOT-scheme infrastructure project will have to construct, operate and maintain the tollways through an automatic grant of a franchise or TOC, in which case, public bidding is required under the law. Where, as here, a franchisee (PNCC) undertakes the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the tollways under its franchise, there is no need for a public bidding.In pursuing the projects with the vast resource requirements, the franchisee can partner with other investors, which it may choose in the exercise of its management prerogatives.In this case, no public bidding is required upon the franchisee in choosing its partners, as such process was done in the exercise of management prerogatives and in pursuit of its right ofdelectus personae. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.

Toll Regulatory Board; Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Functions. Petitioners in the special civil actions cases would have the Court declare as invalid (i) Sections 3(a) and (d) of Presidential Decree No. 1112 (which accord the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) the power to enter into contracts for the construction and operation of toll facilities, and, at the same time, grant it the power to issue and promulgate toll rates) and (ii) Section 8(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1894 (which grant the TRB adjudicatory jurisdiction over matters involving toll rate movements). As submitted by petitioners, granting the TRB the power to award toll contracts is inconsistent with its quasi-judicial function of adjudicating petitions for initial toll and periodic toll rate adjustments. There cannot, so petitioners would postulate, be impartiality in such a situation. The Court rejected these arguments. It does not perceive an irreconcilable clash in the enumerated statutory powers of the TRB, such that the exercise of one negates the other. The ascription of impartiality on the part of the TRB cannot, under the premises, be accorded

cogency. Petitioners have not shown that the TRB lacks the expertise, competence and capacity to implement its mandate of balancing the interests of the toll-paying motoring public and the imperative of allowing the concessionaires to recoup their investment with reasonable profits. The fact that an administrative agency is exercising its administrative or executive functions (such as the granting of franchises or awarding of contracts) and at the same time exercising its quasi-legislative (e.g., rule-making) and/or quasi-judicial functions (e.g., ratefixing), does not support a finding of a violation of due process or the Constitution. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.

Administrative agencies; findings of fact. Findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Securities and Exchange Commission are controlling on the reviewing authority. The rule is that findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. It is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and the credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court, tribunal, or office, as we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latters findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court. The SEC Hearing Officer had the optimum opportunity to review the pieces of evidence presented before him and to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within his jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law, which has not been shown by petitioner in this case. Queensland-Tokyo Commodities, Inc., et al. vs. Thomas George. G.R. No. 172727, September 8, 2010. Administrative investigation; right to counsel; admission. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. The exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the rule under existing laws is that a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. Clarita J. Carbonel vs. Civil Service Commission. G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010. Administrative remedies; exhaustion. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before judicial intervention may be availed of. No recourse can be had

until all such remedies have been exhausted, and the special civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if there are superior administrative officers who could grant relief. This doctrine is a judicial recognition of certain matters that are peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency to address. It operates as a shield that prevents the overarching use of judicial power and thus hinders courts from intervening in matters of policy infused with administrative character. Dimson (Manila), Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration. G.R. No. 168656, September 22, 2010. Administrative remedies; exhaustion. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. Resort to administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to several exceptions, the Court finds that the instant case does not fall under any of them. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010. Laguna Lake Development Authority; powers. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) has power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. Adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. Although the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010.

Administrative agencies; findings. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, like the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded respect. In this case, there is no ground to disturb the DARABs findings, which affirmed those of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board after due hearing and appreciation of the evidence submitted by both parties. Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes, et al. vs. Jesus G. Miranda. G.R. No. 183352, August 9, 2010. Administrative cases; preliminary investigation; due process. Section 45 of the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997 gives the President and General Manager of GSIS the authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. However, this power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with civil service rules. While the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service

Rules) do not specifically provide that a formal charge issued against a government employee without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void, it is required that, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit a counter-affidavit or comment under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word shall quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least give the respondent the opportunity to comment and explain his side. This must be done prior to the issuance of the formal charge, and the comment required is different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioners claim, no exception is provided for in the Civil Service Rules, not even an indictment in flagrantias claimed by petitioner. The above rules apply even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as in this case. To comply with such requirement, petitioner could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents comments, petitioner should have properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the formal charges were issued after the sole determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case against respondents. To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. Thus, respondents here were denied due process of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their guilt is in the opinion of their superior strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut taken by petitioner. The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least giving the respondents the opportunity to comment violated their right to due process. Accordingly, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al. .G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010. Administrative cases; decision rendered without due process. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a partys right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same. Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al.,G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010. Administrative cases; quantum of evidence. In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In this case, substantial evidence consisted of the uniform findings of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Deputy

Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that petitioner connived with his co-defendants to destroy the improvements introduced by respondent on the subject property so they could construct their own cottages thereon. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010. Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities. Even an asset that was acquired through chattel mortgage must be declared and included in the Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL). The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired. Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the vehicle has not yet passed to him on the basis that it was acquired only on installment basis. The requirement to file the SSAL not later than the first 15 days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty to the people. It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote transparency in government, and ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action. In this case, however, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that recourse to the Commission on Higher Education is mandatory or even possible in an action such as that brought by the respondent, which is essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present case. Petitioners liability, if any, for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. University of Santo Tomas, et al. vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010.

Government agencies; reorganization. Reorganization in a government agency is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of good faith is whether or not the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must pass the test of good faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank, which may or may not involve a reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it. Consequently, before a demotion may be effected pursuant to reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential. There was no demotion in this case because petitioner was appointed to a position comparable to her former position. In fact, her new position entailed an increase in her salary grade from 20 to 24. There is, thus, no evidence to suggest that the Development Bank of the Philippines acted in bad faith. Virginia D. Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission and Development Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010

Primary jurisdiction; Commission on Higher Education. The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Petitioners have not shown that the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has power to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 (the Higher Education Act of 1994), which enumerates the powers and functions of CHED) does not contain any express grant to CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power. In any event, CHED has no authority to adjudicate an action for damages. University of Santo Tomas, et al. vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010.

Administrative cases; quantum of evidence. In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The evidence upon which respondents administrative liability would be anchored lacked that degree of certainty required in administrative cases, because the two separate audits conducted by the Commission on Audit yielded conflicting results. Evidence of shortage in respondents cash and accounts, as alleged in the first audit report, is imperative to hold him liable. In this case, the evidence against respondent could not be relied upon, because the second audit report, which was favorable to him, necessarily puts into question the reliability of the initial audit findings. Whether the zero balance as appearing in the second audit report was correct or inadvertently indicated, the credibility and accuracy of the two audit reports were already tarnished. Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support a finding of liability. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. Rodolfo Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010.

Philippine Economic Zone Authority; jurisdiction over building and fencing permits. By specific provision of law, it is the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), through its building officials, which has authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands. Corollary to this, PEZA, through its director general, may require owners of structures built without said permit to remove such structures within 60 days. Otherwise, PEZA may summarily remove them at the expense of the owner of the houses, buildings or structures. Considering that, in this case, a fencing permit is issued complementary to a building permit and that, within its premises, PEZA may properly issue a building permit, it is only fitting that fencing permits be issued by PEZA within such premises. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude Carantes, et al., G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation; power to grant casino licenses in economic zones. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) draws its authority and power to operate, license and regulate casinos from its charter, Presidential Decree No. 1869, and not from Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80, dated April 3, 1993 (which extended to the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) all applicable incentives granted to the Subic Bay Special Economic Zone), in relation to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7227, which created the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and empowered it to license tourism related activities except casinos

which shall continue to be licensed by PAGCOR. Thus, PAGCOR did not lose its power to license and regulate casinos when the Supreme Court nullified Section 5 of EO 80. It incorrectly argued that such nullification automatically invalidated its memorandum of agreement with respondent for the operation of a casino inside the CSEZ. It cannot therefore, on the basis of that position, revoke such memorandum of agreement and replace it with its new Standard Authority to Operate. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Fontana Development Corporation, G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010.

Administrative proceedings; due process. On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trialtype hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010 Procedural due process; requirements. The Ang Tibay formulation was overlapping and repetitious. Hence, in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the formulation was simplified into four basic rights, as follows: 1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal right; 2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; 3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and 4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentinos gripe was unwarranted. He was not denied procedural due process. The Division had required him to provide the names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of objections, the claiming votes for him, or the contesting of the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither alleged being deprived of this opportunity, nor indicated any situation in which his revisors were denied access to the revision proceedings. He could not also insist that the COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual arguments; besides, he could still raise them in his memorandum should he chose to. During the revision stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence and witnesses, and file his memorandum before the case would be submitted for resolution. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on

Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010. Reorganization; good faith. The presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith. If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Proceedings; evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. In the present case, petitioners Order of May 18, 2004 finding respondent administratively liable for neglect of duty, which implies the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either carelessness or indifference, was adequately established by substantial evidence. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) vs. Asteria E. Cruzabra, G.R. No. 183507, February 24, 2010 Administrative agencies; findings of fact. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the SEC, will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. These factual findings carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA. They are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon. A review of the petition does not show any reversible error committed by the appellate court; hence, the petition must be denied. Petitioner failed to present any argument that would convince the Court that the SEC and the CA made any misappreciation of the facts and the applicable laws such that their decisions should be overturned. Catmon Sales International Corporation vs. Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as Liquidator of Catmon Sales International Corporation, G.R. No. 179761, January 15, 2010.

Administrative proceedings; due process. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side suffices to meet the requirements of due process. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In the present case, since PCMC was properly informed of the supposed discrepancy in its import and export liquidations, that it was given ample opportunity by the PEZA management to be heard or to explain its side in relation to its unaccounted imported materials and that it was

subsequently informed of the decision of the PEZA Board to cancel its registration on the basis of its assessment of the evidence presented or lack thereof, petitioners cannot claim that they were denied their right to due process of law. Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), et al. Vs. Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 168668, December 16, 2009. Administrative proceedings; due process. The CA correctly concluded that petitioners right to due process was not violated. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, filing charges against the person and giving reasonable opportunity to the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard; or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. She was given every opportunity to submit various pleadings and documents in support of her claim, which she, in fact, did through her counter-affidavit and documentary evidence, manifestation and motion, memorandum on appeal, etc. In her Manifestation and Motion, petitioner moved and submitted the case for resolution based on the arguments and evidentiary records that were submitted before the Ombudsman. These were all duly acted upon by the Ombudsman. Petitioner was given all the opportunity to present her side. Due process was, therefore, properly observed. Lily O. Orbase Vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009 Administrative proceedings; exhaustion of remedies. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions, viz: 1. when there is a violation of due process; 2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; 4. 5. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners filing of a petition for mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief. Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should have first brought the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. Evelyn S. Cabungcal, et al. vs. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No. 160367, December 18, 2009. EO 259; lack of implementing rules. Carabeo impugns the validity of EO 259 for lack of implementing rules and regulations. Indeed, EO 259 lacks any implementing guidelines. However, such fact is immaterial and does not affect, in any manner, the validity of the criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo. While the DOF-RIPS derived from EO 259 its power and authority to gather evidence against DOF officials and employees suspected of graft and corruption, the DOF-RIPS need not be vested with such power in order to validly file criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo. In fact, any concerned ordinary citizen can file criminal and administrative charges against any corrupt government official or employee if there exists sufficient evidence of culpability. Hence, the DOF-RIPS, even without EO 259 and whether as subordinates of the Secretary of Finance or as private citizens, can validly file criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo. At any rate, the Court finds that EO 259 is basically internal in nature needing no implementing rules and regulations in order to be enforceable. Principally aimed at curbing graft and corruption in the DOF and its attached agencies,[14] EO 259 covers only officers and employees. Liberato M. Carabeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 178000 & G.R. No. 178003, December 4, 2009. LLDA; fines. The Laguna Lake Development Authority has the power to impose fines. Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority G.R. No. 165299. December 18, 2009

Cardinal rights; administrative proceedings. The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decisionmaker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence. Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts

and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the duty to give reason to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker. R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there are several exceptions to this rule. The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish. Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya vs. Hon. Mariano M. Malones, etc., G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009.

Administrative proceedings; liability. An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Even if respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present administrative complaint, the same will not automatically mean that they are also administratively liable. A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal will not necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. To state it simply, petitioner erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative liability. Dr. Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B. Aquino, G.R .No. 171491, September 4, 2009. Administrative proceedings; quantum of proof. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere

conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit. Dr. Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B. Aquino, G.R .No. 171491, September 4, 2009. Administrative remedies; exhaustion. The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review. A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible. EO 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR for policy and program coordination and/or administrative supervision x x x. Under EO 149, DENR only has administrative power over LLDA. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. However, Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192), which reorganized the DENR, mandates the DENR to promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution and to promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations. EO 192 created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases, including NPCCs function to [s]erve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution. Hence, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Alexandra Condominium Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 169228. September 11, 2009. Dismissal; gross misconduct. Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense punishable with dismissal for the first offense, without prejudice to the Ombudsmans right to file the appropriate criminal case against the petitioner or other responsible individuals. We are, of course, aware that in several administrative cases, this Court has refrained from strictly imposing the penalties provided by the law, in light of mitigating factors such as the offending employees length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, advanced age, and other equitable considerations. However, we find that petitioners recalcitrant refusal to explain the use (or misuse) of the more than P700,000.00 in cash placed in her possession makes her unworthy of such humanitarian consideration, and merits the most serious penalty provided by law. Gloria G. Hallasgo, Municipal Treasurer of Damulong, Bukidnon vs. Commission on Audit (COA), Regional Office No. X, G.R. No. 171340, September 11, 2009. Public officer; private sector representative. A private sector representative appointed to the National Book Development Board is a public officer for purposes of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. Carolina R. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petitioners failed to appeal the decision of the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit to the Commission on Audit proper before filing the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, in derogation of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. It is, therefore, imperative that the Commission Proper be first given the opportunity to review the decision of the ASB. Only after the Commission shall have acted thereon may a petition for certiorari be brought to the Supreme Court by the aggrieved party. While the principle of exhaustion

of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, the Supreme Court did not find any cogent reason to apply the cited exceptions to the instant case. The non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. Joseph Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No. 177011, June 5, 2009.

Administrative regulation; void. Executive Order No. 566, which grants the CHED the power to regulate review center, is unconstitutional as it expands Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.

Dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even at the first instance, jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the presence of mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the government and being a first time offender. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Ma. Celia A. Flores, A.M. No. P-07-2366, April 16, 2009. Re-assignment; detail. A reassignment is a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. A detail, on the other hand, is a movement from one agency to another. National Transmission Corp. Vs. Venusto D. Hamoy, Jr., G.R. No. 179255. April 2, 2009

Bidding. During the preliminary examination stage, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) checks whether all the required documents were submitted by the eligible bidders. Note should be taken of the fact that the technical specifications of the product bidded out is among the documentary requirements evaluated by the BAC during the preliminary examination stage. At this point, therefore, the BAC should have already discovered that the technical specifications of Audio Visuals document camera differed from the bid specifications in at least three (3) respects, namely: the 15 frames/second frame rate, the weight specification, and the power supply requirement. Using the non-discretionary criteria laid out in R.A. No. 9184 and IRR-A,

therefore, the BAC should have rated Audio Visuals bid as failed instead of passed. Commission on Audit, etc. vs. Link Worth International Inc., G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009. Burden of proof. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of impropriety and partiality against respondent Justice. Aside from his naked allegations, conjecture and speculations, he failed to present any other evidence to prove his charges. Hence, the presumption that respondent regularly performed his duties prevails. On the other hand, respondent Justice adequately explained that since his voluntary inhibition from the case, he no longer participated in the case and his perceived participation in the issuance of the assailed Resolution was a result of a typographical mistake. The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche, etc. vs. Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. No. CA-09-48-J, March 13, 2009., see also Rodolfo B. Baygar, Sr. vs. Judge Lilian D. Panontongan, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-08-1699, March 17, 2009.

1. Administrative liability. It is a fundamental principle in the law on public officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent of criminal liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability, each independently of the others. This is known as the threefold liability rule. Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, and vice-versa. The dismissal of the administrative cases against the petitioners will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against them. Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. et al. Vs. People of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 166086-92, February 13, 2009. 2. Reorganization. A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It alters the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. It could result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an office. For a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test of good faith, otherwise it is void ab initio. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that there has been a drastic reduction of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern in order to address the local government units gaping budgetary deficit. Thus, he states that in the municipal treasurers office and waterworks operations unit where

respondents were previously assigned, only 11 new positions were created out of the previous 35 which had been abolished; and that the new staffing pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old which had 129. The CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6) casual positions for clerk II and utility worker I, which positions were previously held by respondents Marivic, Cantor, Asor and Enciso. Petitioner inexplicably never disputed this finding nor proferred any proof that the new positions do not perform the same or substantially the same functions as those of the abolished. Nowhere in the records does it appear that these recreated positions were first offered to respondents. The appointment of casuals to these recreated positions violates R.A. 6656. Pan vs. Pena, G.R. No. 174244, February 13, 2009.

SC: Designation of Offenses in Administrative Case Not Controlling

Posted: May 7, 2008 By Arcie M. Sercado

The designation of the offenses with which a person is charged in an administrative case is not controlling and one may be found guilty of another offense if based on the same facts subject of the original designation. Thus the Supreme Court ruled when it affirmed the dismissal of an administrative officer of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), who was found guilty of Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service even if he was not charged specifically with such offenses. In a 12-page per curiam unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals which sustained the findings of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that the Show Cause Order issued to petitioner Eugenio R. Avenido sufficiently described the irregularities committed by him and that there was substantial evidence to show his guilt. Petitioner claimed that he was deprived of due process of law when the NTC, through a Show Cause Order, charged him with Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, and Usurpation of Authority, and then later found him guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, an offense which he avers is so different from the offenses with which he was earlier charged. On appeal, the CSC in addition found petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, which carries the penalty of dismissal. The Court, however, found that the NTC found petitioner guilty of an offense which was still based on acts that were alleged in the Show Cause Order, specifically, making an assessment for the Order of Payment for a Permit to Import for an applicant who had not even complied with the requirements; and personally delivering the Order of Payment to the cashier instead of turning over the documents to the authorized officer. The Court also found that petitioner was furnished a copy of the charges against him and was able to file an answer and present evidence in his defense. Thus, the Court held that due process was present. Petitioner Avenido also contended that his act of making the assessment is a commendable act of an accommodating civil servant but the Court ruled that he should have also took it upon himself to ensure that the applicant is qualified. The Court also found that petitioners acts led the acting assessor of the licensing unit to believe that the applicants documents were sufficient, thus enabling the applicant to illegally import Php40 Million worth of SIM cards and Motorola cellular phones. Moreover, the Court ruled that the finding made by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the petitioners signature in the Permit to Import was forged is immaterial as he already admitted to preparing the assessment without examining the applicants documents. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Senior Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, and Justices Consuelo YnaresSantiago, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Ruben T. Reyes, Teresita Leonardo De Castro, and Arturo D. Brion took part in the decision. Justice Renato C. Corona was on leave. (GR No. 177666, Avenido vs. CSC, April 30, 2008)

SC Upholds Fiscal Autonomy, Corporate Restructuring of Government Hospitals

Posted: July 24, 2007 By Arcie M. Sercado

The Supreme Court recently upheld the validity of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA), a program developed by the Department of Health (DOH) in 1999, which provides fiscal autonomy and corporate restructuring to government hospitals. In a 23-page decision penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, the Court En Bancdenied the petition of a group of public health workers led by several DOH employees and affirmed the Court of Appeals (CA) which validated the HSRA as well as Executive Order No. 102 (EO 102) issued by former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. EO 102 provided for the changes in the organizational processes of the Department of Health (DOH). Petitioners alleged that the HSRA should be declared void, since its policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate certain provisions of the Constitution. Such policies resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services, the petitioners said. However, the Court said that the provisions mentioned by the petitioners are non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts because they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. Moreover, the Court said that the petitioners failed to explain how the HSRA violated the equal protection and due process clauses in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Regarding the contention of the petitioners on EO 102 being void for being issued by the President in excess of his authority, the Court ruled that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department. As such, the DOH, being part of the Office of the President, can be reorganized by the Chief Executive. Petitioners also assailed the validity of EO 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung areas. However, the Court held that the reorganization caused by the EO was made in good faith as it was done to make health services available to far-flung areas, in addition to the fact that none of the petitioners were removed from the public service nor were they able to identify any action taken by the DOH that would result in their dismissal. The petitioners also asserted that a number of unidentified DOH employees suffered from diminution of compensation, were matched with unidentified positions which they were neither qualified nor suited, and were deployed during the three-month period before the national and local elections in May 2001, in violation of Republic Act No. 7305 or the Magna Carta for Public Health Workers. The Court did not take cognizance of these issues as it found the allegations too general and unsubstantiated by the records. In closing, the Court found that the petitioners miserably failed to show any merit to their claims, considering the fact that they did not sufficiently show that they personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government. Concurring in the decision are Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Cancio C. Garcia, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part. (GR No. 167324, Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, July 17, 2007)