Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Walden University
May 24, 2009
ABSTRACT
Breadth
The purpose of this research is to trace the development of Positive Thinking, as taught in
leadership seminars commonly conducted throughout the corporate world, back to its
ideological, philosophical, religious, and social origins in American life. The philosophy of
Mannheim, and the Puritan work ethic traced by Max Weber into the spirit of capitalism, when
taken together throw a sharp illumination on how this concept of mind functions in today’s
world. I hope to apply this to a team concept of leadership, and to determine how it can be
Depth
The purpose of the following analysis is to examine the scope and impact of the work of James,
Weber, and Mannheim within the context of the social thought of their times, and their impact on
social thinking today. William James was a seminal thinker in founding a science of psychology.
Weber rationalized social thought within the realm of capitalism. Mannheim critiqued the
Marxian concept of ideology, and founded the sociology of knowledge. The ideas of each of
these scientist/philosophers reached further into the possibilities for human development than
any of their epigones would find possible. Their work still stimulates research and discussion at
the beginning of the 21st Century, and will continue to provide humus for robust new research
Application
From the standpoint of the worker, the Puritan work ethic has turned ugly in today’s market,
driving all who are caught marketing our skills on a commodity level into a frenzied rat race to
the bottom of what Mao Zedong designated as “Third World” conditions of life and labor.
Positive thinking came out of the Puritan work ethic as the form of thought for the capitalist in
pursuing his vocation as an entrepreneur within the marketplace. For this, goal setting, critical
thought, and a positive mental attitude are still needed. The first goal is to create a basis of
financial independence for oneself. Then one can find ways to help others, even in transcending
BREADTH .......................................................................................................................................1
Individual and Society ...............................................................................................................1
Karl Mannheim’s Sociology of Knowledge ........................................................................2
William James’ pragmatism and Mannheim ......................................................................9
Max Weber and the Puritan Work ethic ...........................................................................15
Mannheim, James, Weber and Marx’s Humanism ............................................................21
The Puritan Work ethic and the Concept of Grace………………………………… ........24
The Steel Cage ..................................................................................................................37
DEPTH ...........................................................................................................................................43
Annotated Bibliography .........................................................................................................433
Literature Review Essay ..........................................................................................................71
Kant…………….. ..............................................................................................................71
Peirce……………..............................................................................................................71
James…………….. ............................................................................................................73
Dewey…………….. ..........................................................................................................91
Behaviorism .......................................................................................................................95
Vulgar Materialism and Modern Researh…………….. ....................................................97
Truth as an Epistemic Ideal……………..........................................................................104
Weber’s Historical Causation …………….. ...................................................................109
Mathematical Model of Weber’s Historical Causation…………….. .............................113
Class, Status, Party...........................................................................................................114
Empirical Relevance of Class and Status.........................................................................119
Occupational Status and Perceived Limitations. .............................................................121
Democracy, Knowledge and the Division of Labor.. ......................................................124
The Iron Cage…………….. ............................................................................................127
Weber’s Verstehen ...........................................................................................................140
Weber, the Elect, and the Poor…………….....................................................................144
The Role of Ideas in History.. ..........................................................................................145
Ideology and Utopia…………….....................................................................................150
Mannheim’s Critics: Left .................................................................................................162
Shils Leads with his Right ...............................................................................................164
Ideology and Sociology ...................................................................................................169
Utopia ……………..........................................................................................................172
What happens after the Revolution?……………. ...........................................................174
Hegel…………….. ..........................................................................................................176
Rationalism…………….. ................................................................................................180
Proletarian Philosophy .....................................................................................................184
Civics as Applied Sociology…………….. ......................................................................190
Conclusionl……………. .................................................................................................199
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APPLICATION ...........................................................................................................................201
Professional Practice, Human Development,
and Agency in Financial Security ...................................................................................201
Discussion ..............................................................................................................................216
Bonfires of the Vanities …………….. ............................................................................216
Adam Smith…………….. ...............................................................................................220
Spencer and Sumner ........................................................................................................223
Critical Possibility Thinking ............................................................................................226
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................23231
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BREADTH
My purpose is to show that the founders of social science, who were generalists
religion, attempted to lay the groundwork for sociology as a discipline relevant for ethical and
moral evaluation of social phenomena. Karl Mannheim, Max Weber, William James, and Karl
Marx, each with varying philosophical, theoretical and practical perspectives, taken together
created the basis for a transformative vision of society that can help in changing the way we
define our fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Rather than pitting
individuals against each other in a zero sum game for control over resources (economic man),
reducing human relationships to abstract social transactions as the fundamental unit of study, or
juxtaposing the individual against society, as though for the one to thrive the other must suffer,
social science must develop a humanist perspective that views and supports the highest
In the study of human society, a variety of perspectives are needed to focus research on
relevant, critical problems that we must resolve to provide our posterity with a chance at creating
a more peaceful, humane world we can all live in and with. The challenge of human survival
makes social science the most hopeful and important intellectual endeavor we have ever
undertaken. Yet, the reification of social knowledge into material force, along with all of the
other products of our labor (art, culture, literature, science), has transformed mainstream
sociology into a tool for controlling deviant behavior, rather than an informed approach toward
human liberation. Positivism, with its view of social transactions as objects, to be treated exactly
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as objective reality, reduces the scope of social science from that of helping to liberate humanity
from our fears, delusions, and superstitions, to that of controlling deviant behavior, adjusting it to
the mechanisms of a social machine that defines reality and transcends critique (Sayer, 1992). By
imposing an outdated, mechanistic empiricism (no longer appropriate even for physical science)
on social philosophy, the Positivism of Comte (1851/1988) has been adopted as the methodology
Comte (1875/1968) limited critique to prediction and control of abnormal data points. If
social facts are to be treated as irreducible raw data, seen through the eyes of a value-neutral
observer, rather than as perceptions visible through the world outlook of a social actor, each
observation is completely unrelated to all other data categories except through correlations,
which must then be explained in terms of intervening variables. Social phenomena acquire the
status of natural facts, rather than revealing their true nature as social constructs, and we become
the products of our environmental or genetic precursors, rather than the creators of ideas who can
Mannheim (1929/1954) argued that human cognition of social reality is grounded in and
defined by the fundamental interests of social groups, which range over a spectrum in their
respective attitudes toward social change. This means that no matter how objective the social
observer, or scientist, tries to become, one is always working from a set of premises that define
the research problem as well as the social reality in which it exists. Mannheim compared the
problem of the social observer to that of perspective in art: any two-dimensional representation
of a three-dimensional reality has to choose a point of view (in perspective, actually a single
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point in front of the picture (Arguelles, 1975)) that completely determines the shapes, sizes, and
positions of the objects in the picture, rather like a shutter on a camera. Objects will appear in
different aspects and relationships to each other depending on the characteristics and position of
the lens, as well as their position and orientation toward the camera.
Mannheim (1954) established the basis for the sociology of knowledge that attempts to
synthesize these various perspectives into an objective view of social reality. He saw social
reality as largely in the eye of the beholder, viewed through the lens of ideology. Different social
universes emerge from the world outlook of different social observers, just as different pictures
emerge from the cameras of different artists viewing the same scene, depending on focus,
emphasis, and fundamental values. In dealing with descriptions of social reality, or social
problems, the question of objectivity cannot be adequately addressed without first examining the
identifications, perceived roles in social action, and specific perceptions arising from and within
the individual’s social context. There can be no universal consensus on what constitutes positive
social change because different groups will see things differently. The problem which a social
scientist chooses to define or work on will depend entirely on one’s perception of social reality.
To follow Mannheim’s argument, varying sets of assumptions, arising from the consensus of
various groups, create a spectrum of varying and conflicting world outlooks, depending on the
relative stance of the social observer’s unconscious group identification toward social change.
For the working professional who wishes to effect social change, examination of the values,
goals, and presumptions one brings to the definition of the social problem is the beginning of
various groups that constitute modern society, from the most reactionary to the most
revolutionary. He saw them all as working in different directions to maintain the equilibrium of
society, even as it experiences revolutionary social change. In today’s world, the exponential
increase in the rate of technological development drives the rate of social change, which is
inevitable (Frenzel & Frenzel, 2004). Even the most conservative groups must deal with the fact
that technology will change society, often in ways that are entirely unpredictable. For instance,
Fanon (1959/1984) pointed out the psychic change that occurred in Africa when transistor radios
became available in every village, most of which were just emerging from the Iron Age. Being
caught in the settler/native social dynamic, and having their ears tuned to the entire world, drove
Mannheim (1954) defined ideology as emerging from the most extremely conservative
position, which sees absolutely nothing wrong with things as they are and brooks no serious
proposal for social change. During the capitalist revolution, utopian thinking emerged from
rationalized Protestant asceticism (Weber, 1905/2002), and the spirit of capitalism was born to
unleash new social forces. Now that capitalism is entrenched world-wide, in Weber’s phrase, it
provides an “iron cage” of ideology, within which we must each follow our calling as defined
introduces automation into higher levels of intellectual work (Frenzel, & Frenzel, 2004).
Mannheim saw that yesterday’s utopia is today’s ideology. Under the universal domination of
capital, whether the state-owned capital of the Five Year Plan (Dunayevskaya, 1942), or the
privately owned capital of the “free market” (Dunayevskaya, 1957/2000), today’s utopian
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thinking emerges from the classes that are enslaved to the machine, which now includes
by speed-up of the production line, concessions driven by the cost of slave labor and high rates
of unemployment created by automation, working people and allied intellectuals may perceive
that change is needed to realize more humane ideals. They may in fact demand immediate,
“chiliastic” (Weber, 2002) change in the effort to control the terms and conditions of their own
labor, whether working in so-called “ socialist” utopias such as the former Communist Bloc of
Eastern Europe, or in the belly of the nominally “capitalist” beast nominally defined as “ the Free
World.”
Barbara Kopple (Kopple & Caplan, 1990) documents the efforts of meatpackers in
management driven by blind ambition for continuously increasing profits. The workers brought
into question the entire social reality created through competition with slave labor under NAFTA
and the WTO. The defeat of the ideals raised in 1986 at Solidarity City (the Meatpacker’s Local
P-9 union encampment in Austin, MN) has exacerbated conditions of life and labor among
meatpackers, as Schlosser (2001) documented, engendering unsafe practices that drive high
Meatpackers originally entered the 20th Century with horrifying conditions detailed by
Upton Sinclair (1906/2003), who took the viewpoint of immigrant workers in Chicago’s
stockyards. They formed one of the most powerful and militant unions in the country, the
meatpackers Union, which conducted strikes that led to major reforms, culminating in the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (many other unions, under the auspices of the AFL-
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CIO, the Teamsters, and the United Mine Workers, also led in these struggles). By 1986, the
Meatpackers Union had been subjected to a hostile take-over by the United Food and
Commercial Workers, which first sanctioned, then led the effort to defeat the Local P-9 strike in
Austin, Minnesota (Rachleff, 1990). Under the retrogressive leadership of the UFCW, AFL-CIO
International Unions have modified the Kroger (Yellow Dog) contract and imposed it throughout
the labor movement, transforming unions that once spoke for working people into whip- hand s
for management. Here, social change has buckled from progress into retrogression, although the
national union bosses of the UFCW and their lackeys in the American Communist Party
(CPUSA) call it progress. As the members of Local P-9 asked (Kopple & Caplan, 1990), “which
This retrogression did not start, but rather culminated in the strike of Meatpacker’s
LocalP-9, and consolidated itself in the defeat of the workers. The fast food industry was
founded by marketing mavericks in the 1950’s in Southern California (where grocery stores first
started operating on a 24/7 basis), as Schlosser (2001) pointed out, and certainly represents a
trend toward social change. Because it has now entered the international arena, penetrating even
Russia and China, one might suspect that the fast food business represents positive social change.
This is surely true from the point of view of franchise owners, who can expect one million
dollars in yearly income for a one million dollar investment in a single franchise store. Simply
put, this “progress” may be viewed differently by the people who work for sub-minimum wages,
and whose lives are endangered by Third World conditions of life and labor now being
introduced in America through competition with slave labor, whether as children working in
these fast-food stores under a loophole in the child labor laws, or as peasants working for less
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than $10 per day in the Malquiladora meat packing industry of Northern Mexico (Schlosser,
2001).
Globalization under the WTO and NAFTA (Boudousquie, Maniam, & Leavell, 2007)
represents nothing new, other than the latest development of capitalism under the impact of
information technology. This trend is characterized by the most intensive automation and
production line speed-up humanly possible, with competition from a huge army of unemployed
to ensure the maximum reduction of labor costs. Marx defined the “rosy dawn of capitalism” in
Despite those who tout the “New Economics,” globalization in fact has a long history dating
back to the discovery of America in 1492, although it may well be experiencing a new “rosy
dawn” as the global reach of multinational corporations now stretches beyond exploitation of
natural resources (not forgetting the never fully eradicated slave labor system) into industrial
exploitation of nominally “free” labor. Many who work under these new conditions may
consider the impact of the social changes introduced by this trend to be negative. It all depends
Mannheim’s (1954) most penetrating insight was that the entire range of world outlooks
created by various groups in social competition maintains the equilibrium of the system through
social change. Conservative ideology sees no gap between the ideal and the real. Liberals see a
gap, but believe it can be closed through evolutionary change. Radical anarchism equates private
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property with violence and seeks to implement the ideal immediately, along the lines of chiliastic
millennialism. These views represent a range of varying perspectives on the same system that
actually maintain the social /political equilibrium, even through shifting power alignments
between the contending groups. In identifying this systemic balance, Mannheim may be
speaking for various groups to rationalize their world outlook (Weltanschauung), depending on
the balance of power. However, he also pointed out a possible independent role for the
intellectual, which is to synthesize the varying perspectives into the sociology of knowledge that
systematically catalogues all views, with specific reference to the assumptions and purposes of
the observer within each contending group. This approach summarizes the contributions of each
group, preserving the insights revealed by the specific focus of each while pointing out
respective blind spots. From this synthesis, Mannheim created a new form of objectivity, which
he called the sociology of knowledge, forged from the experiences of each group, thus providing
a multi-dimensional view of the entire social system. Mannheim correctly attributed the major
contribution to the statement of the problem of ideology to Marx, and pointed out that his
acolytes were never able to apply the critical thrust of the concept of ideology to their own
thinking.
appropriate for the science of society, and the definition of objectivity bequeathed by scientific
methodology as exemplified in the natural sciences. In the century after Galileo Galilei (1564--
1642) laid the foundations for physical science in the critical method of Socrates, Enlightenment
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philosophers such as John Locke (1664/1990), David Hume (1740) and later John Stuart Mill
crux of the matter lies in Plato‘s allegory of the cave, in which the mind knows a realm of pure
forms through the exercise of reason, from which all true propositions can be deduced. Plato
argued that sense experience is an unreliable guide to reality, equivalent to viewing shadows on
the wall of the cave, cast by the true forms in Reality as they appear between the fire and the
wall. Empiricism argued that all knowledge is derived from sense experience, and that anything
Philosophers since John Locke (1990) have endlessly discussed Empiricism, many
postulating that the mind is a ‘white tablet’ (Tabula Rasa: see Ibn Sina’s epistemology (Inati,
1984); Aristotle’s On the Soul, (350 BCE); Summa Theologica, (Aquinas, 1274/1947, 1. 79. 2)),
on which sense impressions leave their mark. A common theme deriving from these pillars of
Western philosophy is the implication of total separation between subject and object, whether in
the Rationalism of Plato and Aquinas, or the Empiricism of George Berkeley (1710), David
Hume (1740), John Stuart Mill (1863), Gilles Deleuze (1953/1991), and Pierre-Félix Guattari
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1996). As Mannheim pointed out (1954), the new empiricist approach to
knowledge founded during the Enlightenment put the emphasis on the subject, rather than the
object of experience.
contribution to this discussion (James, 1908/1911). Charles Peirce originally defined the
In this popular lecture series, James argues that pragmatism takes an empirical approach
to philosophy, rather than viewing the world in terms of a closed system, embracing open
systems, concrete facts, action, and possibilities, leaving no room for absolute truth, the
ideal forms of Plato. Pragmatism advocates no specific results, but represents only
must learn from scientific method. The goal of rationalist metaphysics is to gain power
through learning the magic word that names the universal principle. Pragmatism inspects
the practical value of the word, and “set(s) it at work within the stream of your
experience.” Pragmatism is not a program for identifying the ideal with the real, as in
Mannheim’s definition of ideology, but rather a program for changing reality, therefore a
Theories are an instrumental means for predicting new observations, which can
then be used to test the theoretical framework. Pragmatism puts theory to work, perhaps
in remaking our concept of nature (James, 1911). With nominalism, pragmatism always
dislikes empty abstractions. With empiricism, it stands against all forms of rationalism.
Pragmatism stands for no particular result, no dogma, and no doctrine, other than
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following scientific method. All pragmatic truth is provisional, experiential, and
scientific. To the extent that it helps order, summarize, and account for our experiences,
aligning and relating them to each other, an idea is useful, and therefore true. If it
put simply, is within what parameters, or domain, does the idea (intervening variable,
theory) work?
James (1911) argued further that the criterion of truth is whether or not an idea
empiricism) are over the nature of reality, and what it means to correspond, agree with, or
reflect reality. The pragmatic question is, “What difference does it make?” How will our
experiences differ if the idea is true or false? True ideas can be corroborated, validated, or
results. If an idea has no practical value, it may be true, but irrelevant to our current
purposes. The truth of an idea starts the process of verification. Its utility is how it works
in experience. “The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our
thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving." (James, 1911,
p. vii)
by practicing scientists, in both the social and natural sciences, and which pragmatism
sensory) that are in fact reproducible, and therefore verifiable. Hamlet’s sighting of his
father’s ghost would not qualify as a scientific observation. The scientific investigator
frames working hypotheses as intervening variables, then deduces correlations that can be
correlations, and prior experimental results may be used to build models and test theories.
Only those observations that can provide insights and guidance in research are useful.
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (Cassidy, 2008) has destroyed the absolute
separation of the observer from the “thing in itself” under observation in physical science,
precisely because sense impressions are created by quantum particle/waves that are changed by,
and must they change the quantum object, thereby imparting either a determinate mass or
by starting with the evidence of 20th Century empirical investigations, and building an
epistemology from evidence implied by actual research. Although such a program may shake the
ghost out of the machine of Continental Rationalism (Descartes, 1986) in a way his empiricist
critics never quite managed to accomplish, it can come as no surprise to Karl Mannheim, who
In his opening statement, Mannheim (1954) defined the problem of objectivity in social
science in the following terms: “The principal thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that there
are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are
obscured.” Not only does the individual find situational, but also ideological and moral
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determinants of social perception. Organized groups provide competitive as well as cooperative
bases for thinking and doing, theory and practice. The social position and privileges of the group
will determine whether it sees the need to change the world, or to maintain the status quo. The
problems group action deals with provide its direction, and the ideas by which it defines and
confronts those problems. The need for group action determines one’s world outlook. Reason, as
defined in the Platonic ideal, separates thought from action, knowledge from experience.
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge derives objectivity through the synthesis of the experiences
of conflicting groups. Mannheim is the only early sociologist who actually catalogued the
various viewpoints of actual interest groups in society, and showed how each views the total
Mannheim’s concept of social action (1954) provides the basis for defining social reality,
selecting those experiences that define the elements of thought. Volition provides the principle
by which social problems are conceived, and thereby concrete reality to the problems that are
conceived. The group will is inextricably linked to the definition of social problems. The social
object provides the criterion for truth, but values, the collective unconscious as described by Jung
and group volition provide the intellectual interest embedded in social action that defines
research problems, hypotheses, and models by which social theory orders experience.
Unconscious motivations, presumptions, and evaluations of the social observer must be brought
to critical awareness to understand a new form of objectivity, not by excluding value judgments
The degree to which the social observer makes unconscious value judgments is largely
ignored in mainstream sociology, which focuses as a science on prediction and control of deviant
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behavior, rather than fostering social change. We view mass murderers with horror, building
more prisons, rather than questioning the quality of the social conditions that produce such
deviants. Durkheim (1897/1997) was the first to prove that social statistics vary with social
conditions, but for social observers interested only in social control, to protect and preserve
social norms is the primary goal of social science, precluding even the most cursory glance at the
social order that produces a surfeit of sociopathic personalities. The militarization of American
life that proceeds as a garrison state is erected in Washington D. C. Through such legislation as
the USA Patriot Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the Immigration and Naturalization Act, is
not perceived as a factor in the generalized devaluation of human life that transforms American
reality into Israeli and Spartan fascism. Because it identifies social facts as natural phenomena
rather than as social constructs, mainstream social science cannot critique the society it
perceives, but can only accept normative values on their face (Sayer, 1992). Such an attitude
toward objectivity prioritizes prediction and control of that which deviates from the norm, rather
than attempting to understand how social pathology may arise from the deceptions, lies, illusions
experience, providing us with a world outlook. The way the group experiences the world
provides concrete meaning to the way we conceptualize reality. Thought guides conduct,
providing us with values by which to make decisions between right and wrong. The life of the
mind is socially conditioned, providing us with the means by which we judge our decisions to act
as agents of social change, and the ideals that motivate our actions. Whether we raid the gun
shops to arm ourselves to drive racist, murderous police out of our community—as did the
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returned Black Viet Nam veterans during the Watts rebellion (Thomas, 1965); or we organize
free breakfast programs, health clinics, clothing drives, and rent strikes, advocate for community
control of the schools and the police, and campaign to stop police brutality, drug dealing and
reduce crime rates—as did Fred Hampton, Mark Clark, and the other Black Panthers Cook
County State’s Attorney Hanrahan murdered in 1969 under cover of law (Acoli, 2003)—this will
depend on the shared values, mores, and cognition of the group to which we belong, or with
situation as America approached during the Watts Rebellion and the subsequent rise of the Black
Panther Party in terms of a “transvaluation of values” (1954, p. 24) rooted in the common
perceptions, thinking, and conversations of an entire social group, each member of which takes
part in collective action to overthrow a hated social reality deemed oppressive by all, and highly
resented. All recognized the legitimacy of the 63 day 1944 Warsaw uprising against the Nazi
occupation of Poland. The individual finds new ways to interact with others, and the social
action of each contributes to the upheaval, with new motivations arising from the group. Max
Such a movement was Christianity, in its early days of persecution by Roman authorities
and conflict with Jewish leaders. Once it had attained power (brokered by Constantine at the
Council of Nicea in 323 CE), the Christian movement became the guardian of the status quo,
adumbrating objective salvation through institutional authority for over a thousand years,
eventually promulgating an ideology for the maintenance of the status quo known as
Scholasticism, a rationalist philosophy. Today, the Roman Catholic (universal) church owns
more real property than any other organization in the world (Yallop, 2007), and espouses the
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most reactionary views with the highest authority, through the 20th Century designation of the
Pope as the infallible Vicar of Christ (many Catholics believe that Pope John Paul, the only
contemporary Pope who threatened to use church wealth to help ameliorate world poverty, was
murdered by reactionary elements who still control Church finances (Yallop, 2007)). To say the
least, the primary institutions of Christianity in the world today can no longer be viewed as
utopian under Mannheim’s categorization, but are more in tune with reactionary, or ideological
social strata.
What the philosophers of the Enlightenment wrestled over in terms of Empiricism vs.
Rationalism, the 16th Century Reformation in Europe had first transformed into religious conflict.
As Erasmus (cited in Smith, 1920) (c. 1466–1536) pointed out, there is nothing in Luther’s 95
theses that is revolutionary in terms of church doctrine, other than “freedom of conscience for
good Christians, “which denies the authority of Rome to administer sacraments ( Luther,
1517/1915). The utopia of 1st Century Jewish heresies and revolutions had been transformed into
the ideology of Scholasticism, and the arguments between Luther and Calvin were basically
arguments among Schoolmen. Their unforgivable sin was to align themselves with the absolute
rulers of Europe, who wrested the power to define the boundary between secular and religious
authority away from the church, thereby establishing the separation between church and state
(Sibley, 1970).
Max Weber’s goal was to interpret and explain social behavior in terms of “its causes, its
course, and its effects” (Weber, 1962, p. 29). Social action must have subjective meaning to the
subject and involve others. Weber defines the meaning of social action in terms of “ideal types”
subject to rational proof if everything within its context can be clearly grasped by the intellect.
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An ideal type is approached when the subject uses appropriate means to reach a goal, and
“logically executes a course of action in accordance with accepted ways of thought” (p30).
Understanding that departs from this ideal may be empathetic, in terms of sympathetic self-
analysis and emotional involvement, if logical explanation cannot otherwise prevail. Weber
defined this as verstehen. However, intellectual understanding must substitute for empathy to the
extent that the goals and values of the actor are radically different from our own. If we cannot
understand them at all, we may understand them simply as given data, albeit non-interpretable to
the extent that we have no comprehension or susceptibility to them. Although the emotional
context of behavior may be beyond our experience, we may still understand the behavior in
terms of its impact, direction, and means used. If we can first understand behavior logically, we
may then account for emotionally based deviations. Until the ideal type is understood, we cannot
These ideal types arise from experience, and are not to be seen as Platonic ideals. They
coordinate system has ever been observed, the fundamental equivalence of all such systems must
be presumed to banish “ether,” and its concomitant “action at a distance” explanation of gravity
(which begs the question of supernatural explanation), from ontological existence. The “thought
experiment,” or “ideal type” is a methodological device that leads to fertile fields of empirical
observation, rather than an intellectual reality postulating the realm of pure forms.
ideal type he called “the Protestant Ethic,” which he identified as the spirit of capitalism. After
examining the social stratification of religious beliefs in Europe at the time of industrialization,
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he suggested that asceticism oriented toward a Christian ideal may be a characteristic of those
who most successfully accumulated capital in the early days of the Industrial Revolution. Pietism
grew in commercial circles as a reaction to the horrors depicted by Marx in his description of the
rosy dawn of capitalism. On the other hand, the large number of capitalist entrepreneurs from
clerical families may have been in rebellion against an ascetic childhood. However, Weber made
the point that many Protestant churches, especially those influenced by Calvinism, produced
brilliant businessmen who were extremely pious. Quaker and Mennonite churchmen were well
known for their piety as well as their wealth, the former in America and the latter in Germany.
The Pietist sects also produced strong accumulators of wealth. Weber suggested that perhaps the
English, who enjoyed free political institutions as well as commercial success, may have derived
some benefits from the strictly religious character of their beliefs. Why were the Calvinists such
strong capitalists, whereas Lutheranism had little correlation to capitalist development? Weber
found the difference not in theological disputes over Aristotle’s logic (transubstantiation vs.
consubstantiation, form vs. substance, etc.), but rather in specific similarities and differences
To distill the essence of what he meant by capitalism’s spirit, Weber turned to Benjamin
Franklin, who attended the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787, signed both the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America, and is still
widely considered to be the wisest American. In quotations directly from Franklin’s Collected
What Weber singled out from this pragmatic philosophy of avarice are: the ideal of an honest
tradesman, of impeccable credit; the idea that the accumulation of capital is a moral duty; and the
ethos of pecuniary gain as an end in itself. Franklin’s writings display the early roots of
pragmatism in American colonial thought, which provided fertile soil for the later works of
The idea of having such a “calling” in life, or a profession, which is a task set by God
one has a moral duty to perform, clearly has religious origins. Perhaps less apparent is the origin
The first professionals, other than practitioners of “the world’s oldest profession,” were
professors of the faith, or preachers. The Old Testament story of Jonah, actually derived from the
Epic of Gilgamesh, of Babylonian origin, tells the adventures of a man with a calling who
deliberately attempted to shirk his duty (Sanders, 1960; Green, 2005). However, the word
“calling,” referring to one’s divinely appointed task in life, or field of work, is of Protestant
origin, as a Biblical mistranslation of Luther into “beruf,” who was influenced by German
Although of ancient origin, the idea that fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs is of the
highest moral value is clearly of Reformation origin, deriving, however indirectly, from Luther’s
mistake. In this, all Protestant denominations refuted the Catholic ideal of fulfilling a higher
morality as an ascetic monk, who takes a vow of poverty, chastity, and obedience to God’s will
as expressed through Church authority (Weber, 2002). Taking his lead from Thomas Aquinas,
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Luther saw fulfilling one’s calling as related to the flesh, like eating and drinking, indispensable
to living in God’s grace, but nevertheless morally neutral. In Luther’s view, the monastic life is
actually quite selfish, whereas fulfilling one’s calling is a fruit of the Spirit, showing brotherly
love. Luther was faced with chiliastic peasant rebellions, such as those led by Thomas Münzer.
Because he allied his church with the secular authorities, Luther‘s task was to suppress such
sentiments. Therefore, one must accept one’s place in society, and fulfill one’s worldly duties,
whether those of a peasant or a noble, to live a life of faith in God’s will. Every calling
legitimized by secular authority has the same value in the eyes of God. Thus, the idea has an
ideological, rationalistic purpose, to preserve the status quo by convincing rebellious peasants to
accept their status in feudal society, while accepting the excesses of the rich as perhaps
concomitant to the presumption of their dwelling in God’s bountiful blessings and grace, as
Weber (2002) argued that Luther was still a long way from the “Philosophy of avarice”
espoused by Franklin, although it is certainly possible to see at this point the lineaments of
Testament idea was to tend to one’s own business, honor God, and let the wicked worship
Mammon. Jesus repudiated worldly wealth, pointing out that it is for God to give and take away.
Early Christians were so focused on the second coming of Christ they had little time for worldly
values. One may as well continue one’s labors while waiting to be swept up into the sky, even if
currently in slavery. Paul placed little value on position or occupation. He considered pursuit of
gain beyond one’s needs as evidence of worldliness, and morally wrong because it can only be
of God’s kingdom on Earth, Luther (1915) emphasized acceptance of one’s place in life as
divinely ordained. One’s social station establishes the locus of worldly activity. Absolute
obedience to God’s Will means accepting things as they are. Thereby, in Mannheim’s terms,
Luther opposed an ideology that brooks no social change, accepting the equivalence between the
real and the ideal, to the utopian chiliasm of Münzer, which demanded immediate realization of
God’s Kingdom on Earth. He clearly stated the idea of having a calling as a moral obligation, but
Luther did not carry this idea to its logical limits because he believed in sanctification through
faith, and justification through grace, rather than works. His insistence on purity of doctrine as a
pillar of faith prevented him from being an innovator in ethics (Weber, 2002). Because Luther’s
conception of the calling adhered to tradition, it was of little significance to the “Spirit of
The relationship between material pursuits and religious motives can be more clearly
seen in Calvinism, Puritanism, and the Protestant sects that derived from them. John Calvin
cannot be said to have advocated the pursuit of wealth as an ethical imperative. He was primarily
concerned with salvation, not ethical reform. The cultural revolution of capitalism has roots in
the Reformation, but this was not the intention of the reformers themselves (Weber, 2002).
Reformers only aim at incremental, positive change, rather than the qualitative transformations
Europe, many of them emigrated to America to found New Jerusalem on virgin soil (simply
removing the native Americans as the Zionists simply removed the Arabs in founding modern
Israel), and fully participate in kicking off the second major stage of the Industrial Revolution.
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Mannhiem, James, Weber, and Marx’s Humanism
Weber was interested primarily in the way ideas influence history. He believed religious
ideals played an initial role in the development of capitalism, and opposed these ideas to
Marxism, in which ideas are seen as merely ephemeral phenomena arising from the material base
is easy to see that Weber’s thesis was more effective against vulgar materialists, beginning with
Engels, who truncated the humanism of Marx (1844/1964), which transcended both materialism
and idealism. Because they officially transformed Marxism from a utopian ideal (Mannheim’s ,
not Marx’s usage) of “freely associated labor” into an ideology perpetuated by an absolute state,
Weber clearly repudiated the Marxists of his day, of the Engels/Plekhanov strain, which we
sense (PMMAP). Perhaps less apparent from Weber’s , but more easily seen from Mannheim’s
viewpoint, and most clearly from Dunayevskaya’s , is the fact that Stalin built his absolute state
on production line speed-up, lowering wages through piecework, automation, and the
transformation of labor into material force, which are the hallmarks of capitalism, in Marx’s
view (1867/1954).
The philosophic views of Weber and Mannheim truncate the critical dialectic of Hegel at
reformist philosophy consistent with the views of both. Because materialist philosophical
approaches lack the categories of transcendence and transformation into opposite, they are less
able to grapple with revolutionary social changes, such as those introduced by capitalism, than
idealist philosophies, such as that of Hegel (1837/1990). Post-Marx Marxists reverted to the
23
vulgar materialist viewpoint precisely because they were less interested in “transvaluation of
values” than in simply becoming the new bosses. Mannheim clearly showed they were never
able to apply the concept of ideology, which they used to critique capitalism, to themselves.
Marx never argued that ideas are not important in changing history. In his thesis on Feuerbach
(no. 11), he wrote, “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point,
however, is to change it” (from which Engels, unforgivably, dropped the word “however” in his
Weber (2002) elaborated his position in explaining that religious ideas played a greater
role in spurring the early development of the capitalist revolution than they do today, among
many other historical forces. Capitalist culture inherited certain features from the Reformation,
but did not result from it on the “iron rails of historical necessity.” In an insight that seems to be
a precursor of recent developments in complexity theory, he pointed out that the Reformation
not only do not fit into any ‘economic law,’ but fit into no economic scheme of any kind, (that)
had to come together in order for the newly created Churches to continue to exist at all (p. 36).”
Neither could the capitalist revolution be considered to be a necessary result of the development
of the “spirit of capitalism.” However, when large groups of people began to act in terms of this
ideal type, the capitalist revolution took off in “seven league boots.”
Along the tracks left by this historic development, we can trace the transformation of a
utopian ideal (in Mannheim’s, certainly not Marx’s sense) into an ideology, as the Spirit of
Capitalism that originally expressed the freedom of a Christian’s conscience transformed itself
into a “Steel Cage” of technologically driven rationalized labor. In Russia and China the
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religious origins of this spirit of capitalism had been thoroughly repudiated at an early stage. The
ideology that resulted was specifically anti-capitalist (although the economies were state
capitalist), until recently, when the leaders realized that specific ideological assertions are not
needed to maintain power. The assertion that the real is identical with the ideal is still used to
suppose an “end to ideology” (Bell, 1960/2000) in the West, while at the same time crushing, or
co-opting new utopian movements (Mannheim’s definition) in the East, such as the massacre at
on the other side of the now rusted Iron Curtain. In terms of Marx’s primary definition of
capitalism as the absolute separation of theory from practice (Marx, 1964), all so-called
“socialist” countries are thoroughly capitalist. The only real dispute with the “capitalist bloc” is
conducted with respect to the quality and velocity of state planning, although this distinction has
Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism, and Baptist sects embraced the ascetic Protestantism
that, at a certain juncture, influenced and provided the spirit by which capitalism developed
(Mannheim, 1954). The distinction between these religious tendencies was never clear. For
instance, Methodism was only intended by John Wesley as a new awakening of the ascetic spirit
within the Established Church of England, not as the foundation of a new denomination (Wesley
and Outler, 1980). In coming to America, it finally broke all ties with the Anglican Church.
Pietism sprang from English Calvinism; later Spener led it into Lutheranism. Baptists originally
opposed Calvinism, but later they embraced it (Hard Shell vs. Soft Shell Baptists). Puritanism
attacked Anglicanism (as the Colonial mind attacked all things British), and then gradually the
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two were reconciled, like feuding spouses. Complex dogmas were developed in terms of
doctrine, causing splits that only the most fanatical could grasp intellectually.
However, moral conduct can arise from similar maxims derived from various dogmas.
Great similarities in dogma can exist under wide variations in conduct (Weber, 2002). Even
though various dogmatisms died, they left their mark on the ascetic morality, and later the
secular ethic that remained. Theories about the after-life frightened churchmen into moral
behavior, providing psychological sanctions that directed and held the believer accountable in
the conduct of life. Because the boundaries between religious ideas are fluid, they must be seen
Calvinism was the first great divide in Protestantism, with its dogma of predestination
(Calvin, 1536/1960), the historical and cultural significance of which may be greater than its
religious significance. King James I saw this dogma as the primary political threat of the
Puritans, who elevated the dogma to the central purpose of the Westminster Confession of Faith
(Westminster Assembly, 1646), and raised it as a banner to become the rallying standard for
great awakenings. This document deserves careful reading because the doctrine of predestination
as stated provides the fundamental belief system from which the spirit of capitalism arose. Grace
is dispensed according to God’s will, and is in no way commensurate with the personal worth of
the believer. Neither faith nor will have any influence over the gift of Grace. When Luther wrote
“The Freedom of A Christian,” (1520/2005) this state of grace was his ultimate source of
inspiration, although it never became a central dogma in the Augsburg Confession, under the
influence of Melancthon. Lutherans subsequently believed that grace is revocable and can be
won back through penitence, humility, trust in God’s word, and participation in the sacraments.
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Calvin, on the other hand, moved the doctrine of predestined grace to the center of his dogma in
The Westminster Confession follows the logical necessity of the doctrine of Grace to the
extreme dictate that only a few are chosen for Grace, all to God’s glory. God alone is subject to
no law, but reveals Hi swill to mankind only at his pleasure. Our personal eternal destiny is a
mystery he chooses not to reveal. Humankind deserves only eternal death at the hand of an angry
God, unless He has decreed otherwise to glorify His own name. Our personal merit, guilt,
penitence, repentance, confession, or any act whatsoever plays no part in salvation, which is
predestined, and subject to no human influence. God is transcendent being, beyond human
comprehension, who in His infinite wisdom has predestined human fate from eternity. The
believer can do nothing whatsoever to alter his state of grace. Because God’s will is unknowable,
there is no assurance of salvation. Neither priest, nor sacrament serves as a means to attain grace.
Church membership includes the unwitting doomed, who can in no way be distinguished from
the faithful. Christ died only for the elect, and was himself doomed to die from eternity. Church
and sacrament were thus completely eliminated from salvation, in absolute opposition to
Catholicism.
Calvinism thereby banished magic from the world, as the Empiricists had previously
banished magic from philosophy. They considered religious ceremony at the grave to be an
expression of superstition. As humans, we are all inheritors of Adam’s fall from Grace. We have
no means to attain grace, which is not subject to our choice, but only to God’s will. The flesh is
corrupt; sensuous and emotional elements in culture and religion are idolatrous. Even in decline,
the dogma of predestination influenced Christian conduct and attitudes toward pessimism and
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despair. Trust no one is the credo: in God we trust, only. Even confession, for the sake of
discharging guilt, was banished, leaving it pent up in the ethical attitude of Puritanism. Bunyan’s
Pilgrim’s Progress (Bunyan, 1678/2003) has Pilgrim flee the City of Destruction crying, “life,
eternal life,” with no room whatsoever for any other thought, even for the lives of his wife and
child.
Pilgrim must achieve success in pursuit of his calling to show obedience for God’s glory.
Following a calling in service to others is an outward manifestation of brotherly love, but only
for the glory of God. Natural law defines our daily tasks, in the interest of rationalization of
labor. The universe is at man’s disposal, to serve our purposes. The social utility of labor
therefore serves God’s glory. The Puritan Ethic never questioned the meaning of life. Weber
explained that the certainty of salvation depends only on faith in Christ. No one can know
another’s faith, by any means. The invisible Church is truly invisible as the body of Christ,
which can only be known through personal faith. The question of developing infallible criteria
by which Christians can recognize each other became of central importance within the church in
determining such matters as the administration of the Eucharist, especially in Pietism. The
individual’s state of grace must be known for admission to Communion, which determined the
Servetus to Geneva for a discussion of the subject, upon which Calvin promptly burned the
heretic at the stake. In Geneva, a statue to Servetus still stands, although there is none to Calvin,
the despotic dogmatist who once ruled Geneva with an iron fist (Smith, 1920). In his view, it is
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the duty of the Christian to banish self-doubt, which is evidence of insufficient faith. Worldly
activity is evidence of election, even if the daily prayer of the Christian is, “Lord, forgive me for
my non-belief.” Lutheranism aims at the certainty of union with deity. Again following Weber’s
argument (2002), to the Calvinist, the transcendence of God prevents this. Only in His acting
through us can we be conscious of God. Action justifies and originates in faith through grace.
This circular argument provided the only possibility of communion with God. As a tool of the
divine will, I am inspired to ascetic action. Calvinism sets all feelings aside, and an effectual call
to salvation can only be exhibited in one’s dedication to one’s calling, specifically demonstrated
To the extent that our conduct as Christians serves the glory of God, it can be measured
by our success in the world. Real good works provide the certainty of salvation. They are useless
to attain salvation, but serve as the only certainty that one lives in grace. Only through the
measure of my social utility, which manifests in the degree of success I exhibit in my calling, can
I eliminate the fear of damnation. The fire and brimstone sermons of the Puritan clerics serve as
a stimulus to my success in worldly endeavors. Self-control at all times separates the chosen
from the damned. This is not a doctrine of salvation by works, but rather that we can only be sure
of our salvation through the fruits of our labor. Following one’s calling is not merely an ethically
neutral means of surviving in the world, as Luther would have it, but is the highest form of
ethical behavior, the goal of one’s religious passion, and success in this endeavor is the only sure
sign of salvation. An entire code of conduct in one’s profession rationalizes life, provides every
action with meaning, and assures the Elect that we are living in a state of grace rather than any
natural state. Rather than “I think, therefore I am, ” (Descartes, 1641/1986) the Puritan
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substituted eternal vigilance and concentration of effort as the demonstration not of existence,
but rather of living a life dedicated to the glory of God, therefore of living in God’s grace. This is
the method (Wesley and Outler, 1980) by which the sinful state of nature is conquered.
As the Catholic Benedictine and Jesuitical monks had already discovered in their
monastic credos, systematic rational conduct and purpose can free the faithful from irrational
impulses, and through self-control conform action to ethical dictates. Puritanism brought this
ideal out of the monastery and into professional practice. Puritan asceticism shapes the entire
personality, subjecting the passions to the governance of Reason, bringing order into the entire
conduct of life. Thus, as professionals we are subject to a higher calling in the practice of our
worldly occupations. Essentially, God's Elect has become a monk, not with respect to his specific
assigned task but rather in how successfully he performs his calling (Weber, 2002). Rather than
take formal vows, one proves one’s faith through the performance of one’s duties.
Only a life of continuous success and productive activity can sustain the consciousness of
being a saint. Since one can never be sure about the status of one’s neighbor, he may easily
become an object of hatred and contempt, an enemy of God wearing the mark of Cain, as
evidenced in his failure to be a productive member of society, or to perform well the duties of his
calling. The belief in a just world results in scape-goating and blaming the victim, which are still
major themes in capitalist culture. There is no excuse for poverty, is a sure sign of God’s
displeasure, which could result from no other cause than failure of focus, lack of discipline, and
laziness. We will see how these themes carry into the profession of selling. In the age of
Puritanism, this attitudinal complex could result in witch burning, but most likely resulted in
schisms. Servetus may have been the first schismatic who was burned as a witch. He was
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certainly the first to suffer this fate as the result of being invited to a discussion of the meaning of
the Eucharist.
Although religious account books of sin and triumph over temptation, presumably
existing from the foundations of a predestined world, are kept by angels to be opened and read at
judgment day, Benjamin Franklin kept his own books on his (Pilgrim’s ) progress in attaining
moral virtues, weighed solely in terms of their social utility (Weber, 2002). God’s actions can be
seen in every detail, along with a full revelation of His purposes (contrary to doctrine), thereby
providing the means to conduct life as a business enterprise, dedicated to God’s glory. The
rationalization of ethical values, especially the work ethic, in the conduct of life was the primary
subjected to persecution, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, and other schismatic’s upheld the
Westminster Confession, and defended it as an article of faith, until the doctrine of predestination
repudiating pleasure and extolling the value of work in fostering ethical values such as
discipline, self-control, and sacrifice. Proof of faith through conduct characterized Pietism within
the Anglican Church, and in fact Methodism and Puritanism are often considered as forms of
Pietism. However, the religious ecstasy of union with God found within Pietism was quite
foreign to the strict discipline of temperance practiced by the Puritan, exposing the religiously
rational person to influence from the passions, which Calvin deemed depraved, of the flesh.
However, under the influence of Pietism, the ascetic conduct of life found its way into Lutheran
contributions of Pietism to Lutheran doctrine (Weber, 2002). The bottom line is that God blesses
his chosen few through success in their labors. In place of Calvinism’s lifelong struggle to attain
assurance of salvation, Pietism substituted the need for communion and reconciliation with God
in this life, thereby adapting the pure logic of the doctrine of predestination to irrational
influences within Lutheranism. Working class persons, clerical workers, and officials were
thereby provided with a confession suitable to their various callings, whereas Calvinism was
certainty of salvation. John Wesley (CE 1703—1791) intended his method as a reform effort
within the Anglican Church. His (1980) emphasis on feeling, combined with a proselytizing
mission to the masses, characterized Methodism in America. Repentance often led to ecstatic
behavior at public meetings, providing immediate certainty of salvation and union with the
Almighty through divine grace. The Holy Spirit provides immediate knowledge of forgiveness at
the moment of conversion. According to Wesley, sanctification can then be attained through a
separate, subsequent spiritual transformation, which may not occur until one is nearing the end of
one’s mission, which provides serenity and absolute certainty of salvation. That is how one
becomes saved (born again), and then sanctified, after a presumably long pilgrimage.
The elect are made clearly visible to each other by the immediate fact that sin no longer
has any power over them. Works for the purpose of glorifying God were only a means of
knowing one’s own state of grace, as the Puritans insisted. The difference between Methodism
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and Anglicanism is not doctrinal, but lies in religious practice, where the fruits of the Spirit in
conduct provide clear evidence of spiritual rebirth. Once converted, the emotions are
immediately directed toward the goal of sanctification, in place of the doctrine of predestination,
through a rational, life-long struggle for perfection. Conduct provides the same guide to
assurance of salvation as in Calvinism, as Wesley himself points out (cited in Weber, 2002),
even though the pure doctrine of works is substituted for the doctrine of predestination.
The Baptist movement, which included the Mennonites and the Quakers, grew directly
out of Calvinism. They all began as communities of born-again Christians, or sects, consisting of
baptized adults who have already gained salvation. Justification is by accepting the gift of
salvation through faith, which baptism symbolizes. Only the Holy Spirit, working on the
individual, can provide the conviction needed for the act of faith. The calling is to repentance, to
be born again in the spirit of God. The lives of the Apostles provide the model of how to live in
the world, meaning avoidance of intercourse with worldly matters to the early Baptists. Daily
communion with the Holy Spirit is the only evidence of election. The Spirit testifies to the reason
and conscience of each individual, as the Quaker’s developed in their familiar doctrine. This
discarded the sole authority of the Bible, and eventually all authority of sacraments. Even the
Bible could only be “rightly divided” through the inner revelation of the Spirit. Without this
inner light, we remain creatures of the flesh. Once converted, it is nearly impossible to lose
salvation. However, the attainment of this state of grace is subject to the development of
perfection in the individual. Conduct that shows repudiation of worldly things and submission to
God’s will is the only sure sign of true rebirth, therefore it is crucial to salvation. Grace cannot be
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earned, but the man of conscience, who acts accordingly, is justified in thinking himself reborn.
This doctrine of good works is the working equivalent to the Calvinist conception of success in
the calling as proof of the performance of duty, and therefore the source of assurance of salvation
(Weber, 2002).
While waiting for the Spirit to descend and shed some light, we must clear our minds of
every irrational impulse, passion, and inclination of the natural man. Only through deep repose
can the soul hear the word of God. Some go into trance-like states for hours at a time to exhibit
their receptivity to this inner voice. Hysteria, speaking in tongues, prophesying, chiliastic
enthusiasm, and other irrational outbursts may interrupt this repose. To silence the flesh, a moral
course of action according to conscience is advisable. The radical repudiation of all magic,
sacraments, and idols left few alternatives to the practice of worldly asceticism. Although born in
radicalism, the strict imitation of Christ was not necessary for all believers. Rich churchmen
defended worldly virtues and private property; leading strict Baptist morality down the path of
In all of these sects, Weber detected a commonality existing in the idea of the state of
grace, protecting the elect from the corruption of the flesh, and the influence of the world. Not
sacraments, confession, or good works can provide assurance of salvation, but only a course of
conduct exhibited in the application of the work ethic in the performance of the calling. As the
Puritan idea of the calling entered the world of business, it infused the conduct of business with
asceticism, as the elect planned his life under God’s will, which is to His glorification. The saints
now lived not in monasteries, but rather within the world and its institutions, although not being
of the world, but rather of the Kingdom of God. This work ethic is required of everyone who
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wishes to attain certainty of salvation (Weber, 2002). It places action squarely in the world, but
During the period of the revolution of industrial capital, the clergy held sway through
their connection with the after-life, which meant everything. The church influenced and shaped
national character and conscience, although the religious framework has since been discarded.
The accumulation of wealth was condemned not because it is wrong, but rather because it
subjects the capitalist to the temptations of idleness and distracts from the pursuit of
Only activity in one’s calling, not the enjoyment of the fruits of our labor, glorifies God within
His will.
Under the Puritan work ethic, the first deadly sin is to waste time, of which there is little
for the assurance of election. Getting more sleep than necessary is morally wrong. As much
conscious attention to work as possible must be manifest in the dedicated, moral pursuit of one’s
calling. Inactivity is provided for by the observance of Sunday, on which even God rested. The
performance of hard, continuous physical or mental labor for the remainder of the waking hours
is the best defense against all temptations. Even sexual activity within marriage must be only for
purposes of procreation rather than pleasure. Labor in itself is the end of life, as ordained by God
in placing mankind under His curse for disobedience to His will. To be in a state of grace means
being willing, able, and actually working, all to God’s glory. Work for its own sake has become
a transcendent value.
This is very different from the traditional concept of work, which lost value beyond the
maintenance of the person, family, and community. Traditionally, the man of means, who can
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live by virtue of his property in the alienated labor of others, is not expected to work. To the
Puritan conscience, the possession of wealth does not exempt anyone from work. Even the
wealthy man has a calling, which God has prepared, for his profession and for his labor, all to
God’s divine glory. Rational labor in a calling is what God commands, not labor per se, as proof
of conscientiousness, care and method. The opportunity to make a profit must be pursued
diligently as a revelation from God. This is good stewardship, and riches may be accumulated to
the glory of God, but not for self-aggrandizement. The accumulation of wealth in pursuit of
The Puritan work ethic condemned dishonesty and greed. The sin of covetousness meant
the pursuit of wealth for its own sake. This contrasts to the attainment of wealth as the fruit of
labor in a calling as a sign of God’s blessing. The value of deliberate, unceasing, productive
labor in a calling as the highest ethical value, as well as the best possible proof of salvation,
provided powerful psychological motivations for the embodiment of this attitude toward work in
what Weber designated as the spirit of capitalism. The positive sanction of acquisition provided
the basis for the accumulation of capital. The limitation of consumption released even more
wealth for productive activity. The Puritans, who hated the feudal way of life, did not permit
their fortunes to be absorbed into the nobility, but rather plowed them back into further
accumulation.
The Puritan work ethic favored the development of rational economic life, and thereby
provided for the development of modern economic man. As wealth accumulated through
industry and frugality, religion was forgotten, and only the work ethic remained. Those
Christians who accumulate riches should also give all they can, to accumulate other-worldly
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wealth. The honest businessman fulfills his moral duty in pursuing profit, is blessed by God, and
assured of grace. The same work ethic provides excellent and industrious workmen, who treat
their work as a way of life ordained by God. Faithful labor at low wages by unskilled workmen
is also pleasing to God (Weber, 2002). Rational conduct based on the calling is a fundamental
element of the spirit of capitalism, born out of Christian asceticism. This work ethic built the
world economic order in which we now live. Today, this order forces each of us to work in a
calling. We no longer need the fear of God, but only the fear of poverty to drive us forward in
our calling.
With the Puritan work ethic, we can trace the development of the rationalist idea of the
into a reformist restatement by Luther, for the purpose of repudiating monasticism while at the
same time protecting reform efforts from chiliastic utopian enthusiasms, as espoused by Thomas
Münzer. Calvin originally meant to support the most extreme Protestant absolutism through his
elevation of the doctrine of predestination to a central tenet in theology, and the subsequent
working out of all of its logical ramifications. However, many Protestant schisms resulted from
the idea that the whole of life should be rationalized, and magic abolished from religion. Many
reformers adapted the idea of the calling to the establishment of new absolutisms, especially in
The Puritan arrived on American shores with the idea of conquering nature and, perhaps
as remnants of the lost tribes of Israel, establishing New Jerusalem. They would conquer the
natural, sinful side of human nature, as they would the wilderness, all to God’s glory, and God’s
Will would be manifested in the Elect’s victorious overcoming of the world. The sects
37
themselves kept spinning off new schisms, and the demands of building new utopias dictated
much of the work. Anyone with an industrious spirit could escape into the wilderness, to pursue
the allure of God’s bounty in terms of seemingly unlimited land and resources, with an axe, a
musket, a barrel of dry gunpowder and a sack of corn, and establish New Jerusalem, as did
Joseph Smith, Brigham Young, and their original Mormon sect (even adopting a New Old
Testament). The Puritan work ethic, elevated by the theology of predestination into the
transcendent value of life, only received a revolutionary thrust when it adapted to the industrial
Empirical philosophy also rose out of the new emphasis on experience introduced by the
Enlightenment, fueling the Industrial Revolution by providing a philosophical framework for the
scientific method and reasoning needed to unleash the energy of fossil fuels. New discoveries
provoked new ideas, and new ideas needed new paradigms, theoretical frameworks, and methods
movement against the ideology of Scholasticism (Mannheim, 1954), has now allied itself with
the new ideology of capitalism, the ‘steel cage’ alienating all human labor. The absolute
rationalization of labor under the work ethic transformed the worker into an appendage of the
machine, and conception was divorced from execution, theory from practice.
and energy are expanding on an infinite frontier, science is forever divorced from philosophy by
the limitations of empiricism and pragmatism, which ask only theoretical, rather than human
questions. All facts are seen as discrete, atomized, sensual phenomena, which in principle bear
38
no relationship to any other sensation, and only have meaning in terms of their utility. Although
science now serves as the basis for human life, it can serve only industry, thereby completing the
alienation of labor through the rationalization of its social utility. Man’s relationship to nature,
and therefore science, is through industry, the absolute alienation of labor (Marx, 1964).
Empiricism aligned itself with capital’s rationalization of labor under the Puritan work ethic ,
stripped predestination and “beruf” (calling) of their religious garb, and became the new
ideology, or perhaps, in Weber’s metaphor, “steel cage, ” (Stahlhartes Gehäuse; 2002, p. xxiv).
philosophers can come to introducing experience into philosophy, abstractly. Truth has meaning
only in terms of utility, which Marx showed to be an external relationship (1964). He reasoned
that philosophy, religion, history, politics, art, and literature all confront us as objects in the
marketplace, products of alienated labor, whose “cash value,” to use one of pragmatism ‘s
favorite terms, is grounded in utility. Men like Dewey, Peirce, and James led the new reform
(utopian in Mannheim’s sense) movement to unite theory and practice by incorporating within
philosophy the experiences of industrial workers struggling for power over the terms and
conditions of their own labor, rather than merely accepting maximized economic rationalization
of labor power as their lot in life in fulfillment of their “calling.” Marx (1964) pointed out that
although the will to unify theory and practice was there, philosophy was unable to accomplish
such a feat precisely because the philosophers could only liberate humanity abstractly, rather
than in life. Against all of the abstract materialists (idealists), whether calling themselves
communists, Marxists, or utopians, Marx argued that “We should especially avoid establishing
society as an abstraction opposed to the individual. The individual is the social entity” (cited in
39
Dunayevskaya, 1973/1989, p. 53). In his brilliant essay Science, Society, and Life, Marx threw
down the gauntlet to empiricism, however cloaked or labeled, in a ringing challenge that was
deliberately garbled in all English translations but one: “to have one basis for life and another for
It is not that every society up to ours has not had a separation of theory from practice,
mental from manual labor, thought from execution. As the spirit of capitalism, the rationalization
of labor, originally to God’s glory in the Protestant work ethic, becomes absolute, transforming
the worker into an appendage to the machine. Although Weber’s intent was always anti-Marx, in
fact Marx was no vulgar materialist, as were the communists and all of his epigones, starting
with Engels. In Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx (1964) outlined the birth of a New
Humanism, transcending both idealism and materialism, what Dunayevskaya (2000) called a
It is no accident that the only translation of Science, Society, and Life that does not garble
Marx’s astonishing conclusion is that of Grace Lee Boggs, who, with C. L. R. James and Raya
Dunayevskaya, led the Johnson/Forest tendency within the Socialist Worker’s Party in America.
Neither is it an accident that this was the first English translation of any of Marx’s Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. State capitalism in Russia has the same relationship to science,
and to the worker, as does any other form of capitalism, whether Chinese, or in any other so-
called socialist country. Because Marx’s New Humanism was such a total break with the
bourgeois form, all of his epigones divorced his philosophy from their theories and transformed
Marx’s dialectic of freedom into a triadic dialectic of process: thesis, anti- thesis, and synthesis
— the hallmark of vulgar materialism, which Weber opposed to his last breath. Elsewhere in
40
these essays Marx (1964) almost envisioned yesterday’s Communists and today’s “New
Thinkers” (Beyond War Foundation, 1988) when he completely hammered away the bourgeois
form in arguing that the new society could never result from communism, or the transcendence
of capital, but must transcend even that, and begin on a new, human basis (Marx, 1964).
One of Mannheim’s clearest (1954) perceptions was that a ruling ideology can take any
criticism that is hurled at it, and transform the meanings of words into their opposites, thereby
using utopian arguments against the reformers to maintain the status quo. However, his
sociology of knowledge was strictly an empirical endeavor, and was as divorced from
philosophy, in Marx’s words, as is the remainder of bourgeois science, “to have one basis for life
and another for science is a priori a lie” (Marx, 1844/1947). Like Marx, Mannheim saw society
as a system governed by the interests of contending groups, who use ideas to advance their
various material interests. However, Mannheim could not trace the transformation into opposite
of utopian into ideological thought, any more than he could create a sociology of knowledge that
is more than synthetic, transcending synthesis and qualitatively transforming society into
something completely new, capitalism into its absolute opposite of freely associated labor, as
could Marx. Mannheim was in full possession of the Trinitarian (truncated) dialectic of thesis
/anti- thesis /synthesis, as were Marx’s vulgar materialist epigones, with no categories for
transcendence and transformation into opposite. Marx showed all abstract materialists such as
Mannheim to be idealists. In his revealing essay critiquing Hegel’s philosophy, Marx pointed out
that this New Humanism is the truth uniting both idealism and materialism (Marx, 1947).
As Dunayevskaya argued (Savio, Walker & Dunayevskaya, 1965), “There was nothing
mechanical about Marx’s new materialist outlook. Social existence determines consciousness,
41
but it is not a confining wall that prevents one’s sensing and even seeing the elements of the new
society.” Citing Hegel, she further argued that the spirit is the “indwelling spirit of the
community…As Hegel put it in his early writings, ‘the absolute moral totality is nothing else
than a people... (and) the people who receive such an element as a natural principle have the
mission of applying it.’” Here we get a glimpse of what happens to the Spirit of Capitalism
supplied by the Protestant work ethic when working people release themselves from the steel
“transcendence” and “transformation into opposite” from their dialectic method. They thereby
transformed historical Materialism into vulgar materialism, ending all thought with the Trinity of
thesis /anti-thesis /synthesis, which is process, the highest level abstract materialism can reach. In
this sense, Marx’s utopians converge with Mannheim’s: they all want to become the new boss,
while exploiting labor exactly as before, changing nothing in production relationships. That is
why, when the Hormel workers of Local P-9 in Austin, Minnesota struck against automation and
their union bosses, they threw all of the communists and leftists out of their union meetings the
moment these “supporters” tried to take over the strike. The workers raised such serious
questions as “How shall a man work?” One striking P-9 worker pointed out to a leftist on the
picket line that no one is going to support communism, because it doesn’t make any difference
whether the state or a private entity owns the property, the owners will still demand speed-up,
concessions, and exposure to the risk of man-killing automation from the workers. When asked
how she would deal with competition from foreign workers working for slave wages, she said,
“Pay everyone a union wage. That should solve the whole problem.”
42
The coal miners had struck against automation in1949-50 (Phillips & Dunayevskaya,
1984), raising the same safety questions, as well as questions regarding concessions and speed-
up that Meatpackers Local P-9 raised in 1986. Although they had struck against a new epoch of
Automation, by1986 the workers were confronting the face of the counter-revolution in America,
Reaganism, which introduced a new age of retrogression. Solidarity with the P-9 strike showed
new passions and new forces for the creation of a new society that only Marx’s philosophy of
revolution can embrace (Dunayevskaya, 1996). That is because a new, human world cannot be
built by reformers, philosophers, or theorists, but rather only by human subjects, struggling for
freedom, developing their own philosophy through praxis in the form of a New Humanism,
which Marx himself derived from practice (praxis). In fact, this is precisely the movement from
practice that Marx discovered in the essays of 1848-49 when he announced this philosophy. As
such, philosophy is never finished, and must always be an open system helping to unleash human
potential as every man, woman, and child joins the discussion (Dunayevskaya, 2000). For this
purpose, the real meaning of philosophy, or love of wisdom, becomes an integral part of human
knowledge. The battle of ideas in the marketplace of freedom is far from over. It has only begun.
DEPTH
Annotated Bibliography
Axtmann, R. (2006). The myth of 1648: Some musings of a skeptical Weberian. International
Politics, 43(5), 519+. Retrieved from Proquest Research Library Database.
Summary:
This contribution sketches Max Weber’s model of historical causation and contrasts it to
theoretical and methodological differences between Teschke’s Marxian political analysis and
Weber’s approach. Axtmann also offered a substantive argument concerning the role of religion
in state formation. He suggested that Teschke’s focus on the ‘logic of exploitation’ leads to his
marginalizing the role of religion and the importance of the collective action of ordinary people.
Analysis:
property relations approach, as Teschke used it. Theoretical and methodological differences
result from Weber’s use of ideal types and his concept of the structure of social action, on the
one hand, and a materialist approach to history reflecting one stream of Marxian empiricism on
the other. Axtmann critiques Teschke’s marginalization of the role of religion, thereby discarding
the role of the masses in collective action. This would have horrified Marx, who always kept an
ear to the ground for new ideas from the freedom struggles of his age, even when cloaked in
religious garb.
44
Perspectives:
idealist or materialist, and relativism that strongly resonates with the positions of James and
Sayer. Weber’s main battles were with the vulgar materialism of Engels/Plekhanov Marxists, in
which he succeeded in staking out a position more suited to the study of society, similar to
James’ radical empiricism and Marx’s New Humanism, which were all attempts to escape from
the narrow constraints of 19th century science, which Lenin identified as “the empiricism of a
machine gun.”
Summary:
The authors conducted an experimental study with a dynamic general equilibrium model
of development and growth to test Weber’s hypothesis that Calvinistic asceticism contributed to
the rise of capitalism. They introduce a counterfactual exercise against their model, assuming
that England had remained Catholic at the onset of the Industrial Revolution, quantifying a
parameter for differences in religious belief between Catholics and Protestants, and calculate that
England may have had to wait 70 years for the revolution under their simplifying assumptions.
They conclude that Weber’s model may have some plausibility in comparing Northern to
techniques, to answer precisely the question of how much later would the Industrial Revolution
have started in England if it had not undergone the Protestant Reformation and continued as an
essentially Catholic nation. Grounded in today’s anti- theoretical distinction between land, labor,
and capital, these authors assume that capitalism can be described by assuming that industrious
people, of a Puritan mentality, worked hard to accumulate wealth in their young years, and then
invested it when they got older. The entire history of the first industrial revolution is missing
from their mathematical model, including the enclosure movement, the Opium War, and the
mass starvation in Ireland. Even with their oversimplified assumptions, the authors still find that
the industrial revolution was perhaps accelerated by 70 years because England turned Protestant.
Perspectives:
The authors assumed a utility theory of value, rather than the classical labor theory Smith
essentially a return to this older philosophy, and is subject to all of the criticism offered by Smith
in Wealth of Nations (1776/2003), which today’s econometrists would do well to return to before
attempting to construct economic models of capitalism. It is interesting that this study, even after
development, still find a Weberian role for ideas in historical causation, however minimal.
Chan, T., Goldthorpe, J. (2007). Class and status: the conceptual distinction and its empirical
relevance. American Sociological Review, 72(4), 512--532. Retrieved from Proquest
Database.
46
Summary:
The authors considered Max Weber’s concepts of class and status as forms of social
attitudes were taken as determinants of either one or the other of these categories. This study
points beyond the one-dimensional Duncan Socio-Economic Index, citing empirical evidence for
the continued existence of Weber’s distinctions between class and status in British society, this
study examined the stratification of life outcomes based on Weber’s categories. Chan and
Goldthorpe used the CASMIN class schema for an operational definition of class, and a multi-
affiliations.
Analysis:
The main distinction between the scales used to measure class and status is that the class
scale reflects employment relations, whereas the status scale reflects occupational social honor.
The hierarchy of status that emerged empirically ranks symbolic workers near the top, placing
those who work with materials lower. Managers who have to talk to blue-collar employees rank
below white-collar staff employees. Occupational prestige does not enter into the acquisition of
status, with a low correlation between status as determined by occupational structure and status
here defined are quite distinct. Status is defined by loose social networks, whereas class, the
This study points to the differences in expectations and attitudes between mental and
manual laborers. Blue-collar workers set no goals beyond planned leisure activities, and make no
attempt to acquire the knowledge skills needed for higher status occupations for the very good
reason that they are too scarce to admit more than a few anyway. One road to success is available
in acquiring status, perhaps in cultural, civic, leisure, military or religious activities, which tend
to overlook class differences. However, real class differences remain between those who
consume haute culture and those who only consume popular culture. These differences can only
be overcome by acquiring the knowledge skills needed for mental work, and actually acquiring
one of these very scarce jobs. The bureaucratic division between mental and manual labor is
maintained by solid walls under capitalism which would take nothing less than a thorough
Summary:
Marx, Weber and Durkheim concerned themselves with ideas in general and religious
ideas in particular. This essay compares and contrasts what each of them had to say about ideas
and religion. Demirezen compared Mannheim’s methodology to those of Marx and Weber in
terms of how each approached ideas in general, and religion in particular. Weber certainly broke
with Marx in taking sides with the status quo rather than revolutionary insurgents, but his anti-
materialism was aimed more at the Engels/Plekhanov interpretation of Marxism, rather than
48
Marx’s own humanism, in which Marx argued for the unity of materialism and idealism,
transcending both.
Analysis:
Marx was first and foremost a revolutionary journalist, interpreting and contributing to
the ideas that arose from mass struggle. In action, his polemics against religion were completely
reductionist, although he never espoused vulgar materialism. In the last analysis, humans really
do create ideas, and can only be governed by them in so far as we permit them to govern us.
Marx was more interested in creating revolutionary ideas than being governed by reactionary
ideas. To this extent, his view of religion was reductionist. In Varieties of Religious Experience,
James (1902/2008) took a different approach, attempting to find the validity of religion in
experience. Weber argued against vulgar Marxist epigones, stressing the importance of ideas in
history, but in fact was very Marxian in his approach to class. The main difference between
Weber and Marx was that Weber stood clearly and resolutely on the opposite side of the class
struggle.
Perspectives:
All three thinkers, James, Weber, and Marx, attempted to find a course between the
extremes of radical materialism and absolute idealism in their various attempts to create methods
appropriate to social rather than physical science. Each made important contributions to Sayer’s
(1992) important methodological synthesis, which can provide a new humus for the creation of
social science adequate to human needs, that does not separate science from life, which Marx
Geoghegan, V. (2004). Ideology and utopia. Journal of Political Ideologies, 9(2), 123--138. doi:
10. 1080/13569310410001691172
Summary:
Mannheim and Bloch both believed that the concepts of ideology and utopia are closely
related. Although Bloch accused Mannheim of plagiarizing his idea of utopia, they in fact
analyzed the relationship in different ways. Mannheim viewed both concepts as they emerged
historically through the conflict of group interests in defining modernity, enabling reactionary
and revolutionary elements to transcend reality in pursuing their struggles for power. Bloch saw
ideology as carrying a utopian surplus of unachieved human potential. This paper discusses the
relationship of both thinkers to the ideas of Marx, in terms of their relevance to ‘post-secular’
political philosophy.
Analysis:
To Mannheim, utopias that do not eventually attain power are of little consequence. In
his dialectical theory of history, both ideological and utopian elements emerge through the
politics of conflicting social groups, which may end up sharing power in a dynamic, systemic
synthesis. Today’s utopian vision of freedom may contain ideological resistance to those who
later try to share in the original promise. Reactionaries may stigmatize all oppositional activity as
utopian, while refusing to make any distinction between the impossible and that which is merely
inconvenient to defenders of the status quo. Mannheim terms the illusions of such defenders of
the existing social order ‘ideological, ’ archaic, and extinct, as opposed to the utopian, which
preserves the ideals and hopes of humanity. The sociology of knowledge embodies the
Perspectives:
Mannheim provided the first full discussion of conservatism in Ideology and Utopia
(1954), which continues to exist as an ideology because society never measure sup to the
conservative vision, thereby actually providing it with a utopian thrust, contra-radicalism, for
maintaining the status quo. He founded the sociology of knowledge, which is no small
achievement considering the valuable histories of ideas that have been generated under this
impulse. Bloch and Mannheim both provide illumination, although they define ideology and
utopia differently. Although Mannheim was vague in his elucidation of the sociology of social
examining the stratification of social ignorance, which reflects strongly on the social
Summary
that reflect commonly held evaluations of prestige. Education and income are strongly correlated
to occupation, in terms of the competence, experience and education required for the job.
Education and income provide honor and prestige to status-groups, thereby conferring value to
51
the community, reflecting a social ordering of competence, with scarcity of positions and
Analysis:
The study found that the demographic variables of income and education are strongly
correlated with occupational status and achievement motivation, whereas negative psychological
factors, especially stress/challenge avoidance, were all negatively correlated to the occupational
status scale, to an extremely high degree of significance. This negative factor, strongly reflecting
lack of confidence in performing non-routine tasks and immobility when challenged, was as
strong a predictor r of occupational status as all other factors combined, which confirms
theoretical expectations that accepting and overcoming challenges is required for strong
occupational worth. Persons in unskilled occupations experience low self-esteem, which then
limits their chances of self-realization. People in high status occupations maintain attitudes that
help maintain their success. The willingness to accept challenges and set goals is reinforced by a
Perspectives:
Although no similar study has been conducted in the United States, a US study of
attributional style among life insurance agents (Seligman and Schulman, cited in Henry, 2003)
found that willingness to take personal responsibility for results, accept challenges, and set goals
made a major difference in quantity, retention, and non-redundancy of insurance sold. This is
extremely important for my demonstration, because it provides an empirical basis for the
attitudinal training that is necessary for building a successful insurance agency. Not intuition and
52
natural talent, but rather planning, goal setting, and careful prioritization are needed for such an
endeavor.
Kando, T. (2008). What is the mind? Don’t study brain cells to understand it. International
Journal on World Peace, 25(2), p83-105. Retrieved from SocINDEX Database.
Summary:
This paper looks at the modern belief that the mind is the same thing as the brain, and
therefore consists of genetic and chemical processes. Contrary to this notion is the more
commonsense view that our minds are made up of experiences in the world and with others, and
while the brain may be the material home of the mind, it is not the mind itself. Professor Kando
began with a refutation of materialistic reductionism and positivism, and then built on the work
of William James, George Herbert Mead, and Joel Charon to make the case that the mind is a
Analysis:
The materialist positivism of Comte and the utilitarianism of Mill are presumed in the power
structure of social science research funding, which pours $4G per year into reductionist research
through the NSF and the NIMH. Ill-informed research that presumes morality and ethics are
coded into genetic structures gets funded under supposedly value-neutral suppositions, thereby
science. Thus, scientific journals continue to confuse the brain with the mind, in the same way
Since Durkheim, sociologists have tended to reify society as some supra-individual entity
that thinks and acts as an agent for the collective totality of individuals. Sociologists can then act
as ventriloquists, speaking for society in punishing and correcting deviant behavior. Such
separation between mental and manual labor is emblematic of the separation of science from life,
a priori a lie (Marx, 1947). In developing a new model for critical possibility thinking, I must
avoid such structural fabrications at all costs, and not set myself up as the ultimate interpreter of
reality.
Kumar, K. (2006). Ideology and sociology: Reflections on Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and
Utopia. Journal of Political Ideologies, 11(2), 169-181. doi: 10.
1080/13569310600687940
Summary:
Much of what Mannheim called ‘ideology' is now ‘social constructionism’ and 'discourse
analysis.’ Social scientists are now suspicious of utopias, whereas utopian scholars prefer literary
sketches of perfect societies to revolutionary or messianic social movements. Today’s calls for
the revival of utopian thought fail to specify what social and political conditions are likely to
favor such a revival. Mannheim analyzed the social and political conditions under which utopian
thought flourishes. For sociology, the study of ideology contributed to empirical sociology,
stratification theory, and cultural sociology in attempting to analyze media bias in industrial
strikes.
54
Analysis:
Thatcherism and Reaganism, major working class defeats such as Reagan’s destruction
of PATCO, and the impact of the Kroger contract on the Meatpacker’s Union all brought on
nihilism in thought that renders the whole concept of ideology meaningless precisely because of
its critical edge. If all truth is relative, science is religion. Any opposition between ideology and
truth can only be a false dichotomy. Social constructionism is the current vogue, posing as the
absolute truth of relativism (an oxymoron) while it is in fact an ideology no longer capable of
Foucault’s substitution of the term ‘discourse’ for ideology now imposes the dominant mindset
in place of the radical world outlook provided by Marx’s identification, and Mannheim’s
application of ideology.
Perspectives:
Mannheim, who was perhaps more in tune with Marx than the other Marxists referred to
so far (excluding Marxist-Humanists), believed that truth is a perspective that can be reached by
intellectuals, precisely to the extent that their thinking is not subject to the interests or ideology
of a particular group (Kumar, 2006). To the extent that social constructionism is derived from the
sociology of knowledge, Mannheim is one of its originators. If ideology can be divorced from
truth, how is it possible to be critical in the sociology of fascism? Why not just talk about
programs, doctrines, or philosophies, and forget about false consciousness, and whatever other
Marxist baggage we have been carrying? This is where the social realism of Sayer (1992) is
crucial. We must retain those man-made concepts that contribute to critical verstehen.
55
Lacbelier, P. (2006). Democracy, knowledge and the division of labor. Humanity and Society, 30
(2), 167--179. Retrieved from SocINDEX database.
Summary:
The article discusses social problems in the division of labor and the distribution of
social knowledge. A major consequence of the division of labor under modern capitalism is that
workers are not comfortable with reading. Having taught them how to read enough to fulfill
minimal job functions, such as submitting an application for a position, their teachers never
provided instruction that relates “book learning” to practical experience. This division of labor
shapes a person’s life, self and leisure, aiming at productive efficiency by adapting abilities to
production requirements, while at the same time the ideology of production adapts the minds of
workers to becoming appendages to machines. Weber identified three classes of labor based on
the relationship to and power over knowledge: knowledge professionals, knowledge consumers
Analysis:
Drawing from his training in sociology applied to lived experience as a graduate student
and political activist, the author observed that activist faculty and students become or remain
satisfied with defining their public engagement primarily in terms of teaching and research,
rather than actively working for social change. Most people take for granted an abysmal gulf
between making history and every-day life, only participating in political life during elections or
crises. The division of labor in society defines how people work, think, and live their lives,
reflecting fundamental social problems in the absolute separation of mental from manual labor.
Sociologists already know most of these things, but keep their knowledge locked up in ivory
towers, where it is inaccessible to ordinary citizens, who look at books as objects rather than as
56
reading material. Using Weber’s categories of “knowledge power,” the author suggested means
by which intellectuals, especially sociologists, may help address these social problems.
Perspectives;
Marx (1964) identified this gulf between mental and manual labor as the essence of
capitalism, ultimately to be transcended not in the first negation of communist society, but in the
second negation of “freely associated labor,” which asks us not to define what we are against, but
to create an entirely new form of social organization based on what we are for. Lacbelier does
not seem to recognize the implicit theory in freedom struggles, or how intellectuals can articulate
new theory to help guide such practical struggles beyond elections and crises.
Leary, D. (2004). On the conceptual and linguistic activity of psychologists: the study of
behavior from the 1890s to the 1990s and beyond. Behavior and Philosophy, 32, 13--35.
Retrieved from Academic Search Premier Database.
Summary:
Early in the twentieth century psychology became the study of "behavior.” This article
reviews developments within animal psychology, functional psychology, and American society
and culture that help explain how a term rarely used in the first years of the century became not
only an accepted scientific concept but even, for many, an all-encompassing label for the entire
subject matter of the discipline. Leary then discussed the subsequent research of Watson,
Dolman, Hull, and Skinner, as they attempted to explain ‘behavior’ throughout the course of the
twentieth century. Finally, the article suggests the need for greater conceptual and linguistic
diversity in psychology. In this last regard, reference is made to cognition and consciousness, to
57
James and Dewey, and to the fact that prediction and control of behavior, or behavior
Analysis:
This article examines what was going on in animal research, functional human
psychology, and American society as a whole that led to Watson’s issuance of his behaviorist
manifesto in1913, and the perceived limitations of behavioral research today. Beginning with
Darwin’s work, which placed humans squarely within the animal kingdom; researchers began to
investigate comparative animal intelligence, which eventually led to dropping speculations about
animal minds, and consciousness, which cannot be observed, and substituting studies of their
learning and behavior, the only things that scientists can observe in animals. However, James
and Dewey were also influenced by Darwin, arguing that mind is expressed in natural selection
of purposive action, adapting responses to environmental stimuli for the purpose of survival.
Perspectives:
processes through learning from experience. The pragmatists thereby helped lay the critical
ground for research that transcends the narrow goals of prediction and control of behavior.
Concepts from systems and chaos theory, such as self-adaptive systems and emergence, have
replaced Darwin’s Malthusian metaphors. Meaning can no longer be excluded from the study of
social phenomena, as we deal with objects that are socially defined and study systems that
include self-reflective processes such as our own efforts to understand human behavior.
58
Nolt, J. (2008). Truth as an epistemic ideal. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37(3), 203—237.
doi: 10. 1007/s10992-007-9068-9
Summary:
Peirce, James, Putnam and Wright have variously proposed truth as an epistemic ideal
(TEI), meaning that fixed warranty by human observers under ideal conditions of knowledge is
the necessary and sufficient condition of truth. Kripke’s semantics of intuitionist logic are here
used to examine this notion. Nolt shows that standards of warrant, and one’s ideal standard for
inquiry both determine truth as so defined. The problem of truth has not been resolved, merely
pushed back by any such definition, which may in fact be circular. All requirements but one of
formal logic are here met, but the difficulties involved in defining ‘warrant’ still leave us with
Analysis:
Weber, James, and Mannheim all wrestled with the problem of truth as presented under
empiricism’s critique of idealism, which originates in the skepticism of Socrates. The problem is
to find some middle ground between relativism and absolutism that will enable critique without
dissolution into solipsism, the inevitable end of empiricism and rationalism. Peirce and James
both supplied definitions of warrant that imply endless scientific inquiry, with perhaps the most
reasonable interpretation of Peirce making it the regulative ideal of inquiry, perhaps the best for
which we can hope. No useful notion of truth is infallible, but must be at least falsifiable by
In Sayer’s (1992) terms of practical adequacy, to predict results which are useful subject
to the purpose of inquiry, notions of truth must remain open to the possibility of failure even if
practical adequacy are in fact useless. TEI summarizes a common thread in the efforts of many
to create a critical methodology that remains anchored in truth while avoiding the extremes of
relativism and absolutism. It runs through the methods of James, Mannheim, and Weber, and is
preserved in Marx’s New Humanism (1962). Sayer’s (1992) realist method is the most
comprehensive explication of this methodology, which is crucial for the future development of
Ormerod, R. (2006). The history and ideas of pragmatism. The Journal of the Operational
Research Society, 57(8), 892. doi: 10. 1057/palgrave. jors. 2602065
Summary:
This paper examined the origins of philosophical pragmatism in the USA in the second
half of the 19th-century and its development and use up to the Second World War. The story was
told through the lives and ideas of some of the main originators: Holmes, Peirce, James, and
Dewey. The core idea of pragmatism, that beliefs are guides to actions and should be judged
against outcomes rather than abstract principles, dominated American thinking during the period
of economic and political growth from which the USA emerged as a world power. The paper
suggested that the practical, common sense, scientific approach embedded in pragmatism
resonates with practical operations research, and that much of pragmatism could be attractive to
Kant coined the term ‘pragmatic belief’ in his Critique of Pure Reason, (1781/2003),
which exercised a heavy influence on Peirce. His primacy of will thereby originated in
Schopenhauer’s elevation of will over intellect. Mill’s Utilitarianism provided the valuation of
action in terms of results, the optimum result being the greatest good for the greatest number.
from James’ popularization, identified meaning in terms of the practical link between an idea and
the results expected in practice. Peirce used this as the criterion of truth for obtaining observable
results through the application of scientific method, and for establishing standards of objectivity
for inquiry. James defined experience not as that of scientific research communities, but rather as
relative to the individual stream of consciousness. The practical meaning of ideas is here put to
work in a personal rather than scientific context, according to the individual’s ability to use them
to predict experience, controlling emotions and behavior through internal rather than external
social sanctions.
Perspectives:
scientific approach suggested here. In sales training, much cognitive damage is inflicted on the
Packard, N. (2008). Weber on status-groups and collegiality: Applying the analysis to a modern
organization. Humanity and Society, 32(1), 2-23. Retrieved from SocINDEX database.
Summary:
The article explicated Weber’s derivation of the ideal type ‘status-group’ from his
studies of the Chinese Literati, and then applied it to the Göring Institute of World War II
Germany. Göring stole the Freud Institute (abandoned by Dr. Freud barely in time to save his
own life) and provided it with a Nazi mandate for conversion into a modern, state-funded mental
health industry practicing psychotherapy in the interests of the state. As occupational status-
groups, both the Literati and Nazi therapists generated and mediated social value conflicts,
especially during times of political stress (although the Nazis did not achieve their projected
thousand years of experience). The Reich generously funded short-term directive therapeutic
practice to align deviant behavior with specific social norms through behavior modification,
medical doctors.
Analysis:
Weber’s 1903 thesis of the Iron Cage of capitalism provides a firm grasp, in human
terms, of the rise of Nazi power in Germany, not forgetting Weber’s own contribution to racist
theory noted elsewhere in this thesis. The Calvinist thesis of the natural depravity of man, and
the grace of God’s omniscient selection of the elect from the damned contributed heavily to the
development of modern capitalism under the Puritan work ethic. As a secular religious ethic, the
spirit of capitalism had lost its spiritual aspect, becoming fully rationalized, secularized and
institutionalized through the British and later the American industrial revolutions. By the 20th
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Century, the Nazi medical propaganda machine exploited Luther‘s ideal of the calling, creating a
secular religion by transforming the rationale for obedience to God’s will into obedience to the
state. This ideal social norm supposedly returned Germans to their psychological religious roots,
even to the point of obliterating self for the service of the state, all to the glory of God, in this
Perspectives:
The reason Hitler was so heavily admired by corporate elements in the United States
prior to his pact with Stalin can be found in this analysis of the role of ideology, posing as
absolute scientific truth, in the creation of a garrison state. The USA Patriot Act and the
Homeland Security Act, along with the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (formerly
the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill), draconian anti-poor laws posing as drug control laws, such as the
mandatory minimum sentencing laws of 1986), the ongoing state level privatization of prisons
since the Attica rebellion and massacre, and many other tendencies in American life point in the
same direction. This is why the critical teeth were stripped out of social science methodology,
with a happy smile now defining the meaning of verstehen. This is all being accomplished under
the auspices of the secular religion of Puritanical capitalism, as defined by Weber, who would
have found little fault in Hitler’s application of his ideas. To define the kind of people we want to
Pooley, J. (2007). Edward Shils’ turn against Karl Mannheim: the Central European connection.
American Sociology, 38, p364–382. doi10. 1007/s12108-007-9027-5
Summary:
63
While at the London School of Economics, Edward Shils was influenced by Karl Popper
and Friedrich Hayek to criticize Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, which he had
Mannheim’s theoretical work. This sudden transformation cannot be understood outside of what
during troubled times. Hayek and Popper took issue with all who advanced any form of state
planning, as manifested in the Engels/Plekhanov strain of Marxism touted by the Stalinists, in the
national socialism of Germany, or John Menard Keynes’ (1938, 2008) General Theory of Income
and Employment, Interest, and Money touted at Cambridge. However, as a fellow Hungarian
émigré and lecturing professor at the London School, Mannheim was by far their closest and best
target.
Analysis:
outlook represented the cynicism of idealistic intellectuals whom they thought had paved the
way for fascism and communism. They held Mannheim to be an especially obnoxious and
egregious example of the kind of pompous epigone they thoroughly despised. Mannheim saw a
philosopher/king role for intellectuals in creation of a sociology of knowledge suitable for policy
and planning. This involved far more than the abstract ‘economic man’ of Keynesianism, and
had no relationship to Stalinist or Nazi state planning. However, such inconvenient facts weighed
less in their estimation of Mannheim as a target for intellectual wrath than did the fact that he
was so close at hand. Mannheim attempted to analyze and understand the various ideological
Perspectives:
Because they can disassociate themselves from their point of origin, Mannheim held that
intellectuals may be especially suited to synthesize social knowledge to provide a holistic (not
totalitarian) view from the partial insights of the various intellectual factions. Mannheim’s
position built on Lukacs’ (1923/1971) (another Hungarian intellectual, as was Popper) History
and Class Consciousness. Mannheim had little to say about the sociology of the class that
produces social knowledge, and therefore lacked the capacity for self-criticism, a failing not at
all uncommon even today. However, the criticism of his fellow Hungarian intellectuals must
ideas of Georgi Lukacs. Mannheim’s critique of ideology is especially appropriate today, with
the death of ideology (Bell, 1960/2000) and its rebirth as Foucault’s nominalism.
Reiland, R. (2006). Fat cats, Calvin, and the poor. The Humanist, 66(6). Retrieved from Proquest
Research Library Database.
Summary:
between the development of capitalism and Calvinism, and related his experience of the
Calvinist moral code at Muskingum College in Ohio, which retained a strict moral code left over
from its origin in the church. As a Catholic, he was scape-goated at the school for Romanism,
and failed to see the absolute justice of the Calvinist deity in foreordaining billions of humans to
Analysis:
the implications of Weber’s thesis on the role of predestination in determining the Puritan work
ethic as a driving force in the development of capitalism. Weber saw no injustice in the poverty
of billions of people, but saw it as his job to create a social science that would prevent the
degenerate and weak from overcoming the strong, especially under capitalist competition, where
command over labor and capital markets by racial elites must be maintained and supported by
the state. Reiland seemed to miss Weber’s point, that capitalist markets cannot be relied upon to
protect the strong from the weak, and that scientifically guided government intervention may be
needed to aid “survival of the fittest” under capitalist conditions. To Weber, this was no reason to
overthrow capitalism or embrace a more humanistic value system, but provided the unexamined
values that guided his “value-free” methodology, the purpose of which was to control deviant
Perspectives:
This work shows the outlines of the Puritan work ethic in forming a secular religion in
today’s society. Of special interest is the scape-goating of the poor, a remnant from the ancient
religious practice of human sacrifice to appease angry deities, which functions today to maintain
the belief in the prevalence of justice. Under God’s omniscient plan of predestination, justice can
be seen in the destruction of the morally weak, or the moral weakness of whomever suffers as
did the biblical Job. Job’s job was to suffer. In a perfect society (actually, not perfect so much as
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unevaluated through lack of critical acumen), imperfection is literally in the eye of the beholder.
By confessing our sins, we may always be forgiven, even before the torch is set to the kindling.
Summary:
In this previously unpublished letter to William Erasmus Darwin (Charles Darwin’s son,
named after his grandfather), William James explained the importance of evolutionary theory to
the philosophy of pragmatism, both theoretically and morally, James always recognized the
complexity of psychology as a higher biological function, both in terms of the need for a radical
approach to empiricism in such a science and in understanding humans in terms of our existence
as biological organisms. It is not some ineffable ‘soul’ that differentiates humans from other
animals, but precisely the fact that we make it our business to know and to evaluate.
Analysis:
James’s most distinctive views, both theoretical and moral, were shaped by the new
theory of Darwin, which clearly located humanity within the animal world. In the struggle of the
human organism for existence, knowledge and values both serve biological functions in helping
us to survive. James held standards of truth to be relative to the purpose of action, and the
concrete difference they actually make, rather than to some presumed essential, ideal realm of
reality. No absolute essence, whether objective or subjective, can define an absolute morality that
Perspectives:
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As opposed to both rationalism and empiricism, there is an empirical relationship
between subject and object in experience. Moral knowledge cannot be progressive because there
is no ideal target state for evolution. No evolutionary goal is possible involving any absolute
However, contrary to the Jamsean formulation, I would hold that social evolution occurs within
moral perspectives, and can be evaluated in terms perhaps not completely separated from the
conditions of existence.
Weinstein, J. (2003). Civics as applied sociology. Social Justice, 30(4), p21+. Retrieved from
Questia database.
Summary:
A group becomes self-conscious, in Sorokin’s term ‘for itself,’ when it provides each
functional member with the same degree of access to and influence on the decision-making
process, reaching its full potential to achieve an emergent existence. Through the democratic
process, the group can understand, explain, and act on its own interests. In practice, sociology
applied to anything less than a democratically governed group is simply dealing with an object,
indulging in reductionist psychologism. That is why the sociologist is always looking for
universe. The statistically significant random sample is one in which each member of the
population has an equal probability of being selected. The attributes of a democratic aggregate
Analysis:
Upton Sinclair’s League for Industrial Democracy (LID) articulated the principle that, for
processes, such as education, industry, and civic organizations. Sinclair elucidated industrial
opposed to Taylorism, still the ruling paradigm for management control of production in the US.
As the student auxiliary of LID, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) issued the Port Huron
Statement, which focused applied sociology on the development of a fully democratized society,
which must supply the underpinning of political democracy for it to work. The philosophical
forerunners of sociological thought were the first to take the idea of popular rule seriously, and
promote democracy.
Perspectives
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ suggested that social causation may occur behind the backs of
purposeful actors in the marketplace, reaping unintended results. Smith’s political orientation
was that of laissez faire, which did not connote today’s meaning that elites should be left to
plunder the public treasury in peace, but rather that society, conceived as a democratic
marketplace, should be left alone by plutocrats, autocrats, kings, and aristocrats. Unrestricted
capitalism, under these conditions, would not result in monopolistic advantage, but rather a fair
and equitable division of labor. This was an ideal that could be easily associated with
Zimmerman, A. (2006). Decolonizing Weber. Postcolonial Studies, 9 (1), 53-79. doi: 10.
1080/13668250500488827
Summary:
imperialism in academic circles, and an original theorist of neo-racism for the neo-colonial era,
denying the sole role of biological determinants in racial inferiority, while upholding, and
thereby rationalizing the dominant culture of the colonizer over the native in what Fanon
(1952/2008) identified as the Settler/Native dialectic. The “white man’s burden is thereby
upheld, replicating the political and economic inequities of imperialism in the post-colonial era.
Under new nationalist flags, the citizens of the former empire now immigrate to the metropolitan
centers of the West for their education, where they learn the dominant values of settler culture,
which they return home to implement as administrators over the deracialized, economic empire
of neo-colonialism. Europe is no longer the conqueror, but merely the superior civilization to
Analysis:
Modern globalization reflects a mobility of capital that demands stagnation and continued
superiority under empire that supersedes racial superiority under colonialism. Through the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Western investors maintain conditions of slave labor
and free exploitation of natural resources such as oil and precious metals, whether through the
domination replacing the gunboat diplomacy of the British Empire, now under the one-world
rubric of Pax-Americana. Before the old colonialism had died, Weber had already prepared the
analytical framework for the new imperialism that commenced with the ascendency of America
over the British Empire at the end of WWII (Greene, 1970). Weber simply precludes all
Perspectives:
Today’s ‘cultural relativist’ Weberian epigones, whom Marx would have identified as
springboard for apologetics for the status quo. Weber differed little from Marx’s explanation of
class conflict, placing his adumbration of the new, empirical science of sociology squarely on the
side of the ruling rather than insurgent classes. Today’s neo-racists appeal to Weber rather than
Marx to denigrate all suggestions that political and economic inequities have any social origin as
Kant
Jonathan Edwards systematized and justified the Puritan theme of predestination (cited in
Ormerod, 2006) at the core of Weber’s (2002) identification of the instrumental role of the
Puritan work ethic in the foundation of capitalism, which we will explore in relation to Jamesean
psychology and Mannheim’s concept of ideology. To the Puritan, the ground of reality lies in the
mind of God, who communicates his ideas to humanity through His Word. Unitarianism reacted
asserting the innate moral goodness of the individual. Seeking a philosophic alternative to the
Unitarian religion, as well as to Locke’s empiricism, Emerson helped develop New England
Transcendentalism as a stronghold against Calvinism and the Enlightenment, under the influence
of Kant distinguishing between intuitive reason and analysis of sense experience. Emerson
Peirce:
Kant (2003), who originally coined the term ‘pragmatic belief’ (from the Greek
pragmatikos, meaning deed) in his Critique of Pure Reason, influenced Peirce’s thinking greatly.
Peirce’s primacy of Will derived from Schopenhauer’s elevation of Will over intellect. His
valuation of action in terms of results originated in the Utilitarianism of Mill, for which the
optimum result is the greatest good for the greatest number. Peirce borrowed from all of these
sources to state the original philosophy of pragmatism, identifying the meaning of an idea in the
link between its application and the ensuing results. His primary concerns were with obtaining
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observable results through the application of positivistic scientific method, and establishing
objective standards.
science, the former drawing logically necessary conclusions from formal hypotheses, the latter
deriving positive knowledge about reality from experience. Philosophy is concerned with
common sense in its greatest generality, providing a general conception of reality that serves as a
basis for the remainder of the positive sciences: Phenomenology, normative science (aesthetics
and ethics), and metaphysics. Phenomenology brings order to experience by inquiring into the
general characteristics of all phenomena, however derived. Peirce thought of predicates in terms
of consistency with realism rather than nominalism, deriving semiotics as a theory of meaning.
Today, semiotics is divided into semantics, the meaning of meaning; syntactics, the study of
grammar and deep structure; and pragmatics, which Habermas developed as communications
theory. Semiotics fathered the structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss in the 1950s and 1960s and
Peirce’s epistemology derived from his experience as a laboratory scientist, which led
him to believe that the universe is intelligible, and accessible to understanding (Ormerod, 2006).
To Peirce, science is a cooperative endeavor, taking for granted propositions already established
as certain. Scientific method presumes a reality independent of opinion, affecting the five senses
according to natural laws, and enabling reasonable judgments about reality. Knowledge is
fallible, induction providing the test of certainty, with progress measured by the self-correcting
elimination of errors through experience. Peirce’s affinity with Darwinism arose not from
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Darwin’s refutation of teleology, but rather from the process of natural selection, which is
grounded in random mutations, or errors. All observations are made within defined limits of
error, and natural laws change and adapt over time, becoming absolute only by the pragmatic
2006). For instance, truth is the conclusion that anyone who investigates a matter long enough
will eventually draw, emerging from the consensus of the research community as opinions
converge. Peirce based quantitative induction on statistical sampling, by which the probability
that an element within a population possesses a particular property can be established. His
approaches the correct probability value. Peirce’s central theme throughout voluminous writings
on numerous scientific subjects was the question, “What does it mean to say that we know
something in a world based on chance?” Uncertainty means that knowledge is fallible, and that
mind therefore cannot mirror reality. Knowledge can only be determined socially through the
James
William James’ Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907)
replaced Peirce’s experience of scientific research communities with individual experience. Here
James put Peirce’s concept of meaning to work in a personal rather than scientific context,
deriving the usefulness of ideas in terms of the individual’s ability to use them in predicting
experience, enhancing emotions, and controlling behavior internally rather than being controlled
74
externally through social sanctions. Jamesean radical empiricism viewed reality as constructed
through pure experience. He defined pragmatism as oriented toward consequences and action
rather than any closed ontology, a priori presumption, idée fixee, or absolute; focusing on facts,
consequences, and adequacy: “…ideas (which themselves are but part of our experience) become
true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our
experience, to summarize them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of
following the interminable succession of particular phenomena” (cited in Ormerod, 2006). Truth
is the result of belief defined as that upon which we are prepared to take action, applied in a
specific context. The Cambridge pragmatism of James and Peirce influenced Lewis, Goodman,
Quine, Kuhn, and Putman. James explained Peirce’s philosophy clearly and concisely to the
bowdlerization.
James began his laboratory scientific work in physiology in 1861, founding the first
psychological laboratory at the Harvard School of Medicine two years after Darwin (1859/2006)
announced the Darwin/Wallace theory of evolution, forcing publication of his own 20 years of
research as The Origin of Species. Louis Agassiz, James’ mentor, opposed the theory, while
Jeffries Wyman, another mentor, supported the new research, although the intellectual
community generally received it as under-cutting the theistic account of creation. Organizing the
new science of psychology, James created empirical methods for the study of psych, Aristotle’s
functionalism, the view of mental activities as rooted in the biological needs of living organisms;
although James and Darwin both warned against considering function in isolation from structure,
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an annoying habit of contemporary pseudo-intellectuals Gould (2002) identified as neo-
Darwinists.
science he was explicating and its philosophical background, thereby establishing heuristic
methods appropriate to the study as well as the hermeneutic validity of its concepts. Sharing
American philosophical concerns, he clarified thinking about the new science. James later turned
exclusively to philosophical writing, but his primary concerns in creating Radical Empiricism
and contributing to pragmatism have clear roots in his views on psychology as a science, which
he explored in Principles. Reaching deeply into the philosophical past of psychological thought,
James laid a fresh and robust foundation for a new science that continues to generate research
physiology while taking for granted the clearest introspective human experience, that individual
minds are somehow (in a manner still mysterious, dimly perceived, as through a glass darkly)
functionally grounded in the structure of the human brain. The mind is an evolutionary
adaptation to environment far more flexible than any instinct, or genetically programmed
behavior. Like Peirce and all realists, James assumed that physical reality exists independently of
our minds. In Principles he defined psychology as “the science of mental life, both of its
phenomena and of their conditions” (cited in Heidbreder, 1933, p156). The phenomenological
aspect is borne in the stream of consciousness, whereas the conditions of mental life emerge
the empiricism of Chauncey Wright, and the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer. Wright
considered the empirical justification of cause and effect to be a universal postulate in scientific
inquiry, following Hume and Mill in believing that inductive inferences must be empirically
justified because no a priori principle can supply the necessary connection. The young James
first accepted this postulate as a classical empiricist, later critiquing this principle, radically
extending Peirce’s objections. In the last chapter of Principles, (1950) ‘Necessary Truths and the
Spencer, James noted variability and fitness as two primary mechanisms of survival. However,
Spencer popularized Lamarkian ideas about ‘use inheritance,’ which he used to rationalize his
idea of society as a big, highly evolved animal. Rejecting such nonsense, James took Darwin’s
concept of biological variation and selection, and combined it with falsification through testing
of hypotheses in Pierce and Lotze to devise his theory of mental evolution, which he called
experience. That which is useful in realizing our ends is true, emphasizing an individual, as
opposed to social (Peirce’s scientific consensus) criterion of truth. We choose based on the
effects of experience. The action of will is choice, understood as selection, and viewed in terms
James clearly distinguished the limits of rationality, with Pearson finding the sole
foundation of logic and mathematics in the innate capacity to compare, excluding experience. To
Pearson, reality consisted of elementary qualities, sensations that constitute the a priori
experience, thought creates abstract systems and hypothetical laws, the very stuff of thought.
Predication, classification, reasoning and mathematics are the bases of rationality. Rational
thought cannot tell whether its contents, such as numbers and geometric forms, are real, but only
that if they are, then certain formal relationships exist among them.
1993) noted that he would expect such a distinction to fall in any theory of man-made truth.
Truth may be found through introspection and analysis of a working hypothesis, narrowing error
events, in relation to its practical consequences relative to particular thoughts through a process
of inquiry. Truth is not related to any correspondence theory of mind and reality. Kant’s critiques
of reason and morality suggest that truth is based on belief. Peirce’s hypothesis testing and
Lotze’s Kantian view of scientific method lead to the same conclusion. James synthesized both
the Kant/Peirce suggestion that truth is based on belief, and Darwin’s theory of evolution into his
own theory of mental evolution, psychogenesis (Woodward, 1993), but did not accept the
Kantian duality between phenomena and noumena, theoretical and practical knowledge.
James argued that in no aspect of experience can ideas be seen as reflections, or copies of
reality. Although he wished to ground scientific and moral truth in something more than learning
from experience, he would not accept any logical theory that coherence within a deductive
framework could guarantee truth. Seeking guidance from nature, James extended the
Darwin/Wallace concept of natural selection to the realm of ideas. He clearly rejected the
philosophic dualism of mind/body. Ideas are neither copies of reality, nor are they merely
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rational or empirical. Wherever beliefs come from, their truth is established through a process of
Woodward found this concept coherent with modern ideas about probability and chaos,
especially Croce’s 1990 thesis (cited in Woodward, 1993), calling attention to James’ open,
probabilistic ontology, and Siegfried’s 1978 thesis on chaos. Whether or not James provided
final answers to questions of the philosophy of science, he clearly stated the problems, and
refused to commit himself to any existing school of thought. It is interesting that, after he wrote
the last chapter of Principles, his interests focused on philosophy from that point forward, and
rather than rewrite his work using the radically empirical methodology he had derived from this
study of the human mind, he went on to state the principles of Radical Empiricism and became a
major influence in the philosophy of pragmatism, which inspired behaviorism in psychology and
Consciousness lies in the action of the cerebral cortex, as it mediates between neural
inputs and outputs. The immediate and personal character of experience provides the
fundamental data of psychology. James evaluated all of the new kinds of psychological
theory he never lived to see), British Associationism, and French studies of psychopathic
personalities, valuing knowledge won through all methods, while critiquing narrow views and
research principles. Even in his psychical research, James clearly distinguished between
speculation and observation. “He was fundamentally of a scientific turn of mind…. (although) he
was so alive to human hopes and desires (especially religion, which he investigated in Varieties
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of Religious Experience (2008)) that he could not help giving them a chance” (Heidbreder, 1933,
considered intellect to be only one of many human coping mechanisms. He observed that
human faculties. James’ sharp critique exposed the true appeal of determinism in terms of its
rather than grappling with its complexity. All thought originates in experience, which validates
and verifies value as truth. The clearest and most immediate field of experience is self-
consciousness. Although James would eventually deal with challenges to the existence of
consciousness in his philosophy, he considered such questions to be too metaphysical for the
science of psychology.
that we can never step twice into the same stream (of consciousness), that any idea reconsidered
exists in an altered state, and that the object of thought must never be confused with the process
of thinking about it. James rejected determinism as inadequate to moral experience, and
verifiable. With Bergson, James rejected Hume’s “sensate” as the foundation of causation and
necessity. We exercise freedom of will relative to a future open to possibility and effort. In
dismissing Plato’s ideal realm of absolute truth as a myth, James dismissed both absolute
psychology. Single, complete thoughts, inseparable from language, reference objects with all of
the ‘fringe’ connotations that accompany transitive states of consciousness. This stream flows
without break, form interacting with substance, thereby creating complexity in terms of unity and
continuity. Perception is selective, leading to deliberation and choice in identifying the attributes
of its object. Not all selection activities are volitional, some are even unconscious, but
nevertheless selection narrows the possibilities in the stream of consciousness. The individual
constructs self out of such material, thereby finding salvation and meeting her calling, which we
When behavior adapts to circumstances, arriving at the same goal through a variety of
means, following James we can infer the existence of mind. In Principles, James postulated a
stream of consciousness, with the entire brain constantly changing its state as human will directs
thought, resulting in behavior. Taking partial semiotic cues from James, the Behaviorists reduced
this concept of perception and thought embedded in experience to simple stimulus and response,
and learning to simple and operant conditioning, both objectively observable, as constituting the
Watson, Pavlov, and Skinner reduced Jamesean spontaneity, grounded in free will, to
genetically preprogrammed behavior, or instinct, which can be shaped in the laboratory using
lacking the self-consciousness requisite to mental life, the founders of Behaviorism assumed no
empirical distinction between mind and body, dismissed introspection as unscientific in favor of
discarded physical concepts of ‘phlogisten’ and ‘ether,’ Behaviorism rejected Jamesean self-
awareness, embracing only the functionalism derived from James’ evolutionary biology.
James viewed self-consciousness from two perspectives. As awareness of self, ‘I’ thinks,
whereas ‘Me’ is the objective self, projected in social life as observed by others, with a spiritual
aspect. Personal identity is the remembered sequence of self in action. We exercise the will to
believe through habit. James believed his personal clinical depression was brought on through
over-indulgence in introspection, his primary scientific methodology, and overcame this medical
problem through action and choice. James’ Varieties of Religious Experience (2008) presented
this struggle as a moral choice, sustained through faith, which is the will to believe. He thought
too highly of human aspirations, hopes, and dreams to crush faith under the enfilade of
empiricism (the empiricism of a machine gun, in Lenin’s apt phrase). To quote C. L. R. James
“The bourgeois hypotheses are for the most part unconscious. They are the
inevitability of bourgeois society, natural division of labor, more particularly of
men into capitalists and workers, constantly expanding technical progress,
constantly expanding production, constantly expanding democracy, and
constantly rising culture. But during the last thirty years, these have crumbled to
dust in their hands. They have no hypotheses they can believe in and that is why
they cannot think. Historical facts, large and small, continuously deliver
shattering blows at the foundation of their logical system. Nothing remains for
them but the logic of the machine gun, and the crude empiricism of police
violence.”
William James’ interest in religion was detached and impersonal, and his assessment of
belief empirical. James hoped to establish the validity of religion through mystical experience,
and did not dismiss the possibility of Spiritualism (which Houdini the magician later thoroughly
debunked). William Barrett (cited in Ormerod, 2006), the existentialist philosopher (Sartre was
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influenced by James), suggested that perhaps James should have taken a more pragmatic
approach to religion, elevating prayer to the status of praxis. Others see a Svedborgian religious
James pointed out that established beliefs are held, in the face of contradictory facts, until
some new idea enables a new synthesis of old and new experience. Kuhn (1996) picked up on
this idea, defining normative research and its response to change. Barrett (cited in Ormerod,
2006) observed that Wittgenstein’s pragmatic analysis of language, and the 20th Century rise of
Existentialism under the influence of Heidegger and Sartre have brought James’ ideas back into
toward introspection. One extreme considers our awareness of our own states of consciousness to
be the immediate, infallible, undistorted experience of reality, as distinct from the reconstructed
form in which we know external objects. Comte (founder of naïve objectivist sociology), took
the opposite extreme, according to which “the thinker cannot divide himself into two, of whom
one reasons while the other observes him reason. The organ observed and the organ observing
being, in this case, identical, how could observation take place?” (cited in Heidbreder, 1933).
Comte is here presuming objectivity as possible only in the absolute separation of subject from
object.
Sayer (1992) identified Comte’s formula as Scientism, a bastardized mix of idealism and
empiricism concocted by Comte in applying J. S. Mills’ recipe for a new social science, modeled
on the mechanistic natural science married to technology and capitalism that emerged from and
drove the industrial revolution. Today’s normative social science inherited Comte’s materialistic,
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deterministic precepts. Although functional and behavioral psychological methodologists paid lip
service to James, their reductionist interpretation of pragmatism fully embraced the British
Empiricism James had so thoroughly criticized as woefully inadequate for any humanistic
science.
Although Hume’s empiricism was considered radical in its day, James established his
own separate stream of Radical Empiricism. Philosophically, modern empiricists were children
of Epicurus, Democritus, and Lucretius, whereas James derived insights about change
(Heraclitan fire) from Stoicism. Zeno’s paradox was designed to show the impossibility of
change under atomistic assumptions, which British Empiricists adopted while dismissing Zeno as
a Sophist. Simply ignoring Zeno through misinterpretation rather than grappling with the
implications of the paradox prevented modern naïve, objectivist materialists from understanding
contingent rather than causal relationships. To James, both causal and contingent relations are
foreshadows Sayer’s (1992) middle ground between idealism and relativism, which he
labeled ‘realism,’ James focused more on experience, whereas Sayer focused on the role
is the extent to which knowledge in action generates expectations that are subsequently
realized. James’ criterion of truth is utility, which is the extent to which an idea helps
explain experience. “The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of
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our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving" (cited in
Crosby, & Viney, 1993). To James, reality is what we experience. Sayer’s stream of
Radical Empiricism.
In James’ view, subject and object are empirically and irreducibly separated in terms of
(Descartes’ ‘ghost in the machine’) absolutely separated subject from an unknowable object,
known only through the reflection of sensations relative to a priori ideal prototypes. To
somehow look behind experience for ‘true’ forms, known only to intuition, is pointless when the
truth of an idea can only be defined in terms of its practical adequacy to experience. The world
of thought and our thoughts about the world are both connected to experience. Cartesian doubt
(actually reconstituted Scholasticism, stripped of any concept of divinity) and John Locke
To Sayer (1992), neither theory nor observation can be value-neutral, in line with James’
critique of Comte’s definition of scientific objectivity, which rendered absurd the notion that
human interests have nothing to do with scientific constructions. Science begins with a “craving
to believe that the things of the world belong to kinds which are related by inward rationality
together” (cited in Crosby & Viney, 1993). Science is selective, built on plastic human
assumptions and demands. James denied the rationalistic “law of sufficient reason,” admitting
order and chaos, causation and mystery. Methodology must be pluralistic, adapted to the subject
matter at hand. James evaluated all experience (reality) in terms of memory, judgment, and
85
inquiry. The sensate, from which selective perception determines the way we construct reality,
exists within the stream of consciousness. James would have been comfortable with Sayer’s
socially constructed objects, which perhaps reflect Peirce’s criterion of truth as educated opinion
contradicted this principle in adhering to the dogma of atomism, causation as grounded only in
succession, the absolute separation of the five senses, and accepting a priori judgments and
experimental confirmation. James recognized the specific problems arising in both experimental
and comparative methods, identifying two transcendent linguistic problems that result in
confusion between thought and its object: Mental facts for which no words exist will be missed
entirely, and words can identify facts for which there is no introspective evidence of existence.
The persistent identity we attribute to ideas is a result of our confusion of thoughts with their
objects, which he found to be the primary sin of empiricism, whether Continental or British.
Furthermore, in observing a mental state, the psychologist must identify only what is,
“undistorted by custom, learning, or the uncritical habits of common sense” (Heidbreder, p175).
deriving his scientific methodology through his observations as a student of the psyche. In his
James first developed his methodology heuristically, while exploring the human psyche.
His distinctive approach, as opposed to British empiricism, derived directly from his
addresses psychological subjects, and in the course of his philosophic writings, James
To James, the unity of experience is ‘concactenated’ (cited in Crosby & Viney, 1993),
formed out of the chaotic material of experience by our selective, classificatory, constructive,
theorizing attention. Although he accepted the mechanistic claims of 19th Century science, James
did not accept ‘science’ as the ultimate ordering of experience, and conceived the study of
psychology as broader than any such narrowly defined science. A science of the psyche cannot
be value-neutral, but embraces human interests, needs, and assumptions. As Sayer (1992) would
later point out, naïvely objective empiricism, today’s normative stream of social science
research, cannot be accused of actually being value-neutral, or of making observations that are
not theory-laden; but only of refusing to acknowledge these facts, and therefore of failing to
grapple with its own prejudices and presumptions. In accepting experience, consciousness and
self as we find them in introspection, James laid the psychological groundwork for a pragmatic
Experience is complex and dynamic, but not beyond systematic understanding. James
theory. To James, any unitary, universal monism is a myth. His Radical Empiricism defined
‘pure experience’ as relative and fallible, as are all of our intellectual constructs, hypotheses or
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facts, subject to future experience. Empty abstractions and generalizations are useless without
reference to concrete experience. In Principles, James as philosopher and scientist tentatively but
science. The subject of the psyche, as encountered in experience and explored through the widest
possible spectrum of approaches, demanded the radicalization (in the sense of getting to the root)
became the basis of his clear statement of Radical Empiricism, and later his Pragmatic Method
(James, 1977).
In The Perception of Reality (cited in Crosby & Viney, 1993), James argued that
concepts are real to the extent that they are rooted in sensation, are vivid and immediate, are
coherent with other ideas, and have practical and emotional value to the self. In The Stream of
Thought he argued that this reality is fluid, dynamic, and changing between persons and cultures.
The dualism between subject and object, as relationship between knower and that which is
known, is not of two opposed substantial realms of mind and body, but rather an experientially
given, empirical fact that forms the subject matter of psychology. Rather than separate mental
from physical substance, psychology is interested in how the mind, as a function of the brain,
actually works, and how changes in the brain correspond to thoughts and emotions.
Although concepts must refer to sensual experience, both must also be consistent with
religious and moral needs. The social nature of man makes it impossible to doubt the existence
of other minds, which is a matter beyond sensation that brings us to spiritual awareness. By
refusing to preclude psychical and religious experience, Jamesean psychology paved the way for
later philosophical development. The scope of Principles accepted empirical information from
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all forms of investigation related to the stream of experience, all ways of studying the psyche,
whether of the paranormal, the abnormal or religious belief. Furthermore, data from the five
senses imply no absolute, atomistic monism. There is no such thing as an individual sensation,
separated from the stream of consciousness and unrelated to all other sensations except by
contingency. The stream consists of a teeming multiplicity, from which selective attention must
discriminate structure and relationship to identify objects. Because relationships are inseparable
from objects, neither science nor philosophy needs British Associationism as glue to patch
together the atomized, disassociated world of Mill, Hume, and Hartley. This conception of
reality clearly paved the way for Radical Empiricism. Sayer’s (1992) causal powers of objects
James may not have provided a final solution to the problem of knowledge in his concept
of pure experience, in which subject and object are both part of a process of cognition, but he did
seriously critique the reduction of science to materialism. James’ influence can be seen in
Bernstein’s 1983 reformulation of the German hermeneutic tradition (cited in Woodward, 1993),
also opposed to neo-Kantian analytic philosophy, which finds structure embedded in shared
experience and nature. Edie’s 1987 critique viewed Rorty as returning to James through Dewey’s
theory-laden.
“Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience,” the final chapter of Principles of
Psychology (1890/1950), highlights James’ rejection of Kant’s division between analytic and
synthetic knowledge. The genetic epistemology presented here, and later developed by Piaget,
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ranges over various kinds of knowledge and how they develop. James established the link to
evolution through the surviving effects of action. This links James’ pragmatic approach to
meaning to the German hermeneutic tradition through praxis, in terms of the verifiable content
idealist presuppositions,’ neither mechanistic nor socio-biological. Woodward found the center
of James’ vision is a ‘reconstructed realism,’ through which humans construct order, relative to
cognitive development and philosophical discussions of truth, belief and meaning, thereby
establishing the role of James’ evolutionary epistemology in history and in theory. “True ideas
are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we
cannot.” Fallibilism discards scientific hypotheses that do not meet the test of logic, that (P→Q)
hypothesis, but no accumulated weight of empirical evidence can otherwise establish its truth.
James, Wright, Peirce, Fries and Myers all contributed to Fallibilism, although strong links to
Kant remain obscure. Woodward cites Myers in tracing the origin of James’ pragmatism to
1885, and goes on to show the true origin in James’ mid ‘60’s critique of Spencer. James derived
the idea that we posit uncontradicted beliefs as absolute reality from Kant by way of Peirce and
the proposition that mind somehow ‘mirrors’ reality. The distinction between mind and body is
insight, or verstehen (Weber, 1962), and emotion is blind, cutting off value mediated by feeling
and oblivious to the feelings of others. Feelings can be the best guide to truth. Here, James seems
Throughout his Principles of Psychology, (1950), James made a careful study of all
phenomena, and philosophers, and explored their relationship to a methodology appropriate for
the new science of psychology. “Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience,” the final
chapter of Principles, summarized his criticism of empiricism, rationalism, and Kant’s divorce
between theory and practice, without fully synthesizing James’ own methodological discoveries,
which are developed throughout Principles. It is interesting that, after he wrote the last chapter of
Psychology, James’ interests focused on philosophy from that point forward, and rather than
rewrite his work using the radically empirical methodology he derived from this study of the
human mind, he went on to state the principles of Radical Empiricism and became a major
influence in the philosophy of pragmatism, which inspired behaviorism in psychology and led to
aspects. In1917, Dewey (cited in Crosby & Viney, 1993) acknowledged the contribution of
interactions and group behavior, investigating the relation between instincts and social habits.
George Herbert Meade then picked up Dewey’s gauntlet and founded the science of social
Psychology.
Dewey
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics in pragmatic terms (Ormerod, 2006). He was
analysis, during undergraduate studies at the University of Vermont, later turning to Hegel for a
philosophy to provide guidance in living. During graduate studies at Hopkins, he was inspired by
Wundt’s Gestalt psychology. He integrated this with evolutionary theory, dropped Hegel, and
established an experimental school for educational reform at the University of Chicago. Modern
philosophers Putman, Habermas, and Rorty acknowledge his influence (cited in Ormerod, 2006).
Dewey applied philosophy to social practice in relating education to political reform. His
thought represented the Progressive Movement, which identified positive social change as the
need to reform the socially destructive habits of working people, such as exemplified in the
colleagues at the University of Chicago: Mead in founding Social Psychology and Watson in
founding Behaviorism, and was seminal for researchers at Columbia and several other
practical problem solving and in scientific inquiry (Ormerod, 2006). Scientific inquiry is self-
correcting, to be reviewed in the light of social rather than scientific values. Intelligent inquiry
solves problems, correcting itself through experimental testing and refinement of hypotheses
formulated in the light of experience. Morals and politics yield to this approach, as do the natural
sciences. For instance, legislation to change functions of government can be tested, with social
context defining the problem and suggesting its solution, and results reflecting back on the
process of inquiry. No rule is infallible, but progress results from intelligent personal habits
Education is crucial to such progress. Children are active, willful, and impulsive,
influenced by as well as acting on their environment. Flexible and intelligent habits can be
cultivated in an environment that permits and evokes intelligent inquiry. Practical activities that
suggest the direction of theory should be emphasized, which can then guide further action. These
ideas provided the philosophical foundation of Dewey’s education laboratory at the University of
Chicago, the Dewey School, in which he tested and developed the new Gestalt psychology, in
the light of the psychology of James, who would surely have embraced the new synthesis with
the latter findings of Gestalt had he lived to see them (Ormerod, 2006). Dewey never lost the
idea of the unity of knowledge which he had first learned from Hegel.
Growth is the goal in human development, both in powers and abilities, through an open
capacity for and sensitivity to experience. Ends cannot be separated from means, knowing from
doing, theory from practice. In Dewey’s laboratory, children learned through goal-directed group
activities, conducted as workshops, addressing needs of family, business, and industry. Although
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not a socialist himself, Dewey was sympathetic to American socialism, which grew in the wake
of the labor movement. Dewey was an enemy of oligarchy and economic injustice. As a political
naturalist, he held that a philosophical view of politics and society can learn from the natural
sciences that humans are political animals, and that social interaction is an emergent
phenomenon, a biological activity that creates, preserves, and propagates shared meanings, and
that cannot be reduced to its biological components (Ormerod, 2006). Consciousness arises
socially, emerging from complex relationships between systemic elements of open systems,
The unpredictable physical and highly organized social environments with which we
interact justify the state and natural rights, rather than any appeal to reason (Ormerod, 2006).
Dewey studied early and modern cultures and institutions. His method of philosophic criticism
was genetic analysis, tracing the history of ideas and institutions, comparing action and its results
in terms of original intention. Instrumentalism analyzes action in terms of means and ends.
Concepts and theories can be made to serve even higher ends, such as social justice. Dewey
proposed that justice can only be known by first categorizing, then comparing just to unjust
actions. Justice arises from concrete living activity, and becomes a dead letter when embodied in
an abstraction such as an ideal or principle, which leaves no room for alternative viewpoints in
The quality of our participation in the political process can be evaluated through
experience. Generational and technical change introduce social instability, which now has
reached crisis proportions, requiring the best intellectual and moral resources of the entire
community, which only democratic economic and social justice can call forth. Democracy
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provides the widest universe of discourse for the human experiment, and the broadest possible
framework for intelligent inquiry, which will determine the outcome of the battle of ideas.
Dewey wrote in 1937 that practical problem solving is critical to inquiry: all “controlled inquiry
and all institution of grounded assertion necessarily contain a practical factor, an activity of
doing and making which reshapes antecedent intellectual material and sets the problem of
Impact of Pragmatism
well adapted to unlimited expansion s Natty Bumppo (Cooper, 1984) first explored, then Paul
Bunyan conquered the Western Frontier. Pragmatism expressed the go-getter, maximum
achiever attitude engendered in the Puritan work ethic, as identified by Max Weber (2002).
Dewey pointed out that abstract principles cannot provide a basis for action precisely because
ends cannot be separated from means. Empirical questions always arise from the examination of
means. Ends must always be compared to outcomes. Inquiries into possible outcomes of social
action can be conducted along empirical lines, through the scientific analysis of factual evidence,
with each issue weighed against experience, history, and context. Preferring logical positivism,
symbolic logic, and linguistic analysis as paradigmatic frameworks for normative social science,
professional philosophers failed to notice their loss of a critical edge in adopting methods from
physical science. Sartre, Marcuse, Freud, and others questioned whether the world really can be
improved through human effort. A critical pragmatism is surely preferable as a guide to action to
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such existential angst.
Marx and Habermas both emphasized praxis in rapidly accelerating technical change at
the center of their social vision. In founding the Frankfurt synthesis of Marxian class interest
with Freudian alienation, Habermas focused on modern politics, in terms of Dewey’s theory of
value, clarifying rational grounds for social criticism, and analyzing the role of ideology in
public debate. Widespread public discussion of social concerns enables the adoption of
reasonable policy. The role of ideology in creating technocratic consciousness must be carefully
Out of the Frankfort School, Mannheim’s (1929/1954) Ideology and Utopia developed
ideology as fundamentally conservative and reactionary and utopian thought as critical, radical,
ideologies to class interests, and was the first to actually examine the various world outlooks that
define competing interests. His sociology of knowledge provided an intellectual framework for
Behaviorism
Leary asked what was going on in animal research, functional human psychology, and
American society as a whole that led to Watson’s issuance of his behaviorist manifesto in 1913
(cited in Leary, 2004), and what are the perceived limitations of behavioral research today?
Beginning with Darwin’s work placing humans squarely within the animal kingdom, researchers
animal minds and consciousness, which cannot be observed directly, and focusing on direct
observations of animal learning and behavior. With Angell’s 1913presentation to the APA (cited
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in Leary, 2004), behavior became a category in psychology, and grew in preferential use as
of study. The ultimate outcome of mental processes was seen to lie in how an organism
Under the inspiration of Darwin’s ideas about evolution, James and Dewey had argued
that mind is expressed in natural selection of purposive action, which adapts responses to
appropriate in terms of its consequences. Mind is a tool serving survival, having evolved in the
struggle for existence. As such, it is a function within the stream of consciousness, orchestrating
life processes through learning from experience. Dewey (Leary, 2004) conceived of spiraling
stimulus-response (S-R) circuits with feedback, rather than James’ S-R arcs. Watson studied at
the University of Chicago under Dewey, but turned to Angell for the definition of functional
adapting behavior to environment. Under the leadership of Mead (founder of social psychology),
the Chicago functionalists never forgot Angell’s point that for human beings the environment is
The experimental work of Tolman, the theorizing of Hull, and the success of Skinner in
actually controlling behavior under some circumstances, outline the primary scope of
behaviorism throughout the remainder of the 20th century. The rise and consolidation of the
Progressive Movement during this same period, in which Dewey, Mead, and other pragmatists
were leaders, provided the social backdrop in America for the course of behaviorism. The idea
was that America’s otherwise perfect democracy was blemished by the dysfunctional behavior of
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poor people, which must be predicted and controlled. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity, his opus
to utopian reform in America, Skinner (1971) stepped completely outside of his laboratory
results with pigeons, proposing operant conditioning as the model for all learning and the basis
for social control. By this time, major criticisms had already arisen within the social sciences of
the reductionism, logical positivism, philosophical materialism and scientism under which
Although James, Dewey, and Mead laid the groundwork for the excessive claims of
behaviorism, they also helped to lay the critical ground for research that transcends the narrow
goals of prediction and control of behavior. Darwin’s simplistic metaphors (primarily inherited
from economics, especially the Malthusian hypothesis) have been replaced by concepts from
systems and chaos theory, such as self-adaptive systems and emergence. Meaning can no longer
be excluded from the study of social phenomena, as we deal with objects that are socially
defined and study systems that include self-reflective processes such as our own efforts to
understand human behavior. As are the systems of thought and behavior found outside of
The popularization of vulgar Darwinism (Kando, 2008), originally defined by James and
thoroughly critiqued by Gould (2002), holds that morality and ethics are coded into genetic
structures. Kuhn’s paradigm might describe this as normative research, although extending
Kuhn’s r-r-revolutionary analogy a bit further, we might also describe it as a scientific counter-
revolution. With the government, under the auspices of the NIMH (National Institute of Mental
Health (see Goring Institute below)) and military research, pouring $4 trillion per year more into
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reductionist research into consciousness and self-awareness, the unexamined prejudices and
presumptions of normative, positivistic social science continue to receive that much more
reinforcement (with scientists behaving like pigeons in Skinner boxes), in the form of ill-
informed research published in scientific journals that continues to confuse the brain with the
Kando described this in Marxian terms as reification, providing material form to abstract
concepts, personifying ideas into something tangible, often in the interest of operationalizing
measurement, but even more often in the interest of visualization, as when we attribute human
characteristics to animals or organizations. This process can be most clearly seen in cartoon
characters, such as Tony the Tiger, or Dino the dinosaur, who personified energy in your belly or
your gas tank. Sociologists, following Durkheim, tend to reify society, as though there were
some supra-individual entity that thinks and acts as an agent for the collective totality of
individuals. Sociologists can then act as ventriloquists, speaking for society in punishing and
When psychologists equate the mind and consciousness with the brain, they presume
both to be material substances that can then be investigated using microscopes, chemicals,
weights and measures, like any other physical object. This is not to say that conditions such as
hunger, fear, motivation, etc. do not have physiological correlates, but only that a state of being,
quality, or experience, cannot be reduced to such physiological measures. A lie detector cannot
detect a lie, but only physiological changes that people usually, but not always, go through when
they are lying, and often when they are not. The physiology, motivation, and feeling of hunger
are neither located in the stomach, nor in any particular brain neuron. Hunger is a state, a
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process, or a sensation, but not an object that can be quantified in terms of ‘insufficient food
intake.’
Consciousness may require neuro-chemical processes to emerge, but it is not the sum of
these processes. It may be the result of chemical processes in our nervous system, just like pain
is the result of tissue damage. Different mental functions are performed by different parts of the
brain, but mind is a function, a process emerging from experience, that requires language, and
therefore society, for self-awareness. My computer can process this document, enabling me to
create and store it. However, the computer will never produce this document. Turn the computer
on, and this document springs back on to the monitor. Turn my brain off, and the remainder of
this document will never be produced. No computer ever had a thought. The idea of a thought
When humans try to breathe life into their conceptions, they only reify monsters, as did Mary
The good doctor meant well, as did his creation, an allegory for reductionist science, but
like today’s research establishment, he was wedded to Comte’s Positivism, believing that life,
rather than merely a semblance of life, can be derived from electricity interacting with matter.
Dr. Galvani may have galvanized a frog leg back in 1737, but he was further from inspiring the
breath of life than the discoverer of the lodestone was from inventing a warp drive for the
starship Enterprise. Martindale (1960, p53) defined positivism for the social sciences as, “that
procedure, and rejecting all tendencies, assumptions, and ideas which exceed the limits of
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scientific technique.” The primary drawback of positivism is that it suffers from the same
limitation Bruce Willis exhibited in The Sixth Sense (Shyamalan, 1999): positivism, along with
Descartes, sees the machine only through the eyes of the ghost, but cannot see ghosts. By failing
to examine their own presumptions, precepts, and values, positivists can point to Comte as the
founder of social science, modeled on Galileo’s laboratory experiments, but cannot identify
themselves as acolytes of Comte’s religion of Scientism. This is the ruling paradigm of today’s
normative social science research (Kuhn, 1996), sturdily resisting all criticism, however
trenchant.
Even James and Mead worshipped at this materialistic altar, laying a trail that leads
directly to Skinner and his boxes. Because James saw philosophy as the higher calling, he
abandoned the science of psychology, of which he was a major architect, thereafter deriving
from his studies of the mind and hammering out a radical methodology for an empirical science
of psychology which neither he, nor anyone else has fully realized even today. He went on to
become a major thinker in pragmatism, expanding it beyond the narrow fetters of the scientistic
presumptions of men like Peirce. The underlying ontology of orthodox science is reductionist
materialism, which James thoroughly critiqued. Karl Popper fashioned Lotze’s Kantian
formulation of hypothesis testing into his own theory of falsification (Woodward, 1993), paying
lip service to critical rationalism while covertly importing the atomism and natural law of
Lucretius, Berkeley, Hume, Locke and Mill. James had methodically rooted these
Today’s rationalists, on either side of the narrow ideological divide between Popperism
and post-Marx Marxism, whether epigones of the London School of Economics or acolytes of
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Stalin’s Five-Year Plan, all follow Descartes into Plato ‘s cave, separating subject from object
and theory from practice. The ghost still lives in the machine, recreating the entire material
universe with each observation, even in the extremely durable Copenhagen interpretation of
out by Bohr and Heisenberg. As Dr. Samuel Johnson said when he kicked the stone, “I refute it
(Bishop Berkeley), thus.” (cited in McFadden, 2000, p. 195). Critiquing modern psychological
deducible a priori, or subject to empirical verification, must exist for any specific state of
consciousness is simply incoherent in the light of ongoing research. An unknown bard provided
this reply to Dr. Johnson: “Kick the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones, but cloudy, cloudy is
the stuff of stones.” (cited on p36). Rationalism, in its unrelenting materialism, functions as a
bridge from Berkeley to Descartes, providing a thin baptismal chrism for solipsism.
The closed universe presented by Popper’s Critical Rationalism presumes that all
cannot be seen as a category, therefore such science cannot admit that it is guided by any
philosophical ontology or metaphysics, but rather prefers to interpret its own blindness as “value-
neutrality.” All abstractions must be reducible to physical building blocks to earn the ascription
of physical reality. On work-days, scientists drop the religious trappings of inductive empiricism,
exchanging their ascension robes for the laboratory coats of deductive-nomological theory,
having survived the firing squad of peer review. Although critical rationalists profess immediate
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conversion when confronted by falsification, Kuhn (1996) suggested that they are more likely to
A major issue that still causes confusion is the difference between the Darwin/Wallace
co-discovery of the fact of evolution, and the scientific metaphors (from the realm of economics)
that Darwin used to state his theory of evolution (Skrupskelis, 2007). Darwin wrote thousands of
pages of observations illustrating the fact that evolution has indeed occurred in biological
systems, although it would be four decades before Mendel’s contemporaneous gene theory could
provide a mechanism for mutation, and the process is still not well-understood (McFadden,
2000). From James’ synthesis of Peirce’s philosophy of pragmatism and the Darwin/Wallace
James clearly argued, this is dangerously simplistic for understanding an evolving organism that
possesses language and self-consciousness. Functionalism assumed that structure can be fully
relationships between elements and by establishing the conditions necessary for development.
However, this does not explain origin (Sayer, 1992), and leaves untouched the emergence of new
The corpus of scientific thought since James and Darwin/Wallace shows clearly that
evolution has also occurred in all aspects of creation other than biological. Many different strata
of systems have emerged, dating back to the first few billionths of a second during the proto –
event astronomer and astrophysicist Fred Hoyle (a steady-state theorist) disparagingly dubbed
“The Big Bang.” Today, Father Georges LeMaitre’s solution to Einstein’s equations of General
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Relativity is universally known as “the Standard Cosmological Model.” Although his appellation
has been retained, few follow Dr. Hoyle in scoffing at the theory as the rehashed Catholic dogma
of creation ex nihilo. Today, theories of evolution are themselves an open system, undergoing
framework available to men like James and Darwin was that which is most appropriate for
deductivism, and scientism (Sayer, 1992). That is perhaps why James’ thought evolved from
Darwin and James discovered the fundamental realities of transformation and change.
James rejected many aspects of the science of his time, including foundationalism, the theory of
absolute knowledge. In laying the foundations for the science of psychology, James first
identified all aspects of his new scientific method, Radical Empiricism, although this
methodology remains yet to be fully realized in the study of the psyche. Separately, he was an
original thinker in the philosophy of pragmatism, which he conceived and that still exists as an
perspective Darwin, Wallace and James were conducting initial explorations of the most
complex of open systems, and could not be expected to have fully escaped from the closed
ontology they had inherited as the orthodox view of science. In fact, with all of the new
developments in chaos and complexity theory, quantum evolution and adaptive, open systems,
we still have not fully escaped from many of these limitations from the past, especially in the
absolute, even the absolute dismissal of a view he is arguing against, James ended a recently
discovered discussion of relativism with respect to the evolution of morals by viewing the
question as open (Skrupskelis, 2007). If survival of the fittest, the ultimate value of evolution, is
relative only to the continued existence of a life instinct, its replacement by the development of a
death instinct in all living things, resulting in the ultimate extinction of all life, would leave no
means to evaluate whether or not the universe had failed. If there is some absolute ground for
preferring life to death, then the passion or instinct for survival could be said to be objectively
right by serving this higher good. A key aspect of James’ legacy is his emphasis on the role of
the importance of learning as a topic of psychological study. It was not a major subject of
empirical study before William James, but it has been ever since. Similarly, a concern for the
practical, for what really matters regarding human welfare, was firmly entrenched by those who
According to Peirce, “Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal
limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief…” In James’
formulation, “Absolute truth…. Means an ideal set of formulations toward which all opinions in
the long run of experience can be expected to converge (cited in Nolt, 2008). Nolt identifies
these definitions as expressing the notion of truth as an epistemic ideal, meaning that all
observers would warrant the truth value of a statement under ideal epistemic conditions. For both
philosophers, these conditions would mean endless scientific inquiry. One interpretation of
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Peirce’s statement takes it to be a regulative ideal of inquiry, which we must either assume or
hope for.
Both philosophers, in turning toward useful rather than ideal definitions of truth, would
not hold any notion of truth to be infallible, but rather subject to further experience, which is
unknowable. For instance, I must presume that there is no unicorn in my garden. This truth may
be unshakeable, at least until I actually encounter the unicorn in the garden. The fact that my
knowledge is in principle fallible, that is, subject to empirical verification or at least falsification,
is no reason for me to expect it to fail. In fact, I know from my own experience that it will not.
When the unicorn appears, I will know that I have finally lost it. The practical adequacy of the
notion of the fallibility of all propositions lies in being able to accept failure to predict useful
results, even contrary to previous experience. Such failure is a new experience to which I must
re-establishing its boundary, if necessary, perhaps including unicorn sightings as real events.
However, Nolt (2008) held that under any definition of truth as an epistemic ideal (TEI),
including the practical adequacy of Sayer, a proposition must first be fixedly warranted by
human inquirers under certain ideal epistemic conditions, and vice versa. ‘Warranted’ means
only justified, verified, or proved. Peirce and James established ongoing scientific inquiry as the
ideal epistemic condition, although other interpretations exist, such as Putnam’s ready
availability of all relevant evidence, Wright’s arbitrarily close scrutiny of pedigree, and the
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possibility of extensive improvements in information. Peirce hedged his bets by saying that
ultimately, disciplined consensus is the best we can hope for, while yet holding even our most
cherished truth as subject to falsification. Any empiricist, if confronted with a truth that has
purported to reach this ideal, would consider it to be rationalistic dogma. At best, an ideal can
only be approached from an empirical stand point, but never transcendentally realized.
Pragmatism established this criterion of truth to counter any argument that truths may exist that
of the inquiry space are all critical to any such concept of truth. Nevertheless, such a criterion of
truth faces the problem of universal quantification and of negation, whether as unconfirmable or
as refuted. TEI also fails to reach any absolute, therefore leaving any such definition open to
An idea cannot be both warranted and unwarranted for the same observer in the same
discipline of communal inquiry by a research community may involve evidentiary pathways that
cross, converge, or diverge. Two different inquirers in the same evidentiary state may disagree as
to warrant, with either one or both being mistaken, subject to a uniform standard of warrant
within a given universe of discourse. This is the definition of discipline. Without such discipline,
the door is left open to relativism, and realism founders. TEI can hold rigorously only if
Under the presumption that progress in science must yield increasing numbers of
warranted propositions, most of these must remain fixed, in not being contradicted by further
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experience. Fixed warrant means confirmation. Because a confirmed proposition must in fact be
considered fallible, it can never be established as absolute. In formal logic, a proposition is either
true or false. Such reasoning is inadequate here, because a proposition may either be confirmed,
Relating truth of a proposition to confirmation in the future does not help, because two
different disciplines, using different evidence, could disagree permanently over whether the
proposition or its negation is confirmed. With limited human investigative resources, the
majority of propositions will never be investigated. All evidence actually available to humans,
were it available to any one of us, and would confirm propositions that have not yet been
investigated. However, the only way to preserve equivalence between truth and confirmation is
In this spirit, the inquiry space, which includes all possible paths of inquiry, can be
expanded to include all possible evidentiary states attainable over an endless stretch of time.
Peirce, in fact, does this (Nolt, 2008), identifying possible confirmation in at least one of
infinitely many paths of disciplined inquiry as truth. However, more in line with Peirce’s actual
intent, the practical adequacy of a proposition can be maintained until its negation is confirmed.
Kuhn’s dominant paradigm of normative research will continue to function, even though it has
made a prediction that has been proven wrong, until some accommodation can be made to the
disconcerting empirical evidence, or a more powerful paradigm that can explain all of the facts is
adopted by a new generation of researchers. Few scientists are as quick to abandon a false
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premise as Popper suggests they ought when confronted by a new evidentiary state that
An inquiry space, that is, all paths of inquiry within a discipline, Is pair-wise convergent
(Nolt, 2008) when paths have combinatorial closure, which simply means that confirmatory
evidence states from two different lines of inquiry can be combined into a new evidence state
wherein the proposition remains confirmed. This releases truth from relativity to either observer
or evidence states, guaranteed by discipline. It also establishes the truth values for propositions
paired under ‘not,’ ‘and,’ and non-exclusive ‘or’ operators in traditional Aristotelian logic.
Peircian truth is consistent with universal quantification, in which inconsistencies arise when the
inquiry space is infinite, because it sets global convergence as an ideal limit of inquiry,
considered as a maximum state in which any proposition confirmed by any set of inquiry paths is
confirmed. Pair-wise convergence remains adequate for finite spaces. Although Peircian truth
meets all the requirements of prepositional and predicate logic, it still suffers from a problem
with negation. If, realistically, some value of a proposition must be true, but is unconfirmable,
any assigned value must be unconfirmed. By Sayer’s definition of truth as practical adequacy,
this is not a problem, since no truth can be determined from inadequate evidence. The problem
arises because any particular value is unconfirmable, meaning that the negation of all values is
confirmed. This logical confirmation must be subject to the absence of any warrant to reject it.
Therefore, all unreasonable values are confirmed, and reasonable values of the negation of an
unconfirmable hypothesis must be considered as neither true nor false, thereby negating the law
of contradiction. Enough has been said to show that the pragmatic criterion of truth can be
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adapted to a realist position, as in Sayer’s concept of practical adequacy, without losing more
Teschke’s interpretation of Brenner’s property relations approach. Teschke studied the role of
property relations in the formulation of international relations from 1000 CE through 1748 CE,
when the Peace of Westphalia marked the end of the Thirty Years’ War, which consolidated the
secular claims of the absolutist state in Europe. From that point on the separation between church
and state would be determined by secular, rather than religious authority (Sibley, 1970). The
into an era of geopolitics, in which the British Empire exported modernization, transforming
absolutist states into parliamentary democracies under the global influence of capitalism.
always [sic!] guaranteed directly or indirectly, in the last analysis, by force—by which an
unpaid-for part of the product is extracted from the direct producers by a class of non-producers”
(Cited in Axtmann, 2006). Teschke used this model to assert his claim that international relations
are governed by the structure of social property relations. Feudalism is thus understood in terms
violent exploitation characterized class relations. Conflicts within the ruling class were over
relative share in the means of coercion. War and peace were governed by internal class relations,
of ‘legitimate domination,’ do not account for historical change (Cited in Axtmann, 2006).
Historical change, in Weber’s model, results from the structure of social action in various
institutional forms of association. The question is whether there is any relationship between such
structures that reinforces or restrains them. Although most groups are economically determined,
structural change must account for how social action affects existing constraints, using resources
and opportunities to further group self-interest. Political structural change, such as the
formulation of the modern state, results from dynamic relations between institutional structures
of social action, with no single realm, such as the economic, determining the entire process. This
explanatory model is the basis of Weber’s analysis of the role of the Protestant Ethic in the
development of capitalism.
social power as ideology, the military, politics, and the economy, each resulting in its own form
of organization (none of which is primary), that provide social structure. In social change,
complexity in the relations between various organizational forms introduces unpredictability into
the process. Teschke accuses Weber’s model as being eclectic, denying necessary relations
between social spheres, and failing to account for dialectical contradictions. Weber’s (1978)
contradictions has not resolved the latter issues, except in perhaps underlining the futility of
knowledge, and methods. Weber would never, as do Post-Marx Marxists, deny functional
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autonomy to organized political power, seeing politics as integral to the logic of exploitation.
Neither would he posit war as arising out of property relations through economic necessity.
Collins (cited in Axtmann, 2006) argued that, to Weber, legitimacy derived from the
internal order: “the state with high prestige vis-à-vis other states assures itself of a higher degree
of legitimacy for its demands for internal obedience." Loss of international standing can result in
increased internal tyranny, internal coups, or revolutions. Weber analyzed the economic origins
of imperialism, as well as class forces that motivate external politics. His attention to religion
exhibits the same kind of focus James took in distancing himself from positivism. The pragmatic
focus on action is found in Weber’s category of social action. Such action has a structure, from
which causal relations can be derived. Although empirical in approach, Weber maintains ideal
types similar to TEI of pragmatism. Weber seems to be locating a middle ground between
idealism and relativism, as did James and Sayer. Marx himself founded a New Humanism
in1848, uniting the truth of both materialism and idealism. Engels, from whom Post-Marx
Marxism (of the Engels/Plekhanov strain) took its cue, transformed the empiricism of Marx into
vulgar materialism. This is the vein in which Teschke worked, although disregarding other
Certainly, during the period of nation state formation, religion played a major role in
international relations, whether in terms of Christianity vs. Islam, Pope vs. Emperor,
Reformation vs. Counter Reformation, or England vs. Spain. Royalty was stripped of its sacral
everyone gained direct access to interpretation of God’s Word. A society of heretics cannot abide
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theocratic politics, which inevitably gives the ruling denomination power to suppress all others.
The rational state that resulted from this process no longer attempted to impose a moral order on
its subjects, preferring to inculcate national solidarity in terms of a secular religion of bigotry and
fanaticism, especially against religious minorities. In his approach to property relations as the
material base of society, Teschke marginalized religion, even though religious agitation
mobilized the European masses into political struggle, forcing rulers to either suppress or
accommodate religious enthusiasm. His logic of exploitation ignores not just religious struggle,
but all popular resistance in establishing nation states and international relations. Weberians
studied such struggles empirically, rather than abstractly. Teschke, the political Marxist, perhaps
inherited more from the Rationalism of Descartes than from the Humanism of Marx.
Weber’s use of ideal types, with his concept of the structure of social action, compared to
a materialist approach to history reflecting one stream of Marxian empiricism, reveals theoretical
and methodological differences that perhaps reflect less of a “Great Divide” than differing
investigative and explanatory purposes. Max Weber’s theoretical perspective provides a ground
between extremes of empiricism, whether idealist or materialist, and relativism that strongly
resonates with the positions of James and Sayer. In marginalizing the role of religion, Teschke
also discarded the role of the masses in collective action, which would have horrified Marx, who
always kept an ear to the ground for new ideas from the freedom struggles of his age. Perhaps,
had post-Marx Marxists paid more attention to the sociology of religion, as did Weber’s classic
(1922/1993), they could not have been stabbed in the back by Stalin while permitting themselves
to be overrun by fascism, the secular religion created by socialists to fully rationalize labor under
Cavalcanti, Parente & Zhao, (2007) use a mathematical growth model of capitalism to
determine the effect of belief on England’s Industrial Revolution. Although it might be argued
that the inadequacies of the mathematical model subtract out of the derivation, leaving only the
distilled differences in ‘belief utility,’ this procedure may best be answered by Weber himself, in
Weber went further to suggest that the inanity of such criticism would best be corrected
through familiarity with the source material. The enclosure movement, the pauperization of the
peasantry and the guildsmen, the enslavement of Africans, and all of the concomitant phenomena
Marx identified as “the rosy dawn of capitalism” are missing from a model based on youthful
work effort resulting in capitalized pension plans. Smith designed his idealized market to reflect
the rationalization of labor. The authors of this study quoted Weber in defining the purpose of
their experiment:
Although they may have set out to do exactly what Weber here suggested, their failure to
accomplish the stated objective results from the qualitative validity of their approach, which is
seriously flawed. Had such a model any serious validity, the Industrial Revolution in England
would have been delayed by70 years, no doubt. It is interesting that the researchers conceded
that Weber’s thesis may explain differences between industrialization in Northern and Southern
Europe, but cannot explain underdevelopment in such places as Latin America. Weber framed
his research question about the role of ideas and economic interests in history in terms that would
not contradict any of the new research in growth economics. Haber (1997) wrote what is today
considered the standard work on the subject, which would meet Weber’s approval in arbitrarily
Weber (1978) began his analysis of stratification with the legal order, which requires a
staff to enforce rules, obtaining conformity through the use of force to inflict sanctions. The
structure of the legal order influences the distribution of power, defined as the opportunity to
impose will on communal action in the face of resistance. Power is not strictly economic, but
may also be valued for the prestige it confers, although prestige may also confer social or
economic power. The legal order may uphold power and honor, but it cannot guarantee either.
Social order is the distribution of honor between groups within a community. Economic order
involves the distribution and use of products and services. Class, status, and parties result from
constitutes a class when the members share common economic interests originating in
commodity or labor markets that determine their opportunities for obtaining commodities and
income. Specifically, what constitutes a class situation is determined by the power to exchange
goods and services for income. The fundamental fact of economic life is the creation of specific
opportunities from the power people have over the distribution of property in a competitive
market for exchange. Those who own no goods or services that can be valued as commodities
cannot acquire any. Those not forced to exchange their property can monopolize opportunities to
profit, thereby gaining a decisive advantage in price wars with those compelled to sell for
subsistence, Property ownership provides entrepreneurial opportunities through the control and
transfer of capital based on market conditions that are unavailable to those who have only the
direct product of their own labor to bring to the market, even when no individual buyer or seller
The kind of property and services offered further differentiate class situations. For
instance, Engels was a rentier, as opposed to an entrepreneur. Marx, whose research Engels
responsible for the consolidation of Engelsian Marxism in the historic period immediately
following Marx’s death, and the subsequent loss of Marx’s New Humanism, until its rediscovery
in the Eastern European revolutions. To put it simply, the boss had the last word. However
differentiation in the class situations of capitalists and laborers breaks down, the market chances
provided by class are decisive to an individual’s fate, providing a strong incentive to the
development of class consciousness and forms of communal action for those similarly situated.
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As a property form to be bought and sold on the market, slaves do not constitute a class, but
rather a status-group. Because Marx had his ear to the ground, he could hear the thunderous roar
of the emergence of chattel property on the historic stage of freedom struggles, as compared to
Engel’s denigration of women in a theoretical ‘world historic defeat,’ and Weber’s dismissal of
all forms of struggle except workers’, and their affect on the labor market.
Weber (1978) saw communal action as derived from the feeling of the actors that they
belong together. Social action is group action serving rational interests. The intellectual
transparency of class situation in terms of its causes and effects is crucial to the development of
class action, in which the decision-making process must be fully democratic to represent the
human subjects involved, thereby reflecting the socially derived will of the group. Only when
people recognize that their real life opportunities result from the distribution of property and the
structure of the economic order can they conceive of the idea of taking collective action to
control the terms and conditions of their own labor. The modern labor union was born in such
class-consciousness. Price wars on the labor market constitute the most common form of modern
class struggle.
of honor rather class interest. Class distinctions can be variously linked to status, with property
ownership usually a prerequisite to status honor, although property can actually be a burden to
the parvenu who wishes to attain status. People with and without property can socialize within a
lifestyle (the ability to do so may be economically determined), and observe certain restrictions
in social intercourse. Selection of marriage partners may be constrained to those within the
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status-group. Strict conformity to the dominant fashion is expected, determining whether one
socializing opportunities. Genealogy, residence, or any number of exclusive factors may usurp
status honor, even conferring legal privileges in the distribution of economic power.
The extreme evolution of status, grounded in ethnicity, may result in caste, which is
upheld by ritual as well as convention and law. Social subordination accompanies ethnic
exclusivity, with honor attached only to the upper caste. Even physical contact with a member of
a lower caste may require religious expiation. Dignity, beauty, and grace are conferred by birth
into the dominant caste. Lower caste members may find succor only in the hope of an after-life.
In this analysis of power, which is found in Weber’s (1978) chapter titled ‘Political
Communities,’ he should not be seen as presenting a full theory of social stratification, but
perhaps as laying stress upon the establishment of sociology as a scientific discipline with its
own, clear purview, as opposed to the legal and political order. The period in which he wrote had
witnessed the consolidation of Engelsian Marxism in Russia, and all academic efforts to establish
a science of society had to carefully delineate the distinction between ‘sociologists’ and
adamant in showing the role of ideas in history, whereas the Marxian rationalists emphasized
gedankenexperiments, and his concept of "verstehen," that attempts to enter into the world
outlook of the social actor while yet remaining critical of it, are what relate his work to current
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efforts in establishing truth as an epistemic ideal (Nolt, 2008), and the work of realists such as
Sayer (1992) in laying the methodological foundations for a more humanistic social science.
Weber’s work on the Puritan work ethic should be read in its original 1904 version
(Weber, 2002), then compared to Alcott Parsons’1922 rewriting (Weber, 1992). Weber’s mind
was always encyclopedic, but never over-processed. Parsons seemed to transform into dogma
what was clearly meant to be tentative, exploratory, and an aid to verstehen. Weber’s Puritan is
alive and breathing. One almost wants to meet the man who started a newspaper because
Philadelphia did not have one (Benjamin Franklin). In his translation, which might better be
new Westminster confession, like a system builder offering sociology as a closed ontology rather
than exploring it as an open system. Parsons’ own writings, such as The Structure of Social
Action (1937/1968), are cut and dried, difficult to digest. Like his interpretation of Weber,
Parsons’ writings on Marshall, Pareto, and Durkheim (1968) are best read with the original, if
only to clarify his treatment of the original works. After writing The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, Weber went on to write The Sociology of Religion (1993), a breath taking
survey that belongs with James’ Varieties of Religious Experience (2008) as a classic, one the
original sociological treatment and the other the first truly psychological view of the subject. In
the reprint of Weber’s original Protestant Ethic (2002), the translators explained their translation
of Weber’s designation of the Luther /Calvin ideology of the calling as ‘The Steel Cage,’ rather
than retaining Parsons’ usage, ‘The Iron Cage.’ I have kept the latter designation only because of
the association with Goring’s Institute and Nazi psychotherapy, to which I will turn after
between class and status to a one-dimensional metric, the Duncan Socio-Economic Index (cited
in Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007). Having established the continued existence of distinct British
class and status orders in a previous study, here they showed that the stratification of life
outcomes can occur in terms of either class or status. Operationally, Chan & Goldthorpe used the
CASMIN class schema to define class, with its seven categories: 1. Higher managers and
workers; 7. Routine workers. The status scale used is based on the occupational structure of close
friendship developed out of national survey data for Great Britain, using a multidimensional
scaling analysis based on inputs of dissimilarity indexes between occupational groups of the
Although both scales are based on occupation, the definition of class reflects the
employment relations involved, whereas the definition of status reflects the social honor ascribed
to occupation. The resulting status hierarchy of occupations ranks those that work with symbols
and people near the top, with lower status for those that work with material things. Blue-collar-
managers rank below white-collar staff employees. Status as here defined does not reflect
occupational prestige, which involves judgments of job rewards and requirements and in fact is
highly correlated with socio-economic status. The correlation between status established by the
income is low. Although moderately correlated, class and status as here defined are quite
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distinct. Status is defined by loose social networks, relations among equals who socialize
Class position is here empirically found as a determinant of major life chances, as would
be expected if the Weberian ideal type is valid. The risk of unemployment and variability of
earnings are highest for blue-collar and self-employed workers, and nearly nonexistent for
salaried employees. Long-term earnings are better for those in the upper class, who have better
employment contracts. Income of salaried workers generally tends to rise throughout the
working years, whereas working class salaries level out early in their careers. Including status in
either earnings by age or unemployment has very little effect. Because both of these measures
are good indicators of security and prospects, class clearly predominates over status in
if the Weberian category of status-group is to be upheld. Lifestyles establish cues that mark the
hierarchy separate from that of crass economic advantage. The main distinction is between those
who appreciate high culture, as opposed to those who only consume popular culture. In the
higher levels of the status order, libertarians as opposed to authoritarian views predominate,
along lines of ideal interests. Party membership is distributed along class lines of material
limitations. Measuring occupational status by the ANU3_2 scale, Henry developed a scale of
education and income, it also has implications for social designations of status and honor. Those
who possess valued skills are considered to have high competence, forming the basis for popular
perceptions of occupational desirability, both in terms of income and worth to the community.
The status of an occupation reflects a social ordering of competence, with jobs and those
potential, or self-worth. Social perceptions of the worth of one’s occupation are a strong measure
of ability and worth, creating a social hierarchy of competency evaluations that, as Sennett and
Cobb (cited in Henry, 2003) have shown, also affects feelings of self-worth. Australians believe
that competence and effort result in upward mobility, to a level concomitant with personal talent.
Serious limitations in the availability of high-status jobs restrict many from actually achieving
such goals. Realities do not meet expectations, resulting, according to Nickel (cited in Henry,
2003) in feelings of inferiority and incompetence. The class situation of market position creates a
unavoidable results of social consciousness. Feelings of powerlessness and personal limits result
outlook, careful planning, and self-direction. In two separate studies, Giddiness, and Ready, et al.
(cited in Henry, 2003), psychological and economic constraints pervade daily life for low status
workers, making free choice illusory. Lachlan and Weaver (cited in Henry, 2003) found a
negative correlation between perceived constraints and socio economic status. Such attitudes
result in helplessness in dealing with stress, rather than problem solving behaviors. A strong
desire for security, rather than outstanding success, results in mediocrity and failure to set goals.
The measure of occupational status as shown on the ANU3_2 should show a negative
correlation between high status and negative attitudes regarding self-worth, confidence,
potential, and freedom of choice if the scale is actually grounded in group perceptions of social
status. Henry (2003) constructed a7-point Liker scale of 21 statements from a previous
qualitative pilot study of 40 subjects from manual and professional occupations. Analysis of the
pilot study indicated that professionals set high achievement goals, whereas manual laborers seek
security, avoid challenges, and have low aspirations. Four factors were identified: Factor 1
reflects high achievement motivation, opportunity seeking and desire for change; factor 2 reflects
belief that the future holds little opportunity for positive change; Factor 3 reflects desire to
maintain the status quo, with any change viewed as having negative consequences; and Factor 4
reflects low self-esteem, avoidance of challenge in the belief that it will only result in failure.
The last three factors were highly correlated, indicating that they play a major role in a coherent
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cognitive field that reflects a strong sense of personal limits, pessimism about the future, and
The demographic variables of income and education were strongly correlated with
ANU3_2, as well as psychological Factor1, achievement motivation. The negative factors were
all negatively correlated to the occupational status scale, to an extremely high degree of
which strongly reflects lack of confidence in performing non-routine tasks, leading to immobility
in the face of challenge, was as strong a predictor of ANU3_2 score as all other factors,
including demographic, combined. This makes sense if accepting and overcoming challenges is
seen as required for strong achievement. The only alternative is to attribute success to luck,
which has been shown to be highly unlikely in the light of this research.
Democratic attitudes in the United States are similar to those in Australia, in that
Americans also share a widespread perception that the economy constitutes a meritocracy, with
talent rising to its appropriate status. Because high status job opportunities in the US are also
extremely limited, as they are in Australia, the adjustment of attitudes to the persistence of
failure must follow a similar trajectory, creating a strong likelihood that similar research in the
US would yield similar results. A US study of attributional style, which is willingness to take
personal responsibility for results, conducted by Seligman and Schulman (cited in Henry, 2003)
responsibility for success is grounded in goal setting behavior, and willingness to accept
challenges. Occupational status clearly reinforces psychological characteristics that are stable
throughout life experiences that include perceptions of occupational worth. The low self worth of
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persons in unskilled occupations limits their chances of improvement in a self-fulfilling way. The
psychological attitudes of people in high status occupations provide valuable resources that help
maintain their success. A sense of unlimited potential helps in accepting challenges and setting
higher goals.
Citing Weber’s concept of the division of labor along bureaucratic lines, Lacbelier (2006)
defined ‘knowledge power’ not in class terms of ruling bureaucrats and laborers, but in status-
group terms of the producers of social knowledge, those who consume social knowledge, and
those who look at rather than read books, having no interaction with social knowledge
whatsoever. Lacbelier argued that the bureaucratic division of labor, which Marx (1964) found to
be the essence of modern capitalist society, defines the structure of work, leisure, and the very
way we live and think. The vast gulf that separates thinkers from doers defines the whole of
existence in terms of one’s job, taking this separation to result from differences in natural
intellectual capacities rather than as a specific historical form of society. Thus, the rationalization
of labor under the Puritan work ethic not only maximizes economic efficiency (profits), but also
creates the best of all possible worlds, in which stupid people do stupid work and intellectuals
define themselves as the sole possessors of intelligence. Although sociologists know this is not
true, it is the dominant society’s primary myth, marketed to the majority through mass media to
Boride, Foucault, Leotard, DiMaggio & Mohr, (cited in Lacbelier, 2006) and many others
showed that knowledge power helps to determine the distribution of other forms of power,
including political. Weber (cited in Lacbelier, 2006) originally noted that the bureaucratic
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professionalization of administrative power placed the requisite knowledge “in the hands of a
specially trained, credentialed, and specialized few” Political power concentrates in the hands of
those organizations that actually conduct the business of life. In Weber’s words, “the decisive
aspect here... is the leveling of the governed in face of the governing and
Bureaucratically articulated group, which in its turn may occupy a quite autocratic position, both
in fact and in form.” Knowledge power is the source of the status group’s authority, which then
becomes a determinant of class. From Weber’s perspective, the producers of social knowledge
actually define and disseminate knowledge of the society in which we live, thereby creating and
The consumers of official knowledge constitute the second most powerful status group,
deriving their authority from their specialized occupational knowledge while engaging in critical
discussion of social knowledge. Because of their high status, these are not likely to engage in
serious social criticism, except to the extent that they perceive their status as threatened by the
ever expanding routinization of intellectual labor. The ‘blue-collar’ workers are altogether
disconnected from knowledge power, lacking requisite skills and experience to wield it, and
therefore increasingly powerless to control the terms and conditions of their own lives even
though they are, formally, the much touted ‘participating democrats’ in the socially defined
political democracy.
Knowledge professionals, whose incomes may actually be smaller than those of some
blue-collar workers, nevertheless constitute a ruling status group, perhaps best designated by
Lukacs (1981) as ’prize-fighters for capitalism.’ Lacbelier (2006) suggested they rule by virtue
of the power that knowledge confers in all social institutions, as science and technology
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increasingly dominate society. In her book, Diminished Democracy, Theda Skocpol (cited in
Lacbelier, 2006) documented the replacement of membership power in civic associations by the
power of professionals, thereby introducing the division of labor between thinkers and doers into
the very process of democratic involvement itself, From the American Association of Retired
Persons and the Democratic Party, to the AFL-CIO, members seldom meet, have no control
whatsoever over policy, and suffer the limitation of their participation to the payment of dues.
Lacbelier pointed out that Skocpol’s knowledge itself is limited to the status-groups who produce
and consume social knowledge, thereby making her an actual participant in the
unwashed American masses have never heard of her, or what she has to say.
To Lacbelier, Skocpol represents the political limits of sociological critique: even when
it is effective in showing the sources of America’s myriad social problems, it remains ensconced
in ivory towers, and at best is consumed only by those status-groups who consume intellectual
culture. Sociological research fails to empower citizens to participate in the use of the knowledge
so attained, and will continue to fail to democratize society (which is, in fact, the fundamental
mission of sociology) until such time as sociologists themselves redefine their own relationship
to workers, the disenfranchised, and the vast majority of the people whose problems they make
disseminate social knowledge to ordinary citizens, those who currently spend their entire lives
In the book Making history, Richard Flacks (Cited in Lacbelier, 2006) redefined
democracy as
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"a social arrangement in which the gap between history and everyday life is permanently closed
because society’s members achieve the ability to make history (i.e., to influence and decide the
terms and conditions of their lives) in and through their everyday lives.” This definition casts a
stark light on the ersatz nature of American democracy, in which engagement in decision-making
is only exercised by less than half of the potential electorate, and only in so far as they choose
between professionally determined (by the Democratic or Republican Party), yet virtually
indistinguishable candidates, who then make promises they cannot keep while continuing to
Flacks identified American society as dominated by elites precisely to the extent that
they, rather than ordinary people, make the decisions that determine the terms and conditions of
the rest of our lives. To the extent that the fundamental purpose of society, under the domination
of the Puritan work ethic, is to produce more wealth efficiently for its current owners, this is,
speaking from the world outlook that Mannheim defined as ideological, the best of all possible
worlds. If the purpose of society (Marx, 1964) is the fullest possible human development of each
individual, the rationalization of labor may be seen, in Weberian terms, as an ‘Iron Cage,’ that at
best currently produces accelerated social retrogression, and at worst produces fascism.
Packard (2008) first applied Weber’s ideal type of status-group to the Chinese Literate,
which lasted for two millennia, then to the Göring Institute of World War II Germany, finding
many similarities between both organizations and Weber’s concept. The Göring Institute had a
Nazi mandate to convert the Freud Institute into a modern, state-funded mental health industry
practicing psychotherapy in the interests of the state. Packard’s application of Weber’s concept
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of ‘status-group’ to a modern group reveals that status societies generate and mediate social
value conflicts, especially in societies under political stress. The Nazis partially mitigated
Germany’s economic depression by stealing assets from wealthy Germans, who were then
dispatched to ovens as part of the health program to purify the master race. To save socially
dysfunctional but genetically pure Germans, the Reich generously funded psychotherapy, which
is short-term directive therapeutic practice for the purpose of bringing deviant behavior under
social control by aligning it with specific social norms. Very consistent with functionalism and
behaviorism, such practice provides a medical rationale for compulsive, invasive physical
(cited in Packard, 2008), that to understand the historic circumstances under which the Third
Reich rose to power, including the social and psychological conditions in the context of Western
cultural traditions, and to understand this in human terms, one must take into account Weber’s
1903 thesis of ‘The Iron Cage’ of capitalism. This cage is the intellectual trap of Calvinism,
predestination, the natural depravity of man, God’s omniscience, and the Puritan work ethic. The
Spirit of Capitalism had lost its spiritual aspect, becoming fully rationalized, secularized and
institutionalized through the British and later the American industrial revolutions. By the 20th
Century, the Nazi medical propaganda machine exploited Luther‘s ideal of the calling, creating a
secular religion by transforming the rationale for obedience to God’s will into obedience to the
state. This ideal social norm supposedly returned Germans to their psychological religious roots,
even to the point of obliterating self for the service of the state, all to the glory of God, in this
deliberately twisted into its ultimate logic by cynical men for Machiavellian purposes, all
academically justified by materialism, determinism, and Nietzsche’s nihilism. The social and
intellectual vacuum at the center of this whirlwind had brewed a witch’s cauldron of counter-
revolution and murder out of many decades of brutal suppression of all liberal democratic ideals
workers’ organizations, and civic associations, and the liquidation of all freedom fighters as
‘communist’ since the counter-revolution of 1848, and the total collapse of the Second
International on the eve of the Great War. Its aftermath was not the origin of runaway repression
(as is commonly believed), but rather the key to unleashing the whirlwind lies in the inception of
the war. Dunayevskaya (1981/1991) identifies the transformation of revolution into counter-
revolution in the collapse of the Second International when the most revolutionary congress of
working people ever assembled was subjected to a leadership coup, voting to supply war credits
to the Kaiser and thereby providing the green light for World War I. This is the event that drove
Lenin to re-examine Hegel, identifying the dialectical category of transformation into opposite
By the armistice of November 11, 1918, the combatants merely suspended the Great War
because they had all expended their youth, laying out untenable markers for the fighting of future
wars by a new generation to be bred perhaps eugenically (the National Socialists in Germany
actually implemented this then commonly accepted notion), rather than implement the Marshall
Plan, which had to wait until the final cessation of hostilities at the variously dated end of World
War II. German working people had once been the leaders of the European Revolutions of 1848,
the high point of which Marx (1844) identified as when the Silesian weavers burned the titles to
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the machines to which they were appended (cited in Messinger, 2007). Citing the Collected
Works of Marx & Engels, Messinger further wrote, “Hence Marx proudly called the German
proletariat ‘the theoretician of the European proletariat.... A philosophical people can find its
corresponding practice (praxis) only in socialism, hence it is only in the proletariat that it can
find the dynamic element of its emancipation.’” After dying as cannon fodder in the Great War,
and having their organizer murdered and their organizations and forms of action destroyed by
capitalists or co-opted by Stalinists, who inevitably sold them back into the hands of the
capitalists, by the post-war era German workers had diminished their expectations to the lowest
common denominator of security. Their sense of personal efficacy and agency were thoroughly
demoralized to the point of actually being willing to accept an iron cage of capitalist ideology as
their God-given vocation, or calling ( Luther ‘s Beruf), in exchange for an illusion of security
(Fromm, 1969).
Weber’s sociology contributes greatly to the analysis of the Third Reich and its
therapeutic practice of mental health. Weber’s occupational status-group sheds light on the actual
practices and functions of the Göring Institute, an exemplary example of how such a group
thrives in turbulent political conditions, as Weber observed; and how, and as Cox (cited in
Packard, 2008) added, the medical mental health profession can adapt easily to authoritarian
lifestyle, as consumers of the dominant high culture. The status-group occupational lifestyle that
Weber described includes formal and scientific education, rational instruction and behavior, and
prestige ascribed to race and profession. The ability to define culture is one of the privileges of
status. Chivalric gentility is pragmatically defined as belonging to a pure racial type. Being a
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middle manager in industry or government, advising governments, and classifying information
are all Weberian status-group functions. Such a group may practice eugenics, monopolize
privilege and political power, abhor work (even capitalist accumulation), and recognize charisma
by descent. Their purpose is to maintain respect and honor for possessing special knowledge and
inside access to government. Such honor cannot be obtained merely by making money or
working hard.
Rather than being grounded in the means of getting income, which reflects class, status-
groups are based on cultural consumption and privileged lifestyles, with specific incentives,
language, and honor. Resenting government regulation and capitalist competition, a status group
may manipulate the market, but will submit to strong government. Abjuring hard bargaining and
hard work, a status-group will fight to maintain the loyalty of its membership. Economic
depression coupled with a laissez faire regulatory climate provide ideal opportunities for an
positions are always scarce, officials are self-serving and protective of their jobs.
Weber analyzed an ancient status-group, the Chinese Literati, in The religion of China
(cited in Packard, 2008), demonstrating the empirical validity of his concept of status-group.
Highly trained scholars (a prerequisite for literacy in the language of ancient China), as civil
servants they spent their lives passing exams, perfecting their morals, and competing for
prestigious positions as scribes and advisors to the power elite. The group was responsible for
‘rational administration’ and ‘all intelligence’ (state secrets), From good family backgrounds,
members of the group were called ‘living libraries’ (ancient policy woks). The aim of Confucian
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education was spiritual rebirth into an esthetic life of self-control and awe toward authority, as
screen a surplus of candidates for scarce funding and positions, offering status honor rather than
thought,’ in Weber’s words, a “systematic and pragmatic correction of facts from the point of
Thus, the official function of the Literati was to resolve value conflicts in Chinese
millennia. By appeasing the leadership and maintaining the balance of Heaven, they thereby set a
public example of how to incorporate new social values into the ancient social regimen. As
gentlemen of culture, the Chinese Literati concerned themselves with the ethics of duty in public
office, mastering the elements of compulsion in the bureaucratic organization of the state. They
naturally opposed feudalism which, in today’s parlance, involves nepotism over qualification by
civil service examination. The Literati maintained loyalty and cohesion in its membership,
Mao Zedong sought to root Confucianism out of Chinese society through the Cultural
Revolution, by which he rationalized youth rebellion, drawing totalitarian lines only when the
youth criticized Mao Zedong rather than Confucian thought. In this respect, Maoism failed to
defeat the Chinese civil service, which eventually removed his heirs, ‘the Gang of Four,’ from
the reins of power. From the Weberian analysis of the Chinese Literati emerges the ideal type of
a status-group monopolizing social power to dictate social norms and values. No other group
earned the privilege of a long life in ancient China, with increased opportunities for reproduction,
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conditioned on continued success in meeting the strenuous requirements of civil service
examinations. Absolute respect for elders and senior officials maintained rather than challenged
the status quo, creating a climate antithetical to social change or revolution. Nazi psychotherapy,
adapting such status-group functions, was a clear impediment to Weber’s concept of teaching
science as a vocation of social change, in which students are introduced to new facts, without
value judgments, and encouraged to take their own position in making sense of contradictory
The status-group follows a strategy of usurping privilege and honor, conforming to the
authority of strong government, and silencing the rebellious voice of youth. The basic distinction
of honor was between gentlemen of status and plebeians, including the military, landed gentry,
novae riche, and capitalist parvenus. The Literati fought and died to retain their monopoly of
social honor. Like the prophets of Judaism, the Literati pronounced doom on society when the
ruler abandons the Way of Heaven, resulting in turning society upside down, or revolution. Only
by acceding to prescribed rituals and ceremonies could the ruler maintain Literati support, which
was otherwise unflagging. Through discipline and class struggle, which includes monopolization
of privileged control over markets, the Weberian status-group maintains its lifestyle based on
cultural consumption and control over value systems. As a status-group, the Literati acceded to
authoritarian power so long as the ruler accessed their special knowledge and services.
his analysis of the Literati of China, Packard turned to Cox’s analysis of the Göring Institute
(cited in Packard, 2008), whose mission was to implement the Nazi program of social control
through the medical model of psychotherapy. They specifically modeled their practice on
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Stalin’s institutionalization of political dissenters in psychiatric or work-camp facilities,
depending on whether or not they were considered redeemable. Posing as a tool of social
adjustment, in the hands of the Nazi Literati psychotherapeutic practice involved behavior
modification strikingly similar to Mao Zedong’s political re-education camps. Rather than
destroy Freudian psychoanalysis, Göring ostensibly purged the discipline of its ‘exploitative,
capitalistic character,’ developing it into a modern tool for brainwashing social deviants into
becoming model citizens of the Third Reich. Göring used political power to usurp monopolistic
control over the profession, and traditional inquisitorial tactics to literally burn the German
Freudians as witches while taking over their methods. Göring considered Freudian
subordinating individuals to the group. Opting for behavioral rather than psychic controls, Nazi
psychotherapy provided the correction needed for short-term, coercive behavioral modification.
Göring’s ideology of mental and social hygiene integrated the individual into society by
simply abolishing individuality, rejecting the personal subconscious mind as unscientific, while
acknowledging a collective unconsciousness. The word ‘Nazi’ stands for National Socialism, the
ideological cover under which brown shirted thugs acquired the functional role of a status- group
such as the Literati, endowing themselves with the responsibility of interpreting and determining
the values of society, while covertly practicing the rapacious plunder of the German ruling elites
they purportedly served. They touted traditional Romantic values such as patriarchy, "just war"
nonexistent weapons of mass destruction used to justify the US/Iraq War), purity, physical and
spiritual health, and Aryan supremacy, a new heresy grafting 19th Century American Jim Crow
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legislation and ‘race theory’ (rationalization of slavery) into German jurisprudence while
aids the individual in struggling against society, rather than demanding total surrender to the
diktats of the party. Charting his theoretical path between narrow determinism and absolute
idealism:
“Freud had been a leading advocate among those who feared that medical
monopolization of the treatment of medical disorders would lead to a functional
and technical narrowing of the field from a means of humane insight to that of
mechanical ‘cure’” (Cox, cited in Packard, 2008).
The historic dispute was over whether ‘mental illness’ is biologically based and curable
psychotherapists are effective: those who can establish a relationship of trust with the
patient, and are willing to enter the patient’s cognitive world, taking into account
meaning and exercising ‘verstehen’ to help with the process of self-healing (Rogers,
1989). Psychotherapy has never been a ‘hard’ science precisely because it requires
After driving Freud out of Germany and burning his books, Göring put his own
name on the German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy in Berlin.
Evidently the Nazis were not satisfied with Freud’s capitulation to their power, asking
only that his ideas be presented correctly. They did, however, utilize Freudian methods
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when they worked. For eugenic reasons, sexually dysfunctional Nazis such as
homosexuals needed to be cured, whereas those from inferior racial stock were simply
prosecuted as criminals, and then murdered. The Göring Literati renamed Freudian
The social disorder introduced by the Nazis, the pragmatic utility of administered
adjustment techniques to national socialist ideology, Göring’s personal interest, and professional
expectations for growth and expanded practice all conspired to keep a modified Freudian
medical practice alive in Germany. These conditions meet Weber’s criteria for an occupational
an official monopoly in the ‘care and control’ of the German people, and the anarchy of social
competition for der Führer’s favor enabled the consolidation of the new status-group, which had
previously been marginalized in German medicine. The new, improved Psychotherapy used
monopolized the expertise to identify and cultivate proper German character, care for and control
the German soul, ensure party loyalty, and imposed an iron work ethic on the masses, in return
for the security of ascribed social honor as a racial legacy, with no need for personal
Cox (cited in Packard, 2008) concluded that professional Psychotherapy functioned well
Institute from being usurped by others in possession of the requisite political and professional
power. As a badge of their fall from status, psychiatrists were responsible for implementing Nazi
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euthanasia and ethnic cleansing policies, universally considered to be a dirty job, except by men
such as Dr. Mengele. The Nazis enforced the destruction of higher education, while fighting with
each other for control over the government and deprofessionalizing psychiatry. Nazi
Psychotherapists originally had a hard time getting licensed, gaining teaching posts, and securing
an income. As a status-group, they were uniquely situated to take advantage of the chaotic
political fragmentation of the Nazi regime because they possessed resources insulated from
government and private enterprise, and thereby from the ravages of war. Their claim to social
honor was grounded in formal education, scientific training, hereditary leadership, privileged
acquisition or the abhorrence of certain kinds of acquisition, status, and conventions (traditions)
of other kinds” (Weber, cited in Packard, 2008). Weber’s entire description of an occupational
Cox (cited in Packard, 2008) showed how the Göring Institute appropriated privileged
modes of acquisition, such as funding by the Labor Front and the Reich Research Council for
short-term therapies for military and youth programs, while disdaining psychotherapy for profit.
To Weber a status-group as “a plurality of persons who, within a larger group, successfully claim
a special social esteem, and possibly also status monopolies” (cited in Packard, 2008). Like the
Chinese Literati goal of fostering a new soul in their members, the Göring Institution mandate
was to provide a new soul for Germans, manifested in correct thinking and submergence of
individuality to the need s of the community, the state (Führer), and homeland (Vaterland). The
Göring Institute was the qualified keeper of the hearts and minds of the Volk, guiding them in
thought, behavior, and lifestyle. The Institute’s mission was to maintain the Romantic German
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ideology of soul, rendering the spirit and body of Germany, especially her youth, suitable to the
service of the state (Führer). Like the Chinese Literati, they maintained a monopoly on their
specific role as interpreters and arbiters of values and norms, providers of mental therapeutic
services, and even keepers of official secrets about the German people developed by Hitler’s far-
flung paranoid intelligence network, retained intact by the Allied occupation government to spy
on the Russians.
Along with Nazi rocket scientists (such as SS Sturmbannfüehrer Werner von Braun),
General George S. Patton, commander of the US Third Army and military governor of most of
the American occupation zone in Germany, provided protection and relocation for many SS
intelligence officials, as well as the continuation of their spy network. Perhaps this helps explain
similarities to the American FBI’s branding of Dr. Martin Luther King as a communist under J.
Edgar Hoover, and Nixon’s military Cointelpro (counter intelligence and propaganda) service,
which kept illegal intelligence files on American peace activists, also branding them. Along with
the entire Black American domestic semi-colony, as communists. As the SS and its clones have
proven, such intelligence is very useful for purposes of blackmail, as were the files alleging
Like the Chinese Literate, Göring Institute incomes derived from bureaucratic office. The
ancient Literati had the official privilege of a long life, whereas Göring Institute personnel were
exempt from military service and death camps. Renegades were subject to ostracism or death.
Whereas the Literati had an over-supply of qualified applicants from which to screen members
using the ancient equivalent of civil service exams, the attending psychologist program of the
Göring institute had a surplus of women applying for the position. With a general shortage of
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men resulting from their utility as cannon fodder, officials were forced to deflect women into
The Göring Institute exhibited many, if not all of the attributes Weber identified as
belonging to an occupational status-group. They usurped the status and techniques of Freudian
psychoanalysts using Nazi political influence. The pretenders adopted the lifestyle of the older
group by controlling and distributing their educational credentials and techniques, moving into
their social circles, eschewing dirty occupations such as capitalist or worker, and even deriving
honor from the severity of Germany’s wartime budget limitations. The new, modernized,
intellectually impoverished practitioners monopolized power over the ‘care and control’ of
jealously defended their territory from encroachments by Party officials and university
psychiatrists.
Cox’s findings (cited in Packard, 2008) were that Freudian theory and practice were not
destroyed under the Nazis, merely truncated to narrow materialism, cynically manipulating
cultural symbols supplied by German Romanticism in the name of behavior modification. Cox
warned that such an occupational status-group cannot only be expected to merely survive, but
may indeed thrive under non-democratic conditions, as Weber predicted in his analysis of the
autonomy of the Chinese Literati from stressed political and economic circumstances. They
pursued lifestyle and consumption patterns easily extorted through liquidation of a wealthy
ruling elite. They inculcated willingness to serve up youth as cannon fodder for the militarized
total warfare state, thereby making themselves useful to the social machinery of Nazi rule. They
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demonstrated Weber’s assessment that occupational status-groups can thrive under chaotic
political conditions, and that they can survive through servility to authoritarian regimes.
The Göring Institute maintained professional continuity throughout the Third Reich,
expanded its practice, and attained status to a degree unique in German history. The excellent fit
of Weber’s ideal type of occupational status-group, derived from his studies of ancient religion
in China, to a modern institution such as the Göring group shows how Weber’s ideal type
‘status-group’ may be applied to other modern organizations. Packard (2008) concludes that such
analysis provides insights into social dynamics under conditions that jeopardize human life and
values. Putting this knowledge to humanistic use may be problematic under ‘value-free’
scientific presumptions, which we have shown elsewhere are not objective at all, but simply
Weber’s Verstehen
spokesperson for imperialism in academic circles, and an original theorist of neo-racism, which
Etienne Balibar (cited in Zimmerman, 2006) defined as a form of scientific racism for the neo-
colonial era that denies biological determinants of race, while upholding the culture of the
colonizer, thereby rationalizing the continued dominance of settler (western) culture over that of
the native, and thus upholding the political and economic inequities of imperialism in the post-
colonial era. Under new nationalist flags, the citizens of the former colonial empire now emigrate
to the metropolitan centers of the West for their education, where they learn the dominant values
of the ‘white man’s burden,’ which they return home to implement as administrators over the
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deracialized, economic empire of neo-colonialism. Europe is no longer the conqueror, but merely
Under empire, cultural superiority supersedes racial superiority. The mobility of capital
demands stagnation and continued underdevelopment. In imposing the plans of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund on the Third World under the careful planning of
University of Chicago ‘supply side’ economists, the Western investors must maintain conditions
bordering on, and actually reproducing slave labor, while also maintaining free access to exploit
natural resources such as oil and precious metals, whether through the establishment of racist
hierarchies or by way of more flexible cultural hierarchies. Prior to the Great War, Weber’s ideas
met the needs of German and American imperialism for imported labor. Although actually dating
back to 1492, Globalization is the new by-word for empire, with new forms of economic and
political domination replacing the gunboat diplomacy of the British Empire, now under the one-
capitalist economics as a mainspring for apologetics for the status quo, which Weberian
denigrate all suggestions that political and economic inequities, especially as between the two
billion people who live on less than $2 per day, and the developed world, have any social origin
other than ‘dependency theory, ‘ which is patently false in the neo-racist view. Such ideas imply
that had America, for instance, encouraged democracy in places such as Iran, rather than
financing by proxy and through any means necessary the crushing of democratic movements
throughout the world since the 19th Century rise of American Imperialism, perhaps we would
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have democratic friends rather than dictatorial enemies in the same places where we now face
Although the idea of verstehen, as interpreted by Parsons, is not specific to Weber, this
dominant idea in Weber invokes the role of values in rationalizing the racism and cultural
imperialism now practiced under the ethos of capitalism. Weber specifically disagreed with
Ploetz (cited in Zimmerman, 2006), who argued that Christian love and sympathetic social
welfare programs for the poor had weakened the superior white races of Europe through
dysgenics, permitting the survival of the unfit. Weber, who with Lincoln, conceded that racial
inferiority may play a major role in society, knew full well that the Calvinist form of the Puritan
work ethic had increased social contempt for the poor, and argued that social welfare programs
had permitted strong, although indigent, persons to survive, rather than propagating the weak.
Having visited America, as did Ploetz, Weber argued that no such ‘racial instinct’ as Ploetz had
identified (actually getting the idea from the Scientific Racism that had arisen in America to
defend the slave-labor system against the abolition movement) was responsible for the fury of
white racial hatred in America, but rather the old, European feudal contempt for labor, embraced
by the Southern planter class who had no personal use whatsoever for any Puritan work ethic.
Along with other theorists we have discussed in these pages, Weber’s verstehen of racism
in America did not extend to self-critical analysis of his own treatment of Polish minorities.
Weber openly admired many of the Black intellectuals he had met in America, all of whom had
white ancestors, and despised poor Southern whites as well as ‘half-ape’ plantation cotton belt
negroes. Weber recognized race, culture, and class as determinants of superiority, providing a
rationale for the more subtle racism that has replaced Ploetz’s crude Social Darwinism, adapted
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from the Scientific Racism born in America for later use by the Nazis. In fostering the spread of
Nazism throughout the world since the end of World War II (Israeli and South African Apartheid
were both born in the aftermath of that war), America has found the neo-racism of Weber far
Weber’s imperialism and racism, first developed in his work for the Prussian government
on Polish immigrants (in removing them from the land and replacing them with German farmers,
who would then provide a social bulwark against the socialist ideas of free labor), provided the
values for his scientific methodology. Weber saw the free capitalist labor market, rather than any
social principle of Christian love, as providing the dysgenic means by which inferior Polish races
prevailed over their German superiors. Most Social Darwinists feared the threat posed by inferior
races over-running their more human superiors, usually along nationalist lines. Thus was racism
born in the heart of Europe, even though the American slaveocracy articulated its first pseudo-
scientific rationale.
Weber explained his racist political work, “the politician must recognize a fundamental
fact: the irresolvable and eternal struggle of man against man on the earth…” (cited in
Zimmerman, 2006, p63). Weber exemplified radical nationalism and racism both in politics and
in science. His racist apologetics rationalized irrational economic policies, as against the
rationalization of labor under capitalism, in nationalist appeals to preserve the German race from
inferior Poles, Slavs, and other sub-human species. Weber viewed such value judgments as taken
for granted, forming the backdrop for scientific theory in so far as they embody true human
values in preserving the ‘permanent power-political interests of the nation.” In the context of all
of his other work, the lip-service he paid to value neutrality in science in his 1918 lecture
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“Science as a Vocation” (cited in Zimmerman, 2006, p64) can only be understood as the origin
of the uncritical acceptance of the unexamined values that has become a tradition in Weberian
and mainstream social science we have examined elsewhere. As opposed to Sayer’s (1992) use
of verstehen, which provided for the critical evaluation of other cultures in the light of a self-
critical statement of underlying values, Weber’s verstehen can only be seen as value neutral if
white racism is fully accepted on its own terms, as the culmination of the human endeavor.
Muskingum College in Ohio, founded by Calvinists, and retaining a strict moral code derived
from the era of church governance. As an economics professor at Robert Morris University in
Pittsburgh, Reiland recognized the implications of Weber’s thesis on the role of predestination in
determining the Puritan work ethic as a driving force in the development of capitalism. Reiland
pointed out that Weber considered capitalist society, as defined under this ethic, to be the
impoverished people on earth, who have no command over labor or capital markets, through the
grace of God, and for no fault of their own, are simply predestined to remain among the non-
elect. Although this is the religious doctrine, the secularized doctrine actually finds fault with the
poor, scape-goating and blaming the victim in an effort to retain a belief in a just world order.
Although Calvin would scoff at such foolishness, pointing out that we are not to attempt
to probe the divine mind, or assess its justice, the purity of the doctrine was never practiced, even
by Calvin himself, who burned Servetus at the stake after inviting him to Geneva to discuss
issues regarding the Eucharist. The Salem witch trials and the McCarthyism of the ‘50s, down to
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the current Homeland Security and USA Patriot Acts, are manifestations of this same impulse,
generated from the insecurity of the elect in their continuous struggle to avoid being swallowed
into poverty.
Reiland (2006) may have over-stated the case a bit in remarking that Weber saw
capitalism as the perfect society. If that were indeed the case, Weberian sociology could never
have carved out a secular calling for the sociologist. In fact, as we learned from Zimmerman
(2006), contrary to the Social Darwinists in the far right clubs to which he belonged, Weber
showed that the capitalist market functions to maintain persons of inferior caste, and that only
governmental intervention can ensure ‘survival of the fittest’ in society. Weber saw the Prussian
state which he served loyally as naturally generating eugenic and ‘ethnic cleansing’ programs to
deal with such problems, especially with respect to internal Polish and other Eastern European
immigrants, but he constantly worried that the state did not go far enough in protecting the
‘elect’ from the damned, and he devised a scientific methodology for helping the state achieve its
goal in protecting the master race in the continuing human struggle for existence. Like Marx, he
viewed history as the struggle between group interests, but contra-Marx Weber sided with the
Demirezen (2006) compares Marx directly to Weber and Mannheim. Marx’s basic
concept of social structure identified base and superstructure. The base concerns how human
beings create their material conditions of existence, which he called the mode of production.
Changes in the economic base of society cause changes to occur throughout the superstructure,
which includes culture, ideas, political ideology, and all social institutions other than economic.
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This view transcends the limits of vulgar materialism, in which no idea can function as the
material cause of anything, and idealism, that denies reality altogether to the material world of
experience, the ground of empiricism. Marx wrote that “ the materialistic doctrine that men are
products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other
circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances” (cited
in Demirezen, 2006). Any social or psychological method that considers cognition must also
account for human sensuous activity. History can only be understood in terms of material
production as the basis for the various forms of social intercourse, such as morality, religion, and
philosophy, and how they arise from that base. Ideas, even the best ideas, such as ‘freely
associated labor,’ cannot be realized in history before the material conditions for their expression
Western modes of production evolved from slave, to feudal, to capitalist class relations,
which mediate between base and superstructure. When changes occur in society, it is because
new productive forces render obsolete old relations of production, creating contradictions
between old and new classes expressed in social realms of discourse and action. The relationship
of a class to the mode of production from which it arises determines its class interests, which are
expressed in ideology. Ruling ideas are simply the ideas of the ruling class, expressing dominant
material relations. Alienation arises when the product of labor no longer expresses the
personality of the worker in communal effort, but rather becomes a commodity on the
marketplace. This alienation is from self as well as from humanity because work is objectified,
with no reward for its expenditure beyond compensation for the socially necessary labor time in
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its production. Labor itself becomes a commodity, bought and sold at its exchange value, whose
utility in use is only the capacity to produce surplus value, which the capitalist appropriates.
‘opiate’ to still class struggle (cited in Demirezen, 2006). The religious struggles by which the
peasants and workers of Europe entered history were expressions of and protests against
economic distress. Religion has a contradictory secular basis related directly to social structure.
Starving masses will only settle for ‘pie in the sky when you die’ up to a point, beyond which
they will conduct food riots, agrarian rebellions, strikes, and other forms of mass resistance.
universal belief, while yet supplying support for non-producing classes whose only function is to
appropriate surplus value within an ideological means of domination. Marx’s interest in religion
did not extend beyond its function as ideology, in support of ruling ideas. He saw religious
writings, meanings, and beliefs at best as rationalizations supporting the status quo, at worst as
lies to deflect class struggle. At no point did he explore religious content. In Marx’s context, the
Weber actually took interest in the concrete meaning of action for a specific actor, as well
as the subjective meaning of social action. However, motives may better be explained from
ascribed rather than expressed intentions (Demirezen, 2006). Interpretation can be direct, or
indirect. Verstehen, which is the suspension of disbelief to create empathy with the actor in a
concrete situation, is the indirect means by which motivation can be ascribed. Examining the
social actor’s writings and explanations, the observer makes an attempt to understand the
meaning of an action from the stand point of the actor. Interpretive understanding provides
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causal explanations of social action, which always has a subjective meaning oriented toward its
Weber’s thesis about the relationship of the Protestant work ethic to the rise of modern
capitalism provides an understanding of the role of ideas in history, and critiques any vulgar
(Demirezen, 2006). Although religious ideas are important factors in their influence over action,
they are affected by economic forces and cannot be seen as independent variables in history.
Weber went on to study the psychology of world religions, concluding that material and ideal
interests govern conduct. However, ideas create world outlooks, which can determine the course
of action motivated by material interests. The Calvinist, whether capitalist or employee, believed
that success in one’s occupation is the only available assurance of salvation. Failure is simply
unacceptable, as a sure indication of continued absence of God’s grace. Such beliefs generated
asceticism in the accumulation of wealth, providing a strong impetus to re-investing it rather than
capitalism. To Weber, ideas are closely connected to structure through ‘elective affinity,’ which
emphasizes the contingent connection between beliefs and their consequences in social action.
Mannheim, under the influence of Lukacs, critiqued Marx’s world outlook by showing
that it, too, can become an ideological reflection of class interest (Demirezen, 2006). This would
be absurd to Marx, who saw the revolutionary subjectivity of masses in motion as the only real
basis for objectivity. When class society is abolished through freely associated labor, ideology as
the rationalization of class interest ceases to exist. However, when radical criticism of society
becomes co-opted into the system, the rationalizations of all contending classes are expressed as
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ideology, with nothing more revolutionary on the horizon than elitist rule in the name of the
working class, as happened in Russia. To this situation, as well as the total situation throughout
the West, where co-optation of revolutionary movements became the mode of systemic survival,
Mannheim’s total conception of ideology is extremely appropriate. This total conception calls
into question all contending opponents’ conceptual frameworks, in terms of how the battle of
ideas arises from the experience of each interested group, understanding each world outlook as a
Functional analysis does not seek motives, but rather describes the structural elements
involved in totally different settings. If every view can be considered ideological, relativism is
one possible solution to the theory of knowledge, which validates any proposition. Mannheim
epistemic ideal). This is the sociology of knowledge. Rather than seek absolute truth, the
relationist recognizes the effects of history and class (Demirezen, 2006). Mannheim proposes
free-floating intellectuals as best qualified by education to reduce the level of bias, transcending
narrow class viewpoints in their mastery of the tools of knowledge. Although intellectuals may
be detached from the Weltanschauung of their point of origin, Mannheim found positive
elements in ideology: each class point of view contributing knowledge of society as a complex
whole that would otherwise be missed. The intellectuals can fuse such partial viewpoints into a
new knowledge of society that transcends class and ideology, both of which play a positive role
in providing parts of the overall picture, as light from a prism provides the various spectral colors
that constitute the original ray. Intellectuals have written many histories of ideas in a wide
variety of areas to enlighten social inquiry along the lines Mannheim proposed for the sociology
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of knowledge. Whereas James and Weber ventured into the realm of religion from
phenomenological and sociological viewpoints, Mannheim was the first to actually study each
highly politicized world outlook from within, exercising a form of verstehen in elucidating
Marx’s original concept of ideology was polemic, used to question and criticize the entire
world outlook of the ruling class, which tends to be stated as the objective view of the entire
society. Mannheim proposed that Marxism could itself be criticized in the same way. Not only
infrastructure, but history and social viewpoints also determine ideology, which may even reveal
as much as it obscures. Weber also acknowledged that special interests have a strong influence
on ideas. Mannheim proposed the total concept of ideology in framing a durable sociology of
knowledge.
Goldman (1994) located Mannheim within the context of the sociology of knowledge,
Mannheim’s own creation, taking up the conditions and modalities under which Mannheim
produced social knowledge. The rapid development of a sociology of science since Mannheim’s
proposal of this new field has not focused on the producers of social knowledge. As Mannheim
himself pointed out, his concept of ‘total ideology’ is not only a tool for unmasking the economic
interests underlying consciousness, separating truth from the claims of power. The sociology of
knowledge analyzes meanings of beliefs and ideas relative to the experience of social groups, in
terms of the viewpoints and perspectives available to the average member. How do we approach
knowledge producers and their products objectively and with sensitivity to the social dynamics
of their work?
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Scholars have only recently begun to recognize the relevance for today of Mannheim’s
intellectual reach. Before Grams defined hegemony, Mannheim wrote that knowledge “is clearly
rooted in and carried by the desire for power and recognition of particular social groups who
want to make their interpretation of the world the universal one” (Cited in Goldman, 1994).
Intellectuals elucidate the ‘world outlook’ of the group to which they attach themselves. In the
The analysis of ideological positions reveals the social forces and impulses on which they are
based. Goldman critiqued Mannheim for failing to account for the effect of the struggle for
power on the formulation of ideology. Foucault and Mannheim both elaborated a theory of the
role of intellectuals in defining truth, each arguing for a political economy of truth to expose the
We have just evaluated the Göring Institute in Weberian terms as an occupational status-
group. The psychotherapeutic practice of the Nazis cannot be fully understood in these terms
alone. We must turn to the normative function of ideology to find the social roots of Nazism,
more visible prior to the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939, which in providing the green light for that
war also generated the ideological smog that has clouded the issue of fascism in American life
ever since. The fate of Chaplin’s first dialogue movie, The Great Dictator (1940), made at the
height of American isolationism, when many influential Americans were still in love with
Adolph Hitler, and at any rate no one thought it would be possible to convince American white
men to go back to killing Germans (the Japanese later provided the needed racist rationale), is a
case in point. Eugenics, the pretentious claims of pseudo-intellectual animal breeders, had not yet
fallen into disfavor, although Chaplin certainly did for thumbing his nose at Der Führer. Henry
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Ford, the National Association of Manufacturers, Winston Churchill, and many in America’s
ruling elites avidly supported Nazi racist ideology, the legal structure of which derived directly
from America’s late 19th Century Jim Crow laws, and the rationale for which was provided by
the Scientific Racism that had developed in the death struggle of the slave system against
Abolitionism.
20th Century normative sociology clearly expressed the fundamental problem of society
as the correction of deviant behavior, preferably through the control techniques of the
behaviorists. Skinner had not yet written Beyond Freedom and Dignity, (1971/2002) his paean to
social control, but the ideals of social Darwinism (Hofstadter, 1944/1955) had been around for
decades. Social Darwinist ideology was the platform of the Progressive Movement. Dewey’s
social theories, derived from the psychological ideas of James (in which Dewey grounded his
pragmatism), established normative sociology’s viewpoint that the only social change needed
after the consolidation of political democracy and capitalism in America was to correct the
inappropriate behavior of working people, which ranged from anarchistic and social uses of
dynamite (Adamic, 1931), through the conduct of mass strikes, such as the successful general
struggle of the American working class to establish the 8 hour day, 5 day work-week (which
culminated in the St. Louis Commune, through which working people directly governed their
city at its high point); to supporting populist and socialist political movements. In the shadow of
psychological discipline, the purpose of which was to predict and control behavior, which served
as the theoretical apparatus of Nazi psychotherapy. Social Darwinism provided the intellectual
context for social legislation creating the AMA occupational status group stranglehold on the
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distribution and use of molds, synthetic pharmaceuticals, surgical procedures, and psychiatric
medicine (Chase, 1977), generating a still extant medical services delivery system founded on
the premise that those who cannot afford treatment, and are therefore unfit, should not survive
the struggle for existence. Turn of the 20th Century social engineers erected a system of restricted
medical school admissions that assures those who cannot afford to pay highly inflated
All of the ideological tools used by the Nazis were ready-made for them under an
American label. The most quintessentially American product, other than decorticated
pragmatism, was racism, brewed in the cauldron of America’s Melting Pot, a democratic stew
from which a new American archetype (blonde-haired and blue-eyed, excluding Jews, Negroes,
and Indians, as Weber foresaw) would surely emerge. Using Weberian verstehen, we can only
imagine the plight of the thoroughly demoralized German working class from which National
socialism emerged. When the Nazi economy revived slightly from the infusion of plunder from
Germany’s wealthy banking classes (under cover of eugenic measures against the Jews), the
worker’s status expectations of security seemed within reach, and they embraced nihilism in the
garb of the Puritan work ethic, otherwise identified by Weber as the Spirit of Capitalism. A
populace with expectations lowered below the widely-perceived minimum sustenance level,
having no achievement motivation whatsoever, suddenly injected with the bacillus of racism,
blamed sub-species and interbreeding with inferiors for all of humanity’s problems. Originally of
no status, the worker now had an ascribed status by way of skin color. This was an opiate that re-
created Christianity as a new secular religion, and posed as the fundamental glue of culture. The
sense in which the Nazis used the word Aryan meant human, so that the master race was actually
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the human race, with all others constituting sub-species. If this were the absolute truth, even
humanists could get on the Nazi bandwagon. The Final Solution would have to work if humanity
were to survive.
Robert Ardrey (1961, 1966/1997), Desmond Morris (1967), and others wrote pseudo-
scientific works that posited human descent from killer apes. As elements of the pop culture of
the ‘60s, these ideas influenced the opening scene from 2001: A Space Odessey (Kubrick,
1968/2007), in which the tossed bone-weapon, representing the advent of technology among
killer apes, dissolved to a view of presumably the highest human technological achievement: a
space station in stationary orbit between the earth and the moon. The same line of speculation
has also suggested that humans eliminated our nearest competitors, such as Neanderthal Man,
through mass murder. Carried forward by legitimate scientists straying far from their own
training and discipline, such as Herrnstein’s The Bell Curve (1996), Wilson’s Sociobiology
(1975/2000), and William Shockley’s revived eugenics (he shared the 1956 Nobel Prize in
Physics for the investigation of the transistor, and during his tenure as Professor of Engineering
at Stanford University from 1963 through 1975 attempted to use his scientific credentials to
revive the pseudo-science of eugenics), this kind of pop-Darwinism permits any presumed
explain any presumption, such as racial superiority. Stephen J. Gould taught scientific
methodology to laymen in many writings, culminating with the Structure of Evolutionary Theory
(2002), his magnum opus published the year of his death. The work is accessible to any
intelligent layman who wants to know how biological science actually works, written by a
Geology and Curator of Invertebrate Paleontology at Harvard and in 1982 was awarded the title
Association for the Advancement of Science, which he served as president from 1999-2001. He
served as president of the Paleontological Society in 1985-1986, and also presided over the
Society for the Study of Evolution in 1990–1991. He was nominated to the body of The National
Biology at New York University from 1996-2002. The American Humanist Association awarded
him the Humanist of the year award in 2001. In 2008, the Darwin/Wallace Medal award was
would-be modern reincarnations of the Göring Institute (such as the Institute for Creation
Research), attempting to pass themselves off as legitimate scientific concerns, ever turned a pen
to paper exposing their discredited presumptions and credentials. Gossett (1963/1997) researched
the history of racism to supply a guide to the origin of modern scientific racism, of exactly the
same variety as that promulgated by the Göring Institute, in the American apologetics of slavery
after the institution was challenged by the Black freedom struggles. Montagu (1945/2007)
weighed in with more stellar scientific credentials to thoroughly discredit racism, which he
showed to have no place whatsoever in empirical scientific investigations other than the history
of discredited ideologies.
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In the most recent news, a man was elected president of the United States only because of
his racial ascriptions. Racial theory will not be rooted out of popular culture in the immediate
future, and is even consumed by high-status occupational elites with financial strings to major
universities (Smith, 1974). Combine racism with the departing presidential administration’s
vision of total War as America’s role in the 21st Century (see the Bush administration’s The
National Security Strategy of the United States (2002)), and we have a potent brew for
retrogression only marginally more sophisticated than Nazi psychotherapy. Foucault and
Mannheim both examined globalizing, totalizing discourses that conceal the actual struggles and
accidents that lead to domination of a particular world outlook (Goldman, 1994) as the strongest
barriers to scientific truth. The analysis of the production and distribution of knowledge is the
combination of Weber’s verstehen and ‘practical adequacy’ derived from James, or Mannheim’s
concept of total ideology, for which the retrieval of specific insights of all groups in society can
be synthesized into a sociology of knowledge. Sayer (1992) pointed out that, without some
grounding in humanistic values, there is no way to evaluate the claims of an ideology such as
racism, forcing us to accept the normative views it promulgates as the dominant mindset in
German or American society, without any way to evaluate its ersatz scientific claims and mal-
appropriated credentials. Without access to human values, Gould could not have written The
Mismeasure of Man (1981/1996), and we would be forced to accept Herrnstein’s Bell Curve
(1996). Without the values of democracy and an appreciation for cultural diversity, we would not
understand the monstrous abuse in interpreting the ‘g’ scale as a measure for genera intelligence.
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To enable us to escape from such intellectual traps, sociology must remain true to its democratic
resulting in a variety of perspectives, all struggling for academic and intellectual prestige. Neo-
Hegelianism, historic ism, critical theory, ontology, and logical positivism were all contenders
for the academic robe of truth. Today’s third generation of criticism includes deconstruction,
hermeneutics, edifying philosophy, and discursive rationality. All accused Mannheim’s new
discipline as ungrounded, without sufficient critical acumen to lead to truth. Mannheim analyzed
needs of social groups. In his defense against charges of relativism on all sides, Mannheim
examined the origin and significance of fear of relativism (1936), stating that such fears can only
be relevant if relativism is confused with the older, absolute ideal of objective truth. Mannheim
stated his preference for a relativism that “calls attention to those moments that make
propositions discernable within their situation to any absolute proclamation of truth, no less
partial than its competitors, yet incapable of grappling with the concrete determinants of thought,
overlooking altogether the biases and presumptions that condition the evolution of knowledge”
the mutual reference of all elements of meaning to each other and their respective roles in a
particular system. Relational statements cannot be formulated absolutely, but only in terms of
structures within a world outlook. The remainder of relativism for Mannheim lacked standards
and order, “everyone and no one is right.” Perspectivism allows that various viewpoints come
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into existence in relationship to each other and the social milieu from which they arise, but none
can be understood without reference to another perspective, which is itself a product of history.
With Hegel, Mannheim maintained an existential content of truth at every stage in the
evolution of human thought, with a specific goal. The absolute unfolds in an “enduring and
signifies the way in which one views an object, what one grasps in it, and how one constructs the
facts for oneself in thought.” Perspective is either concretely grounded or tied to viewpoint.
Relationism permits access to certain aspects of social truth only from specific viewpoints.
Certain aspects of history can only be grasped through particular circumstances, making the
All interpretations of history from temporally emergent viewpoints do not have equal
standing, according to objective criteria set for the evaluation of interpretations, subject to
concrete historical evidence. Inspection can reveal which perspective more deeply penetrates
social reality, distinguishing truth, differentiating among norms, thought modes, and behavioral
patterns. Truth of perspective means that history determines correct conclusions, with different
perspectives determining different partial truths, each correct within its own field. Ethical values
and moral judgments are valid to the extent to which they refer to norms that help the individual
discover new possibilities of human development in new situations, or guidance to the existing
one. Incorrect or distorted knowledge ignores or conceals new realities, clings to outdated
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ideologies, and imposes inappropriate categories. With Lukacs, Mannheim held that
structure.
skepticism emerged as a result of the rediscovery of the Greek classics, their original meaning,
and their original critics. Skepticism doubted the ground of belief in reason or revelation,
rejecting fixed standards of truth and righteousness. 19th Century relativism arose in response to
social and institutional changes that swept Europe, overwhelming existing faiths and institutions.
World outlooks were subject to intense analysis by academic elites seeking meaning and purpose
in the face of radical changes in prestige, meaning, and social action. They valued communal
consensus over critique. Sharp contradictions between social groups and interests created well-
grounded fears of civil wars, class conflicts, social fragmentation, and family dissolution.
Mannheim’s interest was to find unity and synthesis in partial views, accomplishing in thought
what could not be accomplished in reality. He sought to synthesize different ideologies and
philosophies into a comprehensive view, a relative optimum of what cannot be combined into a
Mannheim believed in absolute being at some point, thereby positing some sphere of
experience as absolute. Like Weber and James, he found ground between relativism and idealism
on which to build a critical theory. He was a model for the role he proposed for radically
disassociated intellectuals to create a synthesis of partial viewpoints, benefiting from the truth of
presumptions one brings to the task is preferable to a blind denial that any such value
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orientations exist, as is actually the case with ‘value-free’ objectivity in social science, which in
so denying also precludes possibility of taking a critical stance. To further this task, Mannheim
advocated the creation of an occupational status group, with social power to act as carriers of the
The mission of the intellectuals is to take an unaffiliated, ruling point of view. Without
ruling authority, they would nevertheless be trained to grasp totality. Through education,
intellectuals could release themselves from the particularities of their personal social experience,
cultivating a will to seek dynamic social equilibrium orientated toward the whole. Weber also
sought such leadership, with a commitment to an ultimate ideal (cited in Goldman, 1994). From
Durkheim, Mannheim added the goal of social and intellectual integration and acceptance of the
whole, to mediate between conflicting groups. They must locate more comprehensive, systematic
centers for reinterpreting older elements of culture, developing a broader social vision, ranking
Mannheim’s ideology and utopia are two types of reality transcendence because both are
incongruent with social reality (Geoghegan, 2004). Ideologies are outdated, looking to an
irredeemable past, whereas utopias point to the future. Mannheim’s theory of history is
dialectical, developing through conflict driven by succeeding social strata, each with a social
vision articulating its newly established status quo and implementing its political project. Each
new transformative vision is the basis of a new social reality, which is eventually challenged by a
newer vision of a new rising class. At this point, yesterday’s utopia becomes today’s ideology,
changing in function from criticizing reality to defending the status quo. Historically, liberalism
went from being a utopian vision of the rising bourgeoisie in overturning the medieval world, to
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the ideological effort to defend the middle class status quo from challenge by rebellious workers.
The situation is considerably more complicated by his theory that social context determines
thought. Mannheim was very skeptical of any transhistoric vision, including Marxist claims that
the world outlook of the workers is universal. Some labeled Mannheim as a relativist for this
reason, which is a claim that he rejected, as we have seen. His analysis of reality-transcending
Utopias that do not eventually attain power are of little consequence. In accordance with
the dialectical theory of history, both ideological and utopian elements animate the politics of
rising social strata, which may only partially realize their projects. Ideological aspects of their
social vision may block the utopian promise. The liberal idea of freedom contains a high level of
resistance to the idea of equality (Geoghegan, 2004), which only became apparent to later strata
who hoped to cash in on the original utopian promise. The terms ‘ideology’ and ‘utopia’ carry a
lot of historic baggage. All oppositional political activity is stigmatized as utopian, whereas
ideological defenses make no distinction between what is really impossible and what is merely
not possible without changing the existing social order. The term ‘ideological’ describes the
indicating that which is out of date, archaic, and extinct as opposed to the new, rising star of the
utopian. The sociology of knowledge (Geoghegan, 2004) itself emerged out of the socialist
utopia. For thought that is congruent with reality to dominate would bring ideology to an end, as
well as utopia, with loss of the ideals and hopes of humanity. In the modern context the
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sociology of knowledge can explore distorted experience and generate a new sense of totality,
which is the progressive mission of modern intellectuals. However Mannheim viewed historical
and social reality, it is contemporary, dividing ideology from utopia. Mannheim included a full
because society does not live up to the conservative vision, which provides it with a utopian
thrust. In response to radicalism, the conservative mind was forced to develop a counter-utopian
vision to remain in power. Paul Tillich decided that this effectively negates the concept of utopia.
Ernst Bloch (cited in Geoghegan, 2004) criticized Mannheim from a Marxist perspective,
considering the sociology of knowledge a flawed and harmful theory. He accused Mannheim of
plagiarizing the concept of utopia from his1918 The Spirit of Utopia, then misusing it, without
including a single reference. Bloch used a normative approach to ideology and utopia, making
judgments without reference to history, which in Mannheim’s view, sinks into unreflective
particularism. Bloch drew on historical resources of rationality and value to distinguish truth
from error, good from evil, and to analyze the emergence of these two forms in history, their
current constellation, and future course. A red thread that runs through the historic succession of
ideologies, utopia embraces authenticity that has not yet emerged. Although Bloch was a
historical materialist, utopia need not be historically realizable to validate a specific utopian
vision.
Bloch (cited in Geoghegan, 2004) believed that because they fundamentally challenge
existing power constellations, our highest human aspirations have been ever subject to historical
defeat. The real difference between ideology and utopia is the difference between self-delusion
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and authentic humanism. Mannheim tossed all those utopian hopes that do not become active
oppositional utopias into the trash of ‘wishful thinking.’ Mannheim tied ideologies and utopias to
specific social strata, whereas Bloch analyzed the social production of ideas. Bloch’s utopian
thinking is not distorted, a product of analysis and aspirations, and therefore will remain even in
the triumph of congruent thinking, which is scientific. Because history has many utopian
moments, the archaic can still retain relevance in contemporary society. When justice is done and
historic accounts settled, the social contract linking the generations will restore humanitarian
ideas that have been cast down, and radical hermeneutics will settle the score.
Bloch’s usage of the term ‘utopia’ is so ubiquitous as to destroy its explanatory value, in
Adorno’s words (cited in Geoghegan, 2004), “Everything borders on being nothing.” In the
Marxist tradition, the word ‘ideology’ denotes a wide range of phenomena, as ideological
cultural and political formations, as false consciousness, and as the project of social classes.
Bloch argued that National Socialism consolidated power in Germany by exploiting utopian
Marxists and Mannheim. To Bloch, nihilism rather than ideology is the real enemy. The
optimism of Fascism was not so stupid as to disbelieve in everything. For Bloch, ideology needs
the utopian to succeed as ideology, whereas an ideology of simple lies would never succeed,
requiring utopian resources to gain power. The Nazi slogan of ‘home, soil, and nation’ captured
longings for security and community. Lenin used the term ‘proletarian ideology,’ or true
ideology, showing how the utopian depends for emergence on existing ideological forms. To
Bloch, ideology and utopia both inform practice, and are part of reality rather than past and
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future ideals. He criticized Mannheim for refusing to accept Marx’s claim that the proletariat has
That may be true in proletarian social action, when workers act democratically, in their
own interests, as a class. However, when, as a thoroughly demoralized occupational status group,
they are whipped into a mob by an ideological demagogue such as Der Führer, seeking security
in fascism’s ersatz offer of an escape from freedom (Fromm, 1969), one doubts whether even
Marx could have foreseen so many negative consequences of the collapse of the First
International. Surely Bloch’s own failure (Geoghegan, 2004) in the wake of the 1939
Hitler/Stalin Pact to recognize Stalin as the face of the counter-revolution rising right out of the
Party gives one pause to wonder about his own objectivity as a revolutionary exponent of the
working class. If nothing else, such poor continuing performance as is exemplified in Bloch’s
belief that Russia had no woman question because it had resolved the worker’s question, lends
claims to totality. Mannheim’s normative grounding is clear in his statement that: “selection and
accentuation of certain aspects of historical totality may be regarded as the first step in the
direction which ultimately leads to an evaluative procedure and to ontological judgments” (cited
grounded in some values, although the critic may perceive her objectivity as an expression of the
During World War II, Edward Shils went from being inspired by to harshly criticizing
Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge. Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek, fellow Hungarian
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émigrés to England, conducted a vituperative and merciless assault on Mannheim’s theoretical
work that cannot be understood outside of the paranoia and unreason of embattled democracies
in rationalizing their existence during troubled times. Writing in the pages of Economica, the
journal of the London School of Economics, Hayek and Popper took issue with all who advanced
any form of state planning, as manifested in the Engels/Plekhanov strain of Marxism touted by
the Stalinists, in the National Socialism of Germany, or in Keynes’ General Theory of Income
and Employment, Interest, and Money touted at Cambridge. These men felt that the totalizing
cynicism of idealistic intellectuals had wrecked European society, paving the way for fascism
and communism, and because he was a very popular lecturer among students at their beloved
London School of Economics, they held up Mannheim as an especially obnoxious and egregious
example of the sort of pompous epigone they despised so thoroughly. The fact that Mannheim’s
role for intellectuals, which is to create a sociology of knowledge suitable for policy and
planning, only vaguely resembled Keynesianism, Stalinism or Nazi state planning, weighed less
in their estimation of Mannheim as a target of opportunity for their intellectual wrath than did the
Mannheim thought that, by analyzing and understanding the various ideological positions
available within Western political thought, intellectuals were in an especially suitable position to
synthesize social knowledge in a fashion that could provide a holistic view from the partial
insights of the various intellectual factions. The simplistic way to attack this position, which
builds on Georgi Lukacs’ (another Hungarian intellectual) History and Class Consciousness
(1971), is to deny that social knowledge is social or that it is historical. By coining their own
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meanings for ‘scientism’ and ‘historicism,’ this is precisely what Popper, Hayek, and later Shils
did.
The fact that John Maynard Keynes’ General Theory would soon become one of the most
influential economics treatises in history did not deter Karl Popper or Friedrich Hayek from
attacking state-planning in any form, holding that economic activity is far too complex to be so
regulated. At that period, when World War II was far from won, Popper, Hayek, and Shils
(Pooley, 2007) could not have anticipated that Keynes’ treatise would become the policy
document for state planners, at least until the collapse of the Phillips curve in the Nixon
Recession destroyed their ability to trade employment for inflation. From that 1940’s
perspective, the only fundamental disagreement among policy woks was over the degree of state-
planning to be implemented, its scope and direction. Stalin and Mao leaped forward on five-year
plans, whereas the Japanese, like Grand Fenwick, roared ahead on 20 year plans and American
aid for having lost the war (1955/1983). The emergence after Nixon of the dire Marxian
prediction that the rate of return on capital has a permanent tendency to decline is the reason the
longer works as policy, but these events had to await another three decades to emerge.
Meanwhile, the Hungarian intellectuals could denigrate everyone who even resembled a state-
Religion
The world-wide rise of fundamentalism from all three desert religions, Judaism, Islam,
and Christianity (whose common central ethic is defense of the water-hole), has forced the
righteous indignation directed against indefensible American foreign policy (Johnson, 2001).
Mannheim suggested that religious ideas performed as ideology in the Middle Ages, when the
Christian ideal of brotherly love could not be realized in a society grounded in the institution of
serfdom. These ideals formed the basis of a utopian movement in Anabaptist orgiastic chiliasm.
Thomas More’s Utopia (1515/2003) did not meet Mannheim’s requirements for activism, as did
the polemics of Thomas Münzer, the radical Anabaptist cleric. Chiliasm resurfaces only in
religiously attenuated political movements, but cannot serve as a modern form of political
from Hitler’s persecution, Mannheim later began to recognize the contemporary significance of
religious belief even as, in Bloch’s words, “Nazis steamed into the vacated, originally Münzerian
dangerous ideological forces can only lead to a new holocaust that will make the
Mannheim adapted Marx’s particularist use of ideology in exposing false consciousness, which
The proletarian stance taken by Post-Marx Marxists above the social process by which ideology
is formed was simply delusion, permitting them to forget to apply their own critical tools to
themselves. However, Mannheim was guilty of the same sin, forgetting to apply the sociology of
(Goldman, 1994); thereby leaving his ideas open to charges of relativism from all sides. Though
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touting a specific rather than a general theory of ideology, Mannheim credited Marxist theory
with discovering the distinction between the two, with the particular referring to skepticism
about motives, actions, and presumptions of opponents, and the general theory denoting the
Marx denoted as utopian both premature visions of social change, and ideological
may be closer to Marx than Bloch’s, who saw utopian consciousness in the working class as
undistorted. Although Bloch used some early works of Marx, such as his1843 letter to Rüge, and
his characterization of Owen, Fourier, and Saint-Simone as great, early utopians in the
Communist Manifesto (1848/2005); he might well have remembered Marx’s identification of the
fundamental utopia of the working class, ‘freely associated labor,’ to which communist society is
only a preliminary but contingently necessary step in negating capitalism. Here, we could
perhaps make Bloch’s distinction between abstract utopians and the emergence of a concrete
utopia of fulfilled existence, but certainly not in what Marx also identified in his introduction to
the Russian edition of Capital as a State Capitalist society, which is the best description of the
form of social organization Stalin bequeathed to Russia, with its Stakanovitch five-year speed-
ups, continuous concessions, and constant shortages (manifested in the West with the difference
redeeming utopian value. Mannheim and Marx both consigned religious politics to the decline of
the medieval order, with no role in establishing the new. Mannheim and Bloch both explored
how ideology and utopia function in perpetuating self-deception and hope, and emphasized their
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centrality to any attempt to understand the contemporary world. The emergence of religious
ideology as terrorism forces us to re -evaluate the role of America as a utopian ideal in the
modern world (Bruckberger, 1959), and grapple with the extent to which we have transformed
such dreams into the dross of ideology, failing to meet the expectations for even minimal
security of the billions who live on less than $2.00 per day. We must make credible progress in
this realm to defuse the righteous indignation of fundamentalists of all persuasions currently on
the verge of attaining nuclear weapons of mass destruction that could annihilate us all.
Although the mad rush of intellectual discourse to the far right in the ‘80s and ‘90s has
left earlier discussions of Marxism and Mannheim in the lurch, sociology has found new labels
for the topic of ideology, such as social constructionism and discourse analysis (Kumar, 2006).
Professional sociologists distrust utopian thinking, whereas utopian scholars prefer the ivory
the social and political condition sunder which utopian thought flourishes. Bell’s (1960/2000)
premature announcement of the end of ideology (pre-dating as it did the social movements of
women, workers, Blacks, and youth in the ‘60s) notwithstanding, everyone had something to say
about ideology. Marcuse’s (1964/1991) analysis of late capitalist ideology became the bible of
the new left. Paris in May of 1968 recreated memories of the Paris Commune, generating
New Left academics as the ‘bourgeois Marx. ’ Theorists aiming at stirring up working class
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militancy and consciousness were miffed at his substitution of intellectuals for workers as the
architects of the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim became an unperson (Orwell, 1949) after
1970, as the use of ideology as an analytical concept was also dropped, along with the study of
Marxism, to the extent that it was identified with the ideological strain of Engels/Plekhanov, or
mainstream post-Marx Marxism. In this view, the post-structuralism and post-modernism that
systematic statements of belief, with or without links to status groups or classes, political
doctrines such as communism or fascism may be studied in their own right, with fruitful results.
For sociology, the study of ideology was linked to appearance and reality, truth and error,
subjective consciousness and the objective world (Kumar, 2006). It had contributed to empirical
sociology, stratification theory, and cultural sociology in attempting to analyze media bias in
industrial strikes.
Post-modernism in the sociology of the ‘80s suggested that there is no truth, objectivity is
a myth, and history has no meaning. The triumph of the totalizing ideologies of Thatcherism and
Reaganism, major working class defeats such as Reagan’s destruction of PATCO and the impact
of the Kroger contract on the Meatpacker’s Union, all contributed to advent of a corrosive
relativism that rendered the concept of ideology almost meaningless. If the truth of science is
completely relative to the viewpoint of the scientist, any opposition between ideology and truth
must itself be a false dichotomy, and the term may indeed be as useless as the concept of race,
under different names, without the previous connotation of demystifying and exposing truth.
Berger and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality (1967), identifies social reality as
man-made, in terms of language, thought, and scientific constructs, thereby implying that all
Race, ethnicity and nationalism are socially constructed categories, paving the road for a cultural
relativism that cannot recognize such a category as false consciousness. Immemorial tradition
may have been invented recently. Feminist studies of gender and sexual identity witness the
emergence of structures of ideas and emotions that condition our self-definition. Foucault
substituted the term ‘discourse’ for ideology, which now serves to enlighten some areas while
concealing others, provide evaluations, and to impose a dominant world outlook in place of a
Mannheim, who was perhaps more in tune with Marx than most of the other Marxists
referred to so far, believed that truth is a perspective that can be reached by intellectuals,
precisely to the extent that their thinking is not subject to the interests or ideology of a particular
group (Kumar, 2006). To the extent that social constructionism can be seen to be derived from
the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim can be seen as one of its originators. If ideology can be
divorced from truth, how is it possible to be critical in the sociology of fascism? Why not just
talk about programs, doctrines, or philosophies, and forget about false consciousness, and
whatever other Marxist baggage we have been carrying? This is where the social realism of
Sayer (1992) is crucial. We must retain those man-made concepts that have supported critical
evaluation of the institutional structure of society. This is the humanistic mission of social
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science: to help us discern the difference between truth and lies in our man-made constructs,
providing practical adequacy ”in guiding us in building democratic economic, educational, legal,
and other institutions, especially political, which are otherwise captured by ideological elites.”
Utopia
What of utopia, the other term of Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia? For
Mannheim, the two were linked, in ways that few of his critics understand. The function of
ideology is to support the status quo and enforce order, but it has a utopian aspect. Utopia is
more than the principle of hope for positive change. It has an element of ideology in it. The real
problem with Mannheim’s synthesis, on which he based his sociology of knowledge, is that it
remains at the level of process, rather than reaching for transcendence. From a vulgar materialist
opposite not only unite the truth of materialism and idealism, but also retain both in the highest
contradiction. This is the absolute, new humanism that Marx announced in his Critique of the
Hegelian Dialectic (1964). Society is more than a material process. It involves human beings.
Mannheim, like Marx, was a far better Hegel scholar than Mannheim’s Marxist epigone
critics. Ideology is that which is unrealizable. It consists of the pie in the sky hopes and dreams
that keepers of the status quo feed to the masses to placate them. The aspirations of ideology
offer objects the prevailing social order cannot possibly allow, but finds convenient to
incorporate. For instance, the medieval Church offered paradise and Christian brotherly love,
neither of which were attainable but both of which were useful. Utopia is fantastic to the ruling
elites, yet is realizable in principle and has actually been realized. When social groups embody
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utopian ideals, and realize them in social action, these ideals become the new ideology.
Mannheim criticized those who equate utopia with revolution, but recognized their appreciation
of social dynamics, that in fact utopias are necessary in any positive social change. Utopias
express and realize “those ideas and values in which are contained in condensed form the
unrealized and unfulfilled tendencies which represent the needs of each age…break (ing) the
bond of the existing order…only those orientations transcending reality will be referred to by us
as utopian which, when they pass into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the
order of things prevailing at the time” (Kumar, 2006). Such ideas are anathema to conservative
Mannheim argued that his concept, while grounded in empirical reality, enters the
socialism is just such a utopian ideal, with its goal of a free and egalitarian society. The
contradiction in the idea of freedom arises when those who have attained it to some degree close
ranks against all newcomers, who also wish to share in the benefits of egalitarianism. As long as
class-divided society continues to exist, some people will always think they are supposed to be
freer than others, whether by race, inheritance, or some other ascribed characteristic. Mannheim
was the first to sketch the actual ideologies of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism, showing
how these tendencies interact, preserving the social order yet moving it forward. As
contradictory elements, they function together to actually preserve the system. 18th Century
utopian liberalism became 19th Century bourgeois conservatism, Communism and social ism
were the new utopias that challenged this ideology. Understanding that the contradiction is never
synthesized, but actually becomes sharper in the new society, can help to understand how the
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Russian Revolution was transformed into the Stalin counterrevolution, and how such unwanted
revolutionists, which is now, “What happens after the revolution?” Are women to be dragged
back into bondage? Are workers to be re-chained to their machines? Does the fastest output by
the strongest worker become the new standard of production? What emerged from the Russian
Revolution was not socialism, neither was it Communism. It was State-Capitalism, as best
described by James and Dunayevskaya, (1950/1986). They argued that, in an age of absolutes,
characterized by Cold War and hydrogen bombs, all universals acquire concrete meaning for
individuals as well as for society. Total planning is met by permanent crisis, the struggle for
men’s minds met by the effort to completely mechanize humanity. The absolute contradiction of
state-capitalism contains all previous contradictions. When workers confronting automation are
forced to ask, “What kind of work shall a person do?” the human activity of philosophy becomes
actual. Confronted by the need to establish a theoretical basis for Soviet democracy, Lenin broke
with the materialism of the Second International and applied the Hegelian dialectic to Marx’s
The Russian workers successfully used his conception of the complete abolition of
bureaucracy and all ordering from above as a weapon to abolish the one-party state (James &
Dunayevskaya, 1986). Lenin’s problems of production in 1920 Russia are universal. Although he
was not able to surmount the historic barriers confronting the revolution with his New Economic
Plan, in his philosophic notebooks he began to confront the dialectical method of Marx’s
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Humanism to envision the creation of a higher way for labor to organize socially, as freely
associated labor, the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. “What kind of labor shall a
human do?” is the critical question in the current stage of automation in capitalist production.
West Virginia coal miners confronted automation in their 1949-1950 battle against the automatic
miner, a man killer; as did Meatpacker’s Local P-9 in Austin, MN in their 1986 strike against
Automation and the Kroger contract. The high point reached by these struggles has compelled
workers to confront this issue. Today’s crisis in production flows from the antagonism between
mental and manual labor. From Descartes’16th Century Rationalism to Mid-Twentieth Century
Stalinism, the fundamental contradiction of capitalism has been in the division of labor between
In establishing its power over feudal society, the revolutionary bourgeoisie of the First
Rationalism (James & Dunayevskaya, 1986). This ideology combated superstition, increased
production, and expanded productive forces. This expansion was accomplished through the
division of labor between thinkers and doers, thereby re-establishing idealism. Here is where the
concealment that prevents rationalism from actually rising to philosophy comes in. At the idea
that harmonious progress is the only possible result of this social process, rationalism shows its
true colors whether expressed as vulgar, uncritical materialism or idealism of the same stripe that
recognizes no human ideals or utopias. Once the result of individuals associated in a common
effort to control nature, today the division of labor lies in the control of the administrative elite
over the masses. The final clash between mental and manual labor, state-centralized capital and a
thoroughly socialized proletariat, will spell out the end of Rationalism. The political ideology of
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rationalism is democracy, providing equal opportunity for all to take command of society, and
therefore equality at law, in voting rights, and in the labor market. Anyone with sensitivity to the
deteriorating conditions of life and labor in the United States can sense that political democracy
The planned economy under a one-party state differs from corporatist laissez-faire only
in its degree of rationalism (James & Dunayevskaya, 1986). The solution to continuous crises in
production is always more production through technological advance. Any private property that
stands in the way of this complete rationalization of labor can be appropriated. Today’s Spirit of
Capitalism started out as a utopian ideal, made the journey to power, and installed itself as the
ideology of the Iron Cage, the complete rationalization of labor under the Puritan Work Ethic.
Events in the Soviet Union parallel our previous description of fascism. The Labor Bureaucracy
(CCCP) rose out of the modern mass movement of the working class in response to the
centralization of capital, which kept it in power. The proletarian representative turned into an
administrator. The only viable solution to today’s crisis is to abolish the division of labor in
Hegel
All critiques of rationalism are grounded in Hegel and concerned with the proletariat
(James & Dunayevskaya, 1986). The French Revolution first challenged uncritical materialism
and idealism. This ideology fell into permanent crisis when the Napoleonic counter-revolution
encountered the insurgent masses. Kant’s critique exposed the contradiction between science and
human freedom. His solution was to install a moral elite in leadership, all men who obey moral
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law and act according to the General Will. Thus, vulgar idealism is replaced by critical idealism.
Having witnessed revolution and counter-revolution, Hegel could not resolve the contradiction
contradiction as the creative and moving force in history (James & Dunayevskaya, 1986).
internal contradiction, not competition. The nature that confronts man as an alien power
development is the goal of history. Freedom is not utility, but rather creative universality.
Lenin recognized that these dialectical principles at the center of Hegelian philosophy are
these utopian ideals would guide human development. The Post-Marx Marxists
transformed Marx into a vulgar materialist, only interested in expanding production and
increasing consumption. In fighting this tendency, Marx found that only the creative
activity of masses in motion can expand the dialectic of Hegel. Marx transformed this
vision out of previously unattainable elements of the old ruling ideology, is objective
history. Rather than confine the human quest for universality to the development of a
relations of production, in the need for the free development of all human capacities in
mental and manual labor. For Hegel, this was the work of a small elite with a monopoly
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of leadership talent (James & Dunayevskaya, 1986). To Marx, masses in motion, in
pursuit of Mannheim’s utopian ideals, create world historic movements. Rather than
deliver society into the hands of a professional labor bureaucracy, such as the Central
Committee of the Communist Party, which could only replicate the essence of Tsarism,
Marx proposed the only possible humanistic future as lying in the abolition of the
distinction between mental and manual labor. Communism, the immediate response to
capitalism, would perform the historic role of seeing this project through. Communism
development.
This was the mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat, not the entrenchment
of a new bureaucracy. Hegel could not carry the dialectic through to its logical
such as that which rose on the wings of the General Strike of Mau 1, 1886, when half a
million American workers and tens of thousands of supporters went on strike or joined
marches and picket lines for the 8 hour day. This was the turning point from which
American labor went on to create the American Federation of Labor and the First
sent a request to make May 1 the International Day of Labor, which so carried. Workers
were ready to take over the reins of capital through self-organization and development of
the proletariat under the universal idea of freedom (James & Dunayevskaya, 1986).
Freedom was the unattainable ideology of Liberal Democracy, which it held out
to all for the sake of convenience without any intention of acting on or delivering the
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promise. When new passions and new forces seized upon this ideal, it was transformed
into a practical and realizable utopia. In fact, the Paris Commune of 1871 was an historic
realization of concrete universality for the masses, as was the St. Louis Commune of
1877. The events in Paris of May, 1968 show that, as an imminent historic ideal, this idea
of freedom was never defeated, but still lives in the hearts and minds of working people
In Hegel’s day, only the state bureaucracy could represent the universal needs of
the community. Thus, the Stalinist epigones who attempted to truncate the dialectic at
process are in fact the real inheritors of Hegel’s mantle (James & Dunayevskaya, 1986),
with no other reason to call themselves Marxist than the transformation of the utopian
vision of the Russian Revolution into the ideology of control, the ultimate development
of Rationalism. The only dogma Hegel left standing was that of the backwardness of the
masses, which Stalinists and the New Left now perpetuate; always ready to deliver the
masses into the hands of the capitalists in the last resort, rationalized by the vulgar
Rationalism
always tail-ends state bureaucracy at the end of the day, whether it is North Korea’s Kim
Il Sung, Shining Path Maoism, orthodox Trotskyism, or some other variant of Engelsian
unrealizable ideology precisely because of his monopoly on the reins of power. Under the
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ideology of state-capitalism, the party poses as exponent of a revolutionary utopian ideal
that it could never permit to be realized. Vulgar materialism demands only that the
worker works harder than ever before, transforming labor into a material force of
production. The vulgar idealism lies in positing the Party to lead, as it has never led
before, using carrots and sticks to goad recalcitrant workers into more frenzied
production activity. Stalinists view workers as lazy and indifferent, performing as little
and taking as much as possible. They see the workers in the same light as the Progressive
Movement of Dewey, as rebellious children who need someone to modify their behavior.
While the labor bureaucracy hands out marching orders, as the UFCW told Meatpacker’s
Local P-9: “you go back to work,” workers continue to resist speed-up and discipline,
whether from the Party, or imposed under the Kroger contract, neither of which was ever
submitted to a vote (Meatpackers simply woke up one morning to find themselves under
As did the Progressives and the Fascists, Stalinists needed to fashion an ideology to
combat the sullen attitude of the workers, therefore they imposed the police state under an
exclusively scientific world outlook. In the wake of the terrorist event of September 11, 2001,
Congress imposed the Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act, long time wish lists of
security agencies now realized in panicked disregard of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.
Congressman Dennis Kucinich, (D., OH) commented that he was witnessing the creation of a
ideology, this view is scientistic rather than scientific. Sociology suffers from the same attitude
in the hands of the same kind of bureaucrats. Only in so far as it is utopian in Mannheim’s usage
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can social science actually become scientific, by promoting democracy in all social institutions,
thereby providing the scientific observer with the opportunity to study representative samples of
The official Soviet history of philosophy, like all Soviet history, is bound in loose leaf,
subject to rewriting at any time. The enemy of social progress is and always has been
superstition, posing in philosophical and religious garb as idealism. While pretending to defend
Marx’s materialism from Hegel’s idealism, Stalinists actually defended themselves against the
revolutionary dialectical logic Marx had already set on its feet (James & Dunayevskaya, 1986).
State-planning is conducted by trained intellectuals completely freed from class bias, performing
the role assigned to them by Mannheim as keepers of the sociology of knowledge, or as Weber’s
ancient Chinese Literati, or Nazi psychotherapists, take your pick. The theoretical enemy of
totalitarianism is the theory of state-capitalism. The philosophic enemy is the New Humanism of
Marx, from which he never departed. The real enemy of the Soviet state was never capitalism,
but the workers’ collective resistance to labor discipline. This is why the Kroger contract was
never subject to a vote, but simply imposed on the Meatpackers Union by the UFCW hierarchy,
with no more mandate than the Communist labor bureaucrats, serving as it does to transform the
labor bureaucracy into the whip-hand of capital. The Stalinists were terrified that an objective
basis for class struggle actually existed in Russia. They substituted “criticism and self-criticism”
for Hegel’s objective contradiction, thereby transforming their materialism into idealism.
All development depends on the subjective intuitionism of the labor bureaucrat. No less
august an occupational status group than the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences
of the USSR dished up Zhdanov’s new idealism of the state plan as the official ideology of
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Soviet society in 1949 (James & Dunayevskaya, 1986). While the role of the worker in the
struggle for socialism is to work harder, all intellectual life is subsumed under the Party, which
acts as the consciousness of the bureaucracy, directing and controlling it, and planning ahead. As
did the ancient Chinese Literati and the psychotherapists under the Göring Institute, the Party
defined morals and resolved value conflicts, establishing what is politically correct. The masses
were material forces of production at the disposal of the Party in its control of capital. The
murderous rule of the Polite Bureau, designed to keep the workers in continuous speed-up as the
leaders plan, has never been paralleled. Anyone who believes that they simply threw up their
hands under the gun of Reagan’s Star Wars, and shouted, “We surrender!” is living in a dream
world.
As I hope I have shown, the same dark forces are at work throughout the world today, on
both sides of the “Iron Curtain,” and in all forms of capitalism, whether statist or privately
owned. Christian Humanists, as exemplified by Peter Drucker, lead today’s middle class struggle
to avoid being absorbed into the proletariat. Only the divine authority of faith can rescue the
individual from sin. To them, rationalism, as expressed in the division of labor, is poised for the
conflict between sin and salvation is the basis of the new social order. This ideology, as
Mannheim shows ideologies are want to do, offers no possible solution to the absolute divorce
between mental and manual labor brought on by the rationalization and division of labor under
the Puritan work ethic. Their political economy is decentralization of capital, with every worker
knowing his or her calling. Freedom can never be attained on this earth, but only in an
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undeliverable after-life. Popular sovereignty must be dismantled, in favor of rule under a natural
In Italy, Germany, and France, at the University of Chicago, and with spreading influence
Christian Humanism embraces the embattled middle classes in suppressing workers’ struggles
and prepares them for Fascism. Such an ideological weapon is useful to big business in attracting
mass support, which is how Peter Drucker became an organization guru, joining forces with the
labor bureaucracy to prevent workers from exercising control over the terms and conditions of
their labor, and thereby remain at the bottom of the ladder in production. The degradation of
labor has extended to the point that no individual can do anything about it, much less in terms of
his own struggle for salvation. By repudiating rationalism and attracting intellectuals to Fascism,
Christian Humanism plays a crucial role in the battle of ideas surrounding today’s absolute crisis
in production.
Threatened with their own proletarianization, withdrawing in horror from the barbarism
of Stalinism, and fearful of the working class, for whom they share with all others the Hegelian
contempt, the middle classes are attracted to the barbarism of Fascism precisely because it offers
security in a misconstrued, idealized and authoritarian past, in this case with no less an authority
than God himself. Petty-bourgeois intellectuals, also victims of the absolute rationalization of
labor with nowhere to turn, fall victim to their own indecision, isolation, alienation, and
confusion. Modern intellectuals, the most educated in history, are undergoing theoretical
indecision between Christian Humanism and psychoanalysis in Germany. After centuries of the
division of labor between thinkers and doers, this is the destruction of reason (Lukacs,
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1952/1981), the disintegration of a society without values or perspective, the final climax to
Proletarian Philosophy
action of workers, blacks, women and youth (James & Dunayevskaya, 1986). No small group of
intellectuals, not even sociologists, can substitute theory for revolutionary action. Only
proletarian revolution can put Russian state-property in its place. In the United States, only
proletarian revolution will put science into the service of human values and establish democracy
in all existing social institutions. The evils decried by Christian Humanism and Existentialism
are not subject to any ideological solution, but can only be resolved through the transformation
of society by the only groups capable of resolving them, the exploited themselves. Reason as
Woman, as Black masses in motion, as Workers’ struggles, as the idealism of Youth, and as the
new revolutionary subject of Gay Liberation: these are the concrete manifestations of Reason in
today’s liberation struggles. Everything begins with the creativity of masses in motion, fighting
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for the ideals of freedom from which they have been excluded. This was Lenin’s universal as
early as1905:
By 1917, the proletariat had created workers, soldiers, and peasants committees, their
form of social and political rule. The Russian Revolution could only have been sustained by the
creativity of masses in motion, their sensitivities to their own problems, their forms of reason and
labor organization, sociality, and humanity. As Marx had pointed out in his introduction to the
Russian edition of Capital, the ancient Russian commune could help provide a new pathway to
revolution, thereby enabling Russia to by-pass the capitalist stage of development. Stalin’s
liquidation of the Kulaks, a polite word for genocide, eradicated that possibility. Today, the
historic challenge still remains. Philosophy must become proletarian. This task cannot be
separated from the reorganization of production, which only the workers can accomplish by
In the encounter with Marx, Lenin and Hegel, we must dismiss altogether the Stalinist
effort to equate state-property with revolution, and the Post-Marx Marxists’ (Engels/Plekhanov)
effort to equate Marx’s New Humanism with Rationalism. Now that the Russian masses have
overturned Stalinist rule using Lenin’s weapon of total resistance to control from above, the
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critical question today is how to transform the Stalinist counter-revolution into its opposite, the
revolution in permanence, as conceived by Marx rather than Trotsky (James & Dunayevskaya,
1986). The negation of the negation is the dialectical law Lenin discovered between 1914 and
1917, the self-mobilization of the masses. The revolutionary struggle of workers against
state power, Stalinism as the conscious, active counter-revolution is still the deadly enemy of all
freedom struggles, whether in Eastern Europe or South America. Stalinists, in the final analysis,
always turn the workers over bound and gagged to the capitalists. The theory of state capitalism
provided by James & Dunayevskaya (1986) was the opening salvo in the assault on Stalinism.
The enormous scope of the ensuing revolutionary attack on Stalinism finally resulted in its fall in
Eastern Europe and Russia. This ideology is no more moribund than Fascism. It has only been
deposed from superpower state status. The theory of state capitalism elaborated here provided
America, under the auspices of Raya Dunayevskaya and News and Letters Committee.
America) arose from the Eastern European revolutions, providing the philosophic ground for
evaluating the vulgar materialism of Engels/Plekhanov. In1949, the theory of State Capitalism
arose out of the Johnson/Forest tendency of the Socialist Workers’ Party in America, providing
the explosive critique for the final assault on Stalinism. With eyes of today, we can see that
Mannheim hardly deserved the opprobrium heaped upon his sociology of knowledge, and it
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almost seems laughable that anyone could argue that ideas are not socially and historically
determined. The tragedy is that Mannheim did provide a means to critique Marxism, as well as
other ideologies on the left and right. Perhaps, had his ideas received a more sympathetic hearing
in America (although he has long been an icon in graduate schools of business), Mannheim’s
sociology of knowledge could have provided a means for democracy to criticize itself rather than
Although terror-bombing was universally condemned when the Nazis, under the
leadership of men such as Werner von Braun, slung missiles at England, by the end of World
War Il the US had adapted the idea of carpet bombing, with massive ‘collateral damage’ from
the RAF, by instantaneously igniting an aerial ‘carpet’ of millions of gallons of oil to melt cities
such as Dresden. In the attacks on Japanese civilian targets, nuclear weapons were substituted for
the oil. If we could have emerged from World War II in horror at the genocide we had
perpetrated in Japan and Germany, evaluating the roots of totalitarian thought in the racism of
America’s ‘paranoid democracy’ that permits us to accept such collateral damage, perhaps we
could have developed sympathy rather than absolute hostility for world-wide democratic
movements, which became the ideological basis for the Cold War.
Orwell’s (Eric Arthur Blair) 1984 (1949), based on the novel We by Russian novelist
Evgeny Zamyatin, described that hysteria best in terms of mind control and the total propaganda
of warring superpowers more afraid of their own citizens than of each other. By signaling our
nonchalance about the use of nuclear weapons in terrorist attacks on civilians to attain American
foreign policy goals, such as the Truman Administration’s determination to control Caspian Sea
oil reserves (Scott, 2003), the Cold War established the ‘balance of terror,’ with the Russians
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quickly replacing the massive Red Army threat to Europe with their own nuclear weapons. This
balance was maintained through the ABM agreement, steering policy away from the slippery
slope resulting from any ‘nuclear umbrella’ that could provide unilateral first strike capability to
either superpower (super-terrorist). With today’s nuclear proliferation, such a balance no longer
exists. The official policy of the US is to use nuclear cudgels to implement policy, exhibiting no
reserve whatsoever about their potential for actual deployment (Kyvig, 1990). Minor changes in
administration, such as from Democrat to Republican, have not altered this policy, which
terrorizes the world. Counter-revolutionary regimes like Iran lead the pack against US policy,
When Kennedy co-produced the Cuban Missile crisis, all sides were forced to save face
through compromise, with the US guaranteeing no more attempts to overthrow Fidel, while
promising to withdraw nuclear missiles from Turkey within six months. In return, the Russians
withdrew their nuclear umbrella from Cuba. Fidel is a clear case where, had not Kennedy’s
‘brightest and best’ Cold Warriors dominated intelligence analysis, Mannheim’s sociology of
knowledge could have provided us with the ability to see the democratic movement that thrust
Fidel into the leadership role of the Cuban Revolution, rather than forcing him and Cuba into the
loving Soviet bear hug for survival. The CIA had expected Cuban civilians to welcome the US
backed invasion with open arms, as did the French in Normandy in WWII. All the Batista
supporters thought they had to do was establish a beach-head at the Bay of Pigs, then funnel
arms and equipment to the aroused Cuban populace. Instead, they met universal opposition, with
every man, woman, and child willing to defend ‘the Beard’ rather than permit the Mafia to once
again rule their tiny island. Kennedy may have learned from this in his apparent readiness to
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reverse directions in Vietnam, where the CIA was providing him with the same advice. We will
never know, because Johnson, the ultimate Cold Warrior, was waiting in the wings.
In domestic policy, the United States did follow the Keynesian, rather than Mannheim’s
state-plan. However, by the Nixon Recession, brought on largely by the stresses and strains of
the US/Viet Nam War, the abilities of state-planners in the US had been exhausted. Prior to this
point, they had always been able to balance inflation against unemployment. With the collapse of
the Phillips Curve, state-planners noticed that Marx’s anticipation of the permanent tendency of
the rate of interest to decline had finally emerged, permanently splitting the United States into a
two-tiered society, with older workers who had won many historic battles through their unions
rapidly losing any toe-hold in the upper tier by simply permitting themselves to be replaced by
contract labor. Carter best exhibited his abject confusion in his handling of the Iranian Hostage
Crisis, which he permitted to drag down his reelection campaign, leaving the field wide open for
The Iranian Revolution need not have collapsed immediately into counter-revolution,
had America not committed itself to support of the murderous Shah. Carter was not obligated to
maintain the Cold War ruse that America’s strong man in Iran had been anything other than a
murderous dictator, using American support to bolster the massive destruction of democratic
struggles and union movements, just as Hitler had accomplished in Germany. There was no ‘iron
clad necessity’ in America’s swallowing the equation of Russia with Nazi Germany in our post-
war propaganda, as revealed by any attention to Kennan’s Russia and the West under Lenin and
“there is, let me assure you, nothing in nature more egocentrical than the
embattled democracy. It soon becomes the victim of its own war propaganda. It
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then tends to attach to its own cause an absolute value which distorts its own
vision on everything else. Its enemy then becomes the embodiment of all evil. Its
own side, on the other hand, is the center of all virtue. The contest comes to be
viewed as having a final, apocalyptic quality. If we lose, all is lost; life will no
longer be worth living; there will be nothing to be salvaged. If we win, then
everything will be possible; all problems will become soluble; the one great
source of evil—our enemy—will have been crushed; the forces of good will then
sweep forward unimpeded; all worthy aspirations will be satisfied.”
under intellectuals practicing the sociology of knowledge would have involved more than
Keynes’ presumptions about ‘economic man,’ as Kennan’s insight clearly reveals the need for
School, he held forth as a popular lecturer at the London School of Economics during the same
period when Keynes developed his ideas at Cambridge. Our state-planners adopted the ideas of
Keynes rather than Mannheim precisely because the abstraction of ‘economic man’ precludes
other kinds of insights into the nature of society. Let there be no mistake that Obama is as
capable of invading Iran as Bush II. Had the US encouraged democratic movements and political
tendencies in Iran rather than crushing them, perhaps we would not be confronted with the
prospect of going to war again because we cannot rid ourselves of Cold War anti-communist
propaganda.
Weinstein (2003) defined democracy as a means by which a group expresses its will and
manages its affairs. Each functional member of the group has the same degree of access to and
influence on the decision-making process. Other means of governance operate on a premise that
some members have differential access to the decision-making process, thereby making it
possible for variously constituted minorities to govern, without reference to any general will as
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democratically defined. Theoretically, this definition of democracy meets Sorokin’s (cited in
Weinstein, 2003) minimum Marxist definition of a group ‘for itself,’ at which the self-
consciousness of the group reaches its full potential to achieve an emergent existence. Rather
than exist as an object for others, the group can understand, explain, and act on its own interests.
In practice, sociology applied to anything less than a democratically governed group is simply
(Weinstein, 2003). Representative samples enable reliable generalization to the universe. The
statistically significant random sample is one in which each member of the population has an
equal probability of being selected. The attributes of a democratic aggregate are most
representative of the group. The League for Industrial Democracy (LID), which fielded Upton
Sinclair as a presidential candidate, articulated the principle that democracy must operate within
which the Japanese applied in implementing quality circles, as opposed to Taylorism, still the
ruling paradigm for management control of production in the US. Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS), the student auxiliary of LID, held in the Port Huron Statement that applied
sociology supports a fully democratized society, which must supply the underpinning of political
At the birth of the industrial age, philosophers such as Adam Smith, Ferguson,
Condorcet, Godwin, and Malthus were the first to take the idea of popular rule seriously, and
promote democracy (Weinstein, 2003). All were aware that purposeful action can reap
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unintended results. This is because collective causation may operate over and above the
outstanding example of social causation. Buyers flocking to the market may cause prices to rise,
whereas sellers trying to maximize price may actually cause it to fall. Population increases
geometrically relative to a limited supply of resources. The moral lesson for sociology was that
good and evil is not absolutes, but relative to consequences that may be unknowable to an
individual.
The best intentions can wreak unanticipated havoc. Society evolves in an unconscious
manner, as a result of group action. Smith first observed the results of the division of labor. The
political orientation was that of laissez faire, then a liberal doctrine with an opposite meaning to
today’s connotation (Weinstein, 2003). To Smith, this did not mean that elites should be left to
plunder the public treasury in peace, but rather that society, conceived as a democratic
marketplace, should be left alone by plutocrats, autocrats, kings, and aristocrats. Unrestricted
capitalism, under these conditions, would not result in monopolistic advantage, but rather a fair
and equitable division of labor. This was an ideal that could be easily associated with
Saint-Simone and Comte presided over what Weinstein (2003) called the second birth of
sociology, propagating social democratic ideals of positivism, altruism, socialism, and sociology.
Human existence is social, and needs management to actually enable democratic self-rule. Rather
than religion, which accommodated easily to aristocratic and totalitarian regimes, positive
science would serve in aiding democratic self-determination of nations, arbitrating the true
course of progress. Social science would lead the way, maximizing the value of scientific
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endeavor under democratic control. Comte’s technocratic priesthood might, in modern parlance,
Marx presided over sociology’s ‘third birth’ (Weinstein, 2003). He founded the First
revolution. Although Lenin’s Bolsheviks took over the Third International after the collapse of
the Second into World War I, Marx had long since broken with the First International over its
Goltha Program and thereafter supported no existing parties, positing rather the historic
notwithstanding, Marx’s humanism, which he also announced in 1848, posited ‘freely associated
labor’ as the form of the new society resulting from the workingmen of the world actually
uniting, rather than being flung across international borders as cannon fodder.
Social revolutions of the age resulted from the enslavement of labor, including the
South’s attempt to harness working people in the chains of slavery in the United States.
Freedmen, working men and women were knocking on the doors of the stratified society that had
actually resulted from the industrial revolution, demanding industrial and other forms of
democracy, What passed for political democracy excluded the masses from participation in the
decision-making process, and still does. Marx contributed a technical point of view on solving
the problems of democracy and sociology, producing a clear statement of the problem, as well as
recommending the kind of social action needed to solve it. The sociological aspects of Marx’s
thought offered a clear guide to changing society in a progressive manner, making it more
democratic and egalitarian. The overthrow of capitalism, and even the momentary phase of
adjustment Marx conceived as communism, were only preconditions to the establishment of true
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democracy, which would be the actual birth pains of civilized human society.
Spencer, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and Pareto were the first to describe their work as
sociology. At this point, Gouldner (cited in Weinstein, 2003) identified a split in sociology,
brought on by the misidentification of Marx’s thought with the post-Marx Marxism of the
Communist Party. Formed by Lenin along the lines of the Tsarist secret police, by the
adventitious rise of Stalin to power the Party had implemented a full-blown program of counter-
revolution, reverting to Tsarism without its religious or monarchical trappings. Despite its partial
degeneration into what Mannheim identified as classic ideology, which is the rationalization of
dictatorial power, academic Marxism retained its analytical and sociological side. Weber
disassociated himself from Marxism, seeing only its ideological degeneration, disregarding its
explicate a value-free rationale for the emerging discipline (Weinstein, 2003), thus paving the
way for the admission of sociology into academic circles. We must not forget the anti-
intellectualism of the Bolsheviks in Russia, shooting down with machine guns everyone who
identified himself with academia (Medvedev, 1989). Almost as if in conspiracy with these
ideological terrorists, academia took seriously ersatz Bolshevik claims to Marx’s mantle, having
little use for a discipline with a pro-democratic orientation in any case because they already
considered Western political democracy to be its absolute form. Remembering Weinstein’s point
that the application of sociological technique to anything less than a democratic aggregate is
reductionism, attributing psychological processes to an object rather than identifying truly social
processes as subject, this great divide in thought may provide us with clues as to why
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sociologists such as Weber and psychologists such as James were unable to fully escape the
narrow empiricism they so carefully tried to mediate. Political democracy is a sham when the
institutions of society are not democratized, especially economic and educational institutions.
Such a society exists more as object than as subject, unable to generate a representative sample
of its constituents. This made little difference to mainstream sociologists who took their lead
from the far more differentiated conceptions of men such as James and Weber, while neither
understanding nor implementing their ideas. Logical positivism and materialistic determinism,
which collapse the efforts of both men to establish critical methodology, are sufficient to
The influence of Communism did not end with providing the foil for developing a
dialectically truncated sociology. It also provided the model for fascism, the most extreme
reaction to the Communists. In places such as Italy and Germany, where the collapse of the
Second International left the most conspicuous vacuum for the complete destruction of all
democratic impulses, fascism led to holocaust. The end of World War II did not crush fascism,
but witnessed the emergence of apartheid regimes in Israel and South Africa, with Nazis under
US auspices proliferating throughout South America. The social malaise of today’s retrogression
in American life has roots in our inability and unwillingness to deal with fundamental issues of
Mannheim’s Diagnosis of Our Time (1944) was the first of three major discussions on the
crisis in and reconstruction of democracy. Mannheim argued that since academic sociology
became institutionalized at the turn of the 20th Century, the conflict between the consolidation of
formal political democracy as ideology and individual freedom has reversed previous gains in
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self-government, with mainstream sociology playing an ideological rather than critical role (cited
in Weinstein, 2003). Today’s retrogression in moral and rational progress is glaringly apparent to
all who are not paid apologists for the status quo. Sociologists and intellectuals have ignored the
democratic calling of their discipline and our age. The Jeffersonian dictum, “eternal vigilance is
the price of liberty,” (Phillips, 1852) and Benjamin Franklin’s (1755/1963): “They that can give
up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety,” have
never been more studiously ignored. The so-called value-free social science founded in reaction
to Communism has been shown by Sayer (1992), working in the tradition established by James,
Weber and Mannheim, to be yet another form of ideology. Mannheim sounded the tocsin for
social scientists to renew their original commitment to democracy as a society in which all
members have equally privileged influence in planning and making decisions, with recognition
of the modern need for democratic social planning, both in terms of what kind of people we are
Dewey and Mead, working in the tradition established by James, led the way. The
Chicago school of American sociologists pursued a similar line of investigation in the United
States. Park, Wirth, and Ogburn shared a common interest in the extent to which current trends
support democratic institutions and values (Weinstein, 2003). Selznick (1957/1984) observed
that modern society must exercise social control, especially over the industrial system. Not
whether, but how to implement democratic planning is the question. Commonly overlooked,
precisely for racist reasons, is the work of Dubois and the Atlanta School, under the banner of
Pylon, in practical sociology and democracy, Democracy in America must remain a lie until
African Americans are admitted to the planning process, en masse, not merely by selecting a
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racial avatar as chief executive. Although the Democrats have now selected a black face to serve
as president, the extent to which this ‘ historic moment’ amounts to anything more than the
charade under which a black face was nominated to the Supreme Court remains to be seen,
although there can be little doubt about the passion for freedom of those who voted for Obama.
Mills, Lipset and Wilson also contributed to the democratic tradition within sociology. Mills
especially argued for the extension of democracy to economic and institutions other than
political.
Under the leadership of Upton Sinclair (Weinstein, 2003), the League for Industrial
Democracy educated millions of Americans on the need to actually create, rather than merely
presume a democratic society. Their clear warning that big government is the hand maiden of big
business was taken up by President Eisenhower (1961), who noted that the unholy alliance
constituting the military-industrial-political-complex (his speech writer cut out the word
political) is the greatest threat to freedom in the world today, even at the height of the red-baiting
McCarthy Era. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was the student auxiliary of LID. The
Berkeley students, taking their inspiration from the freedom schools they had helped establish
during the Freedom Summer of 1964 (the Mississippi Summer Project), realized that they
themselves needed to democratize their own educational institution. The Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party arose out of the voter registration activities of that summer, under the
leadership of Fanny Lou Hamer, to become a pivotal force in the 1964 Democratic Convention
under whose rules the new spearhead for freedom was organized. The Democratic super-
delegates, with no authority whatsoever, ejected the MFDP from the convention, leading to
today’s bankruptcy of the party in democratic ideas, which has not been corrected by the recent
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presidential election. Putting someone forward with a commitment to democracy would have
been more appropriate than selecting a creature of the Chicago Democratic machine. Al Jolson,
the famous Vaudeville singer, had a black face. All it takes is a little bit of charcoal.
SDS broke with LID in 1962 over the issue of red-baiting, which was intolerable to the
students who eventually embraced Angela Davis as a spiritual leader. SDS reorganized under the
Port Huron Statement. This became the New Left manifesto for the ‘60s, which still constitutes a
thorough diagnosis of Mill’s ‘malaise’ in American democracy. Ordinary people still do not
participate meaningfully in the democratic process, President Johnson’s momentary and ersatz
lose control of it, they shut it down). Our lack of self-determination as a people results from the
political and economic rule of America’s governing and ownership elite, which has no broader
basis for popular support than the Communist Party had when the Russian people decided to
throw it off their backs. The establishment of democratic systems and procedures in all American
institutions was the remedy proposed by the Port Huron Statement, projecting nothing less than a
non-violent revolution.
Gitlin, at New York University, emerged from SDS to become a leading sociologist.
Eugene Walker, at News and Letters in Chicago, is a leading social activist, philosopher, and
within the Socialist Worker’s Party by Raya Dunayevskaya. SDS, LID, Sinclair and Mannheim
are all spiritual descendants of Marx. Dunayevskaya created the category of post-Marx Marxism
I hope that I have demonstrated that the problems of this age are generic, and that no one
has found the organizational solution to the questions raised by the freedom struggles of this age.
The core of the problem lies not in social theory, but in our philosophy, which is where we
determine what kind of a people we are, and what kind of a people we want to become. William
James recognized that the scientistic empiricism of his age was not suitable ground for the study
of the human psyche, grappled with philosophic issues in his study of the mind, and created a
radical empirical methodology that eventually became the foundation for his statement of
pragmatism. He never anticipated that he would inspire truncated forms of inquiry such as
Functionalism and Behaviorism, but did create a fine legacy for methodological realists such as
Andrew Sayer to begin to reformulate a humanistic social science. Marx made the clearest
statement of a New Humanismin1848, but his epigones, as did James’, truncated his philosophic
method into vulgar materialism, attempting to take a shortcut to the absolute by way of theory
rather than philosophy, thereby translating theory into a pillow for intellectual sloth.
As James’ Radical Methodology was forgotten, so were the ideas of Weber and
Mannheim, who both tried, variously, to forge a middle ground between materialism and
idealism to shed light on human problems. Using Weber’s ideal typology of status group and his
concept of verstehen, and Mannheim’s concepts of ideology and utopia, we have applied them
directly to 20th Century social problems such as Fascism, Communism, and capitalism,
illuminating the terrain significantly. Holocaust Jews who see a Nazi in every brown shirt have a
grain of truth in their vision, although few of these (with no reflection on those Israelis who
remember the socialist roots of Zionism in a real quest for peace) would recognize fascism in the
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ongoing attempt to sweep aside the original inhabitants of Palestine. As was so eloquently
expressed on an Israeli peace Website, “there is more than one way to conduct a holocaust.”
‘pre-emptive warfare,’ we are still confronted with the fundamental question arising out of the
events of September 11, 2001, which is, “How do we create the preconditions for peace, both
domestically and internationally?” In a nuclear (new, clear) world with 2 billion people starving
on less than $2 per day, nothing could be more terrifying to certain elements of the American
psyche than the election of a Black president. As Bush shuffles off the stage, muttering his fear
of terrorists, we could not make a greater or more disastrous error than to presume that the fear
that drove his administration is groundless. We must find away to express the energy, hope, and
idealism that fueled this event to create new historic ground in reaching for the future, and look
far beyond any new ‘economic stimulus package.’ If this discussion even partially illuminates
the philosophic and organizational problems we must confront in this effort, it will have served
its purpose. No task could be more urgent, and no effort more rewarding.
APPLICATION
The purpose of this project is to unify theory and practice in applying the tools of
aim is to build a platform for my own financial security by marketing my skills above the
commodity level, which means that I name my own price for my own services. Under the
capitalist work ethic, financial security can only be attained when it is no longer necessary to
work for money, which means the accumulation of enough capital to provide for my needs. This
does not mean that I will quit working, but only that the focus of my activities will change from
meeting my own bare necessities to actually serving the public interest. Ralph Nader is a good
example of someone who has accomplished this: He lives on a small monthly stipend provided
by the organization he has created, while continuing to work for social change. Because the unity
of theory and practice can only be located in philosophy, from the beginning of my
organizational effort I will develop a philosophy of Critical Possibility Thinking, which expands
positive thinking in new directions that can point beyond capitalism to a social organization of
thought and purposeful behavior explored by James and Peirce, and the relationship between
rational thought and social action explored by Weber all converge on the activity of marketing
and selling in a capitalist marketplace. The marketplace of ideas presents us with an unreflective
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form of the Protestant work ethic in positive thinking, which is the entrepreneurial interpretation
of Luther‘s concept of the calling, the thinking side of the split between thought and execution
that characterizes capitalist society and culture. We have seen how the action side of the calling
can degenerate into the most extreme form of secularized Christianity, which is fascism.
However, secular religion can also express the calling of the capitalist, which is to accumulate
wealth. That is why positive thinking looks so similar whether marketed by a televangelist or a
sales training program. I shall first evaluate some of the negative aspects of positive thinking,
which the faithful never do, then I shall develop a form of positive thinking that can be used for
more than just personal aggrandizement, but expressed in a manner that can point in the direction
of ‘freely associated labor.’ I do not expect to arrive at this absolute in building a successful
marketing concern, but I hope to at least put these ideas together in a manner that will help those
who work with me market their skills above the commodity level, receiving financial rewards
commensurate with such an effort as well as returning value to society that is constructive.
The narrow, ideological agenda of secular religion can lead to the suspension of critical
faculties, which is disastrous to any sales or marketing effort. When the market changes under
the impact of technology and popular culture, old techniques that served the original designers of
the marketing program well may no longer work, or they may work only for a small percentage
of those who make a good faith effort to apply them. From the management point of view, the
only possible reason for failure is laziness on the part of the sales representative, which is
dereliction of duty, the underlying cause for the fall from grace. Under the Protestant work ethic,
the only visible difference between the elect and the damned is success in one’s calling. If that
calling is the accumulation of wealth, poverty is the mark of Cain, the sign of disgrace. Failure
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means that one has not set goals under the discipline of work, which is the only purpose for
conscious effort. The way this is broken down in most sales organizations, the salesman simply
From the point of view usually adopted within the secular religion of positive thinking,
only success stories are told. An example would be the number of people miraculously ’healed’
at a tent meeting. Those who were not healed are simply not counted. Furthermore, those who
may have contacted disease vectors at the meeting and contracted new communicable diseases
are not counted. The number of people who may have been miraculously healed at a baseball
game is studiously ignored, making it impossible to establish any kind of control group. The
other side of this coin is scape-goating, or blaming the victim. Not receiving the healing can only
be the result of lack of faith. Failure to accept the managerial chrism is the reason for not getting
enough business to stay in business. That is the law and the gospel. The elect can only be
identified by the blessings they receive from God in doing business, but even this success is
suspect. However, it is the only means by which the ‘elect’ can identify each other for purposes
In the life insurance business, only 5% of those who acquire a new license will renew it
three years later. Yet, the standardized goal is to acquire 600 clients who will provide referrals
within the first three years. One is deemed a failure if this goal cannot be reached, which puts
95% of those who start up in the insurance business into the failure bracket, with more to follow
before the three year target date is reached. This is an incredible result, considering the fact that
it is not possible to get a license without company backing, and that all of the marketing agencies
in the business use psychological profiles to measure attribution styles, as well as success in past
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efforts, to screen recruits. This is not troublesome from the managerial point of view, which
simply recruits enough new hires to ensure that the company’s needs for sales personnel are met.
From the point of view of the 95% who, no matter how hard they work, turn out to be ‘lazy,’ this
1979 was my first year in the life insurance business. I graduated from college in 1976
with a baccalaureate in economics, and Prudential was looking for such men (my only flaw was
that I was pushing 30, rather than in my early twenties) to market debit insurance. Although
management handed me a health insurance marketing program that cost $100/week in bulk
mailing expenses, they also turned over a debit book from which I was expected to develop new
business. Between these, the personal market (now universally designated as ‘Project 100’), and
the Property and Casualty license, I was supposed to be able to survive the first quarter on a
$300/week salary, then live on commissions from that point forward. However, at Antioch
College, I was taught to use my critical faculties under all circumstances, and I immediately
learned from my prospects that the program I was offering them did not meet their expectations.
A whole life policy is paid for using level premiums through age100, at which time the face
value of the policy matures, and the insured receives that amount plus any dividends paid by a
mutual company, which Prudential is. The premiums are over-paid during the early life of the
policy so that the excessive amount paid in can be used to reduce the net amount at risk over
time, thereby keeping the premiums level as the mortality rate rises with increased age. Any
dividends and accumulated cash values are considered to be prepaid premiums, and therefore are
not taxed when cashed in. This can be a great means for transferring wealth to a younger
generation in a higher tax bracket, but the guaranteed cash values accumulate at a low rate, and
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are mixed in with the mortality experience to the point that the consumer cannot evaluate a life
insurance policy from the standpoint of an investment vehicle. This is why whole life cannot be
sold as an investment, but only to provide the security that investments cannot provide.
My market was Orange County, Southern California, in1979. The engineers displayed
bumper stickers that read, “Thank You, Ronald Reagan.” The federal government was paying
double digit interest rates on T-Bills to finance Star Wars and murderous proxies throughout
Central America, and everyone expected to make at least 14% return on their investments. The
‘termites’ under the auspices of A. L. Williams had already assaulted the industry with their
battle cry, “Buy term and invest the rest!” Very few prospects (except those who were already
worried about their health and therefore only marginally insurable) were interested in the
security I was selling. I did not have enough capital to survive for two years while I built a
property and casualty business for the purpose of selling life insurance through the back door,
and I received 0% rather than 3% response from my mailings soliciting health insurance business
from mom and pop operations. My entire sales group failed. My manager went back to selling.
Prudential shut down the debit side of their entire operation. I went back to driving cabs for
several decades. In response to the crisis created by the unethical Williams marketing tactics, the
industry created Universal Life policies, which would play a major role in my renewed
By the early years of the 21st Century, my driving days were almost over. Having worked
under the dehumanizing side of the Protestant work ethic for decades, I had spent almost all of
my waking hours behind the wheel, alert and at attention, chasing the daily ‘nut,’ which is what
it takes to keep a driver in business. I had really gotten to the point where I could no longer
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concentrate on driving for 60+ hours a week, forget about holidays, and do so in a manner
consistent with public safety. I was driving a school bus in 2001, when the September attack on
the World Trade Center put Chet Romanowski out of business and into his grave. That was the
end of my driving career. By 2004, I went to work as a volunteer administrative assistant for the
Illinois for Kucinich presidential campaign, with my wife as the Illinois coordinator. The high
point of this effort for me came when Howard Dean raised one million dollars for eating a ham
sandwich at his Internet connected computer workstation. At this point, volunteers who handled
information technology issues had already split the Illinois Kucinich campaign, which the good
senator permitted to happen through a series of poor campaign managers. Dean had built his
whole campaign through IT, and I began to think I wanted to learn more about that subject. I
subsequently joined two graduate programs in information security, one focused on management
At the age of 57, that was really not as unrealistic as it might now appear. I was forced to
turn down a great offer to train as a network engineer because I did not have $4, 000 in cash to
pay upfront for every technical manual with a certification attached to it. I began to realize that,
sans certifications, I was not going to penetrate the Chicago market for IT meat. Evaluating my
own credentials from a managerial perspective, I realized my best shot at the time was in
financial services. I accepted an internship as a life insurance agent with Western Southern;
whereas such were the only bona fide offers I was getting anyway. In my view, I was never again
Walden to conduct my own research into sales and management. The idea was to build up a
clientele of 600 customers who would consider me as their life insurance agent. By the end of
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three years, this effort should succeed, thereafter providing me with enough referrals that, like
most professionals, I would no longer need to make cold calls. The old ‘natural market’ has been
transformed by the industry into the standardized ‘Project 100,’ but the chances of success are
still only1in 20. I entered this proposition with eyes wide open, knowing that I would never
permit any sales agency, no matter how badly it was floundering, to pull me under.
I almost made it at Western Southern. They offered me a salary for one year, provided I
could validate it, and my validation for the fourth quarter would have been in had the
underwriters put any priority on placing the business I gave them, and had my district manager
not torpedoed my marketing effort. One aspect of positive thinking that I must retain in my own
development of a marketing philosophy is not to permit the failure of others, even my trainers, to
deter me from meeting my own goals. However, analysis of what went wrong is the key to future
success, and that is my only purpose here, not casting blame. In terms of blaming the victim,
perhaps I victimized one of the ten largest life insurance marketing concerns in the world. For
that, I can only apologize. I suspect the company will carry on, and that the Chicago/Midwest
Agency was floundering even before I got there. When the district manager presented me with
the option of working sans salary, I realized that would cost me more than I could afford in
gasoline, and that I could just as easily work for nothing out of my own home office. My
marketing efforts had led me to the point where I was about to violate my agreement as a captive
company agent not to conduct any outside business anyway. The parting of our ways was only a
matter of time. I only wish the income I was using to pay for my marketing efforts had lasted for
the lesson Western Southern taught me by negative example. In fact, I already knew that nothing
is free, and that you get exactly what you pay for, but it took me too long to apply this in the
propaganda atmosphere provided by Western Southern. In this case, the ‘Project 100’ is not for
purposes of marketing life insurance to your friends, but only for the purpose of getting 2 or 3
hundred referrals from them, from which to build a clientele. That probably worked for some of
the sales managers at Western Southern in their marketing milieu. For me, asking people that I
knew for telephone referrals to their acquaintances was like taking out a pair of pliers and trying
to pull their teeth. To overcome reluctance, we were supposed to get two ‘tie downs’ affirming
the value of the conversation I had with them, thereby softening their resistance. In this
marketing era, when millions of Americans have actually placed their names on a ‘do not call’
list that every cold caller must update on a monthly basis to remain in legal compliance, the best
I could get from friends and acquaintances was the assurance that they would bird dog some
business for me if they happened to run into anyone who needed life insurance. Because I have
never met any such person who did not chase me down the street in a wheelchair, no useful
referrals ever came in from my ‘Project 100,’ although for management purposes I had to lie
about that and actually claim to be conducting interviews won through this effort. Another agent,
who started on salary about the same time I did, never lied to management. His sales plan failed
about the same time mine did, so however one handles management on this matter cannot be
considered to be a determinant of success. In my own marketing efforts, I will never pay anyone
anyway, thereby eliminating the natural market part of the triad. Western Southern handed me a
debit book, 70% of which consisted of ageing Universal Life (UL) policies. Hank Gilbert, the
corporate troubleshooter who recruited me into the Naperville office, had made a great living
converting these underfunded, lapsing policies into new business. However, actually
accomplishing that feat is a very delicate matter. Hank was forced to shut down Naperville
because he could not meet the company’s new hire demands, and he was promoted to district
manager. When he sent me to the Chicago/Midwest district, he told me the presiding district
manager of my new office, Mickey, had his own issues, and that I should not permit that agency
to slow me down. I could have met this expectation had I stayed under Hank long enough to
learn how he pitched sales to the ageing UL crowd, which is an extremely tough market.
Although they constituted the majority of my book, no one in the new office knew how to
communicate with these customers. Mickey issued standing orders for new agents not to attempt
The universal life customers at Western Southern deserve a bit more attention, because
the way today’s upper management at one of the ten largest insurance consortiums in the world
marketed these policies twenty to thirty years ago, when I was a Prudential agent, reflects the
marketing tactics I want to avoid using. I knew there was a crack in the picture the company had
given me of my debit book when an old woman gladly made an appointment with me (which I
did not keep), stating over the phone, “Your company screwed me out of $20,000.” The
insurance industry concocts the regulations handed down by federal and state insurance
regulators and commissioners. When the Williams termites first started replacing whole life
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business with term policies, under the still heard slogan of, ‘Buy term and invest the rest’ (the
meaning of which should be clear from the foregoing discussion), the ethical standards of the
insurance industry dictated that one must not replace existing business, even that of a competitor,
with new business, because the customer stands to lose too much money, especially first and
When the industry hit upon the formula for Universal Life, this standard changed to an
older standard from the real estate industry, “Let the buyer beware.” Western Southern actually
paid its agents complete commissions on brand new business to replace existing whole life
policies with UL policies, generally written for the same face amount at half the premium. Some
variation of these tactics must have been used industry-wide, with disastrous results for the
supposedly, but actually not very investment savvy customer. Western Southern implemented a
rule that each debit customer must have their business reviewed on a yearly basis. In my book of
about 400 policyholders, I never spoke to one who would permit an agent to actually conduct
such a review. The only way to get into the door was just before the policy lapsed because it had
been underfunded for twenty years. By this time, the customer was already indignant, and talking
to other agents.
The company corrected the ethical problem created by these shady sales techniques by
paying off a class action settlement to all of its customers who did not tear up their mail from
Western Southern, and then forbidding all further discussion of the lawsuit among sales agents.
Today’s UL policy is a pretty savvy vehicle for stashing money, although federal regulations
now limit the amount that can be laundered that way. By paying the minimum premium, the
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customer can make the policy perform like a whole life policy, which is what they thought they
Actually, the original Western Southern UL policy was one of the most customer
favorable contracts the company ever offered to the public, and they subsequently tweaked some
of the benefits to make the overall performance more profitable. None of this helps when you are
dealing with a lifetime Western Southern policyholder, who started out with a whole life policy,
was offered the same amount of insurance by the company for half price twenty years ago, and is
now being informed that the cash value, about which they received yearly unread reports, has
now reached the vanishing point. The customer is too old to buy another whole life policy for an
affordable rate, and must accept a drastic cut in coverage along with premium hikes on what he
had thought was ‘whole life.’ This was the majority of my debit book, along with a few 3%
annuities that the customer would pay a penalty to cancel. I doubt seriously that the agents who
conducted this scam even knew what they were doing. My marketing program will succeed by
teaching sales personnel to exercise their own critical faculties, rather than suspend them in favor
of ‘company policy.’ Only when everyone wins can a lasting relationship be established for
I did not realize until six months into my sales efforts at Western Southern that two of the
legs in my marketing effort were extremely weak: the debit book and the personal market. This
left only the commercial market, which none of the sales trainers believed in because they were
preaching the gospel of sales, not marketing, and they were convinced we could present
perceived value to potential clients without spending a dime to find them. If I had it to do over
again, I would spend $100/week buying commercial leads, and establish myself as trustworthy
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with as many of these potential customers as possible. Usually, these leads result in an e-mail
address. I was able to provide good advice to some of these potential clients, and actually won
anew of them over by advising them how to lose a few pounds before applying for life insurance,
and how to shop for the best deal. These are the people who will trust you, and bring their
The whole sales program was based on getting enough people to trust you that they will
bring in their business without solicitation, and recommend friends and relatives, which is how
other professionals do business. However, Western Southern, which had only 66% of their
optimum sales staff at the time I was being trained, put all of its eggs in the basket of personal
sales, and trained me mainly in the art of personal selling. This was a good approach, back in the
day when insurance salesmen could go door to door, make appointments in people’s homes, and
collect the premiums every week. Industry-wide experience shows that the most intensive
training in personal selling works for only 5% of the people who enter the business, no matter
how carefully they are trained. Marketing is the real key to success with today’s customers.
The Chicago/Midwest office of Western Southern Life Insurance Company may or may
not have foundered by now. Last year, when I was put on probation, or quit, no one was doing
very well, especially the new agents. Some of the old timers were doing good insurance business
out of the back door to some other business they had already established, but such efforts were
not duplicable. Mickey got so desperate he even asked for backdoor business, even though it
violated the captive agent agreement. Company initiatives, most of which paid for a large part of
mailing costs, that showed promising results in other districts produced dismal sales in
Chicago/Midwest. I had expected this from the start, having hired into the Naperville office to
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replace a fired sales staff, just before the company forced its closure. When you join a sinking
ship, it is not always realistic to expect not to go down with it. However, I received the training
and experience I needed, and am prepared to continue on my own until my efforts pay off
financially.
The corporate mantra at Western Southern was that, by using personal sales techniques,
a business could be built without spending any money on leads. The primary lesson I learned
there is that all such efforts are futile. During the course of my training I found several
motivational websites that attempt to teach positive thinking for salesmen. I noticed that some of
them have a link directly to a life insurance agent. This is the key to any successful marketing
effort today: you must have some sort of automated media that will reach customers and generate
business. Marketing means using such media in place of making cold calls and using sales
techniques such as tie-downs, horror stories, etc. The best way to market is to hire a company
that generates leads, and outsource this part of the effort, whether by mail or telephone.
I have been invited to several dinners to explain how to make money on the Internet.
Throwing such dinners is an excellent approach. The entire lead generation effort can be
outsourced. It gets interested parties together in one room, and provides a friendly setting for
generating further interest. When I have about $10, 000 to spend, I am going to throw my first
dinner. The idea is to create a marketing lever, whether by television, Internet, or some other
medium, that will reach a large audience and generate a calculable response. The mailings from
Western Southern did not produce expected results of any useful percentage in the
Chicago/Midwest market, but other mailing efforts could very well work. I can continue to
redesign my marketing levers until I create one that will produce a given financial result. From
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that point on, it will simply be a matter of cranking it enough to produce a desired income,
without over extending myself. The last thing I want to do is kill my own fledgling business by
Until I can throw my first dinner, I shall have to rely on the mail. I will be offering
college funding services (provided through outsourcing) to people who have too much money to
get a free ride. Because a real solution to the disposition of assets for the purpose of minimizing
the expected parental contribution can be provided by a universal life insurance policy, this
business will provide a way to begin building a relationship with clients for security and
eventually financial planning. The insurance will be a back door business, but it will be a good
one.
This is what I was doing at Western Southern last year at this time, when Mickey cut off
my cash flow. I think the weekly mailing I was doing was beginning to pay off, and all I needed
was one bona fide customer for the college funding business in order to launch it. As with God’s
grace under the Puritan work ethic, nothing is guaranteed, and I was forced to cut these efforts
short. As soon as I can swing it, I will outsource my mailing for college funding, and start to
throw seminars, eventually banquets, to generate business. Until then, I have only my personal
market to fall back on, which must be handled more carefully to prevent the new business from
I and my wife spent the first month of this year putting together her birthday party, which
was held in a rented space, onJanuary26th of this year. At that time, she announced the official
commencement for our fund-raising effort for orphans, which has become a priority for us since
two of her great grandchildren lost their parents. As a Black minister, with many ministerial
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contacts throughout the Aurora area, we are hoping to raise funds through these contacts as well
as begin church marketing for life insurance, by which congregation members leave a bequest
for the church through a church-owned life insurance policy on their own lives. This marketing
involves finding churches that have enough members to be able to spare $10/week out of their
tithes for a life insurance policy on themselves, with the church designated as owner and
beneficiary of the policy. Naturally, no one that the church would be forced to bury can be asked
to make such a contribution, so the first order of business will be to straighten out the donor’s
family need for financial security. Life insurance companies started out as widows and orphans
protection societies. From that inauspicious beginning, they went on to become major financial
personal basis, I will create my own financial security, and help show others how to do the same
for themselves.
In so doing, I will create a marketing effort that starts through churches and college
funding. To make it work, I will need to implement a sales training program that incorporates
positive thinking and positive mental attitude (PMA), on the tried and true formula derived
directly from Benjamin Franklin and the Puritan work ethic, that PMA=OPM (positive mental
attitude= other people’s money).. However, there are very negative aspects of the Puritan work
ethic which I do not want to take along as baggage. For this purpose, I will need to develop my
own philosophy of critical possibility thinking, rather than borrow from the self-help literature,
both in sales and popular psychology, that is currently available. The primary goal of my sales
organization will be to develop critical thinkers, who could be dropped into a desert with a
suitcase full of rocks and manage to barter their way out of there. For this, self-deception is
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poisonous; something to be avoided at all costs. Nothing is free. That is the first word of
financial freedom. You will always get exactly what you pay for. An example of deception used
in marketing is the Quixstar pitch, which I turned down earlier this year.
Quixstar is the new marketing approach of Amway, which along with the A. L. Williams
organization showed a special affinity for President Ronald Reagan back in my early days in the
business. The Quixstar marketing approach involves a triad of milti-level tiers, the first two of
which are given to the new representative, gratis, by company management. That means that the
person who brings me into Quixstar offers to create two chains of income for me, without any
effort on my part. All I have to do is recruit a third, additional chain of my own, and I can secure
my future as a Quixstar agent. Without going into the ethical question as to whether or not this is
a Ponzi scheme, which I certainly think it is, I would have to be a fool to believe anyone is going
to recruit and train twenty agents to work for me. To sell such deception to my own recruits, I
would have to suspend my critical faculties and believe in such fairy tales myself, not to mention
put people to work who believe in fairies. If I were any good at selling in that manner, I would
Discussion
Although the Baehr (2002) translation of Weber’s Protestant Ethic seems to present a
more tentative and exploratory work than Parsons’ (1992) original interpretative English
translation portrays, Weber’s (2001) defense of his own work, as well as the thrust of Weber’s
(1993) sociology of religion, and, as Parsons (1968) convincingly argues, the corpus of his
further research present probably the best proof in sociological literature that ideas do influence
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history, and that Calvin’s theological ideas about of predestination and grace form a strong
foundation for the ethic that guided modern capitalist development. For those who remain
unconvinced, Merton’s Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth Century England (Cited
in Parsons, 1968, p511) presents further evidence to make Weber’s case. That is not to say that
the secular religion of capitalism, all that is left of the original ethical and moral impulse, is an
exact replication of Calvin’s theology, or that Calvin even practiced what he preached in Geneva.
The well-known story of how Calvin invited Servetus to Geneva to discuss the theology
of the Eucharist (Smith, 1920), then burned Servetus at the stake for taking a modern approach to
blood and the wine are symbolically present in communion), is perhaps more famous than the
ultimate reaction of the citizens of Geneva after they had rid themselves of the tyrant John
Calvin. They built a statue to Servetus that still stands in the center of town. This first of many
than the insecurity of the would-be Elect whose self-knowledge of salvation should never, as
Calvin himself warned (1960), be questioned in any attempt to plumb the mind of God. Socially,
though, the burning of the unrepentant witch represents a more ancient ritual of human sacrifice,
which is important in placating the wrath of God against the community as a whole. Witch
burning remained a central activity among Calvin’s Puritan acolytes, and as Arthur Miller
wickedly pointed out in The Crucible (1953/1976), was part of the capitalist social structure they
established in America. The McCarthy hearings of the 1950’s was certainly a memorable
outbreak of the witch-burning frenzy, but the recent USA Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act
are far more subtle and far-reaching variants of the social impulse. Sherman McCoy, the
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protagonist of Wolfe’s (1987/2008) Bonfire of the Vanities, is a fictional example that throws
light on exactly how this recurrent hysteria functions. In this case the scape-goat fell from the
In Italy, the Bonfire of the Vanities was a medieval ritual in which objects that might
tempt one to sin were burned in an enormous bonfire. In 1497, Savonarola burned thousands of
art objects, books, and sinful toys such as playing cards, musical instruments, and cosmetics at
the Shrove Tuesday festival. Sherman McCoy considered himself to be a ‘Master of the
Universe,’ one of the select Wall Street brokers who made millions of dollars on a single deal.
His father was the original Puritan capitalist, frugal in his own personal spending, and strictly
observant of the Protestant work ethic, having produced enormous wealth not for the sake of
making money but for the glory of God. Sherman fell from grace because of pride, and was
sacrificed in a modern reenactment of the ancient ritual of human sacrifice that is all too familiar,
with all parties involved fully conscious of their own corruption. Hypocrisy is integral to the
ceremony, with the burning of the unrepentant witch serving to purify the community, for which
Wolfe’s story brings out the real difference between the calling of the capitalist and that
of the worker. The worker performs a rational function as an appendage to the capitalist machine
rather than as an accumulator of wealth, but the capitalist enjoys no better benefits than the
worker, in terms of personal rewards. Whereas working stiffs may be faced with poverty as the
reward for their continual efforts, capitalists eschew personal displays of wealth to maximize the
accumulation of capital. Both work primarily for the glory of God rather than for personal gain,
and to demonstrate living in grace. The New York workers were especially infuriated at their
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Wall Street demigods for their vanity and conspicuous consumption, which is why they took so
much pleasure in bringing one down. You just aren’t supposed to have that much fun
The fear of poverty drives today’s workforce in Perot’s rat-race to the bottom, which
results from decades of direct legal conspiracy to destroy the union movement (Adamic, 1931;
Dunn, 1927; Rasmus, 2006), just as the German workforce was thoroughly demoralized in their
preparation for Nazi ideology. Although today’s ideologues believe we are ready to march off
into slavery under the auspices of the World Trade Organization in the process of Globalization,
this is more wishful thinking by today’s new Mercantilists than the true mood of labor. In the
Civil War, Americans put on blue uniforms and fought to the last drop of blood to prevent
ourselves from being enslaved by the same slave power most recently represented by George W.
Bush.
The best way to understand the depth of the passion that put Obama in office (although
he seems little aware of it) is to trace it to its origins in 1776. When Jefferson and Paine issued
the Declaration of Independence (ratified by the signatures of their peers and by the blood of
British revolutionists) on July 4, 1776, they defined inalienable human rights in terms of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and the right to revolution as against any government that
becomes destructive of these ends. The unfitness of today’s neo-liberals and neo-conservatives to
inherit this on-going American revolution is no better shown than by their refusal to recognize
Instead, they appeal to the free market as the final arbiter of the rights and privileges of
citizenship. Their rationale is Social Darwinism (Chase, 1977), although they appeal to the
‘guiding hand’ of the marketplace (Smith, 2003). Wealth of Nations, published the same year as
the Declaration of Independence, is actually titled An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations. The thrust of this inquiry is a powerful, passionate, and convincing argument
against the mercantilism of his day, in favor of a capitalism that perhaps never existed, except in
spirit. Smith discovered the labor theory of value, which is quite simply that the labor of its
people, not the pot of gold in the kings (today’s corporate) coffers is the sole source of exchange
value, the market’s measure of wealth. The new Economics, properly called New Mercantilism,
can take no refuge in Smith, whose concept of laissez faire never meant to provide a federal
trough for the feeding frenzy of international corporate sharks, who supposedly should be ‘left
alone.’ To Smith, laissez faire meant that civil society, in pursuing its economic interests, should
be left alone by kings, monopolists, cartels, corporations, and all who would control prices
through unholy alliances. To Smith, the wealth of the nations lies not in the King’s treasure
trove, but rather in the marketable exchange values created by the socially necessary labor time
of its citizens.
Wealth of Nations stands as the first and most concise statement of the labor theory of
value, although Meek (1956) traced the subsequent history of the concept. In 1776, when Natty
Bummpo (Cooper, 1984) was already fleeing West to escape from Eastern bankers, lawyers, and
industrialists, the only thing needed, besides an axe, a musket, dry gunpowder, a mule, and a
sack of corn, to survive in the wilderness was to be left alone. Nothing could be clearer than the
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fact that success in ‘the pursuit of happiness’ was the result of one’s own labor, that a man’s
word was his bond, and that in so far as he maintained an upright and moral bearing, the
blessings of God’s bountiful gifts would naturally follow assiduous effort to conquer the
wilderness. Nowhere was the Puritan work ethic more successfully applied in the accumulation
of capital than in America’s second industrial revolution. The bounty of nature was taken for
granted, as was the blood of the Indians and workers sacrificed in guerilla and class warfare.
Nature’s bounty can still be taken for granted, because we can still apply our minds in
extracting it. Today’s economy has collapsed because we no longer put people to work
with hundreds of Air Force bases scattered around the world. Air bases now serve the role under
today’s imperialism that gunboats served under colonialism in acquiring natural resources and
world markets for capital. Militarism costs7 to 20 times what it would cost to defend the security
of Americans and the sovereignty of the nation (Center for Defense Information, 1992). This
level of spending actually erodes, rather than enhances national security. Unproductive men and
women in uniform constitute the armed sector of today’s vast army of the unemployed, who
produce only national insecurity, and whose families actually live on care packages and food
stamps. One billion dollars spent by the Pentagon in this Faustian effort that actually decreases
America’s security posture in the world, applied to the civilian economy would produce seven
billion dollars in goods and services (Center for Defense Information, 1991). Do the math the
way Adolph Hitler did in presenting his guns for butter production possibility curve, and half a
trillion per year in military expenditures costs 3 trillion per year in productive civilian economic
activity, marketable exchange values, the actual wealth of nations. Put the millions of people to
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work who are now structurally unemployed and we would produce so much wealth the very
subject matter of economics, which implies scarcity, would need a new designation to imply
abundance. Under such conditions, the industrial, technical world would spread rapidly rather
than contract, embracing the billions of people whom it now exploits. Perhaps, along the way,
I doubt that it would be possible to find direct, immediate evidence that Peale
(1952/2003) and Hill (1937/2005) actually derived their ideas from the Puritan work ethic, when
such evidence must be inferred from Weber’s concept of historical causation even to
demonstrate the influence of these ideas on capitalist development. Indirect evidence may be
cited from these authors themselves: Hill having gleaned his ideas from observation of the
original robber barons (Josephson, 1934/1962), whereas Peale interviewed successful business
persons. Because these works are not academic, but form the nucleus of the ‘self-help’ literature
category, and are famously used throughout the world of sales training, they could not be used as
source material. Our investigations into source material provide convincing evidence that Peale
and Hill may be compared directly to the sources, and found to be fully secularized versions of
the original Westminster Confession, with the same driving work ethic and the same rewards
promised to those who work hard and strictly within the ethical code. Perhaps the most direct
connection is to the writings of Benjamin Franklin, whose Poor Richard’s Almanac (2007)
espoused the Puritan work ethic for 25 years of continuous publication. Weber (2002) took
Franklin to be an American exemplar of this ethical orientation, and Franklin is still considered
to be the Solomaic source of American wit and wisdom. The Franklin close is still part of the
stock and trade of the salesman, and can still be used to close any sale.
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Hill (2005) wrote that what the mind can conceive and visualize, it can achieve. This
concept is closely related to the Jamesean pragmatic philosophy of will, in which goal directed
behavior plays a major role. It is also consonant with the European view of American
pragmatism, which collapses the philosophy into Paul Bunyanesque conquest over nature,
Manifest Destiny, overweening greed and the presumption of infinite natural resources. Hill has
actually stated, within the confines of the Puritan work ethic, the true relationship of mind to
nature. No limits to the potential development of the human mind and spirit have ever been
demonstrated. Although limitless natural resources are no longer available on the third rock from
the Sun, limitless energy resources are indeed waiting for humankind to learn how to avail
ourselves of them. There is no reason to take this as some absolute from an ideal or revealed
world available only to the few philosophers possessed of some divine insight, muse, etc. “What
the mind can conceive and visualize” is an absolute if that absolute is the absolute development
of humanity, first discovered empirically in the Paris Commune and then projected by Marx’s
Humanism. Marx expressed this philosophically as, “Time is the space for human development,”
and “Human power is its own end.” the actual philosophy of capitalism is rationalism, which
reduces human labor power to a material force, the limit of the Scottish School’s concept of
historical causation. Marx discovered labor as human subject as well as object. Under this
conception, labor power becomes not only the source of all abstract economic value, but the
Although Hill (2005) said that he derived his concepts about the powers of mind from
observing captains of industry, it is quite likely that he observed Andrew Carnegie, who
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underwrote his work, more than most. Carnegie underwent an epiphany while reading Herbert
Spencer, who adumbrated a theory of social evolution before Charles Darwin’s announcement of
his discoveries, and from the same sources in Malthus and Ricardo. Carnegie wrote (cited in
“I remember the light came in as in a flood and all was clear. Not only had
I got rid of theology and the supernatural, but I had found the truth of evolution.
“All is well since all grows better,” became my motto, and true source of comfort.
Man was not created with an instinct for his own degradation, but from the lower
he had risen to the higher forms. Nor is there any conceivable end to his march
toward perfection. His face is turned toward the light; he stands in the sun and
looks upward.”
Spencer had already coined the term “survival of the fittest” when Darwin published his
work in 1859. One might think evolution implies social change, and government
intervention in the economy, but not to Spencer. He viewed society as a highly evolved
organism that could not be interfered with through positive legislation without doing
great damage to civilization. One might view the questionable interpretation of the 14th
Amendment, originally enacted after the Civil War to ensure the voting and civil rights of
freedmen, now applied by a reactionary Supreme Court to attach all personal property
rights to corporations, in a jaundiced light under this line of reasoning, but such an idea
never occurred to Spencer. Laissez faire is the only rule for any other government
individuals under the Bill of Rights. Large corporations and monopolies are natural
results of the struggle for existence, and Captains of Industry, or Robber Barons,
work ethic under today’s neo-Darwinian Synthesis under the influence of Fisher,
Haldane, and Wright (Williams, 1966), but Spencer was a thorough-going Lamarkian,
and little of his evolutionary cosmogony would make sense without “use inheritance.”
Simply put, like Lysenko in Stalinist Russia, Lamarck posited that inheritance could
occur through use. For instance, the neck of the giraffe grew longer through generations
of reaching higher into the trees for nourishment. Darwin himself, who had not read
Mendel’s work on the gene (neither had nearly anyone else), found it difficult to discard
this idea. Rich men, who had practiced frugality, discipline, and all of the Puritan virtues
in accumulating capital, could expect their progeny to inherit these character traits,
thereby creating a eugenically bred master race. Capitalism, competition, Calvinism, and
civilization itself are all grounded in the struggle for existence, resulting in the best of all
possible worlds under the optimism of Andrew Carnegie, Napoleon Hill’s financial angel
and intellectual model as well as the brutal murderer of striking workers in the 1892
William Graham Sumner (cited in Hofstadter, 1955, p51) tied this constellation of
Tying Spencer’s evolutionism directly to conservative thought, Sumner assumed the industrialist,
frugal and temperate, who accumulates wealth, all to God’s glory, is the strong. Misinterpreting
Smith’s concept of laissez faire, Sumner forever equated it in the conservative mind with the
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idea that corporate entities, no matter how monopolistic, must be left alone by government.
Marx, in his introduction to the Russian edition of Capital, had already predicted the end result
of the concentration of capital as the merger of private property with government, but Sumner
never considered this possibility, “…the strong and the weak … (are) equivalent to the
industrious and the idle…if we do not like the survival of the fittest, we have only one possible
alternative, and that is the survival of the unfittest” (p57). The process of natural selection, and
therefore the progress of civilization, can only proceed if competition is unrestricted (by
government, cartels and combinations, monopolies and even unions (when they win strikes) are
all part of the natural order. Sumner was probably the first to point out that the writers of The
Federalist Papers actually feared that democracy would degenerate into mob rule if not checked,
and therefore created aristocratic limits to the Constitution of the United States by design. In
Hifstadter’s words (p66): “Like some latter-day Calvin, he came to preach the predestination of
the social order and the salvation of the economically elect through the survival of the fittest.”
Any schema of positive thinking that can actually discern the difference between truth
and lies must banish self-deception and all efforts to deceive the public from its stock of sales
tactics. A classic example of the use of self-deception in positive thinking training is the daily
affirmation, in which I stand in front of my mirror just before exiting the bathroom for my of ice,
and chant some charming lie about my own personal powers. Self-hypnosis is a useful tool in
selling, but I do not believe I could ever sell a lie to my own subconscious mind, which is where
the sale must be transacted. How am I going to make myself believe that I sell my product to one
in three interviews with potential clients, if my real record is one in ten? In using affirmations,
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the best approach is to say something that is believable in the first place. If I cannot convince my
Critical thinking must lie at the bottom of any effort to develop a positive mental attitude
that will work in the face of an intractable reality. What we have to remember is that technology
is constantly reshaping the market, and only those who are critical enough to separate flagrant
con jobs from real efforts to help will be able to discern new opportunities when new
possibilities open up. Critical possibility thinking is crucial. Today’s customer is extremely
sensitive to charlatanry of all sorts, and will immediately suspect a slap on the back by any Dale
Carnegie charm school graduate. Only those of us who can offer services far above the
commodity level will be able to avoid being sucked into today’s universal rat race to the bottom
Any effort by today’s ruling Democrats to revive the economy will not help all of us for
the simple reason that no one has the idea of a full employment economy on the table. This
means that a lot of us will have to take responsibility for our own financial outcomes. Rather
than offer our labor power on the market for labor as a commodity, we will find it necessary to
offer services that are valuable, and that no one else can duplicate. Those who have the critical
ability to adapt to a market for services that is driven to rapid change by technology will not have
to make cold calls, or beg clients to try out their services. We will be able to name our own price
for our service, and control the terms and conditions of our own labor. As Chet Romanowski (the
founder of Illinois Charter Bus Company who died of disappointment when the event of 9/11
destroyed his tour business) used to say, “If you are not having fun, you should not be working
here.”
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Within this context of critical evaluation of marketing opportunities, taking
responsibility for our own results, and positive thinking, the most important marketing skill that
we must develop is goal setting. This is not taught in primary, graduate, or post-graduate
education, which primarily focuses on attaining the skills necessary to work for someone else.
Goal setting is the most important skill we can learn, but few ever encounter anything regarding
the subject unless it is in a sales training course, where the material has been standardized. From
Western Southern, and many others, we have SMART goals: Specific, and in writing;
Measurable, in terms of dollars; Achievable, in that they are not humanly impossible; Relevant,
with reference to some purpose; and Timely, with respect to a daily action plan for attaining
them. Two of the most important aspects of goal setting are to create them with reference to
some value system that provides a sense of purpose for life, and to visualize not only their
achievement, but the daily, concrete effort it takes to realize them. My sales training program
At the heart of the Protestant work ethic is the idea of eternal vigilance. Keep awake,
conscious, and sober at all times, focusing only on the acquisition of money. The closest I ever
came to this was in driving taxi for two decades, during which better than 9 out of 10 waking
hours were spent chasing the almighty dollar. This is taking it too far, and was only necessary
because I was selling driving skills, a commodity every family from a Third World country
willing to move to Chicago can duplicate. Because they help each other, many of them were able
to go on to become doctors while I had my eyes glued to the windshield, booking more income
but nevertheless stuck in a deeper rut. I think it is fair to say that any manager who cannot take
time for vacations, family, and recreation is a pretty poor boss to work for, even if self-
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employed. This is an over-rationalized part of the Puritan work ethic I will discard, perhaps
relevant to some sinner’s guilt, but never the less too close to fascism for comfort. Work should
Victim blaming and scape-goating are those parts of the Puritan work ethic that generated
the Salem witch burnings, not to mention their historic role in fueling the Spanish Inquisition and
creating the negative Christian image of the Jew (actually, the devil, complete with horns). The
sociology of such secularized religion is founded on the irrational belief in a just world, that
misfortune is the result of God’s wrath, and that good deeds will always be rewarded by divine
Providence. This is actually the logical inverse of the Puritan belief that good financial fortune
may be, but is not necessarily a sign of actually being one of the ‘elect,’ living in God’s grace.
However, secularized religion is not very logical, and has no place in positive possibility
thinking. Possibility thinking that builds on real human values is not one-sided, but can learn
from mistakes through critical assessment of what went wrong to avoid them in the future. There
is no justice in past misery, but we can discard negative, self-destructive behaviors to help create
the kind of a future we visualize for ourselves and our children. We can only create such
visualization in action according to some rational purpose, which is the heart of pragmatism. By
taking that which is rational as that which is best according to human values, we can transform
pragmatic and positive philosophy into humanism without discarding the critical edge that has
I am going to cut it off at this point, knowing full well that much work will be needed to
develop a full-bodied goal setting and motivational training program from this sketchy
beginning. I want to build a sales force in college funding, in which my sales personnel make
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$100, 000 per year, generating me an income of $250, 000. I will develop a step-wise procedure
for training people to do this, without actually doing it for them. Finding people willing to take
responsibility for their own financial results is the first order of business, after I take
responsibility for my own. For now, it is a matter of using the plans and ideas I have been
working on to actually generate financial results. Once I have distilled a set of activities that can
produce a certain amount of money, it will only be a matter of turning the crank as many times as
necessary to get the desired income of $250,000 per year. This may sound unrealistic, but I think
it is well within the SMART goal framework. We are still within the capitalistic milieu, and the
Puritan work ethic is still the spirit of the system. With this in mind, and to the glory of God
(Universal), I will make every effort, as did old Ben Franklin (the wisest American who ever
lived), to use the Ben Franklin close for every sale, weighing the advantages against the
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