Social Legislation Case Digests

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)
Page 1 of 17
CASE #01. G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 - Elvin Palao ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER,petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. FACTS: The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27: No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government. In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree. ISSUE: 1.Whether or not writ of mandamus is the proper remedy 2.Whether or not the Implementing Rules and Regulation was published 3.Whether or not P.D. 27 has been repealed RULING: The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time. But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Page 2 of 17
Moreover, that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available 2 from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution. In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition. Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree. CASE #02. G.R. No. 139285 December 21, 2007 - Milott Requillo ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES FACTS: The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) has truly noble goals, and these noble goals should not be stymied by the creation of exemptions or exceptions not contemplated by the law. The Facts Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land, 249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining 19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut trees. In 1985, Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office No. 19, Naga City, Camarines Sur several petitions for exemption of certain properties located in various towns of Camarines Sur from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.[2] Two of these petitions were denied in an Order dated November 6, 1986, issued by the Regional Director of DAR, Region V, Juanito L. Lorena.[3] Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director, and sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands planted with rice and corn which were registered in the name of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres. In his appeal, Archbishop cited the following grounds: a) That said properties are all covered by conditional donations subject to the prohibitions of the donors to SELL, EXCHANGE, LEASE, TRANSFER, ENCUMBER OR MORTGAGE the properties; b) That they are used for charitable and religious purposes; c) That the parishes located in depressed areas badly need them for the furtherance of their mission work, propagation of the faith, maintenance and support of their chapels, churches and educational religious institutions like the Holy Rosary Major and Minor Seminaries for the promotion of the priesthood vocation;
Page 3 of 17
d) For the preservation of good relationship between church and state thru non-infringement of the right to exercise religious profession and worship; e) For the maintenance of the Cathedral and Peafrancia Shrine, which now include the Basilica Minore Housing our venerable image of Our Lady of Peafrancia and the venerable portrait of Divine Rostro; f) That the petitioner (church) is amenable to continue the leasehold system with the present cultivators or tenants.[4]
This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao in an Order dated December 8, 1997.[5] A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated June 10, 1998.[6] The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on Certiorari. The petition was dismissed by the CA in its February 4, 1999 Decision. Archbishop filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied in the June 18, 1999 CA Resolution. Archbishop now brings the matter before us through this petition. ISSUE: Archbishop raises issues he had raised previously, which, he contends, the CA failed to properly address. He claims that the CA erred in holding that he is only entitled to assert one right of retention as the subject properties are registered in his name. He further claims that an express trust had been created wherein he only held naked title to the subject properties on behalf of the beneficiaries. He argues that it is not the landowner contemplated by the law, but merely a trustee, and as such is entitled to as many rights of retention on behalf of the beneficiaries of each particular property. He then raises the question of the applicability of the ruling in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. The Land Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Davao City,[10] which, he cites, ruled that properties held by the Church are held by it as a mere administrator for the benefit of the members of that particular religion. As Archbishop claims to be merely an administrator of the subject properties, he argues that these subject properties should have been exempt from the OLT. RULING: The petition has no merit. Archbishops arguments, while novel, must fail in the face of the law and the dictates of the 1987 Constitution. The laws simply speak of the landowner without qualification as to under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds naked title only or can exercise all the rights of ownership. Archbishop would have us read deeper into the law, to create exceptions that are not stated in PD 27 and RA 6657, and to do so would be to frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit of landless farmers and farmworkers. Archbishop was found to be the registered owner of the lands in question, and does not contest that fact. For the purposes of the law, this makes him the landowner, without the necessity of going beyond the registered titles. He cannot demand a deeper examination of the registered titles and demand further that the intent of the original owners be ascertained and followed. To adopt his reasoning would create means of sidestepping the law, wherein the mere act of donation places lands beyond the reach of agrarian reform. There can be no claim of more than one right of retention per landowner. Neither PD 27 nor RA 6657 has a provision for a landowner to exercise more than one right of retention. The law is simple and clear as to the retention limits per landowner. PD 27 states, In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it; while RA 6657 states: SEC. 6. Retention Limits.Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall the retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Page 4 of 17
Nothing in either law supports Archbishops claim to more than one right of retention on behalf of each cestui que trust. Th e provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further interpretationthere is only one right of retention per landowner, and no multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party. Furthermore, the scheme proposed by Archbishop would create as many rights of retention as there are beneficiaries, which could in effect protect the entire available land area from agrarian reform. Under Archbishops reasoning, there is not even a definite landowner to claim separate rights of retention, and no specific n umber of rights of retention to be claimed by the landowners. There is simply no basis in the law or jurisprudence for his argument that it is the beneficial ownership that should be used to determine which party would have the right of retention. Archbishop makes much of the conditional donation, that he does not have the power to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage the transferred properties. He claims that these conditions do not make him the landowner as contemplated by the law. This matter has already been answered in Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City (Hospicio) v. Department of Agrarian Reform.[11] In that case, wherein Act No. 3239 prohibited the sale under any consideration of lands donated to the Hospicio, a charitable organization, the Court found that the lands of the Hospicio were not exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform. In characterizing the sale of land under agrarian reform, we stated: Generally, sale arises out of contractual obligation. Thus, it must meet the first essential requisite of every contract that is the presence of consent. Consent implies an act of volition in entering into the agreement. The absence or vitiation of consent renders the sale either void or voidable. In this case, the deprivation of the Hospicios property did not arise as a consequence of the Hospicios consent to the transfer. There was no meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on one hand, and the DAR or the tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause which are to constitute the contract that is to serve ultimately as the basis for the transfer of ownership of the subject lands. Instead, the obligation to transfer arises by compulsion of law, particularly P.D. No. 27.[12]
We discussed further: The twin process of expropriation under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been aptly described in common law jurisdictions as sale made under the process of the court and in the mode prescribed by l aw, and which is not the voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc. The term has not been precisely defined in this jurisdiction, but reference to the phrase itself is made in Articles 223, 242, 237 and 243 of the Civil Code, which uniformly exempt the family home from execution, forced sale, or attachment. Yet a forced sale is cl early different from the sales described under Book V of the Civil Code which are conventional sales, as it does not arise from the consensual agreement of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of law. Still, since law is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there can be no dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as it is authorized by law.[13] Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop cannot claim that the alleged conditions of the donations would have primacy over the application of the law. This forced sale is not even a violation of the conditions of the donation, since it is by application of law and beyond Archbishops control. The application of the law cannot and should not be defeated by the conditions laid down by the donors of the land. If such were allowed, it would be a simple matter for other landowners to place their lands without limit under the protection of religious organizations or create trusts by the mere act of donation, rendering agrarian reform but a pipe dream. Archbishops contention that he is merely an administrator of the donated properties will not serve to remove these lands from the coverage of agrarian reform. Under PD 27, the coverage is lands devoted to rice and corn. Section 4 of RA 6657 states, The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. The lands in Archbishops name are agricultural lands that fall wi thin the scope of the law, and do not fall under the exemptions. to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production center, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (As amended by R. A. 7881)
Page 5 of 17
Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian reform by stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does not appear under the list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed status as administrator does not create another class of lands exempt from the coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657, and The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc.[14] does not create another definition for the term landowner. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the February 4, 1999 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48282. SO ORDERED. CASE #03. G.R. No. 169913 June 8, 2011 - Melissa Nikolai Ansaldo Deleste vs. Land Bank of the Philippines FACTS: Facts: The spouses Gregorio and Hilaria were owners of a parcel of agricultural land in Iligan. They were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio and two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad, by other women.Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property. On February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the property to Deleste for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Deleste paid the taxes on the property from then on. On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died and Gregorios brother, Juan, was appointed special administrator of the estate. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed before the CFI an action against Deleste for reversion of title which escalated to the CA up to the SC which ruled that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that Hilariacould only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it. Notably, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued and the subject property was placed under the said program. However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the DAR as the landowners therefore notices and processes relative to the coverage were sent to these heirs only. In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the Zoning Regulation of Iligan City, reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential. Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants of the subject property. The CLTs were registered on July 15, 1986. In 1991, the subject property was surveyed and was approved on January 8, 1999 then submitted to LBP. Thereafter,EPs and OCTs were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, in favor of private respondents over their respective portions of Lot No. 1407. On November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the RTC for the expropriation of a portion of the subject lot. The RTC issued a Decision granting the expropriation. Considering that the real owner of the expropriated portion could not be determined, as the subject property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to any of the heirs of Gregorio and Deleste, the just compensation for the expropriated portion of the subject property in the amount of PhP 27,343,000 was deposited with the DBP in Iligan City, in trust for the RTC in Iligan City. On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste filed with the DARAB a petition seeking to nullify private respondents EPs. The PARAD rendered a Decision declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a residential/commercial land, and the violation of petitioners constitutional right to due process of law. DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD. ISSUE: 1. *WHETHER PETITIONERS LAND IS+ COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM GIVEN THAT THE CITY OFILIGANPASSED *CITY+ ORDINANCE NO. 1313 RECLASSIFYING THE AREA INTO A STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN 1975. 2. [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND PARTIALLY EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY] STILL BE SUBJECT[ED] TO AGRARIAN REFORM. 3. [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 4. [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS] LEGAL GIVEN THAT THEY WERE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL PROCEEDING. 5. [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN THAT THEY WERE DIRECTLY ISSUED TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(E) OF R.A. 6657 RULING: On the coverage of the subject property by the agrarian reform program We agree with petitioners that the subject property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment by the City ofIliganof its local zoning ordinance, City Ordinance No. 1313. It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands.
Page 6 of 17
The Court held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. It was also emphasized therein that *t+he power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657+ is not subject to the approval of the *DAR+.*46+*46+ Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the City ofIligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area. DARAB, however, believes that the approval of HLURB is necessary in order for the reclassification to be valid. We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was already in existence at that time, having been created on September 19, 1973 pursuant to Executive Order No. 419. It should be noted, however, that the Task Force was not empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations. The City Ordinance No. 1313 enacted by the City ofIligan was approved by the HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB. The validity of said local zoning ordinance is, therefore, beyond question. Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an agricultural land within the ambit of RA 6657. To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all pu blic and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential land. Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultur al activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined agricultural land thus . . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use. However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to divest tenant[]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988. As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied to defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27. An ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light industrial should be given prospective application only, and should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such land. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we must, the ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The further implication is that it should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such lands. This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued in the instant case. In this respect, under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were deemed owners of the land they till as of October 21, 1972. This policy, intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil, is given effect by the following provision of the law: It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners as of October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the land they were tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as payment of just compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the tenantfarmers. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have, at most, an inchoate right over the land they were tilling. In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were recognized to have an inchoate right over the subject property prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Considering that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no vested rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents were issued the CLTs and were deemed owners. The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since reclassification had taken place twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights accrued prior to reclassification and its approval. Consequently, the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program. On the violation of petitioners right to due process of law Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notif y them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated. The
Page 7 of 17
importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as noncompliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due process of law. Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. A violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law happened when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired. Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law. Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CAs October 28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title covering the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in favor of private respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID. The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. CASE #04. G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011 - Stella Monette de Castro Hacienda Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council FACTS: At the core of the case is Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac, once a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac and owned by Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the Spanish owners of Tabacalera offered to sell Hacienda Luisita as well as their controlling interest in the sugar mill within the hacienda, the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT), as an indivisible transaction. The Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and/or controlled by the Jose Cojuangco, Sr. Group, was willing to buy. As agreed upon, Tadeco undertook to pay the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita in pesos, while that for the controlling interest in CAT, in US dollars. To facilitate the adverted sale-and-purchase package, the Philippine government, through the then Central Bank of the Philippines, assisted the buyer to obtain a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Board of Trustees extended a loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component of the sale. One of the conditions contained in the approving GSIS Resolution reads as follows: That the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita shall be subdivided by the applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act; As of 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the purchase price for the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita and Tabacaleras interest in CAT. In 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Tadeco, for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, besides which sugar lands of which the hacienda consistedare not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations. Eventually, the Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the case the Marcos government initially instituted and won against Tadeco. The dismissal action was, however, made subject to the obtention by Tadeco of the PARCs approval of a stock distribution plan that must initially be implemented after such approval shall have been secured. Markedly, Section 10 of EO 229 allows corporate landowners, as an alternative to the actual land transfer scheme of CARP, to give qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase shares of stocks of the corporation under a stock ownership arrangement and/or landto-share ratio. Like EO 229, RA 6657, under the latters Sec. 31, also prov ides two (2) alternative modalities, i.e., land or stock transfer, pursuant to either of which the corporate landowner can comply with CARP. From the start, the stock distribution scheme appeared to be Tadecos preferred option, for it organized a spin -off corporation, HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock. Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

1.
Page 8 of 17
FARM argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 permits stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the farmers or farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as envisaged in the Constitution. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
FARM contends that the farmers in the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 do not own the agricultural land but are merely given stock certificates. Thus, the farmers lose control over the land to the board of directors and executive officials of the corporation who actually manage the land. They conclude that such arrangement runs counter to the mandate of the Constitution that any agrarian reform must preserve the control over the land in the hands of the tiller. ISSUE: WON Section 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional. NO. RULING: The instant challenge on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 and necessarily its counterpart provision in EO 229 must fail. For one, there appears to be no breach of the fundamental law. Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution reads: The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of the farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to OWN directly or COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. The wording of the provision is unequivocalthe farmers and regular farmworkers have a right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distributiondirect and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers. Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be exercised. Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657. Its Sec. 29 allows workers cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the second paragraph of Sec. 31 allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers becoming stockholders or members. Clearly, workers cooperatives or associations under Sec. 29 of RA 6657 and corporations or associations under the succeeding Sec. 31, as differentiated from individual farmers, are authorized vehicles for the collective ownership of agricultural land. Thus, Sec. 31 is constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution that land can be owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ While it is true that the farmer is issued stock certificates and does not directly own the land, still, the Corporation Code is clear that the FWB becomes a stockholder who acquires an equitable interest in the assets of the corporation, which include the agricultural lands. Anent the alleged loss of control of the farmers over the agricultural land operated and managed by the corporation, a reading of the second paragraph of Sec. 31 shows otherwise. Said provision provides that qualified beneficiaries have "the right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the companys total assets." There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. CASE #05. G.R. No. 177190 February 23, 2011 - Michelle Silos LANB BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PAGAYATAN FACTS: In 1972, Suntay Estate was subjected to the operation of PD 27. However, a 300 hectares potion of the land was subjected to th e coverage of CARP. The CARP application was later subjected to a case before the DARAB. Meanwhile, the owner of the land re maines ubpaid for the property, thus, the assignee of Federico Suntay filed a petition for summary determination of just compe nsation
2.

Page 9 of 17
PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation and directed the LBP to oay the said amount. LBP contested stating that under Section 16 (e) of RA 6657, the purchase price offered by the DAR in its notice of acquisition of theland must be deposited in an aaccessible bank in the name of the landowner before the taking possession of the land, not th e valuation of the PARAD. ISSUE: What should be the proper amount to be deposited under Section 16 of RA 6657? Is it the PARAD/DARAB determined valuation or t he preliminary valuation as determined by the DAR/LBP? RULING: It is the initial valuation made by the DAR and the LBP that must be released to the landowner in order for DAR to take possessi on of the property. Under the law, the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Once an expropriation proceeding or the acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role of LBP begins. EO No. 405 provides that the DAR is required to make use of the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the LBP as the latter is primarily responsible for the determination of the land valuation and compensation. In fact, the LBP can disa gree with the decision of the DAR in the determination of just compensation, and bring the matter to the RTC designated as [Sp ecial Agrarian Court] for final determination of just compensation. Sec. 16 of RA 6657 contains the procedure for the acquisition of private lands, viz: SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedure s shall be followed: (a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the lan d to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the mu nicipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of th e DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinen t provisions hereof. (b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landown er, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. (c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within t hirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certi ficate of Title and other muniments of title. (d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the co mpensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to th e just compensation There is no mention of the PARAD in the foregoing Sec. 16(e) when it speaks of "the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act." Moreover, it is only after the DAR has made its final determination of the initial valuation of the land that the landowner may resort to the judicial determination of the just compensation for the land. Clearly,btherefore, it is the initial valuation made by the DAR and LBP that is contained in the letter-offer to the landowner und er Sec. 16(a), said valuation of which must be deposited and released to the landowner prior to taking possession of the propert y.
CASE #01. Emerald Jamora FACTS: ISSUE: RULING: CASE #02. Katrina Mae de Castro FACTS: ISSUE:

RULING: CASE #03. G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970 - Jerome Acledan Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo FACTS:
Page 10 of 17
Doctrine: When the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. Facts: Two petitions for review of decisions with the same issue involving the same landowners and vendees which dismissed petitione rs actions as share tenants for the enforcement of the right to redeem agricultural lands. Petitioners have been working on the lands as share tenants for several years. 1. First case: respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo owned lands and sold it with two other parcels of land for 4,000. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales as tenants alleged that the area of land they worked on is worth 1,500 and thus they seek the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount by respondents-vendee in their favour by way of redemption. Second case: parcel of land worth 750 was sold by respondent. Petitioner-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo sought the execution of a deed of sale for the same price by way of redemption.
2.
Section 12 of the Land Reform Code or RA 3844 is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants. It provides that: Lessees Right of Redemption in case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same as a reasonable price and consideration, provided that where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have the priority over any right of legal redemption. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the pre-emption prescribed by Section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform was given. ISSUE: WON the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of RA 3844 is applicable to share tenants also. Or WON the plaintiffs, as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working from the purchasers thereof where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder, of the latters intention to sell their property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale. RULING: The Agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Land Reform Code is available to leasehold tenants only and not share tenants and that their respective ri ghts and obligations are not coextensive or coequal. CASE #04. Ana Nihara Magarang FACTS: ISSUE: RULING: CASE #05. Charlotte Martinez FACTS: ISSUE: RULING: CASE #06. Allen Lupera FACTS: ISSUE: RULING:
Page 11 of 17
CASE #07. G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990 - Edrianne Beth Jaso LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM , Respondent. FACTS: The President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. Subsequently, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 and its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof. Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it: (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity." (b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ." (c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan. (d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling. In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ." Contention of the Petitioner: Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms. Contention of Public Respondent: Livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words: "Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming. It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . . Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit. Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines

promulgated in accordance therewith are unconstitutional. RULING:
Page 12 of 17
YES. It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]). The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted as follows: x x x "Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who work in piggeries and poultry projects. I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618). x x x The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows: x x x "Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621). It is evident from from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process. CASE #08. G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001 - Ma. Pilarliza Macasaet STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B. AMANTE, et al THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, and REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER FOR REGION IV, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area. 3 Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case4 with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents.
Page 13 of 17
FACTS: In October 1986 to August 1987, PETITIONER filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna separate complaints for forcible entry against respondents.5 After the filing of the ejectment cases, RESPONDENTS petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP. On August 17, 1989, PETITIONER filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a "Protest and Objection" to the compulsory acquisition of the property on the ground that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.7 On August 29, 1989,RESPONDENTS together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by 8 the Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna. On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner's landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. On February 6, 1990, PETITIONER SRRDC in two letters12 separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition. On April 6, 1990, PETITIONER sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid land titles were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion. ISSUE: WON: (1) the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted. RULING: On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations and the Regional Director of Region IV, answered the two issues raised. first, by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Second, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property. During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion specifically concerning the parcels of land in question. On April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification issued on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were classified as "industrial Park" per Sanguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989.14. In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision,16finding that private respondents illegally entered the SRRDC property, and ordered them evicted. On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property. On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the decretal portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders: "1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation ( "2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of (P7,841,997.64) "3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and encumbrances; "4 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a final segregation survey on the lands so the same can be transferred by the Register of Deeds to the name of the Republic of the Philippines; "5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to take immediate possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna."17
11
Page 14 of 17
On February 6, 1992, PETITIONER filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the DARAB decision.19 On November 5, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The decretal portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated September 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian Court on the issue of just compensation."20Hence, this petition.21 On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads: "G. R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) Considering the compliance, dated December 13, 1993, filed by counsel for petitioner posted a cash bond or surety bond in the amount of P1,500,000.00 Pesos with the Cashier of the Court as evidenced by the attached official receipt no. 315519, the Court resolved to ISSUE the Temporary Retraining Order prayed for. "The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing its decision dated December 19, 1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657. In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian courts (provisionally the Supreme Court designated branches of the regional trial court as special agrarian courts) for final determination of just compensation. On July 26, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows: Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/ meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area. The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative, a notice of acquisition of the subject property. From this point, the provisions of R. A. No. 6657, Section 16 shall apply. For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR.."24
Page 15 of 17
Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals DARAB's decision ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioner's property.25 Here, petitioner pressed the question of whether the property was a watershed, not covered by CARP. Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides: "Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters." However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area.29 Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a "watershed or part of the protected area for watershed purposes." Ecological balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be interconnected.. In a report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment, they concluded that: "The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matang Tubig springs. It would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degredation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.It was recommended that the Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance. Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate rehabilitation. The ERDB prepared a composite report and the DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a Memorandum for the President dated September 7, 1993 ; which reads: " that the area in question must be maintained for watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations. Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP beneficiaries will be affected, it is important that a larger view should also consider the adverse effect on thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for watershed purposes. The important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides: Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234. In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program. In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case. NO cOST. SO ORDERED. CASE #09. G.R. No. 122256 October 30, 1996 - Flordeliza Batingana REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL CORPORATION, respondents. FACTS: Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). The lands were valued by the Land Bank of the Philippines at P19,312.24 per hectare for the riceland and P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears, however, that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings ("LISTASAKA") which private respondent had earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower "Fair Value Acceptable to
Page 16 of 17
Landowner" was stated and that based on this statement, the Land Bank of the Philippines valued private respondent's lands uniformly at P15,311.79 per hectare and fixed the amount of P390,557.84 as the total compensation to be paid for the lands. Private respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP. On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that, in violation of the DARAB's rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision of the PARAD. ISSUE: Whether in cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to the RTC under Section 57. RULING: In case the landowner rejects the offer of DAR, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. It is clear from Section 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. CASE #10. Gemini Mancera FACTS: ISSUE: RULING: CASE #11. G.R. No. 123417 June 10, 1999 - Roxanne Valente Morta vs. Occidental et. Al FACTS: Petitioners filed 2 cases of damages with preliminary injunction with the MTC of Guinobatan, Albay against respondents. In the complaints, petitioners alleged that respondents, through the instigation of Atty. Baranda Jr., gathered pilinuts, anahaw leaves and coconuts from their respective land, delivered the same to the latter and destroyed their banana and pineapple plants. In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were not the owners of the land in question. They alleged that the torrens title is registered to the father of one Josefina Opiana-Baraclan. Respondent Occidental contended that he was a bona fide tenant of Josefina. They denied the accusations against them. MTC rendered decision in favor of petitioners. Respondents then appealed to the RTC questioning the MTCs jurisdiction that the case was cognizable by the DARAB and not of the MTC. RTC reversed MTCs decision ruling that the cases for damages are tenancy -related problems which fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. CA affirmed RTCs ruling. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WoN the civil actions for damages are tenancy-related and is cognizable by the DARAB and not of the trial court. RULING: What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.
Page 17 of 17
For DARAB to have jurisdiction there must exist a tenancy-relationship between the parties. For a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would essential to establish all its indispensable elements: 1. That the parties are the landowner and the tenant/agricultural lessee; 2. That the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3. That there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4. That the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5. That there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; 6. That the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant/agricultural lessee. The Court held in Vda. De Tangub v. CA, the jurisdiction of the DAR is limited to the ff: 1. Adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; 2. Resolution of agrarian conflict and land-tenure related problems; 3. Approval and disapproval of the conversion of agricultural lands into residential; commercial, industrial and other non-agricultural uses. Petitioner Morta claimed that he is the owner of the land. Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding before the appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof and is outside DARABs jurisdiction. At any rate, the case cannot be considered as tenancy-related for it fails to comply with other requirements. Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites, we conclude that the issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB. WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35300 and that of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Cases Nos. 1751 and 1752. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, Albay, in Civil Cases Nos. 481 and 482, for damages. SO ORDERED.

Social Legislation Case Digests

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Social Legislation Case Digests

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

AGRARIAN LAW - LE 106 (30 SEPTEMBER 2013)

You might also like