1. People v. Buyagan G.R. No. 187733.February 8, 2012 BRION, J. Buyagan Appealed.

CA affirmed, but modified the RTC decision wherein Buyagan was found guity of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Sentenced to death. 10.30.00 RTC found Buyagan guilty of the aforementioned crime. It gave credence to the prosecution witnesses who said that Buyagan shot Jun Calixto and PO2 Osorio. Jun grabbed Buyagans robbery partner (John Doe) who robbed WT Construction Supply. This was when Buyagan shot him. PO2 Osorio what shot by Buyagan when the former was chasing him after the incident The testimony of the witnesses were straightforward and consistent with the medico-legal findings. Penalty: Death plus 50k civil, 22400 as actual, 592k as unearned income. To heirs of Osorio: 50k as civil, 200k moral 50690 as actual, 1588600 as unearned income. CA: affirmed but modified penalty to RP. CA said that there was conspiracy between him and Doe. The special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide exists as long as the intention is to rob and the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. Buyagan failed to impute illmotive on the witnesses to falsely testify against him. ISSUE: W/N the lower courts correctly ruled that there was a complex crime of Robbery w/ Homicide. (SC: YES) HELD: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes were committed at the same time.5 In the present case, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The eyewitness accounts of the prosecution witnesses are worthy of belief as they were clear and straightforward and were consistent with the medical findings of Dr. Vladimir Villaseor. They positively identified the appellant as the person who shot Calixto at the back of his head as the latter was grappling with John

Doe; three others all declared that the appellant shot PO2 Osorio at the market while the latter was chasing him. Significantly, the appellant never imputed any ill motive on the part of these witnesses to falsely testify against him. The lower courts correctly ruled that the appellant and John Doe acted in conspiracy with one another. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its execution. The records show that after John Doe robbed the WT Construction Supply store, he casually walked away from the store but Calixto grabbed him. While John Doe and Calixto were grappling with each other, the appellant suddenly appeared from behind and shot Calixto on the head. Immediately after, both the appellant and John Doe ran towards the Hilltop Road going to the direction of the Hangar Market. Clearly, the two accused acted in concert to attain a common purpose. Their respective actions summed up to collective efforts to achieve a common criminal objective. In People v. Ebet,7 we explained that homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if its commission was (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery. Under the given facts, the appellant clearly shot Calixto to facilitate the escape of his robber-companion, John Doe, and to preserve the latters possession of the stolen items. The Proper Penalty The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is penalized, under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised

Penal Code, with reclusion perpetua to death. Since the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm had been alleged and proven during trial, the lower court correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty pursuant to Article 638 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Nonetheless, we cannot impose the death penalty in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Pursuant to this law, we affirm the CAs reduction of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua for each count, with the modification that the appellant shall not be eligible for parole. Civil Liabilities For the deaths of Calixto and PO2 Osorio, we increase the amounts of the awarded civil indemnities fromP50,000.00 to P75,000.00, as the imposable penalty against the appellant would have been death were it not for the enactment of R.A. No. 9346.9 We affirm, to be duly supported by evidence, the award of P1,588,600.00 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity to PO2 Osorios heirs. We, however, delete the award for loss of earning capacity to Calixtos heirs because the prosecution failed to establish this claim. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. While there are exceptions to this rule, these exceptions do not apply to Calixto as he was a security guard when he died; he was not a worker earning less than the current minimum wage under current labor laws. With respect to actual damages, established jurisprudence only allows expenses duly supported by receipts. Out of the P50,690.00 awarded by the RTC to PO2 Osorios heirs, only P15,000.00 was supported by receipts. The difference consists of unreceipted amounts claimed by the victims wife. Considering that the proven amount is less than P25,000.00, we award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Villanueva.10 For the same reasons, we also award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages, to the heirs of Calixto since the proven actual damages amounted to only P22,400.00. The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we

award exemplary damages of P30,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of PO2 Osorio and of Calixto.11 Finally, we uphold the award of moral damages to the heirs of PO2 Osorio and to the heirs of Calixto, but reduce the amount awarded from P200,000.00 to P75,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.12 However, we observed that the dispositive portion of the RTC decision, as affirmed by the CA, only awarded moral damages to the heirs of PO2 Osorio. " While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision's ratio decidendi; and (b) where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision."13 We find that the second exception applies to the case. The omission to state in the dispositive portion the award of moral damages to the heirs of Calixto was through mere inadvertence.1wphi1 The body of the RTC decision shows the clear intent of the RTC to award moral damages to the heirs of Calixto. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 19, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01938 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Teofilo "Rey" Buyagan is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. For the death of Calixto, the appellant is ordered to pay the victims heirs the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; andP25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. For the death of PO2 Osorio, the appellant is ordered to pay the victims heirs the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages;P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages; andP1,588,600.00 as loss of earning capacity. No costs. SO ORDERED. 2. People v. Suyu 3. People v Cabbab

4. People v Basao 5. People vs. Michael Hipona Facts: Michael Hipona was convicted by the RTC of Rape with Homicide (and Robbery) for the death of her aunt AAA, the youngest sister of her mother. AAA was found dead in her house. She was raped, physically manhandled and strangled, which led to her death. Her necklace with two heart-shaped pendants bearing her initials and handbag were missing. Upon investigation, the police found a hole big enough for a person to enter - bored into the lawanit wall of her comfort room. They also found that the main electrical switch was turned off, drawing the police to conclude that the perpetrator was familiar with the layout of AAAs house. The police thus called for a meeting of AAAs relatives, during which AAAs sister BBB, who is Michaels mother, declared that her son had told her that "Mama, Im sorry, I did it because I did not have the money," apologizing for AAAs death. BBB executed an affidavit affirming this confession. On the basis of BBBs information, the police arrested appellant. He was at the time we aring AAAs missing necklace. He was likewise presented to the media and his relatives, he apologized claiming he did it because of his peers and poverty, but qualified his participation in the crime, claiming that he only acted as a look-out, and attributed the crime to his co-accused Romulo B. Seva alias "Gerpacs" and a certain "Reypacs." Seva was arrested while Reypacs remained at large. The RTC, after considering the circumstantial evidence found Michael guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide (and Robbery) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death: Based on the foregoing circumstances, specially of his failure to explain why he was in possession of victims stolen necklace with pendants, plus his confession to the media in the presence of his relatives, and to another radio reporter"live-on-the-air" about a day after his arrest, sealed his destiny to perdition and points to a conclusion beyond moral certainty that his hands were soiled and sullied by blood of his own Aun Seva was acquitted for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The case was elevated to the CA, which affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Hence, the appeal to SC arguing that

his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that he should only be held liable for robbery and not for Rape with Homicide (and Robbery). Issue: WON appellant should be liable for Rape with Homicide (and Robbery) Ruling: SC affirmed the conviction but modified the crime to Robbery with Homicide. Michael cited the testimony of the DNA expert that the vaginal smears taken from AAA were negative of appellants DNA. SC said argument has no merit. Presence of spermatozoa is not essential in finding that rape was committed, the important consideration being not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. However, SC said that from the evidence, robbery was the main intent of appellant, and AAAs death resulted by reason of or on the o ccasion thereof. Following Article 294(1) and Article 62(1)1 of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance instead. *Just in case: For circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The confluence of the following established facts and circumstances sustains the appellate courts affirmance of appellants conviction: First, appellant was frequently visiting AAA prior to her death, hence, his familiarity with the layout of the house; second, appellant admitted to his relatives and the media that he was present during commission of the crime, albeit only as a look-out; third, appellant was in possession of AAAs necklace at the time he was arrested; and fourth,appellant extrajudicially confessed to the radio reporter that he committed the crime due to his peers and because of poverty. 6. People v Evangelio 7. Marquez v People FACTS: On April 6, 2002 in Caloocan City, Ricky "Totsie" Marquez (Marquez), Roy Bernardo (Bernardo), Jomer Magalong (Magalong) and accused Ryan Benzon (Benzon) confederating together and mutually aiding each other, destroyed the door lock of the Rice in a Box stall of

one SONIA VALDEROSA and passing/entering thru the same, once inside, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following items, to wit: Two (2) pieces Rice Cooker (heavy duty),One (1) piece of [Teppanyaki] (big), 1,000 pieces of Boxes, Kitchen Utensils, Fresh Meat (48 kls), Three (3) boxes of Teriyaki Sauce,One (1) Heavy duty blender One (1) Programmer Calculator and One (1) Transistor Radio. Mallari confessed to his brother of his participation to the crime and then eventually to the stall owner Valderosa. RTC gave credence to the testimony of Mallari and held that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things but did not discuss whether the robbery in this case was committed in an inhabited house or in an uninhabited place. It was different, though, when the case was decided by the CA. Unlike the trial court, the appellate court discussed about robbery in an inhabited house Article 299 of the RPC in its assailed Decision. Pursuant to the same provision, it then proceeded to affirm the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the petitioners after finding them guilty of the crime charged. Issue: W/N CA erred in finding that the accused are guilty of robbery under Art. 299. Held: Yes. It should have been under Art. 302 ART. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship. - Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if (a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery is committed, by any of the following means: 1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress; 2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window;

3. By using false keys, picklocks, or similar tools; 4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority. Or if (b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances: 1. By breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle; 2. By taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery. xxxx ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. - Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 299, if the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, provided that any of the following circumstances is present: 1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress; 2. If any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken; 3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks, or other similar tools; 4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been broken; 5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere. When the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed. The records show that the store alleged to have been robbed by petitioners is not an inhabited house, public building or building dedicated to religious worship and their dependencies under Article 299 and as defined under Article 301. From Valderosas testimony, it can be deduced that the establishment allegedly robbed was a store not used as a dwelling. In fact, after the robbery took

place, there was a need to inform Valderosa of the same as she was obviously not residing in the store. "If the store was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling, since the owner lived in a separate house, the robbery committed therein is punished under Article 302. Neither was the place where the store is located owned by the government. It was actually just a stall rented by Valderosa from a private person. Hence, the applicable provision in this case is Article 302 and not Article 299 of the RPC. 8. Laurel v Abrogar DOCTRINE: The general rule is that, only movable properties which have physical or material existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of theft. Only those movable properties which can be taken and carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft. Facts: Baynet Co., Ltd. Is being sued for network fraud. Laurel is the board member and corporate secretary of Baynet. 2 other filipinos and two japanese composed the board. (Baynet) sells "Bay Super Orient Card" which uses an alternative calling patterns called International Simple Resale (ISR). ISR is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using International Private Leased Lines (IPL), cables, antenna or air wave or frequency, which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the terminating country (the country where the call is destined). The operator of an ISR is able to evade payment of access, termination or bypass charges and accounting rates, as well as compliance with the regulatory requirements of the NTC. Thus, the ISR operator offers international telecommunication services at a lower rate, to the damage and prejudice of legitimate operators like PLDT. Search warrants were issued against baynet through PLDT's complaint. The seach was followed by an inquest investigation. The prosecutor found probable cause for THEFT and filed Information. After preliminary investigation the information was amended to include Laurel and the other members of the board for THEFT using ISR. Accused Laurel filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer Arraignment)" on the groundS that RPC does not punish use of ISR, The telephone calls belong to the person calling not to PLDT, and that

no personal property was stolen from PLDT. There is no crime when there is no law punishing the crime Issue: whether or not international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Cards through the telecommunication services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in short, PLDTs business of providing said telecommunication services, are proper subjects of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code Held: RTC denied MQ MR denied. Petition for Certiorari with CA, dismissed. SC, granted.The petition is meritorious. An information or complaint must state explicitly and directly every act or omission constituting an offense and must allege facts establishing the conduct. the Amended Information does not contain material allegations charging the petitioner of theft of personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows: Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent. For one to be guilty of theft the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi) personal property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property which intent is apart from and concurrently with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolus malus). An information or complaint for simple theft must allege the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with intent to gain; and

(d) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation of person/s or force upon things. "Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code must be considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law. The statutory definition of "taking" and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only movable properties which have physical or material existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of theft. only those movable properties which can be taken and carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft. Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not subject of theft because the same cannot be "taken" from the place it is found and is occupied or appropriated. movable properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code should be distinguished from the rights or interests to which they relate. A naked right existing merely in contemplation of law, although it may be very valuable to the person who is entitled to exercise it, is not the subject of theft or larceny. Such rights or interests are intangible and cannot be "taken" by another. There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires possession of personal property even if for a short time; or if such property is under the dominion and control of the thief. The taker, at some particular amount, must have obtained complete and absolute possession and control of the property adverse to the rights of the owner or the lawful possessor thereof.t is not necessary that the property be actually carried away out of the physical possession of the lawful possessor or that he should have made his escape with it. Neither asportation nor actual manual possession of property is required. Constructive possession of the thief of the property is enough. The essence of the element is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without animus revertendi. gas and electricity are susceptible of taking since they can be appropritated. Business and services cannot be taken thus, not a subject of theft. They both have different definitions. RPC could not have included human voice or ISR in theft since such was not existing at that time.

Respondent PLDT does not acquire possession, much less, ownership of the voices of the telephone callers or of the electronic voice signals or current emanating from said calls. The human voice and the electronic voice signals or current caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of possession, occupation or appropriation by the respondent PLDT or even the petitioner, for that matter. PLDT merely transmits the electronic voice signals through its facilities and equipment. Congress did not amend the definition of theft rather they passed RA 8484 and 8792. Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, on February 11, 1998. Under the law, an access device means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, personal identification number and other telecommunication services, equipment or instrumentalities-identifier or other means of account access that can be used to obtain money, goods, services or any other thing of value or to initiate a transfer of funds other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument. Among the prohibited acts enumerated in Section 9 of the law are the acts of obtaining money or anything of value through the use of an access device, with intent to defraud or intent to gain and fleeing thereafter; and of effecting transactions with one or more access devices issued to another person or persons to receive payment or any other thing of value. Under Section 11 of the law, conspiracy to commit access devices fraud is a crime. However, the petitioner is not charged of violation of R.A. 8484. Significantly, a prosecution under the law shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provisions of the Revised Penal Code inclusive of theft under Rule 308 of the Revised Penal Code and estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, if an individual steals a credit card and uses the same to obtain services, he is liable of the following: theft of the credit card under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code; violation of Republic Act No. 8484; and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code with the service provider as the private complainant. The petitioner is not charged of estafa before the RTC in the Amended Information. Section 33 of Republic Act Commerce Act of 2000 provides: No. 8792, Electronic

Sec. 33. Penalties. The following Acts shall be penalized by fine and/or imprisonment, as follows: a) Hacking or cracking which refers to unauthorized access into or interference in a computer system/server or information and communication system; or any access in order to corrupt, alter, steal, or destroy using a computer or other similar information and communication devices, without the knowledge and consent of the owner of the computer or information and communications system, including the introduction of computer viruses and the like, resulting on the corruption, destruction, alteration, theft or loss of electronic data messages or electronic documents shall be punished by a minimum fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and a maximum commensurate to the damage incurred and a mandatory imprisonment of six (6) months to three (3) years. 9. Valenzuela v People 10. Miranda v People 11. People v Tanchanco 12. Pideli vs. People Facts: Placido and Wilson (the partners) entered into a partnership agreement to subcontract a rip rap and spillway project in Benguet. They were in need of a supplier of construction material. Ernesto Pideli (the accused) offered them to use his credit line with a hardware. The project continued and the hardware supplied the materials. The project was completed and they were paid. Since the hardware was yet unpaid, the partners, instead of dividing the proceeds, entrusted the money to Ernesto for the purpose of paying the hardware. The following day Ernesto was nowhere to be found. Placido filed a complaint for theft against Ernesto. The trial court convicted Ernesto of Theft. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. Ernesto was contending that the money belonged to the partnership hence it cannot be the object of theft as between the partners and that he acted as an agent of the partnership.

Issue: What is the crime committed by Ernesto, Theft or Estafa? Held: Theft. The elements of theft are as follows: 1. 2. 3. That there be taking of personal property That said property belongs to another That the taking be done with intent to gain

4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner 5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things All the elements of theft are present in the case at bar. The money belongs to the partners and it was taken by Ernesto against the consent of the owner. Although there is misappropriation of funds here, Ernesto was correctly found guilty of theft. As early as U.S. v. De Vera, the Court has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, succinctly opined: The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa In the case at bar, Ernesto was entrusted only with material or physical possession of the money, not juridical possession, hence he is guilty of theft, not estafa. Juridical possession remained with the partners. Conviction AFFIRMED. 13. Cruz v People 14. Briones v People

PetRev on Cert wherein Briones is appealing the affirmation of the CA. He was convicted of the crime of Robbery. RTC: charge was robbery but convicted for simple theft CA: Briones appealed but convicted him of Robbery saying that force and intimidation was employed by Briones. Facts: 1) Info: on or about the 6th day of January 1998, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to gain and against the will of the complainant S/G Dabbin Molina, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest from him a .38 cal. gun worth P8,000.00, more or less. CONTRARY TO LAW. 2) S/G Molina was a security guard and was issued a .38 cal. 3) S/G Molina and S/G Gual were manning the northwest gate of BF homes in Paraaque. They noticed that Bersamina was being mauled by 4 individuals, including Briones and his brother. 4) the S/Gs tried to stop the mauling. At this point, Molina lost his gun to Briones. It was unsure though if violence and intimidation was used to get the gun. 6) Briones denied participating and said that he was in his house during the incident. 7) RTC found Briones guilty of Simple Theft. It relied on the positive testimony of Gual. It ruled that it is only simple theft because violence and intimidation was not proven. Gual merely testified that Briones grabbed the gun of Molina. 8) CA found Briones guilty of robbery sating that force and intimidation attended the taking of Molinas gun as he approached the latter with the intent of taking the gun away. 9) On MR/MNT/MTD, Briones said that he was merely protecting his brother when he took the gun. CA denied hence petition. Issue/s: W/N Robbery was the correct crime. (SC: NO) W/N the lower courts were correct in convicting Briones (SC: YES)

HELD: I. To show that robbery was committed, the government needs to prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property be committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; and (3) the taking be done with animo 32 lucrandi. On the other hand, the elements constituting the crime of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or 33 intimidation of persons or force upon things. Thus, the distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft. We have no doubt that the elements of taking of personal property which belongs to another person without his consent have been established in the case, while the intent to gain is presumed from unlawful taking and can only be negated by special circumstances showing a 34 different intent on the part of the perpetrator. We previously held that intent to gain is a mental state whose existence is demonstrated by a persons overt 35 acts. Briones' overt acts in this case were in grabbing S/G Molinas firearm and running away with it. We stress that these pieces of evidence, showing his unlawful taking of the firearm and running away with it immediately after, were not refuted by the defense's evidence before the RTC. There is also evidence, as testified to by S/G Gual, that the firearm was not found nor retrieved after this unlawful taking. Further, these pieces of evidence defeat Briones belated contention that he threw away the firearm immediately after he got hold of it. Under the circumstance, we are left to consider the nature of the crime committed, as proven by the evidence on record. We agree with the RTC that only the crime of theft was committed in the case as S/G Gual's testimony does not show that violence or intimidation attended the taking of the firearm; S/G Gual only testified that Briones merely grabbed the firearm and ran away with it. Thus, we can only convict Briones for the crime of theft for taking S/G Molinas firearm without his consent. Theft is produced the moment there is deprivation of personal property due to its 36 taking with intent to gain. In arriving at this conclusion, we are keenly aware that the accused was indicted under a charge for robbery, not theft. The failure to specify the correct crime committed,

however, will not bar Briones conviction for the crime of 37 theft. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information, or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated. The crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or 38 information. In this case, the allegations in the Information are sufficient to make out a charge of theft. II. As S/G Gual is a credible eyewitness to the incident, we find no reason to doubt that he was with S/G Molina when the incident happened, and saw all the incidents of the crime. As against this credible and positive testimony of S/G Gual, Briones could only set up denial and alibi as his defenses. We have previously ruled that for these defenses to deserve merit, they must be substantiated by 18 clear and convincing proof. Under the present facts, these defenses were without corroboration. On the contrary, Briones and his new counsel desperately now move to try the case again at the expense of Briones former counsel; based on allegedly newly discovered 19 evidence. They blame the former counsels allegedly erroneous legal strategy when he raised denial and alibi as Briones defenses, instead of invoking self -defense or defense of a relative. They also now foist on this Court an 20 Affidavit of Desistance dated July 29, 2002 executed by Fuentes, as well as an Affidavit dated July 22, 21 2002 executed by one Oskar Salud. These documents allegedly prove that Briones had no intent to gain and, in fact, threw away the firearm after grabbing it from S/G Molina. A change of Briones' defense from denial and alibi to selfdefense or defense of a relative is effectively a change of theory of the case brought only during appeal. We cannot allow this move. Law and fairness to the adverse party demand that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided on the basis of that theory in the court below, neither party can change his or her theory 22 on appeal. While this rule is not absolute, no exceptional 23 reasons in this case exist to justify a deviation. 1avvphil Additionally, an error or mistake committed by a counsel in the course of judicial proceedings is not a ground for new trial. From the facts, it does not appear that Briones was denied competent legal representation in the proceedings before the RTC. What significantly remains on record is the unopposed testimony of S/G Gual that Briones grabbed the firearm from S/G Molina; no evidence on record exists to show

that this firearm was pointed at Briones or at his companions. For these reasons, we find that the CA did not commit any reversible error when it denied Briones' motion for new trial. Likewise, we find no error in the RTC and CA conclusion that he is criminally liable under the criminal information. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 17, 2002 and Resolution dated November 13, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24127 are hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Rommel Briones is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of THEFT under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor. SO ORDERED. 15. Belen Real v People 16. Francisco v People 17. People v Lourdes 18. Milla v People 19. People v Montaner 20. Gonzalez v People Facts: Gonzales was charged of arson after setting fire to their room in an apartment building, burning the units occupied by the other tenants. Tenants testified that they heard Gonzales quarrelling with his aunt, yelling that he will burn the house down. Afterwards he set a pile of clothes on fire which smelled of LPG gas. The testimonies were corroborated by the police investigator who testified that when they arrived at the crime scene, Gonzales admitted responsibility for the fire. However, he later denied it claiming that the fire was caused by faulty electrical wiring and also denied fighting with his aunt. He said she was partially deaf so he had to speak in a loud voice for her to hear him. He also sought police protection from his neighbors who accused him of starting the fire. After investigation, the evidence was found negative of any flammable substance. Nonetheless, RTC found Gonzales guilty of arson (penalty: Prision Correccional to Reclusion Temporal as max). Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. CA held that the denial of Gonzales cannot prevail over the positive identification of a witness and that the prosecution established circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Although there were discrepancies in the oral testimony and affidavits of witnesses, the discrepancies did not necessarily discredit them because

affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. Moreover, CA held that the alleged discrepancies pertain to minor matters which negated any suspicion that the testimony was perjured and rehearsed. Issue: Whether the discrepancies in the affidavit and the court testimonies of a witness are sufficient to exculpate Gonzales of the crime of arson Held: No. The arson committed in the instant case involving an inhabited house or dwelling is covered by Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove 10 the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. When these are present, the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes 11 inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject. In this case, the eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit who caused the fire. Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. As a general rule, when the findings of both courts are in agreement, this Court will not reverse their findings of fact. Furthermore, in our view, the findings of the Physical Science Report is a negative evidence and taken together with the bare denial of petitioner, supported only with testimonies of relatives, constitute inferior evidence as against the circumstantial evidence coupled with the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense by a credible witness. 21. Buebos & Buebos v People 22. People v. Bravo FACTS: That on or about 9:30 P.M. of August 10, 1989, at Brgy. Magungunay, Municipality of Naguilian, La Union,

Benjamin Bravo motivated by anger and hatred stormed into the house of one Mauro Camacho who he thinks put a curse on his father. Bravo pointed a gun at Mauro and demanded for him to bring out the akusan (object for witchcraft), Mauro was able to make him go away but before Bravo left he said that Mauro and his family will burn to death. After a few seconds a fire broke out in the second flr of the house where one Mrs. Shirley Camacho (daughter in law of Mauro) and her four month old son Jerickson Camacho were sleeping. They both were trapped and died instantaneously and also the house of Dominador Camacho was also gutted down by the fire. RTC found Bravo guilty of Arson. CA affirmed Issue: W/N circumstantial evidence is enough to prove the accuseds guilt even if there is no direct evidence proving that he caused the fire. Held: Yes. Ratio: In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. The occurrence of the fire was established by the burnt house, the charred bodies of the two fire victims and testimonies of prosecution witnesses. As to the identity of the arsonist, no direct evidence was presented. However, direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime

as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitness are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. The following circumstances form an unbroken chain that point to no other than that appellant is the arsonist, to wit: First: Prior to the burning incident, the Bravo family, including the accused, had denounced Mauro Camacho and his wife of engaging in witchcraft. The Bravos blamed the witchcraft to be the cause of the illness of the father of the accused. Second: A week after the rumors had spread that Mauro Camacho, Sr. and his wife had subjected the father of the accused to their witchcraft, their house got burned downed. Third: The accused was present at the scene of the crime at about 9:30 pm on August 10, 1989, daring Mauro Camacho, Sr. to go down from his house. The accused himself even went up the house of the Camachos and pointed his long firearm at Mauro, Sr. Fourth: The accused was heard uttering while going down the stairs of the house the Camachos: Matay kayo aminen, po-urak daytoy balay yo (all of you will die. I will burn your house). Fifteen seconds later, Mauro Camacho, Sr. heard gunshots and then saw a big fire in the room occupied by Shirley Camacho and her son.

And fifth. Barangay councilman Alejandro Marzan, while at a wake in Barangay Ambaracao Sur, Naguilian, La Union at about 9:30 pm of August 10, 1989, heard gunshots that prompted him to go outside. He then saw a fire to the north about a kilometer away from where he was. He rushed towards the place of the fire. Midway, he encountered Benjamin Bravo running from the opposite direction and carrying a long firearm. 23. Taguinod v People G.R. No. 185833 October 12, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE

ROBERT TAGUINOD,vs. PHILIPPINES,

Facts: at the parking area of the Rockwell Powerplant Mall. Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda CRV (CRV) from the 3rd basement parking, while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara) from the 2nd basement parking. When they were about to queue at the corner to pay the parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each other. The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake, which resulted the touching of their side view mirrors. The side view mirror of the Vitara was pushed backward and naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was pushed forward. This prompted the private complainant's wife and daughter, namely, Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the petitioner. Petitioner appeared to be hostile, hence, the private complainant instructed his wife and daughter to go back to the CRV. While they were returning to the car, petitioner accelerated the Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them. The CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara, took another lane. Private complainant was able to pay the parking fee at the booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was at the upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp.As a result of the collision, both cars sustained damages, the CRV having most of it. An information was filed for malicious mischief against Taguinod to which he pleaded not guilty. He was convicted of malicious mischief with a punishment of 4 months and damages. RTC affirmed. CA modified only the penalties. Petition for review to SC Issue: WON taguinod has committed malicious mischief.

Held: This Court finds the petition partly meritorious. Affirmed modifications only on omission of attorney's fees. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code has been proven beyond reasonable doubt which are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it. The incident of the collision of the side mirrors of both cars, the pounded hood of the vitara and the bad mouthing of the wife and daughter of the complainant are proof enough to establish existence of the element of hate revenge and other ill motive , for in his mind he was wronged. First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private complainant. 24. Intestate estate of Manolita Gonzalez v People 25. People v Cerbito 26. Tan v People 27. Wong vs. CA and People Facts: Wong was an agent of Limtong Press, Inc (LPI), a manufacturer of calendars. Since Wong had a history of unremitted collections, LPI required Wongs customers to issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their purchase orders. Wong issued 6 postdated checks and drawn payable to the order of LPI. These checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers who failed to issue postdated checks but LPI refused to accept the

checks as guarantee. They instead agreed to apply the checks to the payment of Wongs unremitted collections. The said checks were dishonored. Wong was notified about the dishonor but he failed to settle the same within 5 days. Wong was charged for 3 separate Informations for violation of BP 22. The trial court convicted Wong. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court. Hence this petition. Issue: What is the crime committed by the accused? Held: He is liable for violation of BP 22. There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded; and (2) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days. The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the first situation, pertinent to the present case, are: (1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because the checks were not issued to apply for account or for value. He attempts to distinguish his situation from the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case by claiming that the checks were issued as guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee were already paid. This

flawed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA having both ruled that the checks were in payment for unremitted collections, and not as guarantee. Likewise, the argument has no legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. Thus, the makers knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June 5, 1986, or 157 days after the December 30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of knowledge of lack of funds under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 should not apply to him. He further claims that he should not be expected to keep his bank account active and funded beyond the ninety-day period. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides: Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check." To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes

arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.22 Contrary to petitioners assertions, nowhere in said provision does the law require a maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioners insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the respondent courts affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. However, pursuant to the policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which took effect on November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner should now be modified to a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the checks that were dishonored.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. 28. Domagsang v CA Josephine Domagsang obtained a loan from Ignacio Garcia in the amount of P573,800.00. In consideration of the loan, Domagsang issued eighteen (18) postdated checks to Ignacio. When presented for payment, the said checks bounced for the reasons "Account Closed". Ignacio demanded payment by calling up Domagsang at her office. However, Domagsang failed to pay. Both the RTC and Court of Appeals convicted Domagsang of the crime. The latter appealed to the Supreme Court. Will a verbal notice of dishonor or demand to pay enough to convict a person for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)? The Supreme Court held that Although Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, Section 3 states that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. A mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. Both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Domagsang was acquitted of the crime. However, she was ordered to pay Ignacio the total face value of the dishonored checks as it was established that she failed to pay her debt. 29. Griffith v CA GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A. VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE MANUEL D.L. VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC., respondents. G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002. QUISUMBING, J.

Griffith was found guilty by the RTC on two counts for violation of BP22. CA affirmed. Was to suffer imprisonment of 6 mos, to be served consecutively. FACTS: 1) 1985 Phelps Dodge Philippines (PDP) leased its lot and factory to Lincoln Gerard Inc (LGI) for two years at a monthly rate of 75k. 2) LCI defaulted on some of the rentals. Griffith, as president of LGI issued two checks (1 is 100K, 2 is 115442.65) both from FEBTC. The vouchers for the checks indicated that: a) checks are not to be presented without prior approval of LGI to be given not later then May 30, 1986 b) But if written approval is not given by LCI before the date, PDP shall present checks for payment. This is final and irrevocable. 3) May 20, 1986, PDP advised LGI that it was transferring the contents of the LGI warehouse in the leased premises since a new tenant was moving in and that the properties of LGI will be placed in PDPs custody. 4) On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote PDP not to present checks for payment because they could not be funded due to the four-week labor strike which paralyzed the operations of LGI. 5) June 2, 1986, PDP did not receive further comms from LGI, PDP then presented the checks for payment. The checks were dishonored. LGI was notified but failed to refund the checks. As such, PDP foreclosed the LGI properties in its possession despite the latters protest. 6) November 6, 1987, LGI lodged a complaint for damages against PDP and the notary who conducted the auction sale. RTC ruled for LGI saying that the sale was invalid, applied the proceeds to the arrears and ordered PDP to return 1.07M since it was the excess of the sale. CA affirmed. 7) May 10, 1988, two informations for BP22 were filed against Griffith before the RTC. Thereafter remanded to the MeTC due to the subsequent expansion of the latter courts jurisdiction over BP22 cases.

8) MeTC found Griffith guilty for both counts. But did not judge the civil aspect of the case due to Res Judi or Litis Pen. RTC affirmed in toto. CA denied appeal. 9) Griffith assails the decision due to the fact that PDP knew that the checking accounts did not have sufficient funds and the latter presented it for payment despite such knowledge. ISSUE: W/N the conviction was correct. (SC: NO) HELD: The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user."25 It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.26 Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to "best serve the ends of criminal justice." Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school that imposes penalties for retribution,27 such retribution should be aimed at "actual and potential wrongdoers".28 Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerard's property for cash amounting to P1,120,54029 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was already in Phelps Dodge's custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was moving into the leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals was onlyP301,953.12.30 Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks, totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This was the situation when, almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard,

Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as involuntary.31 That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or returnP1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. We cannot, under these circumstances, see how petitioner's conviction and sentence could be upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale as its chosen remedy. That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the Court of Appeals earlier rendered in deciding the petition for Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros Caguioa, CA-G.R. SP No. 20980, in connection with the petitioner's motion to quash the charges herein before they were tried on the merits.32 Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices Reynato S. Puno and Asaali S. Isnani: "We are persuaded that the defense has good and solid defenses against both charges in Criminal Cases Nos. 73260-61. We can even say that the decision rendered in Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 55276, well-written as it is, had put up a formidable obstacle to any conviction in the criminal cases with the findings therein made that the sale by public auction of the properties of Lincoln was illegal and had no justification under the facts; that also the proceeds realized in the said sale should be deducted from the account of Lincoln with Phelps, so that only P47,953.12 may only be the rentals in arrears which Lincoln should pay, computed at P301,953.12 less P254,600.00; that out of what had happened in the case as the trial court had resolved in its decision, Phelps is duty bound to pay Lincoln in damages P1,072,586.88 from which had been deducted the amount of P47,953.12 representing the balance of the rental in arrearages; and that consequently, there is absolutely no consideration remaining in support of the two (2) subject checks."33 Petitioner's efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges against him was frustrated on procedural grounds because, according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not

certiorari was the proper remedy.34 In a petition for certiorari, only issues of jurisdiction including grave abuse of discretion are considered, but an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review. While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically.35We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations. In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19621 dated March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated July 8, 1997, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED of the charges of violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679. Costs de officio. SO ORDERED. 30. People v Lagat 31. People v Dimat