Page 1 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS)

POLITICAL QUESTION and JUDICIAL REVIEW CASE DIGESTS

Taada and Diosdado Macapagal vs Cuenco
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question. HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

ALEJANDRINO V. QUEZON
Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby, declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr.Alejandrino. Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered. Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments. In view of the propriety of mandamus Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House Members On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature. In view of effects of punishment Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. In view of no remedy Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power.

Page 2 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS)

Avelino vs. Cuenco

GR L-2821, 4 March 1949 FACTS: Senator Taada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Taada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motupropio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other members who continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum the majority required of the 24member Senate. ISSUES: (1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter? (2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved? HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. In view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president. Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. II On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case. HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court. Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution? There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. **Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA. Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session? The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949) Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.

Page 3 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS) The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed. Justice Feria: (Concurring) Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required concurrence of two -thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

Bondoc vs. Pineda

Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda is a member of the Laban ngDemokratikongPilipno. While Bondoc is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal. One member of the Electoral Tribunal, JuanitoCamasuraJr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held and that the new representative that theyd be placing in the HRET will be voting for Pineda this time. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman JusticeHerrera by virtue of a resolution passed by the HOR. ISSUE: Whether or not such action by the HRET is valid? HELD: The act is not valid for the HRET has already reached and rendered a decision and such decision may not be annulled due the reason that LDP has withdrawn its representative in the HRET who participated in the voting. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot and academic. LDP change their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. **HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from the minority. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a member of the Laban ngDemokratikongPilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET). One member of the Electoral Tribunal, JuanitoCamasuraJr and a member of LDP conf essed to Rep. joseCojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Herrera. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion? HELD: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with theproposal of the LDP. But since the HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case.

Page 4 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS)

G.R. No. L-36142: Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence. Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary The Facts: Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then Ratification Cases. The Plebiscite Case On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973. On December 7, 1972, CharitoPlanas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. "In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying: "... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary ConradoEstrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion." On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the

Page 5 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS) Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor: ____________________________ "BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES "PROCLAMATION NO. 1102 "ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. "WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people; "WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary; "WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues; "WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution? "WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite; "WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the KatipunanngMga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people; "NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect. "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. "Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three. (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"President of the Philippines "By the President: "ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"Executive Secretary" _________________________________ The Ratification Case On January 20, 1973, JosueJavellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by JosueJavellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void." The Issue: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question? 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.) 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? The Resolution: Summary: The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution. Details: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question? On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and

Page 6 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS) myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry." 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88 Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution." 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)heeffectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91 Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions. 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It is so ordered.

Page 7 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS)

Summary of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). Facts On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office. The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss term. William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. Issues 1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission? 2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy? 3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void? 4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdicti on beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution? 5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus? Holding and Rule (Marshall) 1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission. The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams. 2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy. 3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. 4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judic ial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance. 5. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction. Disposition Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the commission. See Ex Parte McCardle for a constitutional law case brief holding that that the Constitution gives Congress the express power to make exceptions to the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction.

Page 8 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS)

Summary of Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246 (1911). Facts Congress passed an act that conferred original jurisdiction the Court of Claims and appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to determine the validity of certain acts of Congress (i.e. to issue advisory opinions). The Congressional acts related to the distribution and allotment of lands and funds to members of the Cherokee Indian tribe. Muskrat and the other plaintiffs in this case brought suit in the Court of Claims seeking a declaration that Congressional acts of 1904 and 1906 were unconstitutional, and that an earlier (and more favorable) act of July 1902 was controlling. The Court of Claims sustained the validity of the acts of 1904 and 1906 and dismissed the petitions and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issues 1. What is the scope of the judicial power conferred by the Constitution upon the Supreme Court? 2. May Congress expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts by empowering them to issue advisory opinions? Holding and Rule (Day) 1. The judicial power is limited to cases and controversies, i.e. the claims of litigants brought before the courts for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs. 2. No. Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the judiciary by empowering it to issue advisory opinions. As per Marbury v. Madison, neither the legislative nor the executive branch can assign to the judicial branch any duties other than those that are properly judicial and to be performed in a judicial manner. Under the Constitution, judicial power is limited to cases and controversies. A case or controversy implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication. Congress does not have the power to provide for a suit of this nature to be brought in federal court to test the constitutionality of prior acts of Congress because such a suit is not a case or controversy. This court has no veto power over legislation enacted by Congress, and its right to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional can only be exercised when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for determination. Disposition Reversed and remanded with orders to dismiss to lack of jurisdiction. Notes: Nothing in the United States Constitution prohibits state courts from issuing advisory opinions and some states engage in the practice. A fair amount of Supreme Court jurisprudence has arguably been unkind to the indigenous peoples within United States territory.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

Judicial Review Electoral Commission In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest a gainst the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly ----------------------------------------------------------NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the

Page 9 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS) National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx. [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

ASHWANDER v. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Petitioner Ashwander Respondent Tennessee Valley Authority Decided By Hughes Court (1932-1937) 297 U.S. 288 (1936) Argued Thursday, December 19, 1935 Decided Monday, February 17, 1936 Term: 1901-1939 Location: Alabama Power Company Facts of the Case The Tennessee Valley Authority was a government corporation established as part of the New Deal to improve the economy of the state. For example, projects of the TVA included improving navigation on the state's rivers, constructing flood control projects, and generating hydroelectric power. Shareholders in a private Tennessee power company sued to prevent the TVA from acquiring over half of the company's property and equipment. The proposed contract which detailed the sale would allow the government agency to allocate electric power to consumers. Question Did Congress exceed its power in implementing and administering the TVA? Conclusion No. The Court held that Congress did not abuse its power with the TVA. Justice Hughes argued that the Wilson Dam, the location where the TVA was in the business of generating electricity, had been built originally in the interest of national defense: it produced materials involved in munitions manufacture. The government could sell excess electricity to consumers without violating the Constitution. This case is especially important for the concept of judicial review as expressed in Justice Brandeis's concurrence.. Brandeis articulated a set of "rules" governing the appropriateness of judicial review. ------------------------------------------------------------------297 U.S. 288 (1936), argued 1920 Dec. 1935, decided 17 Feb. 1936 by vote of 8 to 1; Hughes for the Court, Brandeis concurring, McReynolds in dissent. Claiming that the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was unconstitutional, minority shareholders of a utility company sought to annul their board's agreement to purchase electricity from the TVA. The Court upheld the act and found Congress had authority to construct dams for national defense and improve interstate commerce. The sale of electricitya byproductwas authorized by Article IV, section 3 of the Constitution, granting the federal government power to sell property it lawfully acquires. Justice Louis Brandeis believed the constitutional question should never have been addressed because the case involved a simple internal dispute among shareholders. He maintained that the Court should avoid making decisions on the constitutionality of legislation, and the case is remembered for his list of guidelines the Ashwander rules: (1) the Court will not determine the constitutionality of legislation in nonadversary proceedings; (2) it will not anticipate a question of constitutional law; (3) it will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than needed; (4) it will not rule on constitutionality if there is another ground for deciding the case; (5) it will not determine a statute's validity unless the person complaining has been injured by it; (6) it will not invalidate a statute at the instance of persons who have taken advantage of its benefits; and (7) the Court will always ascertain whether any reasonable interpretation of a statute will allow it to avoid the constitutional issue. Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/ashwander-v-tennessee-valley-authority#ixzz2YC5fpyxR

Page 10 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS)

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC vs.SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955 FACTS:The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that ActsNo. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of privateschools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and wasamended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutionalon the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well asteachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will alsodeprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civicefficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimitedpowers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawfuldelegation of Legislative powers. Section 1 of Act No. 2706It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all privateschools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, inaccordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his dulyauthorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same, The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no.180 may be declared void and unconstitutional? RATIO DECIDENTI: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition.

Tan v. Macapagal
Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people. The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein." Issues: WON the petitioners has locus standi WON the court has jurisdiction over the case Held: 1. NO. J justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute Must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain , direct injury as a result of its enforcement.Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: Validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement .Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer." 2. NO. At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the 1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body. Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties; judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfill its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes

Page 11 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS)

United States v. Nixon (1974)

Relevant Facts: See Watergate scandal. Agents of CREEP broke into Democratic National Headquarters and were caught in the act. It was slowly uncovered that President Nixon authorized the break-in, as well as several other incidents. Former White House counsel John Dean named Nixon himself in an ensuing investigation into the cover-up, and impeachment proceedings were brought against the President. As a result of a grand jury indictment against 7 defendants, most notably former Attorney General John Mitchell, the President was named as an unindicted co-conspirator and was ordered by a District Court upon subpoena, to produce certain tapes, memoranda, and other writings related to specific meetings associated with the scandal. President released transcripts to some of the tapes and then moved to quash the release of them all together on grounds of executive privilege. District Court denied motion. The Court took the case before the Court of Appeals could hear it, and then affirmed the lower court and remanded it for examination of the subpoenaed documents.

Issue: Under constitutional law, may the President of the United States, upon his non-indictment but association with a conspiracy which violates federal law, invoke executive immunity to interpose a District Court order which directs him to produce certain documents and recordings of meeting associated with this conspiracy? Holding: No. When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process law in the fair administration of justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. Courts Rationale/Reasoning: The Court has at the very best before this case interpreted the explicit immunity conferred by express provisions of the Constitution on members of Congress by the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, an express power. Thus, if the Court were to construe and delineate claims under express powers, then the Court should have the authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers. President claims (1) valid need for protection of higher authority and those who advise him; and (2) separation of powers insulates the President from judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal investigation. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the Court finds it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obligated to provide. As for separation of powers, they were not meant to stand by themselves, as there are cases in which the powers co-mingled with one another. Presidential communication is protected, however when the communication is not of a governmental nature, and there is a public interest in those communications, then the immunity granted by the Constitution does not exist. This is important to the adversarial system we have in this country. There must be a full disclosure of all of the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. This is essential to the carrying of justice. Both the 5th amendment (due process) and the 6th amendment (right to face adversaries is part of this carrying of justice. In applying the balance test, Presidential communications are indeed protected generally, but in the instance of a criminal case, the protection cannot remain, for it would cut deep into the guarantee of due process law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. Rule: Balancing test weighs the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the Presidents responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. Important Dicta: No court has defined the scope of judicial power specifically related to the enforcement of a subpoena for confidential Presidential communications for use in a criminal prosecution.