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U.S.C. § 2201(a) to declare the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (“PDUFA”)
here by reference all of the allegations found at Count Five (¶s 22-36) of the
standing and the question of whether Appellants stated claims under the civil RICO
statute (18 U.S.C. 1964 ( c)) for violations of 18 U.S.C. 1962 (b), ( c), and (d) against
12(B) and Incorporated Brief in Support found at USCA5 305-315, Document #45
Sepracor Inc’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim found at USCA5 1059-
1498-1530, and Document #71 captioned Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment under
See U.S. Supreme Court Docket No. 04-537 found at Document #83-6, pages
39 and 40 of 40, in Case No. 4:07-cv-00471. See affidavit and Exhibits attached to
this Motion. On September 17, 2004, Davidsons filed Petition for Writ of Certiorari
before Judgment, (the “First Cert. Petition”) in Docket No. 04-537, a true and correct
copy of which is found attached as an Exhibit to this Motion. Certiorari was denied
arguments, points, and authorities found at Issues II and III of the First Cert.
5th Amendment equal protection grounds found in the U.S. Constitution. Appellants’
have stated an equal protection claim at Count Five of the Amended Complaint
(Document #19 Index of Record) under both the “selective enforcement” theory and
the “class of one” theory. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000). Davidsons were intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 S.Ct. 190, 67 L.Ed 340 (1923); Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty, 488 U.S. 336, 109 S.Ct. 633,
retaliatory, and bribery-motivated FDA action against Davidson at Count Five, the
attached to the Amended Complaint (Document #19) at USCA5 705-716, the Exhibits
Document #47 at USCA5 1714-1803. See DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704, 705 (2d
Cir. 2003); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1995).
Davidson was “singled out” for selective enforcement of the PDUFA by the
FDA and Sepracor Inc, after Davidson “blew the whistle” on high-enroller [Jay
Grossman] in his Letter of April 14, 1999, to Dr Antoine El Hage of FDA, and the
Affidavit filed by Robert Davidson with FDA investigator, Armando Chavez, on May
21, 1999. See ¶ 5.3, 8.32, 8.63 of the Amended Complaint at USCA5 516, 529, and
534, respectively. While the principal target of the equal protection clause is
plaintiffs victimized by “the wholly arbitrary act”. The exercise of FDA discretion
evidence to suggest that Davidson was targeted by the FDA for an invidious reason
(a bribe from Sepracor Inc). See Mach v. County of Douglas, S-99-266, Neb. 787.
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of’‘, not merely ‘in spite of’’, its
(Davidson)).
and 1711-1713. The relationship between Appellants’ injuries and the defendants’
RICO violations are direct (not attenuated). See Document #71 at USCA5 1852-1853
where it states,
at USCA5 1498-1511 under the heading Alleged Failure to State Claim: Proximate
Cause after the Anza Case. Plaintiffs incorporate here by reference the arguments
found in Document #56 at USCA5 1514-1515 under the heading Alleged Lack of
February 19, 2003, in the U.S. District Court for the district of Arizona (Case No. CV
03-110-TUC FRZ) tolled the limitations period as to Counts One, Two, and Three.
See Preveza Shipping Co. v. Sucrest Corp., 297 F.Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). (when
a federal statute of limitations is involved, the federal rule is applied to the effect that
Selective Enforcement
protection. See Little v. Streater, 452, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). See Gale v. North Dakota
protected right. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944). Davidson has stated
claims that involve his fundamental right to equality of treatment before the law (fair
Davidson’s claims involve a fundamental right, his federal equal protection claims
are subject to de novo review. See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights,
equality of treatment before the law (fair legal procedures). FDA’s actions were
protection by FDA and that he was the victim of selective enforcement. Davidson
argues for certainly not the first time that his equal protection rights were violated by
selective enforcement of the PDUFA by FDA. See USCA5 1650 and USCA5 1584
for the Notification of Claim of Unconstitutionality in the First RICO Action (Case
Complaint and Counterclaims in the State Action (Pima County Superior Court Case
equality of treatment before the law (fair legal procedures). See Beeler v. Rounsavall,
328 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 2003); Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 277 (5th
Cir. 2000). Appellants have alleged illegitimate animus, or ill will, on the part of the
will not be presumed; there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.
See State v. Long, 206 Neb. 446, 293 N.W.2d 391 (1980). Davidsons have offered
evidence to suggest that he was targeted by the FDA for invidious reasons. The
exercise of the FDA’s discretion in enforcing the PDUFA was both discriminatory
and arbitrary. See ¶s 8.99 and 8.100 of the Amended Complaint at USCA5 540.
Davidsons have alleged facts that would support a claim of invidious discrimination.
See ¶s 5.10, 5.14, 5.16, 8.64, 8.65, 8.67, 8.80, 8.82-8.84, 8.86, 8.89, 29-31, and 33-35,
of the Amended Complaint. See Count Five of the Amended Complaint at ¶ 31,
where it states,
Appellants have pleaded a strong equal protection case on the basis of selective
FDA in deciding when to enforce the PDUFA include whether the corporate research
sponsor had paid a “user fee” (paid a bribe to FDA), whether the principal
is conducting multiple studies, and whether anyone at the site has “blown the whistle”
by raising concerns regarding patient safety, fraud, or both. See Stemler v. City of
Sepracor Inc to selectively enforce the PDUFA in support of its New Drug
actions of the FDA that were both wholly arbitrary and lacking in legitimate
justification and had a concrete effect on Davidsons’ rights. Appellants allege that
one case” alleges a wholly irrational, retaliatory, and bribery-motivated FDA action
The Supreme Court has recognized that the equal protection guarantee extends
to individuals who allege no specific class membership but are nonetheless subjected
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). In Olech, the Supreme Court “affirmed the validity
of such ‘class of one’ claims ‘where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” See Harlen Assocs. Inc. v. Village of
Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178-79
(7th Cir. 1995); Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 522-24 (7th Cir. 1982).
FDA’s action at issue was motivated by personal animus. FDA had a malicious or bad
discriminatory design to favor one individual or class over another. See ¶s 8.63-8.89
and ¶s 22-36 of the Amended Complaint (Document #19) found at USCA5 546-548.
Davidson was treated differently from others similarly situated and that there was no
by FDA and Sepracor. In Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 1074 (2000), the
Supreme Court explained that “[o]ur cases have recognized successful equal
protection claims brought by a “class of one.” As we read this part of the holding, it
merely stands for the proposition that single plaintiffs may bring equal protection
claims. They need not proceed on behalf of an entire group. Davidsons’ Count Five
is an example of selective enforcement. See Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267
(5th cir. 2000); Allred’s Produce v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir.
2000); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1995); Stern v. Tarrant
county Hospital District, 778 F.2d 1052, 1058 (5th Cir. 1985). Davidsons allege that
FDA’s official acts were motivated by improper considerations, such as the desire to
prevent the exercise of a constitutional right. FDA selectively used their powers
against Davidson. Davidsons have shown that FDA’s acts were deliberately based
against Davidson for exercising his fundamental right to equality of treatment before
Discriminatory Animus
affecting a protected class is properly invoked only where the plaintiff can show
intentional discrimination by the government. See Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517
FDA (acting in their personal capacity for personal financial gain) under color of the
by the FDA was improperly motivated. Officials of the FDA (acting in their personal
capacities) were bribed [into selectively applying the PDUFA] by Big Pharma
review and market approval of their New Drug Applications (NDAs), while the for-
USCA5 535.
and Sepracor, in support of Sepracor’s New Drug Application, was the result of a
bribe (a “User Fee”) paid by Sepracor to FDA. See ¶s 5.5, 8.66, 8.67, 8.96-8.102,
10, 19, and 20, of the Amended Complaint presently before this Court.
corrupt motives ought to be judicially remediable”. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
‘meaningful standards’ and ‘law to apply’ to an agencies’ decision not to act, and
See ¶s 5.10, 5.14, 8.80-8.84, and 28-31, of the Amended Complaint (Document
#19). By delaying the publication of the FDA Tucson, AZ EIR of 5/5-6/28/99, the
PDUFA II substantially delayed the time at which Plaintiffs could begin to seek a
legal remedy against Defendants. This “delay” was intentional and directly targeted
deprived of their fundamental right to equality of treatment before the law under
the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Appellants have alleged and
fundamental right to equality of treatment before the law. The “delay” and
There is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Application of the PDUFA
alleged and provided evidence of improper motive (bribery), illegitimate animus, and
blower” Davidson. FDA and Sepracor Inc took affirmative steps to “silence the
messenger” (Davidson).
College, and Sepracor Inc, in support of the NDA # 20-837 for Xopenex Inhalation
Solution, that gained FDA approval on 3/25/99 (review was posted on 6/20/01). Time
in the marketplace is literally worth “billions” to Big Pharma. The User Fees in the
PDUFA are bribes paid by Big Pharma to the FDA in order to gain expedited market
PDUFA can be selectively enforced by FDA whenever the whistle is blown on high-
Appellants allege that they have been intentionally treated differently from
rational basis for the difference in treatment. Whether the complaint alleges a class
provided evidence to show that the FDA’s motive in selectively enforcing the
treatment before the law by “blowing the whistle” on Grossman for patient safety
concerns. See ¶s 8.82 and 8.84 of the Amended Complaint at USCA5 536. The
considerations (bribery) and to inhibit and punish Davidson’s exercise of his Ninth
Amendment fundamental right to equality of treatment before the law. See Document
#45 at USCA5 1006 where it states,“This inspection report was delayed due to a
PDUFA report.” Underline, italics, and boldface have been added for emphasis. See
Appellants’ have shown that they have suffered actual injury in both Arizona
and Texas. Appellants have demonstrated that the Appellees’ conduct caused the
injury. Granting the relief requested likely would redress Appellants’ injury. See the
legal interests between the parties, warranting the issuance of a declaratory judgment,
failure to state a claim in Case 4:07-cv-00471. See Document #38 at USCA5 775-
780.
targeted at the Davidsons. There exists a substantial controversy between the parties
having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
adequate and effective judgment may be rendered. There is an adequate and full-
bodied record. Appellants seek a holding by this Court that the PDUFA is
lawsuit are estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the
warranting the issuance of a declaratory judgment, see USCA5 1650 and USCA5
1584 for the Notification of Claim of Unconstitutionality in the First RICO Action
(Case # 03CV110TUCFRZ, captioned Davidson et al v. Vivra Inc et al) and page 25,
Complaint and Counterclaims in the State Action (Pima County Superior Court Case
No. 333954), respectively. Davidson argues for certainly not the first time that his
FDA. The First RICO Action (Case 4:03-cv-00110-FRZ) was filed on February 19,
2003. See Document #83-6 at pages 3-40 of 40, and Document #83-7 at pages 1-4 of
16, in Case 4:07-cv-00471, for unequivocal proof that Appellants have not at any
time “slept on their rights”. Appellants first raised their concern as to the
PDUFA. There is still a live and acute controversy. See Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608
F.2d 208, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 63118 (1st Cir. 1979). Appellants continue to
seek a legal remedy for significant injuries to their business and property, by reason
of the misconduct of the Defendants to this lawsuit. Those directly injured may
Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992), citing Associated Gen.
Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542. Plaintiffs have suffered direct injuries by reasons of the
Defendants’ misconduct.
Sepracor Inc alleged failure to state a claim and moved the District Court for
under the RICO statute (18 U.S.C. 1961). The User Fees under the PDUFA are bribes.
See ¶s 6, 8.14, 8.28, 8.66, 8.67, 8.102, 10, 18, 19, 31, and 35, of the Amended
Complaint (Document #19). This Court is especially referred to ¶ 8.14 where it states,
“This assault and battery in the workplace on May 11, 1999, was
an unsuccessful attempt by Jay Grossman and others to provoke Robert
Davidson into defending himself physically. This unwitnessed assault
and battery was a carefully orchestrated attempt by Jay Grossman, and
others, acting by agreement and in concert, to shift blame for insurance
and research fraud from Jay Grossman to Robert Davidson. Their
contingency plan (should their attempt fail) called for Jay Grossman to
sue Robert Davidson (and his wife Vanessa Komar) for alleged
defamation after Davidson reported the incident to the Tucson Police
Department. Davidson was advised to make a police report on May 11,
1999, by Gayle F. Petrillo (the “Vivra” Tucson Office Manager). Their
contingency plan called for Grossman to use his stock ownership and
stock options in “Vivra” as a measure of alleged damages against the
Davidsons, should Grossman ultimately prevail in his defamation suit.
“Vivra” knew in advance of the assault and battery in the workplace on
May 11, 1999, that “Vivra” would terminate Jay Grossman’s
employment (“for cause”) under the terms of the Physician Employment
Agreement (the “Agreement”) of April 22, 1997. It is by means of the
“stock purchase and sale” that took place between Vivra Specialty
Partners of Arizona, P.C. (“VSP”) and Jay Grossman on or about April
22, 1997, and by means of the employee stock option plan of VSP, that
the “Vivra” enterprise gained control over Grossman while providing
Grossman with an interest in the “Vivra” enterprise. Jay Grossman is
known to have been involved in many lawsuits. See Albany county Case
#2960-91.”
Section 1962 (b), ( c), and (d), and the injury to Davidsons’ business and property,
is thus very direct. Appellants were directly in the headlights of Grossmans’ unlawful
acts, not the United States. See Document #71 “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment”
This lawsuit (Case 4:07-cv-00471) was timely-filed under the Texas tolling
treatment before the law, has been alleged. Selective enforcement has been alleged.
Invidious discrimination has been alleged. As applied to the Appellants, the PDUFA
the law), their federal equal protection claims are subject to de novo review.
Davidsons’ Notice of Appeal was timely-filed under Rule 4(a) of the Federal
§1291. “Any court of the United States” may render a declaratory judgment based
upon 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a). The constitutionality of the PDUFA has already been
thoroughly briefed and is ripe for adjudication by this Court. Granting the relief
racketeering under the RICO statute. The User Fees under the PDUFA are bribes.
authorities, Appellants pro se, pray for this Court to remedy ongoing violations of
constitutional law by declaring that the PDUFA is repugnant to the U.S. Constitution
and order such “further necessary or proper relief” to aid enforcement of the
judgment.