RESTRICTED “ CHAPTER IV INVASION OF NEFA - FALL OF TAWANG INDIA ACCEPTS CHINESE CHALLENGE As seen earlier, the relations between India an China had much embittered by the summer of 19629 Shooting incidents between Indian and Chinese troopg had started frequently in Ladakh. But the border if the Eastern Sector had so far remained comparatively free from trouble. Except the Longju and Khinzemang incidents, the Eastern Sector area remained quiet# The Chinese, however, disturbed that quiet in August 1962 when they crossed the border and occupied ¢ Thag La Ridge. It was followed by the encirclement off the Indian post Dhola on 8 September and firing by th Chinese troops on the post on 20 September anf subsequent days. The incursions of the Chinese into the Kaneng Frontier Division and thelr attacks on the Dhola posi south of the river Namkha Chu signified that they hagj not only violated the: International Bordey aggressively and attacked indian troops in this sectof as well, but they had also militarily occupied th Thag La Ridge south of McMahon Line in order substantiate their claim in NEFA. Although the Chinese Government had not formal! recognised the McMahon Line, they had also nm violated it so far. Prime Minister Chou En-lai h even given indications that China night recognise l\ provided India accepted their claims in Ladakh. 4 The Government of India, on their part, had, @ more than one occasion, declared publicly that aq intrusion by the Chinese into Indian territory acro§ the McMahon Line would not be tolerated. In Septembly 1962, the Chinese did exactly that against which th Government of India had taken a4 stand publicly. yy September incidents, thus, represented a development and it led to a new response fron # Government of India(1). On 9 September 1962, a meeting was held in H Defence Ministry. Presided over by the Defens “Minister V.K.Krishna Menon, the neeting was attends by Chief of the Army Staff, Gen P.N.Thapar, coc-ing Eastern Command, Lt Gen L.P.Sen, Cabinet Secreta S.S.khera, H.C.Sarin, Joint Secretary in the befé Ministry and a few others, including B.N Mullik, "¢ Director of Intelligence Bureau(2). At the geet fi -94-RESTRICTED decided that the Chinese must be evicted fromsautip : the Thag La Ridge immediately and by force if 0: cessary(3). General Thapar accepted the decision, nee a signal was passed down to Eastern Command and in m there to XXXII Corps and 4 Inf Div to carry out decision. With the aim of evicting the Chinese the Dhola area the signal(4} ordered the diate move of 9 Punjab to the Dhola area; the rest 7 Bde was to get ready to join it within 48 The order specified that all troops should go repared for battle and, if possible, an attempt was o be made to encircle the Chinese troops investing posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any arned Chinese who entered Indian territory, if the * gituation justified such action; the use of ‘unnecessary force" was, however, to be avoided(7). On 15 Septenber, at another high-level meeting in the Befence Ministry, it was decided to contain the Chinese near the Theg La and, if possible, to establish posts at Karpo La II and Yumtso La(@). In a meeting in Defence Minister's room on 17 September, Lt Gen Sen inforned that it would take more time to concentrate the Erigade in the area than he _had anticipated(9). On 18 September, a Government spokesman announced at a press conference that the Arny hed been instructed to drive the Chinese out of the Dholz area(10), The intention, obviously, was to let _ ethers know about the Governzent decision(11). On 20 September, Eastern. Command flashed a Ressage in the afternoon that all patrols and posts were to engage Chinese patrols that came within range of their weapons(12). The sane day XXXIII Corps bed on the Eestern Command instructions to 4 Int on which, among others detailed instructions of sepetional nature, ordered the preparation arc Tragesston of plans for the eviction of Chinese frew tan territory(12) and its submission to XXXIII ‘ laws for Corps Commender's approval before it w to nched. The instructions were relayed by 4 Inf Div ‘ Inf. Bde for inplexentation. -O5-” RESTRICTED The same day (i.e. 20 September) at 2240 hrs while the Brigade Commander was discussing with hig Battalion Commander the way how to implement those instructions, two Chinese troops threw hand-grenadeg into one of the bunkers wounding three Indian soldiers. Indians then began firing, which was. returned by the Chinese(14). Firing from both sides continued intermittently upto 29 September 1962(15). The outbreak of firing on the Namkha Chu and j reports of Chinese build-up induced Gen Thapar to ask the Government to reconsider its decision regarding Op ‘Leghorn’. Gen Thapar presented his case at a4 meeting in Defence Ministry on 22 September 1962, ; which was presided over by K. Raghuremaiah, Deputy Defence Minister, in the absence of both Nehru and Krishna Menon. Gen Thapar argued that the Chinese 4 could react to Indian moves in the Dhola area by : sending more reinforcenents against that post; they could also retaliate elsewhere in NEFA or.in Ladakh. 4 The Foreign Secretary then explained the Prime 4 Minister's instructions on the subject and stated that 4 the Government's view was that no infringement of the 4 border in NEFA was to be accepted. He was of the 4 opinion that the Army must build up strength in the 7 Dhola area and evict the Chinese from Indian territory 4 there even at the cost of Chinese reaction in Ladakh which, according to him, could at the most be to try and capture a post or two(16). After some discussto: it was decided that as a matter of policy there was no 3 alternative but to evict the Chinese from the Dhola 4 area(17). Playing safe, Gen Thapar, therefore, 4 requested for a written order of the government to | that effect(18). As a result, he received a note + signed by H.C.Sarin, Joint Secretary, Ministry of § Defence, stating: a "The decision throughout has been as discussed” at previous meetings, that the Army should prepare and 4 throw the Chinese out as soon as possible. The COAS | was accordingly directed to take action for the” eviction of the Chinese in the KAMENG Frontier @ Division of NEFA as soon as he is ready(19)". Thapar repeated the Government's orders to Sen with the injunction that all necessary arrangements be § made for the eviction of the Chinese troops who hae 4 entered Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA at “to? g speed"(20). At the same time he warned Wester Command of the possibility of Chinese reaction in 4 Ladakh and advised that Indian posts there should be strengthened(21). On 24 September Corps Commander, ut Gen Umrao Singh personally conveyed it to Maj Ge 4 Niranjan Prasad(22). From now on the energies of the @ Indian Ardy in the area were to be directed to execute | -96- y