CHAPTER § FIGHTING IM LADAKE TEREAIN AND THE The first problem faced by a soldier in Ladakh. 3 is survival, fighting the enemy comes only efter that The peculair geography of the region had a major’ impact on the fighting and its outcome. To understand the events, a background to the terrain is essentiay The salient features have been noted elready in the" first chapter. To recapitulate, Ladakh is a high plateau Lyting nearly 350 km North East of the valley of Srinapar, The entire region is shut off from the South by the® Great |Mmalayan range that runs Kerth West to South Fast. The average elevation of the Himelayas in these areas 1s 5000 metres. The rain bearing clouds thus: ‘cannot penetrate to Ladakh. On Che North is the Karakoram range while the Ladakh range lies between the valleys of the Indus and the Shyok. . The effect of this has been pronounced desertification, Travelling on the Srinagar-Lek route, the last forests are near Sonamarg. There were some trees in Kargil and Khalsi areas, but beyond this it was impossible to find a single tree({1). This lack of vegetation coupled with high elevation made: lack of oxygen more pronounced in Ladakh than anywhere else. The pronounced lack of oxygen produces effect on human efficiency and there is a perceptible 30% loss. Even the internal combustion engines of cars: and trucks suffer from the same effect. In the earlier chapters, mention has been made, of the effect of cold. The temperatures alone do no give a true picture, as added to the low temperature is the fsctor of wind chill. The wind general starts around mid-day and continues throvgh-outy thereafter. The combined effect can cause cot: injuries similar to burn injuries on any exposed par of human body. ‘Touching wetal with bare hands hazardous. The Ladakh plateau is flanked in the North : the Karakoram mountains, a branch of which runs ores Rast. Due East is the Ladakh range. Beyond core ranges are again the flat areas of Aksai Chin- rea majority of fighting in 1962 took place in the 4* yg on the eastern edge of Ladakh plateau and of pa western fringes of the Aksai Chin, This geont trey, configuration meant that North South movement 600 fe Indian side entailed crossing of ranges of > =-305-RESTRICTED with passes located above 17,000 ft. Development of road communication had to be parallel to the ranges, and lateral communication between sectors was difficult. On the Chinese side, the terrain aade development of road communications a comparatively easiet affeir. Most Chinese posts in Ladakh vere © connected with a road with a capacity to handle normal P Trucks. On the Indian side of the border, due to late start as well as difficult geography, except for Chushul garrison that had a jeepable road along the _Jndus valley that connected with Srinagar highway at Leh, all other posts were connected with only eule tracks, and at times only footpaths(2). This gituation compelled Indian reliance on primarily air supply. The availability of a suitable dropping zone therefore became the main criterion for establishment of Indian posts. Since the posts had to be completely dependent on ait supply, defence of the dropping zone was a najor factor influencing its location. The administrative requirements thus dictated locating ‘posts at lower altitudes in relatively flat areas, . even at the expense of defence potential, and very few of the posts were thus tactically well sited. The total front in Ladakh sector ran to over 400 kus. Force level to even police this effectively was nearly 4 battalions or about 4000 men. Leaving aside the large number of men that were required to san rear installations, barely helf of this strength was available for manning a border from Karakorar pass in \ the North to Demchok in the South. The deplcyment as well es the outcome of fighting in Ladakh was ultimately dictated by the terrain and, state of cormunications es existing in 1962, Thus at the risk cf certain repetitions, it is essential to mention some features of the terrain. Leh has been a major Indian base of since 1947 war with Pakistani raiders. en the kenks ef Indus and hes motor read connec with Srinagar. Leh was also the ancient tr centre and numerous tracks starting from here go towards Tibet. The Leh eirfield is sufficienc for most transport aircraft operations and remains open _ Virtually throughout the year. Leh was the hub of comsunications(3). in 1962 on the eve o operatior a jeepable trac! Constructed. linking Leh with Chushul via Pun Karu. The track ran along the valley of the it took nearly §-i0 hours to cover the dicter around 150 k The Indus ¢ Bat Bung “eanders in a fairly, open all the wasRESTRICTED Demchoky In this relatively flat and open area, the road ran along joining Demchok with Dungtl. pene A mule track joining Leh to Manali in Himachay Pradesh also existed. The track passed over Sed rugged country and could be used only for about two Hee three months, as the passes over the Himalaya ang Zaskar ranges remained closed rest of the year. n Mule tracks from Leh went North over the Ladakh* range, crossing it at Khardungla and thence on to th Shyok river. Another track crossed over at Changl; and went on to Daulat Beg Oldi and the Karakoran pass This track bifurcated after Changla one branch turnin east along river Tangtse to link up Chushul. SLIDE TOWARDS ARMED CLASH . Geography as well as the deployed units divided! the Ladakh front into various sectors, The’ Northernmost was the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) a smalla outpost on the traditional Silk route that eventuall. crossed over the Karakoram pass and into:the Chines: province of Sinkiang. To the South of DBO th Changchenmo-Galwan valley sector. Phobrang was th support base for this sector. Next came Chushu: sector that extended from the Sirijap complex north o lake Pangong upto Rezangla, south of the lake. Th Southernmost’ sector in Ladakh was the Indus valleyg sector that extended from Dungti to Demchok. . Except for the Chushul and Indus valley sectors on the Indian side there was no lateral communications available and therefore the fighting was isolated and unconnected with other sectors. i events of 1962 can therefore be conveniently deal with by sector. ing in Ladakh In the early phases of the fight groul the whole of Ladakh had merely a brigade consisting of 4 battalions. These were deployed froy North to South in the following order: 14 Jak wilitt (later 14 Ladakh Scouts}, 5. Jat, 1/5 GR and 1 Militia. The force was commanded by Headquarters it Infantry Brigade located at Leh, 14 J@k Militia ¥ additional company from 5 Jat was in the pRO sect Changchenmo sector had the rest of 5 Jat battalions companies) 1/8 GR was in Chushul and the Indus va sector had 7 J&K Militia. In addition, there ea platoon of 1 Mahar (Machine Guns) with 1/8 GR: jo¢ force of 4 battalions covered the frontage of overs kms. The deployment of Indian troops wae a y according to any military principles, and hed e any defence potential. The force was deploye small outposts to guard various approaches in aI