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Executive Department Philippine Bar Association v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455 The validity of the "Snap Election Law"

called by the Batasang Pambansa was raised in the case of Philippine Bar Association v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455 (1985). The issue was raised because of the conditional letter of resignation sent by Mr. Marcos to the Batasan, making his resignation effective only upon (i) the holding of a Presidential election, (ii) the proclamation of a winner, (iii) the assumption into office by the winning candidate. It was contended that a conditional resignation was not allowed under the 1973 Constitution, for it did not create a vacancy, and without a vacancy, there was no reason to call for an election. But the SC failed to issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC from preparing for the election, thus making "the initially legal question into a political one." In the meantime, the political parties have started campaigning and the people were so involved in the election that to stop it on legal grounds would frustrate their very will. And so, failing to come up with the majority to hold the Snap Election Law unconstitutional, the SC could not issue the injunction prayed for. The election went ahead. Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 In Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, the petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions. In declaring the EO unconstitutional, the SC held that by ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOCCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. Facts: The petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions. HELD: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOOCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment. Marcos v Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 178 SCRA 760 This is a petition for mandamus asking the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The issue is whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President (Art. VII, Sec. 1). However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the power of control over all executive depts., bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander in chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to congress and the power to address Congress. (VII, Sec. 14-23) The inevitable question is whether by enumerating certain powers of the President, did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. In this case, the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. She has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. She has to balance the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. Free Telephone Workers Union v Minister of Labor, 108 SCRA 757 Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor (108 SCRA 757) had occasion to reemphasize its continuing validity. Here, the power given to the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute affecting the national interest or to certify it for compulsory arbitration was challenged as an undue delegation of a power which properly belonged to the President. All that was needed to settle the case was to hark back to the Villena doctrine that the heads of ministries are alter egos of the President. Under the presidential system, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief

Executive. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority. The President has the constitutional power of control and direction over such dept. heads and cabinet secretaries. Under the qualified political agency doctrine, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. The secretaries are the alter ego of the President, men of his bosom confidence whom he designated to assist him in his otherwise physically impossible multifarious functions, the extension of the President in the particular field in which they act. Their acts are presumptively acts of the "President, until countermanded or reprobated by him". The President can substitute his will over those of the secretaries, and they cannot complain. Laurel v Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential lot). The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract. The Roponggi property consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy." As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. ISSUE 1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine government. 2. Whether there was a conflict of law between the Japanese law on property (as the real property is situated there) and Philippine law. RULING 1. No. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the commerce of man. And the property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. 2. No. A conflict of law rule cannot apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) there is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) a foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply. In the present case, none of the above elements exists. Sarmiento v Mison, 156 SCRA 546 Sarmiento v Mison (Dec. 1987), the SC held that no they did not need to be confirmed. The deliberations of the Con Con showed that a draft similar to VII, 10 of the 1935 Constitution, which included bureau heads in the list of appointees requiring confirmation, was introduced, but upon motion, bureau directors were omitted ex- pressly from the draft because they were considered of low rank, and so were thought to be better shielded from partisan politics. But the SC added that of the 4 categories of public officers requiring confirmation, the 4th must be given a restrictive construction because confirmation derogates the appointing power of the President. Indeed, it said, only a small class of officers needed confirmation. In saying so, however, it did not try to explain certain anomalies that may arise from such restrictive interpretation: (a) If a colonel needed confirmation, why not the Undersecretary of National Defense who has a higher rank as line officer? (b) If an ambassador needed confirmation, why not the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs who has a higher rank? (c) Why not the CB governor who is so powerful as to plunge the country into bankruptcy? Bautista v Salonga, 172 SCRA 160 F: Petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 12/17/88. She took her oath of office on 12/22 and thereafter entered into the discharge of her functions and duties. However, on 1/9/89, she was asked by the Commission on Appointments to submit certain information and documents needed in the confirmation of her appointment. She refused to do so on the ground that her appointment was not subject to confirmation. On 1/14/89, the Pres. submitted petitioner's ad interim appointment to the CA, but, considering petitioner's refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA, the CA disapproved her appointment on 1/25. Petitioner, anticipating the action of the CA, filed a petition for certiorari w/ the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is to be made with or without CA confirmation.

HELD: (1) Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewed by the CA, namely, "the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, other officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution." All other appointments by the Pres. are to be made w/o the participation of the CA." Since the position of Chairman of the CHR, an independent office created by the Constitution, is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CA, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CA. They are among the officers of the govt "whom he (the Pres.) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Sec. 2 (c) of EO 163, May 5, 1987, authorizes the Pres. to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR. Quintos-Deles v CA, 177 SCRA 259 F: Petitioner and 3 others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, par. 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. However, petitioner and the 3 other sectoral representatives- appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments (CA), who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the CA before they can take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives. ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires confirmation by the CA in the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives. HELD: YES. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides that: "The president shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution x x x". Calderon v Carale, 208 SCRA 254 F: In March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code, was approved. It provides in Sec. 13 thereof as follows: The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CA. xxx" Pursuant to said law, President Aquino appointed the Chairman (B. CARALE) and Commissioners of the NLRC. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performances of the duties of the office. The present petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715. Petitioners insists on a mandatory compliance w/ RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity. RA 6715 is not, according to the petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16 of Art. VII of the Constitution. The Solicitor General contends, on the other hand, that RA 6715 transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis. ISSUES: (1) W/N Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. (NO) HELD: The controversy in the case is focused on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution w/c provides: "Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." xxx There are four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, more specifically under "those whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 whose appointments requires confirmation by the CA. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the CA of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, it is unconstitutional because: 1. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the CA; and 2. it amends by legislation, the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, by imposing the confirmation of the CA on appointments w/c are otherwise entrusted only with the President. Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function. Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.

Aytona v Castillo, 4 SCRA 1 (1962) In Aytona v Castillo, 4 SCRA 1 (1962), the SC ruled that while "midnight appointments" are not illegal, they should be made in the capacity of a "care-taker" doubly careful and prudent in making the selection, so as not to defeat the policies of the incoming administration. Said the court: After the proclamation of an incoming President, the outgoing President is no more than a "caretaker" administrator duty bound to prepare for the orderly transition to the new President, and he should not do acts that would obstruct the policies of his successor. The filling up of vacancies in important posts, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications, may be undoubtedly permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night, and the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may be regarded as abuse of presidential prerogatives. Where the President makes ad-interim (i.e., midnight) appointments, he is bound to be "prudent" to insure approval of his selection, either by previous consultation with the CA or by explaining his reason thereafter. Where the CA that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of appointment, and where the names are to be submitted by his successor who may not wholly approve of his selections, the President should be "doubly careful in extending such appointment. Jorge v Mayer, 10 SCRA 331 (1964) In Jorge v Mayer, 10 SCRA 331 (1964), the Court emphasized the rule in Aytona that a prudently made midnight appointment so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees' qualifications is not prohibited by law. The circumstances of Jorge's appointment as Director of Lands in this case, based on his 38 years of faithful service and confirmed by the CA before its adjournment, were found to be judicious. People v Vera, 65 Phil 56 (1937) Petitioners, People of the Philippines and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation. HSBC intervened in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in this case. HELD: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. Tesoro v Director of Prisons, 68 Phil 154 (1939) In Tesoro v Director of Prisons, 68 Phil 154 (1939), the SC dismissed the contention that because parole is not mentioned in the Constitution, then the power to grant parole is also deemed repealed. The Court said that parole is part of the pardoning power of the President. Justice Fernando points out, however, that this is not accurate. If ever the President has the power to grant parole, it is because the law grants him that power, and not because parole is part of pardon. F: On Oct. 10, 1934, petitioner Tesoro was convicted in the CFI- Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document and was sentenced. His penalty was to expire on Oct. 28, 1937. On Nov. 14, 1935, the Gov. Gen. granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to certain conditions. One of the conditions was that he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner. Dec. 3, 1937, the petr was charged with the crime of adultery. However, the case was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant, Jose Nagar. Feb. 1938, Nagar lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the crim. action, charged petitioner with violation of the conditions of his parole. Later, by virtue of an order from the President, the petr was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Dir. of Prisons. Petr. contends that sec. 64 (i) of the Rev. Adm. Code, insofar as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has been impliedly repealed by Par. 6, sec. 11, Art. VII of the Constitution, as the latter omitted to specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the President of the Philippines. Sec. 64(1) gives the Gov. Gen the ff. powers and duties:

"To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." The aforementioned Constitutional provision provides: "The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly." ISSUE NO. 1: W/N there has been a repeal. HELD: NONE. The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. If the omission of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to the President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive. ISSUE NO. 2: W/N the Board has legal authority to investigate the conduct of the petitioner. HELD: YES. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report to the executive secretary of the Board once a month during the first year of his parole, and thereafter, once every 3 months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the supervision of the Board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the Board to inquire into his conduct and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose authority it was acting. The power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power, the President is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the govt, or even of any individual, to secure the necessary assistance. ISSUE NO. 3: W/N judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole. HELD: NO. As one of the conditions of his parole, petitioner agreed that he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner. Thus, the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole. And under Sec. 64 (i), the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition/s of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence. ISSUE NO. 4: W/N the courts can review the findings of the Pres. regarding the violation of the conditional parole. HELD: NO. Where the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. ISSUE NO. 5: W/N upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires. HELD: NO. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in w/c he was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prison. xxx The rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence. (Pp. v. Tapel) This rule applies by analogy to conditional parole. Torres v Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 Before 1979, Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay an indemnity. The maximum sentence would expire on Nov. 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted the petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phil. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was released. On Sept. 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons. The record before the Board showed that petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, convicted of sedition w/c is the subject of an appeal, and a letter report from the NBI showing a long list of charges brought against the petitioner. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Petitioner claims he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition. He also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and thus deprived of due process. ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. HELD: NO. The Court cited 3 cases: Espuelas v. Prov'l Warden of Bohol; Tesoro v. Dir. of Prisons and Sales v. Dir. of Prisons. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec. 64 (i) of the Rev. Adm. Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art. 159 of the RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Sec. 64 (i), RAC, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

Barrioquinto, et.al v. Fernandez, 82 Phil 642 Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of Procl. No. 8 which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period Dec. 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Phil. where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. The petitioners submitted their cases to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission (GAC). The GAC returned their cases to the CFIZamboanga w/o deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither of the petitioners have admitted to committing the offense, they cannot invoke the benefits of the amnesty. HELD: Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while Amnesty is by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (Art 36 RPC). While Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. ISSUE: W/N in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Procl. of Sept. 7, 1946, it is necessary as a condition precedent that he should admit having committed the criminal act with w/c he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense. HELD: NO. It is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or of the accused, shows that the offense committed comes w/n the terms of said Amnesty Procl. It is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of the amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, w/n he admits or confesses having committed the offense w/ w/c he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who has rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. ISSUE: W/N the benefits of amnesty may be waived. HELD: The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the prosecution or the defense, cannot be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, cannot be punished as a criminal. Dissenting Opinion: Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-evident that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those conditions. A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil 34 (1940) In Cristobal v Labrador, 71 Phil 34 (1940), the voter whose right to vote was challenged in an exclusion proceeding because he had been convicted of estafa which carried the accessory penalty of disqualification from the right of suffrage, and in Pellobello v Palatino, 72 Phil 441 (1941), the mayor-elect who was not allowed to take his oath because of a previous conviction, for falsification of a private document which likewise carried the accessory penalty of disqualification, were both allowed to exercise their political right in view of the subsequent pardon granted them. [There would be no problem if they were pardoned beforehand, for then they would be restored to their political right(s) right away.] On 3/15/30, Teofilo Santos was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to 6 months of arresto mayor. Upon appeal, his conviction was affirmed. He was confined in jail from 3/14/9/32 to 8/18/32. Notwithstanding his conviction, Santos continued to be a registered elector in Malabon, Rizal and was municipal pres. from 1934 to 1937. Subsequently, The Election Code was approved. Sec. 94, par. (b) of said law disqualifies the resp. from voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against prop." Bec. of this provision, Santos petitioned the Chief Executive for absolute pardon. The Pres. granted his petition restoring him to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be appointed for appointments only to positions w/c are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or prop. responsibility. On 11/40, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos' name in from the list of voters in Malabon on the ground that the latter is disqualified under par. (b), Sec. 94 of CA 357. LC denied Cristobal's petition holding that Santos' pardon had the effect of excluding him from the disqualification created by par. (b) of Sec. 94. Hence, this petition for ceritorari. HELD: There are 2 limitations upon the exercise of the constitutional prerogative of the Pres. to grant pardon: (1) that the power be exercised after conviction; (2) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. xxx An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but it also removes all disabilities resulting from conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction w/o w/c there would be no

basis for the disqualification from voting. xxx In the present case, while the pardon extended is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions w/c are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or prop. resp., " it is absolute insofar as it "restores the resp. to full civil and political rights." Pellobello v Palatino, 72 Phil 441 Pelobello alleges that Palatino is disqualified from voting and being voted upon. It appears that Palatino was convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment. He was later elected mayor of Torrijos, Marinduque in 1940. It is admitted that Palatino was granted by the Gov. Gen. a conditional pardon in 1915. It is also proven that on Dec. 25, 1940, the President granted him absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights. ISSUE: W/N the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under the then Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office. HELD: YES. The SC adopts the broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislation; an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. Thus the better view is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabili- ties of criminal conviction. Under the circumstances of the case, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended after the election but before the date fixed by the Election Code for assuming office. Lacuna v Abes, 24 SCRA 780 In Lacuna v Abes, 24 SCRA 780, the petitioner was convicted of counterfeiting, and so was disqualified from the right of suffrage. As a result, he was not allowed to file his candidacy, even if he was already granted pardon, because one of the requirements for the office was that the candidate be a qualified voter. The SC, after pointing out that the law did not require that he be a registered voter but only a qualified voter at the day of election, pointed out that, granting arguendo, pardon retroacted to the day of the crime. Thus, on the day of the election, "it is as though he was a registered voter even if on that day, he was not yet pardoned." Mayor-elect Abes had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants and sentenced to prision mayor and a fine. After he had partially served his sentence, he was released on April 7, 1959 by virtue of a conditional pardon granted by the President, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison term and fine. Without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have been served on Oct. 13, 1961. With the approach of the 1967 elections, Abes applied for registration as a voter but said application was denied. Despite this, Abes filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor and later won. On Nov. 16, 1967, he was proclaimed the fully elected mayor. Lacuna placed second. Lacuna filed his petition for quo warranto with prelim. injunction in CFI-Nueva Ecija. On the same day that the hearing was held on the application for prelim. injunction, the President granted Abes an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to him full civil and political rights. CFI dismissed the petition, declaring Abes' eligibility to the position of mayor. Lacuna contends that the restoration of Abes' civil and pol. rights did not retroact to remove the disqualification existing anterior to the grant of the pardon. ISSUE: W/N a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by both the criminal and electoral codes. HELD: YES. The view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effects should not be unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the Constitution (Cristobal v. Labrador; Pelobello v. Palatino; Mijares v. Custorio). Monsanto v Factoran, 170 SCRA 190 In Monsanto vs Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, where a woman who was convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents was granted an absolute pardon, and thereafter claimed she was entitled as a consequence to reinstatement as assistant city treasurer, the SC held that a pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical facts" which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind, lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege. Thus, pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. A Pardoned Convict is not Entitled to Reinstatement to a Public Office. F: Petitioner Salvacion Monsanto was Asst. Treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to 4 yrs., 2 mos. and 1 day of prision correcional, as minimum, to 10 yrs. and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum; to pay fine (P3,500) and to indemnify the govt (P4,892.50) in a decision of the SB. While her case was pending appeal in the SC, she was granted absolute pardon and "restored to full civil and political rights" by then Pres. Marcos. The Ministry of Finance agreed to reinstate her w/o necessity of a new appointment provided this was done not earlier than the date of her pardon. However, on 4/15/86, the new administration held that she was not entitled to automatic reinstatement on the basis of the pardon granted her. As her MFR was denied, petitioner brought this action to the SC. Petitioner's theory is that the gen. rule on pardon does not apply to her bec. she was extended clemency while her case was still pending in the SC. She contended that w/o final judgment on conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach.

HELD: (1) Petitioner was granted pardon under the 1973 Consti., as amended, w/c, by deleting the requirement that pardon could be granted only after final conviction, impliedly authorized it to be granted even before conviction. The 1987 Consti. reverted to the former rule, requiring final conviction as a condition for the grant by the Pres. of pardon. However, it is immaterial when the pardon was granted, for the result would be the same. By accepting the pardon, the petitioner is deemed to have abondoned her appeal, w/ the result that the judgment of conviction of the SB (w/c entailed her temporary absolute disqualification from holding public office) became final. (2) The modern trend of authorities reject the unduly broad language of Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867) to the effect that in the eyes of the law, the offender who is pardoned is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the view that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct w/ one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen. Accordingly, pardon does not ipso facto restore him to public office may have been forfeited by reason of the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. Petitioner may apply for reappointment but, in considering her qualifications, the facts constituting her conviction should be taken into account to determine whether she can again be entrusted w/ public funds. (3) Nor can petitioner be exempted from the payment of the civil indemnity. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, if for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. VV. Notes on the case: "Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (w/c is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege. xxx" Llamas v Executive Secretary, 202 SCRA 844 (1991) "Conviction" may be used in either a criminal case or in an administrative case. F: Pet. Llamas was Vice-Gov. of Tarlac who assumed the position of gov. when Gov. Ocampo was found guilty by DILG of a viol. of RA 3019 and meted a penalty of 90 days suspension. Administrative conviction was based on complaint filed by petitioners and others charging Ocampo w/ executing loan agreement w/ Lingkod Tarlac Foundation for the amount of P20M, w/c is a non-stock and non-profit org. headed by the gov. as chairman and his brother-in- law as executive director, trustee and secretary. Loan was claimed to be disadvantageous to the govt. MFR by Ocampo was denied by DILG. On 3/19/91, Ocampo issued "admin. order" wherein he signified intention to continue in office at his residence in the belief that pendency of appeal to the Exec. Sec. precluded finality as executory of the DILG order. W/o ruling on the MFR, the Exec. Sec. issued a resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo. Llamas filed petition claiming that executive clemency could only be granted by the Pres. in crim. cases, not in admin. cases. HELD: According to petitioner, "after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to crim. cases." But, he himself describes the governor as one "convicted in an admin. case" and thus actually concedes that "conviction" may be used either in a crim. or admin. case. The Const. does not distinguish bet. w/c cases executive clemency may be exercised by the Pres., w/ the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. However, the power of the President to grant executive clemency in administrative cases refers only to administrative cases in the Executive branch and not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the govt. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different Executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her. In this case, the President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted. Tolentino v Catoy, 82 Phil 300 (1948) Petitioner was a Hukbalahap who was found guilty of illegal assembly in furtherance of the Hukbalahap designs. After the judgment was promulgated, the President issued Proc. No. 76 granting amnesty to leaders and members of the Hukbalahap. Petitioner who was already serving his sentence, sent a petition to the President for his release under the provisions of the proclamation. No action was taken on his petition. He then went to court and filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. HELD : Though some members of the Court question the applicability of Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 to Hukbalahaps already undergoing sentence upon the date of its promulgation, the majority of the Court believe that by its context and pervading spirit the proclamation extends to all members of the Hukbalahap. It makes no exception when it announces that the amnesty is proclaimed in favor of the leaders and members of the associations known as the Hukbalahap and Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid (PKM). No compelling reason is apparent for excluding Hukbalahaps of any class or condition from its object which is "to forgive and forego the prosecution of the crimes of rebellion, sedition, etc." If total punishment is foregone in favor of Hukbalahaps who succeeded in evading arrest, it stands to reason that those who fell into the clutches of the law have a better claim to clemency for the remaining portion of a punishment fixed for the same offense. The avowed practical objective of the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and obedience to the constituted authorities and encourage resumption of lawful pursuits and occupation. This objective cannot be expected to meet with full success without the goodwill and cooperation of the Hukbalahaps who have

become more embittered by their capture, prosecution and incarceration. Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Pardon includes amnesty. Pardon and amnesty are both construed most strictly against the state. Vera v People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963) Amnesty cannot be invoked, where the accused actually denies the commission of the offense charged. F: In the CFI-Quezon, petitioners Vera, among others, were charged w/ the complex crime of kidnapping w/ murder of Amadeo Lozanes. Upon petitioners' motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty Procl. of the Pres, s. of 1946, the case was referred to the Eight Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, w/c actually tried it. During the hearing, none of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Vera, the only def. who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozanes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Commission, in its decision held that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Procl., could be invoked only by defs. in a criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial. A MFR was filed by petitioners but was denied. From this order of the Commission, petitioners appealed to the CA w/c certified the appeal to us, in view of the legal issue involved. ISSUE: W/n persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed the crime of w/c they are accused. Petitioners contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Procl. No. 8, it is not necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing in support of their submission, among others, the case of Barrioquinto, et. al vs. Fernandez, et, al. (82 P642.) to the effect that "in order to entitle a person to the benefits of Amnesty Procl., it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent, admit having committed the criminal act or offense w/ w/c he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes w/in the terms of said Amnesty Procl. HELD: But said cases have been superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of Peo. vs. Llanita, et. al. (86 P 219), etc. wherein we held that-"It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act or seek forgiveness for an act, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty procl. imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation." (italics supplied.) At any rate, the facts established bef. the Commission do not bring the case w/in the terms of the Amnesty Procl. xxx As found by the Commission, the killing of the deceased (Lozanes) was not in furtherance of the resistance movement, but due to the rivalry bet. the Hunter's Guerrilla, to w/c he belonged, and the Vera's Guerrilla of petitioners. Lansang v Garcia, 42 SCRA 446 The test to be used by the Supreme Court in so reviewing the act of the President in proclaiming or suspending, or the act of Congress in extending, is the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the measure. The question is not whether the President or Congress acted correctly, but whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact. Deciding on whether the act was arbitrary amounts to a determination of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is now made part of judicial power by Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2. This curbs radically the application of the political question doctrine. This test was taken from the case of Lansang v Garcia, 42 SCRA 446 (1971). The issue there raised was whether in suspending the privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing so. The SC, in considering the fact that the President based his decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition in Central Luzon and (b) a closed door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the President did not act arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is without basis. [In this case of Lansang vs. Garcia, the SC held unanimously that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual basis in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. This holding of the SC is now found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3.] Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown at the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8 persons and injuring many. Thus, on August 23 then President Marcos issued proclamation 889, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Herein petitioners were apprehended by members of the Philippine Constabulary having invoked the said proclamation. In effect the proclamation implies that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the writ belongs to the President and it expressly states that such declaration is deemed final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A, amending the previous proclamation. September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities. September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities. October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on selected areas. In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities are still under the suspension of writ of habeas corpus Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous decision in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda? Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original proclamation and that flaws attributed thereto are formal in nature. Which actually emphasize the actuality of the intent to rise in arms. Second, The court intervention: In Sterling vs. Constantin, Chief Justice Hughes declared that

when there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured by the Constituti on, the subject is necessarily one for judicial review. Thus, the grant of power to suspend the privilege o f writ is neither absolute or unqualified The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to be a wide-scale event, it may be declared even if it only involves a small part of the country. The president decision to suspend the writ was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available courses to suppress rebellion. First, to call out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and lastly to declare martial law. Petitions DENIED; the CFI is directed to conduct preliminary investigations Garcia-Padilla v Ponce-Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 With this test and the new provisions in the 1987 Constitution, the case of Garcia-Padilla v Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983), is, at last, overruled, and may it be so always. In that case, the SC held that the President's proclamation of martial law is beyond judicial review, and that the citizen can only trust that the President acts in good faith. Aquino v Military Commission No.2, 63 SCRA 546 Military Trial of Civilians Void Even Under Martial Law, If Civil Courts Are Open. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5.). In Aquino vs Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546, the SC upheld the power of the President to create military tribunals authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the "open court" theory. The SC there held: "Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction, must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. Olaguer v Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, the Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. According to the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process. Since we are not enemyoccupied territory nor are we under a military govt. and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning. The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process. "The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminished salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger. Araneta v Dinglasa, 84 phil 368 (1949) In Araneta v Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368 (1949), the Congress granted the President emergency powers to fix rentals of houses. After the war, Congress held a special session. The SC held that the emergency power lasted only until Congress held its regular session. The fact that Congress could now meet meant that there was no emergency anymore that would justify the delegation. F: The petitions challenge the validity of EOs of the Pres. avowedly issued in virtue of CA 671. They rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (CA 671) has ceased to have any force and effect. HELD: CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on 5/25/46, and the EOs were issued w/o authority of law. CA 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Consti. Art. VI of the 1935 Consti. provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." The words "limited period" are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that CA 671 was approved w/ this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Consti., and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony w/ the Consti. either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that w/c was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet w/ the approval of the Pres., and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Further, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a 2/3 vote. Rodriguez v Gella, 92 Phil (1953) At the very least, said the SC in Rodriguez v Gella, 92 Phil 603 (1953), it should cease upon the approval of a resolution by Congress terminating such grant. In this case, the Congress enacted a bill precisely terminating the grant of emergency power, but this was vetoed by the President. The SC ruled that the vetoed bill should be deemed a resolution that terminates the grant. F: On 12/16/41, CA 671 was approved declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Phils. and authorizing the Pres. to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." In 1949, the SC decided that said emergency powers ceased as early as 1945. Here, the issue again is w/n CA 671 is still effective. It appears that in 1952, the Pres. issued EOs 545 and 546 (for appropriation of funds for public works and for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, etc.) The Congress passed House Bill 727 declaring that "was has long ended"

and that the "need for the grant of such unusual powers to the Pres. has disappeared," and for that reason , Congress repealed all the Emergency Powers Acts of the Pres. However, this was vetoed by the Pres. Petitioners seek to invalidate said EOs. HELD: Although House Bill 727, has been vetoed by the Pres. and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd situation that, "while Congress while delegate its powers by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by 2/3 vote. Notice the apparent inconsistency bet. the Constitution and the cases. The Consti. [Art. VI, Sec. 23 (2)] states that the emergency powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of Congress whereas the cases tell us that the emergency powers shall cease upon resumption of session. To reconcile the two, I believe that it would not be enough for Congress to just resume session in order that the emergency powers shall cease. It has to pass a resolution withdrawing such emergency powers, otherwise such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress. RA 4860 AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF RE- LENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Sec. 1. The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines to contract such loans, credits and indebtedness with foreign governments, agencies or instrumentalities of such foreign governments, foreign financial institutions, or other international organizations, with whom, or belonging to countries with which, the Philippines has diplomatic relations, as may be necessary and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, to enable the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to finance, either directly or through any government office, agency or instrumentality or any government-owned or controlled corporation, industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or projects authorized by law: Provided, That at least seventy-five per cent shall be spent for purposes of projects which are revenue-producing and self-liquidating, such as electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication, housing, construction and improvement of highways and bridges, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, water works and artesian wells, air navigation facilities, development of fishing industry, and other: Provided, That such foreign loans shall be used to meet the foreign exchange requirements or liabilities incurred in connection with said development projects to cover the cost of equipment, related technical services and supplies, where the same are not obtainable within the Philippines at competitive prices as well as part of the peso costs, other than working capital and operational expenses not exceeding twenty per cent of the loan: Provided, further, That in the case of roads, bridges, irrigation, portworks, river controls, airports and power, the amount shall not exceed seventy per cent of the loan. The authority of the President of the Philippines as herein provided shall include the power to issue, for the purposes hereinbefore stated, bonds for sale in the international markets the income from which shall be fully tax exempt in the Philippines. Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding interests, which the President of the Philippines is authorized to incur under this Act shall not exceed one billion United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the loans, credits and indebtedness are incurred: Provided, however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred under this Act shall not exceed two hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of the approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million every fiscal year thereafter, all in United States dollars or its equivalent in other currencies. All loans, credits and indebtedness under the preceding section shall be incurred only for particular projects in accordance with the approved economic program of the Government and after the plans for such projects shall have been prepared by the offices or agencies concerned, recommended by the National Economic Council and the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and approved by the President of the Philippines. Sec. 3. The President of the Philippines is, likewise, hereby authorized, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, to guarantee, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, foreign loans extended directly to, or bonds for sale in international markets issued by, corporations owned or controlled by the Government of the Philippines for industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or projects authorized by law, such as those mentioned in Section one of this Act, including the rehabilitation and modernization of the Philippine National Railways, the cash capital requirements of the Land Bank , electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication, housing, construction and/or improvement of highways, housing, construction and/ or improvement of highways, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, waterworks and artesian wells, air navigation, development of the fishing industry, iron and nickel exploitation and development, and others: Provided, That at least seventy five per cent shall be spent for purposes or projects which are revenue-producing and self-liquidating. The loans/ or bonded indebtedness of government-owned or controlled corporations which may be guaranteed by the President under this Act shall include those incurred by government-owned or controlled financial institutions for the purpose of re-lending to the private sector and the total amount thereof shall not be more than five hundred million United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the guarantee is made: Provided, That the government- owned or controlled financial institutions shall re-lend the proceeds of such loans and/ or bonded indebtedness to Filipinos or to Filipino-owned or controlled corporations and partnerships, at least sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the outstanding and paid-up capital of which is held by Filipinos at the time the loan is incurred, such proportion to be maintained until such time as the loan is fully paid: Provided, however, That during anytime that any amount of the loan remains outstanding, failure to meet with

the capital ownership requirement shall make the entire loan immediately due and demandable, together with all penalties and interests, plus an additional special penalty of two per centum on the total amount due. Sec. 4. The implementation of this Act shall be subject to, and governed by, the provisions of Executive Order 236, dated February 13, 1957, prescribing procedures for the planning of development finances, the issuance of government securities, and the disbursement of proceeds and creating the Fiscal Policy Council and the Technical Committee on Development Finance, as amended by Executive Order No. 236, dated May 26, 1966, not inconsistent with this Act, which are hereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of this Act. Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of every regular session, to report to the Congress the amount of loans, credits and indebtedness contracted, as well as the guarantees extended, and the purposes and projects for which the loans, credits and indebtedness were incurred, and the guarantees extended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to Filipino-owned or controlled corporations and similar purposes. Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credits or indebtedness as and when they shall become due. Sec. 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, September 8, 1966. Does Congress have to be consulted by the President when he contracts or guarantees foreign loans that increase the foreign debt of the country? The affirmative view cites Art. VI, Sec. 24 which holds that all bills authorizing increase of the public debt must originate exclusively from the House of Representatives, although the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. The negative, and stronger view, is that the President does not need prior approval by Congress because the Constitution places the power to check the President's power on the Monetary Board and not on Congress. Congress may, of course, provide guidelines for contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, and have these rules enforced through the Monetary Board. But that Congress has prior approval is a totally different issue. At any rate, the present power, which was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, was based on RA 4860 or the Foreign Loan Act. What used to be a statutory grant of power is now a constitutional grant which Congress cannot take away, but only regulate. Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 In holding that treaties are formal documents which require ratification with approval of the Senate, while executive agreements become binding through executive action without need of a vote by the Senate, the SC in Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), said that the difference between a treaty and an executive agreement is that a treaty is an international agreement involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character, while an executive agreement is an international agreement embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions, and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature. Examples of treaties are an agreement on tax, extradition, alliance. Examples of executive agreements are agreements relating to postal conventions, tariff rates, copyright, most- favored nation clause. F: Resp. Eastern was the consignee of several shipment of onion and garlic w/c arrived at the port of Mla. from 8/5 to 9/7/54. Some shipments came from Japan and others from HK. Inasmuch as none of the shipments had the certificate required by CB Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of Sec. 1363 (f) of the Rev. Adm. Code, in relation to the said circulars. Said goods were then declared forfeited in favor of the govt by the Commissioner of Customs-- the goods having been, in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds. On review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the Commissioner of Customs and ordered the aforementioned bonds to be cancelled and withdrawn. According to the CTA, the seizure and forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan cannot be justified under EO 238, not only bec. the same seeks to implement an Executive Agreement-- extending the effectivity of our Trade and Financial Agreements w/ Japan-- w/c agreement, is of dubious validity xxx owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the making of said Executive Agreement. HELD: The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by the Consti. in the making of "treaties", w/c are, however, distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly entered into w/o such concurrence. [The court went on to distinguish a treaty from an executive agreement.] The agreement in question, being merely an executive agreement, there is no requirement of concurrence. USAFFE Veterans Association v Treasurer, 105 Phil 1030 F: The central issue in this case concerns the validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950) whereby the Phil. Govt. undertook to return to the US Govt. in ten annual installments, a total of $35 M dollars advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the National Defense Forces of the Philippines. The USAFFE Veterans contended that the money delivered by the US were straight payments for military services and that therefore there was nothing to return to the US and nothing to consider as a loan. They also contended that the Romulo-Synder Agreement was void for lack of authority of the officers who concluded the same. HELD: The funds involved have been consistently regarded as funds advanced and to be subsequently accounted for. Such arrangement therefore includes the obligation to return the unexpended amounts. In this case, Pres. Quirino approved the negotiations. He had power to contract loans under RA 213 amending RA 16. As to the contention that the agreement lacks ratification by the Senate, it was held that the yearly appropriations by Congress of funds as compliance with the agreement constituted ratification. But even if there was no ratification, the agreement would still be valid. The agreement is not a "treaty" as the term is used in the Constitution. The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence. It must be noted that a treaty is not the only form

that an international agreement may assume. For the grant of treaty making power to the Executive and the Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt. over international relations. Consequently, executive agreements may be entered into with other states and are effective even without the concurrence of the Senate. From the point of view of international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. The distinction between an executive agreement and a treaty is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance. CIR v Gotamco, 148 SCRA 36 F: The World Health Organization (WHO) is an international organization which has a regional office in Manila. It enjoys privileges and immunities which are defined in the Host Agreement entered into between the Philippines and the said organization. One of the provisions is that WHO shall be exempt from all direct and indirect taxes. When it decided to construct a building to house its own offices, it entered into a further agreement with the govt. exempting it from paying duties on any importation of materials and fixtures required for the construction. WHO informed the bidders that it was exempt from the payment of all fees, licenses and taxes and that their bids should not include such items. However, the CIR demanded from its contractor, Gotamco, the payment of 3% contractor's tax. The CIR questions the entitlement of the WHO to tax exemption, contending that the Host Agreement is null and void, not having been ratified by the Philippine Senate. HELD : While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate, less formal types of international agreements may be entered into by the Chief Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body. The Host Agreement comes within the latter category. It is a valid and binding international agreement even without the concurrence of the Philippine Senate. Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963) In Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1959), the SC declared that while the Deportation Board has no power to issue a warrant of arrest issued upon the filing of formal charges against certain alien for the purpose of taking him in custody to answer those charges, it has the power delegated by the President, to issue a warrant to carry out a final order based on a finding of guilt. F: On 5/12/52, Sp Pros. Galang charged petitioners bef. the Deportation Board w/ having purchased dollars in the total sum of $130,000, w/o having the necessary license from the CB, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to HK; and petitioners w/ having attempted to bribe officers of the Phil. and US Governments in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of US dollars. Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding officers of the Deportation Bd. xxx Petitioners contest the power of the Pres. to deport aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Bd. of the ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. It is claimed that for the power to deport aliens be exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same. HELD: Under CA 613, the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Bd. of the existence of ground or grounds therefor. W/ the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone. While it may really be contended that Sec. 52 of CA 613 did not expressly confer on the Pres. the authority to deport undesirable aliens, xxx but merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for bef. the Pres. can deport an alien-- w/c provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of Immigration Act of 1940-- is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in 2 ways: (1) by order of the Pres., after due investigation, pursuant to Sec. 69 of RAC, and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Bd. of Commissioners, under Sec. 37 of CA 613. President's power of investigation may be delegated to the Deportation Board.-- The President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Sec. 69 of the RAC w/c provides for "a prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent xxx the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the Pres. xxx Power to arrest aliens.-- Sec. 69 of the RAC does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. The contention xxx that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the Pres. obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. Power to order arrest of alien may not be delegated to Deportation Board by President.- - Conceding w/o deciding that the Pres. can personally order the arrest of alien, yet such power cannot be delegated by him to the Deportation Board. The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. xxx And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercised of discretion and judgement may not be so delegated. Go Tek v Deportation Board, 79 SCRA 17 (1977) In Go Tek v Deportation Board, 79 SCRA 17 (1976), the SC upheld the President's power to order the deportation of an alien under Sec. 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. He need not wait for the pending case to end in conviction. He may, even during the pendency of the case, order the deportation if he thinks he is undesirable to national interest. This decision to deport, said the Court, is an act of State. F: Petitioner was arrested for possession of fake dollars and prosecuted under Art. 168 RPC. At the same time, deportation proceedings were brought against him. He filed a petition for prohibition against the Deportation Board, contending that he could only be deported on grounds enumerated in Sec. 37 (3) of the Immigration Law (of w/c possession of fake dollars is not) and only after conviction. The CFI-Mla sustained his contention.

HELD: The President's power to deport aliens derives from Sec. 69 of the Rev. Adm. Code w/c does not specify the grounds for deportation of aliens but only provides that it be ordered after due investigation. The intention is to give the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or inure the security, welfare, or interest of the State. The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts w/c warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigation. Soliven v Makasiar; Beltran v Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 F: This is the libel case involving Beltran's allegations that President Aquino was hiding under her bed. One of the issues was whether the President may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. According to Beltran, the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit. He contended that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the TC's jurisdiction. This would be an indirect way of defeating her privilege of immunity from suit, since by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholder's time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case where the President is a complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against the accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by another person. Senate of the Philippines v Eduardo Ermita, et.al. (re: Constitutionality of EO 464), GR No. 169659, 169660, 16667, 169834, 171246 Pending consideration are 1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 18, 2006 filed by respondents, praying that the Decision promulgated on April 20, 2006 (the Decision) be set aside, and 2) the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 17, 2006 filed by petitioner PDP-Laban in so far as the Decision held that it was without the requisite standing to file the petition in G.R. No. 169834. Petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Francisco I. Chavez, and PDP-Laban filed their respective Comments to respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Respecting PDP-Labans Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al. and petitioner Chavez endorse the same. Respondents, however, pray for its denial. In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents argue that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation has not been published,hence, the President may properly prohibit the appearance of executive officials before Congress. Even assuming arguendo that the said Rules of Procedure had not been published, such does not have any bearing on the validity of any of the provisions of E.O. 464. The prohibition under Section 1 of E.O. 464 has to do with the question hour, not with inquiries in aid of legislation. As to the prohibition authorized by Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b), the basis thereof is executive privilege, not the purported failure to publish rules of procedure. If the President would prohibit executive officials from appearing before Congress on the ground of lack of published rules of procedure, such would not be an exercise of executive privilege, but simply a claim to protection under the due process clause a right which the President has in common with any other citizen. The claim to such protection is not based on the confidential nature of the information held by the official concerned, as in the case of executive privilege, but on the defective nature of the legislative inquiry itself. The prohibition under Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b) of E.O. 464, however, is based solely on executive privilege, not on any alleged defect in the inquiry arising from a lack of published rules of procedure. Respondents go on to argue that the Presidents invocation of executive privilege is for practical purposes, in that since the President would be in no position to raise an objection the moment a question is asked by Congress, she must be allowed to prohibit the appearance of the official concerned, at least until she is able to thoroughly discuss the matter with the said official. For, so respondents contend, once the information has been coerced out of the official, there is no turning back, and the damage that could result might be devastating to the functioning of government. The tentative prevention of an official from appearing before Congress pending discussion of the matter on inquiry with the President cannot, however, be properly deemed an exercise of executive privilege, not even one for practical purposes. Any such discussion is meant precisely to allow the President to determine whether the information sought falls under the privilege. Before such determination, the claim of privilege could only be based on mere speculation that the information sought might be confidential in nature. Certainly, Congress cannot be bound by such a tenuous invocation of the privilege. The executive branch, nonetheless, need not be apprehensive that it might not be able to invoke executive privilege in time to prevent disclosures of legitimately confidential information. As this Court stated in the Decision, the President and the Executive Secretary must be given fair opportunity to determine whether the matter under legislative investigation calls for a claim of privilege. To secure this fair opportunity, the executive branch need not resort to a precautionary claim of privilege like that proffered by respondents. The President may, instead, direct the official concerned to ask Congress for reasonable time to discuss with her the subject matter of the investigation. Section 3 in relation to 2(b) of E.O. 464, however, is far from being a mere directive to officials summoned by Congress to ask for time to confer with the President. It is an authorization for implied claims of privilege. As such, the criteria for evaluating its validity must be those for claims of

executive privilege. On the basis of such criteria, the Court found the implied claim authorized under Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 to be defective. In fine, no argument in respondents Motion for Reconsideration merits a rev ersal or modification of the Decision. As for its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner PDP-Laban avers that there is no fundamental difference between it and petitioner Bayan Muna to justify their unequal treatment since both of them have members in Congress. It claims, moreover, that all its members are taxpayers and Filipino citizens whose right to information was, as held in the Decision, violated by E.O. 464. There are, however, fundamental distinctions between PDP-Laban and Bayan Muna which call for this Courts contrasting rulings with regard to their standing. While both parties have members in Congress, PDP-Laban, unlike Bayan Muna, is not represented therein as a party-list organization. The PDPLabanmembers in Congress were elected to represent, not their party, but their constituents, i.e., their legislative district in the case of representatives, or the nation at large in the case of senators. The Bayan Muna members in Congress, on the other hand, were elected precisely to represent their party. In fact, in light of the party-list system, the representatives from Bayan Muna may be said to have been elected only indirectly, since it was Bayan Muna itself, as a party, which was voted for in the last elections where it received enough votes to entitle it to three seats in the House of Representatives. This, again, contrasts with the situation of the PDP-Labanmembers in Congress who were all elected in their individual capacities. Indeed, the rights of the Bayan Muna representatives are so intertwined with their partys right to representation in Congress that, in the event they change their party affiliation during their term of office, they would have to forfeit their seat a rule which clearly does not apply to the PDPLaban members in Congress. Bayan Muna is thus entitled to participate in the legislative process in a way that cannot be said of PDP-Laban. With regard to PDP-Labans assertion that it consists of taxpayers and Filipino citizens, suffice it to state that its Petition did not assert this as a ground for its standing to sue. It merely alleged that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda and that the issues involved are of transcendental importance, which points were already addressed in the Decision. If PDP-Laban intended to sue as an organization of citizens in pursuit of the right to information of such citizens, it did not so state in its petition. As such, the Court could not be satisfied that its participation in the controversy would ensure concrete adverseness which sha rpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. A final point. Petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al., by Manifestation dated April 25, 2006, called this Courts attention to the inadvertent omission, in the title of the petition in G.R. No. 169777, of the name of Senator Manuel B. Villar, Jr. The Manifestation reiterated an earlier Manifestation dated October 24, 2005requesting that Senator Villars name be included in the title of said petition. Finding the Manifestations well-taken, the title of G.R. No. 169777 is hereby amended to reflect the name of Senator Villar as one of the petitioners. WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of Respondents dated May 18, 2006 and the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of Petitioner PDP-Laban dated May 17, 2006 are DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. The title of G.R. No. 169777 is amended to include the name Senator Manuel B.Villar, Jr. as one of the petitioners. Bayan, Kapatiran, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v Eduardo Ermita, et.al (regarding Calibrated Preemptive Response), GR No 169838, 169848, 169881 Petitioners come in three groups. 1 The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. 2 The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries. 3 The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881, allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were 4 then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides: Batas Pambansa Blg. 880: An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and 5 Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and toSTRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED. No costs. David et.al v Macapagal-Arroyo, et.al (re: Proclamation 1017), GR no. 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, 171424 1. 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential proclamation No. 1017 (PD 1017) and General Order No. 5(G.O. No. 5) President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo committed grave abuse of Discretion 2) Unconstitutional issuances 3) February 24, 2006: anniversary of EDSA People Power Ipresident issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency 4) Section 18 Art 7 of the Constitution 5) Conspiracy of the political opposition with the leftists (NDF-CPP-NPA) and rightists (military adventurists ) - Bring down the Philippine state - Magnified by elements of media - Hindering the growth of the economy - Give totalitarian forces to the leftists and rightists - Art 2 Sec 4 of Constidefense and preservation of the democratic institutions - Clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the Phil state and Filipino people - Sabotaging confidence in the government and fait in the country 6) Same day issued : G. O No. 5implementing PP 1017 - Asked the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country 7) Midnight of Feb 23, 2006 pres convened security advisers and several cabinet members to assess gravity of the fermenting peace and order situationsuspended classes in all levels in the entire NCR 8) After one week, March 3, 2006- lifted PP 1017 and issued Proclamation no. 1021 section 18 Art VII and Section 17 Article XII Solicitor Generals claims: A. Intent of the Constitution to give full discretionary powers to the president in determining the necessity of calling our the armed forces b) January 17, 2006: member s of the Magdalo Group who indicted the Oakwood mutiny escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio Taguig Citycalling the people to show and proclaim displeasure at the sham regimenot only street protests but wearing red bands on left arms c) February 17, 2006: authorities got hold of OPlan Hackle I Document plans for bombings and attacks during the PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio Cityassassinate selected targets including cabinet members and presidentPres did not attenda bomb was found during celebration d) February 21, 2006:recapture of Lt. San Juan in batangas- 2 disks containing minutes of meeting of Magdalo group and NPA e) Lt. San Juan, prior to arrest declared D-Day on February 24, 2006 f) February 23, 2006: PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted info that members of PNP Special Action Force were planning to defectordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco Jr. to disavow any defection

g) Same day: house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco: business and mid-level government and midlevel govt officials plotted to bring down the Arroyo administration h) Nelly Sindayen from TIME Magazine: reported Pastor Saycon called a US government official about his groups plans if Arroyo is ousted also phoned a man code named Deltaidentified as B./Gen Danilo Lim Commander of the Armys elite scout ranger i) Danilo Lim and Brigade commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen Generoso Senga Chief of Staff of the AFPthat a huge number of soldiers would join Anti-Arroyo protests and they were breaking the chain of command to join forces wanting to unseat the pres j) Senga remained faithful to the Commander-in-chief to chain of command k) He took custody of Lima and Querubin to return to Phil Marines HQ in fort Bonifacio l) CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within military and police establishments m) NDF- Cesar Renerioannounced growing anti-arroyo groups within the military and policenearing ouster of the pres (first half of 2006) n) Bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan o) Raid of army outpost in benguetdeath of 3 soldiers p) Directive of the CPP ordering its front organizations to join 5000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protest Petitioners claims: a) Cancellation of all programs and activities related to 20th anniversary of Edsa People Power I b) Revoked permits to rally issued by local government units c) Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrests and take over of facilities including media, can already be implemented d) Dispersal of protests and rallies (EDSA, Cubao, Santolan, Ayala Ave and Paseo de Roxas, Makati) e) Arrested without warrant Prof. Randy David and Ronald Liamas (pres of Akbayan) f) Feb 25, 2006: 12:20 early morning: raid of the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and Malaya and Abante g) NTC Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to cooperate with government or there will be a takeover- a balanced reporting h) Feb 25, 2006: arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis and KMU)warrant dated 1985case of inciting rebellion i) Satur ocampo (Bayan Muna rep) eluded arrest public forum at the Sulo Hotel, QC; drivers taken into custody j) Arrested: Retired Major General Ramon Montano; attempts to arrest: Satur ocampo, Teodoro Casino, and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza; arrested: Bayan Muna Rep. JOsel VIrador; (turned over o the custody of House of Reps-Batasan 5 decided to stay indefinitely Issue: A. Procedural 1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic 2) Whether petitioners in said cases have legal standing B. Substantive: 1) Whether the SC can review the factual bases of PP 1017 2) Whether the PP 1017 and GO NO 5 are unconstitutional A) Facial challenge B) Constitutional basis C) As applied change Held/Ratio: I. Moot and Academic principle $ Judicial review power of the court $ Following requisites: a) Actual case or controversy b) Petitioners raise questions of constitutionality c) Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity d) Decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself Respondents: 1st and 2nd requirements are absent Court: the contention lacks merit MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE: one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events so that declaration would be of no practical use or value COURT: vital issues involved: illegal acts: Are PP 1017 and GO no 5 constitutional and valid? Do they justify illegal acts? The court will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic if: a) There is grave violation of the Constitution b) Exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved c) When constitutional issues raised require formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public d) The case is capable of repetition , yet evading review All of these exceptions are present: justify courts assumption of jurisdiction over the petitions

Even a moot case can be decided on if the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance II. Legal Standing -Locus standi right of appearance in court of justice in a given question - provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest the party who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit - difficulty in identifying this is a public suitplaintiff asserting a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action - he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protectionhe has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public and the securing relief as a citizen or a taxpayer -direct injury- for private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public - but there are times were liberal policy has been observed on technicality on locus standi= principle of transcendental importanceeven without direct injury- ( cases involving constitutional issues, taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators - all have legal standing except cadiz and IBP and Loren Legarda (but considered transcendental importance principle) - The president cannot be implead as a respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure, of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal casedegrade the dignity of the high office of the President and free him from harassment B.Substantive I. Review of factual bases - in times of national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The president it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the people and God but this does not prevent an examination as to whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretiondetermine whether is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government Petitioners failed to show that Arroyo execise of the calling out power by issuing PP 1017 is totally bereft of factual basis * solicitor general presented supporting reports, records and circumstances petitioners presented nothing to refute such events - president in judging the seriousness of the incidents, was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion III. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and GO NO.5 $ REAL PROBLEM IN EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE: that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under the effective limitations and checkscheck and balance mechanisms DECISION OF SC: x The petition is partially granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL in so far as it constitutes a call by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence x Provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL x Provision of PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Sec 17 Art VII of the constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation x GO NO. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017 whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence x Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of GO NO. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL x Warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In Re Applicability of Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution to Appointments to the Judiciary, Estelito Mendoza, Petitioner A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding: WHEREFORE, the Court: 1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;

2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and 3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council: (a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; (b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and (d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED. Ruling We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis. First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or 1 abandoning Valenzuela. The contention has no basis. Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial 2 courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to 3 enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of coordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to 4 its best lights. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, 5 is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The adherence to 6 precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc 7 or in division. Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, 8 Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication," such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit: Section 13. xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction. The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction. For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst. Another instance is the movants unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply

the omission, for doing so would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and 9 Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in them. Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or without 10 the omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the law itself. Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter. Final Word It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice. The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair. The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy. ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality. SO ORDERED. Louis Barok C. Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, GR No. 192935; Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, Rep. Rodolfo B. Albano, Rep. Simeon A. Datumanong and Rep. Orlando B. Fua, Sr, v Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr and Department of Budget and Management Secretary Florencio B. Abad, GR No. 193036 (re: Constitutionality of E.O No. 1 creating the Truth Commission) Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission. (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987. (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies. 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction. 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes. ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1; 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause. RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1. Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Rea l-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer. The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding. 3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occa sioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

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