Marcos vs. Manglapus G.R. No.

88211 FACTS: In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic. This, did not however, stop bloody challenges to the government. The armed threats to the government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Marcos. The woes of the government are not purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines (2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return HELD: Although the Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The Constitution declares among the guiding principles service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the Presidents residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is a power borne by the Presidents duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the Presidents duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order.

De Rama vs. CA G.R. No. 131136 FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioners allegation that these were midnight appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution HELD: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

QUILONA VS GENERAL COURT MARTIAL G.R. No. 96607 FACTS: A policeman was charged before General Court Martial with a crime of murder in a previous case. Petitioner policeman wrote to President Corazon C. Aquino, expressing his desire to be tried by a civilian court and sought a waiver of a military jurisdiction, for the reason, among others, that the "enactment of the Philippine National Police Law creates his honest belief that he should now be under the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court. Petitioner filed a pleading denominated as "MOTION FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT MARTIAL TO INHIBIT ITSELF FROM PURSUING THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED AND TO HAVE HIS CASE INVESTIGATED BY THE CIVILIAN PROSECUTOR OR AT LEAST TRIED BY A CIVILIAN COURT". Respondent court martial denied the petitioner's motion. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, alleging that respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for inhibition and that there is no appeal, nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petition is meritorious. RULING: Yes. Republic Act No. 6975, 10 creating the Philippine National Police (PNP), 11 which took effect on 1 January 1991, 12 provides: SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts; Provided, That the courtsmartial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, as amended by Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, that criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge. (Emphasis supplied) Although Republic Act No. 6975 was not yet in effect when petitioner was arraigned on 28 December 1990, nevertheless, respondent court martial knew or should have known that the said Act had already been signed or approved by the President on 13 December 1990 and that the same was published in two (2) national newspaper of general circulation on 17 December 1990 and that it would take effect on 1 January 1991. It is precisely for this reason that respondent court martial decided to have the petitioner's motion to inhibit argued on 28 December 1990 and thereafter arraigned the petitioner on the same day despite his vehement refusal to enter a plea. Clearly, under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, respondent court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to or excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment of the petitioner on 28 December 1990. The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in line therewith, the law mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts.

BAYAN VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR No. 13857 FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the US forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, both countries entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. In view of the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement both countries negotiated for its possible extension. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the extension of the US military bases which was now called RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. During the term of Pres. Ramos, he approved the VFA which was the result of a negotiation on the complementing strategic interests of the US and the Philippines in the AsiaPacific region. On October 5, 1998, Pres. Joseph Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon, ratified the VFA. The Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA were then transmitted to the Philippine Senate for concurrence pursuant to Sec 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The necessary 2/3 votes of the members of the Senate were gathered thus concurring with the ratification of the VFA under Resolution No. 18. On June 1, 1999 the VFA officially entered into force. The petitioners argue that the VFA is governed by the provision of Sec. 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution? HELD: Sec. 25, Article XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities should apply in the instant case. Being a special provision, Sec. 25, Article XVIII will prevail over the general provision of Sec 21, Article VII of the Constitution. Also, the argument that Sec 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities are involved in the VFA is untenable. The clause found in Sec 25 does not refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects as evidenced by the use of comma and the disjunctive word or. This interpretation which contemplates three different situations a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities and any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Sec 25 is also manifested in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the said section. Moreover, the establishment of military bases within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by the new weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without returning to their home country. Therefore first requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII already satisfied by considering the VFA as a treaty. The second condition of Sec 25 requires that the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate should be viewed in light of Sec 21 Art. VII of the Constitution requiring a 2/3 votes for treaties or international agreements in general. The 2/3 votes is again satisfied after the approval of the VFA by the Senate through Resolution No. 18. The third requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII is that the other contracting party acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. The records of the US Government, through the US Ambassador to the Philippines, show that the US government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. Also, the deliberations of the Consitutional Commission show that,through the words of Fr. Bernas, ...we will accept whatever they say.If they say that we have done everything to make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty.. Also through Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International law Commission in 1949 provides that Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. This is also known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Therefore, the third requisite is also satisfied.