Hitler had achieved a major triumph at Munich. How valid is this assessment of the Munich Agreement?

There is a great amount of debate as to whether Adolf Hitler gained all he wanted from Munich. There are those who believe that Munich worked out almost completely in Hitlers favour, although few argue the opposite. Hitler had managed to successfully outmanoeuvre several senior European politicians in Neville Chamberlain and douard Daladier and had as a result established a name for himself as a heavyweight in then modern politics. Despite this however, Chamberlains popularity in Britain soared as he was heralded as a peacemaker by the British public, somewhat overshadowing Hitler in their minds. Hitlers basic needs so far as his plans were concerned were fulfilled by Munich, prompting argument as to whether he intended for it to work out that way or not. There exists a school of thought known as intentionalists that believe he planned everything out, whereas the opposing group, known as functionalists believe that he was an opportunist, taking advantage of the situations he found himself in. Some historians, such as William Shirer, believed Hitler intended to start a war from the outset, planning his foreign policy meticulously to meet his overall goal of European domination and defeating his political and racial enemies. This would be an intentionalist viewpoint, whereas other historians, one of the first being A.J.P. Taylor, believed that under the Third Reich Germany was run in chaos, and that Hitler was an opportunist, taking chances where they occurred. I believe that of the two groups the functionalist viewpoint seems the most fitting with the evidence, although theres supporting evidence for the intentionalist viewpoint also. As time has gone on, viewpoints have changed, alternating between an overall intentionalist or functionalist majority. The reasons for these changes vary; for instance in 1968 came the release of new documentation on the Munich agreement as per the thirty year rule, allowing for a new perspective on Hitlers intentions and actions at Munich in 1938. Other reasons include distance from the war years, as more recent historical texts tend to have a more rational, objective view on the events prior to World War Two. For instance A.J.P. Taylor laid out the argument that Hitler was an opportunist in his book The Origins of the Second World War. This text was published in 1961, nearly twenty years after the end of the war and as a result Hitlers actions are viewed with a more subjective, newer approach, as the memory of the war isnt as raw as in earlier years. I agree more with the functionalist viewpoint, as Hitlers overall goal was mostly achieved at Munich, but the methods by which these occurred werent as he planned them. For instance hed gained a lot of territory for nothing in Czechoslovakia as a result of the agreement and hed also established himself as a serious contender in European politics as well as earning the respect of his people through standing up to Britain and France without violence. There is substantial evidence to show that Hitler gained a lot from the Munich Agreement. Most of his needs for his plans were fulfilled, as
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hed gained a large part of Czechoslovakia with the concession of the Sudetenland, including the highly valuable Skoda factories, which would go on to produce a significant percentage of the Nazis war machines. Hitler had also gained 28,500 square kilometres of land from the Sudetenland and 70% of Czechoslovakias steel and iron industry. This would again aid in Germanys future war effort. In addition to this, Hitler had also gained a huge military advantage over Czechoslovakia, as the vast majority of Czechoslovakias defences were in the Sudetenland, with over 260 small forts being set up along the border with Germany. The Germans were later to use these as testing in preparation for war against France, as the Czech defences were similar to the Maginot Line. Additional Source A The Cabinet met that evening. The Prime Minister looked none the worse for his experiences. He spoke for over an hour. He told us that Hitler had adopted a certain position from the start and had refused to budge an inch from it. Many of the most important points seemed hardly to have arisen during their discussion, notably the international guarantee. Having said that he had informed Hitler that he was creating an impossible situation, having admitted that he had "snorted" with indignation when he read the German terms, the Prime Minister concluded, to my astonishment, by saying that he considered that we should accept those terms and that we should advise the Czechs to do so. It was then suggested that the Cabinet should adjourn, in order to give members time to read the terms and sleep on them, and that we should meet again the following morning. I protested against this. I said that from what the Prime Minister had told us it appeared to me that the Germans were still convinced that under no circumstances would we fight, that there still existed one method, and one method only, of persuading them to the contrary, and that was by instantly declaring full mobilisation. I said that I was sure popular opinion would eventually compel us to go to the assistance of the Czechs; that hitherto we had been faced with the unpleasant alternatives of peace with dishonour or war. I now saw a third possibility, namely war with dishonour, by which I meant being kicked into the war by the boot of public opinion when those for whom we were fighting had already been defeated. I pointed out that the Chiefs of Staff had reported on the previous day that immediate mobilisation was of urgent and vital importance, and I suggested that we might one day have to explain why we had disregarded their advice. This angered the Prime Minister. He said that I had omitted to say that this advice was given only on the assumption that there was a danger of war with Germany within the next few days. I said I thought it would be difficult to deny that such a danger existed. Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty; written in his autobiography, Old Men Forget (1953).

Additional source A is an excerpt from First Lord of the Admiralty Duff Coopers autobiography and it shows how Hitlers demands were met by Chamberlain completely: The Prime Minister concluded, to my astonishment, that we should accept those (Hitlers) terms, and that we should advise the Czechs to do so. This source also supports the intentionalist argument, as: Hitler had adopted a certain position from the start and had refused to budge an inch from it. This shows how Hitler went into the meeting with the intention to see the demands he made completely fulfilled. This shows planning on his part, in keeping with the intentionalists view of his actions. Duff Cooper was a voiced critic of Chamberlains appeasement policy, so this may influence the sources reliability somewhat, as Cooper would more likely depict this aspect of Chamberlain in a negative light. The view shown in the source is supported by historians Martin Gilbert and Richard Gotts work The Appeasers (1963), which heavily criticises Chamberlains pursuit of appeasement as a war avoidance policy. Gotts text was published in the early sixties, when there was a trend towards criticising Chamberlains pursuit of appeasement. The source is reliable to an extent because of the authors high position in the military at the time; as war was believed to be imminent at the time of the Munich Agreement the author wouldve been kept well informed regarding the proceedings taking place there. The source is also lent reliability by the fact that it was written nearly a decade after the war was over, meaning information regarding the Agreement wouldve been more freely disclosed. However, the sources reliability is somewhat limited by the authors apparent bias against Chamberlains policy of appeasement, as the author may exaggerate the extent to which Chamberlain gave into Hitlers demands. The sources reliability is further lessened by the fact that the author didnt actually attend the meeting and so his account lacks the accuracy of a transcript. Additional Source E The final settlement forced Czechoslovakia to give Germany 11,000 square miles of territory. Within this area lay all the vast Czech fortifications. Czechoslovakias entire system of rail, road, telephone and telegraph communications was disrupted. It lost 66% of its coal, 86% of its chemicals, 80% of its textiles, 70% of its electrical power, and 40% of its timber. A prosperous industrial nation was split up and bankrupted overnight.
An American historian, William Shirer, writing in his book, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich 1959

Additional Source E supports the argument that Hitler gained from the acquisition of the Sudetenland as part of the agreements made at the Munich conference. Its an extract from The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, a book about the Nazi regime authored by William Shirer and published in 1959. The source shows that the majority of the Czech defences lay in the land that was forfeited to the Nazis in Munich. It also states that Czechoslovakias entire rail and communications network was
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disrupted by the loss of the Sudetenland and that they lost the majority of their heavy industry, with 86% of its chemicals industry, 80% of its textiles and 70% of its electrical power being lost. This would all serve to render Czechoslovakia crippled economically and in complete disarray, which would be ideal for Hitler to attack in the future. In addition to this, Hitler now had control over the vast majority of Czechoslovakian defences, which were located in the Sudetenland region, now under Nazi control due to Munich. This meant that the Nazis future war efforts against Czechoslovakia would be made considerably less difficult by the fact that their opponents were militarily under-equipped and that the Nazis themselves were significantly better armed than prior to the agreement. The source can be said to be reliable due to the fact that its written by an historian who specialises in the Nazi regime and its workings. The fact that the author specialises in Nazi history means that he will have studied the regimes history extensively and thus is more likely to understand the actions taken by it due to this familiarity. The sources reliability is lessened somewhat by the publication date, as many figures and such werent released until several years later in accordance with the thirty year rule, meaning new facts may have come to light about the Munich agreement in the years following the books publication. Hitler definitely gained from Munich in the respect that he gained more resources and weakened one of his proposed future targets in Europe, as these sources have shown. Additional Source I If I do not begin this afternoon by paying the usual tributes to the Prime Minister for his handling of this crisis, it is certainly not from any lack of personal regard. But I will say the most unpopular thing, namely that we have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat, and that France has suffered even more than we have.... I believe the Czechs, left to themselves, would have been able to make better terms than they have got - they could hardly have worse. I think that in future the Czechoslovak state cannot be maintained as a separate entity. You will find that in a period of time which may be measured by years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed in the Nazi regime. But our loyal brave people should know the truth: that there has been gross neglect and deficiency in our defences; that we have suffered a defeat without a war. Speech in the House of Commons by Winston Churchill on the Munich Agreement, 5 October 1938 Additional Source I also supports the view that Hitler gained substantially from the agreement. Its an excerpt from a speech made by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons in the days following the Munich Agreement. In this speech, Churchill criticises Chamberlains handling of the crisis, claiming that Britain had lost face at Munich: we have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat. In addition, he states that Czechoslovakia had been unfairly treated in favour of Germany by the
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allies: I believe the Czechs, left to themselves, would have been able to make better terms than they have got - they could hardly have worse. This shows that even a senior British politician such as Churchill considered the Munich Agreement to be too severely in Germanys favour and also raises the fact that the Czechs werent included in the negotiations regarding the agreement. The fact that Czechoslovakia suffered as a result of the deal means that Hitler mustve gained, as if Czechoslovakia was weakened due to the agreement this meant it was more susceptible to German invasion in the future, in addition to the fact that any land lost by Czechoslovakia would be given to Germany, further increasing Hitlers gain. The source is reliable because Winston Churchill was part of the British government, one of the key participants in the Munich agreement alongside Germany and France, so any criticisms raised regarding Britains handling of the crisis would have an element of truth to them at least, as Churchill would be basing his arguments from observations made from within the British government. Any unreliability would arise from the fact that Churchill was an opponent of Chamberlains and thus would be more likely to criticise than praise him. Czechoslovakias defences in the Sudetenland may have posed a greater problem to the Nazis than they originally anticipated.

Additional Source F When after Munich we were in a position to examine Czechoslovak military strength from within, what we saw of it greatly disturbed us; we had run a serious danger. The plan prepared by the Czech generals was formidable. I now understand why my generals urged restraint.
Hitler while on tour of the Czech fortress line, talking to Dr. Carl Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig

Additional Source F is an excerpt from a conversation held between Hitler and the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig, Dr. Carl Burckhardt, whilst on tour of the Czech defence line some time after Munich. In the source, Hitler acknowledges that the Czech defences were more formidable than he suspected: We had run a serious danger. The plan prepared by the Czech generals was formidable. I now understand why my generals urged restraint. This shows that had Hitler carried through with his plans to take Czechoslovakia by force, he may have taken heavier losses than he believed he wouldve, as he admits in the
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source that the Czechoslovakian forces were stronger than he anticipated. This means that he gained from the Munich agreement due to the fact that the Sudetenland was given to him, saving him from taking heavy losses attempting to take it by force and also weakening the rest of Czechoslovakia, who would be unable to put up much resistance to an invasion of their remaining territory. The source is reliable because Hitler would be more open discussing things with the League of Nations representative after Munich than before, as he now controls the area they are discussing, so any plans he may have had regarding the area are now no longer incriminating and unlikely to cause a response on the part of the League of Nations. The reliability is also added to by the fact that the conversation is with the League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig, Dr. Carl Burckhardt. This is because Dr. Burckhardt had numerous encounters with the Nazi regime, each time attempting to dissuade them from attempting to annex Danzig as they had other nations. The fact that Hitler is revealing this information to Dr. Burckhardt increases its reliability, as Hitler is revealing past errors on his part to Burckhardt, who opposed the Nazi regime and was in a similar situation at the time as Czechoslovakia had been at the time of Munich as the Nazis sought to take Danzig for their own. The sources reliability may be limited, however, by the fact that it may be an attempt by Hitler to lull Burckhardt into a false sense of security, as he may be exaggerating how much they underestimated the Czech defences. The sources argument is supported by Winston Churchills The Gathering Storm (1948), as in this text, Churchill states that Hitler couldve been stopped at any number of moments prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, including the Munich Crisis. This supports the viewpoint that Hitler was an opportunist, which is the functionalist viewpoint that states that he reacted to opportunities as they came as opposed to planning and anticipating events. The text is critical of Chamberlain particularly for not stopping Hitler at any of the points available and went on to shape much of the post-war eras historical views on appeasement and Hitlers actions. This is due to the fact that Churchill was the wartime leader of Britain and was one of the victors, meaning he would be quick to pass any faults leading to the war over to his predecessor, Chamberlain, whom hed been incredibly critical of even before the war. In addition, the war had ended just 3 years prior to the texts publication, meaning it was written in a time when the experience of the war was still fresh in the memory of the author and the people, meaning other figures of authority on the issue would be easily influenced by sentiments such as those expressed in Churchills text. Hitler had also gained a considerable amount of respect as a politician following Munich, as hed successfully manipulated Chamberlain, a seasoned heavyweight in world politics. Prior to Munich he was regarded as a fringe politician whose extremist views would inhibit his progress, but after the meeting he was treated with more gravitas and respect. He also gained a vast amount of respect from his people, who were relieved that war had been avoided, as the memory of the First World War was still visceral in their minds. WJEC Source 1, an excerpt from a text by
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historian and journalist, William Shirer, shows how Hitler gained from Munich: Hitler had got what he wanted and had achieved another great conquest without firing a shot. His prestige soared to new heights. This shows how Hitler was considered to be a skilled diplomat, as hed seemingly resolved the Czech crisis without violence. Shirer adds: They (the German public) were relieved that war had been averted; they were elated and swollen with pride at Hitlers bloodless victory. This demonstrates how the German people respected Hitler for taking Czechoslovakia and resolving the crisis without resorting to war. The sources reliability is enforced by the fact that the author is an historian who specialises on the Third Reich, as the source is taken from The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960), a text whose focus will be entirely on the machinations of Hitler and his regime. As a result of this the content of the text would be reliable, as the authors knowledge would be extensive due to the specialised nature of the text. The sources reliability is further enhanced by the fact that the author was in Germany during the time immediately after the Munich Agreement, meaning he was able to see firsthand what the German publics opinions on Hitler were. However, the sources reliability is weakened by the fact that the author is a journalist, as he may have exaggerated somewhat to sensationalise the issue. I believe that the fact that the German people responded with such enthusiasm shows how they fully expected Hitler to start a war over Munich, supporting the functionalist argument about Hitlers actions, as hes been presented with an unexpected opportunity and taken it, surprising even his own people, but at the same time could be used to support the intentionalist argument that hed planned events beforehand, as his people expected a war. This is in agreement with Alan Bullocks Hitler, A Study in Tyranny (1962) , which presents the view that Hitler had an overall foreign policy with goals, but was flexible in the way he got there.

Additional Source H The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the
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10th of October. The genius of the Fuhrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way. A German general, Alfred Jodl, speaking on 29th September 1938. In addition to the respect from his people, Hitler also gained new respect from the military commanders of the German armed forces. This was again due to his determination not to back down or be appeased, as hed effectively forced the Western powers to give him Czechoslovakia, lest he take it by force. Additional Source H supports this view, as its an excerpt from a speech made by Alfred Jodl, a German general, made just after the Munich agreement. In the speech, Jodl praises Hitler for his actions during the conference and his determination in dealing with the Western powers: The genius of the Fuhrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. This shows that Hitler won respect from his military forces for his actions and that at least some of them approved of his lack of fear for starting a war. In addition, Jodl also comments: The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way. This shows again that the German public were at least in part swayed by Hitlers actions at Munich and that he gained popularity for them. The source is reliable because its a speech made by one of Hitlers generals, as the army was mainly a separate organisation from the state and Hitlers relationship with his generals was strained at times by his actions, so to have a general openly praise him was an event that mustve taken some careful thought on Jodls part. The sources reliability is limited somewhat by the fact that Jodls view on Hitlers actions may not be shared by the entirety of the German military commanders, but it does show that a few were won over by his performance at Munich. In addition to the direct gains made from Munich, Hitler also gained as a result of the actions of his opponents, as Chamberlain and Daladier had made several mistakes through the course of the Munich Conference that put Hitler in an advantageous position in the future. Chief among these was neglecting to invite representatives from either Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union, as this resulted in the Soviet Union becoming alienated from the Allies and believing, correctly to a degree, that the Western powers were driving Nazi Germanys attentions and focus towards Eastern Europe, deeming Nazism to be a secondary threat to Communism. This sense of alienation was a major factor in driving the Soviet Union to sign the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, dividing Poland up between them and ultimately starting the Second World War. This was a benefit for Hitler as it gave him time to prepare for war with the USSR, as the agreement meant the two forces agreed not to attack each other for a time. This Pact would likely not have existed were it not

for Chamberlain and Daladiers ignorance of Stalin during the Munich Conference. Additional Source C

In the above cartoon, drawn by a Russian cartoonist, Chamberlain and Daladier are shown steering Hitler and the Nazis towards the USSR. Additional Source C is an example of the views of the Soviet Union at this time. Its a cartoon drawn by Russian cartoonist featuring Chamberlain and Daladier steering Hitler and the Nazis towards the USSR, here shown as one of two options the Nazis could take, the other being Western Europe. One of the Nazis is shown to be holding a meat cleaver, demonstrating that the cartoons author was fully aware of the Nazis intentions of violence towards other nations. The source demonstrates a view held by most historians today, so with hindsight it can be said that the source is reliable, but this is potentially erroneous as at the time the source was likely to be used by the USSR as propaganda against the Nazi regime, who were their political polar opposites and this can negatively affect the sources reliability. It is also critical of the British and French policies regarding the USSR at the time, as they effectively tried to steer the Nazis focus towards the East of Europe, the USSR in particular. This caused Stalin, as well as most of the general public of the USSR to feel alienated by their Western allies. The source holds an opposing view to Maurice Cowlings The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy (1975) in which he states that Chamberlains foreign policy was reasonable and competent considering the stresses he was placed under in the years approaching the beginning of the Second World War. This text
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marked the beginning of a trend that extended into the 1980s of a reevaluation of Chamberlains policies just before and during the Munich Crisis, viewing them in a more favourable light. Additional Source D

From left to right: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and Italian foreign minister Ciano.

Additional Source D supports the view put forward in Additional Source C, as its a photograph of those who attended the Munich Conference. In it, Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier are shown to be present, but there is no representation from either Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union, showing that the Western Allies did not hold a very high view of their Eastern allies and made little effort to conceal it, adding to the sense of alienation imposed on the USSR. In addition, Hitler looks elevated in status, with the emphasis being placed on him over the other subjects of the photograph. This is indicative of Hitlers gain in confidence and the fact that he was now viewed with more respect by the other European politicians who attended the conference. The source is reliable, as its a photograph and therefore depicts exactly what happened at the event. The sources reliability may be inhibited, however, by what isnt depicted, as important details may be obscured by its low resolution. In addition the source is an official photograph, meaning its set up and might not display the true relationships between those in it.
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The successes at the Munich Conference were a huge boon to Hitlers propaganda effort, as he was able to tout the fact that hed gained territory for Germany without causing a war. This aspect of his gains was largely incidental, as there was no way he couldve planned out events in such a complicated situation. Hitlers propaganda benefit was counteracted, however, by his frustration at being unable to start a war, as theres substantial evidence that this was his intention. Hitler wanted to aggressively expand into Czechoslovakia, taking territory by force rather than diplomacy. The fact that it was given to him frustrated him, as it deprived him of what he saw as a glorious action. Additional Source B Remarks by Hitler about Munich That damned Chamberlain has spoiled my parade into Prague (October 1938). I had not thought it possible that Czechoslovakia would be served up to me by her friends (January 1939). We should have started the war in 1938. That was our last chance to keep it localized. But they yielded to us everywhere. Like cowards they gave in to all our demands. That actually made it difficult to seize the initiative for hostilities. We missed a unique opportunity at Munich (February 1945). Quoted in J.C. Fest, Hitler (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974) Additional Source B is an excerpt from an historical text called Hitler, written by historians Weidenfeld and Nicolson in 1974. The excerpt consists of remarks made by Hitler with regards to Munich. In it Hitler expresses his annoyance that Chamberlain gave in to his demands: That damned Chamberlain has spoiled my parade into Prague. I had not thought it possible that Czechoslovakia would be served up to me by her friends. This shows how Hitler intended to make a spectacle out of conquering Czechoslovakia and that he was irritated when the opportunity to do so was removed from his grasp. More importantly, however, Hitler additionally states: We should have started the war in 1938. But they yielded to us everywhere. We missed a unique opportunity at Munich. This shows that Hitler had intended to engage in warfare over Czechoslovakia, but that Chamberlains appeasement policy prevented him from doing so. The source is made reliable by the fact that its a specialised text focussing on Hitler and his actions prior to and during the Second World War and as such should go into great detail about this period with greater accuracy than a generalised text. The fact that its cowritten by two historians adds to this, as their combined knowledge should be greater than if just one of them had written the text. The sources reliability is also affirmed by the fact that its a transcript of Hitlers words and therefore expresses his true sentiments, whereas an official release made by Hitler would be subject to editing beforehand.

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This is in agreement with Keith Roberts Munich 1938 (1968), in which the author states that appeasement, rather than being a cowardly tactic used by weak and misguided politicians, was instead a valid war avoidance strategy. This view may have arisen from the fact that the text was published in the year that the 30 year rule came into effect, allowing a massive amount of new documentation to be released about the events of 1938. New documentation may shed light on events that causes them to be viewed differently in the context of the new information. This view is supported by Hitlers remarks, as he blames Chamberlains appeasement policy for preventing him starting a war over Czechoslovakia in 1938. Additional Source J 15. The broad conclusions of this Note may be summarized as follows :(a) A German absorption of Czechoslovakia will enhance her military prestige, increase her war potential and probably enable her to dispose of stronger land forces against France and ourselves than she can do at present. (b) So far as air power is concerned, Germany may be able to maintain her lead over the Franco-British Air Forces in air striking power. On the other hand, it is open to us, provided that we make the necessary effort, to catch her up, or at least greatly reduce her lead, in the matter of defence (both active and passive) against air attack. By so doing we shall have heavily insured ourselves against the greatest danger to which we are present exposed: indeed by substantially reducing Germany's only chance of a rapid decision, we shall have provided a strong deterrent against her making the attempt. (c) It follows, therefore, that, from the military point of view, time is in our favour and that, if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in say 6-12 months' time, than to accept the present challenge. The conclusion of a note from General Ismay to the British Cabinet sent on 20th September 1938, marked 'Secret'. Ismay was Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Additional Source J supports the view that Hitler lost at Munich in 1938. Its an extract from a top secret report from the British general Ismay regarding Britains military strength compared to that of Germanys. In the report, Ismay states that Britain would be made inferior to Germany in terms of military capability as a result of the Munich Agreement: A German absorption of Czechoslovakia will enhance her military prestige, increase her war potential and probably enable her to dispose of stronger land forces against France and ourselves than she can do at present. This shows that, although Hitler would gain in military power from Munich, he would only have a temporary advantage over
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Britain and France, something Ismay was aware of: from the military point of view, time is in our favour and that, if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in say 6-12 months' time, than to accept the present challenge. This shows that Hitler lost from Munich, as he made Britain fully aware of his aggressive intentions and also removed his capability for beginning a war, allowing Britain time to rearm to compensate for his gains as a result of the annexation of Czechoslovakia. Had he not made such demands, he may have been able to catch Britain off guard as opposed to alerting them to the threat he posed, as he did at Munich. The source is reliable because its a top secret document to be shown to the British Cabinet by a high ranking general who was also the Secretary of the Committee for Imperial Defence, which is the organisation responsible for defending the nation from foreign powers. This means the document will contain information that is relevant to the issue and accurate as well. In addition, the source is unlikely to be subject to propaganda or bias, as its an official document to be shown to the Cabinet, not the public, meaning there is no target audience to win over, merely facts to report to the government. WJEC Source 8 shows further evidence of Hitlers plans to invade Czechoslovakia. Its a top secret military document sent by Hitler to his generals several months prior to the Munich Conference, showing that the decision to invade Czechoslovakia was a pre-planned idea that Hitler had been considering for some time. In the source Hitler states: It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. An unavoidable development of events within Czechoslovakia, or other political events in Europe providing a suddenly favourable opportunity which may never occur, may cause me to take early action. This shows Hitlers opportunistic nature, in agreement with the functionalist viewpoint, as hes waiting for an opportunity to make things easier to attack. This also in part supports the intentionalist viewpoint, as Hitler has obviously intended to attack Czechoslovakia which would have undoubtedly sparked a conflict in Europe. The plan is more of an outline than a solid military strategy, but it shows Hitlers intentions clearly enough. The emotional language used shows that he felt strongly about this issue and as such having an opportunity to enact it removed from him would likely incite in him a great deal of anger. The source is made more reliable by the fact that its a top secret military document authored by Hitler and sent to his generals. This means that the document would be free of propaganda but instead would contain Hitlers intentions as clearly as he could put them across. The sources reliability is reduced somewhat by the fact that its just an outline and as such lacks specific details, as this source appears to be just to alert his generals to his future intentions. Overall, this source argues in favour of Hitler losing at the Munich conference, as his intention had been to initiate war with Czechoslovakia and this opportunity was taken from him due to the Sudetenland being given to him at the conference. WJEC Source 5 provides further support for the idea that Hitler wished to start a war over Czechoslovakia. The source is an extract from
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leading academic and specialist on Nazi Germany Ian Kershaws text Hitler: a Profile in Power, published in 1991. In it, Kershaw states that Hitler made it plain at the Hossbach meeting that he wished to take not only the Sudetenland but all of Czechoslovakia by force: Long live war, even if it lasts from two to eight years he would proclaim to the Sudeten leader Konrad Henlein. Hitler therefore was angered by the Munich agreement which deprived him of the opportunity. It can be said that he made a loss there due to the disruption to his plans that it caused. The source is reliable because the author, Ian Kershaw, specialises on Nazi Germany and so has studied it at length and as such would have a greater understanding of the intentions of Hitler than most historians. Any limitations to the source would come from Kershaws personal opinions influencing it, but these would be minor as the author uses the Hossbach meeting and comments made by Hitler there as a basis for his argument and this lends a great deal of reliability to the source. R. J. Overys War and the Economy in the Third Reich (1994) argues with the idea that Hitler planned a war in Europe but instead favours the idea that he had an overall goal of obtaining lebensraum in Eastern Europe. Overy asserts that all of Hitlers focus on rearmament was to facilitate this overall goal, to instigate a war. This would support the intentionalist school of thought, as it surmises that Hitler meant to start a war in the pursuit of lebensraum. Overys book also marks the beginning of the more modern school of thought that returns to the idea that Hitlers rearmament goals and aggressive foreign policy were all suited towards the goal of initiating conflict.

Additional Source G Be glad in your hearts. Give thanks to your God. People of Britain, your children are safe. Your husbands and your sons will not march to war Peace is a victory for all mankind. If we must have a victor, let us choose Chamberlain. For the Prime Minister's conquests are mighty and enduring - millions of happy homes and hearts relieved of their burden. To him the laurels. And now let us go back to our own affairs. We have had enough of those menaces, conjured up from the Continent to confuse us.
Editorial in the Daily Express (30th September 1938)

Whilst Hitler certainly gained in physical terms from the Munich agreement and also gained the respect of other politicians, he lost popularity with other nations, being viewed as an instigator of conflict, whilst his British opposite, Chamberlain, saw a massive gain in popularity due to his appeasement actions taken at Munich. Additional Source G shows this, as its an excerpt from an editorial in the Daily Express in September 1938 praising Chamberlain for his actions in averting war, proving that he was popular at the time for his actions: If we must have a victor, let us choose Chamberlain. For the Prime Minister's conquests are
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mighty and enduring - millions of happy homes and hearts relieved of their burden. To him the laurels. This shows that the British public held Chamberlain in high regard, whilst going on to describe Hitler as a menace, conjured up from the Continent, showing that in Britain, at least, Chamberlain was mainly accepted and praised for his actions. The source is reliable because it was printed shortly after the Munich conference, which was a much covered topic in the press at the time, meaning that the tabloid would want to make its information as accurate as possible in order to successfully compete with its rival newspapers. The sources reliability may be limited however by the fact that its material is subject to influence from the editors political stance. However in this case its probably an anti-Chamberlain bias, as the owner of the paper was Lord Beaverbrook, a good friend of Winston Churchill, one of Chamberlains political opponents. This means that the general opinion of Chamberlain mustve been a good one at the time; as if even those biased against him are praising his actions then he must have performed well politically. A limitation of the source would be that it may not reflect the opinions of the British public as a whole and that it doesnt feature the opinions of nations foreign to Britain, meaning its impossible to gauge the popularity of Hitler relative to Chamberlain in such countries from this source. A text published by Richard Crockett in 1989 entitled Twilight of the Truth is critical of Chamberlain however, as he attempted to get the media to support his decision to follow appeasement in order to generate support and popularity from the British public. Crockett asserts that Chamberlain was attempting to dominate the press for his own means therefore. This book was published relatively recently and as such fits into a more modern trend to criticise Chamberlain for his pursuit of appeasement. Following the Munich agreement, Hitler would find it difficult to make any further progress with his plans, as hed been tied to an international agreement by it, constraining his movements in Europe. In addition, hed made aggressive moves and placed a great deal of strain on the governments of the allies in their attempts to placate him, so they were likely to be watching his movements very closely. WJEC Source 3 is a cartoon drawn by an American satirist in The Daily Californian in October of 1938, about a month after the Munich agreement. It features a lion clad in a Union Jack watching a caricature of Hitler attempting to sneak past through a barbed wire fence and is entitled Watchful Waiting. This shows that after Munich, the Western allies, Britain in particular, were far more observant of any action taken by Hitler in case he attempted to initiate aggression again. This placed restrictions on Hitlers movements, meaning he had to rethink most of actions after the Munich agreement and this was most definitely a loss for him at the conference. The source is made reliable by the fact that its got a narrow focus, concentrating on the relationship between Britain and Nazi Germany following Munich, meaning that theres less room for error on the part of the cartoonist. A limitation of the source would be that its a picture, meaning that there

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arent any written words other than the title and this could leave the source open to misinterpretation. John Charmleys Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (1989) is a text pertaining to Chamberlains appeasement policy in the time of Munich. It supports the idea that Chamberlain was made popular by his decision to pursue appeasement and that Hitler was disliked by the people. It surmises that Hitler was the cause for appeasements failure and not Chamberlain. It supports the intentionalist school of thought, as it implies that Hitler could not be placated by appeasement because he had a plan for Europe that didnt allow for appeasement in it. In short, Hitler couldnt be appeased and hence this is why appeasement failed. In conclusion, I believe that Hitler gained more from Munich than he lost, as hed successfully manipulated senior politicians who were far more experienced than he was into giving him the Sudetenland, which was the territory of their ally, Czechoslovakia. In doing this, Hitler had established himself as a serious contender in European and even world politics, whereas before hed been regarded as an extremist who wouldnt last. Whilst hed missed the opportunity he sought to initiate a conflict over Czechoslovakia, this was a minor restriction on his movements, as he annexed Czechoslovakia soon after Munich with little resistance, mainly due to the fact that hed obtained the Sudetenland, where all of the Czech defences were located. From the Sudetenland, he also acquired a great deal of raw materials and industrial equipment, such as factories and refineries. These would help produce much of the Nazi war machine in the future conflict. He also gained newfound respect from his people and generals, meaning they would be more tolerant and open to future ideas and policies proposed by him. I support the functionalist idea that Hitler was an opportunist, as the events of Munich, whilst beneficial towards him, were not planned or even welcomed by him, as he saw that hed been deprived of his opportunity to take Czechoslovakia by force, an action he interpreted as glorious. Throughout this period of history, Hitler can be seen taking numerous opportunities as they present themselves, reacting to situations rather than planning for their occurrence and as such can be viewed as opportunistic in nature. Overall, Id argue therefore that Hitler gained more than he lost at the Munich agreement.

Word Count: 6,171

Bibliography
Additional Sources A and G:

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWmunich.htm
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Additional Sources B, C and I:

http://www.palgrave.com/masterseries/lowe/questions.htm
Additional Source D: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_Agreement Additional Source E: www.johndclare.net/RoadtoWWII5_opinions.htm Additional Source F: www.lionofjudah1.org/Historyhtml/Buchanan

%20Critique.htm
Additional Source H: www.propagander3.tripod.com/nur17.html Additional Source J: www.nationalarchives.gov.uk

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