Jason Ivler y Aguilar v Peralta Abad et al

GR No. 172716, Nov. 17, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner Ivler was charged before the MTC for two separate offenses: Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) and reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage of property (Criminal Case No. 82366). The first offense for the injuries suffered by herein respondent and the second offense for the death of her husband and damage to the spouses vehicle. Ivler pleaded guilty on the first offense and meted public censure as penalty. He invokes this conviction as a ground in his motion to quash the information for the second offense contending it places him in double jeopardy for the same offense of reckless imprudence. MTC refused quashal of the information thus petitioners motion for certiorari was elevated before the RTC while moving for the suspension of the criminal case before the MTC pending resolution of the prejudicial question as subject of his motion for reconsideration at the RTC. MTC however proceeded with the criminal proceeding. The non-appearance of Ivler to the proceeding resulted to the cancellation of his bail and order of his arrest was issued. By virtue of this arrest order, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the motion for certiorari filed by Ivler on ground that he loss standing to maintain suit. RTC dismissed said petition on this ground thus this petition to the Supreme Court. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner loses his standing to maintain suit? Whether or not the petitioners right against double jeopardy a bar to another prosecution on the second offense charged on Criminal Case No. 82366? HELD: The court held that petitioner did not lose his standing to maintain his petition. The lower court based its ruling from Rule 124, Section 8, second par. that provides that an appeal may be dismissed when an appellant escapes from custody or violates the terms of his bail bond. The appeal contemplated in this section is applicable on a suit to review judgment of conviction. No judgment has yet been rendered against the petitioner. Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendants absence in a proceeding merely renders his bondman liable, subjecting the bond to cancellation if it fails to produce defendant before the court within 30 days. This does not ipso facto convert the standing of an accused as a fugitive to lose his standing before the court. Moreover, the court observed that contrary to the lower court contention that petitioner failed to attend the hearing without justified reason it failed to appreciate the fact that there is a pending motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner which was left unresolved by the lower court. On the issue on double jeopardy, the two charges were prosecuted by the court under the provision of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes quasi-offenses such as negligence. What this provision contemplates in quasi-offenses of criminal negligence is punishing the act of negligence that if intentionally done will constitute a criminal offense. Thus, the law punishes the negligent act and not the result thereof. It takes into account the gravity of the offenses in determining the penalty but not to qualify the substance of the offense. It treats a negligent act as single whether the injurious result

affects one or several persons. The offense of criminal negligence remains as one and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions. The contention of the lower court to invoke Article 48 where light offenses such as slight physical injuries cannot be complexed with grave or less grave felony such as homicide that the court is compelled to separate both charges is untenable in this case. The principle of prosecuting quasi offenses remain intact in the case thus the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for 2 offenses of similar charges on reckless imprudence. His prosecution on the first offense thus bars another prosecution for the second offense by virtue of the principle of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court. MIRANDA vs TULIAO FACTS: March 08, 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered I Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela. September 1999, SP02 Mardeal was arrested. April 27, 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose Miranda, SP03 Ocon, SP03 Dalmacio , a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the death of Vicente Buazon and Elizar Tualiao. Judge 6, 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the Court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of the State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice. DOCTRINES: Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused. CA Justice Oscar Herrerra: Except in application for bail, it is not necessary for the Court of First Instance to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant the relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6 (a), Rule 112 Rule of Court, Criminal Procedure. SANTIAGO vs VASQUEZ The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the Courts jurisdiction over, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. Santiago shows discretion but custody of law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.

EXCEPTION TO THE RULE that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the Court, lead to special appearance. Failure to file them is WAIVER OF DEFENCE 1. Civil cases, motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included. 2. Criminal cases, motion to quash a complaint on the ground of jurisdiction over the person of the accused 3. Motion to Quash a warrant of arrest Legality of Court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused. GENERAL RULE: One who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of the Court.

PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson

April 1, 2003 FACTS: Before the court is the petitioners motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases a. Was express consent given by the respondent? b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims? Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal, 2) offended party notified, 3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally, 4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden

to prove, which in this case has not been done a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims.

2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice.

Held: Motion granted Facts: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial. Issues: 1. WON the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the MFR given they

were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments. The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners contention that while 8 secures the rights of the accused, it doesnt & shouldnt preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application.

2.

WON the application of the time-bar under 8 RCP 117 be given a retroactive

application w/o reservations, only & solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. The Court isnt mandated to apply rules retroactively just because its favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State & the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the States right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust & oppressive consequences to the State & to the victims of crimes & their heirs.