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Electronic Legislature

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Brian King

Purdue School of Eng. & Tech.

Indiana Univ. Purdue Univ. Indianapolis

briking@iupui.edu

Yvo Desmedt

University College London

Florida State Univ.

desmedt@cs.fsu.edu

AbstractThe reasons for developing an electronic legislature

(e-legislature) include: an improved legislature, increasing the

constituents access to the legislator, improving participation

in government and providing our goverment with a mobile

distributed legislature that will be able to continue to meet

even in the face of some drastic activity like terrorism. The

essence of a legislature is political and consequently its members

will certainly act in such a way. Thus one must assume that

legislators would take advantage of the lack of physical presence

in a legislature if it was not secured. In [5], [6] an electronic

legislation scheme was proposed that secured the government

from malicious behavior of legislators. The protocol described in

[5], [6] provided only minimal legislative voting options, to create

a realistic e-legislature one must support all likely functions.

Most legislatures allow their members to abstain. The process

of introducing abstention into an e-legislature can be formative

especially in the case when the legislature passes statutes by

simple majority. Here we discuss how to secure an e-legislature

which supports abstention.

I. INTRODUCTION

The process of integrating digital technology into our gov-

ernment to achieve e-government will provide improved

services as well as bring greater accessibility of governmental

services to the people. However there exists several other

reasons to consider e-government, one that it may provide a

means to ensure the continuity of services/and government in

the case of some drastic action.

Within the context of this work we are interested in a

developing a special type of electronic voting which we

characterize as e-legislature or e-laws. Electronic voting for

general elections has become an active area of research, its

impact will be signicant, whenever (or if ever) a secure

and efcient e-voting scheme is constructed. An electronic

legislature will provide will provide several important services

like improving government, increasing access of constituents

to their representatives, and for several other reasons, including

that it will ensure the continuity of the government in cases

where the physical legislature cannot meet. Its impact will be

important for that reason alone.

There are several reasons to be interested in developing

an electronic legislature (e-legislature). One is that an e-

legislature is desirable since it will ensure the delivery of the

actions of a legislature, especially given the increasing specter

of a terrorist attack made of the government. In the September

11

th

terrorist attack, potential targets had included White

House and/or the Capitol Building. If either attack would have

been successful it is certain that a disruption of our governing

body would have occurred. Immediately following this attack,

a second terrorism attack occurred, the mailing of anthrax

spores to U.S. legislators. This attack successfully stopped the

U.S. House of Representatives from meeting, and restricted

the contact of the U.S. Senate. Fortunately the stoppage was

brief, due to the fact that the anthrax contamination was limited

to an ofce complex for the senators. Comparable attacks on

governing bodies have been enacted on other governments.

One solution to this problem of terrorism disrupting the

legislature is to create the means for the legislature to convene

remotely, i.e. a mobile legislature. The U. S. Congress has

recognized this need and has proposed legislation to develop

electronic legislatures as a means of continuing government

in the face of a terrorist attack [3].

In an electronic legislature, the legislatures ability to pass

or to not pass legislation should be thought of as the legislature

digitally signing (with some secret key) the legislation or not

signing the legislation. The power held by each legislator to

vote on legislation will need to be a share of the legislature

key (the one that will generate this legislature signature).

The potential threats to an electronic legislature can come

from both external and internal sources. Traditional computer

security and cryptographic tools can be used to protect the

e-legislature from most of these external threats (intrusion de-

tection, denial-of-service, authentication, condentiality, etc..).

However new tools need to be developed to protect the e-

legislature from internal threats. The internal abuse is the

potential that can seriously diminish the integrity of the legisla-

tive body. When considering an electronic legislature, we ask

will such a legislature be as representative as the physical

government in place?. The danger of using a distributed

electronic government is that the mechanisms for reigning-

in legislative abuse is not necessarily in-place due to lack of

the physical proximity of participants. The concern for the

possibility of cheating among participants in an electronic

legislature is warranted. Politics in government has always

been built with factions and coalitions. Required protocols

need to be secured. For example, the fact that the number

legislators vary will pose a security problem, because we will

need to redistribute the power to vote (i.e. redistribute digital

shares). One would not want to generate a new legislature

secret key, since a key should last as long as the legislature

(for example in the case of the U.S. House of Representatives,

its duration is 2 years).

A legislative body, like the Senate or House of Repre-

sentatives, will pass laws according to some minimum

number of required yes votes, which is often a proportion

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Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2005

1

of the body present (some possibilities include majority or

two-thirds). This is an example of a threshold application,

however the threshold is dynamic since it will depend on

a proportion of the (legislative) body that is present. Con-

sequently to achieve an electronic legislature, a scheme is

needed which allows transfer of the legislative signing power

from the (original) fully attended body to the body present.

One problem that arises is that the entire original body is

not present to participate, but that is easy to overcome using

threshold cryptography. The difculty with developing such a

scheme is the realization that the legislators must be treated

as adversarial and hence untrustworthy. That is, the legislators

are in competition with each other and they may attempt to

take advantage, for political gain, the fact that the process of

transferring signature process will take place. In light of this

competition, a veriable transfer of power needs to take

place. In [5], [6], a model was introduced which described

the requirements for a veriable democracy. Protocols which

provided partial solutions and described how to achieve

veriable democracy were described in [5], [6], [10].

The protocols described in [5], [6], [10] provided only the

minimal amount of legislative services. For an e-legislature to

actually be implemented, other legislative services need to be

offered, for example abstention. Abstention of e-voting within

a general election has been examined [11], but abstention

within an e-legislature has never been examined. The act

of abstaining is a necessary voting option for a legislator.

Abstention allows a legislator to remove themselves from a

vote. There are several reasons to for a legislator to want to

abstain, some of the reasons include: abstaining because of a

conict in interest and abstaining to avoid problems with their

constituency.

Integral to the veriable democracy protocol described in

[5], [6] is the blinding of the message/law. The basis of

this requirement is discussed in detail in [5], [6]. Within a

legislature, it is possible that legislators may wish to abstain

from voting on certain legislation. Of course the decision for

abstaining (or for not to abstaining) must be made after the

content of the message is revealed. The way abstention is

handled may depend on the legislature, or it may depend on

the type of voting the legislature is utilizing or it may even

depend on what is being voted on. In a majority type vote,

there are two rules that are most likely to be used to handle

abstention: in the rst case the abstention will be noted but

it will be treated as a no vote, this is referred to as absolute

majority, and in the second case the majority will determined

by the total number of the yes and no votes, whichever is

larger constitutes the majority, this is called a simple majority

[7].

1

In the case of a simple majority, the threshold will

change whenever an abstention takes place, whereas in an

absolute majority the threshold remains unchanged. Roberts

Rule of Order [16] provides no guide as to how abstentions

should be handled. There are numerous examples of both

type of majorities used in legislatures. Simple majorities are

1

A third possible rule would be to count an abstaining vote as a yes vote.

used for several types of voting in both houses of the US

Congress, British House of Commons [7], Scottish Parliament

[17], and college of the Commission of the European Union

[19]. Absolute majority is used as well in several places,

for example certain votes in the U. S. Congress will require

absolute majorities. One can generalize the notion of the

classication of a majority, to classify the two-thirds type vote

and dene absolute two-thirds, as well as simple two-thirds.

Consequently since a legislature may use both absolute

majority as well as simple majority, an e-legislature must be

able to support both absolute and simple majority. The goal

of this paper is to describe a protocol that will provide the

means to implement abstention within the e-legislature.

II. BACKGROUND: TOOLS AND TERMINOLOGY

Suppose Alice wishes to send to Bob a signature of mes-

sage M. Alice applies a hash function h() to M, so that

m = h(M). Alice sends to Bob M and Sign(M, privKey),

whereupon Bob can verify the signature using the verify

function where verify(M, X, pubKey) is a boolean function,

it returns true provided X is Sign(M, privKey), otherwise it

returns false. If the signature is veried then Bob accepts the

message. Some examples of signature schemes that can be

used in this protocol include the RSA signature scheme and the

El Gamal signature scheme. In a k out of n threshold sharing

scheme the secret key privKey is shared out to n participants,

so that any subset B of k participants can combine their

shares and construct privKey while any subset of cardinality

k1 gain no information about the privKey. In a k out of n

threshold signature scheme, the signing key privKey is shared

out to n participants so that any k participants can sign a

message M. We let S

i

denote participant P

i

s partial signature

(think of a partial signature as a share of the signature). When

the participants wish to sign a message they will send their

partial signatures to some combiner who will combine their

shares to form the signature.

Sign(M, privKey) =

iB

S

i,B

i

= S

j

1

,B

j1

S

j

2

,B

j2

S

j

k

,B

j

k

where B is the set of k members B = P

j1

, . . . , P

j

k

,

i,B

is the appropriate scalar and S

i

is participant P

i

s partial

signature

2

.

Veriable signature sharing [1], [8], [14] is a cryptographic

sharing technique which allows a holder of document to

distribute shares of the signature of the document to proxies

(participants), so that the proxies can later reconstruct and

sign the document (if they wish). Further, by the end of

the distribution phase, honest proxies can verify that they

have been given shares of the authentic signature, without

reconstructing the signature. In an electronic voting scheme,

if a voter receives data/information such that this data allows

2

The most likely operation used with partial signatures is multiplication,

this operation is dependent on the cryptographic primitive used. The scalar

i,B

is a public value dependent on i and the set B of participants. In most

applications it is dened as

i,B

=

jB

j=i

0 x

j

x

i

x

j

.

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Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2005

2

others (as well as the voter) to verify how the voters vote has

been counted, we say that the voter has left a receipt. A voting

scheme is said to be receipt-free provided that no receipt is

left for the voter which allows others to verify the voters

vote. In the case of an e-legislature, since the legislator is a

representative of the people, we would require that the voting

scheme leaves a receipt.

III. ILLUSTRATIONS OF PROBLEMS THAT CAN ARISE IN AN

ELECTRONIC LEGISLATURE

Let / = P

1

, . . . , P

n

denote the legislature. Let /

t

represent the set of legislators present at time t, thus /

t

/.

Suppose n represents the size of the original legislature and n

t

represents the number of legislators present at time t. A session

is a continuous period of time for which the legislators present

/

t

can vote on legislation and that the set of participants

present remain xed.

As noted earlier, the manner in which a legislature votes

is similar to a threshold signature scheme, and the power

to sign legislation is similar to possessing shares to sign. In

this application the threshold k denotes the quorum of the

legislature, the minimum number of legislators required to be

present in order for legislature to be passed. The threshold

k

t

represents the threshold required to pass legislation at

time t, for example in a legislature for which majority rules

k

t

= [/

t

[/2| + 1.

3

Every time the legislature /

t

changes,

some type of redistribution of shares will need to take place.

Redistribution is possible as long as a quorum k of legislators

exist, i.e. [/

t

[ k.

Some problems that the veriable democracy protocol must

overcome include (for more details/descriptions of these prob-

lems we suggest the reader to see [5], [6]). First, the transfer

of signature power needs to be temporary. If legislators send

their shares of the key to other legislators then these legislators

can use this information to sign other laws. In fact they can

impersonate this legislator in future votes. Temporary sharing

is achieved by having k participants P

i1

, . . . , P

i

k

transfer their

partial signatures instead of their power to sign. Consequently

the transfer will be message-oriented.

Secondly, observe that a few of the k (out of the n

t

) partic-

ipants P

i1

, . . . , P

i

k

could defeat the process by not properly

transferring their power (shares). This would be especially

true if the message (law) was such that they had a vested

interest that the law should not be passed. Thus, as the transfer

of power is message oriented, there is a need for the set

P

i1

, . . . , P

i

k

to transfer power blindly (i.e. encrypt the message

before sharing).

Third, the participants /

t

= P

1

, . . . , P

nt

, when given an

opportunity to act on legislation must know that the outcome

(sign or not sign) is a result of their decision and not a

result of bad faith on the part of the participants P

i1

, . . . , P

i

k

who had transferred them the power to sign. Hence, the

participants P

1

, . . . , P

nt

need to be able to verify that they

were actually given the power to sign that message.

3

The oor of x, denoted by x is the largest integer x.

Fourth, no set of participants should gain any information

about a motion made during an illegal session, a session

where either cheaters have been discovered or the number

of legislators present is less than the quorum k. Otherwise,

they could use this knowledge, to act in later sessions. This

provides another reason to blind the motion.

Fifth, in a receipt-required version of veriable democracy,

for each legislator belonging to /

t

there must exist a record as

to how that legislator voted. Note that if each legislator sends a

validated partial signature (which we interpret as a valid vote)

then this provides a receipt that the legislator voted in favor

of the message. We could use the lack of a validated partial

signature as a no vote.

Lastly, we assume that the network is sufciently reliable

(connected) even to deal with a few routers destroyed by

terrorists.

The requirements are described by the following model [5].

VERIFIABLE DEMOCRACY MODEL

(i) (completeness) If n

t

exceeds or equals the quorum k then

for any set of legislators B

t

, with [B

t

[ k

t

, either B

t

can

sign m

t

or they can identify the cheaters among themselves.

(ii) (soundness) If B

t

, A

t

or if [B

t

[ < k

t

then B

t

cannot

sign any new message m

t

.

(iii) The action of the cheaters should be independent of

the message. Therefore for any set B

(represents a set of

cheaters), with [B

distinguish the way B

a message m

(iv) If n

t

< k or if cheaters have been discovered, then

no subset of A

t

should gain any information about m

t

.

Therefore one should not be able to distinguish the information

distributed by the members of A

t

for message m with the

information distributed by a message m

.

(v) If the set of participants /

t

vote on m

t

, then for all P /

t

there exists a public receipt x

P

such that x

P

demonstrates how

P voted for m

t

.

The basic functions of the e-legislature protocol described in

[5], [6] are provided below.

A. Veriable Democracy Protocol a democratic threshold

scheme

During the set-up, the legislature is empowered with a secret

key so that any k out of n can compute the secret signing key.

If n

t

k we proceed with the protocol, if n

t

< k then there

are not enough legislators to pass the legislation. At any time

t, a message/law m

t

may be proposed. A

t

represents the set

of participants present at time t, n

t

= [A

t

[, and k

t

represents

the threshold (the minimal number of participants required to

sign). We now review the integral functions in the veriable

democracy protocol [5], [6], we omit technical details and refer

the reader to [5] for the technical details.

Legislative key generation. A secret key privKey is dis-

tributed to the n participants so that a blinded message/law

can be signed in a k out of n threshold manner. In addition

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Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2005

3

to distributing shares of privKey this distributor generates

ancillary information

4

which is used later to verify partial

signatures. (For example if the protocol utilizes RSA sig-

natures a test message is generated and broadcasts all n

partial signatures of the test message. The test message and

partial signatures of test message play an important role in the

verication of future partial signatures. This can be performed

by a trusted third party or by the participants using a protocol

such as [5], [10]).

Blinding message. The participant P

m

t

, blinds m

t

before they present it to the legislative body A

t

.

Transfer of Power Partial Signature Generation TPSG.

As long as n

t

exceeds (or equals) k, the message will be

considered for signing. If so, k participants in A

t

are chosen

and they generate partial signatures for the blinded m

t

.

Transfer of Power Partial Signature Distribution TPSD.

Each of the k participants share out their partial signatures in a

k

t

out of n

t

manner to A

t

(we will refer to these k participants

as partial signature distributors). Each participant in A

t

has

received k shares, whereupon they compress the k shares

to one share. In addition to distributing partial signatures,

the partial signature distributors will also distribute ancillary

information which allows the legislative body A

t

to verify the

correctness of the partial signatures of the blinded m

t

.

Transfer of Power Partial Signature Verication TPSV.

The ancillary information provided in TPSD is rst veried

by each legislator in A

t

. Upon verication the ancillary

information is used by each legislator to verify the correctness

of their share of the partial signature of the blinded m

t

. The

verication procedure is devised so that with overwhelming

probability it can be determined that a recipient has received

a valid share this is achieved via a verication and complaint

protocol. If a verication fails then a complaint will be raised,

at that time a cheater has been detected, what remains is a

protocol to determine whether the cheater is the partial share

distributor or the complainer. The consequence is that the

completion of this stage with no complaints implies that the

signature power for the message has been transferred to A

t

such that any k

t

can sign the message.

Unblind the message. The message is revealed to the legis-

lature. Who reveals the message? P

a trusted chairperson as in [10], then the trusted chairperson

could reveal m

t

. In [5], the protocol utilized RSA signatures

and so the legislators themselves could unblind the message

without the legislators revealing their partial signature of m

t

.

Decision vote on m

t

. The legislators decide whether to vote

for or against m

t

.

4

This ancillary information will be broadcasted to all, i.e. public record.

The nature of the ancillary information is dependent on the veriable sharing

scheme that is used. For example for El Gamal use [14] and for RSA use [9]

and [2].

Partial Signatures Sent PSS. If any legislator wishes to vote

for the by now known m

t

they send their share of the partial

signature of the blinded m

t

.

Verication of the signature determining the passage

of m

t

PSV. If k

t

or more participants have sent their partial

signatures then the message may be passed. If so, the combiner

selects any k

t

of the sent partial signatures and veries the

correctness of these partial signatures using the ancillary

information provided within this protocol. For each one of

these invalid partial signatures the combiner selects one of the

remaining partial signatures sent and veries it. If the number

of valid partial signatures is less than k

t

then the message

m

t

is automatically not passed. We have adopted a receipt-

required version of the veriable democracy protocol. The

partial signature sends (PSS) together with the partial signature

verication (PSV) implies k

t

valid votes. Who can play the

role of the combiner? Any person, collection of people, or

even the legislators.

Message passed. The message is passed if a signature of m

t

can be computed and there were k

t

valid votes sent and

veried. A vote for m

t

is a valid partial signature.

Note that the verication procedures TPSV and PSV may

utilize different veriable secret sharing schemes due to the

amount of information the senders TPSD and PSS, respec-

tively, know. In TPSD the senders know the actual shares,

whereas in PSS the senders know only the partial signatures.

Whether TPSV and PSV require different veriable sharing

schemes may depend on the threshold signature scheme that

is used.

IV. ABSTAINING

As stated earlier, a legislature may use both absolute ma-

jority as well as simple majority, an e-legislature must be

able to support both absolute and simple majority. To secure

abstention in an absolute majority type vote, it was suggested

[12] to run the veriable democracy protocol twice, once

for the yes votes and then require those that vote no to

participate in a veriable democracy protocol using a no

vote. Now use some method for counting in a secure manner

such as [13].

What remains is how to handle simple majority when an

abstention takes place. This is a much more challenging

problem, since the threshold will change. Recall that the

veriable democracy protocol requires blinding the vote before

transferring power. An abstention will require a transfer of

signature power (since the threshold will change), but the

transfer cannot be achieved in the blind as the veriable

democracy protocol does, since a legislator can only decide

on whether to abstain based on the knowledge of the pending

legislation. The remainder of the paper is devoted to how to

solve abstention within a simple majority.

Recall we represent the legislature by / = P

1

, . . . , P

n

.

We use /

t

represents the legislators present at time t. We use

L

t

to denote those members of /

t

who wish to abstain once

0-7695-2268-8/05/$20.00 (C) 2005 IEEE

Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2005

4

the message is revealed. Once n

Lt

participants abstain, the

new threshold is k

t

out of n

t

n

Lt

, where k

t

is the result of

going from a k

t

out of n

t

threshold and having n

Lt

abstain.

Let k

Lt

= k

t

k

t

.

Model IV.1. A veriable democratic legislature which sup-

ports abstention should possess properties (1) - (4).

(1) Abstainers should be able to abstain after the message

m has been revealed.

(2) Any action taken by the abstainer should be independent

of B (the set of legislators who vote yes to pass the m).

(3) A cheating abstainer should be revealed.

(4) Cheating by an abstainer should not cause termination

of a vote.

(5) A cheating abstainer who is trying to prevent the vote

should be treated as a no vote, and a cheating abstainer who

is trying to pass the law should be treated as a yes voter.

When one considers the above model, the question becomes

how does one determine if a cheating abstainer is trying to

prevent the vote or pass the law. Further, a cheater may be

such that they do not belong to either category and may just

be mischievous. This difculty of determining motive makes

the application of (5) impossible. Since it is clear that the

intent of a cheater cannot be gauged, we must treat a cheating

participant as either a no-voter or an abstainer. We will treat

them as a no voter.

A. Protocols required for abstainers - resharing a share

The following three protocols have been described in [5].

Due to their complexity we will treat them as black-box func-

tions. Realize that one must be careful when to utilizing these

functions, valid inputs must be available to these functions

to achieve the desired results. In the technical version of

this paper, the complete details will be discussed thoroughly.

In this paper we will assume that the implementation of

the veriable democracy protocol has ensured that there is

sufcient ancillary information available either publicly or

to each shareholder to assure that each invocation of these

protocols will achieve the desired results.

Resharing a Share - Share Generation RSSG Suppose a

participant holds a share S and they wish to share S in an

a

t

out of b

t

manner. This is straightforward, except that the

shares that are generated will need to be veried. Since this

protocol will reside within the Veriable Democracy protocol

there will exist ancillary information concerning S. Based

on this ancillary information this participant will be able to

generate ancillary information concerning the shares of S so

they can be veried. For example if participant P

i

wishes to

share their partial signature S

i

to P

j1

, P

j2

, . . . , P

bt

S

j1,i

,

S

j2,i

, . . . ,

S

j

b

t

,i

) = RSSG(i, pubInfo, S

i

).

So that S

i

=

jB

j,

B

j,i

where

B is a set of a

t

participants

B = P

j1

, . . . , P

ja

t

5

.

Resharing a Share - Share Distribution RSSD The partici-

pant who is sharing out S in an a

t

out of b

t

manner distributes

the shares to the b

t

participants. In addition this participant will

distribute the ancillary information that will used to verify the

correctness of these shares.

for all r

S

jr,i

P

jr

xxxpubInfo_RSSD_S

i

generated and distributed

Resharing a Share - Share Verication RSSV The ancillary

information provided in RSSD is rst veried by each par-

ticipant. Upon verication, the ancillary information is used

by each legislator to verify the correctness of their share

of S. The verication procedure is devised so that with

overwhelming probability it can be determined that a recipient

has received a valid share this is achieved via a verication

and complaint protocol.

for all r

xxxverify(

S

jr,i

, i, pubInfo_RSSD_S

i

, pubInfo) = true

V. ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION

We assume for the sake of simplicity that all legislative

decisions are made according to majority rules

6

. The result

is that the set of participants L

t

wish to abstain, so we must go

from a k

t

out of n

t

threshold scheme to a k

t

out of n

t

where

k

t

=

nt

2

| +1; k

t

=

n

t

2

|+1; n

t

= n

t

n

Lt

; and k

t

= k

t

k

Lt

.

The change in threshold must occur after message m

t

has been

unblinded. Consequently we have a set of participants L

t

who

can act based on the knowledge of this information.

A. A rst attempt at a solution

To achieve a transfer after abstention, any k

Lt

of the set

abstainers L

t

share out their partial signature in a k

t

k

Lt

out of n

t

n

Lt

manner by applying the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV

protocol to share out their share. Once L

t

has completed their

application of the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol, then all n

t

participants possess 1+ k

Lt

shares. Due to the manner in

which the shares will be combined, the n

t

participants cannot

compress their shares. We clarify with an example.

Example V.1. Suppose we have a majority rules in a 100

person legislature. At time t, there are n

t

= 83 members

present. Thus k

t

is 42. Consequently any set of 42 legislators

can sign m

t

, for example

Sign(M, privKey) =

42

i=1

S

i,B

i

5

The scalar

j,

B

is dened as

j,

B

=

B

j=i

0 x

j

x

i

x

j

.

S

j,i

denotes the

share of the partial signature S

i

distributed to participant P

j

by participant

P

i

.

6

Majority rules is not a required assumption, this assumption makes it easier

to describe the protocol

0-7695-2268-8/05/$20.00 (C) 2005 IEEE

Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2005

5

where B = P

1

, . . . , P

42

,

i,B

is the appropriate scalar and

S

i

is participant P

i

s partial signature.

Suppose n

Lt

= 6 wish to abstain. Let us assume without

loss of generality that P

1

, . . . , P

6

abstain. Let us also assume

that P

1

, P

2

, P

3

were the abstaining members that were selected

to share out their share S

i

. So each S

i

(for i = 1, 2, 3) is shared

out in a 39 out of 77 manner to the participants P

7

, . . . , P

83

.

Now suppose

B = P

7

, . . . , P

45

wish to sign the message.

Then S

u

=

45

i=7

i,

B

u,i

where

B = P

7

, . . . , P

45

7

. Conse-

quently

Sign(M, privKey)

=

45

i=7

S

i,B

i

45

i=7

i,

B

1,B

1,i

45

i=7

i,

B

2,B

2,i

45

i=7

i,

B

3,B

3,i

where B = P

1

, P

2

, P

3

B and

B = P

7

, . . . , P

45

. So

Sign(M, privKey)

=

45

i=7

S

i,B

i

S

i,

B

1,B

1,i

S

i,

B

2,B

2,i

S

i,

B

3,B

3,i

.

Problems with this solution

The k

Lt

abstainers P

1

, P

2

, P

3

that participated in the

RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol have documented that they will

abstain. That is, there is a record in terms of information

distributed that they abstained, in many cases the information

would have been broadcasted (this would be the ancillary

information that is used in the verication RSSD+RSSV part

of the protocol). However, there is no record that the other

n

Lt

k

Lt

participants P

4

, P

5

, P

6

abstained. In fact there

is nothing that would stop them from participating in the

vote and be on record as a yes voter. (Although in our

model, if an abstainer backs out and decides to vote they

can only contribute to passing a m

t

that would have been

passed without their vote.) However in this protocol, if a

abstainer who participated in the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV part

of the protocol tries to vote yes (i.e. backs out on being

an abstainer) there is a record that they abstained and so

they will not be given credit for voting yes. The problem

with allowing the n

Lt

k

Lt

participants to participate in the

vote is that the threshold has been lowered to 39 because

they announced they were abstaining. If just one of them

decides to reenter as a voter then the threshold should be 40,

however according to this protocol 39 will be able to pass the

legislation. Another problem with this protocol in that each of

the n

t

participants will now have a share 1+k

Lt

the size of the

original share. Lastly, there must be communication that takes

place to determine who will abstain because it is required

that the abstainers know n

Lt

. The latter two problems are

insignicant in comparison to the rst.

B. A second attempt at a solution

The rst attempt failed due to the fact that the n

Lt

k

Lt

participants have not participated and there does not exist any

public information that documents that they have abstained.

7

S

u,i

denotes the partial signature distributed to participant Pu by partic-

ipant P

i

where i = 1, 2, 3.

We now address this problem. In a k out of n threshold signa-

ture application, it is possible that more than k participants will

send their partial signatures. In such a case, a combiner will

select k veried partial signatures and compute the signature.

In our second attempt at a solution, rather than having only

k

Lt

participate in the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol, we have

all n

Lt

abstainers participate in the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV

protocol. By doing so there is a public record that all n

Lt

have abstained.

So we have all n

Lt

abstainers share out their shares using

the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol in a k

t

k

Lt

out of n

t

n

Lt

manner and send those shares to the non-abstainers. In this

case, each of n

t

n

Lt

abstainers have received n

Lt

shares, so

each possess 1 + n

Lt

shares. Again these participants cannot

compress their shares.

To compute the signature it will require that the k

t

partic-

ipants (non-abstainers) send their partial signatures. However

when these participants send their partial signatures they will

send two partial signatures, one their original and the other the

correct combination of the abstainers shares(see example

below). The combiner will have veried partial signatures.

When the combiner creates the signature, the actual number

of valid partial signatures that the combiner will have received

will be k

t

+n

Lt

which exceeds k

t

. So the combiner will discard

n

Lt

k

Lt

of the non-abstainers original partial signatures and

compute the signature.

Example V.2. Suppose we have a majority rules in a 100

person legislature. At time t, there are n

t

= 83 members

present. Thus k

t

is 42. Consequently any set of 42 legislators

can sign m

t

, for example

Sign(M, privKey) =

42

i=1

S

i,B

i

where B = P

1

, . . . , P

42

,

and S

i

is participant P

i

s partial signature.

Now suppose that n

Lt

= 6 participants wish to abstain.

Thus in this example k

Lt

= 3. Again assume that P

1

, . . . , P

6

abstain. So each S

i

(for i = 1, . . . , 6) is shared out in

a 39 out of 77 manner to the participants P

7

, . . . , P

83

.

Suppose that the set

B = P

7

, . . . , P

45

wishes to vote

for the message. First observe that S

u

=

45

i=7

i,

B

u,i

where

B = P

7

, . . . , P

45

. Therefore each P

i

B will send S

i,B

i

and

6

u=1

S

u,B

i,

B

u,i

where B = P

1

, . . . , P

6

B. Now the

combiner selects 36 = 39 (6 3) = k

t

(n

Lt

k

Lt

) of the

original partial signatures S

i,B

i

. Assume that the combiner

selected P

7

, . . . P

42

. Then

Sign(M, privKey)

=

42

i=7

S

i,B

i

45

i=7

u=1

S

u,B

i,

B

u,i

.

Problems with this solution

There is a problem with this solution in the case of a cheat-

ing abstainer. If an abstainer is caught cheating, then they de-

nitely should not be characterized as an abstainer. That is sup-

pose P

6

was caught cheating during the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV

protocol, then n

Lt

becomes 5. In our example this will affect

k

Lt

, under the premise that P

6

is caught cheating, k

Lt

changes

to 2 and k

t

becomes 40. However given the information

0-7695-2268-8/05/$20.00 (C) 2005 IEEE

Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2005

6

distributed in the protocol, any 39 of the non-abstainers can

compute the partial signatures of P

1

, . . . , P

5

. Altogether

these 39 would control 39 +5 partial signatures and hence they

can sign. But k

t

would be 40. The problem with this solution

is that a cheating abstainer would be treated as an abstainer.

There is another problem with this protocol in that each of the

n

t

participants will now have a share 1 +n

Lt

the size of the

original share. Lastly there must be communication that takes

place to determine who will abstain because it is required that

the abstainers know n

Lt

.

VI. THE THIRD ATTEMPT A PARTIAL SOLUTION

This attempt at a solution does not require the abstainer

to determine n

Lt

, and so the extra communication that the

previous attempts at a solution required will not be needed.

Assume we have applied the Veriable Democracy protocol

and achieved k

t

out of n

t

scheme. If a participant wishes

to abstain they wait until the rst abstainer completes their

communications and then they share out their partial signature

in a k

t,1

out of n

t,1

manner using the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV

protocol. Here n

t,1

= n

t

1 and k

t,1

is the appropriate

threshold (it will either be k

t

or k

t

1 depending if n

t

was

odd or even). If another participant wishes to abstain they

share out their partial signature in a k

t,2

out of n

t,2

manner

using the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol where n

t,2

= n

t,1

1

and k

t,2

is the appropriate threshold (either k

t,1

or k

t,1

1).

Once the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol has been completed,

if k

t,2

k

t,1

< 0 then this abstainer broadcasts the share dis-

tributed from the rst abstainer, otherwise (if k

t,2

k

t,1

0)

they broadcast nothing. The remaining participants can verify

its correctness using the RSSV protocol and the ancillary

information that was provided by the rst abstainer within

the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol. (This participant is not

considered a true abstainer unless this broadcasted share is

veried.) This continues in this manner, until the last abstainer

has shared out their partial signature. Here the last abstainer

broadcasts each share it received from the previous abstainers

or nothing depending if k

t,nL

t

k

t,nL

t

1

< 0 or not. Again,

each of these shares can be veried (using information from a

previous RSSG+RSSD+RSSV session). This last abstainer is

not treated as an abstainer until all shares are veried. If n

Lt

represents the number of abstainers then each of the k

t

non-

abstainers will have received n

Lt

shares (they also possess

their own partial signature). As before, these participants can-

not compress their shares. In addition to the shares possessed

by the participants, there exists the broadcasted shares that

will need to be used. The total number of broadcasted shares

is on the order of O(n

2

Lt

) (a better approximation would be

n

2

L

t

4

). To clarify consider the following example.

Example VI.1. Suppose we have a majority rules in a 100

person legislature. At time t, there are n

t

= 83 members

present. Thus k

t

is 42. Consequently any set of 42 legislators

can sign m

t

, for example signature of m

t

=

42

i=1

S

i,B

i

where B = P

1

, . . . , P

42

, and S

i

is the partial signature.

Now suppose n

Lt

= 6 participants wish to abstain. Again

assume that P

1

, . . . , P

6

abstain. P

1

shares out their partial sig-

nature in a 42 out of 82 manner using the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV

protocol. P

2

shares out their partial signature in a 41 out of

81 manner using the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol. Once the

verication has been completed, P

2

broadcasts its share

S

2,1

that it received from P

1

. (This share

S

2,1

is veried by all

participants.) P

3

shares out their partial signature 41 out of

80 manner using the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol. P

4

shares

out their partial signature in a 40 out of 79 manner using

the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol and then broadcasts all 3

shares distributed to them by the rst three abstainers. P

5

shares out their partial signature n a 40 out of 78 manner

using the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol. Finally, P

6

shares

out their partial signature in a 39 out of 77 manner using the

RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol. Once the verication has been

completed, P

6

broadcasts one at a time

S

6,1

,

S

6,2

, . . . ,

S

6,5

.

The set of broadcasted shares is

S

i,j

: i = 2, 4, 6, 1 j <

i. The total number of broadcasted shares is 1+3+5 = 6

2

/4

(here n

Lt

= 6).

It is clear that the set

B = P

7

, . . . , P

45

can sign the

message m

t

, since they possess their partial signatures, as well

they have the information to compute the partial signatures for

P

1

, . . . , P

6

. Hence they possess 38+6 = 44 > 42 = k

t

partial

signatures.

Problems with this solution

The main problem with this attempt is that there is an attack,

but the attack will be detected by the Veriable Democracy

protocol. Let us discuss the attack. Suppose that P

7

provides

to a coalition of 38 (perhaps their political party or faction)

all the shares they received from the other abstainers, but P

7

does NOT share their partial signature. That is, P

7

is willing

to help this coalition of 38 to pass the legislation but P

7

does

not want to publicly vote yes to this legislation (perhaps P

7

fears retribution from their constituents if they vote on m

t

).

The result is that P

7

provides help to pass the message without

voting for it. With this help from P

7

, this coalition of 38 will

be able to sign the message, yet they never used P

7

s share.

We now point out that the Veriable Democracy protocol will

require that shares sent to be combined need to be veried and

so the this will be detected. There is another problem with this

protocol in that each of the n

t

participants will now have a

share O(1 +

nL

t

(nL

t

+1)

2

) the size of the original share.

Improving the partial solution

According to our model, the abstainers should have doc-

umentation that they abstain. Yet in all of our previous

attempts this documentation never appears in the signature.

The improvement that we make to our third attempt will

incorporate the abstainers into the signature. Here will modify

what we mean by a signature and how we verify signature

(what it means to say a law is passed). Abstainers will follow

the same procedure described above. If a participant wishes

to abstain they share out their partial signature in a k

t,1

out of n

t,1

manner using the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol.

0-7695-2268-8/05/$20.00 (C) 2005 IEEE

Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2005

7

Here n

t,1

= n

t

1 and k

t,1

is the appropriate threshold

(it will either be k

t

or k

t

1 depending if n

t

was odd or

even). If another participant wishes to abstain they share out

their partial signature in a k

t,2

out of n

t,2

manner using

the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol where n

t,2

= n

t,1

1 and

k

t,2

is the appropriate threshold (either k

t,1

or k

t,1

1).

Once the RSSG+RSSD+RSSV protocol has been completed,

if k

t,2

k

t,1

< 0 then this abstainer broadcasts the share

distributed from the rst abstainer otherwise (if k

t,2

k

t,1

0)

they broadcast nothing. We continue in this manner until the

last abstainer has completed the required operations. Again

assume that n

Lt

is the number of abstainers. Once a call for

votes is made each yes voter will submit both their partial

signature as well as the combination of the shares distributed

to them by the abstainers. Let B denote the set of yes

voters and let denote the number of partial signatures sent

to the combiner (this includes both the partial signatures held

by the participants in B as well as the partial signatures of

the abstainers). Then if the combiner use the [B[ original

partial signatures as well as the n

Lt

(result of manipulating

the combinations) many abstainers partial signatures then the

combiner will possess = [B[ +n

Lt

partial signatures. Thus

the signature can be generated if [B[ k

t,nL

t

which implies

that = [B[ + n

Lt

k

t,nL

t

+ n

Lt

k

t

. Dene by

k

t,nL

t

+ n

Lt

= k

t

+ . The combiner now selects + 1

many participants who have submitted (perhaps in proxy) their

partial signatures, this set is denoted by P

i1

, ..., P

i+1

(this

could include, by proxy, the abstainers since the abstainers par-

tial signatures were submitted by the [B[ many yes voters).

Then for each j = 1, . . . , + 1 using the partial signatures

from

(B L

t

) P

i1

, ..., P

i+1

P

ij

, the combiner can

compute the signature of m

t

. The law is passed provided that

all of the + 1 reconstructed threshold signatures turn out

to be a veried signature. This verify function will dene

what it means to say that a law m

t

is passed (i.e. that the

signature is veried). The attack described earlier is no longer

relevant, since the coalition of 38 will not be able to pass the

legislation, unless P

7

actually is willing to send their partial

signature which implies that they commit to a yes vote.

VII. CONCLUSION

We have described a partial solution to abstaining in an

electronic legislature. A minority can attempt to generate a

signature of a message/law but they would be detected. We

have provided a remedy by re-thinking the interpretation

of what it means for a message to become law. As we

have noted, a single legislature any require both absolute

majority type votes as well as simple majority type votes. It is

awkward to have two different solutions. In particular the real

awkwardness is to have two distinct ways to verify that the

vote has passed the message. Future work will be to develop

abstention schemes for absolute majority and simple majority

whose verication protocol are identical. Other future work

will include implementing, enhancing, and developing an e-

legislature prototype which supports the Veriable Democracy

protocol as well as supporting protocols that support absten-

tion. The nal outcome is expected to support a real-time e-

legislature.

REFERENCES

[1] B. Chor, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and B. Awerbuch. Veriable

secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults.

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th

IEEE Symposium on the Foundations of

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[2] M. Burmester. Homomorphisms of secret sharing scheme: a tool for

veriable signature sharing In Proc. of Eurocrypt96, Lecture Notes in

Computer Science, LNCS 1070, Springer Verlag, pages 96-105,1996.

[3] Continuity of government commision. 2002.

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[4] Y. Desmedt and Y. Frankel. Homomorphic zero-knowledge threshold

schemes over any nite Abelian group SIAM J. on Discrete Math.,

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[14] T. Pederson. A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party In

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[15] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adelman. A method for obtaining digital

signatures and public key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM, 21, pages

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[16] Roberts Rules of Order Revised.

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0-7695-2268-8/05/$20.00 (C) 2005 IEEE

Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2005

8

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