1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

JOHN GABRIEL GAMBOA, FACTS: the defendant-appellant John Gabriel Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder together with Miguel Celdran in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. After arraignment but during the trial, the case against Celdran was dismissed. Thereafter, a decision was rendered on August 30, 1989, finding Gamboa guilty of the crime of murder as penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P30,000.00, with costs against him. The fatal weapon, a shotgun, was ordered forfeited in favor of the government. 1 The defendant-appellant interposed this appeal from said judgment alleging that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES CRISTINA SOLEDAD, ENRICO ACRE AND MARIO GASCON. ISSUE: WON the testimonies of the witnesses are admisible against the accused. HELD: By and large, the Court is not persuaded that the appellant's claim of contradictions and inconsistencies on the part of the prosecution witnesses puts into serious doubt their credibility, Different persons who witnessed an incident from different angles and situations could not be expected to give uniform details of what they saw and heard. Such minor discrepancies and inconsistencies are to be expected because of the human differences in perception. Such contradicting statements are on minor details, as hereinabove discussed, and rather than affect the credibility of the witnesses, the same are badges of candor. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the sole modification that the indemnity to the heirs of the offended party is increased to P50,000.00, with costs against the appellant. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chairman of the Philippine National Police for his information and appropriate action on the actuations of the law enforcement agents hereinabove discussed. 2. People vs. Duero Facts:Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide and sentenced to death for the killing of his grandmother after robbing her. His conviction was based on a testimony of the Chief of Police that the defendant voluntarily confessed to him to the killing and robbery, although he refused to sign a statement. HELD: In Miranda v. Arizona, it was held that in custodial investigation the suspect must be given the following warnings: 1)He must be informed of his right to remain silent, in order to make him aware of the right, to overcome the inherent pressures of interrogation atmosphere, and to assure him that his interrogators are prepared to respect his privilege should he choose to exercise it; 2) He must be warned that anything said can and will be used against him in order to him aware not only of the privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it; 3) He has a right to counsel and that if is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. These warnings were not given to defendant. His oral confession, therefore is inadmissible.

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO LAYUSO FACTS: On or about the 14th day of October 1980, in the municipality of Pateros, Metro Manila, robbed the house of Cesar C. Avila, and on the said occasion, assault and stab one Lucresia R. Dagsaan with bladed weapons (knives), which directly caused her death. Upon arraignment on April 22, 1981, the accused assisted by a counsel-de-oficio, pleaded "NOT GUILTY." The accused-appellant contends that the prosecution has failed to prove that the articles allegedly stolen were in fact in the house of Cesar Avila and it was the appellant who took them. He states that the finding was based on his extra-judicial statement which he claims was extracted through the use of force and intimidation. The appellant admits that the confession was taken in the presence of counsel, a certain Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr. However, he states that the counsel was not present during the custodial interrogation which preceded the taking down of his statement. He also questions the sufficiency of the lawyer's representation. He states in his appeal that the lawyer should have participated by also asking him questions. HELD: We rule that the constitutional requirement on assistance of counsel was fulfilled. There is no claim or showing that the accused asked for a lawyer from the moment he was apprehended or that he was not informed of his right to counsel from the time that the warning or information should have been given to him or that the alleged earlier questioning was already part of his confession. The appeal is hazy on these points. What is established was the presence of counsel during the taking of the confession. The attempt to now discredit him has no merit. If the lawyer decided against advising the accused not to admit the crime, he was only complying with his oath as a lawyer to abide by the truth and with the expressed desire of the accused to unburden his conscience of the load it was carrying. This Court denounces in the strongest terms possible the widespread misconception that the presence of a lawyer under the "right to counsel" provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extra-judicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth. 4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.DAVID LOVERIA y SANTOS FACTS: On or about the 21st day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with three (3) John Does whose true name, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with a knife, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hold-up a passenger jeepney; that on the occasion of said robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife one Ricardo Yamson y Malanon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which directly caused his death, and one Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion the driver of the said passenger jeepney, on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds

which ordinarily would have caused his death, if not for the timely and able medical attendance rendered to him which prevented his death. Upon being arraigned on July 3, 1985, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The defense offered by the appellant is summarized by his counsel as follows: The accused David Loveria, 25 years old, a volunteer worker of the Share and Care for Poor Settlers Pastoral (SCAP for short) declared that on February 18, 1985, he was attending a live-in seminar at the Communication for Asia in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The duration of the seminar was from February 18 to February 22, 1989. Between 8:00 and 8:30 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1985, upon permission from their training officer, he went to the Farmers Market in Cubao to ask money from his mother for transportation fare for the following day. When he failed to meet his mother, he decided to go back to the Communication Foundation for Asia. Fortunately, at the loading zone for passenger vehicles bound for Sta. Mesa, he met his father who gave him money. After that, he went back to the Communication Foundation for Asia and stayed there the whole evening After trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty as charged. From this judgment of conviction, the appellant filed the present appeal. The first issue raised by the appellant pertains to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Cerilo Manzanero, the driver because of its improbability. HELD: The contention is without merit. It is true that Manzanero could have been stabbed by the appellant while the former was at the driver's seat. But neither was it improbable for appellant to have stabbed Manzanero in the manner described by the latter and corroborated by witnesses Apolinario and Bales. The motive which impelled the appellant and his companions in pulling Manzanero out of the driver's seat and stabbing him at the inner rear portion of the jeepney is known only to them. The Court will not speculate as to why the appellant and his companions executed the crime in the manner that they did. Crimes are known to have been executed in odd and unusual ways. But in the instant case, the Court is of the considered view that there was nothing strange nor improbable in tile testimony of Manzanero. Moreover, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses that the accused committed the crime WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. 5. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO TAYLARAN FACTS: At about 10:00 P.M. of November 5, 1976 accused called at the house of deceased Ofremia Atup y Sarabosing located in barrio Binliw, Ubay, Bohol for the purpose of submitting himself to the latter for treatment of his snake-bite located at this left foot. His announced purpose being good, the deceased opened the door for him. Once inside, the deceased took her medicine paraphernalia (she being a local quack doctor) and started treating the accused. Then all of a sudden the accused drew his small bolo and stabbed the deceased several times causing her to fall on the floor dead. After killing the deceased, accused proceeded to the house of the son of the deceased for the purpose of killing him and his wife but accused did not accomplish his purpose because the deceased's son refused to left him enter his house. After that the accused surrendered himself with his bolo to policeman Demetrio Basilad who was

then on guard at the municipal hall of Ubay. When asked why he killed the deceased who was also his grandmother-in-law, accused answered, 'because she promised to kill me with a 'barang', hence killed her first. Appellant has also invoked the provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution in trying to block the admission of his declaration to Pat. Basilad that he killed Ofremia Atup because of her alleged vow to kill him by witchcraft, contending that the safeguards therefor have not been made available to him. The cited provision reads: Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against himself. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. HELD: The applicability of the foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases like the print where no written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. What was testified to is only what appellant told the police why he is surrendering to them. It is but natural for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It can hardly be said that under such circumstance, the surrendered is already "under investigation within the meaning of the constitutional provision. As the Solicitor General correctly observes on the circumstances of this case: "If however, he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he surrendered to admit the killing, the constitutional safeguards to be informed of his rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked." In any case, as previously pointed out, another witness, Juanita Busalla, who is not a policeman also testified to appellant telling her when he was already in jail, that he killed Ofremia Atup because of her promise to kill him by means of witchcraft, the same declaration he supposedly made to Pat. Basilad, upon surrendering after the killing. The constitutional safeguard invoked can have no application to Juanita's testimony on what appellant told her not in the course of a police investigation. Verily, the issue is one of credibility. The lower court gave more of it to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. We find no reason to disturb the lower court's appreciation of the relative credibility of the opposing witnesses. Moreover, appellant having admitted the killing, the burden of proving the exempting circumstance he has invoked in his defense calls for clear and convincing evidence, as is required of similar defenses as that of self-defense. This, he failed dismally to fulfill. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs. 6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. BERNARDINODOMANTAY FACTS:Appellant, 29 years old, was charged with rape with homicide for the death of Jennifer Domantay, a 6-year old girl whose body was found in abamboo grove with 38 stab wounds at the back and whose hymen wascompletely lacerated on the right side, though found fully clothed in blueshorts and white shirt. The trial court found appellant guilty as charged and was sentenced to death.Conviction was based primarily on the testimonies of SPO1 Espinoza andCelso Manuel, a radio reporter. SPO1 Espinoza testified that appellantconfessed to the killing of Jennifer and disclosed to him the location of the bayonet used which was submitted as evidence for the prosecution.According to him, appellant waived assistance of counsel but the waiver was not put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel.

On the other hand,Manuel declared that appellant, in an interview, admitted the brutal killing of Jennifer; that he was just outside the cell when he interviewed appellant accompanied by his uncle inside the jail, that the nearest policemen wereabout 2-3 meters from him and that no lawyer assisted appellant during theinterview. Also presented as a witness was Dr. Bandonill, medico-legalexpert of the NBI, who testified that it was possible that the lacerations onthe victim could have been caused by something blunt other than the maleorgan. ISSUE: W/N the two confessions made before SPO1 Espinoza and Manuel which appellant claimed to have been obtained from him were admissible. HELD: The right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation can be waived only in writing and with assistance of counsel and that confessions or admissions obtained in violation thereof are inadmissible in evidence. However, this prohibition does not apply to confessions or admissions made to private individuals, such as radio reporters. For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the followingrequirements: (1)it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with theassistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express;and (4) it must be in writing.In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiquipolice station in the evening of October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect,in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was,therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed inArt. III, Sec 12 (1) of the Constitution applied to him. . . . But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made inthe presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and hisconfession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."However, the SC agreed with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant's confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In holding the confession admissible,despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said: [A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of theConstitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. 7. People vs. Tan FACTS: Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny

Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same. Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing. In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him. HELD: No. It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel." Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 8. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RANILLO PONCE HERMOSO FACTS:The Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, finds accused-appellant Ranillo Ponce Hermoso, alias Allan, guilty of rape with homicide. On September 11, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, was arraigned during which the information was read to him in the Cebuano dialect which he confirmed to have understood. He then

entered a plea of not guilty. He was informed by the trial court of the names of the five prosecution witnesses and their respective addresses. Then the case was tried.. On March 17, 1997, the defense manifested in open court that accused-appellant was changing his plea from not guilty to guilty. Defense counsel Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr. informed the trial court that he had prepared for trial but accused-appellant insisted on changing his plea even after being told of the consequences of pleading guilty to the charge, including the probability that he would be sentenced to death should he be found guilty. Accused-appellant maintains that, based on the evidence of the prosecution, his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Reiterating the grounds for his demurrer to the evidence, he contends that while Josephine Gonzales said she saw the victim and accused-appellant and other children pass by her house as they went towards the house of her neighbor Helen Rabasol, there was no testimony showing that he was the perpetrator of the crime. Accused-appellant also denies the testimony of Naciansino Hermoso who claimed to have found the wallet belonging to accused-appellant while looking for Glery P. Geoca. Accused-appellant avers that the wallet does not constitute direct evidence to link him to the crime. Naciansino Hermoso and accused-appellants father are brothers. Accusedappellant claims that Naciansino had a grudge against accused-appellants father because the latter had been occupying and cultivating the agricultural land of their parents to the exclusion of Naciansino. Accused-appellant alleges that Naciansino sought revenge towards accused-appellants father by testifying against accused-appellant. Accused-appellant alleges that the testimonies of Joveniano Pansacala, Dr. Atilano A. Ocampos, and Ireneo Geoca are hearsay evidence and do not prove his guilt. He argues that his confession is inadmissible in evidence because it was given without counsel while he was under custodial investigation by Barangay Captain Sonny Boy Altamera. HELD: These contentions are without merit. To be sure, a perusal of the records show that the trial court accepted accused-appellants plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea. In the present case, the records show that the trial court did not observe these safeguards to ensure that the plea of guilty is not improvidently made. There was no affidavit presented nor statement made in court to show why accused-appellant changed his plea from Not guilty to guilty. The records merely contain an order, dated March 17, 1997, allowing accused-appellant to be arraigned anew, the Certificate of Arraignment, dated March 17, 1997, and the order, likewise dated March 17, 1997, making accused-appellants plea of guilt of record. This last order states: Accused Ranillo Ponce Hermoso alias Allan having manifested in court duly assisted by his counsel to change his plea of Not Guilty to one of Guilty, the Court arraigned him anew by reading the Information in Cebuano dialect, and in open court, duly assisted by Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr., his counsel de oficio, accused entered the plea of Guilty, changing in effect his original plea of Not Guilty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and the Court having been satisfied on the voluntariness of the change of plea of Guilty from one of Not Guilty by accused Ranillo Ponce Hermoso, consider the aboveentitled case as deemed submitted for decision. 9. People vs. Jungco, 186 SCRA 714

Facts:Jungco and several others, appellants herein, were charged, tried and convicted with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. In convicting the accused, the trial court relied heavily on the extrajudicial confessions executed by them and the pictures taken during the reenactment of the crime. Appellants contend that the said extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence because they were extracted from them during the custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel and after they had been subjected to different forms of maltreatment, threats and intimidation. ISSUE: W/N the evidence were admissible. RULING: NO. The Court is convinced after going over the records that the extrajudicial confessions in question are inadmissible in evidence, the same having been executed by appellants during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, particularly when the confessants manifested the waiver of their right to counsel. The Court also finds that the pictures taken during the reenactment of the crime, are inadmissible since the reenactment was based upon the defendants' inadmissible extrajudicial confessions. Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are themselves inadmissible. 10. People vs. Olvis, Facts: Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the lower court of murder for the death of Bagon. Olvis, the alleged principal by inducement, was acquitted. The three accused were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial confessions executed by them in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI to handle appellants' case, and the reenactment done by them of the circumstances surrounding the killing. HELD: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible. They were made in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. But the accused were denied their right to counsel not once but twice when they were forced to re-enact the crime. Forced re-enactments like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination. This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion but this has since been extended to any evidence communicative in nature acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.