Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

136860 January 20, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant. PUNO, J.: Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos. Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following Information:

"That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 oclock dawn, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping with one another, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic weighing approximately eight (8) kilos, which is in violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. CONTRARY TO LAW."2
During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On October 19, 1996, at about 10 oclock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint. At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga. 3 In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black bag. Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana. To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by the appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present. The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. 4 For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga testified that in the evening of October 19,1996, she went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to their house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She was taken aback when the officer invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passengers seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver. Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by her lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by one Efren Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The sworn statement declared that at about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who boarded their Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in the companys logbook. Gannod, however, was not presented in court to attest that the woman referred in his affidavit was the appellant. After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga, thus:

"WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659, they are hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos. SO ORDERED."5
Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her brief, she assigned the following errors:

"1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and search was violated by the police officers who arrested both accused. 2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of the accused to custodial investigation was deliberately violated by the peace officers who apprehended and investigated the accused. 3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses which inconsistencies cast doubt and make incredible the contention and version of the prosecution. 4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated and considered the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution not formally offered amounting to ignorance of the law." 6
We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be dismissed. In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. In the same manner, she impugns the search made on her belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her. These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 7
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest.8 Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles.9Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.10 Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. 11 When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.12 In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused;13 (b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously;14 (c) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana; 15 (d) where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so;16 (f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong -- that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country;17 (g) where the arresting officers had received a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was established in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu with him; 18(h) where police officers received an information that the accused, who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila; 19 and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset. 20 The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellants bag was not illegal. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus:

"Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. x x x."21 (emphasis supplied)
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her. These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any confession during her custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of the appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana. We quote the relevant portion of its decision:

"Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by Judge Angel Parazo, granted bail to accused Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the confiscation receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit "C") is inadmissible because they were not assisted by a counsel. Confronted with this same issue, this court finds the postulate to rest on good authority and will therefore reiterate its inadmissibility. Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession extracted from both accused as evidence of their guilt, the court finds it needless to discuss any answer given by both accused as a result of the police interrogation while in their custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to be resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the prosecutions evidence, both accused can be convicted ."22(emphasis supplied)
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latters failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible. The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.23 All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. 24 Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. 25 Furthermore, appellants counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.26 Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. She first cites the inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who opened the black bag containing the marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag was already open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on the police officers failure to remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is improbable and contrary to human experience. Again, appellants arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to minor details and not to material points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.27 The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may have different recollections of the same incident. 28 Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to note and remember the name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in complicity with the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of the crime. To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. 29 In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting the appellant. Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.30 It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.31 The sole proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Criminal Case No. 9384. Information, Original Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 4. A male passenger was seated at the back of the tricycle driver. Exhibit E. Decision, Criminal Case No. 9484, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 21-22. Appellants Brief, p. 5; Rollo, p. 44. Art. III, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution. People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998).

The following cases are recognized in our juriprudence: warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; seizure of evidence in "plain view;" consented warrantless search; customs search; stop and frisk; and exigent and emergency circumstances.
9 10

People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994). Ibid. People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997). People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (1988). People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990). People v. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751 (1990). People v. Malmsteadt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991). People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991). People v. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325 (1994). People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995). People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 (1999). Rule 113, Section 5, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Decision, p.3; Rollo, p. 19. Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650 (1991). Exhibits "D-1" and series, TSN, August 15, 1997; TSN, October 22, 1997, pp. 2-6. People v. Mate, 103 SCRA 484 (1981). People v. Napat-a, 179 SCRA 403 (1989). People v. Inocencio, 229 SCRA 517 (1994). People v. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28 (1999).

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26

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People v. Johnson, 348 SCRA 526 (2000). Ibid. People v. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 (1998).

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31

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 171487 March 14, 2008

ERMIN DACLES Y OLEDO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision 1 dated 19 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25188 which affirmed the Decision2 dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 120, finding petitioner Ermin O. Dacles guilty of the crime of violation of Section 27, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. On 14 December 1998, petitioner, together with co-accused Federico Cleofas y Mateo, Virgilio Cardenas y Gercan, Marcelino Dueas y Yabut and Maria Fe Mendoza y Pascual, was charged before the RTC with violating Section 27, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 in Criminal Case No. C-55283. The accusatory portion of the Information reads: That on or about the 10th day of December, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, grouping themselves together did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use and sniff and pass to one another METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, without the corresponding prescription therefore and knowing the same to be a regulated drug. 3 When arraigned, petitioner and co-accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three witnesses: PO2 Jessie Caranto, Senior Inspector Juanita D. Siason of the Philippine National Police-Crime Laboratory, and PO3 Romulo Aquino. Prosecution witness PO2 Jessie Caranto of the District Intelligence Unit (DIU) Northern Police District Office, Larangay Street, Kaunlaran Village, Caloocan City, testified that on 10 December 1998 at around 8:30 in the evening, while he and his two co-police operatives, SPO2 Pascua and PO3 Romulo Aquino, were conducting a surveillance operation along Rubyville Subdivision, Caloocan City, they noticed a Toyota Tamaraw FX utility vehicle bearing Plate No. WDP-587 parked along the side of the street. In order for them not to be noticed, they slowly and cautiously approached the vehicle where they saw five persons engaging in a pot session. The team introduced themselves as police officers and then arrested the suspects. PO2 Caranto gathered the two small transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance believed to be shabu, including drug paraphernalia such as aluminum foil, tubo or pipe and a disposable lighter obtained from the suspects. The suspects and the vehicle were brought to the police headquarters at Larangay Street, Kaunlaran Village, Caloocan City. The confiscated items were turned over to SPO1 Rolando Pascua. PO2 Caranto said it was SPO1 Pascua who gave the confiscated items to the police investigator, SPO2 Marlon Orquia, and that the latter was the one who put the markings on the confiscated materials. The recovered crystalline substance was brought to the PNP-Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for examination. During the investigation conducted by the police officers, the suspects gave their names as Ermin Dacles, Virgilio Cardenas, Marcelino Dueas, Federico Cleofas and Marie Fe Mendoza. PO3 Romulo Aquino, a member of the team conducting surveillance operation in Sta. Quiteria, Caloocan City, said he and a certain PO1 Soreta stayed outside the Rubyville Subdivision while SPO1 Rolando Pascua, PO2 Jessie Caranto and some members of the Bantay Bayan were the ones who entered the subdivision. He admitted that he did not see the suspects inside the Tamaraw FX engaging in pot session as he was far from the said vehicle.4 Upon examination by the forensic analyst, Senior Inspector Juanita D. Siason of the Philippine National Police-Crime Laboratory, the contents of the two plastic heat-sealed transparent sachets were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." The prosecution dispensed with the testimony of SPO2 Marlon Orquia and in lieu thereof, it entered into stipulations with the counsel of the accused the following facts: (1) that SPO2 Marlon Orquia was the investigator of the case; and (2) that SPO2 Orquia was the one who prepared the letter requesting a forensic examination of the contents of the two plastic sachets.5

The defense, on the other hand, presented Federico Cleofas, Virgilio Cardenas and appellant Ermin Dacles. All of them put up a defense of denial and frame-up. Accused Federico Cleofas (Federico) testified that at around 7:30 in the evening of 10 December 1998, while he was in the store of his nephew located inside Rubyville Subdivision, Caloocan City, drinking a bottle of softdrink and having a chat with his nephew, a Toyota Tamaraw FX which was driven by accused Marcelo Dueas, arrived.6 Accused Virgilio Cardenas and Ermin Dacles were on board the vehicle together with four armed police officers wearing civilian clothes. As the policemen alighted from the vehicle and were going to his direction, Federico, scared of the unfamiliar-looking policemen, ran towards the house of his childhood buddy named Aboy, also a police officer, for help. Before the pursuing police officers could arrest Federico, Aboy took him under his care. After the police officers and Aboy introduced themselves to each other, Aboy allowed the arresting officers to take with them his friend with the assurance that Federico would not be hurt.7 Federico was then escorted to the Tamaraw FX where he was handcuffed. 8 The arresting officers thereafter asked him of the exact location of his house, but before they arrived at the site Federico indicated, the police officers punched him in the abdomen, suspecting that he was lying about the exact location of his house. Federico also testified that SPO2 Pascua tried to exact from him Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) from Ermin Dacles and Virgilio Cardenas. When Federico told the police officers that he had no money, PO2 Aquino hit him on the head with a batuta.9 Thereafter, they were brought to Valenzuela, specifically E. De Leon Street, where the vehicle stopped in front of a store. SPO2 Pascua ordered Federico to call up a relative. Thereupon he contacted Natividad Cleofas, his sister, whom he apprised of his situation. SPO2 Pascua then grabbed the telephone and instructed Natividad Cleofas to proceed to the Langaray Police Station and bring with her P20,000.00 in exchange for Federicos liberty.10 After the call, they boarded the Tamaraw FX and, while on their way, the police officers picked up accused Ma. Fe Mendoza before finally proceeding to the police station. 11 When Federico was physically examined by a physician, he did not divulge to the doctor that he had a contusion in the head caused by the batuta. Virgilio Cardenas (Virgilio) also denied the allegations of the prosecution. He testified that on 10 December 1998, at around 7:00 to 8:00 oclock in the evening, while waiting for a ride home at Sta. Quiteria, Caloocan City, a Tamaraw FX stopped in front of him with its occupants beckoning him inside. 12 Virgilio boarded and saw Marcelino Dueas and Ermin Dacles inside the vehicle.13 When they passed through the police check-point at the Tullahan Road, the policemen manning the checkpoint flagged them down.14 Police officer Pascua, who was in uniform, frisked the three of them. Police officer Pascua informed them that he was actually looking for a certain person and Marcelino Dueas volunteered that he knew the person the police officer was looking for.15 The police officers thus boarded the Tamaraw FX. Upon reaching Rubyville subdivision, he saw the person the policemen were looking for running away from the police officers. The police officers caught him and brought him inside the Tamaraw FX. Thereafter, they proceeded to Valenzuela where the police officers arrested a certain Fe Mendoza. All of the accused were brought to the Langaray Police Headquarters. Ermin Dacles (Ermin) declared that in the evening of 10 December 1998, he was at Sta. Quiteria Street, Caloocan City, waiting for a tricycle ride. 16 Marcelino Dueas gave Ermin a ride in the formers Tamaraw FX. When Ermin boarded the vehicle, he noticed that Marcelino Dueas was with Virgilio Cardenas. Along the way, three police officers, two of whom Ermin recognized as PO3 Romulo A. Aquino and PO2 Jessie Caranto, stopped and searched the vehicle and then eventually boarded it. The group then proceeded to Rubyville Subdivision where the police officers chased and arrested Federico Cleofas. 17 The police officers and the arrested individuals thereafter went to Valenzuela. There the police officers picked up Fe Mendoza. The police then brought all of them to the Larangay Police Headquarters, Caloocan City. While on their way to the police station, SPO1 Pascua demanded from Ermin and the rest of the apprehended men inside the vehicle the amount of P50,000.00. For his part, Ermin replied he had no money.18 After weighing the evidence presented by the parties, the RTC was of the belief that the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the petitioner and other accused of the crime charged. It gave full credence to the version of the prosecution and brushed aside the defenses of denial and frame-up interposed by the appellant and his companions. Thus, it convicted all of them of the offense charged and imposed upon them the indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum, and to pay the fine of P100.00 each, viz: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ERMIN DACLES y OLEDO, VIRGILIO CARDENAS y GERCAN, MARCELINO DUEAS y YABUT, FEDERICO CLEOFAS y MATEO and MA. FE MENDOZA y PASCUAL GUILTY of the offense charged and sentencing them to suffer a penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day as minimum to six years each as maximum of prision correccional. The Court orders all the accused to pay P100.00 each as fine to OCC, RTC, Caloocan City.19 Only petitioner Ermin Dacles and Federico Cleofas filed a notice of appeal.20 The RTC ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on 19 August 2005, promulgated its Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC convicting appellant and the other accused therein. 21 It, however, modified the penalty by reducing the same to 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as maximum. It deleted the fine of P100.00. The dispositive part of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by REDUCING the penalty to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and DELETING the fine of P100.00.22 On 9 September 2005, Ermin Dacles and Federico Cleofas filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 7 February 2006. Hence, the instant petition filed by Ermin Dacles. In his Memorandum, the petitioner raises a single issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 27, ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425. 23 Petitioner faults the RTC and the Court of Appeals in giving full credence to the testimony of PO2 Caranto who testified that he saw petitioner and his companions engaged in a pot session. Petitioner stresses that PO2 Carantos testimony should not have been believed since said testimony was not even corroborated by prosecution witness PO2 Romulo Aquino. Petitioner argues that the RTC and the Court of Appeals cannot use the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions in convicting petitioner since the said principle cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. He insists that although the defense of alibi and denial are weak, it is still the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt to support a judgment of conviction.

He also maintains that he deserves an acquittal since there exists a doubt as to whether the items confiscated from them, assuming arguendo that the prosecutions theory were true, were the same specimens submitted for laboratory examination and which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. According to petitioner, there is a possibility that switching of evidence could occur and that the specimens seized from them were not the same items subjected to laboratory examination. The Office of the Solicitor General avers that the questions involving the alleged testimonial veracity or credibility are inappropriate in the instant petition as only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review. It also assails appellants belated attempt of raising as an issue for the first time the identity of the confiscated items. It states that the identity of the shabu should have been questioned at the trial stage to afford the prosecution reasonable opportunity to meet such objection. Since this issue was not raised before the RTC nor before the Court of Appeals, appellant cannot raise the same before this Court. We deal first with the argument raised by the Office of the Solicitor General that it is too late for petitioner to raise the issue on the identity of the confiscated shabu. The long-standing precept is that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review. 24 The reviewing tribunal can correct errors though unassigned in the appeal, or even reverse the trial courts decision on grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.25 In People v. Dorimon,26 appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm. On appeal before the Court, appellant failed to raise the issue of failure of the prosecution to prove his non-possession of a license to possess a firearm. Notwithstanding this, the Court took cognizance of the issue. Likewise, in People v. Galigao, 27appellant was found by the trial court guilty of rape on three counts. On automatic review, appellant raised for the first time before the Court the defense of insanity. The Court addressed the issue consistent with the dictum that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review and the reviewing court may correct errors even if they have not been assigned. With these cases as guideposts, petitioner is legally allowed to raise an issue which was not raised before the RTC or the Court of Appeals. Despite this ruling, however, the Court finds no compelling reason to acquit petitioner in the instant case. The bone of contention in this case is the credibility of the parties and their witnesses. This Court will not disturb the judgment of the trial court in assessing the credibility of the witnesses, unless there appears in the records some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted by the trial court. This is because the trial judge has the unique opportunity, denied to the appellate court, to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under direct and cross-examination. In this case, the evidence in the records fully supports the trial courts finding that petitioner violated Section 27, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425. Petitioner and his companions were sniffing shabu inside the Tamaraw FX parked in a street inside Rubyville Subvidivision. PO2 Jessie Caranto was able to observe from a distance of two meters what petitioner and his cohorts were doing inside the vehicle, as the vehicle had transparent glass windows and considering that the vehicle was parked within five meters of a lit Meralco post. When PO2 Caranto and his companions took custody of the suspects, they obtained from the latter two sachets of shabu and the paraphernalia used in the pot session. PO2 Caranto unwaveringly narrated the incident as follows:

A: When we conducted a surveillance at Rubyville Subdivision, Caloocan City sir we found one (1) Tamaraw FX Van bearing Plate No. WDP-587 parked along the street, sir. Q: Where is this located? A: At Rubyville Subdivision, Caloocan City, sir. Q: Now, you mentioned about one Tamaraw FX Van WDP-587, what is this Tamaraw FX doing? A: There were unidentified male persons on board that Tamaraw FX engaged in pot session sir. Q: The first time you saw this van or this Tamaraw FX vehicle, where were you Mr. Witness? A: I am near the Tamaraw FX maybe two (2) meters away, sir. xxxx Q: This Tamaraw FX has glasses on the sidings? A: Transparent, sir. Q: So you can easily identify the persons inside the Tamaraw FX? A: Yes, sir. xxxx Q: What did you do when you saw the parked Tamaraw FX? A: We introduced ourselves as law men and assigned at the DIU and arrested them. xxxx Q: With this two (2) meters distance, what were these persons doing at that time?

A: x x x they were using drugs known as shabu. xxxx Q After seeing the persons sniffing the prohibited drugs you mentioned, what did your team do next? A: We arrested them x x x. xxxx Q: And what did they do? A: They opened the door of the vehicle sir. Q: And after they opened the vehicle what did you see inside? A: We saw the paraphernalias and we confiscated all the evidence. xxxx Q: And, where did you gather the evidence? A: Paraphernalias, sir. Q: Will you describe these paraphernalias Mr. Witness? A: Two (2) small transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, aluminum foil, tubo or pipe, lighter. xxxx Q: So there are only two (2) plastic sachets allegedly containing shabu? A: Yes, sir. Q: And you were the one who retrieved the paraphernalias from the five (5) persons? A: Yes, sir. Q: And police officers Pascua and Chua what were they doing then? A: They brought the other accused to our office for further investigation. Q: How about the vehicle the Tamaraw FX? A: It is already impounded, sir. Q: Were you able to know the persons brought to your station Mr. Witness? A: Yes, sir. Q: Will you tell us the names of these persons if you can remember? A: I cannot remember their names, sir. Q: Can you recall their faces Mr. Witness? A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you identify them if you see them? Are they inside the courtroom this morning? A: Yes, sir.28
On cross-examination, PO2 Caranto described the relative positions of the suspects inside the vehicle when they were arrested:

Q: Mr. Witness can you tell us who were [seated] at the back, in the middle and front portion of the vehicle? A: The four of them and the other one is the driver. Ermin Dacles is [seated] at the middle portion of the vehicle. Q: What about Cardenas, where was he [seated]? A: In the middle portion sir. Q: What about Maria Fe Mendoza where was she [seated]? A: At the back portion sir. Q: So what about Cleofas? A: I saw him with Maria Fe Mendoza sir. Q: So, what about Dueas? A: He is the driver sir. Court: Where did you come from, behind the parked Tamaraw FX or in front of the parked Tamaraw FX? A: From the front portion of the vehicle sir. Q: And despite the fact you came from the front side you were [not] noticed by Dueas in the drivers seat? A: No, sir he was "nakayuko." Q: While you chanced upon the parked Tamaraw FX vehicle and doing some surveillance who among the accused in this case that you noticed which lead you to approach the vehicle? A: The four (4) of them. Q: Mr. Witness, who among the accused did you notice that made you approached the vehicle? A: The four (4) of them were [seated] at the back. Q: Was the FX parked in a dark place? A: It was lighted sir. Q: How far from the Meralco post if there was a Meralco post? A: About five (5) meters away. Q: And will you describe what was their respective positions? A: Yes, sir. Q: What were they doing? A: "Gumagamit sila." "May hinihithit na tubo," sir.

Q: You were not noticed when you approached them? A: No, sir because they were surprised. 29
PO3 Romulo Aquino corroborated the testimony of PO2 Caranto that indeed there was a police surveillance conducted inside Rubyville Subdivision. Although PO3 Aquino admitted that he was stationed outside the subdivision and therefore was not with PO2 Caranto when the latter arrested the suspects, he confirmed that petitioner and his companions were arrested inside the Rubyville Subdivision. In fact, PO3 Aquino accompanied the arrested suspects to the police station. The version depicted by the prosecution, through the testimonies of PO2 Caranto and PO3 Aquino, could only be described by people who actually witnessed the event that took place on the night of 10 December 1998. Only trustworthy witnesses could have narrated with such detail and realism what really happened on the date referred to. As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime to petitioner, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellants self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed. This Court, of course, is not unaware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. But the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In the case under consideration, there is no evidence of any improper motive on the part of the police officers who apprehended petitioner and his companions. The defense witnesses even admitted that they did not know the apprehending police officers and that they had no quarrel with said law enforcers.30 With this admission by the defense, it is readily clear that the claim of frame-up is baseless. A scrutiny of the version of the petitioner reveals incredulous specifics and details which are far from ordinary human experience. Also, the testimonies of the defense witnesses failed to dovetail with each other on significant points. Petitioner testified that he did not know Federico Cleofas, nor had he seen the latter prior to their arrest on 10 December 1998.31Federico Cleofas, on the other hand, declared that he had known petitioner for about a year prior to 10 December 1998, as they used to play basketball in Valenzuela.32 Another disturbing inconsistency of the defense was the statement given by petitioner that when he boarded the Tamaraw FX, Virgilio Cardenas was already inside and was seated at the middle passenger portion of the vehicle. 33 But Virgilio Cardenas contradicted this when he testified that petitioner was there before he boarded the vehicle.34 At one point, petitioner averred that after he and his companions were wrongfully arrested in Caloocan City, the arresting police officers proceeded to Valenzuela where the latter arrested Maria Fe Mendoza. This is incredible because the only persons who could have known the whereabouts of Maria Fe Mendoza were the petitioner and his co-accused, since they were the ones who knew Maria Fe. The police officers, as the defense witnesses admitted, were strangers to them. Clearly, the police officers could not have known where Maria Fe was. The story of the defense is simply implausible. Petitioner insists that the shabu confiscated from them was not established by the prosecution. Records disprove this. PO2 Caranto positively identified in court the two plastic sachets containing shabu which were confiscated from petitioner and his cohorts. Although he did not place his initials on the sachets of shabu after the confiscation, he was able to identify the same, since he testified that it was the police investigator who placed identifying marks thereon; thus:

Q: If I show you again the two plastic sachets of shabu which you retrieved from all the accused in this case, will you be able to identify it? A: Yes, sir. Q: I am showing to you two (2) plastic sachets of shabu, will you please go over the same and tell us what is the relation of two plastic sachets to the one you confiscated? A: Yes, sir. Q: What is the relation of this Mr. Witness? A: This is the same sir. Court: Why are you certain that these are the same you picked up inside the Tamaraw FX? A: I know it, the other plastic is longer than the other one. xxxx Q: Now Mr. Witness just a while ago you were being asked by the Honorable Court whether you can identify the two (2) sachets as a matter of fact it was presented to you and you already identified the same? A: Yes, sir. Q: Do you confirm to this Honorable Court that you [did] not put any marking?

A: It is our investigator who placed marking there sir. 35

Undoubtedly, the identity of the corpus delicti has been duly established by the prosecution in this case.36 We are convinced that in the evening of 10 December 1998, an honest-to-goodness apprehension of the petitioner and his friends for sniffing shabu was made by the police officers composed of PO2 Caranto and his colleagues. The positive identification made by the police officers and the laboratory report, not to mention the incredible defense of frame-up to which petitioner resorted, sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged.
lavvphil

The Court of Appeals imposed on petitioner the indeterminate penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as maximum. In Teodosio v. Court of Appeals,37 which cited People v. Simon,38 the Court spelled out the proper penalties for drug-related crimes under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua if the quantity of the drug weighs 750 grams or more. If the drug weighs less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional; from 250 grams to 499 grams, prision mayor; and, from 500 grams to 749 grams, reclusion temporal. In the instant case, the Reports of Forensic Analyst Juanita D. Sioson show that the two plastic sachets contained the total weight of 0.19 gram. Since the quantity of the shabu weighs less than 250 grams, the proper penalty should be no more than prision correccional. There being neither generic mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed in its medium period. And applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor. Thus, the imposition of the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as maximum is proper. No fine is imposable in this case because petitioners penalty is not reclusion perpetua or death.39 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25188 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Caloocan City, Branch 120, convicting petitioner Ermin Dacles y Oledo for violation of Section 27, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice ATTESTATION

RENATO C. CORONA* Associate Justice

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes

Justice Renato C. Corona was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 10 September 2007.
*

Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo, pp. 68-77.
1 2

Penned by Judge Victorino S. Alvaro; rollo, pp. 41-46. Records, p. 1. TSN, 31 May 1999, p. 6. Records, p. 203. TSN, 11 August 1999, p. 4. Id. at 6-8. Id. at 9. Id. at 10-11. Id. at 12. Id. at 14. TSN, 15 September 1999, p. 3. Id. Id. at 4. Id. at 5. TSN, 30 May 2000, p. 4. Id. at 7. Id. at 11. Rollo, p. 46. Records, p. 360. Rollo, pp. 68-77. Id. at 76. Id. at 123-124. People v. Jubail, G.R. No. 143718, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 478, 491. People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 174773, 2 October 2007, 534 SCRA 552, 563-564. 378 Phil. 660 (1999). 443 Phil. 246 (2003). TSN, 4 May 1999, pp. 3-9. TSN, 4 May 1999, pp. 16-18.

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TSN, 30 May 2000, p. 11. Id. at 7-8. TSN, 11 August 1999, p. 20. TSN, 30 May 2000, pp. 4, 11. TSN, 16 September 1999, pp. 3, 4. TSN, 4 May 1999, pp, 11-12, 14. People v. Miranda, supra note 25 at 568; People v. Manalo, G.R. No. 107623, 23 February 1994, 230 SCRA 309, 318. G.R. No. 124346, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 194, 209. G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555. Teodosio v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37.

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39

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 141137 January 20, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO; ARNOLD ROBLE and GERLYN WATES, Appellants. DECISION CARPIO-MORALES, J.: From the Decision of July 20, 1999, as amended by Order of September 9, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, they lodged the present appeal. The Information dated April 25, 1995, filed against appellants reads as follows: The undersigned accuses the above-named accused for VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE II IN RELATION TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE IV OF R.A. 6425, committed as follows: That on or about April 10, 1995 in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transported, delivered and possessed 1.7 kilos dried marijuana leaves which are prohibited drugs. CONTRARY TO LAW.1 Upon arraignment on September 11, 1995, appellants, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows: On the night of April 10, 1995, at around 10:45 p.m., as about fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban, a Honda TMX motorcycle with three men on board sped past them. 2 One of the police officers blew his whistle3 and ordered them to return to the checkpoint.

Obliging, the three men aboard the motorcycle returned to the checkpoint. SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong (SPO1 Goc-ong) of the 11th Regional Mobile Force 4th Company thereupon asked them why they sped away to which appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), who was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble (Roble) and in front of appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle, retorted that he is a member of the army.4 When asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card, he could not, however, offer any. At this point, the police officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed, as were his co-appellants, to be afraid and acting suspiciously.5 SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked Vinecario what the contents of the backpack were. Vinecario answered that it merely contained a mat and proceeded to pass it to Wates, who in turn passed it to Roble who, however, returned it to Vinecario.6 Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb, SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his men to disperse, following which he ordered Vinecario to open the bag. Vinecario did as ordered and as SPO1 Goc-ong noticed something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario to take the same out. Again Vinecario obliged, albeit reiterating that it was only a mat. SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed it, 7 resulting to the tearing off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air. Vinecario thereafter told SPO1 Goc-ong "let us talk about this,"8 but the latter ignored Vinecario and instead called his Commanding Officer and reported to him that marijuana was found in Vinecarios possession. On orders of the Commanding Officer, the other police officers brought appellants along with two bundles of marijuana, the backpack and the motorcycle to the battalion office at Camp Catitipan in Davao City and were turned over to one PO2 Cabalon, an investigator of Regional Mobile Force 11. Before proceeding to said battalion office, however, the incident was blottered9 by PO3 Edward Morado at the Buhangin Police Station. 10 On April 11, 1995, SPO1 Goc-ong, PO1 Vicente Carvajal (PO1 Carvajal) and PO1 Pual Padasay brought the confiscated suspected marijuana to the camps crime laboratory for examination11 which determined it to weigh 1,700 grams12 and to be indeed positive therefor.13 As for appellants, their version of the incident follows: Vinecario, then a member of the 25th Infantry Battalion of the 6th Infantry Division of the Philippine army stationed at Pagakpak, Pantukan, 14 approached motorcycle driver Wates at a terminal in Andile, Mawab and requested him to bring him to his elder brother at Parang, Maguindanao for a fee of P500.00 which he paid.15 The two thus proceeded to Carmen, Panabo where they picked up Roble to alternate with Wates as driver, and at 8:00 a.m., the three left for Parang. 16 On reaching Parang at about 1:20 p.m., Vinecario borrowed P3,000.00 from his brother Teofanis to shoulder the medical expenses of his son. At about 4:30 p.m., after partaking of snacks at Teofanis residence, appellants left for Davao City. Along Parang Highway, Abdul Karim Datolarta, Vinecarios former co-employee at Emerson Plywood where he previously worked, blocked the motorcycle.17 Vinecario thus alighted from the motorcycle and shook hands with Datolarta18 who asked where they were headed for and requested that he ride with them. Vinecario turned Datolarta down as there was no longer any room in the motorcycle. Datolarta then asked if he (Vinecario) could take his bag of clothes and bring it to his cousin, one Merly, in Roxas, Tagum. Without examining its contents, Vinecario acquiesced, took Datolartas bag and left with his co-appellants. 19 On reaching Ulas in the evening of the same day, appellants, seeing that there was a checkpoint, 20 sped past it. When they were about 50 to 60 meters away from the checkpoint, they heard a whistle, prompting Wates to tap Vinecario, telling him that the whistle came from the checkpoint. Vinecario then told Roble to go back to the checkpoint. While at the checkpoint, five police officers approached appellants and instructed them to alight from the motorcycle. One of the officers asked Vinecario who he was, and Vinecario identified himself as a member of the Philippine National Police.21 The officer asked for identification and when Vinecario could not produce any, the former got the backpack slung on Vinecarios shoulder. The same officer then asked Vinecario if they could open the bag, and as Vinecario acquiesced, two officers opened the bag upon which they shouted that it contained marijuana. Vinecario then grabbed the backpack to confirm if there was indeed marijuana. At that instant, the police officers held his hands and brought him, together with the other appellants, to the Buhangin Police Station, and later to Camp Catitipan. At the camp, appellants were investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read.22 The trial court, by Decision of July 20, 1999, found appellants guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim: WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of all three accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, accused PFC Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, pursuant to Sec. 4, Art. II in relation to Art. IV or (sic) Rep. Act 6425 as amended by Rep. Act 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, are jointly sentence (sic) to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection, under Rep Act 8177 in the manner and procedure therein provided, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659, amending Art. 81 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 Sec. 22 the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC 16 Davao City, is ordered to elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court, Supreme Court Manila, for the automatic review of this Decision, after its promulgation. SO ORDERED.23 (Underscoring supplied) By Order of September 9, 1999, the trial court set aside its decision of July 20, 1999 and disposed as follows, quoted verbatim: Accordingly, all accused (sic) motion for reconsideration on this aspect, on the imposition of the penalty against all accused, even if invoked only be accused Venecaio (sic) through his counsel de officio, will apply to all accused since there exists conspiracy of all in the commission of the offense charged.

Judgment of this court, dated July 20, 1999, is accordingly set aside and reconsidered, only insofar as the imposition of the supreme penalty of death through lethal injection under Republic Act No. 8177, is concerned. All accused PFC Victor Venecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, are instead sentence (sic) to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 21, in relation to Art. IV of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, in accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as decided by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Peope (sic) vs. Ruben Montilla G.R. No. 123872 dated January 30, 1998. However, the findings of this court for the conviction of all aaccused (sic) of the offense charged, is (sic) sustained. The corresponding motion (sic) for reconsideration of all accused through their counsel for their acquittal of (sic) the offense charged, is denied, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied) The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 dated September 14, 1995 of the above-mentioned Order of the trial court, it arguing that the commission of the offense charged against appellants was attended by an aggravating circumstance in that it was committed by an organized or syndicated crime group, thus warranting the imposition of the death penalty. In the meantime, Roble and Wates filed their Notice of Appeal 26 on September 15, 1999. Vinecario followed suit and filed his Notice of Appeal.27 The trial court, by Order dated September 22, 1999, denied the prosecutions Motion. In their brief, Roble and Wates assign the following errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURTS OBSERVATION THAT APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE CONSPIRED WITH VICTOR VINECARIO IN TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA FROM PARANG, MAGUINDANAO IS NOT BORNE BY THE EVIDNECE (sic) ON RECORD AND SHOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN MISAPPREHENDING FACTS IF NOT A COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE, BOTH DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL. 2. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO AFFORD EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE RECANTATION MADE BY POLICE OFFICERS HAYDENBURG GOC-ONG AND VICENTE CARVAJAL THAT BOTH APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE WERE NOT NERVOUS AND APPREHENSIVE AT THE TME (sic) OF THE OPENING OF THE MILITARY PACK CONTAINING MARIJUANA NEAR THE CHECKPOINT. 3. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE THAT THEY WERE MERELY HIRED BY VICTOR VINECARIO TO BRING HIM TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO FOR A FEE OF P500.00 WITH FREE FOOD AND GASOLINE. 4. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE RENTAL OF P500.00 WHICH VINECARIO PAID TO THE OWNER OF THE [MOTORCYCLE] AS INADEQUATE BY TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE BUS FARE OF P268.00 FROM MACO, DAVAO PROVINCE TO SUN WAY CROSSING, MAGUINDANAO DOWN TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO. 28
Wates and Roble argue that there is no iota of evidence to prove that they acted with unity of purpose and in the execution of any unlawful objective with Vinecario.29 They assert that they had no prior knowledge of Vinecarios plan to meet with a man who would give the backpack containing marijuana; that prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajals declaration that they (appellants Wates and Roble) were not nervous, uneasy or apprehensive when the backpack was opened buttresses their claim that they did not conspire with Vinecario; and that the prosecutions theory of conspiracy was merely based on the testimony of PO1 Carvajal that they acted nervously when the backpack was ordered opened for inspection; that there was a "great variance" in the testimonies of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal in the direct examination and their testimonies on rebuttal as to the events that transpired on April 10, 1995, thus casting serious doubts on the trial courts findings of guilt. On September 17, 2001, Vinecario filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal, 30 stating that he is "practically satisfied with the decision of the trial court"; that "he would not waste anymore the effort of the honorable Supreme Court Justices in further reviewing his case"; and that as he was "driven by the sincerest desire in renewing his life," he "irrevocably moves for the withdrawal of his appeal." On even date, Roble and Wates likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal, 31stating that they admit the commission of the offense for which they were convicted; that they are satisfied with the decision of the trial court; and that they are already serving the penalty for their offense and "realize the overt admittance of guilt as the only vehicle in [their] gradual renewal." By Resolution of November 27, 2001, this Court denied the Motions of appellants and directed Vinecario to file his brief within forty-five days from notice of the resolution. In a brief dated January 25, 2002, Vinecario attributes the following errors to the trial court:

I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS (sic) VALID. II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN GIVING THE POLICEMEN THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY DESPITE THE APPARENT IRREGULARITIES IN THE MANNER OF ARRESTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

IV. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 32 Vinecario argues that the prosecution failed to show that the search conducted by the police officers was incident to a lawful arrest; that he could not have been deemed to have consented to the search as any such consent was given under intimidating or coercive circumstances; and that there existed no probable cause to justify the search and seizure of the backpack, hence, the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence, it being a product of illegal search.
Vinecario adds that the police officers who arrested and investigated him failed to inform him of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his choice, thereby violating Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. 33 The rule is constitutionally enshrined that no search and seizure can lawfully be conducted without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution so ordains: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. And Section 3(2), Article III of the same Constitution mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of the right of the people under Section 2 shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions, however. Search and/or seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations. 34 Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.35 For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. 36 x x x [Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. xxx No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected. Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. x x x These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held by the U.S. Supreme Court: "Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by official responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of rovingpatrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review." 37 Judicial notice is taken of the existence of COMELEC Resolution No. 2735 imposing a gun ban during an election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).38 The national and local elections in 1995 having been held on May 8, the present incident, which occurred on April 10, 1995, was well within the election period. Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. 39 Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not detemined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 40 (Emphasis supplied).

That probable cause existed to justify the search conducted by the police officers at the checkpoint is gathered from the following testimony of SPO1 Goc-ong: Q: You said you saw three on board a motorcycle what did your unit do when these three persons approached? A: We were waiting for them. When they arrived they stopped and speeded away. Q: What was your reaction when you saw the motor speeding away? A: One of my men blew his whistle ordering to (sic) return back (sic). xxx Q: When they returned back (sic) what happened? A: When they returned back (sic) I asked them why they speeded away? Q: What did they answer? A: One of them said that he is a member of the army. Q: If that person who said that he is a member of the army is in court, can you point to him? A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and pointed to a man wearing yellow t-shirt who stood up and when asked about his name answered that he is Victor Venecario). xxx Q: What was your reaction when Venecario failed to show any identification papers to show that he is really a member of the army? A: We saw his big backpack and asked him what was inside. Q: Who was carrying that big backpack? A: Venecario. xxx Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us why did you (sic) ask him? A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were afraid and different reactions (sic). Q: They were acting suspiciously? A: Yes. Q: That is what you have observed from their faces? A: Yes, sir. Q: What did Venecario do when you asked him about the contents of that backpack? A: He said that it is a mat and passed it on to his companion. Q: You said he passed it on to his companion, there were two (2) companions, to whom did he pass it on? A: He passed it on to Wates and Wates passed it on to Roble. Q: What did Roble do when Wates passed it to him? A: Roble returned it back (sic) to Venecario.

Q: So what was your reaction when you saw the three passing the bag from one person to another? A: My suspicion was it was a bomb and ordered my men to scatter. Q: Tell us why are you (sic) concerned about explosives was there any incident prior to that checkpoint? A: Election was past (sic) approaching and there was a threat that Davao City will be bombed. Q: Prior to that was there any incident? xxx A: In Ipil, Zamboanga on April 4. Q: If you recall when was that? A: April 4 of the same year. Q: You said the bag was passed to Venecario and you told your men to scatter, what happened next? A: I ordered Venecario to open the backpack. Q: What did Venecario do when you ordered him to open? A: They opened the backpack..41 SPO1 Goc-ongs testimony was corroborated by PO1 Vicente Carvajal: Q: At about 10:45 in the evening of that date April 10, 1995 do you recall of any unusual incident while you were conducting that checkpoint? A: Yes, sir. Q: What was that incident all about? A: At that time, while we were conducting a checkpoint, we saw this motorcycle passing and flagged them to stop and there were three (3) persons and one was manning and they briefly stopped but speeded away. xxx Q: When these three (3) persons retured (sic) back (sic) what happened? A: The one riding introduced himself as a member of the army. xxx Q: You said these three persons were nervous and one of them introduced himself as an army man, what did you do? A: I asked for an ID. Q: Who among you asked for an ID? A: Sgt. Goc-ong. Q: Where were you at that time when Goc-ong asked for his ID? A: I was behind him because I backed him up. Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked to produce an ID? A: He answered that he has no ID.

Q: What was the reaction of the group when Venecario failed to show any ID that he was an army man? A: Our other companion moved closer as security. Q: Why? A: We were on alert because on April 4 the one who attacked were (sic) in uniform. Q: At that time what was Venecario wearing? A: He was in camouflage and wearing sleepers (sic). xxx Q: After that what happened? A: We were able to observe that he was carrying a bag. Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked what was (sic) the contents of the bag? A: He appeared to be hesitant and he said that it contained clothes. Q: Before that what did Venecario do? A: He placed it in (sic) his shoulder. Q: What did he do with the backpack? A: When asked he passed it to his other companions. Q: What did Venecario when he passed it to his companion? A: Venecario passed it to his companion and that companion passed it to his other companion. Q: After this companion received the backpack from his companion what did he do? A: He returned back (sic) to Venecario. Q: They passed it from one person to another until it was returned to Venecario? A: Yes, sir. xxx Q: You said that backpack was passed from one person to another and when he got hold of that backpack what happened? A: He opened the backpack. Q: Who told him to open the backpack? A: Sgt. Goc-ong.42 In light then of appellants speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his coappellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense. As to Vinecarios allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation conducted by the police officers, the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction. 43 In the case at bar, the trial court convicted appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal.

Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial which he recounted as follows: Q: After leaving the residence of your brother was there any unusual incident that took place? A: Yes, sir. Q: What was that? A: The moment we arrived there there was a person who blocked us. Q: Where? A: Parang Highway. Q: Coming here to Davao? A: Yes. Q: What happened after Crossing Parang? A: There was a person who blocked us. Q: A former companion of yours? A: Yes. Q: A former soldier? A: No, sir. Q: You said your former companion, am I correct? A: Before I became a soldier, I worked in Emerson Plywood. Q: So that person who flagged down you were (sic) your former companion? A: Yes. Q: You are familiar with him? A: I know him very well. Q: He was your close friend? A: Yes. Q: What is the name of that person who stopped you? A: Abdul Karim Datolarta. Q: He was alone when he stopped you? A: Yes, sir. Q: What happened when your friend Abdul Karin (sic) Datolarta stopped you? A: When he stopped us, I immediately disembarked from the motor vehicle and shook hands with him. Q: He was the one who stopped you or you were the one who told the driver to stop?

A: My friend. Q: You immediately recognized the face of that friend of yours? A: Not yet. Q: What else happened aside from shaking hands and greeting? A: He asked me where I was heading. Q: What was your answer? A: I told him that I am going back to Davao. Q: What else did he tell you? A: He told me if he can also ride with us. Q: What did you tell him? A: I told him we were already three. Q: What happened next? A: Since I refused he asked me if I could bring his bag and he mentioned the name of that cousin of his in Tagum. Q: He mentioned the name? A: Yes, Merly. Q: What is the family name? A: He just mentioned Merly who is residing in Tagum. Q: Where in Tagum? A: Roxas, Tagum. Q: What did you do when he asked you to bring that bag to his cousin in Tagum? A: I asked him what was (sic) the contents? Q: What did he answer you? A: He answered clothes. Q: What did you do? A: Because were (sic) were in a hurry I slung it in (sic) my shoulder. Q: You did not become suspicious? A: No more because I trusted the person and I have an emergency to take (sic) that time.44 Vinecarios account - that in the evening of April 10, 1995, while he and his co-appellants were cruising along the highway, a person whom he failed to recognize but who turned out to be an acquaintance, Abdul Karim Datolarta, flagged down45the motorcycle, and as requested by Datolarta, he readily agreed to bring a backpack to Datolartas cousin without checking its contents - is incredible, contrary to human experience, and taxes credulity. Datolarta was not even apprehended nor presented at the trial, thus further eliciting serious doubts on Vinecarios tale. The defense of denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs Act.46

The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill motive to falsely charge appellants was shown, must thus then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denial of appellants. As for the challenged finding by the trial court of conspiracy among appellants, the same fails. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. 47 Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. 48 To exempt himself from criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the crime.49 In People v. Concepcion,50 this Court held: x x x Proof of agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. In the case at bar, as established by the evidence, appellants connived in unlawfully transporting the subject marijuana. Roble, who was driving the motorcycle at Ulas, did not stop but instead sped away upon seeing the checkpoint in a clear attempt to avoid inspection by the police officers. When asked as to the contents of the backpack by SPO1 Goc-ong, appellants passed the same to one another, indicating that they knew its contents. These circumstances manifest appellants concerted efforts and cooperation towards the attainment of their criminal objective. Wates and Roble assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, they contending that these witnesses contradicted their testimonies-in-chief when they subsequently testified on rebuttal that appellants were not nervous or apprehensive at all when they were being inspected by the policemen. It bears noting, however, that the alleged conflicting observations of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal referred to by Roble and Wates on their deportment pertain to different stages of the checkpoint inspection as a scrutiny of the records reveals. Thus, in his direct examination, SPO1 Goc-ong testified as follows: Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us why did you (sic) ask him? A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were afraid and different reactions (sic). Q: They were acting suspiciously? A: Yes. Q: That is what you observed in their faces? A: Yes, sir.51 PO1 Carvajal, on cross-examination, echoed Goc-ongs observations on appellants deportment upon returning to the checkpoint: Q: You said when these three (3) suspects riding the motorcycle returned and stopped you said you noticed one of them was nervous, did I get you right? A: Yes, sir. Q: Only one was nervous? A: All of them. Q: When you said they appeared to be nervous, could that mean that they were trembling? A: Yes, sir. Q: In fact they were pale, is that correct? A: Yes. Q: You noticed they were pale despite the fact that it was dark and it was 10:00 oclock in the evening? A: There was light. Q: The place was well-lighted?

A: Yes, sir.52 On rebuttal, SPO1 Goc-ong stated that appellants were not anxious or apprehensive when he flagged them down as they crossed the checkpoint.53 PO1 Carvajal, on the other hand, testified on rebuttal that Wates was not nervous as Vinecarios backpack was being opened.54 As to the other alleged discrepancies pointed out by Wates and Roble, the following arguments of the Office of the Solicitor General, which are quoted with approval, should dispose of the same: It is incorrect to suggest that just because SPO1 Goc-ong testified that other vehicles passed through the checkpoint before the appellants arrived, the latter could not have sped away from the checkpoint. SPO1 Goc-ong did not give any testimony that other vehicles were still at the checkpoint at the time the appellants arrived. On the contrary, he testified there was no other vehicle ahead of the appellants at the checkpoint when the latter arrived on their motorcycle (TSN, June 17, 1999, p.7). It is also incorrect to suggest that appellants may not have noticed the checkpoint just because SPO1 Goc-ong made no mention of using reflectorized objects at the checkpoint. As described earlier in his Brief, this witness explained that the checkpoint was visible because it had a sign board at the middle of the road that read, "COMELEC GUN BAN" (TSN, June 17, 1999, pp. 6 and 8). There is no way for appellants not to have noticed the checkpoint. 55 In fine, appellants defenses fail in light of their clearly proven act of delivering or transporting marijuana. The evidence shows that accused-appellant was apprehended in the act of delivering or transporting illegal drugs. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean: "to carry or convey from one place to another." When accused-appellant used his vehicle to convey the package containing marijuana to an unknown destination, his act was part of the process of transporting the said prohibited substance. Inherent in the crime of transporting the prohibited drug is the use of a motor vehicle. The very act of transporting a prohibited drug, like in the instant case, is a malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The mere commission of the act constitutes the offense and is sufficient to validly charge and convict an individual committing the act, regardless of criminal intent. Since the appellant was caught transporting marijuana, the crime being mala prohibita, accused-appellants intent, motive, or knowledge, thereof need not be shown.56 (Underscoring supplied) A word on the penalty. As provided in Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death anda fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall transport any prohibited drug. Section 20, Article IV of the same act provides that the penalty imposed in Section 4 shall be applied if the dangerous drug is, with respect to marijuana, 750 grams or more. In the case at bar, the marijuana involved weighed 1,700 grams. Since the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, a resort to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code 57 is necessary. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed by the trial court. A fine of P500,000.00 should, however, been likewise imposed on the appellants in solidum in accordance with the law. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. 35233-95 finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally transporting marijuana under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, appellants are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and solidarity pay a fine of P500,000.00. SO ORDERED. Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
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Id. at 8. TSN, December 13, 1995 at 18. Ibid. Ibid. Id. at 20-21. Id. at 21. Id. at 23. Id. at 23. Exhibit "F", Records at 234.

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TSN, December 13, 1995 at 25. Exhibit "D", Records at 232. TSN, December 11, 1995 at 8. Exhibit "C"-Chemistry Report No. D-072-85, Records at 231. TSN, July 29, 1998 at 13. Id. at 15. Id. at 14. Id. at 20. Id. at 21. Id. at 23. TSN, July 29, 1998 at 23-24; TSN, November 14, 1996 at 14; TSN, November 15, 1996 at 44. TSN, July 29, 1998 at 26. Id. at 30. Rollo at 44. Id. at 45-D. Records at 209-223. Rollo at 45-I. Records at 232-A-232-C. Id. at 53-54. Id. at 73. Id. at 149. Id. at 157. Rollo at 176-177.

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SEC. 12(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
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People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754, 768 (2000) (citations omitted); People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 705 (1999) (citations omitted). People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754, 767 (2000) (citation omitted). Id. Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990).

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SEC. 52 Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.- In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:
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xxx (c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer, and require the payment of legal fees and collect the same in payment of any business done in the Commission, at rates that it may provide and fix in its rules and regulations. xxx
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Valmonte v. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665, 670 (1990). People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, 408 (1991). TSN, December 13, 1995 at 17-22. Id. at 39-42. People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476, 485 (2000) (citation omitted). TSN, July 29, 1998 at 19-23. Id. at 21. People v. Concepcion, 361 SCRA 716, 723 (2001) (citations omitted). Id at 731. People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643, 649 (2001) (citation omitted). People v. Morial, 363 SCRA 96, 124 (2001) (citation omitted). 361 SCRA 716 (2001). TSN, December 13, 1995 at 20-21. Id. at 53-54. TSN, June 17, 1999 at 8. Id. at 14. Rollo at 255-256. People v. Del Mundo, 366 SCRA 471 (2001). ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. xxx In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. 2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. 3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

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4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act. The court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1 Respondent. DECISION SERENO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011. Statement of the Facts and of the Case The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3 Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued. During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion. In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 300,000.00). The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.6 Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision. On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012. Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:

(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID. (ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE. (iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED. (iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic). 7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him. On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus: It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.8 We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.9 First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.11 Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter: SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license. Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints: SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants; At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "underarrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows: It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451. Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda. xxx xxx xxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.) The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formalarrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made. It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation. Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them.14 It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation: The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies. If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody. Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawfularrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case. It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent. 16 Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. 17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket. 18 Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search. Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.20 In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does notarrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown: In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case. We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both legitimate and weighty," x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence"). This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
1wphi1

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.22 The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. 24 The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.26 WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground. SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice ATTESTATION

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes

The Petition was originally captioned as "Rodel Luz y Ong v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Naga City." However, under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petition must state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents.
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Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Samuel H. Gaerlan. Rollo, p. 91. Docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087; rollo, pp. 90-102. See Section 11, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Rollo, p. 101. Rollo, p. 23. Id. at 96. People v. Saludes, 452 Phil. 719, 728 (2003). Rules of Court, Rule 113, Sec. 1. People v. Milado, 462 Phil. 411 (2003). PNPM-DO-DS-3-1 dated March 2010. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).

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Morales v. Enrile, 206 Phil. 466 (1983). People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 (1999). See People v. Macalaba, 443 Phil. 565 (2003). Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263 (2002). RTC Decision, rollo, p. 91. Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263 (2002). People v. Sy Chua, 444 Phil. 757 (2003). 525 U.S. 113 (1998). People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729 (2003). 1987 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 2. Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 611. People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. Id.

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