DeCrescenzo Vs Scientology Plaintiff S Memorandum of Points Ocr

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BLUMBERG LAW CORPORATION
JOHN P. BLUMBERG, ESQ. (SBN 70200)
SINDEE M. SMQ_LOWITZ, ESQ. (SBN 123237)
444 W. OCEAN BLVD., SUITE 1500
LONG BEACH, CA 90802
TELEPHONE: (562) 437-0403
TELECOPIER: ( 562) 432-0107
METZGER LAW GROUP
A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
RAPHAEL METZGER, ESQ. (SBN 116020)
KATHRYN SALDANA, ESQ. (SBN 251364)
401 E. OCEAN BLVD., SUITE 800
LONG BEACH, CA 90802-4966
TELEPHONE: (562) 437-4499
TELECOPIER: (562) 436-1561
Attorneys for Plaintiff
LAURA ANN DECRESCENZO
.P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\21)12-09-06 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
'FILED
LOS ANGEi.ES SUPERIOR COURT
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
LAURA ANN DeCRESCENZO, aka
LAURA A. DIECKMAN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL, a corporate
entity, AND DOES 1 - 20,
Defendants.
CASE NO. BC411018
Assigned to the Honorable
Ronald M. Sohigian, Dept. 41
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DATE:
TIME:
DEPT:
October 23, 2013
8:30 a.m.
41
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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.P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\2012-09-06 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................. 1
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................. 1
A. Plaintiffs Background in Scientology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Defendants' Control on Plaintiffs Communications With Her Family . . . . . . . . . 2
C. Life History Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
D. Schedule in the Sea Org .............................................. 3
E. Schooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
F. Plaintiffs Ability to Leave the Sea Org . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
G. Plaintiffs Forced Abortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
H. Rehabilitation Project Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
L Plaintiffs Departure from the Sea Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
J. Plaintiffs Fears Over Filing a Lawsuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
K. Events Leading Up to Filing Plaintiffs Lawsuit ........................... 8
L. A Reasonable Person In Plaintiffs Position Would Have Feared Filing Suit . . . . 10
III. DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN CONDUCT THAT PREVENTS THEM FROM
INVOKING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Defendants Represented to Plaintiff That She Released Her Right to Sue . . . . . . 10 .
B. Defendants' Representations to Plaintiff Consisted of Threats of Retribution ... 11
C. Given Plaintiffs Background and Experience, It Was Reasonable For Her to
Rely on Defendants' Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
D. Defendants' Conduct Did Not Stop Having a Deterrent Effect In 2004 When
Plaintiff Left the Sea Org . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
IV. THE COURT IS NOT BARRED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT FROM ASSESSING
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A. Application of Equitable Estoppel Does Not Threaten Religious Practices . . . . . 16
B. Application of the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Does Not Violate the Free
Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
D. Defendants' Threatening Conduct That Occurred When Plaintiff Was a
Minor is Subject to Review Based on the State's Overriding Interest in
Protecting Minors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
E. Defendants' Conduct Regarding "Suppressive Persons" and "Sec Checks"
Is Not The Only Conduct Justifying The Application of Equitable Estoppel . . . . 19
V. PLAINTIFF INSTITUTED HER ACTION WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES INDUCING HER DELAY ...... .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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.P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\2012.()9.()6 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
CASES
Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Ateeq v. Najor
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1351 ............................................... 16
Battuello v. Battuello
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 842 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Cantwell et al. v. State of Conn.
(1940) 310 U.S. 296 ...................................................... 18
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah
(1993) 508 U.S. 520 ...................................................... 17
Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co.
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 163 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Doe v. Bakersfield City School Dist.
(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 556 ............................................. 13-15
Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church
(9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3d 790 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Employment Div., Ore. Dept. Human Res. v. Smith
(1990) 494 U.S. 872 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp.
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 907 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 16, 17
John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist.
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 ..................................................... 15
Lemon v. Kurtzman
(1971) 403 U.S. 602 ...................................................... 17
Lobrovich v. Georgison
(1956) 141Cal.App.2d567 ................................................ 20
Mills v. Foretex Co.
(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625 ..................... , ........................ 20
Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist.
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 ............................................... 20
Prince v. Mass.
(1944) 321 U.S. 158 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11
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.P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\2)12-09--06 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
Reynolds v. US.
(1878) 98 U.S. 145 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 257 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 417 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ.
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702 ................................................ 20
Seeger v. Odell
(1941) 18 Cal.2d 409 ................................................. '"". 12
Superior Dispatch, Inc. v. Ins. Corp. of New York
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 175 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 12, 19
US. v. Lee
(1982) 455 U.S. 252 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 18
Van Hook v. Southern California Waiters Alliance, Local 17
(1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 556 ................................................ 20
Watson v. Jones
(1871) 80 U.S. 679 ....................................................... 16
STATUTES
Code Civ. Proc. 340(c) ........................................................ 20
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-P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUOG\2012-0g..()6 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In moving for summary judgment on the statute of limitations, defendants claim that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply because plaintiff purportedly had a mere "crisis in faith"
and that none of defendants' conduct caused her to delay filing suit. Defendants also argue that at the
point plaintiff faked suicide in 2004 to be able to leave defendants' facilities and the Sea Organization,
she could not thereafter have reasonably relied on defendants' threatening conduct.
The Court should deny defendants' motion because plaintiff did not simply have a "crisis in
faith" resulting in the filing of her lawsuit. Instead, starting at age 12, plaintiff entered into a long-term
confide.ntial relationship with defendants, during which defendants controlled all aspects of plaintiffs
life and manipulated and socialized plaintiff to a point where she lost her ability to make clear,
independent decisions and was incapable of objectively evaluating anything she was threatened with
or told. On the day that plaintiff left defendants' facilities in 2004, she was threatened by defendants
when she was forced to sign a sworn affidavit containing negative statements about her and led to
believe that the contents of this affidavit would be used against her if she ever attempted to challenge
defendants in any way. Defendants continued to engage in threatening conduct after plaintiff left their
facilities, and their stronghold over plaintiff continued for another four years. There is no evidence that
plaintiff suddenly became impervious to defendants' threats when she left their facilities in 2004 or that
it was unreasonable for plaintiff to rely on defendants' threats and delay filing suit.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The things that plaintiff saw, heard, read, and observed CSI do during her time in the Sea
Organization ("Sea Org") made plaintiff believe she could not file a lawsuit against defendants, and
that if she did, she would be st,tbjected to severe retribution. As detailed below, plaintiff was too afraid
to sue defendants until mid-June/July 2008 when her parents told her for the first time that they were
no longer Scientologists, that they believed she had been wronged by CSI, and that they would stand
by her regardless of what defendants did or said. [PSUMF, Nos. 1-2].
A. Plaintiff's Background in Scientology
Plaintiff was raised in CSI, and attended Scientology schools for most of her young childhood.
She began volunteering with CSI at age 6 or 7, and by age 12, she joined Scientology's Sea Org as a
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.P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\2012-09-06-Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
full-time employee and moved away from her family to live permanently at defendants' facilities in
Los Angeles, California. The Sea Org is an internal organization within Scientology responsible for
overseeing "the delivery of Scientology" throughout the world. At that time, plaintiff had a 7th grade
education, and signed a billion year contract (meaning that she agreed to work for the Sea Org for a
billion years). Plaintiff remained in the Sea Org for 13 years until she was 25. [PSUMF, Nos. 3-8].
B. Defendants' Control on Plaintiff's Communications With Her Family
Upon joining the Sea Org, CSI controlled plaintiffs communications with her parents and
family. Before any mail was provided to plaintiff or sent to her family members, it was opened and
approved by CSL Similarly, as a general rule, plaintiff also was not permitted to call her family
members unless someone else from the Sea Org was present to listen. Plaintiff also was repeatedly
questioned by CSI about her communications with family, such that she would never say anything
negative about Scientology and would only report that she was doing well to her family members.
Plaintiff was fearful she would be subjected to punishment if she told her family members anything
negative, because.she was trained from the time that she entered the Sea Org that she was not to say
anything negative about the Sea Org or Scientology, and that if she did, she would be found in treason
and assigned demeaning tasks outside her normal long working. She also was required to report
anything that her family did that was negative or antagonistic to Scientology. [PSUMF, Nos. 9-40].
Plaintiff also was prevented from regularly seeing her family, and as young as 12, was
physically stopped from leaving to see her family. During plaintiffs entire time in the Sea Org, she was
required to undergo a sec check before leaving to see her family. A sec check is an investigatory tool
used by CSI, consisting of a number of questions. When someone is taking time off, they are required
to undergo a sec check before they leave, and are asked such things as whether they intend to not
return, whether they intend to reveal confidential information, whether they will be in contact with
anyone antagonistic of Scientology, etc. Only when the examiner determines the person is being
truthful and does not intend to leave permanently or for an "improper" purpose will the person be
allowed to leave. [PSUMF, Nos. 38-40].
Additionally, from age 12 forward, plaintiff was either prevented from leaving when she asked
for time off or was put through angst to get time off and rarely provided such time. As a minor,
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'P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\2012-09-06 - Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
plaintiff went for as long as 2-3 years without returning home or seeing her parents because she was
not provided authorization by CSI to see them. She also had no open contact with her parents and
limited what she said to her parents to comport with what CSI dictated for her communications. This
was true even on the few occasions when she visited her family away from the Sea Org; she remained
convinced that Church officials in the Sea Oi:g would learn if she said anything negative or expressed
. a desire to leave based on their extensive questioning of her. [PSUMF, Nos. 38-40].
C. Life History Questionnaires
Both before and during plaintiffs time in the Sea Org, she was required to fill out Life
Questionnaires, that sought detailed and highly invasive information about her and her family. In a
Questionnaire she filled out at age 12, she was asked the following questions (among others):
"Have you ever been connected to anyone who has threatened or attacked
Scientology?"
"Note any instances of homosexual activity from earliest time up to PT. Give
whom? What done? And how often?"
"Please give exact details concerning your current life: whom you live with,
whom you spend your free time with or run around with, etc. What is your daily
routine? What do you do with your leisure time?"
Plaintiff knew CSI used these Questionnaires to keep information about her, and that if she did
anything to attack Scientology, this would be used against her. [PSUMF, Nos. 41-43].
D. Schedule in the Sea Org
When plaintiff was 12 and for about her first year in the Sea Org, she worked from 8:30 a.m.
until 10:30 p.m. Monday through Sunday. After plaintiffs first year, and until approximately 2001,
she worked from 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. Monday through Sunday. She would return to her quarters
on a bus between 12:30 a.m. and 1 :30 a.m. Plaintiffs only time not working was on Sunday mornings,
but she was not allowed to leave CSI facilities unaccompanied during this time. [PSUMF, Nos. 44-45].
In 2001, plaintiff was sent to the Rehabilitation Project Force (RPF), which is punishment/rehab
program for Sea Org members. During this time, she worked from about 6 or 7 a.m. until 9:00 p.m.
seven days a week with 15 minute meal breaks. Most of her work during this time consisted of heavy
labor. "Lights out" was usually at 10:30 p.m., and there was a quartermaster who came down the
hallway to make sure each person was in their room. The quartermaster would turn out the lights in
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-P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\2012--09-06 MelllOlandum in Opposition.wpd
each room, and would sit in the hallway all night long to make sure that no one left. [PSUMF, No. 46].
Plaintiff recalls regularly being deprived of sleep during her time in the Sea Org to work longer
hours. When plaintiff was 14, she was required to work for 3 days straight without even being allowed
to take a shower or change her clothes. When she received a short shower break after 3 days, she was
told to immediately return and worked for 2 more days without any sleep. [PSUMF, No. 47].
The most plaintiff was ever paid during her entire 13 years in the Sea Org was $50 per week,
and her pay was as low as $10 per week at certain times. [PSUMF, No. 48].
E. Schooling
Plaintiff never received any formal schooling in traditional subjects such as math, science, or
history during her time in the Sea Org. She took her high school proficiency exam at age fifteen or
sixteen, and received no further "schooling" in non-Scientology subjects. [PSUMF, Nos. 49-52].
F. Plaintiff's to Leave the Sea Org
Plaintiffs ability to leave the Sea Org was severely restricted from the time she entered the Sea
- Org at age 12 until the time that she left at age 25. [PSUMF, No. 53].
As a general rule, she was not allowed to leave CSI facilities without an escort or without
receiving a leave of absence after undergoing a sec check in which she was cleared as not being a
permanent flight risk. There were a few times when plaintiff was able to get away without approval
and without an escort. However, on each of these occasions, she returned to the Sea Org because she
had no money, no experience, no car or driver's license, no understanding of the non-Scientology
world, and because CSI officials told her that if she did not return, she would be subject to a Freeloader
bill (meaning a financial bill for all of the services that she received during her time in the Sea Org).
Plaintiff also was told that by leaving, she was hiding crimes or bad acts she had committed and that
she would lose all contact with her family and friends. She also observed that CSI tracked down and
followed anyone who left without permission; this was referred to as a "blow drill." This included
tracking activity on the person's bank accounts, going to airports to search for the person, calling
family members, and similar conduct. As a result, plaintiff believed .that even if she tried to leave, she
would be tracked down and returned to the Sea Org as others had been. [PSUMF, No. 53-55].
On the few occasions when plaintiff asked to leave the Sea Org, CSI officials prevented her
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-P\Cases\9527\SUMJUDG\20120906 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
from doing so by "handling" her to stay. On at least one occasion, this included having someone sleep
with her and watch her 24 hours a day and having various people drill her with reasons why she should
stay, including_ that she would be subject to a Freeloader bill, that she had done bad things or
committed crimes that she was hiding, and that she would lose all contact with her family and friends.
In 2001, CSI spent two weeks "handling" her to stay, and she eventually stayed out of sheer exhaustion.
Plaintiff was never left alone during this time period and was always being watched. On other
occasions, this "handling" included assigning plaintiff manual labor. The challenges and fears of
leaving the Sea Org are affirmed by other former members of the Sea Org. [PSUMF, Nos. 54-68].
G. Plaintiff's Forced Abortion
Plaintiff always wanted to have children, but was forced by CSI to have an abortion in 1996,
due to CSI's practice of coercing members of the Sea Org to have abortions. [PSUMF, Nos. 69-71].
H. Rehabilitation Project Force
In 2001, plaintiff was sent to the RPF. Plaintiff wanted to leave the Sea Org at that time, but
she was "beaten down to the point that she agreed" to go to the RPF. During her time in the RPF from
2001 to 2004, plaintiff left Scientology's facilities less than 20 times, and did not have unfiltered access
to her identification or to any money. She was only allowed to have $20 on her at any given time, her
passport was locked up in a Scientology office (this was her only form of identification), and any trips
out of Scientology's facilities always involved at least two escorts. Plaintiff spent her time performing
manual labor, and attempting to complete "programs" that were required of her. She also was regularly
"punished," which consisted of running around a basement or doing push-ups. [PSUMF, Nos. 72-7 5].
During plaintiffs last year in the RPF, she became extremely distraught and mentally unstable.
Each of the times that she expressed wanting to leave during this time, she was "handled" to stay and
stayed out of fear about what would happen to her if she tried to leave. [PSUMF, No. 76-77].
In April 2004, after nearly three years of participating in the RPF, plaintiff completed
everything that was required of her, and was awaiting approval to end the RPF. However, she was told
that she was being removed from her job position, and that she was being reassigned to perform hard
labor for 10 hours each day. Plaintiff was mentally unstable and physically exhausted by this point.
On all previous occasions when she asked to leave the Sea Org, CSI prevented her from doing so. As
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.P\Cases\9527\SUMJUDG\2012-09-06 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
a result, she did not believe that she would be allowed to leave the RPF or the .Sea Org if she simply
asked to leave. She also had observed that Sea Org members who engaged in suicidal actions generally
were allowed to leave within 24 hours. Having observed this, plaintiff swallowed two gulps of bleach
and made sure that other Sea Org members observed her doing so. Upon doing this, CSI agreed
plaintiff would be permitted to leave. [PSUMF, Nos. 78-79].
I. Plaintiff's Departure from the Sea Organization
Before plaintiff was allowed to leave the Sea Org, and within a day of plaintiff swallowing
bleach, defendants required her to sign an affidavit and a release document. [PSUMF, No. 80].
She recalls from recently reviewing a videotape of her signing the affidavit and release
document that Nick McNaughton of Scientology's Office of Special Affairs (OSA) presented these
documents to her and notarized her affidavit. CSI videotaped plaintiff signing the affidavit, videotaped
the actual pages of plaintiff's affidavit, and had it notarized in her presence. [PSUMF, Nos. 81-82].
Plaintiff recalls generally that the affidavit she signed contained a summary of her supposed
transgressions, including that she engaged in stealing, she failed to uphold her job duties, she attempted
suicide, and that she did not hold defendants responsible for anything that happened to her during her
time in the Sea Org. She did not believe many of the statements made about her in this affidavit, but
was so unstable that she would have signed anything in order to be able to leave. From everything
plaintiff had seen, heard, read, and observed about CSI, she believed that if she took any action against
CSI, it would use the statements in the affidavit against her, and she would be subjected to severe
retribution, including significant financial penalties and loss of her family. [PSUMF, Nos. 83-84].
While plaintiff cannot recall specifically every statement that was contained in this affidavit,
based on her review of the videotape, she was able to read portions of her affidavit and refresh her
recollection as to its specific contents (which are more fully set forth in the Separate Statement):
Paragraph 3 contained language that plaintiff was signing the affidavit so that
no one could make any claims to the contrary later and that her statements in the
affidavit were true and being made voluntarily.
Paragraph 7 made references to instances of plaintiffs "stealing." It also stated
that she deserted her duties as a Sea Org member due to her "guilt" over stealing.
Paragraph 10 indicated that plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of the RPF.
It also stated that plaintiff caused multiple "disturbances" in the RPF, including that she
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engaged in flirting and "similar inappropriate conduct" It also referenced her suicide,
stating plaintiff was provided with emergency medical assistance after gulping bleach
and "suffered absolutely no harm."
Paragraph 11 indicated that CSI was terminating plaintiff because of her
inadequate progress in the RPF program and her unethical activities.
Paragraph 12 stated that plaintiff received "undeniable benefits" from her
experiences in Scientology. This paragraph then goes on to list specific "benefits."
Paragraph 23 indicated that plaintiff was responsible for all of her problems and
included a statement that she agreed to hold harmless CSI, Religious Technology
Center, and all other related entities or individuals for any of her past or current
problems. It also stated that she waived any claims known or unknown against these
entities because to do otherwise would be dishonest.
Paragraph 24 stated that plaintiff reaffirmed any previous bonds or releases that
she executed and that she understood and would honor all of her commitments and
promises in those documents.
Paragraph 25 stated that plaintiff was "not leaving because of anything that was
done to me or that I feel was unjust." [PSUMF Nos. 85-97].
J. Plaintiff's Fears Over Filing a Lawsuit
Plaintiff believed from the day that she left the Sea Org up until the time that she filed her
lawsuit that if she attempted to sue defendants, they would use the contents of her affidavit against her.
Plaintiff also believed that she could not sue defendants due to a long history of observations:
At age seven, plaintiff first picketed a lawsuit filed against CSI outside a
courthouse in Los Angeles. Seeing CSI pull together such a big group of people and
create such a commotion made clear to plaintiff that CSI was a formidable force and
that it would go to every length to bring down people who filed lawsuits against it.
Plaintiff regularly signed waiver and non-disclosure agreements stating that she
would be subjected to severe financial penalties if she took any action against CSL
Given that plaintiff had no money and no non-Scientology education, she was
extremely fearful of appearing in any way to attack CSL She had no ability to pay
financial penalties, which were represented to her to be millions of dollars.
Plaintiff also regularly filled out forms asking if she had ever attacked CSI, if
her family had done so, and if she was connected with anyone who might do so. Based
on this, plaintiff believed CSI was tracking both her actions and those of her family.
CSI also trained plaintiff that she was required to report anyone who took
negative action against the CSI, and she continued to believe that she was required to
do this even when she left the Sea Org.
[PSUMF Nos. 98-103].
Based on the long history of representations by defendants, and based on the documents
plaintiff signed when she left the Sea Org, she tried to ensure that she remained in good standing with
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41P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDGl2012-09-06 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
CSL She feared that if she did not do so, CSI would take action to destroy her life and smear her name
consistent with what she had observed happen with others. Other former Sea Org members also feared
suing defendants based on similar documents and representations. [PSUMF No. 104-116].
K. Events Leading Up to Filing Plaintifrs Lawsuit
After leaving her employment in 2004, plaintiff remained an "active" Scientologist. Looking
back, she believes that she stayed involved in CSI out of fear that CSI would destroy her or her family
as she observed members of CSI do this to other members who acted out against Scientology. Plaintiff
also believes that she remained an active Scientologist to avoid being cutoff from her family, as she
observed others leave the Church and be cutoff from their family. [PSUMF Nos. 117-119].
As a Scientologist, plaintiff was forbidden from reading or thinking anything negative about
Scientology. Further, she was threatened with being deemed a "Suppressive Person" if she in any way
was perceived to be an enemy. of Scientology. As a "Suppressive Person," she would have been
forbidden to contact her friends and family who remained at CSI's facilities or who continued
practicing Scientology. She also believed that if she took any action against CSI, its members would
smear her name and reputation, as this is what plaintiff observed others do. [PSUMF No. 120-122].
Shortly after leaving the Sea Org, plaintiff received a "Freeloader" bill from CSI, which is a
financial bill for services or training that she received during her time in the Sea Org. CSI billed
$120,000. Plaintiff received a number of phone calls to ensure that she paid this bill, and she paid
approximately $10,000 of this bill despite having very little money. The fact that members of CSI
issued this bill and continued to call. plaintiff to collect on it made her believe that CSI was keeping
tabs on her to make sure that she did not take actions antagonistic of the Church. [PSUMF No. 123].
CSI also assisted plaintiff in obtaining employment with Scientologist-owned businesses so that
she could pay her Freeloader bill. This was another way for CSI to keep tabs on her and make sure she
was not doing anything antagonistic of the Church; per Scientology policies, her employers were
required to report her if they observed her doing anything antagonistic of the CSL [PSUMF No. 124].
Plaintiff also received :numerous phone calls from Scientology personnel asking that she
purchase Scientology materials between 2004 and 2008. A number of these phone calls were so
upsetting to plaintiff that she cried. Additionally, one Scientology representative stood watch at
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plaintiffs house while she called other members to collect money from them in order to be able to
purchase materials she could not afford herself. Plaintiff believed that she was regularly being tested
by CSI, and these phone calls were another way for CSI to keep tabs on her. [PSUMF No. 125].
In approximately mid-June or July 2008, when using her mom's computer, plaintiff discovered
a web page minimized on the screen that appeared to be an "Ex-Scientologist" message board.
Plaintiff confronted her mom about this page, because they were forbidden by the CSI from reading
or thinking anything negative about Scientology. Within days of this event, plaintiffs mom and dad
sat her down to explain that they disagreed with a number of things that had happened in Scientology
and that happened to plaintiff in the Sea Org. They also told her that. they were no longer
Scientologists and encouraged her to explore for the first time material that was not "approved" of by
the CSL This was the first time that plaintiff felt safe in openly evaluating and questioning what had
happened to her during her time in the Sea Org. At all times prior to this, plaintiff believed that she
would lose her family if she openly questioned or challenged what had happened to her because they
were forbidden by the CSI from doing anything negative or antagonistic to the Church. Additionally,
at all times prior to this, plaintiff believed and feared the retribution that CSI had threatened her with
(including financial penalties) because she had been forbidden from reviewing or even considering
anything contrary to CSI, and all of the people in her life were also Scientologists. [PSUMF No. 126].
It took months for plaintiff to fully process what had happened to her and to begin to feel
comfortable with the prospect of challenging CSL While plaintiff began posting online about her
experiences in July 2008, she only made these posts anonymously and kept her feelings about what
happened in the Sea Org very internalized. She was fearful if she posted under her true identity, CSI
would send someone to "handle" her, meaning to stop her from speaking out. [PSUMF Nos. 127-131].
In the fall of 2008, plaintiff contacted another former Sea Org member about the prospect of
filing a lawsuit and took steps to obtain her Social Security earnings statement. In January 2009, one
of plaintiffs closest friends from her time in the Sea Org and another person visited her. They asked
plaintiff if she had been posting things on Scientology message boards, and plaintiff initially denied
doing so. When she finally admitted to making these posts, they explained how posting these messages
was bad, and went over what plaintiff should do to get herself back in-line with Scientology. This
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.P\Cases\9527\SUMJUDG\2012-09-06-Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
lengthy conversation was very upsetting to plaintiff. She suspected that these women were sent by CSI
who had been monitoring her posts online. After they left, plaintiff discovered a piece of paper they
left behind with instructions from CSI on how to "handle" her because she was engaging in Black PR
against CSL Immediately after the visit in January 2009, plaintiff reached her breaking point, and
posted under her true identity online for the first time. She was contacted by an attorney as a result of
this post, and filed this lawsuit shortly thereafter in April 2009. [PSUMF Nos. 132-134].
L. A Reasonable Person In Plaintifrs Position Would Have Feared Filing Suit
Dr. Robert Levine, an expert in the psychology of persuasion; has opined that plaintiff was
manipulated and socialized by Scientology to a point where she lost her ability to make clear,
independent decisions about her reality and was incapable of objectively evaluating anything she was
threatened with or told. Additionally, based on the duration and totality of the coercion in this case,
a "normal" person- defined in this case as an average person-would, compared to plaintiff: (1) Have
had no less difficulty walking away from Scientology; and, (2) Have had no less difficulty escaping
the mental grip of Scientology after exiting the Sea Org. [PSUMF No. 135-137].
III. DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN CONDUCT THAT PREVENTS THEM FROM
INVOKING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
"A defendant will be estopped to invoke the statute oflimitations where there has been 'some
conduct by the defendant, relied on by the plaintiff, which induces the belated filing of the action."
Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 907, 925 (internal citations omitted).
A. Defendants Represented to Plaintiff That She Released Her Right to Sue
Defendants first argue that plaintiff cannot invoke equitable estoppel on the ground that
defendants purportedly never represented to plaintiff that she waived her right to bring a lawsuit. This
argument is directly contradicted by the testimony of plaintiff and factual evidence in this case, as set
forth above in the Statement of Facts. Plaintiff was forced to sign a document waiving her rights the
day she left the Sea Org and defendants represented this to her. Additionally, it is worth noting that
while defendants produced more than 34,000 pages of documents in this case from plaintiffs file, the
two documents that defendants were miraculously "unable" to produce are the documents that plaintiff
signed on the day she left the Sea Org.
II
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B. Defendants' Representations to Plaintiff Consisted of Threats of Retribution
Defendants also claim that the documents plaintiff was required to sign when leaving the Sea
Org cannot be used as a basis for equitable estoppel because the Court of Appeal purportedly held that
Defendants' representations concerning the legal effect of these documents amounted to only a denial
ofliability, which is not sufficient for equitable estoppel. The Court should reject this argument.
First, the Court of Appeal did not hold that the documents plaintiff signed when leaving the Sea
Org could in no way be used as a basis for equitable estoppel. Rather, the Court of Appeal noted that
"[ w ]hile it was arguably true that defendants' alleged representations concerning the legal effect of
the documents that plaintiff signed amounted to a denial of legal liability ... plaintiff has alleged more
than simply defendants' denial of liability." Opinion, at 12. The Court of Appeal never held that
plaintiff could not rely on the documents she signed when leaving the Sea Org as a basis for equitable
estoppel. Additionally, the Court of Appeal never reviewed the substance of the documents plaintiff
signed, nor did the Court of Appeal have the benefit of any factual testimony concerning precisely what
was contained in those documents because it made its decision at the demurrer stage.
Second, the documents plaintiff was made to sign when leaving the Sea Org did not constitute
a mere denial of legal liability. Instead, these documents were threatening in and of themselves, and
only furthered plaintiffs fears that she could not sue defendants and that if she did, she would be
subjected to severe retribution. The affidavit that plaintiff signed contained a detailed list of plaintiffs
supposed wrongdoing, including that she had a history of stealing, had failed in her job, and that
everything that happened to her was her fault. It also stated that plaintiff was signing the affidavit so
no one could make any claims to the contrary later. Defendants made clear through both the
representations in this document and in their conduct (beginning 13 years before plaintiff signed this
document) that she would be subjected to severe retribution is she challenged defendants in any way.
C. Given Plaintifrs Background and Experience, It Was Reasonable For Her to Rely
on Defendants' Representations
Defendants claim that because plaintiff faked suicide in order to leave the Sea Org, it was
unreasonable for her to rely on their representations regarding the documents she signed when leaving
the Sea Org. Defendants' argument ignores the fact that plaintiff was in a long-term confidential
relationship with defendants from the time she was a child and that her reliance on defendants'
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statements are not confined to the documents plaintiff signed on the day she left the Sea Org, and
instead are based on defendants' long history of threatening conduct toward plaintiff.
For purposes of equitable estoppel, courts must assess whether the plaintiff reasonably relied
on defendant's conduct in delaying filing suit and whether this reliance was reasonable "in light of the
plaintiffs knowledge and experience." Superior Dispatch, Inc. v. Ins. Corp. of New York(20IO) 181
Cal.App.4th 175, 188; see also Seeger v. Odell (1941) 18 Cal.2d 409, 414 (plaintiff is not held "to the
standard of precaution or of minimum knowledge of a hypothetical, reasonable man"). In assessing
a plaintiffs knowledge and experience, courts consider whether the plaintiff had any sort of
"confidential relationship" with the defendant. See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10
Cal.4th 1226, 1240. '"If the plaintiff and defendant are in a confidential relationship there is no duty
of inquiry until the relationship is repudiated. The nature of the relationship is such as to cause the
plaintiff to rely on the fiduciary, and awareness of facts which would ordinarily call for investigation
does not excite suspicion under these special circumstances."' Ibid. (internal citation omitted).
A "confidential relationship" means "an unequal relationship between parties in which one
surrenders to the other some degree of control because of the trust and confidence which he reposes
in the other." Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 257, 273. The
elements necessary to establish a confidential relationship are: "1) The vulnerability of one party to the
other which 2) results in the empowerment of the stronger party by the weaker which 3) empowerment
has been solicited or accepted by the stronger party and 4) prevents the weaker party from effectively
protecting itself." Ibid. (internal citations omitted). Vulnerability "usually arises from advanced age,
youth, lack of education, weakness of mind, grief, sickness, or some other incapacity." Ibid.
Plaintiff very clearly was in a "confidential relationship" with defendants. First, she moved
away from her family to live exclusively at defendants' facilities when she was only 12, had a 7th grade
education, and received virtually no education in non-Scientology subjects. Second, she lived
exclusively at defendants' facilities for 13 years, working 7 days a week, and making at most $50 per
week. Third, her communications with the outside world were severely restricted by defendants and
plaintiff believed that she was required to report anyone who spoke negatively of defendants, including
herself. Plaintiff also underwent a forced abortion, had been sleep deprived for years, and.observed
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defendants track and follow individuals who acted contrary to their wishes. These facts are sufficient
to establish a "confidential relationship" and directly impacted plaintiffs ability to reasonably assess
defendants' representations well after she left defendants' facilities. Moreover, Dr. Robert Levine has
opined that plaintiff was manipulated and socialized by Scientology to a point where she lost her ability
to make clear, independent decisions about the reality with which she was confronted.
Therefore, plaintiffs "knowledge and experience" is different than that of an ordinary person,
and plaintiff was especially vulnerable to the representations made to her by defendants.
I). Defendants' Conduct Did Not Stop Having a Deterrent Effect In 2004 When
Plaintiff Left the Sea Org
Defendants claim that the day plaintiff left the Sea Org in 2004, their conduct and threats ceased
having any deterrent effect on plaintiff. This argument is contrary to case law and the facts in this case.
In Doe v. Bakersfield City School Dist. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 556, 559, the court held that
the plaintiff could claim equitable estoppel because he presented evidence that his guidance counselor's
threats prevented him from filing suit. Specifically, the plaintiffpresented evidence that his guidance
counselor began sexually abusing him when he was 13, and that this abuse continued until he was 19
or 20. Ibid. Throughout this seven-to-eight-year period, plaintiffs counselor made ongoing threats
to publicly humiliate plaintiff if he ever disclosed the molestation. Ibid. Plaintiff did not file a claim
until he was 22 years old, after the time period for filing such a claim, and well after plaintiff ended
his relationship with his counselor. Id. at 571-574.
Similar to defendants' arguments that plaintiff cannot reasonably claim that she relied on
defendants' representations after she left the Sea Org, the trial court in Bakersfield ruled that the
plaintiff could not assert that his counselor's threats deterred him from filing a claim after a number
of events, such as plaintiff moving to a different school district than his counselor, plaintiffs becoming
an adult, and pl{lintiffs termination of his relationship with his counselor. Id. at 559. However, the
Court of Appeal rejected this finding, holding there was evidence the counselor's threats "were still
having a deterrent effect" after these events and that there was no evidence that on the occurrence of
each of these events, plaintiff"suddenly became impervious" to his counselor's threats. Id. at 572-573.
The counselor's threats in Bakersfield included things such as: "You know what is at stake,"
"I am not the one who is going to get in trouble," and "No one is going to believe you." Id. at 561.
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---------------------------------------------
He also threatened to ruin plaintiffs reputation, plaintiffs "wrestling career," and everything the
plaintiff had worked for in his life. Id. at 563. The counselor also infiltrated plaintiffs relationships
with his family and friends. Id. at 560-564. He came to plaintiffs sporting events, asked his parents
if he could take plaintiff out to dinner after events, and offered to drive plaintiff home on a regular
basis. Id. at 561. He also became friends with plaintiffs friends and roommates. Id. at 561-563. The
counselor also represented to plaintiff that he could find out anything about the plaintiff that he wanted,
and always seemed to know what plaintiff was doing even when plaintiff did not tell him. Id. at 562.
The similarities between Bakersfield and this case are significant. First, similar to the plaintiff
in Bakersfield who was only 13 at the start of the relationship with his counselor, plaintiff entered into
a confidential relationship with defendants when she was only 12. At that time, plaintiff moved away
from her family and lived exclusively in defendants' facilities. She worked 7 days a week, was rarely
allowed time off, often had little or no sleep, and was paid at most $50 per week for the next 13 years.
. Additionally, all of her communications with the outside world were controlled by defendants.
Second, similar to the counselor in Bakersfield, defendants represented to plaintiff that no one
would ever believe her if she challenged CSL In fact, defendants made her sign an affidavit (which
was notarized and videotaped) in which plaintiff took responsibility for everything bad that ever
happened to her, and set forth supposed details about plaintiff that made her look bad (i.e., that she had
a history of stealing, abandoned her job duties, attempted suicide, and was terminated for engaging in
"unethical activities," etc.). The affidavit also stated that plaintiff was signing the affidavit so no one
could make any claims to the contrary later. This constituted a threat to plaintiff that no one would
believe her if she challenged CSI, and that if she attempted to sue or challenge CSI, it would reveal the
contents of her affidavit and publicly humiliate her.
Third, similar to Bakersfield, defendants had a long history of infiltrating plaintiff's relationship
with her parents and family. From the time plaintiff entered the Sea org at age 12, and for the next 13
years, plaintiff was repeatedly questioned about any conversations she had with her parents and family
and was required to report anything negative her family said about CSL This included reporting that
her mother raised concerns about not being able to see plaintiff and that she was not allowed to have
time off. Plaintiff also was trained by defendants in how to "handle" her parents and family members,
14
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.P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\2012-09-06 - Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
including how to get her mother to stop asking about plaintiffs ability to leave and how to speak with
her grandfather who was not a Scientologist. This impacted plaintiffs ability to openly communicate
with anyone, and continued long after her time in the Sea Org. Plaintiff and others testified that she
kept her feelings "very internalized" after she left the Sea Org.
Fourth, similar to the counselor in Bakersfield who said he could find out anything about the
plaintiff, defendants made clear to plaintiff they could find out anything about her. Starting as young
as 12, defendants took detailed and invasive histories of plaintiff. This included asking such things as
whether plaintiff ever engaged in homosexual conduct, when, with whom, etc. It also included asking
if plaintiff had ever attacked CSI, if her' family had ever done so, and if plaintiff was connected with
anyone who might do so. Plaintiff also personally observed defendants go to great lengths to track the
activities of Sea Org members who left, including tracking activity on bank accounts, going to airports
to search for people, calling family members, and hiring private investigators. Plaintiff even personally
reviewed the files of Sea Org members who left to find information on them and instructed others on
how to use this information to track them down.
Fifth, even after plaintiff left the Sea Org, CSI continued its presence in her life. CSI sent
plaintiff a "freeloader" bill for $120,000, and called plaintiff to collect on this bill. Plaintiff perceived
this as a way for CSI to keep tabs on her and make sure she did not take any actions that were
antagonistic of the Church. Plaintiff also received numerous phone calls from Scientology personnel
asking that she purchase Scientology materials and was questioned when she was unable to purchase
books. To plaintiff, these phone calls were yet another way for CSI to keep tabs on her.
Therefore, as much as defendants would like the Court to believe that plaintiff "suddenly
became impervious" to defendants when she faked suicide and left their facilities in 2004, there simply
is no evidence that defendants' threats to plaintiff stopped having a deterrent effect at that time. If
anything, defendants' threats to plaintiff became more cemented in plaintiffs mind the. day she left the
Sea Org because, at that time, she signed an affidavit (under penalty of perjury, before a notary, and
on videotape) that would make her out to be a liar if she ever challenged defendants.
Other courts have found that a defendant's threats can have a lasting impact on a plaintiff and
may deter the plaintiff from filing a lawsuit for significant lengths of time. See, e.g., John R. v.
15
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Oakland Unified Sch. Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 445 (equitable estoppel applied where teacher's
threats prevented timely filing of claim for sexual abuse by the teacher); Ateeq v. Najor (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355 (threats of deportation were sufficient grounds equitable estoppel).
IV. THE COURT IS NOT BARRED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT FROM ASSESSING
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIES
A. Application of Equitable Estoppel Does Not Threaten Religious Practices
Defendants maintain that the Court cannot consider threats that plaintiff would be deemed a
"Suppressive Person" if she took negative acts against defendants or that plaintiff feared receiving "sec
checks" because these purportedly are protected religious activities. Assuming for argument's sake
that these are protected activities, nothing about the Court's decision with respect to equitable estoppel
threatens to impinge on defendants' supposed religious practices. Instead, the Court is simply making
a determination as to whether defendants' conduct caused plaintiff to delay filing suit within the
applicable statutes oflimitations, not whether their practices are right or wrong or caused plaintiff the
harm underlying her causes of action.
Defendants cite Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. 679, 730, which provides that courts "cannot
decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or
unjustly, regularly or irregulary cut off from the body of the church." The issue of equitable estoppel
does not require any of these findings in this case. The Court need not decide whether or not plaintiff
was unjustly or justly cut-off from defendants, and instead is only making a determination as to
whether or not all of defendants' threats, only some of which are that plaintiff would be deemed a
"Suppressive Person" and that she was subjected to "sec checks," reasonably caused plaintiff to delay
filing suit. This is a narrow inquiry that does not require an evaluation of the validity of defendants'
practices. See Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 907, 925 ("It is not necessary that
the defendant acted in bad faith or intended to mislead the plaintiff' for equitable estoppel to apply).
B. Application of the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Does Not Violate the Free
Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause
The First Amendment provides that Congress "shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]." Application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel will not violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because it is a law of neutral and general applicability that
does not prohibit defendants' free exercise of their religion.
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"[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." Employment Div., Ore. Dept. Human Res. v.
Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872, 879. Stated another way, "a law that is neutral and of general applicability
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect
of burdening a particular religious practice." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah ( 1993)
508 U.S. 520, 531-532 (emphasis added).
On its face, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is a law of neutral and general applicability
because it applies across the board without regard to a particular religion, and only concerns whether
"there has been 'some conduct by the defendant, relied on by the plaintiff, which induces the belated
filing of the action." See Holdgrafer v. Unqcal Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 907, 925 (internal
citations omitted). Therefore, the mere fact that application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel
purportedly has the "incidental effect" of burdening defendants' practice of threatening its members
with being deemed "Suppressive Persons" or with using "sec checks" on its members (including
children), does not mean that the doctrine actually infringes on defendants' free exercise ofreligion.
In fact, nothing about the application of equitable estoppel in this case would prevent
defendants from continuing to threaten its members in these ways. The Court would only be making
a determination as to whether or not defendants' conduct induced plaintiff to delay filing her suit, not
whether defendants are barred from engaging in such conduct in the future.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion." "[T]he three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection [are] 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity."' Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612. A three-part
test is utilized to determine if a statute violates the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Id. at 612-613. "Excessive entanglement" occurs in situations where a "protracted legal
process" pits the church and state as adversaries or where the government is placed in the position of
17 .
. DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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-P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\2012--09--06 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
choosing between competing religious visions. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 417, 434.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel has the secular purpose of preventing one party from
benefitting from conduct that induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations
period. See Battuello v. Battuello (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 842, 848. The principal effect of equitable
estoppel is to neither advance nor inhibit religion because it applies to all individuals or organizations
whose conduct induced someone into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period.
Additionally, nothing about application of equitable estoppel fosters an excessive entanglement
because application of the doctrine does not pit defendants and the state in a "protracted legal process."
Rather, it will require a one-time by the Court of whether or not equitable estoppel
applies in plaintiffs case. Additionally, equitable estoppel does not place the Court in the position of
choosing between competing religious visions because the Court is merely assessing whether
defendants' conduct caused plaintiff to delay filing her suit within the applicable statutes oflimitations.
D. Defendants' Threatening Conduct That Occurred When Plaintiff Was a Minor
is Subject to Review Based on the State's Overriding Interest in Protecting Minors
In the context of religious freedom, the First Amendment "embraces two concepts, -freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Cantwell et al. v. State of Conn.
(1940) 310 U.S. 296, 303-04; see also Reynolds v. US. (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 164 ("Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order."). Accordingly, "a state may justify a limitation
on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."
US. v. Lee (1982) 455 U.S. 252, at 257; Prince v. Mass. (1944) 321 U.S. 158, 166-67.
Courts have routinely held that the rights and protection of children are of utmost importance,
and that religious conduct impacting children is subject to review. See Prince, supra, 321 U.S. at
166-67 ("right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child
to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death."); see also Roman Catholic, supra, 131
Cal.App.4th 417, 424 ("there also must be an accommodation by religious believers and institutions
to the rules of civil society, particularly when the state's compelling interest in protecting children is
18
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- Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
in question.); see also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church (9th Cir. 2005) 397 FJd 790, 792) ("First
Amendment does not exempt religious institutions from laws that regulate ... the use of child labor.").
As detailed in the statement of facts, Defendants began threatening plaintiff with "sec checks"
and with being deemed a "Suppressive Person" when she was only 12 and under their direct and
complete control. While arguably this conduct is considered appropriate for consenting adults, it is not
protected from consideration in cases like this, where it impacted the ability of a minor to freely leave
defendants' facilities and to assess whether she could challenge defendants without severe retribution.
E. Defendants' Conduct Regarding "Suppressive Persons" and "Sec Checks" Is Not
The Only Conduct Justifying The Application of Equitable Estoppel
Even if the Court rules that defendants' conduct of threatening plaintiff with being deemed a
"Suppressive Person" or using "sec checks" cannot be a ground for applying equitable estoppel, there
is other conduct for which defendants offer no religious justification that supports the application of
equitable estoppel. This includes forcing plaintiff to sign an affidavit and threatening to use the
contents of this affidavit against plaintiff if she took action against defendants. It also includes
surveying the activities of members of the Sea Org who left without authorization, by hiring private
investigators, tracking these individuals' bank accounts and researching their travel plans .
Moreover, even if Defendants' conduct of threatening plaintiff with being deemed a
"Suppressive Person" or using "sec checks" cannot independently be considered for purposes of
equitable estoppel, this conduct plays into whether or not plaintiffs reliance on defendants' other
threatening conduct was "reasonable." Courts must consider a plaintiffs reliance for purposes of
equitable estoppel "in light of the plaintiffs knowledge and experience." Superior Dispatch,
supra,181 Cal.App.4th at 188. Defendants' ongoing conduct exerted over plaintiff from the time she
was a child, including threats that she would be deemed a "Suppressive Person," clearly molded
plaintiffs reliance on defendants' conduct and should be considered for this purpose. evidence for this .
limited purpose does not impact defendants' free exercise of religion.
V. PLAINTIFF INSTITUTED HER ACTION WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES INDUCING HER DELAY
Defendants argue that plaintiff purportedly failed to file her complaint within a reasonable time
after the circumstances inducing her delay ceased to operate. The Court should reject this argument
for several reasons.
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.P\Cases\9527\SUMJUDG\2012-09-06 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
First, none of the cases cited by defendants are applicable as they all involve circumstances
where there was still ample time to institute an action within the applicable statute oflimitations when
the estoppel ceased to exist. In those cases, the courts held that "[i]fthere is still ample time to institute
the action within the statutory period after the circumstances inducing delay have ceased to operate,
the plaintiff who failed to do so cannot claim estoppel." Mills v. Foretex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
625, 655 (emphasis added); Lobrovich v. Georgison (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 567, 573-574; see also
Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ. (1990) 220 Cal.App3d 702, 716.
Second, the Court should reject defendants' argument because plaintiff filed her claim within
a reasonable amount of time after the estoppel ceased to exist when viewed in light of the applicable
case law. In VanHookv. Southern California Waiters Alliance, Local 17 (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 556,
565, the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs claim was two years and expired by the time the
estoppel ceased. The court held that since plaintiff brought his action within the two-year period
following the time the estoppel ceased to exist, this was "within a reasonable time after the estoppel
has expired." Id. at 569. The court equated "reasonable" time for purposes of estoppel as being the
same as the applicable statutory time. The court in Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist.
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, also held that the "reasonable" time within which to file a claim once the
estoppel ceases to exist is the same as the time period provided by the applicable statute oflimitations.
The shortest statute of limitation on plaintiffs claims was one year. Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
340(c) (statute of limitations on claim of false imprisonment is one year). The longest statute of
limitations on plaintiffs claims was four years. See Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co.
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 168 (statute oflimitations on a claim under Business and Professions Code
17200 is four years). Defendants' threats continued to deter plaintiff from filing a lawsuit until mid-
JunelJuly 2008, more than four years after she left their facilities, such that the estoppel in this case did
not cease to exist until after the relevant statutes of limitations expired. Once the estoppel ceased,
plaintiff filed her complaint within less than one year, which was within a reasonable amount of time.
VI. CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny defendants' motion.
II
20
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DATED: October 9, 2013
.P\Cases\9527\SUM-JUDG\2012.()9-06 Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
METZGER LAW GROUP
A Professional Law Corporation
RAPHAEL METZGER, ESQ.
KATHRYN SALDANA, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
21
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PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I
am over the age of 18 years and am not a party to the within action. My
business address is 401 East Ocean Blvd., #800, Long Beach, CA 90802.
On October 9, 2013, I served the foregoing document, described as:
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the parties to this action
as follows:
~ ~ {BY MAIL) I caused copies of such document, enclosed in sealed
envelopes, to be deposited in the mail at Long Beach, California with
postage thereon fully prepaid to the persons and addresses indicated on the
attached list. I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of
collecting and processing correspondence for mailing: It is deposited with
U.S. Postal Service on that same day in the ordinary course of business.
I am aware that on motion of any party served, service is presumed invalid
if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day
after the date of deposit for mailing set forth in this affidavit.
{BY FACSIMILE) I served the foregoing document by faxing true
copies thereof from facsimile number (562) 436-1561, to the facsimile
numbers indicated on the attached list. Said document was transmitted by
facsimile transmission, which was reported complete and without error.
x {BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused to be delivered such document
by hand to the firms listed on the attached list where personal service is
indicated.
{BY E-MAIL) I delivered such document by electronic mail to the
firms listed on the attached list.
{BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I caused such document to be delivered to
the firms indicated on the attached list by Express Mail or by another
express service carrier, by placing the document in an envelope designated
by the carrier and addressed as indicated on the attached list, with the
delivery fees provided for, and depositing same in a box or facility
regularly maintained by that carrier or by delivering same to an authorized
courier or driver authorized by the carrier to receive documents.
~ - X - {STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
the State of California that the above is true and correct.
{FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the offices of a
member of this court, at whose direction service was made.
Executed on October 9, 2013, at Long Beach, California.
Nina S. Vidal, Declarant
22
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
in Opposition.wpd
1 SERVICE LIST
(DeCrescenzo v. Church of Scientology, Case No. BC411018)
2
3
4
5
6
Bert H. Deixler, Esq.
Kendall Brill & Klieger LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., .suite 1725
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(Church of Scientology International)
Matthew D. Hinks, Esq.
7 Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
8 Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308
(Religious Technology center)
9
IO
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12
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14
15
16
17
18
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20
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22
23
24
25
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-ooo-
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Memorandum in Opposi1ion.wpd
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I
am over the age of 18 years and am not a party to the within action. My
business address is 401 East Ocean Blvd., #800, Long Beach, CA 90802.
On October 9, 2013, I served the foregoing document, described as:
DEFENDANTS I JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the parties to this action
as follows:
___1L (BY MAIL) I caused copies of such document, enclosed in sealed
envelopes, to be deposited in the mail at Long Beach, California with
postage thereon fully prepaid to the persons and addresses indicated on the
attached list. I am "readily familiar". with the firm's practice of
collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with
U.S. Postal Service on that same day in the ordinary course of business.
I am aware that on motion of any party served, service is presumed invalid
if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day
after the date of deposit for mailing set forth in this affidavit.
(BY FACSIMILE) I served the foregoing document by faxing true
copies thereof from facsimile number (562) 436-1561, to the facsimile
numbers indicated on the attached list. Said document was transmitted by
facsimile transmission, which was reported complete and without error.
(BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused to be delivered such document by
hand to the firms listed on the attached list where personal service is
indicated.
(BY E-MAIL) I delivered such document by electronic mail to the
firms listed on the attached list.
(BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I caused such document to be delivered to
the firms indicated on the attached list by Express Mail or by another
express service carrier, by placing the document in an envelope designated
by the carrier and addressed as indicated on the attached list, with the
delivery fees provided for, and depositing same in a box or facility
regularly maintained by that carrier or by delivering same to an authorized
courier or driver authorized by the carrier to receive documents.
(STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
the State of California that the above is true and correct.
(FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the offices of a
member of this court, at whose direction service was made.
Executed on October 9, 2013, at Long Beach, California.

Nina S. Vidal, Declarant
24
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Memorandum in Opposition.wpd
SERVICE LIST
{DeCrescenzo v. Church of Scientology, Case No. BC411018)
Kendrick L. Moxon, Esq.
Moxon & Kobrin
3500 W. Olive Avenue, Suite 300
Burbank, CA 91505
(Church of Scientology International)
John P. Blumberg, Esq.
-ooo-
7 Blumberg Law Corporation
444 w. Ocean Blvd., Suite 1500
8 Long Beach, CA 90802
(Plaintiff)
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(Updated August 23, 2012 jlp)
25

DeCrescenzo Vs Scientology Plaintiff S Memorandum of Points Ocr

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