TCAS: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System The Traffic

Alert and Collision Avoidance System, or TCAS, is an instrument integrated into other systems in an aircraft cockpit. It consists of hardware and software that together provide a set of electronic eyes so the pilot can "see" the traffic situation in the vicinity of the aircraft. Part of the TCAS capability is a display showing the pilot the relative positions and velocities of aircraft up to 40 miles away. The instrument sounds an alarm when it determines that another aircraft will pass too closely to the subject aircraft. TCAS provides a backup to the air traffic control systems regular separation processes. The MITRE Corporation conducted early research into collision avoidance technologies under the sponsorship of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). TCAS is a direct descendant of those invented at MITRE and elsewhere. To learn more about TCAS, and the people who invented it, read further, or click on the following sections: Background Historical Perspective A Collision Avoidance System is Born Taking to the Skies: The Congressional Mandate Evolving to Meet Safety Needs Background Since the early 1960s, MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD) has provided the FAA with Air Traffic Control (ATC) system engineering support. As part of this longstanding partnership, CAASD helped the FAA implement a collision avoidance system for aircraft. The resulting Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, or TCAS, has become a standard for safety in the United States and abroad. Its value is clear: no airline mid-air collisions have occurred in the United States since 1990, when the airlines began equipping their planes with TCAS. From its inception, TCAS has dramatically improved pilots' chances of successfully averting the threat of a mid-air collision. Pilots have come to rely on TCAS to give them the crucial data to avoid collisions. As their last line of defense, TCAS gives pilots the edge needed to ensure that their crew and passengers have the safest flight possible. The project benefited from the cooperative efforts of the FAA, airlines, and several other companies. CAASD designed and developed the collision avoidance logic at the heart of the system. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory developed air-to-air surveillance. The FAA Technical Center and a team of contractors, including The Analytical Sciences Corporation, Coleman Research Corporation, and Rannoch Corporation, were responsible for software verification and validation. The FAA Technical Center and ARINC Research handled operational evaluations. Historical Perspective On June 30, 1956, two planes collided over the Grand Canyon. In the wake of this and other such airborne disasters, the industry realized they needed a system that could help prevent similar incidents. Companies soon began designing collision avoidance systems, but two problems hampered their efforts. First, adoption of the proposed systems would require the airlines to equip their fleets with expensive new hardware.

Second, there was still a lot of development left to do before an adequate system would be ready.

In 1974, MITRE proposed an alternative. Using the transponders already installed in many aircraft for communication with the FAA's ground-based Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS), developers took advantage of existing technologies to significantly hasten the design and implementation process. The Beacon-Based Collision Avoidance System (BCAS) was the predecessor of today's TCAS. This system sent interrogation signals to nearby aircraft similar to the FAA's radar system. The transponders then sent back response signals. The system interpreted these signals to determine the location, speed, and course of each plane and used the data to avoid a potential collision. BCAS test results were promising. On the ground, MITRE equipped a trailer to receive transponder signals as if it were an aircraft. BCAS lived up to expectations, prompting the FAA Technical Center to test the system on one of its aircraft. On the basis of these two tests, the FAA moved forward with further development of BCAS. A Collision Avoidance System Is Born In 1981, the FAA chose to pursue the onboard design approach used in BCAS rather than a ground-based collision avoidance system which was also under consideration. At that point, BCAS was renamed TCAS. There are two different versions of TCAS, for use on different classes of aircraft. The first, TCAS I, indicates the bearing and relative altitude of all aircraft within a selected range (generally 10 to 20 miles). With color-coded symbols, the display indicates which aircraft pose potential threats. This constitutes the Traffic Advisory (TA) portion of the system. When pilots receive a TA, they must visually identify the intruding aircraft and may alter their plane's altitude by up to 300 feet. TCAS I does not offer solutions, but does supply pilots with important data so that they can determine the best course of action. An illustration of TCAS range and altitude criteria shows the horizontal and vertical distances to monitor traffic and issue advisories to maintain safe separation of aircraft. In addition to a traffic display, the more comprehensive TCAS II also provides pilots with resolution advisories (RAs) when needed. The system determines the course of each aircraft; climbing, descending, or flying straight and level. TCAS II then issues an RA advising the pilots to execute an evasive maneuver necessary to avoid the other aircraft, such as "Climb" or "Descend." If both planes are equipped with TCAS II, then the two computers offer deconflicting RAs. In other words, the pilots do not receive

advisories to make maneuvers that would effectively cancel each other out, resulting in a continued threat.

TCAS queries other aircraft, receives information, and reacts by warning pilots when there is a potential threat.

displays

traffic,

MITRE's key contribution to the development of TCAS was its work on the collision avoidance logic for TCAS II. The software uses the collected data on the flight patterns of other aircraft and determines if there is a potential collision threat. The system doesn't just show the other planes on a display like a radar screen, but offers warnings and solutions in the form of traffic advisories (TAs) and resolution advisories (RAs). As CAASD's Dr. Andrew Zeitlin points out, "Because of the pilots' normal workload, we don't expect them to spend all of their time looking at the screen. It's there when needed, but more important, it speaks up and advises them as they need to make a maneuver to avoid a collision." Aside from the logic design, much of MITRE's work on TCAS involved creating and running computer simulations to test the system. "Because it's expensive to fly test encounters," says Dr. Zeitlin, "we have developed some very powerful tools where we can generate millions of encounters on the computer and evaluate the logic exhaustively. We can also play back radar data from ordinary traffic and get a feel for how the system works and how much disruption you get day to day or at different locations with ordinary traffic." On occasion, MITRE has also assisted the FAA and other organizations in evaluating special encounters. "For example, if somebody has a near-miss and they want to know what TCAS's role was or what would TCAS have done in the encounter, we can simulate the encounter and give advice," says Zeitlin. Back to Top Taking to the Skies: The Congressional Mandate On August 31, 1986, while TCAS was still in development, a collision occurred over Cerritos, California, involving an Aeromexico DC-9 and a small Piper aircraft carrying a family of three. The DC-9 was descending toward Los Angeles International Airport in clear skies, flying at 6,500 feet. The Piper hit the DC-9's tail, causing both aircraft to plummet from the sky. The accident resulted in the deaths of all 67 people aboard the two planes, as well as 15 people on the ground. In the aftermath of this accident, Congress passed a law requiring

the FAA to mandate the use of TCAS. By 1993, all carrier aircraft operating within U.S. airspace with more than 30 passenger seats were equipped with TCAS II. Aircraft with 10 to 30 seats were required to employ TCAS I. Evolving to Meet Safety Needs Although the airlines were using the more advanced version 6.01 of the TCAS logic, some improvements still needed to be made. The system was issuing RAs in some situations, such as final approach, when traffic may be closer but is safely under control. Many pilots saw these RAs as a nuisance. The system was basically too sensitive, with unnecessary TAs and RAs even being triggered by transponders on bridges and ships. According to Dr. Zeitlin, "There was a growing tendency among pilots to ignore the advisory, even when they didn't necessarily have full knowledge of the situation. Everyone was concerned that one day they would ignore one that was necessary." In 1992, CAASD developed logic version 6.04 to alleviate these problems. Delta Airlines, the first carrier to voluntarily use the new logic, reported an 80 percent reduction in RAs. The following year, CAASD developed an additional improvement to the logic, version 6.04A. Airlines began equipping their fleets with this version in 1994. The Final Generation In 1997, CAASD finished work on one final major change to the TCAS logic, version 7. It was approved by the RTCA standards committee and the FAA, and is the version that will be installed on all new aircraft. It has also been adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as the international standard. Initially, version 7 will be installed on aircraft serving European and some other countries. American carriers who fly to these countries will have to upgrade from 6.04A to 7 on their international planes, and can voluntarily upgrade the equipment already on their U.S. fleets.

According to program manager David Lubkowski, who led CAASD's TCAS software development group, the version 7 logic should yield at least a 20 percent reduction in RAs over the previous version. "We also ran simulations using radar data from Europe, where they encounter more high-altitude en route conflicts," he said. "The new 7.0 software resulted in a 40 percent reduction in unnecessary RAs." The new logic also significantly improves TCAS performance in several other important areas. CAASD personnel have conducted safety studies to evaluate the performance of each successive version of the TCAS logic. In a 1997 report on version 7, CAASD's Dr. Michael McLaughlin examined the reduced risk of collision in aircraft equipped with

TCAS II versus the risk in aircraft without TCAS. Based on the likelihood of incursions into a protected zone around aircraft with a radius of 500 feet and a height of 200 feet -defined as Critical Near Mid-Air Collisions (NMACs) -- McLaughlin concluded that "TCAS should reduce NMAC probability by at least 90 to 98 percent," depending on whether one or both aircraft in an encounter are equipped with TCAS. Though NMACs, especially those involving commercial, passenger aircraft are already extremely rare, McLaughlin notes that "TCAS is intended to reduce their probability even further." Although the FAA has said that version 7 will be the final logic for TCAS, CAASD continues to work on many different air traffic control projects, and will undoubtedly play a role in the development of any future collision avoidance systems.

Alarma del trfico y sistema de la evitacin de la colisin El sistema de la evitacin de la alarma y de la colisin del trfico, o TCAS, es un instrumento integrado en otros sistemas en una carlinga de avin. Consiste en el hardware y el software que juntos proporcionan un sistema de ojos electrnicos as que la lata del piloto "ve" la situacin del trfico en la vecindad del avin. La parte de la capacidad de TCAS es una exhibicin que demuestra al piloto las posiciones del pariente y las velocidades del avin hasta 40 millas lejos. El instrumento suena un alarmar cuando se determina que otro avin pasar demasiado de cerca al avin sujeto. TCAS proporciona una reserva a los procesos regulares de la separacin del sistema de control del trfico areo. El MITRE Corporation condujo la investigacin temprana en tecnologas de la evitacin de la colisin bajo patrocinio de la administracin federal de la aviacin (FAA). TCAS es un descendiente directo de sos inventados en el INGLETE y a otra parte. Para aprender ms sobre TCAS, y a la gente que lo invent, lee ms lejos, o chasca encendido las secciones siguientes:
Fondo Perspectiva Histrica Se lleva un sistema de la evitacin de la colisin El llevar los cielos: El Mandato Del congreso Desarrollo para satisfacer necesidades de seguridad La Generacin Final

Fondo Desde los aos 60 tempranos, el centro del inglete para el desarrollo avanzado del sistema de la aviacin (CAASD) ha provisto del FAA la ayuda de la ingeniera de sistema del control del trfico areo (ATC). Como parte de esta sociedad de muchos aos, CAASD ayud al instrumento de FAA un sistema de la evitacin de la colisin para el avin. El sistema de la evitacin de la alarma y de la colisin del trfico que resultaba, o TCAS, se ha convertido en un estndar para la seguridad en los Estados Unidos y al exterior. Su valor est claro: ningunas colisiones del mediados de-aire de la lnea area han ocurrido en los Estados Unidos desde 1990, cuando las lneas areas comenzaron a equipar sus planos de TCAS. De su inicio, TCAS ha mejorado dramticamente las ocasiones de los pilotos con xito de evitar la amenaza de una colisin del mediados de-aire. Los pilotos han venido confiar en TCAS para darle los datos cruciales para evitar colisiones. Como su lnea de defensa pasada, TCAS da a pilotos el borde necesitado para asegurarse de que su equipo y pasajeros tengan el vuelo ms seguro posible. El proyecto benefici de los esfuerzos cooperativos del FAA, de lneas areas, y de varias otras compaas. CAASD dise y desarroll la lgica de la evitacin de la colisin en el corazn del sistema. El instituto de Massachusetts del laboratorio de Lincoln de la tecnologa desarroll vigilancia air-to-air. El centro tcnico de FAA y un equipo de contratistas, incluyendo los Analytical Sciences Corporation, Coleman Research Corporation, y Rannoch Corporation, eran responsables de la verificacin y de la validacin del software. El centro tcnico de FAA y la investigacin de ARINC manejaron evaluaciones operacionales. Perspectiva Histrica De junio el 30 de 1956, dos planos chocaron sobre la barranca magnfica. En la estela de esto y de otros tales desastres aerotransportados, la industria realiz que necesitaron un sistema que podra ayudar a prevenir incidentes similares. Las compaas pronto

comenzaron a disear sistemas de la evitacin de la colisin, pero dos problemas obstaculizaron sus esfuerzos. Primero, la adopcin de los sistemas propuestos requerira las lneas areas equipa sus flotas de hardware nuevo costoso. En segundo lugar, haba muchos inmviles de desarrollo a la izquierda de hacer antes de que un sistema adecuado fuera listo.

En 1974, el INGLETE propuso un alternativa. Usando los transpondores instalados ya en muchos el avin para la comunicacin con el sistema de faro de radar de control de trfico areo terrestre del FAA (ATCRBS), los reveladores se aprovech de tecnologas existentes para acelerar perceptiblemente el proceso del diseo y de la puesta en prctica. El sistema Faro-Basado de la evitacin de la colisin (BCAS) era el precursor de TCAS de hoy. Este sistema envi seales de la interrogacin al avin prximo similar al sistema del radar del FAA. Los transpondores entonces enviaron detrs seales de respuesta. El sistema interpret estas seales de determinar la localizacin, la velocidad, y el curso de cada plano y utiliz los datos para evitar una colisin potencial. Los resultados de la prueba de BCAS eran prometedores. En la tierra, el INGLETE equip un acoplado para recibir seales del transpondor como si fuera un avin. BCAS vivi hasta las expectativas, incitando el centro tcnico de FAA para probar el sistema en uno de su avin. En base de estas dos pruebas, el FAA se movi adelante con el desarrollo adicional de BCAS. Se lleva Un Sistema De la Evitacin De la Colisin En 1981, el FAA eligi perseguir el onboard el acercamiento del diseo usado en BCAS ms bien que sistema terrestre de la evitacin de la colisin que estaba tambin bajo consideracin. En ese punto, BCAS fue retitulado TCAS. Hay dos diversas versiones de TCAS, para el uso en diversas clases del avin. El primer, TCAS I, indica el cojinete y la altitud relativa de todo el avin dentro de una gama seleccionada (generalmente 10 a 20 millas). Con smbolos color-coded, la exhibicin indica qu amenazas del potencial de la actitud del avin. Esto constituye la porcin consultiva del trfico (TA) del sistema. Cuando los pilotos reciben TA, deben identificar visualmente el avin de imposicin y pueden alterar la altitud de su plano por hasta 300 pies. TCAS I no ofrece soluciones, sino provee a pilotos de datos importantes de modo que puedan determinar la mejor lnea de conducta. Una ilustracin de los criterios de la gama y de la altitud de TCAS demuestra las distancias horizontales y verticales a los advisories del trfico y de la edicin del monitor para mantener la separacin segura del avin.

Adems de una exhibicin del trfico, el TCAS ms comprensivo II tambin provee de pilotos los advisories de la resolucin (rA) cuando est necesitado. El sistema determina el curso de cada avin; el subir, el descender, o el volar derecho y llano. TCAS II entonces publica un RA que aconseja a los pilotos ejecutar una maniobra evasiva necesaria para evitar el otro avin, tal como "subida" o "descienda." Si ambos planos se equipan de TCAS II, despus las dos computadoras ofrecen el rA deconflicting. Es decir los pilotos no reciben advisories para hacer las maniobras fuera de las cuales se cancelara con eficacia, dando por resultado una amenaza continuada.

TCAS pregunta el otro avin, recibe la informacin, exhibe trfico, y reacciona por los pilotos de la advertencia cuando hay una amenaza potencial. La contribucin dominante del inglete al desarrollo de TCAS era su trabajo sobre la lgica de la evitacin de la colisin para TCAS II. El software utiliza los datos recogidos sobre los patrones del vuelo del otro avin y se determina si hay una amenaza potencial de la colisin. El sistema apenas no demuestra los otros planos en una exhibicin como una pantalla de radar, sino las advertencias de las ofertas y las soluciones en la forma de los advisories del trfico (TA) y de advisories de la resolucin (rA). Como el Dr. Andrew Zeitlin de CAASD's precisa, "debido a la carga de trabajo normal de los pilotos, no esperamos que pasen todo su tiempo que mira la pantalla. Es all cuando est necesitado, pero ms importante, habla para arriba y los aconseja mientras que necesitan hacer una maniobra para evitar una colisin." Aparte del diseo de la lgica, mucho del trabajo del inglete sobre TCAS implic el crear y el funcionar de simulaciones de computadora para probar el sistema. "porque es costoso volar encuentro de la prueba," dice a Dr. Zeitlin, "hemos desarrollado algunas herramientas muy de gran alcance donde podemos generar millones de encuentro en la computadora y evaluar la lgica exhaustivo. Podemos tambin jugar datos traseros del radar del trfico ordinario y conseguir una sensacin para cmo el sistema trabaja y cunto interrupcin usted consigue cotidiano o en diversas localizaciones con trfico ordinario." En la ocasin, el INGLETE tambin ha asistido al FAA y a otras organizaciones en la evaluacin de encuentro especial. "por ejemplo, si alguien tiene un tiro errado y desean saber cules era el papel de TCAS's o qu TCAS habra hecho en el encuentro, podemos simular el encuentro y dar consejo," dice Zeitlin.

El llevar los cielos: El Mandato Del congreso De agosto el 31 de 1986, mientras que TCAS todava estaba en el desarrollo, una colisin ocurri sobre Cerritos, California, implicando un Aeromexico Dc-9 y un avin pequeo de Piper que llevaba una familia de tres. El Dc-9 era descendente hacia el aeropuerto internacional de Los ngeles en los cielos claros, volando en 6.500 pies. El Piper golpe la cola de DC-9's, el causar ambo avin para caer a plomo del cielo. El accidente dio lugar a las muertes de las 67 personas a bordo de los dos planos, as como 15 personas en la tierra. En las consecuencias de este accidente, el congreso aprob una ley que requera el FAA asignar el uso por mandato de TCAS. Antes de 1993, todo el avin del portador que funcionaba dentro del espacio areo de ESTADOS UNIDOS con ms de 30 asientos de pasajero fue equipado del avin de TCAS II. con 10 a 30 asientos fue requerido para emplear TCAS I. Desarrollo para satisfacer necesidades de seguridad Aunque las lneas areas utilizaban la versin ms avanzada 6,01 de la lgica de TCAS, algunas mejoras todava necesitaron ser llevadas a cabo. El sistema publicaba el rA en algunas situaciones, tales como acercamiento final, cuando el trfico puede estar ms cercano pero est con seguridad bajo control. Muchos pilotos vieron este el rA como fastidio. El sistema era bsicamente demasiado sensible, con uniforme innecesario de TA y del rA que era accionado por los transpondores en los puentes y las naves. Segn el Dr. Zeitlin, "haba una tendencia cada vez mayor entre pilotos a no hacer caso del consultivo, incluso cuando l no tena necesariamente conocimiento completo de la situacin. Cada uno fue referido que un da no haran caso de uno que era necesario." En 1992, CAASD desarroll la versin 6,04 de la lgica para aliviar estos problemas. Las lneas areas del delta, el primer portador para utilizar voluntariamente la nueva lgica, divulgaron una reduccin de 80 por ciento en el rA. El ao siguiente, CAASD desarroll una mejora adicional a la lgica, versin 6.0. Las lneas areas comenzaron a equipar sus flotas de esta versin en 1994. La Generacin Final En 1997, CAASD acab el trabajo sobre un cambio importante final a la lgica de TCAS, versin 7. Fue aprobado por el comit de estndares de RTCA y el FAA, y es la versin que ser instalada en todo el avin nuevo. Tambin ha sido adoptado por la organizacin internacional de la aviacin civil (ICAO) como el estndar internacional. Inicialmente, la versin 7 ser instalada en europeo que sirve del avin y algunos otros pases. Los portadores americanos que vuelan a estos pases tendrn que aumentar de 6.0 a 7 en sus planos internacionales, y pueden aumentar voluntariamente el equipo ya en sus flotas de ESTADOS UNIDOS. According to program manager David Lubkowski, who led CAASD's TCAS software development group, the version 7 logic should yield at least a 20 percent reduction in RAs over the previous version. "We also ran simulations using radar data from Europe, where they encounter more high-altitude en route conflicts," he said. "The new 7.0 software resulted in a 40 percent reduction in unnecessary RAs." The new logic also significantly improves TCAS performance in several other important areas.

CAASD personnel have conducted safety studies to evaluate the performance of each successive version of the TCAS logic. In a 1997 report on version 7, CAASD's Dr. Michael McLaughlin examined the reduced risk of collision in aircraft equipped with TCAS II versus the risk in aircraft without TCAS. Based on the likelihood of incursions into a protected zone around aircraft with a radius of 500 feet and a height of 200 feet -defined as Critical Near Mid-Air Collisions (NMACs) -- McLaughlin concluded that "TCAS should reduce NMAC probability by at least 90 to 98 percent," depending on whether one or both aircraft in an encounter are equipped with TCAS. Though NMACs, especially those involving commercial, passenger aircraft are already extremely rare, McLaughlin notes that "TCAS is intended to reduce their probability even further." Although the FAA has said that version 7 will be the final logic for TCAS, CAASD continues to work on many different air traffic control projects, and will undoubtedly play a role in the development of any future collision avoidance systems.