ilitary

eVlew
In This Issue
+ Missile Gap
+ Defector Operations
+ Army Nuclear Doctrine
March 69
UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT
Major General John H. Hay, Jr.
DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Brigadier General David S. Henderson
The Military Review is published by the United States Anny Command and General
Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a
forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national
security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.
Military Review
Professional Journal of the US Army
Army Nuclear Doctrine . . . . . . COL Melvin D. Clark, USA, Ret 3
LTC Richard C. Orphan, USA, Ret
Service Testing Belongs to the User . . . LTC Dan H. Williamson, Jr., USA 5&
Insurgency in Latin America . GEN Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, Peruvian Army 10
Operational Efficiency of Soviet Staffs . . . COL Truman R. Boman, USA 21
Antarctic Treaty in Operation . . . . . Raymond J. Barrett 28
Armor: Soviet Arm of Decision? COL Charles G. FitzGerald, USA 35
US Political-Strategic Interests in Middle East . . . Ralph H. Magnus 47
Megatonnage and Missile Gaps MAJ Edgar O'Baliance, British Army, Ret 65
Defector Operations . . . . . . . . LTC John Ozaki, USA 71
Future Security Arrangements . . . . Donald E. Nuechterlein 79
Mao's Thoughts . .
COL John B. McKinney, USA 84
Reader Forum 94
Military Notes 96
Military Books 107
The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the
US Army or the Command and General Staff College.
EdHor in Cblef
COL Donald J. Delaney
Associate EdHor
COL Jobn B. B. Trussell; Jr.
Army War College
Assistant Editor
LTC A. leroy Covey
Features EdHor
LTC Robert G. Main
Production Editor
Helen M. Hall
SpanlsbAmerican Editor
MAl Juan HortaMerly
Brazilian Editors
LTC Samuel T. T. Primo
LTC Romero Lepesqueur
Publication Ofticer
MAl Donald E. Tuman
Art and Design
Charles A. Moore
MILITARY REVIEW-Publlshed monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leav
enworth, Kansas, In English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication has
been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 25 July 1968.
Second-class postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: $4.00 rus currency) a
year in the United States, United States military post offites, and thosa counUies wbich are members ot
the Pall-American Postal Union "ncluding Spainh $5.00 a year In all other countries; single copy price
50 cents. Address subscription mail to the Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff
College, fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.
.tItlttnry ittritlU
Awnrb Artttit
The Military Review announces the selection of the following article
from the January 1969 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTI
CLE:
"Streamlining the Joint Chiefs of Staff"
Major John F. McMahon, Jr., United States Air Force
Major McMahon writes that the present Joint Chiefs of Staff must devote
their time and energy simultaneously to two full-time jobs. It is inevitable
that some service-oriented views are championed, thereby needlessly
fragmenting military thinking. He suggests that all command relation
ships with the parent service be severed and the Joint Chiefs be concerned
solely with national military matters. This would enhance their ability
to function as national military representatives, and national military
policy would be their sole concern.
*
*
*
COMING:
William R. Tracey, in "Politico-Military Involvement-a Functional Impera
tive," writes of the enlargement of the role of the senior officer and its exten
lion into areas heretofore regarded as the exclusive province of political leaders
md diplomats. He feels that national security demands the thoughtful partici
!IlItion of these officers in matters of foreign and domestic policy, but warns that
;hese officers must be aware of the limitations on their role and should exercise
with great discretion.
Colonel Dennis J. Harron, United States Army, in "A Separate
iJranch for Army Aviation," examines the problem of meeting Vietnam require
nents, the growth of Army aviation, and the present Army Aviation Program
:0 determine whether aviation should be a separate branch of the Army. He
:oncludes that the current program should remain in effect since it produces
responsive to the supported ground commander and these aviators have
he potential for the highest levels of staff and command.
1922
Army
Nuclear
Doctrine
Is it out of date?
Colonel Melvin D. Clark, United Stalea Armg, Retired, and
Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Orphan, United Statea Armg, Retired
I
s A nuclear land war possible? If nuclear weapons are used, how
will ground combat have to be modified? Will the level of de
struction make senseless the present methods of land battle?
In advance of the first combat use of nuclear weapons, the an
swers to these and similar queries will remain unproved. Never
theless, a large part of the US defense posture rests upon the Army
nuclear capability now fielded and deployed.
The Army has a real challenge to make the most of its nu
clear arsenal and, within the broad guidelines of national strategy,
to deploy its nuclear arms and school current forces in their use.
Doctrine provides the direction for these matters. The nuclear
doctrine of the Army consists of the policies, plans, procedures, and
techniques by which land forces would fight a nuclear war if called
upon today or tomorrow. The details of the doctrine can be traced
in a great number and variety of manuals and instructional mate
rials. But this doctrine can be expressed more concisely in terms
March 1969
3
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
of certain major concepts and corol
laries to facilitate analysis.
These are broad beliefs that are
widely accepted. The concepts are not
facts in themselves, but are under
standings upon which doctrine is
founded. These major concepts form a
basis for subsidiary corollaries which
have to do with procedures or tech
niques. These corollaries are also im
portant beliefs on which' the Army
nuclear doctrine rests.
The first concept is: Nuclear war
is only one of many kinds of war the
Army may be called upon to fight.
Land forces have shown great flex
: ibility in the past and have that prom
ise for the future. Future conflicts
involving land forces may range from
general nuclear wars to limited con
ventional skirmishes and the many
variations in between. The threat to
the United States may arise from a
highly advanced great power or one of
Colonel Melvin D. Clark, US Army,
Retired, has been with the University
of California, Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, L.ivermore, California,
since 1967. A longtime research and
development specialist, he received his
M.S. from the Jlniversity of Roches
ter; is a graduate of the Air War Col
lege; served as Commanding Officer,
Kwajalein Test Site; and, at the time
of his retirement in 1966, was a mem
ber of the faculty of the US Army
War College.
Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Or
phan, US Army, Retired, was grad
uated from the US Military Aeademy
in 1949. A career nuclear energy spe
cialist since 1948, he has also served
in various infantry and ordnance as
signments. Since his retirement in
1969, he has been with the University
of California, Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, Livermore, California.
the emerging nations or any interme
diate, and the weapons may vary in
lethality from that of the megaton nu
clear weapon to the almost primitive
tools meant for individual engage
ments.
Meeting any scale of aggression
with a suitable response based upon
the circumstances current at the time
is fundamental to the current US na
tional strategy. The Army sees itself
as capable of contributing to the na
tional defense at any scale of conflict.
Corollaries to this concept are:
Weapon systems must be multi
capable. To implement this concept,
the Army has formulated a multi
capable force unspecialized in any
given type of warfare. Multicapability
means utility in many environments.
The military tasks have not changed,
only the means for accomplishing
them. This has resulted in a mobile
conventional force, with fire support
systems capable of shooting either
conventional or nuclear ammunition
wherever practical. This is to permit
the greatest flexibility and peacetime
economy.
Nuclear fire must be integrated
with conventional fire. The Army
seeks to acquire firepower systems
which will be influential in all levels
of conflict. It is believed that, even in
conventional war, nuclear use may
hover as a threat; and in nuclear war,
conventional fire would be required to
handle small, close, or extremely vul
nerable targets.
Nuclear weapons are primarily
for high-intensity wars. High-inten
sity wars are those in which the entire
spectrum of modern sophisticated
weapons is used. The consequences of
a major attack upon Europe by the
USSR is conceived as such a situation.
Military Review
4
NUCWR DOCTRINE
While nuclear weapons-the capstone
of modern sophisticated weapons-are
not excluded from use in small-scale,
tightly controlled situations, Army
doctrine, tactics, and equipment ap
pear polarized for either conventional
conflicts or high-intensity warfare.
The second concept holds that: N'/bo
clear weapons ezt61ld the level ()f vi0
lence ()f land war.
The casualty rate will reach propor
casualty rate will cause a dispersion
between units which will, in turn, af
fect the areas of responsibility. Rapid
movements and concentrations for lim
ited time periods will be the rule.
Decentralized, mission-type operations
requiring a high degree of initiative
will be required.
Decentralized procecW,res for use
()f nuclear weapons will be necessary.
Under current law, initial use of nu-
US Arm
First-generation tactical nuelear systems were large and unwieldy. The travel weight
of this 280-millimeter gun was 83 tons.
tions not experienced before in land
combat. Engagements will be char
acterized by brevity, but with an in
tensity beyond that now known. Ob
jectives and the scope of the battle will
be deeper than ever.
Corollaries are:
Both operations and organiza,.
tioM for cmnbat will be mooijied. The
March 1969
clear weapons is a decision made by
civil leadership. Once made, it is likely
that authority to fire a nuclear weapon
will be delegated to a command level
Jsponsive to the military need. Within
a theater of operations, it is planned
that a system of allocations will oper
ate to achieve optimum distribution of
nuclear fire support. These plans rep
5
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
resent a style of combat in which the
nuclear weapons would be employed
under various degrees of local control.
A nuclear fire dominancy will be
sought to reduce the level of casualties.
While survival of the forces will be the
initial prime concern in a nuclear ex
change, both combatants will seek a
nuclear fire dominancy. This is a condi
tion like fire superiority where even a
slight advantage in firepower tends to
feed upon itself. Until this occurs, a
nuclear dueling will be the primary
military action.
The third concept is: Combat power
consists of both fire and maneuver.
Fire and maneuver are the two clas
sical ingredients of tactics for land
war. The emphasis between these two
elements is altered with the use of
tactical nuclear weapons. However,
doctrine continues to describe the fire
power as support for maneuver forces,
and this view is apparently fundamen
tal to the Army concepts of nuclear
warfare.
Corollaries include:
The enemy nuclear capability is
the priority target. In recognition of
the unprecedented destructive poten
tial of nuclear weapons, counteraction
against the enemy nuclear capabilities
will be afforded priority. This includes
the enemy's nuclear weapon systems,
as well as the communications and
logistic facilities crucial to his employ
ment of nuclear weapons. Against
such capabilities, counterbattery ac
tivity is more important than ever. As
in the past, the target priority depends
directly on the target worth in the
over-all operation. Nuclear fire domi
nancy is an important premise on
which maneuver proceeds.
Fire supports the maneuver ele
ments. In land warfare in the past,
fire support was subordinated to the
needs of the maneuver elements. Nu
clear doctrine acknowledges the coun
ternuclear role as being dominant
initially, but emphasizes the continued
obligation for fire support of the deci
sive combat element-namely maneu
ver. The criteria for resumption of
classical operations are achieved as
soon as the level of nuclear effects sub
sides to the point that maneuver can
be employed decisively by the combat
forces. This can be contrasted to the
announced Soviet doctrine in which
mobile forces exploit the results of
massive nuclear strikes-that is, ma
neuver supports firepower.
The fourth concept is: Nuclear
weapons are powerful but costly.
Each nuclear weapon is considered
an important element of combat power,
to be committed one by one by a re
sponsible command leve!. While nu
clear weapons are considered the deci
sive element on the future battlefield,
the doctrine seems to impute a high
cost and a relative short supply upon
nuclear weapon systems. In fact, cost
and availability are relative quantities
and are subject to change.
Its corollaries are:
Discrete targets will be engaged.
Discrete targets are those which can
be considered separate from any other.
Doctrine is specific that individual
targets be engaged on the basis of as
complete target intelligence as pos
sible. This presumes adequate target
location sensors working effectively in
the nuclear environment. Pattern or
area fire is obviated when this neces
sity for discrete targeting exists .
A high IJ8surance of effectiveness
is required. The Army's apparent view
that nuclear weapons are costly and
in limited supply is reflected in the
targeting rules. Nuclear targets nor
mally require an effectiveness assur-
MilitIIy Revi
8
NUCWR DOCTRINE
ance level of 90 percent. Such a level is
remarkably high in comparison with
the use of other military resources
such as conventional bombs or artillery
-and results in many special consid
erations for the nuclear fire planning
and can be contrasted with engage
ment criteria for conventional artil
evokes political and moral reasons, as
well as military reasons, for limiting
effects to the target area.
Corollaries are:
Troop safety limits must be re
spected. Friendly troop safety--espe
cially near the line of contact with the
enemy-is a prime concern. The im
Artilkf'JI Trmda
Part of the NATO defense is the survival and protection of a densely populated, indus
trial society
lery characteristic of modern conven
tional war.
The final concept states: Unneces
sary destruction is to be avoided.
The destruction achievable with tac
tical nuclear weapons approaches that
which could occur in a massive strate
gic exchange. Land forces, although
equipped with nuclear weapons, exist
solely to attain objectives short of the
devastation patently achievable in a
massive strategic exchange. Therefore,
the tactical nuclear weapon capability
Milch 1969
pact of changes in the level of nuclear
effects on present and future opera
tions must be considered. The delayed
casualty-producing potential of nu
clear weapons on military forces would
be a unique and often dominant factor
in the decision to use or not to use
such weapons.
Nuclear effects will be limited to
military targets. In the environment
of defending the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the collateral
damage which may be incurred by the
7
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
friendly civilian population is a prime
concern. The military target must be
discriminated from the civilian, and
restraint must be used in the applica
tion of nuclear fires whenever a non
military society is to be protected.
This limita the use of effecta which
might otherwise be of military advan
tage. The announced Soviet tactical
sidered to be composed largely of over
whelming conventional military land
power supplemented by a nuclear
capability. The United States sought
ways of responding to this and other
aggression by means other than mas
sive nuclear retaliation for all provoca
tions.
Tactical nuclear weapons were pro-
of
ConOiets may range from nuclear war to limited conventional skirmishes
nuclear doctrine does not include re
strictions of this nature.
Army nuclear doctrine has its his
tOl'ical origins rooted in the mixture
of the first-generation weapons and
the necessity to cope with a threat in
Europe. The assimilation of the nu
clear weapon to ground combat use
was more evolutionary than revolu
tionary in its impact upon the concepts
for conducting land warfare.
A decade ago, our dominant interest
was the defense of Europe against a
Soviet invasion. This threat was con-
posed in public and allied councils as a
practical means of retaining NATO
initiative in responding to conflict
situations w/lile confining the destruc
tive effects to military targets. This
provided the preferred alternative of
using a strong US technological advan
tage against the massive conventional
warfare threat to NATO.
Although strategic nuclear weapons
were accumulating in the Soviet arse
nal, it was believed that the United
States could deter the Soviet strength
and that NATO would retain a deci-
Military Review 8
sive edge in mobile tactical nuclear
weapons for some time. Nuclear weap
ons responsive to the needs of NATO
land forces were adopted as a practical
means of retaining NATO initiative
in responding' decisively to conflict
situations while limiting the destruc
tive effects on the lives and property
of friendly alIies.
At that time, the specific nature of
the ground to be defended-NATO
was a friendly, densely populated, in
dustrial society. An important part of
the NATO defense was the survival
and protection of that society along
with preventing the capture of the
land area.
The techniques such as discrete tar
get engagement, discrimination by
yield selection, decentralized authority
for use, and minimizing damage to
towns and civilians were established to
fit these circumstances and influences.
The manuals and instructional mate
rial were written accordingly.
Perhaps of no less impact was the
state of technology for the early nu
clear weapon systems when design of
nuclear weapons was a fledgling art. It
is hardly surprising that the first gen
eration of nuclear delivery systems
was large and unwieldy. For example,
the travel weight of the 280-millimeter
gun was 83 tons, and each Corporal
missile weighed almost six tons apiece.
For rapid movement and response in
a nuclear environment, the weapons
were woefuIly inadequate. Both were
soon replaced. The nuclear warheads
were initiaIly characterized by com
plexity, high cost, and relative scar
city. The strategic requirements for
nuclear weapons were paramount, and
the tactical needs were fiIled second.
These characteristics affected the
Army rules for employment.
Many changes have occurred in the
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
world in 10 years. For various reasons,
it appears that our NATO defense no
longer necessarily rests on nuclear
advantage. "Wars of liberation" with
Communist confrontation by proxy
seem the likely style of war facing the
United States now and in the future.
There is the possibility of a world in
the future where nuclear weapons are
broadcast amongna larger number of
nations and where some of the smaller
nations of the world will be able to
indulge in nuclear diplomacy.
Indeed, how the strong nuclear
powers respond to the small nonnu
clear threats is a demanding question.
No longer is a US response to all prov
ocations in Europe committed to the
tactical nuclear weapons; in fact,
there is a distinct preference for less
than nuclear means of combat. There
is even a rejection of conventional
warhead missiles in the Vietnam ex
perience.
The theory of avoidance of nuclear
war on any scale has wide support in
the political establishment; multiple
options and escalated response are the
order of the day; and strong central
control by political authorities is a
keystone. The threat is now more
formidable, the national strategy has
changed, and the technology of war
fare has become more sophisticated.
How, then, does the Army plan to
use nuclear weapons? Much like it has
planned to do in the past-a conclusion
that today may be cause for some con
cern. It seems that the Army nuclear
concepts and philosophy of employ
ment had their genesis about 15 years
ago and reflect the conditions which
existed at that time. A crucial question
does exist as to whether the current
Army nuclear doctrine is sufficiently
flexible to accommodate all of the new
circumstances today and in the future.
Marcb 1969
9
-
Insurgency in Latin America
-Its Impact on Political
and Military Strategy
General Edgardo Mercado Jarrfn, Peruvian Arm"
B
ASICALLY three types of Latin
American countries exist-those
such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
who have achieved a level of develop
ment which, without arriving at ma
turity, has raised them above the
conditions of poverty in which the
rural and working masses of other
American countries live.
A second group is comprised of
Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and
Uruguay where, in spite of the exist
ence of internal contradictions, an
encouraging peaceful revolution has
been initiated and where there also
exists the hope of achieving better
levels of living soon.
The last group is composed of
Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and the
Central American countries where the
living conditions of the masses are
distressing, and these countries do
not have sufficient means of escaping
this underdeveloped state in a rea
sonable pedod of time.
In this situation, Communist insur-
MilitarJ Rawle. 10
gents have been able to act with great
flexibility, adjusting their strategy
and revolutionary tactics to the par
ticular conditions of each country or
group of countries.
Conditions of Countries
In the first group, since communism
has not been able to foment an armed
struggle, it maintains an open political
struggle, legal or semilegal, as in
Mexico, or it makes use of the legal
position of the leftist parties, as in
Brazil or Argentina. In this way, it
attempts to achieve power in Chile
by means of free elections, controlling
or (rying to gain the support of politi
cal parties, alliances, and coalitions.
In the second group, communism
opposes the government in its efforts
to achieve socioeconomic development.
The pro-Castro Communist in the
divided leftist factions have sown
doubt about opting between legal ac
tion or armed struggle. Despite this
disagreement, the action of the guer
rillas can only, as an immediate end,
disturb the socioeconomic develop
ment.
In the third group, communism
takes advantage of the existing con
ditions, and its propaganda finds
favorable ground to demonstrate the
internal contradictions and the exist-
This article was translated and
condensed from the pamphlet, LA
POLITICA Y LA ESTRATEGIA MILI
TAR EN LA GUERRA CONTRASUB
VERSIVA EN AMERICA LATINA,
written by General Mercado and
publi8hed in Peru in September
1967. Translation by Mr. Byron
Palls, Lawrence, Kansas.
General Mercado was Com
mandant of the Center of Mili
tary Instruction of Peru in Char
rillos until October 1968 when he
became the new government's
Mini8ter of Foreign Affairs.
March 19&9
LATIN AMERICA
ence of unjust structures. In spite
of the failure of the guerrillas in
Bolivia, the priority effort of the
Communists is the revolutionary the
ory of Fidel Castro for Latin Amer
ica: "Armed insurrection to achieve
as an immediate end the capture of
power."
Areas of Strategy
Based on these conditions, it is ap
parent that Communist insurgency
strategy in Latin America will con
tinue to be exercised in four large
areas:
In the military field, by means
of a revolutionary armed struggle.
Guerrillas, with the active support of
Cuba, could achieve the immediate
end of disturbing socioeconomic de
velopment.
In the sociological field, by
means of a constant effort to indoc
trinate the masses, with the active
support of the Soviets.
In the economic field, by way of
a systematic attack on the govern
ments' efforta to achieve socioeconomic
development.
In the political field, by legal or
semilegal opposition in combination
with the legally accepted leftist parties
and with the tolerance of certsin gov
ernments.
Communist tactics vary from
strikes and systematic work stoppages
to guerrilla activity encompassing all
types of terrorism, sabotage, assaults
to obtain funds or arms, pillaging,
mass demonstrations, infiltration into
state organisms, and urban or rural
insurrection. Their activities in the
coming years will be oriented toward
an intensification of ideological pene
tration of. the urban masses, particu
larly students, and workers and the
rural population by exploiting the
social, political, and economic prob
lems by means of agitation and propa
11
UTIN AMERICA
ganda. They will continue, at the same
time, to support guerrilla activities
in isolated regions, particularly in
Andean America.
An analysis of the situation in
Latin America establishes the exist
ence of certain characteristics com
mon to all countries in which a latent
Armed revolutionary in Peru. Guerrilla
activity is a threat'in many Latin-Ameri
can countries.
state of insurgency exists. The first
and most dangerous element is the
existence in every country of a con
stellation of political organizations of
the extreme left. These include:
A pro-M0860W group. Orthodox
Communist Parties of the Soviet line
which answer to Soviet direction and
control and which feel that present
conditions are not favorable to guer
rilla warfare. Their strategy is to
weaken the governments, thus im
peding the fulfillment of economic
and social reforms and carrying out
the traditional practices of work with
the masses, systematic infiltration, in
surgency agitation, and propaganda,
by means of "popular fronts.';
A prO-Peking group. This group's
strategy is the use of armed struggle
as the best means to obtain power.
The members receive instructions and
economic aid from Communist China.
As Cuban activities intensify with
Cuba's desire to enlist in the revolu
tionary command of Lathi America, a
gradual weakening is felt in these
groups.
A pro-Castro group. The strategy
of this group is the use of armed
struggle as the only means to achieve
power. Such groups are developing a
strategy independent from Moscow
and maintain that it is not necessary
to wait until the conditions mature to
initiate armed revolution.
DelinH. Nucleus
Around every pro-Soviet Communist
faction, there exists a pro-Peking and
a pro-Castro group. and vice versa.
Each of these organizations has a
definite nucleus, well trained, with
an extraordinary belief and fervor,
fuUy dedicated to the assimilation of
the masses and, generally, of an ap
propriate cultural level. These include
the men who attempt to gain leading
positions so that they can later cap
ture the power and transform them
selves into the leading and governing
groups of the state.
The solidarity of communism has
suffered notably as a result of _the
number of groups, the ideological con
flict between Moscow and Peking, the
differences between Fidel Castro and
the orthodox parties of Latin Amer
ica regarding the tactics to be used,
the lack of doctrinal and directional
unity, and the diversity of the support.
The proliferation of extreme leftist
groups in Latin America can be in
terpreted in two ways: as an indica
tion that the Communists are becom-
Millbry Review 12
Cod6
Communist arms and propaganda material captured from guerrillas in Argeutina
ing tired of being forctid to follow
a common pattern, or as a result of
the ambition of their leaders, of the
appetite for power, and of the exist
ing antagonisms.
Certain characteristics favorable
to the growth of insurgency are com
mon to all Latin-American countries
in varying degrees. One is the exist-
LATIN AMERICA
The unequal distribution of in
come among the different activities
and sections of the people. Even in
countries such as Mexico, who for
several decades has carried out intense
social policies, studies show that less
than five percent of the population
receive 33 percent of the national
income. In Peru, 1.9 percent of the
ence of areas which are geographi
cally, I!.olitically, and culturally iso
lated from the rest of the country.
An analysis of the development of the
guerrillas in Guatemala, Venezuela,
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia shows
that the insurgency centers arose and
are active in those isolated areas
of the country which are cut off
geographically and where political ac
tion of the state and cultural benefits
cannot reach.
Another common characteristic is
the large number of structural im
balances in the society which fre
quently provoke tensions of all types.
Among these imbalances are:
March 1969
population receive 44.2 percent of the
national income.
The great social and economic
differences which exist between the
different regions in the countries. In
Peru, the existing differences between
the coast and the mountains constitute
one of the most serious problems in
the country. The income per capita
on the coast is three times as great as
that in the mountains. The problems
of housing, food, employment, and
education which exist today on the
Peruvian coast are caused principally
by the large number of immigrants
from the mountains. This situation
may eventually create violence.
13
LATIN AMERICA
The ever-increasing difference
between population growth and eco
nomic growth. In the majority of Lat
in-American countries, demographic
growth is more rapid than economic
development. Only in Peru and Pan
ama does economic growth surpass
the rhythm of demographic evolution.
This discontent is almost always
generated where large working and
rural masses suffer serious problems
of an economic or social nature, or
because of the timid way in which cer
tain governments achieve reforms
which the present times require.
In general, the process of ideolog
Communism is very aware of these ically
A.1INrleGrt Union
Malaria control workman in Colombia. Positive social programs are essential to reduce
the threat of insurgency
structural imbalances. Fidel Castro
has stated: "The decade of 1970 will
be a decade of hunger and therefore
a decade of revolution."
A certain degree of popular dis
content and the resulting loss of con
fidence in government is another ele
ment which arises as a common de
nominator in the Latin-American
countries where a latent state of in
surgency exists.
Latin America is being assisted by
postponements in the accomplishment
of promised reforms. The Castro-Com
munist activities and agitators stress
what they term "the lack of ability of
the governments to carry out these
reforms," and they are teaching the
working and rural masses that only
through "violent revolution" will they
be able to obtain the order and justice
they desire.
Military Rille. 14
LATIN AMERICA
Finally, another ever-present ele
ment is outside support. The Com
munist movements in the various
countries of Latin America receive
training, propaganda, and funds from
the outside. Early in 1966 at a tri
continental meeting organized by
Cuba, plans were established to ac
celerate insurgency and foment armed
struggle by bringing in economic and
material aid of all types, including
arms and ammunition.
First Conference Held
In August 1967, the first conference
of the Organization of Latin Amer
ican Solidarity met to revise "the
present procedures of struggle and to
outline a common strategy for all the
Latin American revolutionary move
ments" and in this way to carry armed
strife to the largest number of coun
tries on the continent spreading "co
ordinated revolutionary violence."
In order to eliminate or at least
neutralize these ever-present "com
mon characteristics," it is necessary
to combat their true causes. To for
mulate an adequate national policy for
countering insurgency, political ob
jectives should outweigh military con
siderations.
Unfinanced budgets, unfavorable
terms of trade, imbalance of pay
ments, constant deterioration of rates
of exchange, and small resources in
foreign currency are problems which,
among others, render the countries of
Latin America impotent to accelerate
the process of economic and social
development.
Programs of agrarian reform, de
velopment of infrastructure, and ir
rigation are expensive. Governments
which start this type of operation
in order to diminish discontent and
to integrate isolated areas of the coun
try often find that these same efforts
generate opposition and resistance in
Marcb 1969
certain political and economic sec
tors.
The scarcity of resources demands
the establishment of priorities, and
many times these are badly deter
mined, or projects are begun without
consideration of their total implica
tions. The resulting fiscal crisis re
quires tax reforms, and this causes
new discontent and loss of confidence
in the government by the more opulent
groups which verbally combat com
munism, but who often believe that
any reform goes against their in
terests.
Important Obstacles
While these weaknesses are found in
varying degrees in all the countries
of Latin America, there are also im
portant obstacles to the advance of
communism. Fundamentally, these ob
stacles are the initiation of socioeco
nomic development, the lack of Com
munist support from the rural masses,
and the position of the armed forces.
The development process started by
Latin America in the 1960's, although
slow, is the best weapon holding back
the intensification of insurgency in
Latin America. For the first time in
the history of Latin America, govern
ments are bringing confidence and
hope to the large marginal area of
America. But the governments of Latin
America must continue making the
necessary efforts to equip and incor
porate the still largely marginal rural
masses if they really wish to eliminate
the causes of subversion in the "sierra
maestra" of the Andean belt.
The armed forces of the hemisphere
are fully aware of the Communist
danger, and they will not tolerate its
implantation on the continent. But
the anticommunism of the armed
forces will not be sufficient to deter
insurgency if the politics of the states
15
LAnN AMERICA
Colotul JoA" G. Waggoner
A Peruvian Army engineer battalion builds a road through the Andes to provide access
to the isolated eastern region of the country
is not directed toward economic de
velopment, without group privileges,
and toward effective social justice 'that
will allow the elimination of existing
contradictions.
In the struggle against Communist
insurgency, political considerations
prevail over military considerations.
The politicians basically are the ones
who must conceive, plan, and direct
the strategy because it is necessary
to fight Communist insurgency by
eliminating its root causes.
When revolutionary violence erupts,
politics is always desirous that public
opinion, external or internal, remain
unaware, as long as possible, of the
existence of these armed outbursts.
It tries to avoid at all cost the aware
ness of these insurgency outbreaks in
order to preserve the image of a stable
government and the existence of au
thority.
On the other hand, military strategy
is fundamentally interested in acting
as soon as possible with sufficient
force to eliminate insurgent out
breaks in their weakest phase before
they can attain greater proportions.
As a result, the relationship be
tween politics and military strategy
is often in antagonistic positions in
the struggle against Communist in
surgency creating tensions detrimen
tal to the unity which must exist be
tween the two.
The prevention of insurgency, in
the realm of political responsibility,
requires the realization of broad pro
grams of political, economic, social,
and psychological development. And
here military strategy cannot re
main on the sidelines. The struggle
against insurgency has widened the
scope of relations between politics
and military strategy since the rela
tions between the two are not limited
only to repressive action when coun-
Military RI,il.
18
LATIN AMERICA
terguerriJIa operations are underway,
but exist at all times, before they
arise and after they have been put
down.
Although political decisions are the
responsibility' of the statesman, they
can be wrong if they overlook military
considerations, for today, more than
ever, development and security are
interdependent. The manner in which
political, economic, and social prob
lems are resolved in tense areas is of
great interest to military commanders
who operate in such areas.
The struggle against insurgency
has imposed upon the armed forces
of Latin America a new function of
assisting national development. In ad
dition to the traditional defense role,
the armed forces can contribute to
construction of communication lines
and cooperate in settlement programs.
Also, by means of training and in
struction given on the military posts,
they can help diminish the skilled
labor shortage and assist in creating
the psychological receptivity for a
"technical environment" which the
countries need for industrial devel
opment.
This new function of the armed
forces has required them to emerge
from the confinements of their posts,
where they had stayed for decades,
to come into ever-increasing contact
with the socioecQnomic problems of
the country and to direct their atten
tion to the internal front.
Within the armed forces, the army
has the principal responsibility in
counterinsurgency warfare through
its mission of territorial control. In
fulfilling their mission of maintaining
order and destroying insurgency cen
ters, the armed forces need to identify
the weak points of the socioeconomic
reality of the areas where they work
and aim for changes.
This requires a reorganization of
military education in order to have,
first, the perceptivity to be able to
understand the grave problems which
An irrigation canal built as a civic action project in Ecuador
March 1969 17
LATIN AMERICA
affect security, and then the ability to
see that the observations and sugges
tions they deem necessary reach the
top levels of decision making. Officers
must have a clear understsnding of
national problems, of the fundamentsl
existence of Communist subversion
in all the countries, and the threat
which it constitutes to internal sts
bility and to the existence of the
political, social, and economic systems
of democratic countries, have made
Colombian soldiers train in counterguerrilla operations. Helicopters provide essential
mobility and access for strike forces.
ideological nature of insurgency war
fare, and of those fields in which it
develops--economic, political, and so
ciological.
Due to the continentsl scale of Com
munist strategy, directed and sup
ported from outside, through an in
ternational organization whose action
goes beyond the tel'ritorial limits of
nations, it is necessary to centralize
information on a regional or at least
subregional level to provide the ex
change information among the dif
ferent countries in the continent. The
the existing concept of strategic intel
ligence obsolete.
The way in which the guerrillas
appear and the need for immediate
reaction place new requirements on
combat intelligence. From experience
in Peru and Bolivia, we know that the
insurgents go through a geststion
stsge before conducting offensive ac
tion. The period of geststion in Peru
and Bolivia lasted about two years.
This is the most vulnerable stsge, and
it has two phases. The first is a "re
connaissance" phase in which the group
Military Review
18
tries to get established, maintaining
itself in constant motion and making
surveys in search of the most appro
priate area. In this phase, there is
no contact with the people nor with
the outside.
The second is an "installation"
phase in which the group begins to
establish camps, to construct arms
and supply depots, and to establish
secret roads and paths. In this phase,
the group begins to create ties with
the people and to make outside con
tact for support and direction.
Vulnerable Phase
Since the "reconnaissance" phase
is the 'most vulnerable, intelligence
operations should concentrate efforts
to detect the insurgents during this
period. Since this is basically a clan
destine and dynamic phase of move
ment, intelligence cannot limit itself
to identification. It must penetrate its
objective and then destroy it because
the mobile and fleeting nature of the
objective does not permit the arrival
of traditional operating forces.
It is also necessary in the gestation
phase of the insurgency to avoid
creating the image of chaos and insta
bility within the country because pub
lic opinion becomes uneasy, the op
position intensifies its attacks on the
government, the investment market
falls off, and the developmental proc
ess begins to get snarled, thus play
ing into the hands of the insurgents.
It is necessary to act as they do,
clandestinely, to avoid alarming public
opinion or alerting the guerrillas with
open participation of the military
forces.
The intelligence always includes a
knowledge of the environment in
which the enemy is active, and this
environment is composed of the ter
rain and the population. A profound
knowledge of the people is funda-
Marcb 1989
LATIN AMERICA
mental in insurgency warfare, for it
is only with their support that the
rural guerrillas or the urban ter
rorists can elude the government
forces.
In the struggle against insurgency,
intelligence is the most important
means to success, and it is necessary
that the armed forces have a central
intelligence system. This central in
telligence service should be highly
specialized and dedicated exclusively
to the collection of information, with
highly qualified personnel and means.
It should not be bogged down with
additional functions which paralyze it.
The new strategy of the guerrillas
in Latin America contemplates the
simultaneous operations of armed
groups in different areas of a coun
try, with the obvious purpose of
forcing the armed forces to disperse
their efforts. Consequently, the Com
munist political and military organi
zation avoids encounters with the
armed forces until their situation
permits simultaneous action.
Internal Defense
To combat this strategy, two types
of units are necessary for internal
defense operations: units with ter
ritorial responsibility, and units of
suppression.
The units with territorial respon
sibilities in internal defense act,
through civic action and psychological
operations, to unite the people and,
through their intelligence organiza
tions, maintain control over subver
sive groups that threaten public order.
The units of suppression should
not have territorial responsibilities,
nor should they be involved in civic
action. They should be highly mobile
in the tactical and strategic sense,
and trained and equipped to operate
in small isolated groups in the most
difficult terrain. They should be es
19
LATIN AMERICA
sentially offensive in spirit, and act
in close coordination with forward
intelligence elements. In their oper.
ations, they should be supported by
the territorial units who know the
physical and human environment in
which the insurgency is developing.
The latent state of insurgency
throughout Latin America calls for
new appraisals of political and mili
tary strategy to combat Communist
exPloitation. Political 'considerations
must transcend the military because
the programs must be primarily di
rected toward political, economic, and
social development to correct existing
contradictions and weaknesses that
provide the environment for insur
gency. At the same time, a closer
relationship between military strat
egy and politics is needed to main
tain a climate of stability without
which these programs cannot be car
ried out.
The current crop of insurgents in Latin America is dedicated, fanatical
and totally committed to the armed atruggle. They have defied substantial ef
forts to e l i m i n a ~ e them, and are prepared for a prolonged and arduous cam
paign. They are inspired by the Cuban example.
General Robert W. Porter, Jr.
Military Review
20
Colonel Trnman R. Boman, United States Armll
S
OVIET military leaders reflect
many of' t}1e_concerns of their
Western counterparts .over the proh
lems of command and c'ontrol in mod
ern warfare. This concern is reflected
in Soviet military journals which de
vote a generous share of their space
to discussions of the functioning of
the staff and to measures to improve
its efficiency, responsiveness, and time
liness. A review of recent military
press articles illustrates the trend of
current thinking.
The Soviets long have recognized
the importance of tactical nuclear
March 1969
weapons. They characterize the mod
ern battlefield as wide, deep, and sub
ject to sudden changes in the relative
combat power of the contending
forces. Their motorized rifle and tank
divisions have a capability to conduct
operations over great distances in
short periods of time. They see modern
warfare as fast-moving, subject to
sudden dramatic change, with an ur
gent requirement for the development
of timely and meaningful operational
decisions.
To meet these requirements, the So
viets recognize that the functioning
21
SOVIET STAFFS
of staffs at every echelon must be
rapid, efficient, and effective. Conse
quently, they are giving consider
able attention to training personnel,
streamlining staff procedures, and
adopting technology to assist staffs in
the performance of their duties. The
commander has the responsibility, but
ized training also have been provided
with a well-balanced military and po
litical education that has contributed
to their effectiveness.'
Staff officers are trained and pre
pared for their assignments through
out their careers in the various branch
and combined-arms schools. At the top
Stall' officers are trsined and prepared for their assignments throughout their careers
he is expected to be supported by a
highly qualified and competent staff.
According to Soviet reports, over 26
percent of the officers in the Soviet
forces have received specialized edu
cation. As a consequence, the propor
tion of qualified engineers and officers
with technical training is steadily in
creasing. These highly qualified offi-
cers are spread throughout all eche
lons of the military services. They
occupy key positions in the various
military educational institutions, on
staffs at all levels, and in the Ministry
of Defense. Officers with this special-
of the Soviet military school system
is the Military Academy of the Gen
eral Staff. It was founded over 30
years ago with the mission of prepar
ing highly qualified officers for posi
tions of responsibility on high-level
staffs and in the Ministry of Defense.
Not only does the academy train So
viet officers for high-level command
and staff positions, but, in recent
years, it has trained hundreds of of
ficers from other Communist coun
1 Colonel General P. Lukuhln. "The Selection.
Distribution and Training of Jlilitary Pel"8ODnel."'
Soviet Military Tramlaticma. Number 88'1. 17 Octo-
bel' 1968, P 66.
Military Revl
22
tries. Graduates are found throughout
the armed forces of eastern Europe.'
The formal schooling which Soviet
officers receive lays only the founda
tion for effective staff functioning.
The staffs are' developed into efficient
teams by practical training exercises
conducted throughout the year. County
fair-type exercises, command-staff ex
ercises, and war games are used ex
tensively in the training of staffs.
Field Exercises
Tactical, county fair-type exercises
are conducted under field conditions.
In these exercises, the individual staff
member is required to analyze rela
tively simple situations, make deci
sions, formulate a course of action,
and then simulate passing the action
to the responsible elements or subor
dinates.
Command-staff exercises and war
games are normally conducted under
simulated combat conditions prior to
training exercises or maneuvers in
S Colonels N. Svet1ishin snd P. MochaIov. "Thirty
Years of the BUitary AcademY of the General Staff
Reviewed," Soviet Militaf'1l Translations. Number
872, 2 March 1967. pp 28-27.
3 Colonel General S. Shtemenko. 0' A High Level
of Smooth Functioning and Operational Efficiency
for Staffs;' MUita'1l Herald (VoyennJ/Jl Vllestnik),
September 1963. pp 14.-20.
Colonel Truman R. Boman is with
the Defense Intelligence Agency in
Washington. He served in Europe dur_
ing World War II, was in Korea dur
ing the conflict there, and is a 1956
graduate of the Foreign Area Special
ist Training Program (Russian). He
was with the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Stal! for Intelligence, De
partment of the Army, prior to his
completion of the Regular Course of
the US Army Command and General
Stal! College in 1961. He was assigned
to the faculty of the College until
196,-, after which he served in Viet
nam and with the 16th Artillery at
Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He is a 1968
graduate of the US Army War College.
Milch 1969
SOVIET STAFFS
which troop units are involved. They
are conducted with realistic situations
and are normally played with the en
emy simulated as being strong, aggres
sive, and active. An effort is made to
avoid oversimplification and stereo
typed situations. The officers are en
couraged to use their initiative and
imagination, and to develop independ
ent judgments and decisions. Strict
adherence to a preconceived plan or
scenario is avoided.
The objectives are to develop a pos
itive attitude, skill, confidence, and
proficiency in the stsff officer. During
these exercises, duties frequently are
rotated, perniitting officers to learn
the duties and functions of other staff
members. This procedure recognizes
that there will be personnel losses or
shortages and is designed to insure a
continuing operational capability in
wartime.
Points Emphasized
The commanders take a personal and
direct interest in these exercises. This
practice enables the commander to be
come familiar with the strength and
weaknesses of his staff and also al
lows the staff to become thoroughly ac
quainted with the commander's atti
tudes, opinions, and methods of op
eration. By working together in this
manner, the staff and commander be
come attuned, and the functioning of
the staff is improved.
During the command-staff exercises
and war games, emphasis is given to
the following:
Rapid identification of essential
elements of information and dissemi
nation of these elements to the com
mander and to subordinate units.
Preparation of clear, concise, and
timely reports to higher, subordinate,
and adjacent headquarters.
23
SOVIET STAfFS
Development of skill in making
rapid, sound decisions.
Development of smooth-flowing,
coordinated staff procedures.
Development of an appreciation
for the requirement to keep abreast
of the status of subordinate units.
In aU types of training exercises,
a concerted effort is made to improve
mIssIons and location of subordinate
units are depicted.
The staff is expected to formulate
its plan as information becomes avail
able and prepare an outline plan with
the use of a situation map. When the
commander makes his decision, only
a few final adjustments will normally
be necessary.
and expedite the of lltaffs. In course of staff training exer-
Time is recognized as the most sig
nificant element, and procedures are
directed at this 'critical factor.
Upon receipt of the mission, the
staff is expected to initiate prelimi
nary actions. Instructions concerning
the impending operation are immedi
ately forwarded to subordinate units.
Current data pertaining to the enemy
and the information which will assist
in developing the organization for
combat are immediately identified. The
initial situation is plotted on a situa
tion map. The location of major units,
the mission, known enemy locations,
direction of the attack, objectives,
boundary lines, control points, and the
cises, the follOWing techniques are
used to insure responsiveness:
The commander makes his deci
sion based on information projected
on a situation map.
Fragmentary instructions are
passed verbally to subordinate units
to be followed later by written instruc
tions.
Overlays and graphical tech
niques are used when appropriate.
Tape recorders and photographs
are used to replace written documents
when possible.
Blank forms and standardized
documents are used extensively.
These techniques are used to allow
Military Review
24
the staff members to spend minimum
time in preparing written formal in
structions and to permit them to de
vote more time to direction and con
trol of elements of the command.
To insure that the commander is
appraised of essential items of infor
mation, the staff attempta to categor
ize i n f o r ~ t i o n coming into the head
quarters, identify significant data, and
promptly report it to the commander.
Information pertaining to the enemy's
nuclear delivery systems, movement of
reserves, concentration of armored ele
ments, and major readjustments in
unit locations are typical of informa
tion that is considered of prime in
terest to the commander.
Press articles indicate that this is
the type of direction and training So
viet commanders and staff officers are
receiving. To some extent, published
material that is available to the public
is probably idealistic and overly opti
mistic. However, it certainly reflects
emphasis on sound procedures and is
consistent with the requirements of
contemporary warfare.
Technological Advances
Not only are the Soviets attempting
to improve the functioning of their
staffs by training, but they are using
technological advances to improve
their command and control systems.
During World War II, Soviet com
manders controlled their units from
forward command and observations
posts and echeloned these control cen
ters forward as the battle progressed.
Today. they recognize the requirement
for rapid movement and have given
their tactical headquarters mobility
that permits them not only to displace
rapidly, but to function effectively ':..
while on the move. These facilities
provide the commanders and staffs
Marcb 1969
SOVIET STAFFS
with the modern communication equip
ment. Voice, continuous wave, and tele
type equipment, which uses multiple
channel transmission means, enables
headquarters to maintain close and
continuous communications with sub
ordinate, higher, and adjacent head
quarters.'
With these capabilities, command
and control can b.e exercised by the
headquarters consistent with require
ments of the fast-moving and fluid
situations the Soviets expect to en
counter.
Special Devices
To assist the staffs at the various
echelons in meeting the requirements
created by the introduction of nuclear
weapons, some headquarters have de
veloped special devices such as "slide
rules and aiming circles," probably
hand-operated graphical devices, for
the computation of data. These inno
vations have been developed by some
units, but have apparently not been
accepted by the Ministry of Defense,
and, consequently, have not been dis
tributed throughout the armed forces.'
Computers are being used by the
Soviet armed forces to assist in the
solution of weapons control, training,
operational, and administrative prob
lems.
The Soviets have recognized the
value of computers not only to the
general staff, but to local officials in
compiling information and data used
to coordinate mobilization plans and
procedures. By linking computers of
the general staff with those at various
points throughout the nation, the ac
curacy and speed required for orderly
4 Ma1"8hal A. I. Leonov. "Role of SIgnal Special.
i,t in Toda,.s Soviet Army Evaluated. .. SOttiet Mili
tary TmnMtiou. Number 834. 13 October 1966.
p
II Lieutenant General t. TIJ&tenko. "The Staff and
Troop Maneuvers." SekcUd SotHet MaiUf'll 7'ns'lUr
lGtm.. Number 22, 16 August 1960. p 6.
25
SOVIET STAFFS
mobilization and for mobilization plan_
ning can best be met. Data provided
by computers simplifies the process of
selecting the location for the organi
zation of newly formed or activated
units. Identification of individual spe
cialists, skill levels, and numbers of
personnel available for mobilization
can be done with computers.
The structure of the str,ategic air
for vectoring fighter aircraft and mis
siles on to incoming targets at great
ranges.
The Soviet armed forces are devot
ing considerable attention to the de
velopment of improved staff techniques
and are making maximum use of mod
ern technology to improve their com
mand and control systems. However,
they are not neglecting some of the
weapons and mobiUty of modem vehicles require a fast,
smooth-functioning staff
The firepower
defense forces, the grouping of ele
ments within the air defense force,
types of equipment to be employed,
solution of the various coordination
problems, and determination of reli
able protection of various installations
are all determined by the use of com
puters. Optimum force structure, com
position of forces, evaluation of air
craft and missile capabilities, and the
organization to effect coordination are
problems the Soviets identify as lend
ing themselves to quantification and
solution by use of computers.
Computers are also used in conjunc
tion with other electronic equipment
more mundane problems that have his
torically afflicted headquarters staffs.
The value of staff visits to subor
dinate headquarters is clearly recog
nized and encouraged. The purpose of
these visits is to assist the subordinate
units with the solution of problems,
to keep abreast of current activities,
and to obtain an accurate picture of
the status of the units. Soviet military
leaders believe that the units not only
benefit from the experience of the staff
officers, but the background, knowl
edge, and general education of the
staff officer are improved. By period
ically visiting units, the staff officers
Military Rev' 26
keep abreast of the practicalities of
training and operations and thus avoid
developing plans and programs based
on outdated experience or theories.
In spite of their attempts to sim
plify staff proCedures and minimize
formal documentation, it is apparent
that the Soviet military forces have
not been completely successful. As in
many military organizations, the So
viet staffs have been plagued with pa
perwork. All too frequently, the staff
spends a considerable amount of time
generating work for itself:
In one of the command headquarters
which is assigned the mission of di
rect troop command, of the number of
documents prepared and reproduced in
the typing pool in the course of four
months, 16.5 percent were sent out to
active units, 98.5 percent were de
stroyed, and ~ 5 percent were stuffed in
the files of the administrative head
quarters."
The Soviets consider the reduction
of correspondence between elements
of the staffs and between headquarters
as one of the most critical administra
tive problems they have at this time.
By reducing the frequency of required
reports, they have been able, in some
instances, to make a little progress.
Reports that were previously required
on a quarterly or monthly basis are
now only required annually or semi
annually. This has resulted in reduc
ing the correspondence in some head
quarters as much as one-fifth.
Headquarters have been encouraged
to consolidate reports, particularly in
those instances where staff sections
have been requiring subordinate units
to report essentially the same infor
mation in more than one document.
e Colonel M. ZabaVllkiy. "At Headquartet'8 and
in the Units:" Smcud Soviet Milil4f1/ Tf"dnlfa..
tion8. Number 25. 22 September 1960. p 10.
SOVIET STAFfS
Another area in which Soviet staffs
have apparently compounded the cor
respondence problem is that of at
tempting to delve into extremes of
detail. Many minor specifics and ob
scure items of trivia have been re
portedly included in correspondence
going to subordinate units. Staffs have
been enjoined to confine their activi
ties to major problems and concepts
and leave solution of minor problems
and details to the subordinate units.
Staffs have been accused of spending
too much time with minutiae and not
devoting enough time to creative or
ganizational work.
These complaints or suggested im
provements may not represent condi
tions throughout the Soviet armed
forces, but they do indicate that actual
staff procedures, in some instances,
are not keeping pace with the doc
trine and guidance being advocated
by senior Soviet commanders and the
Ministry of Defense.
In spite of deficiencies that admit
tedly exist, the Soviet military forces
are cognizsnt of the need for rapid
decision making on the battlefield. The
firepower of nuclear weapons, the mo
bility of modern vehicles, and the po
tential for control with advanced elec
tronic equipment have made fast, effi
cient staff functioning imperative.
The Soviet staff officer is being
thoroughly schooled in his profession,
trained to a high degree of proficiency,
and imbued with a positive dedication
to duty. He is being provided with
progressive military schooling, mod
ern effective equipment, and practical
experience in realistic training exer
cises. With this comprehensive prepa
ration, the Soviets expect to achieve
their goal of operational efficiency in
staff performance.
March 1969
27
The
Antarctic Treaty
in Operation
Raymond J. Barrett
T
HE Antarctic Treaty has now
been in force for over seven
years, and the lOth anniversary of its
signing is approaching. It was signed
in 1959 and entered into force in June
1961. The signatories were Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Ja
pan, New Zealand, Norway, South Af
rica, USSR, United Kingdom, and
United States.
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Neth
erlands, and Poland have also adhered
to the treaty. However, they are not
full participants because they have
not, thus far, conducted the substan
tial scientific research activity in Ant
arctica required to qualify.
The treaty was hailed at the time
of its signing as a novel and signifi
cant example of international cooper
ation. It reserved Antarctica for
''peaceful purposes only" and banned
from the continent "any measures of
a military nature" and any nuclear
Milltarr Revle. 28
explosions or the disposal of radio
active waste material. In addition, the
various claims of territorial sover
eignty in Antarctica were frozen for
at least 30 years-the minimum valid
ity of the treaty.
In effect, the signatories dedicated
the continent to scientific research and
pledged themselves to cooperate to the
greatest extent feasible and practi
cable in such research. Perhaps most
noteworthy was the inclusion in the
treaty of a system of reciprocal open
inspection to guarantee the faithful
fulfilIment of those stipulations.
Nonmilitary Activity
Research and other activity under
the treaty are entirely nonmilitary,
but the actual experience is of con
siderable interest to the armed forces.
Increased knowledge of polar environ
ments is obviously useful. Also of con
cern are such matters as meteorology,
oceanography, terrestrial magnetism,
and global communications, alI of
which are affected by research in
Antarctica.
Experience gained in logistic sup
port of the US program in Antarctica
has provided an opportunity to develop
Raymond J. Barrett is Deputy Chief
of the Program Staff, Office of Inter
na.tiontU Conferences, Department of
State. A US Foreign Service officer
formerly a.ssigned to the American
Emba.ssy in Madrid, Spain, he ha.s
served at American Emba.ssies in Mex
ico City, Managua., Dublin, and Cairo.
He ha.s also served with the Office of
Ea.st and Southern African Affairs and
wa.s US Secretary of the Perma.nent
Joint Boord on Defense-United
States and Canada., in Wa.shington,
D. C. A frequent contributor to the
MILITARY REVIEW, his latest article,
"The United States and Europe," ap
peared in the December 1968 issue.
March 1989
ANTARCTIC TREATY
logistic techniques suitable for this
inhospitable environment. In a more
general sense, any practical progress
in international inspection procedures
is of interest and value to military
and other officials concerned witb in
ternational security problems.
Consultative Meetings
The expectations inspired by the
Signing of the Antarctic Treaty have
been fulIy justified. Its terms are com
plied with scrupulously, and to date
not one difficulty or complaint has oc
curred. The signatories meet together
every two years to examine matters
of common interest pertaining to Ant
arctica and make recommendations to
the signatory governments designed to
carry out the principles and objectives
of the treaty.
Some 64 such recommendations have
been made to date, and most of them
have been placed in effect by the treaty
signatories. Consultative meetings
have been held in Canberra, Buenos
Aires, Brussels, Santiago, and the
most recent in Paris in November
1968. Each nation informs the other
signatories in detail regarding its pro
posed activities in Antarctica for the
coming year. The exchange of infor
mation has been thorough and useful.
The scientific research carried out
in Antarctica has had a profound im
pact in many areas of knowledge. It
has, in a short time, made valuable
contributions to such sciences as glaci
ology, meteorology, oceanography, ma
rine biology, geology, and upper at
mosphere physics. Knowledge in tbese
areas is basic to projects of such im
portance as possible climatic control
of the planet, the multiplication of
food resources, and improved means
of communication.
During the 1967-68 season, for in
29
ANTARCTIC TREATY
stance, the US Antarctic Research
Program carried out a great variety
of scientific projects. This program
is funded by the National Science
Foundation and headed by the Direc
tor, Division of Environmental Scien
ces, National Science Foundation.
Projects were carried out in the fol
pated at one time or another during
the 1967-68 program. These scientists
came from universities, Government
agencies, and private research orga
nizations across the United States.
One highlight of the 1967-68 pro
gram was the commissioning of per
manent facilities to support US re-
lowing disciplines; upper atmosphere
physics, meteorology, biology, glaci
ology, seismology, gravity, magnetism,
ocean sciences, geology, infrared sur
veys, geodesy, and cartography.
The United States also exchanged
scientists or carried out cooperative
investigations with Argentina, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
the United Kingdom, and the USSR.
Approximately 200 scientists partici
search in the Antarctic (formerly
Palmer) Peninsula. The station is lo
cated at Arthur Harbor on Anvers
Island and replaces temporary struc
tures used since 1965. The new facil
ity is designated Palmer Station and
was formally commissioned on 20
March 1968.
Another outstanding event was the
successful completion of the program
to drill through the icecap. This work
Military Rnie.
30
ANTARcnc TREATY
was done at ,Byrd Station by engineers
from the US Army Cold Regions Re
search and Engineering Laboratory.
The bottom'of the icecap was reached
at 7,100 feet-:-a depth considerably
cargo vessel, was converted in 1962
into a multidisciplined Antarctic re
search ship. It is operated for the
National Science Foundation by the
Military Sea Transportation Service.
Site of the new Palmer Station
less than that calculated earlier from It has an endurance of 10,000 miles,
seismic soundings. and carries a complement of 49 offi
Also part of the US Antarctic Re cers and men and a scientific comple
search Program are the activities of ment of up to 38.
the USNS Eltanin which is carrying The vessel is equipped to carry out
out continuous systematic studies of scientific investigations in marine bi
the Antarctic seas. To date, it has ology and geology, geophysics, ocean
completed 31 major cruises. This US ography, hydrography, meteorology,
naval ship, a former ice-strengthened and upper atmosphere physics.
Mlrch 1989 31
ANTARCTIC TREATY
The National Science Foundation
also has a new research ship especially
designed for work in the Antarctic
area. The 125-foot sloop-named Hero
after that of Nathaniel B. Palmer who
has been credited with being the first
American to view the Antarctic main
land in 1820-was launched in March
1968. It is a diesel-driven, but sail
equipped, wooden. trawler-type ship
mendations made at the Santiago
meeting. The Ross seal and fur seal.
in danger of extinction, are to be
preserved wherever they occur.
In addition, 15 geographic areas
have been defined where maximum
protection is given to colonies of
other birds and animals. Among these
are the emperor penguin, the giant
petrel, the Antarctic petrel, the ful-
The Eisenhower Range at top is separated from Deep Freeze Range by a glacier
indicated by arrow
which will Bupplement the facilities at
Palmer Station. The Hero serves as
a floating laboratory for both marine
and terrestrial investigations. In par
ticular, it provides the first access to
many coastal areas of the Antarctic
Peninsula.
Impressive progress has also been
made in protecting the fauna and flora
in the treaty zone which includes all
land and water south of 60 degrees
south latitude. The treaty included
provision for protecting the living
natural resources in the Antarctic
area. There were 28 specific recom
mar. and the elephant seal. Also sin
gled out for protection are points of
ecological interest where there are
concentrations of the microfauna and
flora that are the basis of the Antarc
tic ecosystem.
These measures are of great impor
tance because they are directed toward
maintenance of the biological equilib
rium in the Antarctic area. The re
search of recent years has shown that
the alteration of natural conditions in
the waters of Antarctica can affect the
biological balance as far away as Ec
uador.
Military Review
32
Because of the many severe prob
lems encountered, logistics has also
been an area of mutual concern. The
United States has frequently fur
nished logistics information to other
signatories requesting it. The signa
tories also exchange data regarding
airfields in Antarctica for emergency
use. The telecommunications experts
discussed their problems at a 1963
meeting.
A symposium on logistics, sponsored
by the Scientific Committee on Ant
arctic Research, was held in August
1962 at Boulder, Colorado. The com
mittee is a nongovernmental group
that provides scientific advice regard
ing research in Antarctica. Experts
from the signatory countries met in
Tokyo from 3 to 8 June 1968 to ex
change information on the present
state of knowledge about logistics in
the Antarctic.
Tourism
Another topic that the signatories
are finding it necessary to consider
is tourism. It may seem absurd to
speak of tourism in the Antarctic, but
its very desolation and mystery ap
parently attract travelers looking for
something different. As early as 1958
59, tourist flights were made from
Chile over Chilean bases on the South
Shetland Islands and the Palmer Pen
insula.
On other occasions, tourists actually
visited Antarctic bases by traveling
on Chilean ships that served as float
ing hotels during their brief stays in
the area. In summer, the Chilean bases
are easily accessible from Punta Are
nas on the Strait of Magellan; the
round trip takes only six to eight days.
The provision of the Antarctic
Treaty that has attracted the most
i1'terest is probably that which author-
March 1989
ANTARCTIC TREATY
izes national teams to inspect any area
in Antarctica to verify compliance
with the prohibitions against military
uses. Inspection teams dispatched by
a signatory have complete access at
any time to all areas of Antarctica.
The only prior requirement for send
ing out an the no-
A worker inspeets a portion of ice core
from the drill hole at Byrd Station
tification of the names of the team
members to all the other signatories.
The treaty provides that all areas
of Antarctica-including all stations,
installations, and equipment within
those areas, and all ships and aircraft
at points of discharging or embarking
cargoes or personnel in Antarctica
shall be open at all times to inspection
by observers designated by signato
ries. Signatories are also authorized
to carry out aerial observation at any
time over all areas of Antarctica.
The United States, in September
1963, was the first to announce in
tention to conduct an inspection in
Antarctica, and stated that she would
welcome inspection of her stations by
other signatories. Observers were ap
pointed by the Secretary of State and
33
ANTARCTIC TREATY
cautioned that states active in Ant
arctica had been cooperative with the
United States in matters relating to
the continent, and that the US policy
was to preserve this cooperative spirit.
Although the United States was the
first to announce intention to make
inspections, New Zealand was the first
actually to do so. Two New Zealand
observers visited the McMurdo Sound,
the South Pole, and .Byrd Stations in
1963. They reported that everything
appeared to be fully consistent with
the objectives and provisions of the
Antarctic Treaty. Australia and the
United Kingdom each sent one ob
server in December 1963 to three US
stations.
Two groups of US observers con
ducted inspections in January 1964.
One group of three observers visited
two Argentine, two Chilean, and two
United Kingdom bases located in the
Antarctic Peninsula area of West Ant
arctica. This US group was trans
ported by a US Coast Guard' ice
breaker. The other group of four US
observers visited the New Zealand
Scott Station near McMurdo and two
Soviet Union stations in East Ant
arctica-Mirnyy and Vostok. US air
craft based at McMurdo Station were
used for their transportation. In ad
dition, the US observers carried out
aerial photographic and visual obser
vations of the French station, Dumont
d'Urville.
The exercise of the right of inspec
tion is particularly significant because
of the territorial claims of several
countries. These countries are Argen
tina, Australia, Chile, France, New
Zealand, Norway, and the United
Kingdom, but neither the Soviet Union
nor the United States recognizes any
of these claims. The right of inspec
tion and its implementation are also
significant because of the USSR's gen
eral resistance to inspections. The co
chairman of the Soviet delegation to
the conference in Washington that
drafted the Antarctic Treaty observed
that the Soviet Union could agree to
unlimited inspections in Antarctica
''where inspections cannot be used
against national security."
The inspections have ben carried out
without prejudice to the spirit of good
will and cooperation that exists among
expeditions in Antarctica. The 1966
67 US observer team reported that
they ''were cordially welcomed at each
station and full cooperation was ex
tended" and that "the spirit of cor
diality and cooperation, which the
treaty fosters, was evident through
out." In fact, the sense of mutual
confidence has been strengthened by
the inspection results stressing that
no evidence of any violations of the
treaty has been found.
The Antarctic Treaty has thus been
a success in practice and spirit. It has
served as a model for the United Na
tions Outer Space Treaty on the ex
ploration and peaceful uses of outer
space and would seem to be an excel
lent example of cooperation among
nations and a step toward a peaceful
world.
Military Review
34
ARMOR
Soviet Arm of Decision?
Colonel Charles G. FitzGerald,
United Stales Armlt
The striking pOUler of the ground (orees is primarilll insured bll the IJlUlt
extent to Ulhieh thell are saluraled with tws ESBentitJIl,,, tllllks are one
01 the chief meanlf for the rapid exploitation 01 the deep Btrlkelf made bll our
missUe and air forces and our artiilerll.
T
HESE are the words of the pri viets employed armor in World War
mate of the younger Soviet mil II. Recent Soviet writings have delin
itary generation now moving onto cen eated the general outlines of their ex
ter stage-Marshal of the Soviet perience in a series of articles pub
Union, Ivan I. Yakubovsky, First Dep lished in the Military History Journal,
uty Soviet Minister of Defense and beginning in 1963, and summarized
Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact herein.
forces.
Prewar Soviet doctrine on the em
Inasmuch as Marshal Yakubovsky
ployment of the tank in large armored
clearly envisages a prominent role for
formations was noteworthy for its con
the tank, the time would seem appro
ceptual grasp of the capabilities of
priate for a fresh look at how the So-
this relatively untested weapon. That
this was so .should be no surprise. The
-Ivan I. Yakubovsky. Red Star. 21 July 1967.
March 1969 35
ARMOR
Civil War which followed on the heels
of the revolution of November 1917
had been largely a war of movement
over the vast steppes of the Ukraine,
Siberia, and central Asia. As a con
sequence, many cavalrymen had come
to the fore in the Red Army of the
1930's. They viewed armor as the nat
ural claimant to the long Russian cav
alry heritage. .
First Mechanized Corps
During the late 1930's, the Soviet
High Command approved the concept
of armor organized into large forma
tions. This resulted in the develop
ment of the first Soviet mechanized
corps consisting of two tank divisions
and one motorized infantry division
with a total of 1,100 to 1,200 armored
vehicles.
Thus, early Soviet thinking on the
tank went beyond that of the theo
reticians of the West, except for the
scattered zealots who saw it as a
weapon capable of independent opera
tions. The doctrine did not, however,
reach the extreme of asserting that
the tank could operate without infan
try support. The tank division re
tained one mot?rized infantry brigade
Colonel Charles G. FitzGerald is
with the Office of the Secretary of De
fense (International Security Affairs),
Washington. He is a graduate of the
Russian Institute, Columbia Univer
sity; the illS Army Command and Gen
eral Staff College; and the US Army
War College. He has served as De'{1Uty
Chief, US Military Liaison Mission to
the Commander in Chief, Group of So
viet Forces, Germany; with the Wash
ington-Moscow "Hot Line," National
Military Command Center, Office of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington;
in Moscow as Army Attache; and on
the faculty of the US Army War Col
lege.
to support its three tank brigades.
Likewise, the mechanized corps, as
previously noted, had a motorized in
fantry division to support its two tank
divisions. This belief in the require
ment for infantry to support the large
tank unit has continued in the post
war Soviet tank division and tank
army.
Despite the early decision to or
ganize large tank formations, two cir
cumstances dictated that developments
should proceed otherwise. The first
was the Soviet experience in Spain's
Civil War. This led to a reevaluation
of the tank's capabilities for far
reaching offensive operations. Simul
taneously, it became evident that So
viet industry was still unable to re
spond to the demands posed by the
creation of large armored forces.
Consequently, in 1940, the Soviet
General Staff returned to the concept
of armor primarily as a supporting
arm for infantry. The tank and mech
anized infantry brigade became the
chief organizational forms for armor.
The first months of the war were wit
ness to heavy Red Army losses in ma
teriel-especially tanks-resulting in
further disintegration "of large tank
formations. ,
Production Increases t
During 1942, began
to improve. Soviet 1tiink plants, hav
ing completed their evacuation to the
lands east of the Urals, had begun to
produce tanks in large numbers. Pro
duction for 1942 amounted to 24,600
tanks and self-propelled artillery
weapons.
The high command once again un
dertook the organization of tank and
mechanized units. The first was the
tank corps-in essence, tank division
-authorized in mid-1942, with three
MllitaJy Revie.
38
ARMOR
tank brigades and one motorized rifle
brigade. The new mechanized corps,
with its three mechanized infantry
brigades and one tank brigade, fol
lowed shortly thereafter.
Both corps underwent modifications
until they attained their final wartime
configuration in mid-1943. The last
changes provided the tank corps with
six on the Red Army's rolls. All were
retained in general headquarters re
serve and attached to the various
fronts where they conducted opera
tions on the more important axes.
The tank army executed the full
range of missions entrusted to the
combined-arms formation, including
the penetration, envelopment, pursuit,
The Til Soviet tank used in World War IL In 1942, the Soviet High Command again
undertook the organization of major tank and mechanized units.
three tank brigades of 55 tanks each
and one mechanized infantry brigade
with 42 tanks. The corps also had 63
assault guns and a total of 270 ar
mored vehicles. The mechanized corps
consisted of three mechanized infan
try brigades with 42 tanks each and
one tank brigade of 57 tanks, plus 63
assault guns, for a total of 246 ar
mored vehicles.
In 1943, the Soviet General Staff
approved the organization of the tank
army. By the war's end, there were
March 1969
exploitation, seizure of vital objec
tives, covering-force operations, the
meeting engagement, and massive
counterattacks.
The 1943 tables of organization and
equipment provided the tank army
with two tank corps and one mecha
nized corps, plus supporting elements
which included artillery, antiaircraft
artillery, engineer, and signal units.
The authorized strength was 47,000
men, 620 tanks, and 189 self-propelled
artillery weapons-a total of 809 ar
37
ARMOR
mored vehicles. Its organic and sup
porting artillery elements had a total
of 600 mortars and towed artillery
weapons with calibers greater than 76
millimeters. Thus, it had the capabil
ity of operating independently of the
combined-arms--or infantry-army.
In more than one instance, two tank
The Vistula-Oder operation of Jan
uary 1945 is a forceful illustration of
the massed employment of such for
mations. The operation was executed
by two fronts-the 1st Belorussian
Front, commanded by Marshsl Georgi
K. Zhukov, and the 1st Ukrainian
Front of Marshal Ivan S. Konev. Be-
Soviet Tank Ann, Rates of Advance
Name of
Operation
Number
of Days Total
in Advance
Name of E"ploi (in
Dates Formation tation miles)
Average
Daily
Rate of
Advance
(in miles)
Belo
russian
Yassy-
Kishinev
"
East
Prussian
Manchurian
June 2d Tank 4 95-100
July Army'
1944 5th Guards 13 240
Tank Army
August 2d Ukrainian 5 120
September Front
1944 , 3d Ukrainian 5 105
Front
January 2d Belo-
April russian
1945 Front
3d Belo
russian
Front
~ u g u s t 6th Guards
1945 Tank Army
6 105-155
8 60-75
10 510
20-25
18
25
21
18-25
7-9
51
armies were committed in a body to
fashion a formidable striking force.
Until mid-1944, the tank armies fre
quently fought below strength as a re
sult of participating in several con
secutive operations with only brief
pauses. Nevertheless, the massing of
two tank armies on a single axis gave
the front commander at least 1,000
tanks to employ as his exploitation
force. By mid-1944, the tank armies
were generally close to full strength.
tween them, the two commanders con
trolled more than 6,000 armored vehi
cles. This gave them the capability of
massing over 100 tanks and self-pro
pelled artillery weapons along each
mile of frontage where a penetration
was to be made.
Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front had
two tank armies, two separate tank
corps, five separate tank brigades, 35
tank and self-propelled artillery regi
ments (16 armored vehicles each), and
38 .
MllitarJ Reril.
23 self-propelled artillery battalions
(12 guns each) for a total of 3,220
armored vehicles.
Zhukov kept the two tank armies
one-half of all his armored vehicles
-as his exploitation force. He at
tached a separate tank corps to each
of the two combined-arms armies mak
ing the front's main effort. Finally, he
placed all the smaller armored unita
in direct support of the first-echelon
rifle divisions.
Connecting Unk
After the enemy's tactical defenses
had been crushed, the two tank armies
were committed to the exploitation on
the second day of the operation. When
they had moved on through the two
gaping holes on the flanks of the Ger
man defenses, Zhukov ordered the di
visions to release their direct support
armored units to front and army con
trol. These units formed temporary
combined-arms army pursuit groups
with a total of approximately 1,000
tanks. They operated so as to form a
connecting link between the rapidly
advancing tank armies and the slower
moving infantry armies.
As a consequence of this massed em
ployment of armor, the 1st Belorussian
Front advanced from the Vistula to
the Oder-375 to 435 miles-in 16
days (16 January to 1 February
1945). The average daily rates of ad
vance ranged from 25 to 30 miles, but
on several of the days, the tank armies
covered as much as 45 miles.
The chart provides data on the rates
of advance achieved by Soviet tank
armies in exploitation in other World
War II operations.
Despite the doctrinal preference for
employing the large armored forma
tion in the exploitation role, circum
stances sometimes dictated that the
March 1969
ARMOR
tank army make the initial penetra
tion, either independently or jointly
with the combined-arms army. Short
ages of artillery and direct support
tank units in the latter formations
were the usual factors which pre
vented the infantry armies from mak
ing the rapid penetrations necessary
for early commitment of the tank
army as an exploitation force.
Whether employed as a penetration
or exploitation force, the tank army
was committed on the first day of an
operation whenever the situation per
mitted. In the exploitation role, the
tank army's main body was committed
after the combined-arms army had
penetrated the enemy's main line of
resistance to a depth of one to three
miles. In most operations, the tank
armies completed the penetration and
advanced distances of 12 miles by
evening of the first day. During the
war's last phase, they occasionally
moved ahead as much as 25 miles on
the first day.
Organization for Combat
During the advance to contact, the
tank army employed four routes of
march, two for each first-echelon corps.
This gave the two lead brigades of
each corps a separate route along
which to advance. The army's zone in
the advance to contact ranged from 20
to 25 miles in width.
The tank army organized for com
bat in accordance with its mission
penetration, exploitation, or pursuit.
In the majority of cases, the two
corps army deployed in a single eche
lon while holding a reinforced tank
brigade in army reserve. The standard
three-corps tank army normally de
ployed in two echelons with two tank
corps abreast and the mechanized
corps in the second echelon. In mak
39
ARMOR
ing a penetration, the mechanized in
fantry corps usually deployed in the
first echelon, replacing one of the two
tank corps.
The tank corps, in its tum, usually
adopted a two-echelon formation. Two
of its tank brigades formed the first
opment and encirclement operations
were designated as "mobile groups."
The infantry army commander nor
mally employed a tank or a mecha
nized corps as his mobile group while
the front commander used the tank
army in this role.
echelon while the Either formation in this mobile-
Soviet amphibious tanks
and the motorized rille brigade were
in the second echelon.
The air army, consisting of 1,000
to 1,200 planes, assigned to each So
viet front, provided direct air support
for the tank army. The air army had
the initial mission of providing gen
eral support to the front's formations
in making a rapid penetration to per
mit commitment of the tank army on
the first day. Subsequently, the air
army shifted its main effort to insure
the tank army's success in the exploi
tation.
The formations employed in envel
group role had the mission of develop
ing interior and exterior encircling
fronts as the basic maneuver. Two
methods were employed to develop
these fronts: to develop the interior
front initially and then the exterior;
or to form, simultaneously, both fronts
along different axes of advance. The
method employed depended upon the
force relationships, the composition
and size of the tank formation avail
able to the Soviet commander, and the
over-all concept of the operation.
The first method was used when the
Soviet force had no significant supe-
Military Review
40
riority and the Germans had sizable
reserves available to assist in relief
of the encircled units. As a conse
quence, there was an overpowering re
quirement to complete the interior
front of the encirclement before the
enemy's reserves could interrupt the
maneuver.
Double Envelopment
As the over-all force relationships
along the Soviet-German front swung
to the Soviet favor in 1944 and 1945,
the technique of simultaneously creat
ing interior and exterior fronts was
employed more frequently. However,
the first method was employed in the
final Berlin operation, a fourfold So
viet superiority in armored forces not
withstanding.
Whatever the method employed, the
mobile groups always executed their
advances along two converging axes
from two sectors of the front, that is,
the double envelopment was always
envisaged. The aim was rapidly to cut
the encircled German formations off
from adjacent forces and the opera
tional reserves. The mobile forces held
the interior and exterior fronts until
the combined-arms formations were
able to establish a total blockade and
destroy the encircled units.
The depths of envelopment of the
enemy flanks ranged from 30 to 95
miles, depending on the composition
and disposition of the enemy's forces,
the extent to which they were eche
loned, and the availability of his op
erational reserves. The double envel
opment always aimed at encompassing
the entire hostile groupment.
During the last two years of the
war, the mobile groups completed their
double envelopments within three to
five days. The only exceptions during
this period were the Budapest opera-
March 1969
ARMOR
tion of December 1944 which required
six days for completion of the envel
opment and the Berlin operation where
eight days were needed.
A Soviet Ministry of Defense direc
tive of 16 October 1942 decreed that
the tank corps be employed on the
axis of main effort in pursuit of with
drawing enemy forces. Upon forma
tion of tank armies in 1943, they be
came the front commander's pursuit
force, with missions of seiZing river
crossings, defiles, and critical road
junctions, and developing the condi
tions necessary for the destruction of
an enemy force in the withdrawal.
Determining Factors
The chief factors which determined
when the tank formation initiated the
pursuit were the nature of the enemy's
defenses, the dispositions of his main
forces and reserves, the force rela
tionships along the axis of main ef
fort, and the speed with which the
tactical defenses were breached. Nor
mally, the pursuit began after the en
emy's tactical defenses had been rup
tured throughout their entire depth or
his locally available operational re
serves had been defeated.
During the war's latter phase, the
delay in beginning the pursuit de
creased steadily. In some cases, it was
initiated by evening of the first day
of an operation. Consequently, the
planning for the operation itself fre
quently included the preliminary plan
ning for the pursuit, at least to the
extent of designating the advance
guards and tentative missions, and es
timating the time when tank forma
tion commanders could anticipate the
enemy would initiate his withdrawal.
Detailed planning was accomplished as
soon as the withdrawal began. It en
tailed:
41
ARMOR
Reaffirming the earlier missions
or assigning deeper objectives.
Effecting the necessary regroup..
ments and changes in the organization
for combat.
Dispatching and reinforcing the
advance guards, reconnaissance, and
flank security units.
Clarifying coordination problems
with adjacent formations and the sup..
porting air units.
The tank corps swung into the pur
suit phase by reforming into march
columns and dispatching additional re
connaissance units. It usually em
ployed a two-echeloned formation with
two tank brigades in the first echelon
and its mechanized rifle brigade in the
second echelon. The third tank brigade
formed the advance guard. It was re
inforced by a regiment of self-pro
pelled artillery, a motorized rifle bat
talion, a battalion of' towed artillery,
and an engineer company. This stand
ard reinforcement permitted the ad
vance guard to operate at distances of
up to 25 miles in advance of the main
body, to make hasty river crossings,
and to seize bridges and road junc
tions and hold them until the arrival
of the main body.
During the pursuit, the main body
of the tank corps advanced along two
or three routes of march. The total
frontage of the corps ranged from six
to 10 miles. The distances between
corps approximated six to seven miles.
The tank army in the pursuit had
zones varying from 20 to 25 miles in
width. Such frontages permitted the
tank corps and army to execute the
pursuit on routes paralleling those
along which the enemy was making
his withdrawal, thereby bypassing re
sistance points and striking at the en
emy's flanks and rear.
One of the cardinal characteristics
of Soviet armored advance guards was
tlieir superb faculty for deepwater
fording, even at depths as great as 16
feet by employing snorkel devices on
tanks. Coupled with this faculty was
a propensity for making maximum use
of locally available resources. The
hasty crossings of the mighty Dnieper
River at more than 10 different points
near Kiev in latc 1943 are classic ex
amples of this Red Army capability.
During the last six months of the
war, the tank formation's advance
guards were reinforced with ponton
bridge battalions, amphibious truck
battalions, and an engineer assault
battalion-the latter for more rapid
obstacle clearance.
Culminating Pursuit
The rates of advance in the pursuit
increased as the war progressed to its
concluding phase. The culminating
pursuit was that of the Vistula-Oder
operation when the 10th Guards Tank
Corps of the 4th Tank Army advanced
more than 125 miles in three days.
The corps maintained a two-echeloned
formation, but rotated each of its three
tank brigades in and out of the ad
vance guard every 30 to 40 miles.
In keeping with Soviet doctrine, the
pursuit was always unrelenting, both
day and night. If anything, the pres
sure was maintained at an even higher
intensity during the night.
Self-propelled artillery and truck
mounted multiple-rocket launchers
proved to be the most effective means
of fire support for the tank army or
corps in the pursuit. Towed artillery
frequently lagged so far behind as to
lose much of its effectiveness.
The tank, army in the pursuit nor
mally received direct air support from
one or two air corpa (300 to 500 air-
Military Rlril.
42
ARMOR
craft). In addition to ground attack
missions, the air units also conducted
reconnaissance of the enemy's with
drawal routes and executed target
spotting missions and support mis
sions for the advance guard.
Major weaknesses that plagued So
viet armored forces in their pursuit
ments, causing the tank corps to be
overextended. Corrective measures im
proved the situation considerably as
the war moved into its final months,
especially in regard to stream cross
ings.
The major factor limiting more
rapid and deeper pursuit operations
Truck-mounted, mnltiple-rocket lannchers proved to one effective means
of fire snpport for the tank army or corps in the pursuit
missions, especially during the earlier
phases of the war, included a frequent
inability of the air units to operate ef
fectively against German operational
reserves, the absence of organic bridg
ing equipment, and the lack of suffi
cient wheeled vehicles in the tank corps
itself. This latter weakness frequently
resulted in the mechanized infantry
lagging far behind the armored ele-
March 1969
was logistics, especially petroleum,
oils, and lubricants (POL) resupply.
Logistic support for armored forma
tions remained a problem up to the
final campaign in Germany.
Command and control during the
preparatory phase of each operation
involving large armored formations
was maintained, for the most part, by
personal contact between the tank com
43
ARMOR
manders and their combined-arms
counterparts at all echelons. Written
documentation was accomplished only
to the extent absolutely essential. Dur
ing the penetration phase, the tank
army commander established his com
mand post near that of the combined
arms army commander within whose
zone the tank army was to be com
mitted. The supporting air units also
located liaison officers with" the tank
army headquarters.
Communications with subordinate
tank organizations were maintained by
radio, wire, and liaison officers. Gen
erally. the tank units observed radio
silence until they had begun their ad
vance.
Three Elements
When the tank army moved into the
exploitation and pursuit, its headquar
ters broke down into three elements.
The first was a command group headed
by the tank army comlnander. It in
cluded the commanders of the supportc
ing arms (artillery. air, engineer, and
signal), plus a small operations group
from the army staff. This command
group displaced immediately behind
the first-echelon units of the forces
making the main ,effort.
The second element was the army
command post (first echelon). It in
cluded the operations, intelligence, and
signal sections of the tank army head
quarters, plus officers from the staffs
of the supporting arms commanders.
This echelon displaced along with the
second echelon of the lead corps.
The third element was the army
rear. It consisted of all the staff sec
tions not directly connected with the
combat operations. It displaced be
hind the lead elements of the com
bined-arms army.
In general, Soviet maintenance doc
trine provided for three levels of op
medium, and capi
tal. Each required different periods of
time and conditions.
The organic maintenance platoons
in the regiments and brigades were de
signed to accomplish current (roughly
comparable to US second echelon)
maintenance and to assist crews in
servicing their vehicles. They repaired
or replaced damaged parts, assemblies,
and instruments, to include welding
and lathe operations. They usually
made the repairs or replacements at
the spot where the vehicle was put out
of operation. Normally, they were un
able to remain in one place for any
lengthy period of time, especially in a
fast-moving situation. Otherwise, they
ran the risk of separation from their
parent tank regiment or brigade.
Medium Maintenance
The corps"mobile tank repair battal
ions were the chief instruments for
medium or field maintenance. They re
stored or replaced worn out assemblies,
installed and regulated main arma
ments, and accomplished heavy weld
ing and other operations. They also
absorbed some of the current main
tenance burden from lower echelon
maintenance units.
The tank army maintenance units,
as a rule, did not deploy during the
early phase of an operation. Together
with the tank evacuation companies,
they executed the role of providing
technical services to units on the
march. Then, as combat operations in
tensified, the army tank repair bat
talions refitted tanks which required
medium maintenance and had been
evacuated to the army damaged vehi
cle assembly point by the two tank
evacuation companies. Quite often,
both the repair battalion and the evac-
Militaly RlYl
44
uation companies were employed to re
inforce the maintenance resources of
the corps and brigades, especially when
the tank formations were engaged in
heavy fighting and their rates of ad
vance were insignificant.
When the tailk army broke out into
the exploitation, the maintenance units
exerted every effort to remain with
their parent organizations. But this
was possible only with advances of
up to 12 miles a day when the field
maintenance units were able to accom
plish practically all the current main
tenance and as much as 60 percent of
the medium requirements. As the daily
advances exceeded 12 miles, the units
were able to effect as little as 60 per
cent of the current maintenance and
less than 26 percent of the medium,
forcing the tank maintenance units to
seek new methods.
Army Supervision
One of the changes saw the army
commanders take into their own hands
supervision of the operations of the
maintenance units of the corps and
brigades. Army resources were ex
pended to accomplish most of the me
dium and even some of the current
maintenance. The lower echelon main
tenance units devoted most of their
attention to minor repairs and serv
icing.
Soviet ststistics indicate that, for
the entire period of the war, 26 to 30
percent of the armored vehicles in the
tank armies that required current
maintenance during an operation had
to be evacuated to front-level or depot
type fixed installations. Up to 50 per
cent of those that required medium
maintenance during actual combat op
erations also had to be evacuated to
fixed facilities.
From Soviet interpretation of ar-
Marcb 1969
ARMOR
mor's World War II role, can we draw
any conclusions for the future? Mar
shal Pavel A. Rotmistrov, the spokes
man for armor doctrine, has furnished
some insights into likely trends in his
December 1967 summary of lessons
gleaned. Here are the main teaching
points in the marshal's words:
Basic tend6ncies revealed during the
Wllll" were the uninterrupted increaseB
in the strength of the mobile fortn(J
tions committed to penetrations, their
decisive concentration on the twi8 of
main effort. and the increased depth
of their orgfllTlizatitm for ccnnbat for
the purpose of effecting ever greater
acceleration in the impetus of advance.
A new phenomenon . .. was the com
mitment of front mobile groups into
a penetration already made. This per
mitted the 71Unimum effectiveness ...
in the operational depths since the mo
bile forces thereby preserved their
striking power intact. The commit
ment of mobile forces to complete a
penetration of the MLR and second
line of the defenses weakened the in
tensity of the force's brows in the 0p
erational depths. This
ing. it did insure the rapid rupture of
the tactical defenses and helped to con
vert local succeS8 into operational suc
cess within a short period.
* * *
The war demonstrated that the
rapid forcing of water barriers by
tank formatIons 8eparated from their
main groupments requires that the8e
formations have the neces8ary stream
crossing equipment organic to their
organimtions. Deepwater fording by
tanks is also of great interest.
Of great significance is the experi
ence gained in the employment of
transport aircraft tor ammunition and
POL resupply to tank formations op
45
ARMOR
era,ting a,t grea,t dista,nce8 from the
main body.
NM' 1w.s there been any decrease in
the importa,nce of employing tank
forces in the front' 8 first echelon witk
tke mission of penetrating II weak de
fense and making a rapitt eZ]1loitation
into the operational deptks.
* * *
Thus, tke eZ]1erience gained in tke
employment of a,Tmored forces . es
peciaUy to achie1le high rate8 of ad
'IIa,nce, mainta,ins its significa,nce at tke
present time.
Marshal Rotmistrov's words make it
clear that the present tank doctrine
has taken full cognizance of both the
strong and weak points of the wartime
employment of the tank formation. We
must assume that the eUrl'ent doctrine
has distilled the best of the old expe
rience and blended it with the new re
quirements. There are numerous in
dications that this is so.
The wartime tank corps has been
succeeded by a tank division with three
tank l'eltiments (instead of the earlier
tank brigades) and one motorized rille
regiment (instead of the earlier mech
anized brigade). This organization
gives the tank division approximately
300 tanks. It is also known to have or
ganic tactical missile, tube artillery,
mobile air defense, multiple-rocket
launcher, and ponton bridge units.
The new motorized ritle division is,
essentially, the heir of the wartime
mechanized corps. The Soviets have re
peatedly claimed that this new division
has more firepower and mobility than
its mechanized forebear.
Present Soviet doctrine postulates
rates of advance in excess of 30 miles
per day. This doctrine is based upon
their evaluation of their World War
II experience plus their faith in the
capabilities of the new tank division
and tank army.
LESSONS LEARNED
The MiLITARY REVIEW is particularly interested in receiv
ing manuscripts covering lessons learned by US units in
Vietnam. Problems of organization, command and control,
equipment, tactics, and fire support merit informed discus
sion. After complying with appropriate local regulations,
authors may submit manuscripts direct to the MILITARY RE
VIEW. We will obtain the necessary security review on those
accepted.
41" MIfItllJ Rn_
A.i1If'DIIJUt
From United States Interests in the Middle East
US Political-Strategic
Interests
in the Middle ast
Ralph B. MagnuB
T
HE Arab-Israeli war of 1967
and its consequences have led
many to conclude that a major re
evaluation of US priorities and poli
cies in the Middle East is now in
order: The crisis of 1947 led the
United States to assume the burden
of containing Soviet expansionism in
the Middle East. The crisis of 1958
led the United States, while strength
ening her commitments to the north
ern tier states, to assume that Arab
nationalism was the best barrier
against Soviet domination of the area.
Both the United States and the
Soviet tJ,nion had positions of in
fluence in the area. The cold war
among the Arab States replaced the
cold war of the superpowers as the
dominant theme. This Arab cold war,
however, could not be Isolated from
the larger cold war "Or from the Arab
Israeli conflict. In May and June 1967,
these three sets of international con
flicts interacted in a manner which
produced a major regional armed con
flict and a world crisis.
It is in the context of these three
areas of conflict that the major US
political and strategic interests pres
ently operative may best be reviewed.
What is the current content of the
five factors of foreign policy forma
tion that influence US policy in the
Middle East-namely, the Soviet
threat; the policies of local powers;
the technological factor; the influence
of third parties; and the purely US
considerations ?
To answer produces a catalog of
Marc. 1969
THE MIDDLE EAST
This article WIUI condensed
from a chapter entitled "Politi
cal-Strotegic Intere8t8" in the
Btudy, UNITED STATES INTER
ESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, pre
pared by the American Enter
prise Institute for Public Policy
Research, WlUlhington, D. C., in
October 1968.
Mr. Magnus was a Foreign
Service Olfieer with the US In
formation Agency from 1961 to
1965, during which he served lUI
Assistant Cultural Atta,ck8 with
the American EmblUlBY in Kabul,
Afghanistan. He holds an M.A. in
Political Science from the Uni
'Versity of California. at Berkeley
where he is presently a Research
Assistant with the Department
of Political Science and is work
ing toward his Ph. D.
ambiguities as the interests of 1947
and 1957 are examined in the light
of the conditions of 1967. These am
biguities, in turn, suggest alternatives
which could be considered for the
future direction of US policy toward
the Middle East.
The principal US cold war interests
in the Middle East are still concen
trated in the area of their origin
the northern tier of Greece, Turkey,
Iran, and Pakistan. Turkey and Greece
are fulI members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. Cyprus, under
the 1959 independence agreements,
has permanent NATO bases under
British administration. Turkey, Iran,
and Pakistan (as well as Britain) are
members of the Central Treaty Or
ganization (CENTO), the successor
to the Baghdad Pact.
Military Review
48
The United States, despite her early
sponsorship of this regional defense
alliance, has never formally joined,
but is, nonetheless, a de facto member
through membership on all the func
tional committees of the organiza
tion and through repeated declara
tions of US Presidents and Secretaries
of State. In addition, the United
States has the bilateral defensive ex
ecutive agreements of 1959 with Tur
key, Iran, and Pakistan, concluded
under the general authority of the
Eisenhower doctrine.
US Interests
US interests relating to the cold
war between the Arab States are less
clearly delineated. On the broadest
level, the United States has considered
all Arab Governments, even the most
radical, to be preferable to direct
Soviet rule or to Soviet domination
in some satellite status. In practice,
the United States has developed more
friendly relations with the moderate
Arab States. It is these states which
have accepted, either openly or tacitly,
Eisenhower doctrine aid in preserving
their independence from international
communism.
Since the June war, the United
States has resumed arms sales and aid
to the moderate Arab States, prin
cipally to Jordan, and has continued
to train her officers in the United
States. At the same time, Washing
ton has attempted to resume normal
diplomatic relations, which were
broken at the time of the June war,
with the radical Arab States.
US involvement in the Arab cold
war has stemmed from the mutual
attraction between the moderate Arab
bloc and the United States in the
interest of preserving the status quo.
Although Washington has maintained
that its actions have been directed
toward strengthening Arab States
March 1969
THE MIDDLE EAST
against communism, its interest has
been in preserving them against
threats from the radical Arab States.
This was officially recognized in
the 1965 movement of US airpower to
Saudi Arabia as a warning to Gamal
Abdel Nasser not to expand the
Yemeni civil war. The United States
UN forces at demareation line
has thus attempted to preserve the
status quo of the Arab States which
in practice means that she has coun
tered the aggressive, expansionist,
and revolutionary aims of the radical
states against the moderates.
Officially, the United States has no
special commitment to Israel. In 1947,
Washington supported the Palestine
partition plan in the United Nations
and in 1948 recognized Israel's in
dependence, but the Soviet Union did
the same. The 1950 Tripartite Decla
ration of the United Ststes, Britsin,
and France was designed to guarantee
49
'THE MIIIDlE EAST
the borders achieved by the armistice
agreements of 1949, ending the first
Palestinian War, and to prevent an
arms race between the Arabs and
Israelis.
The United States has never rec
ognized Israel's legal right to Jerusa
lem (or Jordan's occupation of part
Refugees
of Jerusalem before 1967) which
under the 1947 partition was to be
internationalized. The United Ststes
maintains her Embassy at Tel Aviv
while the Israelis claim their capital
is in Jerusalem. All public statements
of US interests have emphasized that
she maintains an impartial role, wish
ing only for the peace and security of
all states in the Middle East.
"Evenhanded" treatment of Israel,
the northern tier, and the Arab States,
radical and moderate alike, has been
developed as a policy that suits US
interests well. Beyond the rhetoric
of Presidential speeches and the gen
eralities of UN resolutions, however,
evenhandedness has been found to be
a nearly impossible creed to practice.
The highly articulate, wealthy, and
generous Jewish community in the
United States unofficially, but none
theless, conspicuously, has lavished
favors on tiny Israel, leading all Arab
States to condemn the United States
for befriending their enemy. In times
of Arab-Israeli war, this unofficial
favoritism for Israel has cost US
interests: oil flows have been halted,
other trade has been interrupted, and
air communications have been dis
rupted to the extent of nearly deny
ing vast areas of the Middle East to
US airlines.
Access Restricted
In Iraq, where Western investments
in oil resource development are signifi
cant, US diplomacy rides out, a8 best
it can, the cascading coups with their
anti-American motifs, awaiting the
maturity of some Baghdad govern
ment that will recognize openly the
mutual benefits of international devel
opment of Iraqi oil resources. In the
meantime, as a result of Arab reaction
to the widely publicized US partiality
to Israel, the United States has been
greatly restricted in her access to
six Arab States (the United Arab
Republic, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Sudan,
and Yemen) following the rupture,
on their initiative, of diplomatic rela
tions with Washington.
Having examined some of the US
political-strategic interests relating
to the major areas of conflict in the
Middle East, what are the major
factors in foreign policy formation?
The Soviet Union. There has
b e e ~ a ' general trend in international
relati' ns in the past few years toward
a 8 ch for areas of convergent in
terests between. the two nuclear giants
-the United States and the USSR.
The Vietnam war, directed at the con-
Military Re,le. 50
tainmt!llt of Communist China, has
made this gradual detente more dif
:ficult, but bas not stopped all progress.
In recent years, the nuclear test ban
treaty, a treaty on the peaceful uses
of outer space, aconsular treaty, and
a nuclear nonproliferation treaty have
been concluded.
These areas of agreement did not
eliminate the Soviet Union's efforts
THE MIDDI fAST
and particularly US, influence in the
region through direct Soviet dealings
with the existing ,governments and
through propaganda on the popular
level. Disappointment of Arab leaders
and masses alike with the US policies
following the June 1961 Arab-Israeli
war has been a major factor euhanc
ing Soviet-Arab r(lpprochement.
The Middle E.(J.8tern states. The
Arab Legion soldiers
'to expand her influence or her support
of wars of "national liberation." Long
range, of course, the Soviet Union
sees the breakdown of the power anli
prestige of 'the United States in the
area as the first step toward revolu
tion.
Soviet inftuence with the radical
Arab States is still limited, but ap
pears to be growing. 'Today, it seems
to focus on elimination of Western,
limb 1989
general trend in all Middle Eastern
states, including even the closest al
lies of the United States, has been a
resurgence of particularistic and re
gional concerns and .a refusal to see
the contest between the United States
and the USSR as the principal factor
in individual states' foreign policies.
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have
shown 'more concern with their in
ternal development and their respec
51
THE MIDDLE EAST
tive local quarrels-Cyprus, the Per
sian Gulf, and Kashmir-than with
the threat from the Soviet Union. All
have increased friendly relations with
the Soviet Union and receive aid from
both the USSR and the United States.
Iran has recently made a large arms
purchase from the USSR. Pakistan
has, due to her dispute with India,
become friendly toward Communist
China. .
In the Arab States, the major con
cern has alternated between the Arab
cold war and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The radical states receive Soviet aid
and the conservatives US aid, but
their policies ate not concerned with
the interests of their great power
friends. Due to repeated defeats by
Israel, all Arab Governments are in a
highly precarious position. Even the
most conservative are being pushed
by popular guerrilla movements into
a dangerously exposed position.
Israel has the present military su
periority vis-a-vis the Arabs, but the
extension of her territory has raised
new problems from her hostile Arab
population. So long as Arab States
are unwilling, or incapable through
fear of the domestic consequences, to
make peace, Israel's security cannot
be assured. Future military victories
would only serve to increase the legacy
of hatred. Any attempt to incorporate
the conquered areas permanently into
Israel would endanger either the of
ficial Jewish character or the demo
cratic form of government of Israel.
Third power8. The major factors
here have been the further decline of
British power in the Middle East,
together with the first signs of Chi
nese influence. Britain has officially
announced her withdrawal by 1971
from her last stronghold in the area
(outside of the NATO base in Cy
prus), the oil-rich Persian Gulf.
This among other factors is creat
ing difficulties between Iran and Saudi
Arabia and is producing efforts at
alliance among the Sheikhs of the tiny
Persian Gulf states. Observers doubt
if these feudal states will be any more
successful in resisting radical Arab
nationalism than were the feudal
rulers of the short-lived Aden Fed
eration.
Britain, however, has now gained
greater flexibility as she has shed her
last imperial interests in the area.
In this manner, Britain is following
the example of France who was able
to adopt a more flexible Middle East
ern policy following the agreements
for Algerian independence in 1962.
China's policies in the Middle East
began to diverge from those of the
USSR in 1959. Since then, the Chinese
have supported the most radical of
Arab policies and regimes. China has
never recognized Israel, and openly
encourages and supplies arms to the
Al ABila guerrillas. China has de
nounced the Soviet Union's refusal
to give armed aid to the Arabs in
1967 and Moscow's subsequent sup
port of the 22 Novemher resolution
as a further example of Soviet revi-
Military Review 52
sionism making an alliance with US
imperialism against the revolutionary
movements of the third world.
Technical factorB. The value of
overseas military bases in the area
has steadily declined. This has been
shown by the successive British evac
uation of Suez, Kenya, Aden, and now
the of the Per
MOBkr1fJ
sian Gulf. US power in the area has
always depended more on the naval
based airpower and amphibious Ma
rine forces of the 6th Fleet. Now, the
Soviet Union has deployed a substan
tial Mediterranean Fleet of her own
and has shown a new emphasis on
developing amphibious forces. The
closure of the Suez Canal has made
less difference to the essential sup
. plies of oil to Europe than anticipated.
New oilfields, pipelines, and mammoth
. supertankers have combined to reduce
many of the anticipated effects of the
Canal closure.
The United StateB. In recent
years, the United States has attempted
to maintain a number of policies in
Mlrcb 1969
THE MIDDLE EAST
the Middle East which have appeared
to some critics to be ambiguous or
even mutually contradictory. Ambi
guities may have helped to cause the
June war and later may have served
to lessen chances for settlement.
With regard to the cold war with
the Soviet Union, the United States
has attempted to limit Soviet in
fluence in the area as far as possible.
The ambiguity this presents is on two
levels. On a global scale, the United
States has been seeking areas of
gradual accommodation with the So
viet Union. The bipolar image of the
world has been blurred by the Sino
Soviet conflict.
In the Middle East itself, US allies
enter into friendly relations with
Communist nations, receiving mili
tary and economic aid from the USSR
and even from China as they pursue
what they feel to be their own national
interests. In the Arab world, the So
viet Union has become increasingly
influential. She has large military and
economic aid projects, military ad
visors in the armies of the radical
Arab States, and naval vessels based
in the United Arab Republic.
With regard to the Arab world, the
United States has sought to maintain
at least correct relations with all Arab
States, but failing this has attempted
to build her influence with the con
servative bloc. The ambiguity of this
policy comes from two sources. The
radical Arabs have found Washing
ton's anti-Soviet emphasis unaccepta
ble. They find the Soviet Union a
useful ally, a source of aid and arms,
and a friend in the United Nations.
The conservative Arab bloc has ac
cepted US aid, less for its ostensible
purpose of anticommunism, than to
develop its economies and defenses,
to enable it to resist the radical Arab
bloc in its own cold war. For all the
53
THE MIDDLE EAST
US aid and influence, the United
States was unable to prevent all her
conservative friends from joining a
united Arab front against Israel in
May and June 1967.
In the Arab-Israeli dispute, the
United States has sought with one
hand for the peace and security of
all states on the basis of the 22 N0
vember UN resolution a n ~ its pro
claimed impartiality. On the other
hand, utterances and gestures made
by US political leaders, both in and
out of office, have appeared as one
sidedly partial to Israel. This informal
partiality has not been followed by
commensurate US influence of a re
straining type over Israel's policy
toward the Arab States. The result
has been alienation of the Arab States
from the United States.
Alternatives
Students of the Middle East list
these alternatives for, US policy in
the area:
Alternative 1. To attempt to co
operate with the Arab world as the
best barrier to Soviet penetration of
the area and for preservation of
major economic and political interests
there. This would entail increased US
efforts and aid to both the northern
tier allies and to the Arab States.
Some critics of this approach be
lieve, however, that the Soviet Union
could always outbid the United States
for Arab support by adopting a more
anti-Israeli line. On the other hand.
others believe the United States may
count on a positive response from
many elements in the Arab popula
tions which now may be intimidated,
but remain basically friendly to this
country, to its free enterprise system,
and to its political and religious
beliefs.
Alternative II. To form an open
alliance with Israel. The United States
would give up hope of influencing the
Arab States and concentrate on Israel
and the northern tier allies as bul
warlts against Soviet power in the
~ r e a . This would likely result, how
ever, in the ouster of the United
States from the Arab world and would
enhance Soviet prospects for pene
Deparlme1'li!: of Seuta Photos
US jets over Adana, Turkey
tration, thereby endangering the stra
tegic position of the United States
throughout the Eastern Hemisphere.
Alternative 111. To cooperate
with the Soviet Union to obtain peace
and security in the Middle East. This
would recognize the dangers of Middle
Eastern conflicts leading to confron
tations of the United States with the
USSR. A settlement of the Arab
Israeli conflict would be sought by
a combination of Soviet pressure on
the radical Arab States and US pres
sure on Israel. It would require a
recognition by both sides that the
limited gains possible in the Middle
East are not worth the risks .
Critics say this approach would en-
MilHlil Review 54
THE MIDDLE EAST
tail a degree of mutual trust on both
sides greater than can be expected at
present. Moreover, in view of the
Soviet Union's announced objectives,
her trustworth.iness in any efforts
at cooperation is at least suspect.
This alternative probably would
arouse a great outcry from the Arabs
and from Israel, proud, independent
states which could be expected to
resent any great power deals con
cluded in secret behind their backs.
This policy would no doubt be attacked
in many quarters as a new imperial
ism to divide the Middle East into
spheres of influence. Perhaps the least
satisfactory consequence would be im
plicit recognition by the United States
of the desirability of the Soviet pres
ence in the area.
Alternative IV. To support more
vigorously the implementation of the
UN Security Council resolution of 22
November while continuing the US
policy of neutrality. This alternative
presumably would have the advantage
of incorporating some of the desirable
features of the previous alternatives.
Implementation of this essentially
neutral US policy, however, can be
expected to encounter opposition from
both sides in the Arab-Israeli con
flict because it would not be compati
ble with either side's maximum expec
tations.
Perhaps none of these alternatives
is as likely as a fifth one-that of
continuing more or less the same
policies that led to the June war.
The difficulties have been illustrated
by the events of 1967. The interaction
of the great power cold war, the Arab
cold war, and the Arab-Israeli dispute
led to war, but some believe that after
this lesson it would, perhaps, be pos
sible to avoid a repetition.
Others, however, say there is every
reason to expect that such a conflict
will be repeated, within a few years
at most, as the Arabs are pushed into
more radical positions while guerrilla
raids and Israeli counterraids by regu
lar forces continue to escalate.
It is also said by some to be proba
ble that the Arab Governments of
Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab
Republic would be unable to survive a
further defeat at the hands of Israel,
now that Israeli forward positions
are only a few miles from their capi
tals. The coup in Iraq may be only the
first in a series if this evaluation is
correct.
The great powers agreed to a unani
mous resolution in the UN Security
Council establishing a basis for secur
ing peace in the Middle East, but they
may lack the will or the power to
secure its implementation.
March 1969
55
The view8 eZ'/YT'e88ed in this article are the author's and
do not nece8sarily reflect thoBe of the Department of De
fense or its agencieB.-Editor.
T
ESTING is involved at every stage in the life of a
weapon system or major item of equipment. It is done
by many different agencies to satisfy various requirements
for information upon which to base decisions. Testing be
gins in the initial concept stage, continues through devel
opment and production, and extends through the operational
Service Testing Be/ongs
to the User
MI_ Rul..
5&
life of the equipment or system, end
ing only when the item is discarded.
Service tests are conducted during
the development and production phase
and are performed in order to deter
mine how well "the new equipment op
erates in the role it was designed to
fill. In the early, conceptual phase of
development, feasibility tests are con
ducted by industry or specialized
Government agencies to determine
whether the proposed item is wIthin
the realm of possibility and merits ex
penditure of development funds and
effort to fill some stated militsry re
quirement.
At various later stages, both the in
dustrial producer and the Government
developer test in order to determine
performance, reliability, and compat
ibility of specific components and sub
systems. These tests, including engi
neer design tests and the engineering
Mllcb 1969
SERVICE TESTJIIG
test, are performed under closely con
trolled conditions and are usually
highly instrumented. Attention is fo
cused on the performance of selected
slibsystems or components of the de
velopment item.
It is not until the service test that
the new item of equipment is tested
as an entire system while performing
in the environment and in the manner
that it will be us.id by combat units.
Conduct of service tests, then, is the
special province of the service test
boards. The service test of a new item
of equipment is a significant milestone
in its development. This test, more
than any other, provides information
upon which the responsible Depart
ment of the Army staff agencies base
their decision to reject or accept the
item for Army use.
Service test boards were established
" in the 1920's when the idea of a con
secutive engineering test by the equip
ment developers and service test by the
user of the equipment came into be
ing. This distinction between the two
test roles continued and gained in
creased acceptance and formality when
the Army was reorganized just prior
to World War II. At that time, the
newly created Army Service Forces
was charged with research and devel
opment, and the Army Ground Forces
was made responsible for the using
arms' test boards.
In 1946, the 10 branch-oriented test
boards which had grown up were con
solidated into four numbered boards
still under control of the Army Ground
Forces. This arrangement continued
until 1957 when the US Continental
Army Command (USCONARC) was
given responsibility for service test
ing, and the four boards were redesig
nated branch test boards.
57
SERVICE TESTING
In the decade after 1950, the service
test boards increasingly refined their
procedures for testing under field and
simulated combat conditions, and suc
ceeded in acquiring test and super
visory personnel of considerable field
experience and graduate-level engi
neering education. During this period,
the service test boards greatly en
hanced their reputation for objectivity
and thoroughness.
Great Progress
This period of time saw great prog
ress throughout the field of military
research and development. Science and
technology were involved in almost
every new military endeavor. As a re
sult, the service test boards were in
creasingly cal1ed upon to serve as an
interface or catalyst between the en
gineers and technicians on one hand
and the service schools and combat
developments groups on the other. The
boards had sufficient technical and en
gineering competence to deal knowl
edgeably with the equipment develQP
ers while retaining the field experience
in branch equal to that of the serv
ice schools and combat developments
groups.
Lieutenant Colonel DanH. WiUiam
Bon, Jr., is with the Office of the Chief
of Staff, Department of the Army,
WaBhington, D. C. He kaB BeMled with
the Sd and 6th Armored Cavalry Reg
iment8 and with the 3d Armored Di
vision in Germany, and with GIl, US
Army, Europe. He WaB Project Officer
for the US Army Armor Board, Fort
Knox, Kentucky, and for the Ground
Combat Division, Army Concept Team
in Vietnam. A graduate of the US
Military Academy, he holclB an M.S.
in Engineering from Georgia inBtitute
of Technology and kaB gradtu4ted from
the US Army Command and General
Staff College and the US Army War
College.
By 1961, the service test boards had
earned considerable autonomy in car
rying out their mission under US
CONARC. The boards coordinated test
matters with the service schools and
combat developments groups, and had
the mission of assisting in the formu
lation of new materiel requirements
and providing advice and assistance to
the developers. Board recommenda
tions and opinions on development
equipment were sought both by the
developers and by higher military au
thorities having development and pro
curement responsibility. The service
test board was effectively functioning
as a coequal member of the branch
center team in providing modern doc
trine, tactics, and equipment for the
Army.
User Representation
During the lifespan of a weapon
system or major item of equipment,
there are three phases of critical in
terest to the combat arms user:
The establishment of a require
ment for the equipment. This may
precede or fol1ow the designer's first
concept of the piece of hardware, but
it is the user who describes the opera
tional qualities and characteristics the
eventual equipment must possess.
Service testing against the user's
requirements.
Field operation by combat units.
The service test board, in carrying
out its primary mission, must be in
dependent of the developer and the
logistician. This is not to say the
service test board disregards the lo
gistician and developer; on the con
trary, it is essential that al1 three
work together and remain intimately
acquainted with every aspect of the
development equipment. The essential
point is that nothing should detract
Militaly Reylew
58
SERVICE lEmMI
from the "service" nature of the serv
ice test nor from the user orientation
of the service test board.
The key to the type of personnel a
service test board should have is found
in paragraph 17 of Army Regulation
70-10, Research and Development:
ing tests and preparing test plans and
reports, as well as their supervisors,
must possess certsin necessary quali
fications. The officer at the action level
must have completed his branch ca
reer course and commanded a com
pany-size unit typical of his branch in
The Chaparral guided missile was tested by the US Army Air Defense Board at Fort
Bliss, Texas
Army Materiel Testing. This regula
tion describes the service test as one
which:
. is characterized by qualitative
observations and judgement of se
lected military personnel having a
background of field experience with
the type of materiel undergoing test,
conducted using soldiers repre
sentative of those who will operate
and maintain the equipment in the
field.
It is clear that the officers conduct-
March 1969
order to have accumulated the required
background of field experience.
This officer also prepares opinions,
comments, and recommendations re
garding proposed development mate
riel, as well as materiel under test.
He must be able to deal knowledge
ably with civilian contractors, engi
neers from industry, and military
technicians. He must represent the
user and serve as translator between
the soldier and the technician.
Because of the complex nature of
59
SERVICE TESnN8
his job and the intimate familiarity
he must have with the entire develop
ment program, he is appropriately
termed a project officer. In order to
carry out these responsibilities, he
should have a master's degree in a
field of engineering appropriate to the
materiel under development.
Obviously, the project officer's
~ n g t h of service on the board is im
portant to assure stability of the test
program and over-all knowledge of the
development area. Assignment overlap
of up to six months, in some cases, is
necessary to provide program conti
nuity. The service test board project
officer is in a position to be--and must
be, if he ill to represent adequately the
user's interest-the most informed in
dividual in the user community re
garding the development items in his
area of responsibility.
Three Levels
Usually, there are three levels of su
pervisors above the project officer.
These are the branch chief, division
chief, and president of the board. It
is not necessary that these officers
have graduate-level degrees, but it is
essential for each of them to be well
qualified in his branch which normally
is the branch of the particular board.
Although senior noncommissioned
officers assigned to test projects should
be well qualified in their military oc
cupational specialty by virtue of nor
mal service school training and ap
propriate tactical unit experience, no
other special qualifications are needed.
It is desirable that the lower grades
of enlisted men on test projects be as
signed to the boards routinely and
without special qualifications.
In 1962, the Army underwent a ma
jor reorganization along functional
lines. Each of the three major com
&0
mands was given a role in the devel
opment of new materiel. The US Army
Combat Developments Command (US
ACDC) was charged with establish
ing requirements for new equipment;
the US Army Materiel Command (US
AMC) was charged with developing,
testing, procuring, and supporting all
Army equipment; and USCONARC
was charged with training the per
sonnel needed to operate and maintain
the equipment in the field.
As the principal user representa
tion, the USACDC is charged not only
with developing new doctrine and fu
ture materiel requirements for the
Army, but also is responsible for con
tinuously evaluating the over-all mil
itary worth of Army equipment. Lack
ing an organic capability to test
materiel, the USACDC relies upon re
ports of tests furnished by the US
AMC and upon informal reports from
Army field units.
Special Headquarters
Under the USAMC, a special head
quarters-the US Army Test and
Evaluation Command (USATECOM)
-was created to control and coordi
nate the testing and evaluation of all
Army materiel. Established at Aber
deen Proving Ground, Maryland, the
new headquarters absorbed some of
what had been known as the Ordnance
Development and Proof Service and
drew as well on other technical service
proving grounds and test activities for
staff personnel. A relatively small per
centage of personnel for the new head
quarters was drawn from those staff
sections of USCONARC that previ
ously exercised user responsibilities
for materiel development.
All of the Army's test facilities
technical service proving grounds, en
vironmental test centers, engineering
Milltaly Review
SERVICE TESnNG
US A r m ~ Photo.
The US Army Test and Evaluation Command's Armor and Engineer Board at Fort
Knox, Kentucky, conducted confirmatory tests on the Sheridan weapon system, M551
test activities, and service test boards
-were placed under the direct control
of the USATECOM. The following
missiqns were assigned to the USA
TECOM:
Plan and conduct engineering
and service tests on Army materiel for
the USAMC.
vary somewhat in wording. None of
the board missions specifically charges
them with providing advice and as
sistance to user agencies nor with co
ordination and assistance in the prep
aration of materiel requirements.
The real value of the 1962 Army re
organization has been ita clear and
precise asEliglllment
services and support to sponsoring de
velopment and production commands
and project managers outside the US
ATECOM and the USAMC.
Participate in and help plan and
prepare for troop tests involving Army
materiel.
Direct, manage, and control as
signed installations and activities.
The missions which have been as
signed the service test boards by the
USATECOM are much the same al
though their mission statements may
March 1969
bilities along functional lines. The
most logical and efficient system we
have ever had for the development,
procurement, and support of Army
equipment is a worthwhile result. Al
though one major goal-the reduction
of equipment development leadtime
has not yet been realized, some other
significant improvements are:
Increased capability of applying
scientific and technological develop
ments to the solution of military re
quirements.
61
SERVICE TESTING
A common language throughout
the materiel development and procure
mentfield.
More effective test planning and
scheduling.
Increased availability of proto
type test equipment.
More efficient use of test re
sources.
The accomplishments of the USA
TECOM in organizing, classifying,
and codifying test facilities and tech
niques have been outstanding. Re
dundancy in test capabilities has been
reduced, and economies in personnel
and operating costs have been demon
strated. On the whole, test and evalua
tion service to the developer has been
greatly improved.
Minor Flaw
However, a minor flaw in the 1962
reorganization is depriving the user
of the kind of test support he needs
and is degrading his capability to in
fluence the development process at -its
most critical phase-that of determin
ing the over-all suitability of new
equipment for service use. The user no
longer has the capability of independ
ently measuring newly developed
equipment against his operational re
quirements. Instead, he has the capa
bility of evaluating the results of tests
conducted and measured by the USA
TECOM.
It further appears that the missions
assigned the service test boards by the
USATECOM assure greater respon
siveness to the requirements of the
developer than to the needs of the
user. Official test reports and service
test board positions regarding mate
riel development matters must be
cleared by the USATECOM before be
ing made available to the USACDC,
the user representative. Service test
information deemed controversial by
the USATECOM can be released only
by that headquarters.
Occasionally, there seems to be a
greater concern for meeting develop
ment program schedules than for
determining 'equipment performance
over a valid range of seasonal varia
tions and operational modes. Actually,
the user has a greater interest in
reducing leadtime for new, modern
equipment than iioes the developer, but
the user also knows his own life may
ultimately depend on the suitability
of that -equipment in the field. Tilis_
suitability ciln -liest be determined in
advance of sizable troo,p testa only
throvgh service-oriented and user-.con
trolled field ~ n g . -
COAtinulng Problem
Securing qualified officers for as
signment to the combat arms service
test boards is a continuing problem.
These boards are not getting project
officers of the necessary level of branch
experience and formal engineering ed
ucation.
For lieutenants with advanced de
grees, the USAMC adopted a program
in the fall of 1967 intended to assure
their most effective use. The great rna
jority of these lieutenants are two
year obligated service volunteer offi
cers who have no prior field military
experience.
While the assignment ot newly com
missioned, advanced-degree lieuten
ants to jobs in which they can use
their special training is certainly ben
eficial to the individual, their effec
tiveness in positions which call for the
exercise of judgment based on field
experience .such as service test board
project officers is limited.
Of 40 such lieutenants assigned by
the USAMC to the USATECOM as
-Milltlly RIYItw 62
of February 1968, nine had been as
signed to the US Army Armor and
Engineer Board and one to the US
Army Artillery Board. Using the Ar
mor and Engineer Board as an exam
ple, of the nine advanced-degree lieu
tenants assigned to that board, only
three held advanced degrees appropri
ate to the type of materiel testing done
there, and, of these three, only one was
an armor lieutenant.
EqineeriDI Facilities
These technically trained, inexpe
rienced young officers, if they are not
going to be assigned to appropriate
field units, might be better employed
in any of the excellent engineering
facilities in the USAMC. There seems
to be little reason, with an active war
in progress; why service test boards
and combat developments agencies
cannot be staffed with officers having
firsthand knowledge of branch combat
requirements.
Admittedly, the present combat re
quirements in Vietnam increase the
difficulty of keeping Army activities
elsewhere manned to the desired level,
but the policy of assigning to the serv
ice test boards branch..qualified project
officers with advanced degrees in en
gineering was apparently abandoned
in 1963-well before the Vietnam
buildup.
What, then, are some feasible alter
natives to the present situation which
would restore the service test capa
bilities of the combat arms test boards
and would enhance the value of those
boards to the user?
One solution might be to assign the
service test boards to the USACDC.
They would continue to function at
their present locations, but would be
under the staff supervision of the US
ACDC's Combat Arms Group (CAG).
March 1969
SERVICE TESnNG
Another solution would be to assign
the service test boards to the Depart
ment of the Army as class II activities
under the staff supervision of either
the Chief of Research and Develop
ment or the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Force Development. The latter ar
rangement would probably be more de
sirable since it would place the boards
under an authority outside the con
tinuing stream of materiel develop
ment. In either of these cases, the
Department of the Army could further
assign operational control of the serv
ice test boards to the USACDC.
A third solution might be to reas
sign the service test boards to US
--eONARC. While this would probably
lead to improvement in the personnel
situation, USCONARC's principal mis
sion of training does not as closely
identify that corhmand with the user
as it did before the 1962 reorganiza
tion.
Any of the foregoing solutions
should restore control of service tests
to the user. However, assignment of
the boards to USCONARC probably
would not make them as responsive to
the user as would assignment to either
the Department of the Army or the
USACDC. of the boards
as Department of the Army class II
activities would be most likely to as
sure their being staffed properly. It is
difficult to foresee whether assignment
to the USACDC would significantly
improve the present personnel situa
tion, inasmuch as the USACDC has
numerous other positions which call
for officers having the same qualifica
tions so badly needed on the boards
today.
Although many improvements in
both efficiency and economy have re
63
SERVICE TESnNG
suIted from the Army reorganization
of 1962, at least one serious deficiency
is apparent after six years of operat
ing under the new organization. The
user orientation of the combat arms
service test boards is disappearing,
and the boards have become more re
sponsive to the equipment developers
than to those who will use the equip
ment in the field.
In order to reverse t h i ~ trend and
restore the user's capability to test
equipment independently of the devel
oper, the service test 'boards must be
removed from the USAMC. Assign
ment of the service test boards as
Department of the Army class II ac
tivities under staff supervision of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force
Development would be a good way to
assure adequate staffing of the service
test boards and to guarantee that they
would truly represent the user in the
materiel development cycle.
COMMENTS INVITED
The Military Review welcomes your comments on any mate
rial published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought
will assist us and may lead to publication of your ideas. If you
are an authority on a certain subject, why not write an article
for our consideration? If you have only an idea, query us; per
haps we can assist you in developing an acceptable article.
MiliUry Review
64
Major Edgar O'Bal1ance
British Armg, Retired
W
ITH a nuclear megaton being a measure
of destructive power equal to one million
tons of TNT, it is disturbing to hear that the mega
tonnage gap is closing. Reports indicate that the Soviet
Union is rapidly catching up and may soon overtake the
United States in the nuclear armaments race that has
been in progress for some years. Only a few months ago,
a US official admitted that the Soviet Union may have as
many land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)
as the United States by mid-1969. However, he stated the US
submarineborne missile force will continue to be overwhelm
ingly larger than that of the USSR.
It is more than probable that the Soviet Union now has more
nuclear megatonnage than the United States, and has had for some
time, but, since each power has long had a sufficient quantity to de-
March 1969 65
MISSILE &lAPS
Force. MCl1't(Iueltkmt
Nuelear-powered submarines of the fu
ture will earl')' the Poaeilfoll miSBile.
after modifleation to the Polaris tub;.
.hown here
stroy the other, one might question
the importance of any megatonnage
gap. Does more megatonnage simply
mean a greater o.verkiIl potential, and
is not there a saturation point?
Major Edgar O'Ballance, British
Army, Retired, WII8 a Territorial offi
cer with the 5th Battalion of the Sher
wood Foresters in DerbY8hire, Eng
land. His 1188ignments include duty 118
a stal! of}icer, on. regimental duty, and
commander of a battalion in Burma
against the Japanese during World
War II. Major O'Ballance is Editor,
British Army News Service, London.,
and has written numerous books on.
modern military campaigns. His latest
at-ticle, "Brainwll8hing," appeared in
the March 1968 issue of the MILITARY
REVIEW.
There is both a megat\:)nnage gap
and a missile gap, but they counter
balance each Mher to a certain extent.
nuclear does not
give the i:ODIplete picture, but neither
does a bare statement of the number
of vehicles available to deliver it.
Many other factors, such as means of
delivery, new techniques of attack, and
defenses, have to be taken into con
sideration in assessing the nuclear
balance.
1III1ted Statas First
The United States became the first
nation to possess nuclear weapons,
successfulIy exploding the atomic
bomb in 1945, and the hydrogen bomb
in 1952. The Soviet Union did not per
feet the atomic weapon until 1949, and
the hydrogen one until 1953. With
such a big time lead and technical
advantage, the United States was able
to stockpile at a much faster rate than
the Soviet Union. For many years, the
megatonnage race predominantly fa
vored the United States.
In the early nuclear days, manned,
long-range aircraft were the only
means of delivering such weapons.
Since the United States possessed a
large fleet left over from World War
II, and the Soviet Union had hardly
any at alI, it meant that, not only did
the USSR have to develop and stock
pile, she also had to construct the air
craft capable of carrying nuclear
weapons.
In the early 1950's, it was doubtful
whether the Soviet Union could ag
gressively use the few nuclear weapons
she possessed. This preponderance of
megatonnage and the means to deliver
it, which became known as the nuclear
deterrent, enabled the United States to
adopt a policy of total nuclear retalia
tion in case of any Soviet aggression.
There can be little doubt that this
MilitlrJ Rnn
deterred Joseph Stalin who was eager
to sweep into, and take over, Western
Europe.
In due course, the USSR, too, was
able to stockpile nuclear weapons. As
her megatonnage increased, and her
long-range bombers came into service,
a position of nuclear stalemate set in.
Each country now was able to devas
tate, or at least do crippling and unac
ceptable destruction to, the other. No
matter how good air defenses might
be, it was recognized that a proportion
of manned aireraft would get through.
Aggression or acta of war meant mu
tual suicide, and this stark fact con
tinued to deter Soviet leaders after
Stalin's death.
Improved Delivery Means
Having reached a stalemate, atten
tion was focused on discovering better
means of delivery. Progress was made
in the rocket-missile sphere by both
the United States and the USSR,
especially with short and medium
range rockets carrying small war
heads. The object was to produce a
long-range strategic missile, an ICBM,
capable of delivering sizable nuclear
warheads.
In August 1957, the Soviet Union
was the first to achieve this. The
United States was not far behind, and
by the late 1950's, both countries had
a capability of bombarding each
other's territory with ICBM's. Vulner
able manned bombers began to be
phased out. At this stage, there was no
known defense against missiles. Since
both countries had radar devices that
gave several minutes' warning, which
was sufficient to launch retaliatory nu
clear missiles against an enemy nu
clear attack, the stalemate remained.
A nuclear exchange still meant mutual
suicide.
The "yield-to-weight" ratio now
March 1989
MISSILE GAPS
came into calculations as only a lim
ited amount of nuclear material could
be packed into a warhead to be pro
pelled over such vast distances. Gen
erally, the United States favored
smaller warheads, considering that
extra large ones merely overkilled the
target while increasing the area of
devastation fractionally. A greater
number of smaller missiles would al
low more targets to be hit.
On the other hand, the Soviets
with their space research program
which required heavier rockets, and
also, perhaps, for prestige reasons
favored large ICBM's that could carry
a comparatively heavier warhead.
Since it was anticipated that Soviet
ICBM's initially would be directed
against US launching sites, the policy
was to harden them in strong under
ground silos to give a measure of pro
tection.
The next major breakthrough oc-
OnIftSftCtl
The US Army's SpIIrllUl antimissile mis
sile is the long-range arm of the Sentinel
antiballistic miasile (ABM) system
67
MISSILE GAPS
curred in July 1960 when the United
States successfully fired her first Po
laris missile from an underwater sub
marine. This development profoundly
affected nuclear strategy since it in
sured a second strike capability. A US
submarine force carrying nuclear mis
siles could always be hidden some
where under the oceans of the world,
able to strike back after any initial
nuclear exchange. This second-strike
capability doubled the value o,f the nu
clear deterrent against the Soviet
Union.
Nuclear Parity Reached
In July 1962, the Soviet Union suc
cessfully fired an underwater ICBM.
Once more, nuclear parity was reached
as both countries constructed missile
submarines and hardened their land
based ICBM's, giving both the capa
bility of a second strike. Mutual sui
cide seemed to be the certain end to
nuclear aggression, and the result of
the Cuban missile crisis showed that
the Soviet Union was not willing to
risk self-destruction.
By the end of 1960, the Soviet Union
had perfected two main types of
ICBM, each able to carry a warhead of
at least 20 megatons. As these came
into service, Soviet megatonnage rose
sharply. By 1964, it was estimated
that the Soviet Union had at least 300
such ICBM's, probably amounting to
at least 6,000 megatons. Soviet fasci
nation with large warheads remained,
and experiments were conducted with
missiles able to carry an even larger
megatonnage, including one of over
50 megatons.
This Soviet megatonnage, aimed at
300 separate targets, meant that the
megatonnage balance had swung ad
versely against the United States. This
fact caused a change in nuclear strat
egy. US policy remained that the
entire nuclear armory was to operate
as a retaliatory strike force in a re
prisal role only, but it was decided to
increase the number of missiles. Com
paratively small warheads were to be
retained since they were considered to
be of sufficient destructive power to
deal with the requisite targets.
It was decided to base the missile
strength on about 1,000 Minuteman
missiles in hardened sites, 54 Titans in
semihardened installations, and 41
submarines, each designed to carry 16
Polaris missiles. This number was con
sidered sufficient against a Soviet
surprise attack in the foreseeable
future.
Balance in US Favor
The Minuteman I carried a one
megaton warhead while the Minute
man II was two megatons. The Titan
had a warhead of five megatons and
that of the Polaris was .7 megatons.
This barely totals 2,000 megatons, and
amounts to only about one-third of the
Soviet missile megatonnage. However,
this did not mean much since the US
nuclear strike force consisted of well
over 1,000 warheads capable of being
projected at as many individual tar
gets. Therefore, the more vital and
important missile balance remained
firmly in US favor.
Meanwhile, experiments were in
progress to discover a defense against
ICBM's. The object was to be able to
destroy incoming missiles before they
reach their targets. The United States
produced a few antimissile missiles, as
did the USSR. Nikita S. Khrushchev
boasted in July 1962 that the Soviet
Union had one that "could hit a fly in
space." This statement, made only
a month after the United States
launched her first Nike-Zeus antimis
sile missile, proved to be overly
optimistic.
Military Review 88
MISSILE GAPS
us
The Ballistic-Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) station at Clear, Alaska
Commencing in 1964, the USSR
began to establish antiballistic missile
systems (ABM's), although it was
recognized that they only provided a
partial and local defense around a
selected area. Obviously considering
that the ABM's were better than noth
ing on ABM systems for some time,
the United States reluctantly decided
to set up a small one, to be known as
the Sentinel, ostensibly as a defense
against Chinese nuclear missiles. The
Sentinel system is based on the Sprint,
to intercept at short ranges, and the
ing, the Soviet Union has established
several, notably around Moscow, the
Baltic coast, and near the Urals.
The United States hesitated over
the ABM system, partly because of the
huge expense and partly because the
ABM system was not 100 percent ef
fective. The main hope, though, was
that she could persuade the Soviet
Union to agree that neither would
develop or install them-thus avoid
ing upsetting the nuclear stalemate.
This' hope faded and, when it became
known that the Soviets had been work-
March 1969
Spartan, to deal with hostile missiles
at longer ranges.
Improved Soviet methods of delivery
have also entered the picture. The
Fractional Orbital Bombardment Sys
tem (FOBS) can launch a nuclear
missile into low orbit, about 85 miles
above the earth, to be brought back
into the atmosphere before making a
complete orbit, just in time to make a
steep-angled descent on to its target.
The object is to reduce the warning
time of the attack which may be cut
down to as little as three minutes.
69
MISSILE GAPS
So far, the United States has mainly
relied upon the Ballistic-Missile Early
Warning System (BMEWS), with its
three radar stations in Britain, Green
land, and Alaska, which could detect
any missile launched at the United
States over the North Pole region, un
til recently the only possible route.
BMEWS could pick up a hostile mis
sile about 10 to 15 minutes after
launch, thus giving 15 to 20 minutes'
warning-sufficient to identify it posi
tively and release the nuclear deter
rent in the case of a Soviet attack.
Being in low orbit, a nuclear missile
launched by FOBS is not restricted to
the shorter North Pole route, and can,
in fact, come in by the "back door," or
even the "side door," thus nullifying
much of the defensive warning value
of BMEWS.
The United States also made a tech
nical breakthrough by producing Mul
tiple Independently Targeted Reentry
Vehicles (MIRV's), which are ICBM's,
each with several warheads which can
be ejected in space to be directed at
separate targets. This is a massive
mUltiplication of attack power, swing
ing the missile advantage well on the
side of the United States. A program
based on MIRV's will equip Minute
man 111 and IV alid Poseidon missiles
with multiple warheads. The Poseidon
will replace the Polaris in 31 of the
US ballistic-missile submarines.
When this MIRV program has been
completed in 1972, it is estimated that
the United States will have well over
7,000 warheads, each capable of strik
ing separate preselected targets. While
the total megatonnage involved may
amount only to about 14,000 megatons,
such a "saturation" strategy would
mean that little would escape destruc
tion in the Soviet Union. Its deterrent
value is very great. The US present
view is that MIRV's are better than
costly and unreliable ABM systems.
By 1972, the USSR is expected to
have over 1,000 ICBM's and FOBS
missiles, and a much larger missile
carrying submarine fieet. Already, So- _
viet megatonnage is two-thirds more
,than that of the United States and is
likely to increase. This is made up
from bigger warheads, in the 20 to 50
megaton range. It, therefore, can be
said that the Soviet Union retains the
megatonnage lead. Against this sense
less "overkill" potential must be bal
anced the far greater number of war
heads possessed by the United States.
These are able to engage many more
individual targets and wilI increase
under the MIRV program. Thus, the
United States retains the vital missile
advantage.
The megatonnage and missile gaps
are not quite as popular as Western
opinion imagines. Since the USSR has
the advantage in one, and the United
States the advantage in the other, both
tend to counterbalance each other in
maintaining the nuclear stalemate. Re
cent progressions in nuclear attack and
defense, which are realIy escalations,
have not altered the basic value of the
US nuclear deterrent.
The technical struggle to gain some
major advantage in the nuclear arms
race continues and is moving into
space as each side researches and ex
periments. Both are seeking a better
ABM system, and both are trying to
reduce the delivery warning time.
One wonders whether world war III
might be touched off one day by one
nation destroying another nation's
military space satellite. If ABM sys
tems improve, perhaps it would be
possible for a nuclear war to be fought
completely in space with not even the
debris falling earthward.
MilitJrJ Reyiew
70
DEFECTOR OPERATIONS
Lieutenant Colonel John Ozaki. United States Armll
B
ECAUSE of the economic and
political instability that prevails
during internal defense operations.
many insurgents can be persuaded to
return to their government's cause if
a sound defector plan is instituted.
From the experiences of the suc
cessful campaign against the Huks in
the Philippine Islands. and the more
recent Chieu Hoi (open arms) defec
tor program in Vietnam. it now is pos
sible to formulate a defector program
Mlrclll989
for internal defense and development.
Success. of course. will depend upon
proper implementation.
The successful defector program
requires national coordination and
should have the objective of support
ing the existing government by:
Inducing the maximum number
of insurgents to discontinue voluntary
support of the insurgent program and
to support the legally constituted gov
ernment.
71
DEFECTORS
Exploiting for intelligence and
psychological operations (PSYOP)
those individuals who have returned to
the side of the government.

of s...e.
The defectors need to know that they are
weleome
by providing to them and their fami
lies security and economic support, to
include vocational 'and job opportuni
ties to help them become self-support
ing.
Lieutenant Colonel John Ozaki is
with the Logistics Division, Office of
Reserve Components, Department of
the Army, Washington, D. C. He re
ceived a. B.S. in Agriculture from the
University of Florida, and is a. g r ~
ua.te of the US Army Command a.nd
General Sta.ff CoUege. His a.ssign
ments include duty in Korea. with the
45th Infa.ntry; with the US Army Se
curity Agency in Europe; Headquar
ters, 7th Army; a.nd with 1st Corps,
US Milita.ry Assistance Command,
Vietna.m.
Enlisting the defectors for spe
cialized jobs and units where their
knowledge of the enemy's techniques
can be utilized .
To increase the chances of a suc
cessful defector program, US repre
sentatives to the host country at the
national level should seek approval of
the following policies:
The host country should establish
an agency to be responsible for execu
tion of all aspects of the defector pro
gram. This agency should be equal in
status to major components of the gov
ernment such as the military depart
ments and the national police. This
agency's organization should function
on the principle of centralized direc
tion and decentralized execution from
the national to the lowest level.
US agency responsibilities and
policies for defector operations must
be clearly established from the na
tional level down to receipt of a defec
tor by a combat unit.
Combined agreements should be
made whereby a review of perform
ance can be accomplished for the
purpose of replacing ineffective ad
ministrators.
The responsible US agency
should have control of funds provided
by the United States that are used in
direct support of the defector pro
gram.
Combined civilian and military
counterparts should be established at
each level where major defector opera
tions take place. These would include
district, sector, regional, and national
levels as appropriate to the territorial
organization of the country.
The objective of the inducement pro
gram should be to cause the members
of the insurgent forces to quit their
cause and join the legitimate govern
ment. The over-all effect should be to
MIHIIry Review
72
DEFECTORS
let the insurgents know that the gov
ernment is aware of their plight and
wants to forgive and welcome them
back. Also closely associated with this
program is the requirement of inform
ing loyal citizens and military organi
zations about the program. These are
the groups which play an important
role in the rehabilitation of the defec
tors. The loyal citizens must accept
the defectors back into the society or
the defectors will probably return to
the insurgent side.
Inducement operations should be the
responsibility of PSYOP personnel al
though intelligence organizations also
play a major role in this part of the
program. The intelligence community
can provide the PSYOP personnel in
formation gained from interrogations
determining why insurgents have quit
their cause. If feedback provided by
intelligence is timely and valid, this
information can be used to induce
more insurgents to quit their cause.
Intelligence organizations will benefit
from this type of mutual support be
cause, with more insurgents defecting,
there is the probability of increased
intelligence.
Themes
Before a PSYOP program can be ef
fective, a careful analysis must be
made to determine the vulnerabilities
of the insurgents. Common vulnera
bilities of insurgent forces are hard
ships, disillusionment because of the
slow progress toward objectives stated
by the insurgent leaders, and fear of
getting killed. To be effective, the term
"hardship" must be translated into
meaningful facts such as insufficient
medical services, low pay, and long
family separations. The success of any
PSYOP effort will depend on close
coordination with intelligence agen
cies.
March 1969
Maximum use of radio, loudspeak
ers, newspapers, leaflets, and other
publications will be the mainstay in
the dissemination link. The PSYOP
operator, however, must constantly
seek new and unusual techniques to
spread the word of the government
concerning the promises of the defec
tor program. Innovations such as
badges, postage stamps, and imprinted
balloons will help Itublicize the defec
tor program. Encouraging local gov
ernment officials to speak about the
program may also help.
PSYOP Utilization
Former insurge9ts should be used
to the maximum ( extent possible in
inducement operations. They can be
extremely effective in developing
PSYOP material because they know
the environment and the modus ope
randi of the insurgent. If defectors
are integrated into the PSYOP effort,
their knowledge of the habits, customs,
and idiom of the insurgents will make
the PSYOP effort more effective. Ad
ditionally, these individuals can be
used to evaluate PSYOP material be
fore it is disseminated.
Small units of armed defectors
should be organized to perform prop
aganda missions in locally contested
areas. Such units can be effective since
they speak with firsthand knowledge.
For security, however, selected indi
viduals of known loyalty should be
incorporated in t h e ~ e special units.
An effective system of rewards is
one of the most important aspects of a
defector program. Rewards should be
coordinated to insure that each man
is paid for his actions which are help
ful to the government and that the
amounts are equitable. A central office
monitoring all rewards can establish a
well-publicized standard scale to insure
that rewards are in line with those
73
DEFECTORS
US
A Vietnamese returnee much-needed dentsl attention as part of the Chieu Hoi
(open arms) program in Vietnam
previously paid. Defectors should be'
questioned to determine if they have
received all rewards due them.
Speed in making rewards is neces
sary so that the impact of the deed is
not lost; consequently, funds should be
made available to local officials so that
rewards can be paid immediately.
When security permits, rewards
should receive wide publicity to show
the insurgents that the government
lives up to its word. This added em
phasis may induce other defections,
particularly when large sums of money
are involved.
Exploitation of the returnees in
volves obtaining information, dissemi
nating the intelligence derived from
this information, and using the intel
ligence to defeat the enemy. Some
major considerations concerning the
exploitation of defectors are:
Treatment promised returnees
must be fulfilled. Initial reception is
particularly important because the
treatment an individual receives will
have an important bearing on how
much he will contribute to the govern
ment. A returnee who is properly
treated may even volunteer for ex
ploitation for intelligence and PSYOP
roles. On the other hand, an individual
improperly treated becomes an easy
target for reindoctrination by antigov
ernment forces.
Qualified interrogators shOUld be
available at the lowest level possible.
This is important because of the in
surgents' characteristic of frequently
moving. It is imperative that defectors
be interviewed within the first few
hours after defection to determine
their knowledgeability. Interviewers
also need the necessary communica-
MIIiWy Rnle.
74
DEFECTORS
tions to disseminate information to re
sponsive units. When the number of
qualified interrogators is limited, con
sideration should be given to pooling
and dispatching them by air as the
situation requires.
Security mus! be provided the
defector and his family. Insurgent
forces are likely to place maximum ef
fort on retaliating against a defector
or his family to discourage other de
fections.
Clearly defined policies on ex
ploitation must be established.
One of the major problems confront
ing a commander concerning returnee
exploitation is that many of his officers
and men will not trust the defectors.
To counter this logical distrust, the
commander must implement a massive
command information program which
includes handling, treatment, and use
of defectors. Experience has proved
that one of the best ways to reverse
the feeling of distrust is to publicize
the help that defectors give to the
friendly forces. The returnee's knowl
edge of the insurgent tactics, terrain,
and current situation is invaluable to
the countering forces.
One of the most difficult problems
facing the friendly forces is to iden
tify the enemy. The defector will often
be the only person who knows who the
enemy is; consequently, a major task
of friendly military personnel is to ex
ploit this knowledge. Former insur
gents may be used as scouts, guides,
members of collection and reconnais
sance units, monitors for interpreters,
and in psychological operations.
When working with a defector, spe
cial interrogation procedures are nec
essary. Experience has shown that
most defectors will talk freely without
the use of pressure. Generally, the
best technique is to employ the inter
view method of interrogation. The
interviewer first must gain the con
fidence of the defector, and interviews
VS A.....
Athletics are one means of erasing the feeling of distrust by returnees
March 1969 75
DEFECTORS
should not be continued unless the in
terviewer believes that good rapport
and communication have been estab
lished.
Normally, defectors are highly ap
prehensive immediately after their
escape. As a result, it will often re
quire several interviews before com
information that can be used to help
defeat the enemy.
Rapid and accurate interrogation of
knowledgeable returnees is necessary
if effective exploitation is to be accom
plished. Generally, the best procedure
is to use the normal military commu
nications to report information gained
It may from interrogations. Communications
A",,"
Two defectors relaX at a rehabilitation center which is a key to a successful defector
program
be useful to have earlier defectors talk
to all new returnees to convince them
that they have made the right decision
by defecting.
The interview environment is ex
tremely important. Although a private
room is desirable, elaborate equipment
is not necessary. With new defectors,
it is helpful to have intelligence re
quirements mentally fixed 80 that re
sort to paper and pencil is not neces
sary. The defector should be convinced
that he is important and has valuable
available to police, government offi
cials, and other sources, however, must
be coordinated because many of the
insurgents will defect to other govern
mental agencies rather than military
units.
Reporting by headquarters parallel
to those of the existing government
will speed information to the user. If
the country is so organized, there
would be a military reporting head
quarters at district, province, and
region. Forms used for reporting must
MIIitIrJ B"I,. 76
be simple, and some basic information
should be reduced to blocks designed
for checking. It often will be beneficial
if the forms are bilingnal.
Intelligence agencies must keep the
lower echelons informed of their spe
cial requirements so that special re
ports can be forwarded. Each echelon
in the reporting channel must keep a
reference file on all defectors with
basic information such as date of a l ~ . l J "
area of operations, former job w
insurgents, special knowledge, and dis
position. This information should be
readily available so that an individual
can be quickly located for exploitation
at any time.
Security
Security for defectors is essential to
the success of the program. If the ex
ploitation program is working well, the
insurgents will counter it by attacks
against individuals and compounds
where returnees are kept. Normal
active and passive security measures
can be improved by organizing the de
fectors into self-defense units. Special
protection must be given to high-level
defectors-perhaps evacuating them
from the immediate battle area even
though they may be able to provide
exploitable tactical information.
Special consideration must also be
given to a defector's family. Imme
diately after a person defects, the loca
tion of his family should be deter
mined. If they are in an enemy
controlled area, the defector's identity
may have to be concealed before he
can be exploited. When defectors can
not be exploited because of the fam
ily's location, plans should be made to
evacuate the family to a secure area
to prevent reprisal.
A successful defector program must
include effective means for rehabilita
tion of returnees. This phase of the
Mlrch 1969
DEFECTORS
program must receive national sup
port if it is to succeed. Planning and
coordination of national resources are
required to provide jobs, arable land,
and educational facilities.
Receptioft Centers
Rehabilitation begins at the recep
tion center as soon as a returnee has
been exploited for intelligence and
PSYOP. Centers should be established
in secure areas near the defectors'
homes if possible. It is of the utmost
importsnce that all promises dissemi
nated by the PSYOP program be ful
filled as soon as possible.
A new returnee must be made to
feel welcome. Experience has shown
that an effective way to help a new
returnee overcome initial shock is to
assign him a sponsor-a returnee
who has been at the center for some
time. Additionally, a special ceremony,
such as a retreat formation, should be
held to introduce this individual to the
rest of the group. In addition to tem
porary jobs, such as sponsoring mem
bers, returnees should be hired to fill
as many of the permanent administra
tive jobs at the center as possible.
They know the problems of the re
turnee; therefore, they can be very ef
fective in rehabilitating the former
enemy.
While at the centers, individuals
should be given reindoctrination
courses on government objectives and
the responsibilities of individual citi
zens. Detailed programs of instruction
can be centrally prepared, and support
ing reference materials should be pro
vided the rehabilitation administra
tors.
Vocational training may have to be
centralized because of limited facilities
and qualified instructors. This train
ing should be on a voluntary basis,
and national coordination is required
77
DEfECTORS
to insure that those individuals who
successfully complete vocational train
ing can be gainfully employed.
To assist in their own protection,
defectors should be organized into
self-defense groups. The rehabilitation
complex should be tied into the defense
plan of the area, with some govern
ment forces placed in support of the
center or located close by:,Within the
center, a system of planted returnees
should be used to determine if the
enemy is trying to infiltrate the pro
gram. These specially trained individ
uals should also evaluate the centers'
effectiveness, to include determining if
the centers are providing the defectors
all benefits due them.
The defector program must include
a followup phase to determine if the
defectors are remaining loyal to the
government and if they are becoming
self-supporting.
Field representatives working with
the police should receive information
from the defector administrators when
defectors have moved 'into their areas.
They should determine what problems,
if any, the defectors are having in
being accepted by the general popula
tion. As a minimum, a system must be
established whereby an ex-insurgent is
required to register with the police in
the area where he resides. The police
would then be responsible for the secu
rity and surveillance of these indi
viduals.
Returnees whose home areas may be
under insurgent control may have to
be provided temporary homes. It is not
advisable to place them in defector
villages because they then become easy
targets for the insurgents, and this
positive identification may make it
harder for them to be accepted by the
general public. Defectors should be
resettled where they can find employ
ment in the trade learned during the
rehabilitation portion of the program.
History has provided many examples
to demonstrate that a sound defector
program can be a valuable aid in de
feating an insurgent movement. A
good defector program supports the
existing government by reducing the
number of active insurgents, gaining
support from the general population,
and providing information which can
be exploited to defeat the enemy. A
good defector program is another
form of combat power. To neglect it
invites a longer conflict and unneces
sary casualties. When the insurgent's
voluntary support from the mass base
is severed, his movement will end.
IllliIIIJ Rerin
78
Donald E. Nueehterlein
T
HE favorable prospects for
peace and security in Southeast
Asia that were set in motion by the
massive deployment of US forces in
Vietnam, the buildup of airpower in
Thailand, and the British and Com
monwealth defense of Malaysia
against Indonesian confrontation were
tempered by Britain's announcement
in July 1967 that she planned to re
linquish her defense role in the area.
The real Significance of this action
lay in the fact that the principal bur"
den of protecting the nine non-Com
munist countries of Southeast Asia
from external aggression might then
March 1969
fall to one great power, the United
States. The big question is whether
the United States is prepared to take
on new commitments and accept the
role of guarantor of peace in this area.
The answer is not at all clear, for it
is doubtful that the American people
will accept such a role without the
active support of other powers and the
full cooperation of the nations of
Southeast Asia.
The United States joined the South
east Asia Treaty Organization (SE
ATO) in 1954 on the understanding
that other powers-Britain and
France-would participate fully in a
79
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
peace-keeping mission in this area and
that at least some of the Southeast
Asian nations-Thailand and the Phil
ippines-would give political support
and provide military facilities.
Justification Removed
The withdrawal of French backing
for the Vietnam war in the 1960's,
and the British decision in 1967 to
leave Malaysia and Singapore, re
moved one of the justifications for the
US decision to join SEATO. The other
factor, Asian participation in peace
keeping, remained intact as Thailand
and the Philippines granted military
facilities to the United States to fight
the war in Vietnam and sent their own
military forces to South Vietnam.
What is unclear today is whether
any' other great power, or potential
power such as Japan, will be willing
to help fill the void left by the British
and whether other Southeast Asian
nations will be prepared to participate
in a regional security arrangement to
maintain internal security against
Communist subversion and insurgency
in the future. The answers to these
This article was condensed
from the original, '/lUblished in
ASIAN SURVEY, September 1968,
under the title, "Prospects for
Regicmal Security in Southeast
Asia." ASIAN SURVEY is published
monthly by the Institute of In
ternaticmal Studies, University of
California.
Mr. Nuechterlein is a civilian
officio,l in the Office of the As
sistant Secretary of Defense for
Internaticmal Affairs. He is the
author of the book, Thailand and
the Struggle for Southeast Asia,
and his article, "Thailand: An
other Vietnam?," appeared in the
June 1967 issue of the MILITARY
REVIEW.
questions will significantly affect the
US decision of whether to continue
her defense role in the area in the
1970's.
One of the most promising develop
ments in this direction was the for
mation in Bangkok in August 1967 of
the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). This association
-which presently includes Thailand,
the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Singapore--was an outgrowth of
a previous association among Malay
sia, Thailand, and the Philippines
founded in 1961 and known as the As
sociation of Southeast Asia (ASA).
Asian Organization
ASA was an attempt to bring into
being a purely Asian organization that
would settle differences among its
members and promote cooperation
without the participation of non
Asian nations. So long as the Vietnam
war continued and Indonesia pursued
confrontation against Malaysia, ASA
could not become a meaningful re
gional organization, for, without the
participation of Indonesia, no regional
association could expect to speak for
the Southeast Asian nations.
In 1963, President Diosdado Maca
pagal of the Philippines proposed an
association among Malaysia, the Phil
ippines, and Indonesia known as Ma
philindo. This was an attempt to bring
Indonesia into a regional grouping,
but President Achmed Sukarno used
the concept for his own ambitious pur
poses, and the proposal collapsed when
he launched armed "confrontation"
against Malaysia.
However, after the political demise
of Sukarno and his leftist Indonesian
Government in 1966, the way was clear
for Indonesia to take part in ASA or
in some new grouping of Southeast
Military Review 80
Asian states. Membership was also of
fered to the new state of Singapore
which had declared its independence
from Malaysia in 1965.
Efforts were made to bring in other
Asian nations such as Burma, Cam
bodia, Laos, and Ceylon in order to
satisfy Indonesian desires that the
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
will have an opportunity to join in a
purely Asian endeavor without the
participation, and thereby the direc
tion, of non-Asian powers.
This concept has great attraction
for the Asian states and appeals to
the nationalist yearnings of their ed
ucated elites to exercise an independ
new organization not be dominated
by states allied with outside powers.
Although emphasis in the new asso
ciation, as in ASA, was on economic
and social cooperation, the door was
left open to political and even secu
rity cooperation in the future.
ASEAN offers both a hope and a
danger for cooperation among the
Southeast Asian nations. The hope is
that, after years of struggle against
colonial rule and Communist pres
sures, the new nations of the region
Mlrch 1969
ent voice in world affairs. The danger
lies in oversized expectations for the
fledgling regi'bnal association. Despite
each member's desire for an organiza
tion that is independent of great power
influence, there is considerable differ
ence of viewpoint among the five AS
EAN nations about how the security
of the region may best be arranged.
Thailand and the Philippines are
unlikely to diminish their reliance on
SEATO as the principal means of in
suring their defense against Commu
81
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
nist aggression. Malaysia and Sin
gapore want to maintain a Common
wealth presence on their soil even
after the British leave because at
present they do not have the capability
of resisting aggression from their
neighbors that might be needed if the
current political situation in the area
should deteriorate.
Mediator Role
Indonesia does not consider it nec
essary to join any alliance with an out
side power to insure her security.
However, Foreign Minister Charles
Habib Malik stated in the spring of
1968 that Indonesia would not object
to Australian and New Zealand forces
remaining in Malaysia and Singapore
after the British leave. In fact, Indo
nesia seemed willing to assume the
role of mediator in Vietnam if the
opposing sides desired it.
Thus, considerable differences exist
among the ASEAN states on how to
deal with security matters. For this
reason, ASEAN's possible security
role has been deemphasized by its
members during the association's first
year.
For the future, however, there is a
growing area of accommodation be
tween the objectives of ASEAN, on
the one hand, and the objectives of
SEATO and the Commonwealth on the
other. Assuming that the Paris peace
talks on Vietnam eventually bring
about a halt in the fighting and a set
tlement that does not permit South
Vietnam to be absorbed by the Com
munists, the prospects for peace and
relative stability in Southeast Asia in
the 1970's appear to be reasonably
good.
In this case, the need for large, non
Asian military forces based in the
area would be considerably less than
at present. The withdrawal of major
British forces by the end of 1971, un
der conditions of peace and stability
in the Malaysia-8ingapore-Indonesia
area, would not appear to be so great
a risk. Furthermore, the continued
presence of modest Australian and
New Zealand forces in Singapore and
Malaysia would contribute to stability
in this area and reduce the necessity
for Malaysia, Singapore, and Indo
nesia to spend large amounts on
strengthening their own defenses and
thereby hinder their economic devel
opment programs.
However, Australia and New Zea
land would probably not undertake
such a role unless they were assured
that the United States intended to re
tain a presence in Southeast Asia after
the Vietnam war is ended. Similarly,
on the mainland of Southeast Asia,
a satisfactory solution of the Vietnam
war, one guaranteed by the great pow
ers, would make it less important for
US combat forces to be stationed on
the mainland.
New Regional Grouping
There is no reason to believe that
a cessation of fighting in Vietnam will
lessen the threat of Communist sub
version and insurgency throughout
Southeast Asia should there be a de
terioration in the economic conditions.
Also, there remains the possibility of
new confrontations or tensions among
the non-Communist nations them
selves.
It is in this respect that ASEAN
or some broader association of Asian
states such as the Asian and Pacific
Council (ASPAC)-might be able to
make significant contributions to peace
in the area by providing a framework
in which Southeast Asian nations can
cooperate on essentially internal secu-
Military ReYiew
82
rity problems and solve political prob
lems before they develop into hostili
ties among the states. A case in point
is the recent problem between Malay
sia and the Philippines over the North
Borneo state of Sabah.
Were ASEAN able to grow in the
post-Vietnam war period to include
other Asian states. such as Australia
and New Zealand. the prospects for
pescekeeping in the area would be
greatly enhanced. Economic assistance
from the former colonial powers
France. Britain. and the Netherlands
-and from the only Asian nation with
substantial economic resources.-Ja
pan---i!ould then be channeled into a
regional grouping that had already
determined its own priorities. Re
gional security in Southeast Asia
could thus be strengthened by collec
tive efforts to bring the nations of
the area into a closer political and eco
nomic community.
However. defense of the area
against external aggression must for
some time continue to be provided by
the great powers. particularly the
United States. because the Southeast
Asian nations will not in the foresee
able future have the military capabil
ity to resist aggression or pressures
from a united and hostile China. None
of the former European colonial pow
ers appears willing to commit forces
to Asia for this purpose in the 1970s.
The task will fall to those nations
that have importsnt interests there:
the United States. Australia. New Zea
land. and. perhaps. Japan. Australia
SECURnY ARRANGEMENTS
and New Zealand appear willing to
continue to playa role in partnership
with the United States. Japan, how
ever. is more likely in the foreseeable
future to make her contribution in the
economic rather than the security field.
A key question for the future de
fense of Southeast Asia. and ulti
mately for its security. is whether the
United States and the USSR will find
it in their mutual interest to cooperate
in keeping the peace in this area, or
whether they will become rivals there.
The fact that they found it mu
tually advantageous in 1962 to coop
erate in arranging a peace in Laos.
rather than let the crisis develop into
a larger war. was a promising begin
ning. If these two powers are willing
to cooperate similarly in arranging a
settlement in Vietnam. this could have
a most favorable effect on security
prospects in Southeast Asia. as well
as in other parts of Asia.
If such cooperation is possible. the
threat to Southeast Asia of a nuclear
armed China in the 1970's will be
greatly reduced. But without such co
operation among the superpowers. the
defense of Southeast Asia in the fu
ture will be a much more difficult
task. That is why it is essential that
a new regional grouping. such as AS
EAN. assume responsibility for main
taining internal security in Southeast
Asia while the United States contin
ues to provide the major deterrent
against overt massive aggression. con
ventional warfare. or nuclear black
mail.
March 1989 83
O'S THOUGHTS
T
HE Red convulsion in
Communist China has subsided.
and Mao Tse-tung apparently has re
duced the intensity of his Great Pro
letarian Cultural Revolution. Although
prominent Communist Chinese officials
have been purged and the economy has
suffered interruptions, Mao Tse-tung
still is the boss. Furthermore, despite
the speculation of the China watchers
and the frenetic reporting of the Jap-
Still a Blueprint
for Action
Colonel John B. McKinney,
United StateB Arm/l
anese wall-poster correspondents, it is
quite possible that Mao has "re
treated" to what may have been main
objectives in the first place.
What had been reported as Mao's de
feat may. in fact, be a victory. Why?
Because Mao's published thoughts
show that he takes the long view of
history and accepts tactical losses to
achieve strategic victories. He has not
been reckless nor unmindful of the
consequences of his actions.
The apparent satisfaction with
which the world generally accepted the
"upheaval" in China might have had
serious consequences, particularly if
a consensus should emerge that Com-
MilitIIY Rewiew
MAO'S THOUGHTS
munist China's internal turmoil has
modified Peking's world strategy. It
has not! In none of the pronounce
ments that came out of Red China
during the cultural revolution was
there any indication that basic Chi
nese world strategy was an issue be
tween the contending factions.
Strategy Is Timeless
The thoughts of Liu Shao-chi, Chu
Teh, and the other targets of the Red
Guards were formed in the same caves
of Yenan that they shared with Mao.
Their strategy was tempered in the
same battles with the Japanese and
the Chinese Nationalists as were those
of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. All par
ticipants in the dispute are dedicated
Communists who share the same Chi
nese ethnocentrism and look at the
world with the same xenophobic dis
tortions. All hate the United States
with equal fervor. They may struggle
for power among themselves, but their
view of the outside world and their
strategy toward it are the same.
Colonel John B. McKinney is Di
rector of the Communications Depart
ment, US Army Infantry School, Fort
Benning, Georgia. He is a graduate of
the US Army Command and General
Staff CoUege and the US Army War
College, and holds an LL.B. from
Southern Law School in Memphis;
an M.B.A. from Harvard Business
School; and an M.S. from George
Washington University. His assign
ments include serving as a member of
the faculty of the US Army War Col
lege, and as Associate Editor of the
MILITARY REVIEW; with the 1st Signal
Brigade in Vietnam; and with the
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group,
Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D. C. He is the author
of "The Army's Miniature AT&T"
toMch appeared in the November 1968
issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.
Marcb 1969
It is appropriate, therefore, for
military men to review and relearn.
Mao's grand strategy, and, in isolat
ing its key tenets, to recognize that
the strategy is timeless. It is not the
exclusive thought of Mao Tse-tung, as
the present Peking emphasis on Mao's
thinking would indicate; it is the col
lective thought of all the leaders of
the Chinese Communist Party. The
Western World ignores it only at great
risk. It will remain basically the same,
even after Mao Tse-tung's death or
removal from office.
Conservative Strategy
.communist China's strategy is con
servative. Despite the drastic actions
that Mao and Lin have taken or con
doned during the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution, and despite the
belligerence of the words that have
flowed from Mao's propaganda ma
chine, prudence and audacity have
been the dichotomous hallmarks of
Mao's doctrine. Throughout his writ
ings, Mao has never recommended
China's adventurism, but has cau
tioned sharply against it.
In 1940, for example, Mao outlined
a three-part strategy for use by the
Communists during the period of the
anti-Japanese united front. His first
maxim, the Principle of Self-Defense,
stated: "We never attack unless at
tacked, but must counterattack if at
tacked."
His second rule, the Principle of
Victory, warned that: "We do not fight
unless we are sure of victory, and
never fight without a plan or without
preparation and without being sure
of the outcome."
His final pronouncement, the Prin
ciple of Truce, prescribed that: "After
we have repulsed the diehards and be
fore they launch a new attack, we
should cease hostilities at the proper
85
MAO'S THOUGHTS
moment and bring that particular
fight to a close .... At this juncture
we should initiate moves for unity.
"
These are not the words of a reck
less adventurer.
Communist China's reaction to US
intervention in Vietnam also shows the
same type of prudence. Peking's ac
limited their military actions to the
offshore islands.
A fundamental reason for Com
munist China's prudence in dealing
with the United States is her aware
ness of the relative imbalance of mili
tary power between the two countries,
particularly in the absence of a credi
ble Soviet nuclear umbrella over
tions to date have been bellicose, but
verbal. The Communist Chinese have
placed great emphasis on measures
that would avoid a confrontation with
the United States. Furthermore, this
policy is not new. A decade ago during
the Taiwan Strait confrontation, the
Chinese were extremely careful with
their artillery fire to avoid hits on US
warships. Furthermore, since 1950-
the year when the United States an
nounced her commitment to defend
Taiwan-the Communist Chinese have
8&
China. A secondary reason is the Chi
nese virture of patience.
The United States possesses an in
tercontinental nuclear capability that
can destroy China's hard-won in
dustrial gains in a few hours. No one
knows this better than Peking. Con
versely, despite her successful nuclear
tests, Communist China has no stra
tegic capability at this time with
which to counterattack, much less de
feat, the United States.
The Communist Chinese, moreover,
Militarr ReYiew
do not believe that the Soviet Union
would come to their aid 'in a war
against the United States. Mao's
second cardinal rule of strategy, there
fore, the Principle of Victory-"We do
not fight unless we are sure of victory"
__pplies. Since Peking knows that
Communist China cannot win a major
war with the United States, it is in
keeping with Mao's doctrine to avoid
a confrontation that might lead to a
nuclear holocaust.
Mao once summarized the Com
munist Chinese bllief in the virtue of
patience with these words:
If we are not wanted here or there
we can wait ten years. China will
always be China. It is not soliciting
anything. In tnW hundred years it will
be even more difficult to ignore it. No,
we are not in a hurry. Time is our
good ally. China must above all devote
itself to the building of socialism.
Revolution Inevitable
, Although time may be Communist
China's ally, and Mao's basic phi
losophy is not to use Chinese military
force to accomplish her aims, Peking
believes that Communist Parties in
other developing countries should en
gage in revolution. The Peking hier
archy understands the strengths and
weaknesses of revolutionary move
ments. It knows when to fight and
when to withdraw, and, in Mao's own
words, to retreat is not dishonor. Com
muist China's fundamental position
was stated by Mao in 1952, and a
decade and a half later it still applies:
The central task and the highest
form of revolution is to seize political
power by armed force and decide is
sues by war. This Marxist-Leninist
principle of revolution holds good uni
versally, in China as well as in other
countries.
Communist China's concept that she
March 1969
MAO'S THOUGHTS
must support and encourage revolu
tion is a long-standing one. In the
words of Liu Chang-sheng, one of
Mao's early followers, Peking believes
that:
with imperialism and the ex
ploiting system still in existence, such
wars are unavoidable, and that to
believe otherwise will deprive the op
pressed peoples of their fighting spirit
and, in the face of armed suppression
by the enemy, prevent them from a ~
ing themselves to fight actively the
enemy which is armed to the teeth and
to liberate themselves. That is t a ~
tamount to keeping the oppressed
people forever in a state of enslave
ment.
"Socialism"
The Communist Chinese also pro
claim to believe that the present lead
ers of most of the new countries of
Africa and Asia have not led the right
kinds of people's revolutions against
imperialism and colonialism. Peking
maintains that these leaders are
nouveau bourgeoisie whose ideology
really is no different from that of the
European leaders whom they replaced.
Inevitably, therefore, they must be
overthrown by the "people."
The Communist Chinese leadership
has announced that revolutions must
occur in all countries before these
countries can achieve "socialism." As
a result, the Chinese and Soviets h a ~ e
had a major ideological dispute over
the extent to which violence should be
a policy in the developing world: but
Chinese words do not always express
Chinese motives, even when spoken by
Mao. The sincerity of Communist Chi
nese ideological beliefs on the subject
of wars of "national liberation" is
open to questions because Chinese
actions are based as much on national
ism as on ideology.
87
MAO'S THOUGHTS
Primarily, Peking seeks political
gain for Communist China. The export
of revolution is cheap, and it permits
China to appear to be giving aid and
support to a revolutionary movement
when, in effect, her contribution is
negligible. It costs much more, for ex
ample, to finance a dam than to provide
a hundred cases of rifles, although
China provides a limited amount of
economic assistance to selected coun
tries.
The Chinese leaders much prefer to
support wars of "national liberation"
in Africa or South America rather
than in countries which are contiguous
to China's own borders, Vietnam not
withstsnding. Peking aids the rebels
in the Congo, or Algeria, or Kenya;
but, with the exception of the war in
Vietnam which was not provoked by
Peking, the Chinese give little support
to revolutionary movements in nearby
Asia that might escalate to the point
that the United Ststes would engage
China in a conventional war.
United States Is Enemy
The Communist Chinese believe
that the United States is the enemy
who eventually must be defeated if the
wars of "national liberation" are to
succeed. This c o n v ~ c t i o n has been held
for a long time, even before the Com
munist Chinese gained control of
mainland China. The Communist
leaders in Peking still look upon
Washington, with considerable justi
fication, as the major obstacle to their
efforts to spread the Chinese Com
munist ideology and to have its ad
herents, under Peking's tutelage, take
over the governments of the new
countries.
Peking's hostility toward the United
States runs considerably deeper than
the confrontation over the developing
nations. The major immediate cause
of Chinese antagonism toward the
United States is frustration at in
ability to take over Quemoy, Matsu,
and Taiwan, but a US military pres
ence anywhere in the Far East is con
sidered humiliating. Communist China
feels encircled by the continuous chain
of US military positions from South
Korea and Japan to Thailand. The Chi
nese Government desires to bring
about, wherever it can, the with
drawal of these bases which it views
\IS a strategic threat to China's
national security.
Border Protection
Communist China's concern about
national security applies even more ap
propriately to her interest in protect
ing her borders. Peking does not want
US military forces anywhere in the
proximity of China's frontiers, but,
since the Korean War, generally has
been careful to avoid a direct con
frontation with the United States over
these bases. If US forces approach
China's borders, however, the People's
Liberation Army, undoubtedly, will
feel that it has no honorable choice
but to fight, just as it did in Korea.
On the other hand, Peking does not
want such a war. Although one of
Communist China's fundamental na
tional goals is to increase her security
by driving Westerners out of east
Asia, she prefers to do so by means
short of war. Again, Peking's pru
dence in stopping short of war is at
tributable to awareness of the com
parative weakness of China's military
forces.
China's relative power imbalance
with the United States does not apply
to China's relations with her rim
land neighbors, and she increasingly
has turned her attention to this area.
Mao and his fellow leaders apparently
have decided that Communist China
Military Raw/a.
88
MAO'S THOUGHTS
will exercise her traditional patience
and wait until some later time, per
haps, 30 to 50 years in the future, to
challenge the mighty US imperialists.
In the meantime, mainland China will
establish herself as the dominant
power in Asia.
Communist China's goal to achieve
dominance in the Far East is in
ries, the Chinese hierarchy apparently
believes, are rightfully part of China
and should be restored to her. As proof
of the validity of this rationale, the
Chinese conquests of Tibet and La
dakh are cited by its proponents.
Communist China's timidity in not
taking more aggressive action to es
tablish her claims to other rimland
Communist China has attempted to cultivate dose relations with the new countrle"
of Mrica. Here, Mao and Chinese leaders meet in Peking with delegations from Guinea
and Mali last May.
terpreted in many ways by different
experts on Communist China. One
school of thought emphasizes that the
goal is influenced by Chinese irre
dentism which is a product of Chinese
nationalism rather than Chinese com
munism. Peking is said to be seeking
the recovery of the territories that
were taken from China during her
century of humiliation at the hands of
foreign governments. These territo-
March 1969
territory such as Taiwan, Outer Mon
golia, and the Maritime Provinces of
eastern Siberia-which appears to re
fute the irredentism theory-is at
tributed to Peking's recognition of the
inferiority of Chinese power to the
great and proximate strength of the
Soviet Union and the United States.
According to the irredentist school of
thought, moreover, Communist China
is circumspect in her actions along
89
MAO'S THOUGHTS
her northern border in order to turn
her attentions to the south.
A contrasting viewpoint is that Pe
king will do nothing in the south that
might provoke US action against
China in order to be able to turn her
attention to the north. It is more
likely. however, that the Communist
fluence from them without these
states necessarily becoming Com
munist states. As proof of the logic
of this argument, its proponents cite
the friendly relations that have ex
isted, admittedly with intermittent
flareups, between China and the two
small countries of Burma and Cam
Chinese will do
bodia. of these states has a
Red China's concept that she must support and encourage revolution is a longstanding
one. According to the caption in a Chinese publication, "Freedom fighters of Mozambique
zealously study Chairman Mao's writings."
to avoid intervention by either of the
two major powers.
A second school of thought leans to
the cordon sanitaire concept. Peking
purportedly wishes to surround itself
with a ring of neutral states that will
form a buffer zone between China and
other powers. Chinese leaders are said
to believe that the Chinese can gain
control over their neighboring states
and eliminate US bases and US in-
Communist government nor even a
strong Communist Party.
The proponents of this argument
point out that the Chinese have made
only limited attempts, other than in
Vietnam, to exploit local situations
that might lead to communization of
any of the neighboring states. In
stead, Communist officials offer to
work with the governments in power
and to accept without protest the
Military Review 90
curbs imposed by these governments
on the activities of local Communist
Parties.
On the other hand, the Chinese use
military pressure and political tech
niques effectively: in their attempts
to dominate their neighbors and estab
lish hegemony over them. The sup
porters of the cordon sanitaire line of
reasoning seem, at first glance, to
have persuasive arguments on their
side.
Concepts Overlap
The concept of a cordon sanitaire
of non-Communist neutral states, if
a valid one, however, is a recent in
novation and, therefore, suspect. It
violates the fundamental teachings of
Mao Tse-tung that:
To sit on the fence is impossible.
. Not MIly in China, but also in
the world, without exception, one
either leans to the side of imperialism
or to the side of socialism. N eutral
ity is a camouflage and a third road
does not exist.
The distinction between the two
schools of thought, if there really is
one, is inconsequential because Com
munist China probably wishes to ac
complish both goals. In fact, the con
cepts overlap. Most of the states that
are included in the cordon sanitaire
concept were, at one time or another,
part of China's ancient Middle King
dom or tributary states thereto.
Therefore, whether the reason is ir
redentism or national security con
siderations, Peking wishes to estab
lish Communist China's preeminence
as the great power of Asia, and the Pe
king hierarchy is taking circumspect
but effective actions to achieve this
goa\.
Two major obstacles stand in the
way of Peking's realization of Mao's
goal to dominate Asia-India and the
March 1969
MAO'S THOUGHTS
US military strength in the Far East.
Some observers might add the Soviet
Union and cite the ideological conflict
between China and the Soviet Union.
The Soviets, however, have no impor
tant strategic objectives in south or
Southeast Asia, other than to mini
mize Chinese or US influence there.
Access to a warm water port on the
Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean
might be a long-range hope, but not
necessarily a firm, strategic Soviet ob
jective. The Soviets, therefore, are not
likely to permit themselves to be
come involved in the problems of
China's southern neighbors.
Forced Withdrawal
The Communist Chinese leadership
believes, furthermore, that impe
rialism and capitalism inevitably must
give way to communism, and the world
dominance of the United States even
tually will decline, after which US
strength in the Far East will erode.
Although Communist Chinese aims
cannot be achieved at present because
of US opposition, Peking is convinced
that the United States, when faced
with the combined strength of com
munism and emerging nations of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America,
either will lose interest in or be forced
to withdraw from the Far East.
Communist China's objectives to
ward India, on the other hand, are
more subtle. India has great coal and
iron resources, and a massive popula
tion. She has access to the sea, and she
has received large sums of aid from
the West and the Soviet Union. Al
though beset by major economic prob
lems, India is the only Asian country,
other than the Soviet Union, which
has the long-range power potential to
be a threat to China's goal to dominate
Asia.
In order for Communist China to
91
MAO'S THOUGHTS
establish herself, therefore, as the only
great power of the Asian- Continent,
Peking believes that India's political
and economic stature as China's
ideological rival must be demolished
and discredited in the eyes of China's
Asian neighbors. India must be re
vealed as a weak and unstable country
incapable of solving her great eco
nomic and social problems. The Com-
Peking has maintained a few ties
with the Communist countries of
Eastern Europe and has attempted to
establish close relations with the new
countries of Africa, but this pattern
gives Peking little scope in its foreign
relations. Mostly, the sense of isola
tion that prevails in Peking only sup
ports the traditional Chinese xeno
phobia which sees China as the center
Peking recognizes the relative weakness of its military forces compared with those
of the United States
munist Chinese leadership's ultimate
strategy probably is not to conquer In
dia by force, but to promote India's
disintegration into ethnic components.
With the exceptions of her tenuous
relationships with the United King
dom and France, China has had no
important diplomatic intercourse over
the past decade with any major
power other than the Soviet Union;
and Sino-Soviet relations have been
strained severely for the past five
years. The foreign relations of Com
munist China, therefore, are almost as
limited as those of the Manchus.
of the world and the sole upholder of
the true civilization.
Thus, Communist China stands
virtually alone in the world. She is
denied membership in the United
Nations. Only a handful of nations
have diplomatic relations with her.
China has not been permitted to par
ticipate in any meeting of the world's
major powers other than those that
dealt with the problems of her three
neighbors-Korea, Laos, and Viet
nam.
The countries of the Western Hemi
sphere, except Cuba, oppose her
Military Review
92
policies. The Soviet Union opposes
Mao's ideological views and thwarts
Peking's attempts to gain preeminence
in the world. Communist China's ef
forts to subvert several governments
in Africa and her overt support of the
Indonesian Communist Party have re
sulted in foreign policy fiascoes. She
has been unable to obtain long-term
credits with which to purchase ur
gently needed industrial facilities. She
cannot procure sophisticated arms
with which to modernize her armed
forces.
Karl Marx has replaced Confucius,
and Mao is the high priest of the new
faith. In Mao's interpretation of the
Socialist master, power and material
strength have replaced the moral excel
lence emphasized in the teachings of
Conf}lCius. Large armies contradict
the ancient Chinese adage that a true
ruler needs no armies because the
people will be attracted to him by the
virtue of his government's excellence.
In Peking today, purity of doctrine
is not enough. It has to be supple
mented by armed might, political in
doctrination, revolutionary practices,
and ideological subversion. But this
concept creates a dichotomy with
Mao's equally strongly held view that
China must avoid a major war at all
costs. On one hand, Mao encourages
conflict, and, on the other, he tries to
avoid it.
MAO'S THOUGHTS
To Peking, however, there is no in
consistency in Mao's two positions be
cause the Chinese leaders do not
believe that s<H:alled wars of "national
liberation" will escalate into major
conventional wars. Even if such a pos
sibility exists, however, the Chinese
hierarchy is willing for other countries
to take the risk. The Chinese leaders
believe that only by revolution can
Communist governments come to
power in the emerging third world.
Peking carefully leaves a way out if
such a move becomes necessary. This
escape hatch maneuver is in keeping
with Mao's cardinal principle that re
treat is honorable.
Thus, Communist China's grand
design, as it has been developed by
Mao and his party leadership, is clear.
The United States is to remain the
implacable foe. Moscow is to be re
placed by Peking as the ideological
center in Asia. Revolution in the
"countryside" area is to be encouraged
and supported by the Communist Chi
nese hierarchy, with the model to be
the pattern that was followed by Mao
in defeating the Kuomintang. The US
military bases are to be eliminated in
the Far East, and US influence is to
be destroyed throughout the world.
Finally, the boundaries and grandeur
of the Middle Kingdom are to be re
stored, and Peking's Temple of Heaven
once again will be the center of the
universe.
March 1969 93
READER
FORUM
Joint Chiefs of Staff
I enjoyed reading Major McMahon's
article "The Joint Chiefs of Staff" in
the January issue of the Military Re
view. His views were revealing and
well-presented. However, I question
some of his reasoning for reorganiz
ing the Joint Chiefs of Staff organiza
tion.
Certainly, there ought to be a re
examination of the organization's
structure just on the increase in work
load over the past nine years. How
ever, I wish that Major McMahon
could have provided a recent example
where "fragmented service' thinking"
has been detrimental to the national
military effort at the Joint Chiefs
level. Also, how would "a synthesis of
the best military thinking" differ?
To me, "a well-structured national
military judgment" has a dangerous
connotation. Not only could such an
approach conceivably' inhibit top-level
professional military thinking and in
novation, but it could possibly create
a nationwide public relations problem
by lending support to the "military
mind" concept. For the latter reason,
don't think that Major McMahon
placed enough emphasis on his own
argument about the possible percep
tion of a special elite military staff.
Recently, John Wheldon, a British
author, argued in his book Machine
Age Armies that our ideas in the mili
tary profession about warfare have
not kept pace with technology. Instead
of thinking in terms of extensions of
World War II concepts, we should at
tempt to seek revolutionary view
points. Understanding this, could a
service create serious discussion on a
far-reaching idea in such a well-struc
tured system that limited "extraneous
debate."
I hope that the Military Review con
. tinues to publish stimulating articles
such as Major McMahon'S. Perhaps
the Review can become the forum for
the exchange of thought-provoking
criticism in the military field that will
lead to new thinking and ideas.
LTC Roy D. Wells, USA
Evolution versus Revolution
Early in 1959, the representatives of
two ideological polarities-Fidel Cas
tro, the Cuban revolutionary leader,
and Venezuela's President-elect R6
mulo Betancourt-met in Caracas.
A primary purpose of the MILITARY REVIEW is to provide a forum for the e:lchanp of Jdeu
and informed opinion concemin. mUitary .tratn. When controversial matters are presented in the
REVIEW. readen disa.reeln. with the theoriel!l 01' ('oorlu.ions presented. are Invited to write brief
comments of diveQ'ent .Iewa. Concise dlscuuions on any topics of ,enen1 milital'7 interest are alao
weleomed for poqlble pUbllcatJon.
BeuDs. of limited sp,re. the editor ..Herves tb '1lht to HIed thoJe comments and diseuufons of
areates' reader Interest for pablleatioft and to edit Dr eliminate p ...a..u fol' brevUy. Edllin...HI not
intentionally modlf, a eonlributor. meanin .. or contut.
Contributlona to the Reader Forum .hould be addreJ.P.ed to: Editor in Chief. Military Rniew. US
Arm, Command antl General Staff C o n e ~ e . Fort Lea"enworth. Kana.. 1802:7.
Military Review
I
94
They represented the end of two tra
ditional dictatorial regimes and the
dawn of an era in which two political
systems-the Communist system in
Cuba, and the democratic in Venezuela
-would be put to the test.
Much has been said and written to
publicize the results of the Cuban "rev
olution" throughout the first decade,
while little or nothing has been
brought to the attention of the public
concerning the Venezuelan "evolu
tion." Few people realize that Vene
zuela's democratic experiment com
menced at the same time that the Com
munist system was implanted in Cuba,
or that there was a community of ef
fort and ideals, between Cubans and
Venezuelans, which brought about al
most simultaneously the overthrow of
Perez Jimenez in Venezuela and of
Batista in Cuba.
It is regrettable that the United
tates news media-which is so in
fluential in shaping both North and
Latin American public opinion-still
gives extensive coverage to the prog
ress and development of the Cuban
"revolution," in spite of the countless
failures of the Cuban regime after one
decade.
At the same time, the mass com
munication media have made little
mention of the successful accomplish
ments of Venezuela's democratic sys
tem which has, additionally, overcome
the continued Cuban efforts to obstruct
it.
This might seem unimportant at
READER FORUM
first glance, except for the fact that
both movements are being advocated
as the workable means to break away
from backwardness and underdevelop
ment, and these developmental efforts
are being watched by millions of peo
ple in Latin America.
The contest suggested here is no
whimsical invention. The aim of the
Havana regime is to discredit the dem
ocratic Venezuelan experiment and to
project herself as the only worthwhile
transformative movement available to
Latin America. The reason for this is
very simple. Once Venezuela were
eliminated from the developmental
race, Cuba would not be subject to
comparison, and any economic or social
advancement or development attained
would be decisive.
Were it not for the open interven
tion in the internal affairs of Venezu
ela by Cuba, Venezuela would not have
taken the measures which brought
about the expulsion of Cuba from the
Organization of American States and
the economic sanctions therefrom.
I hope the Military Review, with its
Latin American and English circula
tion might help to correct the informa
tion disparity. An impartial and com
prehensive study comparing these two
systems would be of immeasurable
value for those peoples in search of
their own destinies.
MAJ Pedro E. DAvila F.
Armed Forces of Cooperation,
Venezuela
March 1969 95
MILITARY
NOTES
UNITED STATES
Defense Spendinl Reduced
The Department of Defense (DOD)
has completed plans to reduce Fiscal
Year 1969 expenditures by three bil
lion dollars from budget estimates.
The Revenue and Expenditures Con
trol Act of 1968 requires a total ex
penditure reduction of six billion dol
lars for the Federal Government. The
DOD share of this reduction is three
billion dollars.
Final determinations on reductions
could not be made until Congress com
pleted action on the defense authori
zation and appropriations bills. But a
number of actions were'taken early to
obtain maximum advantage of the e x ~
penditure savings and these were an
nounced previously by DOD. These in
cluded:
Not to compiete activation of the
6th Infantry Division. ,
Inactivation, of 53 Navy ships
and seven naval air squadrons.
Inactivation of 23 Nike Hercules
firing sites.
Deactivation of seven F-I01
squadrons in the first quarter of this
fiscal year instead of later; and the
, stretchout of F-ll1A and FB-l11 pro
duction schedules.
Early release from active duty of
The MILITARY REVIEW and the u. s.
Ar..,. ColDmand and General Statl' Colleae u
aame DO responsJldUtf for aeeaney of Infor
matloD contained III the MILITARY NOTES
IIHtIOD of thll publlcatlon. lulU an "nnted.
.. a.nice to the readen. No ofBeial eD
donement of the ft..... oplDloftl, or facAal
. t a t . ~ e l l t a II fntended.-The Editor.
approximately 30,000 two-year Navy
enlistees.
Reduction of about 2,400 civilian
positions in employment levels at Navy
laboratories.
Reductions have been made in all
areas of DOD operations. However,
the greatest cuts in the case of the
Army are in the logistic support area
for supplies, spares and repair parts
levels, and equipment maintenance for
non-Southeast Asia forces; reduc
tions in equipment procurements for
non-Southeast Asia forces consistent
with minimum impact on readiness;
and reductions in military construc
tions programs.
DOD said the major reductions in
the Navy are in F-I11B aircraft pro
curement; operational areas, including
ship and aircraft squadron inactiva
tions, aircraft modification and re
work, ship overhauls, administration
and logistic support programs; equip
ment procurement for non-Southeast
Asia forces; and ship construction,
military personnel, and research and
development programs.
In addition to unit inactivations and
revised aircraft production schedules,
the Air Force is reducing military and
civilian manpower in support activi
ties by 8,000 military and 8,000 civil
ian spaces; has deferred initiation of
expanded proficiency pay awards in
five specialist fieTds; slowed develop
ment efforts in the manned orbiting
Militarr Review
96
MILITARY NOTES
laboratory program and slightly de fense and the defense agencies, the
layed its initial launch; deleted or de major actions were reductions of not
layed a number of construction proj less than three percent in administra
ects; and reduced or delayed a variety tive areas, and reductions in the pro
of research, development, test, and curement programs for computer
evaluation programs. equipment and inventory levels in the
In the Office of the Secretary of De- Defense Stock Fund.-DOD release.
River Utility Craft
Ch"Wakf' C01"J.lOfUeion
Artist's eoneeption of new amphihian being developed for the Navy
The US Navy has awarded a 1.1 million-dollar contract to design and de
velop 10 prototypes of a river utility craft (RUe) that will transport men and
equipment on twin screw-like revolving pontons through shallow water, swamps,
muck, bogs, water, and snow. The first model is scheduled to be completed and
ready for tests in early 1969.
The RUe models wiII be an improvement over the marsh screw amphibian,
the first experimental military craft to operate on rotating pontons fitted with
spiral blades.
The unique craft will measure 20 feet long, 14 feet wide, and eight feet
high. Power will be supplied by two high-performance engines.
The revolving pontons are filled with rigid foam so that the RUe will float
even if the pontons should become punctured. The Rue can move across firm
surfaces by rolling sideways with both pontons rolling the same direction.
News release.
Mlrch 1969 97
MILITARY NOTES
Camoulla,. Material
An experimelltal texturing adhesive
for camouflage 'on airfield runways,
missile pads, and munitions loading
areas has been reported by the US
Army.
The high molecular weight epoxy
material, mixed with sand, pumice, or
other fine aggregate, shows high re
sistance to jet blast and. heat, tire
abrasion and impact, and spilled fuels.
It can be applied to the concrete or
asphalt by roller, trowel, brush, or
spray.
Green or brown pigments are added
for concealment purposes, but the ma
terial also has been tested successfully
with yellow as a durable airstrip
safety marker. In addition, a nonpig
mented type is being tested for field
camouflage. In this application, leaves,
gravel, and twigs would be scattered
over the adhesive to blend construc
tion-scarred or other areas that might
serve as landmarks into the surround
ing terrain.-US Army release.
Personnel Retention Problems
The retention of trained personnel
is a growing problem that is receiv
ing increased emphasis by military
manpower management officials.
Reasons for individual nonselection
of military service as a career have
been the subject of extensive study.
A multitude of areas, evaluated as
possible influences capable of increas
ing the attractiveness of this tradi
tional life, have been isolated and con
sidered for application. In the past,
the greater attention was placed upon
the so-called "tangible" incentives
such as pay, allowances, benefits, and
housing, all of which are difficult for
each of the services to improve indi
vidually.
While all services continue to search
for improvement in these needed
areas, concurrently they have under
taken supporting studies which are
strongly indicating that there are
other approaches, within the capabil
ity of individual service commanders,
which will greatly encourage all cate
gories of military personnel to remain
on active duty.
While the most apparent difficulties
in service retention seem to be appli
cable to the first-term enlisted popu
lation. the retention of officers-par
ticularly in the junior grades-is fast
becoming of special concern.
Many of these young officers believe
that benefits available to all as junior
civilian executives are far superior to
those offered by a military career. Ad
ditionally, in growing numbers, they
are subscribing to the theory that mil
itary life imposes an unusually severe
hardship on their families because of
the constant separation from home
that is traditional to military service.
A recently completed Army study
indicated that the higher quality offi
cer, considered most desirable for re
tention on active duty, responds im
mediately when given both the author
ity and responsibility to accomplish
assigned missions.
This evaluation readily equates with
the civil management theory that the
military institution, by its basic or
ganization, offers more varied and im
mediately available positions of au
thority to younger executive capability
than can any private concern.
Successful qualities of leadership,
transmitted to the junior officer by
association with his superiors, plus the
assignment of challenging duties and,
most importantly, suitable recognition
for good performance are all consid-
MIlItIry ReYiew
98
ered to be key factors in the accom
plishment of career motivation for un
decided young officers.
The services strongly agree that job
satisfaction is of primary importance
in retaining all individuals, commis
sioned and enlisted alike. The right
man in the right job will encourage
a positive career decision:
There is also general agreement
that a large factor in solving motiva
tion and retention problems must be
personalized service. Personal involve
ment all up and down the line is
needed. The problem is considered to
be serious enough for all services to
require personal attention from com
manders.-DOD release.
MILITARY NOTES
'Hard Rock' Contract Let
A 1.3 million-clollar initial award on
a five million-dollar, cost-plus-fixed-fee
contract has been awarded by the Air
Force for engineering support on a
new superhard silo program. Code
named Hard Rock, the new configura
tion is designed to shield intercon
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's)
from powerful incoming warheads. At
the present time, the only missile
scheduled to go into the new silos will
be of the Minuteman family; however,
the design requirements will insure
that the silo will accommodate future
generations such as the advanced
ICBM.-Armed Forces Management,
1968.
Fuel Storage Tank
UniROJ/tU. Int:.
A US manufacturer has produced an immense collapsible fuel storage tank
for military use. It is made of high-clensity nylon fabric coated with poly
urethane. When filled, the tank holds a quarter million gallons of fuel and
measures approximately 100 feet in length, 51 feet in width, and stands eight
feet high.-News release.
March 1969
99
MIUTARY NOlES
New SAlCOM Pnqp2m
Plans for a new sophisticated satel
lite communications system capable of
being steered by ground control over
any trouble spot in the world-"hope
fully by early 1971"-have been re
vealed by the Defense Communications
Agency.
The program is a follow-on to the
phase I defense sstellite communica
tion (SATCOM) system which has
successfully orbited 26 communica
tion satellites since its inauguration
in 1966. These are nonsynchronous
satellites in an equatorial orbit drift
ing in an easterly direction slowly
around the world at an altitude of
about 21,000 miles.
Because the satellites are not syn
chronized, "bunching" occurs at times
and they are not always in view of
ground terminals, thus preventing a
100-percent availability of the system.
Ground terminals spaced geographi
cally apart cannot communicate unless
a common satellite is in view of both
sites.
In contrast, the satellites of the
follow-on phase II communications
system will be synchronous-that is,
even though they are orbiting around
the equatorial plane in an easterly di
rection, they will move at the ssme
rate as the rotation of earth. As a
result, they will be in view of earth
terminals at all times.
The phase II satellites are to be pro
vided with sufficient on-board fuel sup
ply to keep them on station, virtually
motionless in the sky as far as an
earthly observer is concerned. The sat
ellites are also to have enough fuel to
allow each to be moved several times
during its life from one equatorial
longitude position to another.-DOD
release.
Fuel Cell Research
The United Ststes and the United
Kingdom have recently agreed to a
cooperative basic research program on
electrical power-generating fuel cells.
This collaboration will enlist the best
tslent of both countries in civilian and
governmental laboratories to develop a
better understsnding of the fundamen
tal processes of fuel cells.
These cells, if economically competi
tive, offer advantages of noise and 'air
pollution abatement as compared to
present electrical power-generating de
vices and will meet military objectives
of decreased weight and volume.
The program is expected to run for
three years. The Ministry of Defense
(Navy Department) is directing the
project for the United Kingdom and
the US Army for the United States.
-DOD release.
ShortOrder Maps
Military field commanders will get
photographs of combat hot spots from
a fighter aircraft still in the target
area with a Tactical Photographic
Image Transmission (TAPIT) sub
system now heing tested. Transform
ing tactical fighter aircraft into re
connaissance vehicles, TAPIT-con
tained in a pod mounted under the
wing of the aircraft-takes panoramic
pictures from low altitude, develops
the film in seven seconds, and electron
ically scans and transmits the pictures
from higher altitude for pickup by a
ground station located within a 100
mile radius.
The ground station, mounted on a
%-ton truck, receives and records the
scanned-picture signals on film; proc
esses the film, again in seven seconds;
and produces four to one enlargements
of the original picture for the field
commander.-Ordnance, 1968.
Military Review
100
MILITARY NOTES
'Vulcan' Tested
Vulcan air defense weapon
The Army is evaluating tests of the Vulcan air defense weapon under ex
treme weather conditions. The tests were conducted at the Tropic Test Center,
Canal Zone, and the Arctic Test Center, Alaska. The weapon was tested in its
surface-to-surface, as well as surface-to-air role. The weapon is mounted on an
armored personnel carrier. The electrically controlled gun fires 1,000 to 3,000
rounds per minute and can be operated by one man.-Army News Features.
Joint USUK Arms Control Test
A joint British-United Ststes exer
cise in arms control has been held in
England with 30,000 United Kingdom
troops deliberately seeking to break
the terms of a hypothetical interna
tional pact limiting land and air forces.
The field test---eode-named Exercise
First Look-provided that joint in
spection teams should try to detect
how and where cheating tskes place.
Aim of the unique international op
eration was to build practical exper
ience in procedures for checking arms
control and thereby to help progress
in current and future disarmament
negotiations.
The USSR and four other Commu
nist European countries ignored invi
tstions to send observer teams to the
exercise.-News release.
Variable Diameter Helicopter Rotor
A practical system for varying the
diameter of a helicopter rotor has been
developed by a US manufacturer.
It appears the variable diameter ro
tor will best serve in aircraft designed
for speeds of over 300 knots.
The system being tested is a 25
foot-diameter, three-bladed rotor with
the ability to reduce to a 15-foot diam
eter and smoothly return to a full-
diameter mode. An outer blade portion
is telescoped into a hollow inner blade
to achieve retraction. Both retraction
and extension are governed by altering
the balance between the outer blade
centrifugal force and engine torque.
The concept has specific applications
for a high-speed compound helicopter
and a tilt-rotor vertical tskeoff and
landing craft.-News release.
Mardl1869
lOt
MILITARY NOTES
AUSTRALIA
Purchase of Carrier Studied
The Australian Government is reported to be considering purchase or lease
of the United Kingdom aircraft carrier Hermes. After the British Fleet is with
drawn from Singapore, there would be only one aircraft carrier-the Royal
Australian Navy's Melbourne-in that part of the world.
Fleet. It will be phased out of operation in the next few years under the United
Kingdom cutback on defense spending.
The need for a second carrier in the Royal Australian Navy to make up for
the loss of the Hermes is seen. One carrier would be stationed on Australia's east
coast, the other on the west coast.
The Australian Defense Minister said the government is in continuing and
close consultation with Britain on the many implications of her withdrawal from
Malaysia and Singapore, including consideration of facilities and equipment
which might become available as a result of redeployment of British forces.
Armed Forces Management, 1968.
Last British Submarine Leaves
The Royal Navy submarine Trump ron. It will have two Royal Australian
has left Australia for Britain ending Navy submarines, the Oxley and Ot
the British submarine presence in way, which will be joined by two other
Australia. Trump is the last of the 4th Oberon class submarines now being
Submarine Squadron which was based built in Scotland.
in Sydney from 1949 with two or three Commissioned in 1944, the Trump
operational submarines. On 1 January, arrived in Sydney in 1961. In Eng
the title of the squadron changed to land, it will be scrapped.-Australian
the 1st Australian Submarine Squad- news release.
Military ReYiew 102
ROMANIA
MilltalY Training of Youth
A draft bill on training youth in
the defense of the country is report
edly under consideration by the Ro
manian Government. The bill would
supplement the present compulsory
military training period of 16 months.
According to the Minister of Youth
Problems, boys and girls from the ages
of 18 to 20 would participate in train
ing given in centers organized as en
terprises, economic organizations, in
stitutions, educational units, and com
munes, and would be led by "reserve
officers and noncommissioned officers,
acting in a civilian capacity."-Radio.
Free Europe.
EAST GERMAKY
MllitalY Etiquette
East Germany has just published a
manual on good manners, addressed
specifically to members of the army.
Concerning military behavior, the 340
page volume explains:
A soldier of the National People's
Army must adapt and even subordi
nate himself. He must not only get
used to the brevity of orders given,
but he must also follow these orders
unconditionally, with the entire use
of his military abilities. This he must
do not out of blind obedience, but out
of insight.
For contacts among soldiers and
with others, the book recommends a
polite tone. The formal way of address,
Sie, is mandatory, while the familiar
Du is frowned upon. Excessive famil
iarity between soldiers and officers is
considered undesirable--and this in
an army of a "classless society."
Outside the barracks, the dress uni
form is recommended as suitable garb
for all occasions: "The uniform is al
ways fitting .... It is an entirely ac-
March 1989
MILITARY NOTES
ceptable outfit for all social events."
Pointers for behavior in public in
clude such simple rules as: The telling
of jokes about the German Democratic
Republic is an infringement on the
pledge of allegiance to the flag;
drunkenness is a disgrace to army
honor; and drinking straight from the
bottle is not done either. If there has
been a party in a public place where
certain quantities of food and drink
have been consumed, the book urges
its readers "not to forget to pay."
In dancing and associating with the
weaker sex, the book suggests gal
lantry above all. Decency is the order
of the day in this context, and super
ficial as well as too frequent adven
tures are discouraged. The book main
tains: "The respect for the girl should
be so great that nothing should be
forced which is not given voluntarily."
In the soldiers' behavior toward
women, hand-kissing is recommended
as a chivalrous gesture which is as
important to the People's Army soldier
as to the simple citizen:
Hand-ki;Jlsing 8hould be introduced
in order to provide the po8sibility of
expressing affection together with a
certain reserve. The kis8 on the hand,
which is more a breath than a kis8,
belong8 of course on the back of the
hand. If another 8pot is chosen, the
ge8ture will far SUrpa8S the gallant
function of the hand-kis8. This
hand-kiss should not be considered an
tifllUl,ted or passA, but 8hould always
be given tactfully so as to be seen as
gallantry, as a compliment. There is
no reason why the wearer of the uni
form of our National People'8 Army
should fia,tter the ladie8 any les8 than
any civilian. This applies alBo to the
hand-kiss when given in a tasteful
way.-Radio Free Europe.
103
MIUTARY NOTES
ARGENTINA
'Twin Otters' Ordered
The Argentine Government has or
dered nine Twin Otter short takeoff
and landing aircraft for its armed
forces from Canada. Three of the air
craft. of which one is specially fur
nished with a plush interior. were fer
ried by Argentina Army aviation pi
lots from Canada to Buenos Aires and
will be used for army liaison and troop
support. Later this year. the Argen
tine Air Force and Navy will' receive
six additional aircraft. Two of these.
one flying with the air force and one
with the navy. will be equipped for
Antarctic survey operations.-Armed
FfJrces Management. 1968.
NATO
Advanced Combat Aircraft
Great Britain. West Germany. Itsly,
and the Netherlands have agreed to
develop an advanced combat aircraft
to equip their air forces in the next
decade.
A West German Defense Ministry
spokesman said the four nations had
signed an agreement on cooperation
in the first phase of the aircraft's
development-its design. Aviation
sources said development and produc
tion of the aircraft would cost about
4.8 billion dollars.
The requirement of the four and
possibly other air forces was expected
to be for a total of at least 1,000
planes. Officials of the four govern
ments set a target date of 1975 to
have the airplane operational.
The new plane will provide a re
placement for the US F - I 0 ~ Star
fighter which is now in service with
the German. Italian. Dutch. Belgian,
and Canadian Air Forces.-News re
lease.
Industrial Advisory Group Established
The North Atlantic Treaty Organi
zation will establish an Industrial Ad
visory Group composed of four repre
sentatives from each member country.
The purpose of the group will be to
serve in an advisory role to the NATO
Conference of National Armament Di
rectors. The group will also serve as
a focal point for review and discussion
of special studies and problems of in
dustries which should be brought to
NATO's attention.
Other functions of the group will
be to improve the flow of information
to and from industry in NATO coun
tries; to provide discussion of re
search. development. and production
policies and practices as they affect
industry; and to provide a forum to
present Significant problems to a cross
section of NATO industry.
The first meeting of the Industrial
Advisory Group will be held this year
in Brussels, Belgium.-DOD release.
New Command
The North Atlantic Treaty Organi
zation has activated a new command
to control and improve maritime air
surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea.
The new command, called Maritime
Air Forces. Mediterranean (MAR
AIRMED). is directly under Naval
Forces, Southern Europe, and will
have its headquarters in Naples.
MARAIRMED will coordinate land
based planes carrying out air patrols
over international waters of the Med
iterranean and will disseminate the in
formation acquired for the benefit of
all NATO nations in or concerned with
the southern region of Europe.
Aircraft to be used initially include
the S-! Tracker, the S H - S ~ helicopter,
the Shackleton, and the P-! Neptune.
-DOD release.
Military Review 104
CANADA
CF5's' First Flight
The two-seater CF-5, new Canadian
interceptor, made its first flight re
cently at Montreal. This is the third
Canadian-built CF-5 to begin test
flights. The first two-single-seat
General Dunamica News
New Canadian warplane, the CF5 two
seater, makes first test ftight
models-are being tested at Edwards
Air Force Base, California. The Ca
nadian armed forces have ordered 115
of the aircraft, and 105 are being built
for the Netherlands Air Force.-News
item.
Change Mobile Command
Mobile Command land combat units
in Canada are being regrouped into
four combat groups designated the 1st.
2d, 3d, and 5th Combat Groups re
spectively. The numerical designation
-5th-is used to avoid confusion with
the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade
Group in Germany.
Each of the combat groups will com
prise two infantry battalions, an ar-
March 1969
MIUTARY NOTES
mored regiment, an artillery regiment,
and supporting units. All of the in
fantry battalions will have three in
stead of four rifle companies, and the
armored and artillery regiments wiII
have two instead of three squadrons
or batteries. Other units will be sim
ilarly reduced in size.
The four combat gI;oups will re
place a former organization of three
infantry brigade groups in Canada,
and will be achieved without an over
all increase in troop strength. Not af
fected by the regrouping are Mobile
Command air units and the Canadian
airborne regiment now being formed.
-Armed Forces Management, 1968.
KOREA
Two Armored Units Activated
The Republic of Korea (ROK)
Army has activated two armored bri
gades. Designated the 1st and 2d ROK
Armored Brigades, the two units were
activated to give more firepower to
the infantry defending the western
and central border.
The two brigades have been placed
under the direct operational control
of the 1st ROK Army. The number of
armor battalions in each brigade has
not been released.-Korean Report.
AUSTRIA
AdriaticVienna Pipeline
Austria, in cooperation with several
foreign oil firms, is beginning the con
struction of an Adriatic-Vienna pipe
line which will connect with the trans
alpine pipeline recently built to supply
the refinery centers of central Europe.
The line will run 261 miles from Tri
este to Vienna, with an initial capacity
of 5.5 million tons of crude oil yearly.
-Austrian In/ormation.
105
MILITARY NOTES
JAPAN
Shipbuilding Industry of Japan
In the last 12 years, Japan has led dom (1,298,000), West Germany
the world in total shipbuilding ton (1,002,000) , France (553,000), and
nage, and is n o ~ recognized as the Norway (522,000).
leading shipbuilding nation in the The chart indicates the volume of
world.
ships launched by Japan's shipyards
In 1967, Japan launched 7,497,000 between 1963 and 1967.
gross tons, or 48 percent of the world As the statistics indicate, Japan ex-
LAUNCHING OF JAPANESE SHIPYARDS
(Unit: 1,000 gross tons)
Year Domestit: Use Export Total
1963 870
1964 1,364
1965 2,532
1966
2,692
1967 2,937
--
-(Source: Lloyd"s Register of Shipping)
1,497
2,721
2,831
3,993
4,560
2,367
4,085
5,363
6,685
7,497
tonnage launched in that year. The
remaining tonnage was produced by .
Sweden (1,308,000), the United King-
The 210.000-cleadweight-ton lIlemitau
Maru, the first ship to exceed 200,000 tons,
has automatic and remote-control csrgo
loading equipment and engines and re
quires a crew of onl)' 32 men
ported an annual average of 60 per
cent of her shipbuilding production
during this five-year period.
New concepts of design have been
developed which have reduced building
costs and fuel consumption and have
increased speed and safety. Engines
too have been improved.
At the end of 1967. there were six
Japanese shipyards in operation capa
ble of constructing ships larger than
200,000 tons. A 300,000-ton tanker was
recently constructed within 10 months.
The first of six such tankers to be
built, it is 1,082 feet in length, 174
feet in width, and 105 feet in height
from the bottom to ita upper deck. Its
size surpasses the previous 200,OOO-ton
ships which were produced in Japan
and which were the largest built until
this one.-Japan Report.
Military Review
106
MILITARY
BOOKS
A HISTORY OF WARFARE. By Field.Marshal
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. 584 Pages.
The World Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio
and New York, 19&8. $15.00.
By LTC FIELDING L. GREAVES,
USA, Retired
For all its shortcomings of balance
and omission, this attractive book
will be a welcome addition to every
military library.
Granted that any book of this
scope has the problem of reconciling
available space with a plethora of
material, still some of the omissions
a ~ e hard to understand. The Battle
af the Metaurus (207 B.C.), for ex
/ ample, wrote the end to Hannibal's
hopes of conquering Rome. It is also,
perhaps, our first example of the
strategic use of interior lines. In its
total impact, it was more important
than Cannae, yet it is not mentioned
at all.
Other puzzling omissions are; the
Battles of Telamon (225 B.C.) and
Taginae (A.D. 552) where Celtic and
Ostrogothic power were destroyed;
the February 1945 bombing of Dres
den where 135,000 persons died in
two nights, more than the combined
total dead of Hiroshima and Naga
saki; the entire Sino-Japanese War of
1937-45; and the entire Chinese Civil
War which placed one-sixth of the
world's population under communism.
George S. Patton, a foremost and far
.seeing tank commander in an age of
tank warfare, is not mentioned.
While a certain emphasis on Brit
ish campaigns is to be expected from
March 1969
a British author, in A History of
Warfare the disproportionate lack of
balance is altogether too marked.
Consider such comparisons as the
following; Orde Wingate rates 15
lines of text, T. E. Lawrence has 20,
with 19 lines devoted to James Wolfe's
capture of Quebec and a further 29
lines to Wolfe's life and background,
while a commander of the stature of
Douglas MacArthur is dismissed with
a scant two lines. Even Spartacus got
three. Five pages of text and two
maps are devoted to the Burma cam
paign, while the entire US Pacific
offensive rates four and one-half
pages and one inadequate map.
America's war for independence
has 19 lines and the total efforts of
Simon Bolivar and Jose de San Martin
13 lines, as against 65 lines for the
Boer War. The Korean War is dis
posed of in 13 lines, and the 40 years
of warfare against the world's finest
light cavalry, the American Plains
Indians, gets short shrift with three
lines of text.
Despite these flaws, Montgomery's
work is a beautiful book, generally
well mapped, and superbly illustrated
with weapon drawings, a profusion
of monochrome illustrations, and 32
pages of full-color reproductions of
famous military scenes. The author's
views on controversial political issues
and on such military subjects as phys
ical fitness and morale, the paramount
role of infantry, generalship, the eth
ics of war, and the nuclear age are
worthwhile reading.
107
MILITARY BOOKS
PRESIDENT WILSON FIGHTS HIS WAR:
World War I and tile American IntelYention.
By HalYer A. DeWeerd. 457 Pages. lbe
Macmillan Co., New York; CollierMacmillan
ltd., london, Eng., 1968. $12.50.
By LTC DAVID W. BLACKLEDGE, USA
The 50th anniversary of the Armis
tice has brought forth several at
tempts to place World War I in new
perspective. This book is one of the
WARS OF THE UNITED STATES" SERIES
under the general editorship of Louis
Morton.
DeWeerd places the limited Amer
ican contribution to the war in proper
perspective by discussing Europe's
war in considerable detail. While the
historian will find little that is new,
the general reader will be surprised
by statistics that demonstrate how
totally unprepared, both mentally and
materially, the United States was to
contribute to the Allied efforts in
1917. America did not ~ u s h off to
volunteer in a burst of patriotism,
and the bulk of US troops had to be
transported in British ships. Today,
US artillery is still classified by the
metric system as a result of having
to rely on the purchase of French
artillery after the declaration of war
in April 1917. More supplies and weap
ons, including tankS and airplanes,
were furnished to US forces by the
Allies than were shipped from the
United States.
In spite of the somewhat misleading
title, President Woodrow Wilson's
role is depicted primarily in fighting
the diplomatic battle rather than the
military war. General John J. Per
shing's role and achievements, as well
as his shortcomings in leading the
American Army in France, are well
covered.
The author makes a major contri
bution by combining in one book both
the land and naval aspects of the war,
and he has included individual maps
depicting the many land and naval
battles. The Royal Navy has just pub
lished an official account confirming
his revisionist criticism of Admiral
Lord David Beatty's conduct at the
Battle of Jutland.
It is unfortunate that DeWeerd
perpetuates the popular error of add
ing "Congressional" to the "Medal of
Honor," and naval readers will wince
to read that an Austrian dreadnought
was sunk by a "limpid" mine. The
book's index is also inadequate (for
example, there is no listing for tanks,
airplanes, or poison gas). However,
military readers may be compensated
by finding an excellent bibliography
at the end of the book to guide their
fu rther research.
REBELS IN THE RIF: Abd EI Knm and the
Rif Rebellion. By David S. Woolman. 251
Pages. Stanford University Press, Stanford,
Calif., 1968. $6.95.
By LTC HENRY H. HARPER, USA
The military scholar will find this
an informative and well-documented
account of a guerrilla-counterguerrilla
war. Every reader will be interested
in the corollary that can be drawn be
tween the domestic unrest and rebel
lion caused in Spain and France by the
Rif Rebellion and that presently being
experienced by countries involved in
the Vietnam conflict.
Woolman begins with a description
of Spanish Morocco before and after
establishment of the Protectorate in
1912. Sufficient detail is presented of
the major and minor engagements to
gain an insight to the nature of the
conflict.
The book concludes with an account
of the termination of hostilities and
also traces the lives of the major per
sonalities involved up to the present.
Militaly Review
108
WINGED ROCWRY. By Major James C.
Sparks, United States Air Force, Retired.
Illustrated With Photographs. 183 Pages.
Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1968. $4.50.
The author, an information officer
for the manned Space flights of Proj
ects Mercury and Gemini before re
tirement, traces the history of rocket
planes from the first crude versions
fired in ancient China to the United
States X-15. He then projects into
spacecraft of the future which, com
bining new aero and astronautical
techniques, will be capable of piloted
flight into and returning from orbit,
for global transport of cargo and pas
sengers, and for defense.
YEMEN: The Unknown War. By Dana Adams
Schmidt 316 Pages. Holt, Rinehart & Win
ston, Inc., New York, Chicago, and San
Francisco, 1968, $6.50.
By LTC BENJAMIN G. SPIVEY, USA
This book is a dynamic story of the
struggle for Yemen. Although the
book begins with the coup d'etat of
26 September 1962, and ends with the
Khartoum agreement of 31 August
1967, the war in Yemen has not yet
ended. The author has traced Yemen's
history through the five pre-Islamic
Kingdoms to the Egyptian withdrawal.
Discussions include the Jewish and
Christian civilizations, the Incense
Trail, the Zeidi movement, and the
war itself to include the United Arab
Republic's use of lethal gas.
The war has had a great impact not
only on the Middle Ellst, but also on
the Free World and the Communist
world. The royalists in Yemen and
Saudi Arabia comprise the primary
opposition to Soviet influence on the
Arabian Peninsula.
This book is valuable reading for
anyone interested in the Middle East
and its problems.
March 1969
MILITARY BOOKS
MACHINE AGE ARMIES. 8y John Wbeldon.
231 Pages. Abelard-Schuman, Landon, EnI.,
New York, and Toronto, Can., 1968 $5.95.
By LTC Roy D. WELLS, USA
John Wheldon says his aim is "to
describe machine warfare and the
ways in which humanity in general
tried to cope with it."
He served in the British Army's
reconnaissance corps in North and
East Africa in World War II.
Starting with the early 19th cen
tury, Wheldon introduces the machine
warfare period with Alexander J.
Forsyth's patent in 1807 for the use
of mercuric fulminates for priming
firearms. This patent introduced auto
mation to the discharge of lethal pro
jectiles. Next, came the Maxim ma
chinegun and then the tank.
He explains in considerable detail
how mechanized forces evolved, tech
nologically and organizationally, from
World War I to the brief 1967 Arab
Israeli War.
He describes how the early doctrine
of mechanized armies expounded by
Major General J. F. C. Fuller and
Captain B. H. Liddell Hart was re
jected in their own country. The US
Army is criticized for its resistance
to change in rejecting the ideas of
tank designer J. W. Christie after
World War I.
The introduction of nuclear weap
ons to warfare is also analyzed. His
comments on the integration of heli
copters covers a dis",ussion of their
employment in Vietnam.
The author argues for increasing
modernization of outlook in the mili
tary services to keep pace with new
knowledge and social change.
Mr. Wbeldon's book is valuable for
the reader who wants to trace the
evolution of mobile force doctrine a n ~
employment.
109
MILITARY BOOKS
MIUTARY POSTS IN THE POWDER RIVER
COUNTRY OF WYOMING, 1865-1894. By Rob
ert A. Murra,. 189 Paps. University of Ne
braska Press, Lincoln, Nebr., 1968. $5.50.
By LTC MILTON B. HALSEY, JR., USA
This well-documented book deals
with the n'lilitary posts of the Powder
River country of Wyoming in two
general periods-1865 to 1868 and
1876 to 1894. The author, r\!Cogniz
ing that much has been written about
the dramatic fights that took p l a ~
there, emphasizes the background his
tory of the Army posts in this area
with such details as the structural de
velopment and resources of the posts,
and an insight into the character of
the men and Women who garrisoned
them.
Part I examines the 'limited war
fare against the Sioux Indians in Wy
oming conducted from Forts Conner,
Reno, and Philip Kearny with par
ticular emphasis on the military opera
tions in the Powder River country. It
was during this period that the Fetter
man, the Wagon Box, and the Hayfield
fights took place with troops from
these frontier forts in deadly struggle
with the Indians.
Part II treats, ill similar fashion.
the structural history, resources, and
personnel of Cantonment Reno. and
the two Forts McKinney during the
period that the Indians were forced
from the region and the open-range
cattle industry conflicts raged.
Mr. Murray has combined a wealth
of ststistical data, which includes
maps, plans, drawings. and notes, with
an analysis of the organization, fami
lies. clothing, arms, food, and related
items to make a meaningful and easily
read study of this period of Ameri
cana.
110
S!lLoIERS AND CMUANS: lbe Martial Spirit
in America, ln5-1865. By Marcus Cunliffe.
499 Plies. Little, Brown r. Co., Boston, and
Toronto, Can., 1968. $12.50.
By LTC FRANCIS A. IANNI, USA
One result of the Vietnam conflict
has been a renewed interest by his
torians in the military and martial
traditions and attitudes in the United
States. In this book, the author, a
British historian. examines a portion
of this history, from the Revolution
to the Civil War, in which he feels the
martial spirit triumphed.
The origin and growth of the Amer
ican military tradition and the atti
tudes which it generated in the Amer
ican public are examined for insights
they might provide for the Nation's
social order and values. This has rele
vance in understanding the present
political controversy over the use of
military force by the Government.
What the author finds existing in
this period are the seeming contradic
tions of a nation both peace loving and
violent. and indifferent to military ac
tivity while given to many forms of
military enthusiasm. Two significant
conclusions reached by some earlier
historians-that we are a warlike but
unmilitary people, and that the South
is an exception to our unmilitary her
itage-are closely examined by Mr.
Cunliffe.
The author summarizes the Amer
ican military ethos which developed
in the early period of our history in
terms of an ambivalent heritage char
acterized by three "model" viewpoints.
These are the Southern Chevalier, the
Northern Rifleman, and the Quaker
Pacifist. These three rival yet comple
mentary patterns of the American
martial character are woven into a
comprehensive picture.
Military Review
THE IDISCIPLINE OF POWER: Essentials of a
M o d ~ m World Structure. By George W. Ball.
363 ! Pages. Little, Brown & Co., Boston,
Mass., and Toronto, Can., 1968. $7.50.
By COL TIMOTHY F. CLIFFORD, USAR
For the serious military student,
this is an important book, one to be
read slowly and referred to often.
During his 35 years of experience
in international law and his six years
of service as Undersecretary of State,
Mr. Ball has had an inside view of
the people and events of which he
writes. Yet this is neither memoir nor
chatter about personalities in the
news. Rather, it is the defense of the
thesis that foreign policy must re
shape the structure of power to permit
a more effective sharing of world re
sponsibilities.
Nuclear power forced the evolution
of political and military thinking from
"balance of power" to "balance of ter
ror." The current situation where the
two superstates with their stocks of
nuclear weapons have the only signifi
cant voices in power politics is a dan
ger which must be lessened. A third
power-namely, a European federal
union-must be developed.
The author reviews current prob
lems in England, France, and Ger
many. He considers the impact of a
united Western Europe on these coun
tries, the Far East, the emerging na
tions, and nuclear management.
The union of Western Europe is a
difficult development which only the
member nations can choose to make,
but the United States can encourage
it. The final chapter, therefore, offers
guidelines for a foreign policy to con
trol US power and to apply it for the
welfare of all. Appended is a brief,
but excellent, bibliography. Unfortu
nately, there is no index.
March 1969
MILITARY BOOKS
NO MAN WALKS ALONE. By Lieutenant Com
mander Frank K. Ellis, UnHed States Navy.
128 Pages. Fleming H. Revell Co., West
wood, N. J., 1968. $3.95.
By LUIs A. MONSERRATE
In a brief but inspiring personal
account, the author, a Navy pilot who
lost both legs as a result of an aircraft
accident in 1962, relates his experi
ences in surviving, recovering, and
overcoming outdated prejudiees about
the "handicapped."
The unrelenting determination and
courage of this double amputee en
abled him to pass several physical fit
ness tests and medical reevaluation
boards. Commander Ellis has not only
remained on active duty, but has been
restored to flying status.
HELL OR HIGH WATER. MacArthur's Land
ing at Inchon. By Walt Sheldon. 340 Pages.
The Macmillan Co., New York, 1968. $7.95.
By COL KENDRICK B. BARLOW, JR.,
USA
Early in July 1950, General Douglas
MacArthur began probing the idea of
using an amphibious force to outfiank
the North Koreans. On 15 September,
his idea bore fruition at Inchon. Al
though there are many accounts of
this decisive action, it is doubtful that
one can find a more readable person
alized story than the one told by this
author. He has captured the human
events and individual actions before
and during this decisive campaign that
provide drama and excitement. The re
sult is an informative account of a
nearly impossible feat accomplished
despite incredible odds.
For Korean War participants and
students of military history, this book
provides a personal insight into prob
lems, planning, decisions, and execu
tion of the Inchon landing.
111
MILITARY BOOKS
NEW BOOKS RECEIVED
BRASSEY'S ANNUAL: 1968. The
Armed Forces Year-Book. Edited by
Major General J. L. Moulton, Briga
dier C. N. Barclay, and Air Vice
Marshal W. M. Yool. 360 Pages. Fred
erick A. Praeger, Inc., New York
and Washington, 1968. $16.50.
HISTORY OF RUSSIA: Volume Two.
The Successors of Peter the Great
From Catherine I to the Reign of
Nicholas I. By Paul Miliukov, Former
Professor at the University of Mos
cow, and Charles Seignobos and L.
Eisenmann, Professors at the Uni
versity of Paris. Translated by
Charles Lam Markmann. 315 Pages.
Funk & Wagnalls, New York, 1968.
$10.00.
SEA & AIR: The Naval Environment.
By Jerome Williams, Associate Pro
fessor, United States Naval Academy,
Lieutenant Commander John J. Hig
ginson, United States Navy, and Lieu
tenant Commander John D. Rohr
bough, United States Navy. 338 Pages.
United States Naval Institute, An
napolis, Md., 1968. $11.50.
AUGUST 21ST: The Rape of Czecho
slovakia. By Colin Chapman, Foreign
News Editor, The Sunday Times, Lon
don, Eng. 124 Pages. J. B. Lippincott
Co., Philadelphia and New York, 1968.
$3.95 clothbound. $1.45 paperbound.
THE AIR WAR IN VIETNAM. Text
and Illustrations by Lou Drendel. 95
Pages. Arco Publishing Co., New
York, 1968. $5.00 clothbound. $2.95
paperbound.
THE FAST CARRIERS: The Forg
ing of an Air Navy. By Clark G. Rey
nolds. 498 Pages. McGraw-Hill Book
Co., New York, Toronto, Can., London,
Eng., and Sydney, Aus., 1968. $12.50.
HISTORICAL ESSAYS. Edited by
Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland,
United States Army. 100 Pages. In
fantry Magazine, Fort Benning, Ga.
$1.25 paperbound.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: The
Treaty and After. By Michael E. Sher
man. 96 Pages. The Canadian Institute
of International Affairs, Toronto and
Ontario, Can., 1968. $3.50
THE TANGLED WEB. By Philippe
Ganier-Raymond, Translated From
the French by Len Ortzen. 203 Pages.
Pantheon Books, Inc., New York, 1968.
$4.95.
BIRD. The Christmastide Battle. By
Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall,
United States Army Reserve, Retired,
Operations Analyst, US Army in Viet
nam. Assisted by Lieutenant David
H. Hackworth, United States Army.
Including Sketches by the Author.
206 Pages. Cowles Education Corp.,
New York, 1968. $3.95.
WEST TO CAMBODIA. By Brigadier
General S. L. A. Marshall, United
States Army Reserve, Retired, Opera
tions Analyst, US Army in Vietnam.
Including Sketches by the Author. 253
Pages. Cowles Education Corp., New
York, 1968. $3.95.
THE FIGHTING TRIPLANES. By
Evan Hadingham. 240 Pages. The
Macmillan Co., New York, 1968. $9.95.
TOWARDS A GLOBAL FEDERAL
ISM. By William O. Douglas, As
sociate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States. 177 Pages. New
York University Press, New York, and
University of London Press, Ltd.,
London, Eng., 1968. $7.95.
Military Revlaw
112