199

Sierra Leone

Population: 5.2 million
Life expectancy: 45 years
National capital: Freetown
Independence from UK: 27 April 1961


Abstract

Since 1991, Sierra Leone has experienced a brutal civil war, with the rebel movement, the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF), fighting against three successive governments. The eruption of violence resulted in the
spillover of the Liberian civil war. The conflict has been fueled by extensive foreign military support to the
conflicting parties, engaging foreign mercenaries and private militias. The struggle for political power,
leading to the control of the countrys natural resources, diamonds in particular, has been at the core of the
Sierra Leonean war. The main victim is the civilian population, suffering from RUF fighters looting and
pillaging and from the precarious conditions as refugees. The settlement process has been difficult, due to
the RUFs unclear political positions, the underlying support of external powers, the instability of Sierra
Leonean governments and constant violations of cease-fires. The ECOMOG has played a leading role in
the international response, supported by major donors. Finally, the conflicting parties started negotiations,
leading to the Lom peace agreement in July 1999, providing for disarmament and demobilization, power
sharing arrangements and amnesty for fighters on both sides. The main challenge remains the
implementation of the peace agreements provisions aiming to achieve a dual transition, to peace and to
democracy. The transition to peace is to be achieved through current power sharing arrangements, offering
the rebels a legitimate access to the countrys natural resources and to political power. However, the
blanket amnesty for fighters having committed atrocities against the civilian population would endanger the
future of peace, which remains fragile without any justice for the victims. Recent detentions and killings of
UN peace keepers have seriously endangered the peace process. The future of the whole sub-region
depends on the transition process in Sierra Leone.
200
Diamonds, Mercenaries and Civilian Targets -The
brutal war in Sierra Leone

Terhi Lehtinen & Nosakhare Ogumbor

The brutal civil conflict in Sierra Leone (1991-96, 1997-99) is unique in the scale and
grotesque nature of attacks on civilian populations. The crisis has resulted in the death of
thousands of civilians and in more than one million refugees
1
in and outside the country.
The Sierra Leonean conflict erupted as a direct spillover of the Liberian civil war across
the border and illustrates the challenges of the regional force ECOMOG in West Africa.
External interventions have played a fatal role in the escalation of the Sierra Leone civil
conflict as well as in the negotiation process, which could not be completed without the
commitment of neighboring Liberia and Burkina Faso to the peace agreement. The
current peace process, based on power sharing and on the gradual demilitarization of a
society, faces up to the major challenge of dual transition, to peace and to democracy,
requiring an integrated approach and support by the international community. The
international community has a lot to learn from the lessons for its failure to tackle the
challenges of dual transition in Liberia in 1997. A genuine peace process has to take into
account the complex situation in the whole sub-region.

In 1898, a British protectorate was proclaimed over the hinterland of the coastal colony
of Sierra Leone, which had been under British administration since 1787. Since
independence within the Commonwealth in 1961, Sierra Leone has endured a series of
military regimes and rebellions in struggles over economic and political power. A
Constitution in 1978 enshrined a one-party system of the ruling All Peoples Congress
(APC). The government was repeatedly accused of mismanagement of public funds and
failure to improve the deteriorating economy. In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) launched a rebellion to overthrow the APC government, paving the way to the
RUFs protracted war against three successive regimes (See Chronology).

1
The war killed an estimated 20,000-50,000 people and forced up to half of the 4.5 million population from
their homes (IRIN, July 1999).
201
Agents

Conflicting parties
2
in the Sierra Leonean civil war are illustrated in Table 1:

Acronym Name Established Represents Affiliation Support Conflict with

RUF
Revolution
ary United
Front
1991
Mostly the
Nimbas, Makeni
Bikolo/ illicit
diamond miners,
marginalized
youth
Ousted leaders of
Sierra Leone
Army (SLA) and
their
sympathizers
(since 1994)

Armed Forces
Revolutio-nary
Council (AFRC)
in 1998.

Liberia,
Burkina
Faso Libya,
with the
backing of
France,
mercenaries
from the
Ukraine and
other
Eastern
European
countries

The Sierra
Leone
government
ECOMOG,
and the
Kamajors
militia/ terror
against the
civilian
population

SLA/
AFRC
Renegade
faction of
Sierra
Leone
Army, led
by
Major
John
Koromah/
Armed
Forces
Revolutio-
nary
Council
1997
John Koromahs
loyalists

RUF

Liberia,
Burkina
Faso Libya,
with the
backing of
France,
mercenaries
from the
Ukraine and
other
Eastern
European
countries

The Sierra
Leone
government ,
ECOMOG
and the
Kamajors
militia

Kamajors

Kamajors
rural
militia
1994

Mostly the Mende
ethnic group

The Sierra Leone
government,
ECOMOG/
supported by
civilian
populations
RUF / AFRC

SLPPs
governme
nt
Sierra
Leone
Peoples
Party
1996 Predominantly by
activists of the
Mende ethnic
group in the
eastern and
southern part of
the country

Kamajors and
ECOMOG
ECOMOG
(Nigeria,
Ghana and
Guinea), the
UK and the
US
Mercenaries
from mainly
South Africa
(Executive
outcomes
EO) and the
UK
(Gurkhas)
RUF/AFRC

2
Reportedly, also two other armed groups, the National Front for the Restoration of Democracy and Sierra
Leonean Initiative for peace had been fighting against the Sierra Leone government in 1994.
202


The traditional structure of antagonism in Sierra Leone is complex. However, the current
conflict stems predominantly from external influences and individual political and
economic interests, instead of structural antagonisms between different ethnic groups.
The Sierra Leonean conflict has hardly any ethnic or religious dimension, common to
many other civil wars (Zack-Williams 1999). However, different colonial policies
3

favoured some ethnic groups, such as Mende. (Reno, 1995; West African Magazine,
1991). The rebellion emerged, however, directly from the social inequalities prevailing in
Sierra Leone.

International involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict has aggravated the sufferings on
the battlefield. Liberia, Burkina Faso and Libya have supported RUF and ACRC, by
providing arms and other equipment. Mercenaries from the UK
4
and South Africa
5
fought
on the side of ECOMOG, trained Kamajor fighters and provided security for government
controlled mining industries and also for senior government officials. Also, sobels
6
,
disaffected members of the armed forces have engaged in acts of looting, banditry and
indiscriminate killing. Similarly, mercenaries from the Ukraine and other Eastern
European countries fought on the side of RUF rebels and provided security for the mining
industries under rebel command (Africa Confidential, 20 October 1998; 22 January 1999
and 6 February 1998).

The ECOWAS and the ECOMOG have played a key role in recent political negotiations
and military interventions in Sierra Leone. The ECOMOG has provided training and
supplied arms to the Kamajors militia who are fighting on the side of the government
7


3
The goal of British rule was to protect the mineral resources of Sierra Leone from the expansionist policy
of France without spending too much financial resources in the administration of the colony.
4
Gurkha mercenaries, who had previously served in the British army, have helped the Sierra Leone
government in the operations against the RUF since 1995.
5
The Sierra Leone government engaged a South Africa-based security firm, Executive outcomes (EO) in
1995.
6
Sobel designates the combination of soldiers and rebels.
7
In 1996, there were clashes between the government forces and the Kamajors (traditional fighters
reconstituted as an auxiliary defense force), who had proved highly successful in repelling rebel attacks,
apparently prompting resentment from members of the armed forces (Clapham 1999).
203
against the RUF. The ECOMOG holds the key responsibilities for disarming and
demobilizing combatants as well as training the new Sierra Leonean army. However,
ECOMOG officers have also been accused of taking part in the lucrative illegal diamond
business while abandoning their roles as peace-keepers. Also, international humanitarian
groups have complained that shelling by ECOMOG led to a high number of civilian
casualties (Human Rights Watch 1998, 1999).

The UN presence in Sierra Leone has significantly expanded since February 1998. In July
1998, the UN Security Council approved a measure to establish the UN Observer Mission
to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The UN provides major support to the setting up of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and National Human Rights Commission
according to the Lom peace agreement and to the registration of ex-combatants (IRIN, 6
August 1999). The UN peace-keeping mission (UNAMSIL) has faced serious difficulties
with detention and killings of its personnel in May 2000 (IRIN, May 2000).

Since May 1998, the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union (EU)
8
and the United
States (US) have issued several statements denouncing human rights violations
committed by the ACRC/RUF in Sierra Leone. In July 1999, the EU and the US were
commending the progress in Lom peace process and urged parties to keep their
commitment to its implementation. In the EU and the US have given logistical and
financial support to ECOMOG and humanitarian relief to thousands of refugees and
displaced persons. Meanwhile, France has been accused of supplying weapons to RUF
rebels through Burkina Faso and Liberia (Africa Confidential 1998-99). Facing the
detention of UN personnel in rebel areas, the UK has provided strong military support to
the Sierra Leonean government (IRIN May 2000). The EU has condemned the violations
of the Lom peace accords.




8
The EU has provided electoral assistance in 1996, and through the European Community Humanitarian
Office (ECHO), it has been the most important donor of non-food humanitarian aid (worth 20 m ECU since
1993).
204
Motivation

The roots of the Sierra Leonean crisis date back to the corrosive effects of the
personalized and monolithic rule of the All Peoples Congress (APC) government, which
led to the destruction of civil society and democratic accountability. The oppressive state
apparatus established patron-client relationships, described as a shadow state. Violence
and political intimidation were central for dealing with local populations, deprived of
major developmental efforts and welfare provisions. The network of informal markets
was set up in the quest to control the diamond-rich Kono district (Zack-Williams 1999).
Despite the huge benefits of the mineral industry, in the hands of politicians, powerful
chiefs and Lebanese traders, the ordinary Sierra Leonean standard of living continued to
decline throughout the 1980s. Economic decline, together with the perceived social,
political and economic injustice provoked an anti-government movement, made up of
different dclass elements of society (Zack-Williams 1999). The demilitarization of
society and especially the reintegration of child soldiers
9
, seriously affected and
traumatized by war, constitutes the main challenge to the success of the peace process.

The tradition of rebellious youth culture, known for its anti-social behavior
10
, dates back
to the 1940s, and became part of the university student protest against the APC
government in the early 1980s (Abdullah 1998; Abdullah & Muana 1998). Student
protests exposed the fragility of the regime and initiated the politicization of youth with
anti-imperialist slogans
11
(Abdullah 1998; Abdullah & Muana 1998). The subsequent
guerilla training experience in Libya and close connections with the Liberian National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, contributed to the formation of
the RUF, initially appropriating most of the strategy and tactics from the Liberian

9
UNICEF has estimated that 3,000 children are with the RUF and 1,500 with the Kamajors (IRIN June
1999).
10
Marijuana smoking, reggae music, petty theft and violence are constitutive elements of the youth culture
in Freetown.
11
Khaddafis Green book, together with other revolutionary texts inspired the marginalized youth and
intellectuals, who did not have any clear theoretical guide for their struggle (Abdullah 1998), and
contributed to the establishment of illegal connections with Libya. Finally, in 1987-88, a few groups of
young Sierra Leoneans, such as Foday Sankoh, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray, were recruited for
guerrilla training in Benghazi, Libya (Abdullah & Muana 1998).
205
experience
12
(Richards 1996). However, the RUF failed to gain popular support
13
in the
border region, despite the local populations violent political opposition to the APC
regime, mainly because of the brutality and looting of RUF fighters, and their Liberian
allies
14
(Abdullah 1998). Subsequently, civilians double alienation, both from the APC
regime and the RUF, paved the way for the emergence of the popular Kamajo militia
15
,
proven to be a decisive factor in the war (Abdullah & Muana 1998). Fighting and mutiny
took place mainly in rural areas, but the massive assault on Freetown in January 1999
brought atrocities and pillage to the capital and highly increased the number of casualties
in war (Human Rights Watch 1999).

At the level of individual mobilization, the freedom-fighter mantle was coupled with
the reversal of social hierarchy by means of violence, perceived by urban youth as a
necessary route to heroism. Alluvial diamond mining and a parallel smugglers economy
attracted disaffected youth, despairing at the malaise of economic and political exclusion
but bristling with an overweening determination for prosperity. They constituted a
reserve army of fighting men, attracted by the simplistic emancipatory rhetoric
16
of the
RUF, and motivated by the acquisition of wealth by looting (Abdullah 1998; Abdullah &
Muana 1998). In order to succeed, the peace settlement would have to provide a mix of
incentives and disincentives for ending the conflict greater than the benefits, which the
fighters apparently have enjoyed from its continuation (IRIN, July 6, 1999)

The dispute concerned the distribution of political and consequently, economic power in
Sierra Leone. Disruptive successions of civilian and military rules exposed the fragility of
the state structures. The state is perceived as the main source of distribution, given that

12
RUF leader Foday Sankoh hoped to repeat the successful incursion of the NPFL into Nimba county
where the local population was an ardent opponent of Does regime, in eastern Sierra Leone where the
Kailahun people were long-term opponents of the APC regime (Abdullah & Muana 1998; Richards 1996).
13
The RUF was mainly supported by its natural allies, the illicit diamond miners in the southeast of
Sierra Leone. They shared a common concern about the control of diamond sources in the region.
14
The dependence on Liberian support was fatal to the RUF, as Liberians view the looting of villages as a
reward for their support (Abdullah & Muana 1998).
15
Kamajo militia had a superior knowledge of the terrain and the support of local populations.
16
RUFs political message, manifested in the propaganda pamphlet Footpaths to Democracy, was simply
that the country was very rich in mineral wealth controlled by few Lebanese and business men with
political connections and that the lasting solutions of the countrys chronic economic and political problems
could be found through an explosion of destructive violence (Abdullah & Muana 1998).
206
political power leads to the control of the countrys natural resources. The main victim of
the bloody dispute is the civilian population, which has experienced horrible atrocities
since 1991 (Human Rights Watch 1999). The RUF set no limits to its use of violence for
social destabilization and has never presented any recognizable political platform, except
ill-defined revolutionary rhetoric and persistent calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops
and the recognition of the RUF as a political organization. Consequently, following the
1997 coup, the ACRC/RUF alliance failed to implement any political restructuring of the
state despite several years of struggle for power, instead, they further consolidated the
rule of terror and economic ruin of Sierra Leone. Moreover, the weakness of conflicting
parties
17
and the importance of external interventions have had a major impact on the
fragile outcome of any attempt at settlement. The Lom peace agreement provides for
power sharing between the government and the RUF, offering rebels a legitimate access
to political power and natural resources. Power sharing arrangements, without the
electoral process and accountability through investigation of war crimes, have raised
concern over the future of democratic transition and peace in Sierra Leone (IRIN, 18 June
1999). Power sharing does not involve any ideological divergence, instead, it addresses
the legitimate access to strategic resources and to political power for the RUF and other
factions. The future of the peace agreement thus depends on perceived benefits and
disincentives to fight for different militia groupings. The implementation of the peace
agreement is also challenged by the fact that rebels control as much as two-thirds of the
country, including the main mineral-rich areas, and access to humanitarian assistance has
been very restricted in those areas
18
.

Charles Taylor in Liberia and Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso have allegedly aimed at
controlling diamond smuggling and logging in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burkina Faso and
Guinea. Liberia and Burkina Faso have provided training and arms to RUF rebels.
Frances alleged support for rebel training stems from its historical competition with the
UK and the US for regional hegemony (African Confidential, 22 January 1999,

17
The RUF has never been a formidable military force, but more a peculiar guerrilla movement without
any significant national following or ethnic support, and it has largely remained a bandit organization
mainly driven by the survivalist needs of disaffected combatants. Similarly, the Sierra Leone state has been
largely dependent on external support- ECOMOG, mercenaries, donors-to sustain despite rebel attacks.
18
Some 20,000 have died in areas under the rebel control (AFP, July 7, 1999).
207
Afrikontact Ltd, 1998-1999 and AFP, 1999). The role of regional powers, especially
Liberian, Burkina Faso and Guinea, in the conflict, and consequently, in its resolution is
crucial. Therefore, the conclusion of the Lom peace agreement was made possible by
the regional commitment to the peace process. Similarly, donors have initiated various
initiatives, such as The Contact Group on Sierra Leone, to coordinate aid efforts and
contribute to reconstruction and reconciliation in Sierra Leone. However, the speculations
of the Liberian support to rebels continue, leading to further suspension of donor support.
The Liberian government has asked for an independent inquiry on the matter.

Instruments

The use of violence as a means of achieving political and economic power is deeply
rooted in the Sierra Leonean political culture (Ferme 1998). The communication channels
established through the Sierra Leone-Liberia border region have been crucial to the
escalation of the conflict. The region is a forestry enclave with considerable scope for
clandestine smuggling, logging and diamond digging activities (Abdullah & Muana
1998). The local terrain offered many ambush and refuge points, and secluded access to
weapons supply routes from Liberia. In some areas, rebel commanders even emptied
some regular settlements of their local civilian population (Richards 1998). The rebellion
used sophisticated radios for communication, but subsequently, the South African EO
helped the government to locate the RUF base camps by tracking their radio
communications (Abdullah & Muana 1998). Significantly, the international community
has not done much to intervene in diamond smuggling from the rebel areas, even though
this source of revenue could have been clearly identified. The exploitation of natural
resources enabled the rebels to purchase sophisticated equipment for guerrilla fighting.
Recently, the international community has focused on the illegal diamond trade as a
source of conflict (IRIN, July 2000).

The Lom peace agreement was signed by the conflicting parties and their regional allies,
namely by Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Liberia and Togo in July 1999. The current peace
agreement does not differ very much from the previous agreements, which were never
208
implemented due to lack of genuine commitment by the conflicting parties. However, the
context of the current peace process is different from the 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord,
which was never implemented. The accords provisions included a cease-fire to be
monitored by the international community, the demobilization of RUF combatants, the
restructuring of the army, the withdrawal of mercenaries, and the creation of conditions
needed for the RUF to register as a political party. Despite the similarity of the peace
agreement provisions, certain factors have been in favor of a more serious commitment of
the parties to a peaceful solution: first, the perception of the RUF has changed and it has
been recognized internationally as a negotiating partner. Second, since the assault on
Freetown in January 1999, the government has realized that it cannot win the war
militarily, since the rebels control some two-thirds of the country. Third, the commitment
of the Nigerian civilian government to maintain the same number of ECOMOG
peacekeepers has become unlikely, and urged the government to find a negotiated
solution. Also, international pressure and the integration of neighboring Liberia, Burkina
Faso and Guinea in the peace process have improved prospectives for a regional solution,
needed to ensure peace in the sub-region (IRIN, 6 July 1999; BBC, 20 August 1999). The
Sierra Leonean peace process has affected Liberia, suffering from rebel incursions
possibly by Liberian fighters, disenchanted by Charles Taylor and excluded from the
benefits of the peace agreement (IRIN, August 1999).

However, several problems and doubts remain to be addressed in the implementation of
the agreement. Power sharing between the government and the rebel forces became the
main issue in the search for a peaceful solution. The rebels were in a position of force vis-
-vis the government in controlling two-thirds of the country and therefore, any
agreement with no benefits, including legitimate access to political power and to natural
resources, to the rebels would have certainly been unsustainable. However, the recent
hostage taking and killing of the UN personnel and sporadic rebel activities in the
unstable border region between Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone (IRIN, August 1999)
reflects the importance of a regional solution to the conflict and integration of all parties,
including minor militia groups into the dividends of the peace agreement.

209
However, power sharing, especially if based on blanket amnesty, with rebel forces having
carried out a deliberate policy of mutilation and terrorism against the civilian population
appears to be an unbearable solution in the long run (IRIN, 6 July 1999). The UN and the
EU have both expressed reservations about a general amnesty included in the Lom
peace agreement. There is no peace without justice and therefore, the establishment of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, together with the National Human Rights
Commission, could play a crucial role in healing war-time trauma and contribute to
national reconciliation.

The establishment of an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program
for some 33,000 ex-combatants (IRIN, 9 July 1999) remains the major challenge to the
peace process. The deployment of UNOMSIL and ECOMOG-led peace-keeping forces
has to be accompanied by efforts to improve the relations between the militia and local
communities, having suffered from atrocities, and to demilitarize the whole society, in
which looting and pillaging have become a way of life.

At the regional level, ECOWAS efforts to discuss recent developments in Liberia, Guinea
and Sierra Leone (IRIN, 26 August 1999) stresses the need for an integrated approach to
conflicts in the border regions. At the overall level, the Nigerian role in sub-regional
peace-keeping continues to be important despite its willingness to diminish the financial
burden of peace-keeping activities (IRIN, 12 July 1999). Moreover, the Sierra Leonean
case shows how neighboring countries, mainly Liberia and Burkina Faso, often play a
crucial role in the continuation of combats to the extent that no solution can be found
without their compliance. This raises the question of international sanctions against
external forces fueling the civil conflict or the integration of regional actors in the
negotiations if direct conflicting parties are dependent on them. The cooperation of the
international community is crucial for the sustainable settlement of the Sierra Leone
protracted conflict.



210
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Chronology

1990: Outbreak of the Liberian civil war. Estimated 125,000 Liberians took refuge in Sierra Leone.
Some 500 Sierra Leonean troops joined the ECOMOG, dispatched to Liberia.
1991: Deployment of troops on the Liberian border. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) initiate the
civil war.
1992: The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) ousted the All Peoples Congress (APC)
government, in power since 1978, from power. ECOMOG units along the border between Sierra Leone
and Liberia. The RUF demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops.
1994: The NPRC government offer of negotiations rejected by the RUF.
1995: The RUF prepared to negotiate with the government. The UN and the OAU appeals for peace
negotiations. The OAU negotiations with RUF representatives.
January-July 1996: Legislative and presidential elections in February, leading to the establishment of
civilian rule by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the government announced that the RUF had agreed to a cease-
fire.
211
November 30, 1996: Abidjan Peace Accord: RUF forces were to be demobilized and the movement
was to be reconstituted as a political organization, while all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from
the country and replaced by foreign observers. Establishment of a National Commission to monitor the
peace agreement. The agreement failed to bring an end to the war: RUF leadership subsequently
became fractured; its leader Sankoh was deposed and incarcerated in Lagos.
February-March 1997: Departure of foreign mercenaries. Repatriation of refugees from Liberia
commenced.
May 25, 1997: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) ousted President Kabbah.
October 27, 1997: Conakry Peace Accord to restore civilian rule. Key issues concerned the cease-fire,
the future role of Nigerian peacekeepers, the disarming of Sierra Leonean troops, and the release of
RUF leader Foday Sankoh.
February-March 1998: ECOMOG launched a major offensive and unseated the AFRC. Concern over
the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone. Kabbah reinstated, leading to the restoration of
civilian rule.
June-July 1998: The UN Security Council lifted the embargo on arms sales to President Kabbahs
government, while tightening sanctions against the rebel soldiers. AFRC/RUF troops continued to
terrorize civilians. UN observation force to Sierra Leone.
October 1998: Some AFRC/RUF collaborators sentenced to death. Foday Sankoh sentenced to death
on charges of treason, appealed to the High Court.
November 1998-February 1999: Charles Taylors offers to mediate in the Sierra Leone crisis, while
denying his alleged involvement in the conflict. January 1999: massive rebel attack on Freetown
leading to major atrocities in the city.
March-April 1999: Exploratory contacts between the RUF and regional mediators took place in Togo.
Fighting continues. Refugee camps suffer from an extremely precarious situation. Peace forum
discusses eventual power-sharing arrangement in April.
May-June 1999: Ceasefire agreement on May 24. Popular protests against power sharing between the
government and the RUF. Sankoh liberated.
July 7, 1999: Signature of the Lom peace agreement by president Kabbah, the RUF and neighboring
Liberia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Togo. The agreement provides for the RUF to become a political party
and grants it four cabinet posts and four deputy ministerial posts. Sankoh becomes chairman of a
commission for the management of strategic resources, national reconstruction and development and
enjoys the status of vice president; amnesty for fighters on both sides for offenses committed since
1991; creation of Truth and Reconciliation Commission and National Human Rights Commission;
review of the Constitution and creation of independent Electoral Commission; disarmament and
demobilization under ECOMOG and UNOMSIL supervision; reintegration of ex-fighters. Total death
toll estimated at some 20,000 to 50,000 and half of the 4.5 million population displaced (Human
Rights Watch). Establishment of a program for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR),
to be implemented within six weeks. The international community protest against blanket amnesty for
human rights violators.
August 1999: Renegade soldiers of the AFRC take 40 UN observers and civilians hostage to protest
against their perceived marginalization in the Lom agreement, which they later recognized following
the views of their leader Johnny Paul Koromah. Delays in disarmament. Sankoh has not returned to
Freetown due to security concerns. Census on war amputees. Plans for phased withdrawal of 12,000
Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone.
May 2000: Detention and killing of UNAMSIL troops in rebel areas. UK military support to Sierra
Leonean government.