18. RUFINO T. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

, respondents Facts: In 1948, Amado Cruz asked asked the help of Samson to get the checks of the two claimants. Samson accompanied Cruz and the supposed claimants to Lt. Manuel Valencia and requested him to act as guarantor. Acting on the assurance from Samson, Lt. Valencia helped the supposed claimants secure the checks in the name of Rosalina Paras and Espiridion Lascano; Mallari encashed the checks. Samson received P10 for his taxi fare and P300 to pay the officers who helped them for the processing. Two days later, Samson was informed of the possibility that the two supposed claimants might not be the real claimants. He verified this information and found the real claimants. He reported the incident to an officer. Samson was charged with the crime of estafa through falsification by gross imprudence. Samson appealed. Issues: WON petitioners charge of being guilty of estafa through falsification by imprudence is correct. Decision: Since appellant was aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount of twelve thousand pesos, he must have been prudent to satisfy himself with all the proper and adequate means of identity of the claimants, them being personally unknown to him. As a lieutenant of the Army, he must be sufficiently intelligent and educated to foresee that the certificates could be forged or stolen. He cooperated in the complex crime of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which the crime could not have been accomplished and there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability. The imprudent act does not include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence. 19. MARCELINO LONTOK, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO GORGONIO, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal, respondent. Facts: In 1979, while the petitioner was driving his Mercedes Benz, he bumped a passenger jeep, causing damage to it and physical injuries to three passengers. The petitioner then filed for a motion to quash that part of the information wherein the offense of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be tried by the municipal court on an information charging the complex crime of damage to property and physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Decision: It is ordered to try the petitioner only for damage to property through reckless imprudence and has no more culpability for the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence charged therein since the offense of physical injuries through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, petitioners criminal liability therefor was already extinguished. 20. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LORENZO REODICA and SINFOROSO CORDERO, defendants Facts: Reodica was charged by the CFI of Palawan for the falsification of a public document. On July, 1931, Reodica, then treasurer of Bacuit, Palawan, allegedly falsified municipal payroll documents by making it appear that Sinforoso Cordero, who was on leave, rendered services as secretary for that month. The payroll was received by Reodica, with an authorization by the municipal president allowing him to pay Cordero. Issue: WON the acts of Reodica constitute falsification of public document.

Decision: While the information stated that the Reodica certified in the payroll that paid Sinforoso Corderos salary on July 31, 1931, it does not allege, however, that this was not true, and although it appears that Reodica made this payment on July 23, he was not charged, Cordero having been in fact paid services. The alterations in the certification do not affect the veracity of the document and do not constitute the crime of falsification. The appealed judgment is reversed, and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.

21. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants Facts: Pugay and Samson were charged by the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the crime of murder for the death of Miranda. The former, for the purpose of entertainment poured a can of gasoline to Mirandas body, while the latter set Mirandas body on fire making a human torch out if him. Both appealed to the Supreme Court for the reversal of judgment. Issue: Whether or not criminal intent is present, ensuring that the crime committed is murder. Decision: The appeal was without merit. For Pugay: Having taken the can from under the engine of the Ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, he knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. Judgment for guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder was lowered to guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. For Samson: There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Judgment for guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder was lowered to homicide.

22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SATUR APOSAGA y GUTIEREZ, appellant. Facts: On March 1992, Medel Sigueza and company were having drinking session. When Sigueza decided to go home, the group went to accompany him and they happened to pass by the appellant. Sigueza invited him to join them but appellant angrily declined. At around 11:00 oclock in the evening, the group started on their way home when appellant suddenly appeared from behind a mango tree. Appellant, who was carrying an axe in his right hand and a long pointed instrument in his left, advanced towards the group. Alipoon, member of the group, tried to pacify appellant. But appellant assaulted and stabbed inflicting upon him injuries which caused his death. Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstances for murder are present. Decision: The qualifying circumstance of treachery is not present because there was no proof that the deceased could not have put up a fight when appellant stabbed the deceased from behind. Appellant contends that it would be improbable for him to conceive of attacking the deceased, who was in the

company of three friends who could easily defend the deceased from any untoward act of appellant. Hence, there is no proof that appellant employed ways and means to insure the killing of the deceased without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. Judgment for guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder was modified to guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, with costs de oficio.

23. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AH CHONG, defendant-appellant. Facts: The defendant, a cook, was sleeping when he was awakened by someone trying to open the door of his quarters. When he called out asking for the identity of the intruder, he received no answer. Thinking it was a thief, he leaped to his feet, threatening to kill the intruder if he persisted. Ah Chong was struck above the knee by the edge of a chair and he thought that the blow was inflicted by the intruder. He then seized a common kitchen knife and struck out the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. The roommate eventually died. Issue: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of mistake of fact for the criminal liability is present. Decision: The case was a mistake of fact resulting to self-defense justified in the Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. Ah Chong struck the fatal blow in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstance , he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing his legitimate right of selfdefense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts. Ah Chong was aquitted.