Firefight in Sangin: The Death of Pte. Robert Costall

MEDSUMMREP 2006-02.
14
Updated September 15, 2007
MILNEWS.CA
MEDIA SUMMARY REPORT
Firefight in Sangin:
The Death of Pte. Robert Costall
Tony Prudori
Editor, MILNEWS.ca
tony@milnews.ca
All material contained in this report is taken or paraphrased from

open sources. Direct quotes are not footnoted only to ease reading,
but all material consulted is included in the Bibliography.
MILNEWS.ca is not responsible for the accuracy of the base data or
the reporters’ interpretation of events. All media material shared in
accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the
Copyright Act, http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409 .
This report may be updated as events warrant.
© Tony Prudori, 2007. All Rights Reserved.
1
MEDSUMMREP 2006-02.14
Table of Contents
Background 2
Fire Base Robinson 3
The Ambush 3
Quick Response Force, Under Fire 4
Follow-up 6
Friendly Fire? 8
USA Investigations 9
Results of Canadian Forces Investigations 10
Bibliography 12
Background
Operation ARCHER, Canada’s contribution to the international campaign against
terrorism, is carried out by Task Force Afghanistan (TFA), an organization of
approximately 2,300 combat arms and support troops. Part of TFA is a Battle Group,
known as Task Force Orion (TF Orion), of about 1,000 members located in and around
Kandahar. In March 2006, TF Orion was primarily built around 1 st Battalion Princess
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (1 PPCLI) from Edmonton, and includes engineering,
artillery, and armoured reconnaissance support, as well as a Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT) and a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit. TF Orion is based at
Kandahar airfield, but conducts operations throughout the area.
TF Orion is part of a larger organization, Combined Task Force (CTF) Aegis, a

multinational effort led in March 2006 by Canadian Brigadier General David Fraser,
with Canada in charge of Kandahar, the United Kingdom as lead in Helmand, the
Netherlands controlling Oruzgan and the Americans maintaining Zabul. CTF Aegis is
listed as a “subordinate unit” to Combined Joint Task Force-76 (CJTF-76), whose
mission is, “to conduct a full spectrum of operations throughout its operations area to
defeat enemy extremist movement, establish an enduring security and reshape its
posture for the Long War in order to set conditions for long-term stability in
Afghanistan.” CJTF-76, a subordinate unit to Combined Forces Command-
Afghanistan, was commanded by U.S. Army Major General Benjamin Freakley in March
2006.
Immediately west of Kandahar is Helmand province, one of 34 in Afghanistan, located

at the south-west corner of the country. Helmand shares a border with Pakistan in the
south. It has a population of more than 1,000,000 (largely of Pashtun ethnicity), and
covers approximately 59,600 square kilometres, making it somewhat larger than Nova
Scotia. The Helmand River flows through the mainly desert region, providing irrigation
to the plains in the area.
2
Helmand is considered to be in “a dominant position” in Afghanistan as an opium

producer, accounting for around 25 percent of the national opium poppy cultivated area
in recent years. Within the province, Sangin District has been described as a major
poppy growing area. It reportedly features a number of factors that can contribute to
instability and insurgency: no local police or military presence, a number of roads
converging in the area, three different tribal groups living in close proximity. Some of
the illegal drug activity is reportedly financing the insurgents.
Fire Base Robinson

In mid-February 2006, an Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Forward Operating Base
(FOB) was reportedly set up near the village of Heydarabad (referred to as “Heder
Abad” in one media report from an embedded Canadian reporter). The FOB was
reportedly named “FOB Robinson” in memory of an American soldier killed in the area.
A statement by the U.S. Department of Defense said, “Staff Sergeant Christopher L.
Robinson, 36, Brandon, Miss., died in Sangin District, Afghanistan on March 25, when
his vehicle came under enemy small arms fire during combat operations. Robinson
was assigned to the Army National Guard's 2nd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group,
Jackson, Mississippi.”
FOB Robinson is described as being a small outpost, mostly made up of defensive

works, tents and razor wire. One description: “it is marked off only by an internal
"fence" of sandbags and an external one, perhaps 30 feet beyond, of concertina wire ...
It sits surrounded by known enemy — three local Taliban commanders are known by
name to coalition forces — on three of four sides, with a half-dozen tiny nearby
villages, more affluent than is usual in this impoverished nation, of suspect loyalties.”
The FOB reportedly contained to 100 troops - mostly of ANA soldiers, with some (one
media report mentions “a handful”) U.S. military training staff. One media report
mentions a US Special Forces presence at the FOB as well. British military officials are
quoted in early reports saying the FOB had periodically come under “probing mortar
attacks” over the past five or six weeks. Later media reports describe the FOB as
having come under some form of attack on 25 of the previous 40 days. Afghanistan
National Police officials working in Sangin have been quoted by media saying Taliban
attacks have intensified since the U.S. transferred control of operations in Helmand to
British forces. One police officer told reporters, “The Taliban has threatened the
government, saying they have 600 suicide bombers waiting for the British troops and
government officials.”
The Ambush
On March 28, 2006, an Afghanistan National Army (ANA) convoy was bringing supplies
from a village in the area to a remote FOB in Sangin District. At approximately 1500
local (1030 UTC), the ANA convoy came under small arms and rocket propelled
3
grenade (RPG) fire approximately eight kilometres from the FOB (although one media
account from a reporter in Kandahar indicates it was 13 kilometres from the FOB).
Media reports indicate a remote controlled improvised explosive device (IED) was
detonated, cratering the road and isolating the convoy. Eight ANA troops were
reportedly killed in the ambush.
As troops from FOB Robinson were preparing to assist the stranded convoy, insurgents
attacked the FOB on three sides with mortar, machine gun and rocket propelled
grenades. In response to the attack, Coalition commanders authorized air strikes in
support of the FOB. Media reports indicate two British Harriers, two American Apache
gunships were dispatched, as well as bombing raids by B-52 heavy bombers. One
media report says the air support was “supplementing direct-fire weapons and mortar
volleys.”
Quick Response Force, Under Fire

According to www.timeanddate.com, the sun set in Kabul ( http://tinyurl.com/qwun5 )on
March 28 at approximately 1810 local (1340 Z).
When air strikes proved ineffective, at approximately 2200 local (1730 Z), a Quick
Response Force (QRF) based at Kandahar Airfield was tasked with reinforcing the
FOB. At that point, 7 Platoon, C Company, 1 PPCLI was the unit ready to respond to
such calls for help. The platoon’s 38 troops, following a one hour flight, were inserted
into the FOB, arriving at approximately 2300 local (1830Z).
According to one media report, Sergeant First Class John Thomas Stone, 52, was
already dead when the QRF arrived at the FOB. SFC Stone was a National Guard
medic from Vermont, assigned to the U.S. Army National Guard’s 15th Civil Support
Team. A U.S. Department of Defense statement issued March 30 indicated that SFC
Stone was killed, “as a result of enemy mortar and small arms attacks during combat
operations hostile small arms and mortar fire.” Other media reports indicate that Stone
may have been killed while treating Costall’s injuries.
At approximately 0130 local (2100Z) on March 29, 2006, the insurgents launched a
major attack on the FOB. Media reports indicate the insurgents were firing into the
FOB from nearby hills “from multiple directions” with small arms and rocket propelled
grenades. Speaking after the firefight, the OC C Company is quoted saying, "They'd
come under a fairly heavy rain of fire from what appeared to be a coordinated attack
involving mortars, RPGs, which are shoulder launched grenades, machine guns and
small arms fire."
One detailed account described how the Taliban attacked the FOB: “Some crossed the
looping Helmand River on small craft and approached across a series of desert bumps;
4
others emerged from a sculpted promontory to the west — which has since been
bulldozed; a third wave scrambled from a clot of ruins towards the northern perimeter of
the base...”
A news release issued by CENTCOM following the battle said, “(Afghan Army) and
Coalition ground forces engaged an estimated 20 enemy with small-arms fire. In
addition, close-air support aircraft delivered 11 Joint Direct Attack Munitions on enemy
positions.”
During the firefight, Pte. Costall was reportedly manning a C-9 Light Machine Gun
(5.56mm) during the firefight. One media account indicated that Costall may have
been shot in the head while moving with a group to reinforce one corner of the FOB
“outside the protection of the main area, another account described shots to the head
and chest and yet another mentioned a shot in the back of the head and in the side.
A media account based on interviews with troops involved in the firefight said, “Costall
and other members of his (section) were ordered to take positions outside the relative
safety of the base's inner sandbagged walls, to defend a vulnerable corner of the outer
base. They moved through a makeshift gate, crossing an open, sandy area to a
sheltered spot behind a wall of American (HESCO) barriers – giant, sand-filled wire
baskets which form a perimeter on one side of the base. There on the open sand, as
they made their way to the barrier wall, Costall was reportedly hit and killed and three
of his comrades were wounded. The opening through which they passed, from the
inner sandbags to the outer perimeter, has been named ‘Costall's gate.’ "
Another media report quoted an unidentified military official saying, “They may have
moved in between two sections firing at each other ... I'm not sure they were mistaken
for Taliban as much as they might have gotten caught up in somebody's arc of fire or
somebody was shootin' over their head."
Later media reports, quoting un-named sources and Afghan National Police officials
from Sangin, indicate the shots that killed Costall came from Taliban forces.
The most recent media reports (May 2007) reported, “Costall was laying down fire in a
narrow band between the inside sand berm and the outer razor wire when he was
felled. An autopsy in Toronto determined he'd been hit twice – once through the chest
and once in the back of the head. But because there were no bullet fragments
recovered, ballistic testing was unable to identify whether Costall had been shot by
weapons issued to Canadian, American or Afghan troops, or the Kalashnikovs typically
used by Taliban fighters.”
Three Canadians, one American and one ANA soldier were injured in the firefight. The
5
three Canadians injured in the attack were described as having non-life threatening
flesh wounds from gunshots.
A Canadian Forces statement said the dead and wounded were evacuated by Black
Hawk helicopter to the hospital at Kandahar airfield. Later the same day, the three
Canadians injured in the battle attended the ceremony for the repatriation of Pte.
Costall to Canada, one sitting in a wheelchair with bandaged lower legs, one on
crutches, and the other with a plastic leg cast.
Coalition forces were reportedly caught off guard by the intensity of the attack. British
Colonel Chris Vernon, chief of staff for Combined Task Force Aegis, told reporters at a
March 29 briefing in Kandahar, "The Taliban generally operate in small groups of eight
to 10, and they will generally avoid confrontation against larger numbers ... The size
and tenacity may have slightly exceeded our estimates." Other media quoted different
military sources describing the exchange of fire, which reportedly lasted several hours,
as a “pretty fierce firefight” and “a sustained assault.” One reporter is quoted calling
the firefight, “the biggest battle in Afghanistan for two months.”
Follow-up
A Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan statement issued April 4 said, “In the
course of their pursuit, Coalition forces destroyed two Taliban headquarters buildings
and overran a Taliban compound. The Coalition forces discovered and destroyed large
caches of munitions, including weapons and materials for making improvised explosive
devices.” One media account described the destruction of more than 450 kilograms of
ammonia nitrate, a fertilizer used as an explosive in IED’s.
Early media accounts indicated that by sunrise on March 29 (0545 local, 0115 Z),
military sources reported to media that “all was quiet” at the FOB, and that battle
damage assessment was under way. At approximately 0600 local (0130 Z) on March
29 (the day after his 34th birthday), OC C Company, Major Bill Fletcher told reporters he
told the rest of C Company about the death and injuries at the FOB battle. Later media
accounts indicated the firefight continued until noon local (0730Z) on March 29, with
one Canadian commander quoted saying the firefight “raged all day, through the night
and right through the morning of the 29th.”
Media reports quoting various military sources and statements indicated that between
32 and 34 enemy were killed, mostly by close air support. One media report quotes the
OC C Company saying that there were approximately 70 enemy casualties. One of the
reasons for the difficulty in estimating Taliban dead is that, in the words of OC C
Company,” ‘’as part of the honour amongst warriors,’‘ coalition forces allow the Taliban
to retrieve their fallen and wounded "so long as they're not shooting at us" when they
do it.”
6
At the March 29 briefing at Kandahar, Col. Vernon was asked about Afghan media
reports that there had been civilian casualties and damage to civilian homes in the
area. His response: "I find that very unlikely. I've seen the aerial photographs around
the (FOB). It's in the middle of nowhere. The attacks came over open ground. I cannot
see in any way how any degree of civilian damage could have been inflicted because
there isn't any civilian habitation around. It's almost in the middle of nowhere."
An Afghan National Police official told reporters later that, “civilians outside the forward
operating base were killed when B-52s were called in to bomb a nearby compound into
which Taliban fighters had fled.”
On April 2, Operation Ketara (Pashtun for “dagger”) was launched. Although TF Aegis
is a subordinate unit to CJTF-76, with an American commander, one media report
indicated that the operation was “under British oversight,” perhaps because the
Helmand area is under nominal British command.
The remainder of C Company 1 PPCLI conducted an approximately 24 hour road

move, supported by elements of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, reconnaissance
units and American air support. The convoy reportedly arrived at FOB Robinson at
approximately 0700 local (0230Z) on April 3, to further reinforce the FOB. The OC of C
Company is quoted telling officers and reporters that the aims of OP Ketara were to:
• Reinforce FOB Robinson until relieved by British troops;
• Be prepared to proved support to a nearby Provincial Reconstruction
Team manned by U.S. forces in Lashkar Gah (the provincial capital of
Helmand);
• Disrupt Taliban Forces in the area, denying them access to the transport
corridor in the area;
• Create “settled conditions” as a prelude to British and U.S. forces
beginning opium poppy eradication efforts; and
• “Support "the kill-capture" mission of special forces in the area.”
The enemy situation, as outlined in the pre-mission briefing, appears to be as follows:

• An estimated 150 Taliban hard core remain in the area, with three
identified leaders, likely reinforced by poppy farmers and warlords in the
area;
• “Remnants of the repressive Islamic fundamentalist Taliban, who ruled
most of this embattled country until the U.S. invasion in the fall of 2001,
still enjoy some local support”;
• An estimated half-dozen suicide bombers in cars, searching the Kandahar
area for the Op Ketara convoy;
• The insurgents in the area have been able to quickly activate pre-planted
improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and
7
• “They are sophisticated and disciplined enough to maintain both radio

silence and a fighting reserve.”
During C Company’s road move, one of the LAV’s in the convoy had its main armament
hit by a vehicle, causing the turret to swing around and injure two soldiers on air sentry
seriously enough to be evacuated by helicopter. The injuries were reportedly not life
threatening.
C Company’s 7 Platoon had been moved back to Kandahar airfield shortly before or
shortly after the convoy entered FOB Robinson. While C Company is reportedly to be
in place longer than 7 Platoon was, no timeframe has been given in media reports.
After briefly visiting the area, Brig. Gen. Fraser ordered reporters out of FOB Robinson
because of the security situation in the area.
Friendly Fire?
Immediately following the firefight, a CF statement issued April 4 said, “a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service
(CFNIS) and the U.S. military ... the initial findings justify the requirement for further
investigation to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the firefight,
including whether any of the casualties may have resulted from “friendly fire... As a
consequence, a full CFNIS investigation has been initiated. Separately, but in
cooperation with CFNIS, the U.S. military is also investigating." Later media reports
indicated Afghan authorities also conducted their own probe.
Then-Commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, U.S. Lt. Gen. Karl

Eikenberry, reportedly determined that an investigation was needed following an initial
review of the facts. A media report indicated that, “forensic evidence was uncovered by
the military police investigation that suggested Costall's death could have come from
friendly fire. Maj. Bud Garroch, the (CFNIS’s) senior operating officer, (said) his four-
man team of military police working out of Kandahar have ‘’cause for concern’‘ due to
evidence they've gathered and from initial interviews with soldiers.” One media
account indicated that Brig. Gen. Fraser was told by injured troops he visited in hospital
that they may have been, “shot by our own side.”
The Commander of CJTF-76 formed a U.S., Canadian and Afghan investigation team
whose members will work separately, but in co-operation with each other, to produce
three separate “national investigational reports.” Some media reports indicate the
investigation could take “weeks or months,” although one report quotes a Canadian
“military official” saying it could take approximately two weeks, if not a little longer. A
more detailed report quoting a CFNIS source said four military police officers had been
sent to Kandahar to assist in the investigation, which he said would be “wrapped up in
weeks,” after which the CF is expected to conduct a board of inquiry into the incident.
8
The CF statement described how complicated the situation was: “Coalition military
operations in Afghanistan are complex. Terrain, weather and threat levels combine to
create an extremely challenging operating environment. The fact that this incident
occurred at night, with attacks from multiple directions, just adds to the complexity.”
Brig. Gen. Fraser is quoted in several accounts ruling out friendly casualties from the
air strike.
According to media reports published in May 2007, the five-person Canadian Board of
Inquiry (BOI) finished its investigation in July 2006, and submitted a report to Canadian
Expeditionary Forces Command. Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier is said to
have had a copy of the report since the summer of 2006. Media reports indicate that
the report will not be released until vetted by American and Afghan military officials,
who reportedly have the right to designate any of the contents classified.
General Hillier is quoted saying he is frustrated by how long it is taking for the reports
to be made public, telling reporters on or around May 3, 2007 that “within the next
month, we’ll be ready to go completely public and say here’s what we found in that
(BOI).”
USA Investigations
Media reports published July 2 and 3, 2007 indicate Associated Press (AP) received
documents requested under the Freedom of Information Act from CENTCOM regarding
the March 2006 incident. One report indicates the main source of information for the
media coverage came from executive summaries of two investigations into the incident,
one conducted by “Department of Defence command in Kandahar”, the other by the 3rd
Special Forces Group based in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
The reports quoted by AP indicate machine gun fire (specifically, from an M240) from a
Special Forces compound at FOB Robinson killed both Pte. Costall and Sgt. Stone.
One eyewitness (whose name was redacted from the reports) said during the peak of
the firefight around 0215 local time, “the (Special Forces) security element in the
northeast corner began shooting .... at the Canadian position.” At this point, the report
suggests Pte. Costall was killed by two gunshots, one to the head, the other to the
chest – sach potentially-fatal shots by themselves. After the witness blew a whistle to
stop the fire in that direction, he is quoted saying, “the (Special Forces) security
element then turned his weapon 100 to 140 degrees .... and began firing in the
direction of the American (Embedded Training Team) compound.” This is when Sgt.
Stone was hit while he was crouched on a rooftop, once in the head, once in the back.
His body armour was reportedly under his cot. This contradicts earlier, unconfirmed
reports that Sgt. Stone had been shot trying to provide first aid to Pte. Costall. Initial
media reports indicate that American soldiers were interviewed, but not two Special
Forces machine gunners who appear to have been operating the M240 at the time of
9
the incident.
A second AP report, published July 3, 2007, indicates that US Army officials

recommend that no charges be laid against the Special Forces machine gunner
implicated in the incident. The second report referred to in this article indicates two
machine gunners were interviewed, but neither acknowledged firing the fatal shots. AP
quotes this second report saying, “their statements lack credibility.” The second report
says the deaths, “while regrettable, are understandable in the context of this firefight.”
The second report said factors contributing to the situation included “inaccurate target
identification”, “an inadequate defence plan”, fatigue and exhaustion, “a lack of
communications from headquarters,” and “significant supply problems” at the FOB. At
one point, US troops reportedly bought food using their own funds to feed Afghan
troops co-located at the FOB. Another issue raised was that Pte. Costall’s platoon
arrived at approximately the same time as an 80-vehicle resupply convoy, causing
some confusion regarding where the various vehicles and soldiers should be located.
AP says Sgt. Stone’s family was briefed on the report in May 2007. CEFCOM
Commander Ken MacKillop is quoted saying two Canadian Forces investigations into
the incident are still being reviewed, offering no timeline for public release of further
information. One unconfirmed report indicates Chief of Defense Staff General Rick
Hillier may have received a report from CEFCOM in July 2006, and is still reviewing it.
When reached in B.C. for comment, Pte. Costall’s father, Greg, is quoted saying he’d
heard about the US report, but wanted to see the Canadian report before commenting
further. Costall’s brother, Buddy, is quoted in another account saying, "One never likes
to learn that it was in error a loved one dies. But nothing detracts from his
accomplishments."
When reached for comment in Thunder Bay, Costall's aunt, Colleen McBain, told a
local radio station that was still waiting for an apology from the U.S. military at that
point. "Apologies for the mistake, to my knowledge, haven't been issued from the U.S.
military to the family members," she is quoted saying in a Canadian Press account on
July 4, 2007.
Results of Canadian Forces Investigations

On August 7, 2007, CEFCOM released the results of the Board of Inquiry looking into
the incident. A news release stated: “Private Costall was killed as a result of gun fire
originating from a weapon manned by a US Army soldier during an attack of
unprecedented intensity by Taliban forces from multiple directions. The firefight
resulted in the death of Private Robert Costall and injuries to three other Canadian
soldiers serving with the Canadian Quick Response Force of Task Force Afghanistan.”
CEFCOM Commander Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier said in a statement, “The
10
report clearly documents the sequence of events and the situational context in which
this unfortunate event occurred. Private Costall was killed as a result of an attack of
unprecedented intensity by Taliban forces from multiple directions. In the heat of this
battle, our troops were engaged by other friendly forces defending FOB Robinson
leading to Private Costall’s death and a number of wounded. “
The Canadian Forces National Investigative Service also issued a statement, saying it
had, “concluded that they will not be laying charges in relation to this matter”.
The Costall family also issued a statement through the Canadian Forces on August 7,
2007, stating: “He should be remembered for holding the door of hope open to the
people of Afghanistan. Remembered not for how he died but rather for what he lived
for. Being Canadian, proud, strong and free.”
11
Bibliography
“34 dead in attack on Afghan base.” Daily Times (Pakistan), 30 Mar 06, from
http://tinyurl.com/h5z66 .
"Afghan battle probed for possible "friendly fire"." Reuters, 040758Z Apr 06, from
http://tinyurl.com/ojz5a .
“Afghan fighting leaves '34 dead'.” BBC News Online, 29 Mar 06, from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4855634.stm .
"Afghanistan 'friendly fire' probe." BBC News online, 041006Z Apr 06, from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4874698.stm .
"Aunt of Cdn. soldier killed in Afghan friendly fire incident awaits apology," Canadian
Press, via the Journal-Pioneer (Summerside, PEI), 4 Jul 07, from
http://tinyurl.com/yr7eev .
Blatchford, Christie. “Canadian soldier injured in suicide bombing.” Globe & Mail, 31
Mar 06, p. A15.
Blatchford, Christie. "In the Afghan badlands, troops get haunting news ." Globe &
Mail, 4 Apr 06, from http://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/97976 .
Blatchford, Christine. “How Pte. Costall Died.” Globe & Mail, 30 Mar 06, p. A1.
Blatchford, Christie. "Nature of soldier's wounds fuels friendly-fire theory." Globe &
Mail Online, 5 Apr 06, from http://tinyurl.com/f78vf .
Brewster, Murray. "Afghan police in Sangin say Taliban shots killed Canadian soldier."
Canadian Press, 10 Apr 06, from http://tinyurl.com/ehxaj .
Brewster, Murray. "Canadian reinforcements take up position at firebase where soldier

died." Canadian Press, 2 Apr 06, from http://tinyurl.com/qm8j9 .
Brewster, Murray. “Canadian soldier died defending outpost in bold assault by Afghan
militants.” Canadian Press, 30 Mar 06, from http://tinyurl.com/lromm .
Brewster, Murray. "Canadian soldier likely caught in crossfire, military sources say."
Canadian Press, 5 Apr 06, from http://tinyurl.com/gt45m .
Brewster, Murray. "Friendly fire investigation could take weeks, months." Canadian
12
Press, 4 Apr 06, from http://thechronicleherald.ca/AftUpdate/9000754.html .
Brewster, Murray. "Investigators considering friendly fire in death of Canadian soldier."

Canadian Press, 4 Apr 06, from http://tinyurl.com/lmqng .
Brewster, Murray. "Investigators considering friendly fire in death of Canadian soldier."

Canadian Press, 5 Apr 06, from http://tinyurl.com/q2h8n .
"Canadian Forces Initiate Formal Investigation into March 28 Firefight in Sangin

District." Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command news release, Number NR-06.006,
4 Apr 06, from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1889 .
“Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan.” Canadian Forces Fact Sheet, Number

BG–06.003, 28 Feb 06, from http://tinyurl.com/k5rn9 .
"Collateral Fratricide Investigation, FOB Robinson, 28-29 Mar 2006," US military report,
obtained from Associated Press, from
http://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/f/USA-Costall-Reports-AP.pdf .
"Combined/Joint Task Force 76." Web page, viewed 4 Apr 06, from
http://cjtf76.army.mil/main.html .
"Costall killed instantly in Afghan firefight: CTV." CTV News online, 022328E Apr 06,
from http://tinyurl.com/qmepl .
Den Tandt, Michael. "Full inquiry planned in soldier's death." Globe & Mail online, 5
Apr 06, from http://tinyurl.com/etasr .
DiManno, Rosie. "7 Platoon soldiers waiting to tell their story." Toronto Star, 11 Apr
06, from http://tinyurl.com/fbbmy .
DiManno, Rosie. “A warrior's final battle.” Toronto Star, 30 Mar 06, p. A1.
DiManno, Rosie. "Did friendly fire kill soldier?" Toronto Star, 4 Apr 06, from
http://tinyurl.com/o4vnq .
DiManno, Rosie. "Friendly fire killed Canadian: U.S. Army." Toronto Star, 3 Jul 07,
from
http://www.thestar.com/columnists/article/231806 .
DiManno, Rosie. "Friendly fire? Still no answers," Toronto Star, 7 May 07, from
http://tinyurl.com/yrlggb .
13
DiManno, Rosie. “Officer 'At the end of the day, he died for a reason'.” Toronto Star,
30 Mar 06, p. A7.
DiManno, Rosie. "Taliban killed Canadian." Toronto Star, 10 Apr 06, from
http://tinyurl.com/z76xt .
DiManno, Rosie. "Was Canadian soldier slain by friendly fire?" Toronto Star online, 5
Apr 06, from http://tinyurl.com/gbwuj .
"DoD Identifies Army Casualty." U.S. Department of Defense news release, Number
248-06, 27 Mar 06, from
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2006/nr20060327-12707.html .
"DoD Identifies Army Casualty." U.S. Department of Defense news release, Number
261-06, 30 Mar 06, from
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2006/nr20060330-12729.html .
El Akkad, Omar and Gandhi, Unnati. "Canadian was shot in back, U.S. army confirms:
Long-awaited report points to friendly fire in Pte. Costall's death." Globe & Mail, 3 Jul
07, from http://tinyurl.com/2yhzs8 .
"Executive Summary of AR 15-6 Investigation of Incident at FOB ROBINSON

282146ZMAR06," US military report, obtained from Associated Press,
from http://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/f/USA-Costall-Reports-AP.pdf .
Foot, Richard. “Fierce battle shocked troops.” Ottawa Citizen, 30 Mar 06, p. A1.
Foot, Richard. "Friendly fire in soldiers' deaths 'a possibility'." National Post, 5 Apr 06,
p. A10.
"Forward Operating Base Robinson Board of Inquiry findings released", Canadian

Forces Expeditionary Command news release NR–07.030, 7 Aug 07, from
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2414 .
“Four Canadian and three coalition forces casualties following attack northwest of
Kandahar.” Canadian Forces Expeditionary Command news release # NR-06.007, 29
Mar 06, from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1886 .
"Friendly fire killed Canadian: Investigators find U.S. Special Forces machine-gunned
local soldier." CanWest News Service, 3 Jul 07, from http://tinyurl.com/2ftnlg .
“Friendly fire killed Canadian soldier: U.S. report.” Associated Press, via Toronto Star,
14
2 Jul 07, from http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/231695 .
"Friendly fire possible in soldiers' deaths: Army." CTV News online, 040326E Apr 06,
from http://tinyurl.com/rfch5 .
"Friendly fire probed in soldiers deaths." Canada.com, 4 Apr 06, from

http://tinyurl.com/osr7m .
Galloway, Gloria. “Helping a fallen soldier return home.” Globe & Mail, 30 Mar 06,
from http://tinyurl.com/rlmkq .
Harris, Kent. "NATO allies beef up their forces in southern Afghanistan." Stars and
Stripes, 10 Mar 06, from http://tinyurl.com/zvnok .
"Helmand Province." Wikipedia.org, viewed 30 Mar 06, from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helmand_Province .
"Investigation Into Death in Afghanistan Concluded," Canadian Forces National

Investigative Service news release CFNIS (CR) 2007-005, 7 Aug 07, from
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2417 .
"John Reid: "British task force has a vital job to do in southern Afghanistan"." Defence
News, Ministry of Defence (UK) web page, 26 Jan 06, from http://tinyurl.com/kzh7q .
“Key points: UK troop deployment to Afghanistan.” Guardian Unlimited Online, 26 Jan

06, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1695677,00.html .
Lubold, Gordon. “Possible friendly fire incident to be investigated.” Navy Times online,
4 Apr 06, from http://www.navytimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-1665643.php .
“Operation Enduring Freedom.” icasualties.org, viewed 2 Apr 06, from

http://www.icasualties.org/oef/byCountry.aspx?hndQry=US .
Pain, Adam. “Opium Trading Systems in Helmand and Ghor.” Afghanistan Research
and Evaluation Unit paper, published January 2006, viewed 30 Mar 06 from
http://tinyurl.com/r34xz .
"Report of the Board of Inquiry into the action at Forward Operating Base Robinson,
Afghanistan, 28-29 March 2006", 7 Aug 07, from
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/robinson/index_e.asp .
Ring, Wilson. "Military: Friendly Fire Killed Guardsman." Associated Press, 2 Jul 07,
15
from http://tinyurl.com/2zavzr .
Ring, Wilson. "U.S. investigators recommend no charges in friendly-fire death of

Canadian." Associated Press, 3 Jul 07, from http://tinyurl.com/36ga7x .
Rubec, Stephanie. "Killed by friendly fire?" Toronto Sun online, 5 Apr 06, from
http://torontosun.com/News/Canada/2006/04/05/pf-1520807.html .
“Soldiers upset over Afghan abuse allegations: Hillier,” CBC.ca, 2 May 06, from
http://tinyurl.com/25wbcu .
"Service Members Killed, Wounded in Action in Helmland Province." CENTCOM news

release, Number 06-03-02CM, 25 Mar 06, from http://tinyurl.com/m62vn .
“Statement by Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, Commander Canadian

Expeditionary Force Command, convening authority for the Forward Operating Base
Robinson Board of Inquiry”, Canadian Forces Expeditionary Command, CEFCOM
S-07.001, 7 Aug 07, from
"Statement Released at the Request and on Behalf of the Costall Family," Canadian
Forces Expeditionary Command news release NR–07.031, 7 Aug 07, from
“Two service members killed, others wounded in action in Helmand Province.”

Coalition Press Information Center, Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan,
Release # 060329-02, 29 Mar 06, from http://tinyurl.com/qdeyu .
“Two Service Members Killed, Wounded in Action in Helmand Province.” CENTCOM

web page, news, Release # 06-03-02CJ, from http://tinyurl.com/q2fw9 .
"U.S.-Led Team to Probe Afghanistan Deaths." Associated Press, 040557E Apr 06,
from http://tinyurl.com/mjtmg .
"Vermont Guardsman killed in Afghan hit by fire from Special Forces compound."
Associated Press, via WCAX-TV web page, 2 Jul 07, from http://tinyurl.com/2tp4fv .
16

Firefight in Sangin: The Death of Pte. Robert Costall

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Firefight in Sangin: The Death of Pte. Robert Costall

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MEDSUMMREP 2006-02.

All material contained in this report is taken or paraphrased from

TF Orion is part of a larger organization, Combined Task Force (CTF) Aegis, a

Immediately west of Kandahar is Helmand province, one of 34 in Afghanistan, located

Helmand is considered to be in “a dominant position” in Afghanistan as an opium

Fire Base Robinson

FOB Robinson is described as being a small outpost, mostly made up of defensive

Quick Response Force, Under Fire

The remainder of C Company 1 PPCLI conducted an approximately 24 hour road

The enemy situation, as outlined in the pre-mission briefing, appears to be as follows:

• “They are sophisticated and disciplined enough to maintain both radio

Then-Commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, U.S. Lt. Gen. Karl

A second AP report, published July 3, 2007, indicates that US Army officials

Results of Canadian Forces Investigations

Brewster, Murray. "Canadian reinforcements take up position at firebase where soldier

Press, 4 Apr 06, from http://thechronicleherald.ca/AftUpdate/9000754.html .

Brewster, Murray. "Investigators considering friendly fire in death of Canadian soldier."

Brewster, Murray. "Investigators considering friendly fire in death of Canadian soldier."

"Canadian Forces Initiate Formal Investigation into March 28 Firefight in Sangin

“Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan.” Canadian Forces Fact Sheet, Number

"Executive Summary of AR 15-6 Investigation of Incident at FOB ROBINSON

"Forward Operating Base Robinson Board of Inquiry findings released", Canadian

2 Jul 07, from http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/231695 .

"Friendly fire probed in soldiers deaths." Canada.com, 4 Apr 06, from

"Helmand Province." Wikipedia.org, viewed 30 Mar 06, from

"Investigation Into Death in Afghanistan Concluded," Canadian Forces National

“Key points: UK troop deployment to Afghanistan.” Guardian Unlimited Online, 26 Jan

“Operation Enduring Freedom.” icasualties.org, viewed 2 Apr 06, from

Ring, Wilson. "U.S. investigators recommend no charges in friendly-fire death of

"Service Members Killed, Wounded in Action in Helmland Province." CENTCOM news

“Statement by Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, Commander Canadian

“Two service members killed, others wounded in action in Helmand Province.”

“Two Service Members Killed, Wounded in Action in Helmand Province.” CENTCOM

You might also like