Guy Yedwab

9/27/05

World Since 1945

Blame Game: The Two Sides Of Monsieur Blame Game

The devolution of international relations into the Cold War at the end of World War Two bears

resemblance to an argument between two small children. Like small children, both the United States

and the Soviet Union strove to look like martyrs in the eyes of both their own people and the people of

their enemies, because like a schoolyard debate the final judge is the court of popular opinion.

Although each side has its legitimate complaints, neither side can escape a healthy dose of guilt when

faced with the final result. As the detentes showed, when both sides put effort into improving relations,

it was possible to make progress. However, the mutual paranoia of both sides creates the period of fear

and lack of communication between the two sides.

This passage lays the blame squarely on the shoulders of the United States and her allies. It

sights that the Soviet leadership sought to “guarantee... security their people never had known.”

However, it ascribes U.S. resistance to “capitalist ambition” and “fear that European markets and

access to resources... would be lost under Soviet rule.” The passage also cites “the Allies' suspicions of

and duplicity with the Soviet Union.” The passage's views on the fears of both the Soviet Union and the

United States are equally valid, but the passage states that the fears of the Soviet Union of invasion

were based on substance, whereas the fears of America are to blame for the tense relations. The author,

however, would agree that both sides ended the World War with grave mistrusts of each other. While I

agree with the rationale behind the Soviet fear of the Allies, the Allies had equal cause to mistrust the

Soviets. Although the Soviet Union had fought with the Allies against Hitler, it is important to note that

the basis in truth that American fears came from. Eastern Europe swiftly fell into becoming Soviet

puppet governments, through 'democratic' elections obviously tampered by Soviet agents. Countries

such as Italy, France, and Great Britain were showing strong Communist parties which Americans
believed would follow Stalinist dogma if elected. Although some Eastern European countries tried to

create their own, non-Stalinist forms of Communism, Stalin quickly muscled their leaders into the fold.

Stalin himself was a ruthless tactician, who delayed invading Poland so that the Polish Resistance

Force would break itself on the Nazis, leaving Poland unable to resist Soviet occupation after the war.

The Iron Curtain developed, restricting all movement out of the Soviet Union – and if Communism was

so detrimental to the people that the Soviet government was afraid of mass emigration, then its effects

in the Western World were interpreted likely to be similar. The rhetoric of Stalinist Russia had, except

during World War II, quite vocally denounced the capitalist (or 'imperialist') Western World. With

Turkey, the Soviet Army had threatened extensively until the Turkish government capitulated to the

Soviet demands of access to the Dardanelles.

This is not to deny that the Soviets had good cause for being wary of the Allies. The Atom

Bomb was a source of concern of the Soviet Union, and from the early days it was apparent that

Truman was waging economic war, if not on the Soviet Union, than on Soviet satellites in Eastern

Europe. However, sometimes Soviet paranoia took it beyond the actual realm of American offenses.

The prospects of invasion, although supported by past history, were not as strong at the end of World

War II. Most of the Allies were economically crippled, and America was not a country with a history of

invading without being assaulted first. When the American government lost the Soviet application for

aid, the Soviets interpreted it as a direct slight to their government and part of Truman's 'economic war.'

Although in some areas, capitalism and communism were beginning to compete, Truman had not yet

embarked on a deliberate campaign to limit communism. The end of the Lend-Lease program was in

fact cause for concern, but it must be remembered that England too was hurt by the end of the Lend-

Lease program. Truman's economic war was not so much aimed at the Soviet Union as a general effort

to improve the standing of the United States, in the same respect that Stalin's efforts to expand the

spheres of influence in Eastern Europe was a self-serving effort to improve Russia's position, not a

deliberate attack on the United States.