Social Class Conflicts - Taimoor TK

Sociology 1
Social class Conflicts in Pakistan
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Sociology 2
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Social class refers to the hierarchical distinctions (or
stratification) between individuals or groups in societies or
cultures. Usually individuals are grouped into classes based
on their economic positions and similar political and
economic interests within the stratification system.
Most societies, especially nation states, seem to have some

notion of social class. However, class is not a universal
phenomenon. Many hunter-gatherer societies do not have
social classes, often lack permanent leaders, and actively
avoid dividing their members into hierarchical power
structures.
The factors that determine class vary widely from one society
to another. Even within a society, different people or groups
may have very different ideas about what makes one "higher"
or "lower" in the social hierarchy. Some questions frequently
asked when trying to define class include the following.
1) The most important criteria in distinguishing classes.
2) The number of class divisions that exist.

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3) The extent to which individuals recognize these divisions if

they are to be meaningful.
4) Whether or not class divisions even exist in the society.
The theoretical debate over the definition of class remains an

important one today. Sociologist Dennis Wrong defines class
in two ways - realist and nominalist. The realist definition
relies on clear class boundaries to which people adhere in
order to create social groupings. They identify themselves
with a particular class and interact mainly with people in this
class. The nominalist definition of class focuses on the
characteristics that people share in a given class - education,
occupation, etc. Class is therefore determined not by the
group in which you place yourself or the people you interact
with, but rather by these common characteristics.
The most basic class distinction between the two groups is

between the powerful and the powerless. People in social
classes with greater power attempt to cement their own
positions in society and maintain their ranking above the
lower social classes in the social hierarchy. Social classes
with a great deal of power are usually viewed as elites, at
least within their own societies.
In the less complex societies, power/class hierarchies may or

may not exist. In societies where they do exist, power may be
linked to physical strength, and therefore age, gender, and
physical health are common delineators of class. However,
spiritual charisma and religious vision can be at least as
important.[ Also, because different livelihoods are so closely
intertwined in less complex societies, morality often ensures
that the old, the young, the weak, and the sick maintain a
relatively equal standard of living despite low class.
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In so-called non-stratified societies or acephalous societies,

there is no concept of social class, power, or hierarchy beyond
temporary or limited social statuses. In such societies, every
individual has a roughly equal social standing in most
situations.
In societies where classes exist, one's class is determined

largely by:
• Occupation
• Education and qualifications
• Income, personal, household and per capita
• Wealth or net worth, including the ownership of land,
property, means of production, et cetera
• Family background and aspirations.
Although class is rarely hereditary in a strict sense, it will

often be affected by such factors as upbringing and the
class of one's parents. The child of high status
professionals will grow up with the expectation that a
similar occupation is an attainable goal, whereas a child
of lower status parents in a run down neighborhood will
often have much lower aspirations based upon what they
see around them. The degree to which, in a given society,
an individual's, family's, or group's social status can
change throughout the course of their life through a
system of social hierarchy or stratification is referred to as
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Social Mobility. Subsequently, it is also the degree to

which that individual's or group's descendants move up
and down the class system. The degree to which an
individual can move through their system can be based on
attributes and achievements or factors beyond their
control.
Those who can attain a position of power in a society will

often adopt distinctive lifestyles to emphasize their prestige
and to further rank themselves within the powerful class.
Often the adoption of these stylistic traits (which are often
referred to as cultural capital) is as important as one's wealth
in determining class status, at least at the higher levels:
• Costume and grooming

• Manners and cultural refinement. For example,
Bourdieu suggests a notion of high and low classes
with a distinction between bourgeois tastes and
sensitivities and the working class tastes and
sensitivities.
• political standing vis-à-vis the church, government,
and/or social clubs, as well as the use of honorary
titles
• reputation of honor or disgrace
• language, the distinction between elaborate code,
which is seen as a criterion for "upper-class", and the
restricted code, which is associated with "lower
classes"
Finally, fluid notions such as race can have widely varying

degrees of influence on class standing. Having characteristics
of a particular ethnic group may improve one's class status in
many societies. However, what is considered "racially
superior" in one society can often be exactly the opposite in
another. In situations where such factors are an issue, a
minority ethnicity has often been hidden, or discreetly
ignored if the person in question has otherwise attained the
requirements to be of a higher class. Ethnicity is still often the
single most overarching issue of class status in some societies
(see the articles on apartheid, the Caste system in Africa, and
the Japanese Burakumin ethnic minority for examples).
However, a distinction should be made between causation and
correlation when it comes to race and class. Some societies
have a high correlation between particular classes and race,
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but this is not necessarily an indication that race is a factor in

the determination of class
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Income inequality is one of the most important consequences

of social class. Although class status is not a causal factor for
income, there is consistent data that show those in higher
classes have higher incomes than those in lower classes. This
inequality still persists when controlling for occupation. The
conditions at work vary greatly depending on class. Those in
the upper-middle class and middle-class enjoy greater
freedoms in their occupations. They generally are more
respected, enjoy more diversity, and are able to exhibit some
authority. Those in lower classes tend to feel more alienated
and have lower work satisfaction overall. The physical
conditions of the workplace differ greatly between classes.
While middle-class workers may “suffer alienating
conditions” or “lack of job satisfaction”, blue-collar workers
are the ones who have to worry about health hazards, injury,
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and even death. Kerbo, Herald (1996). Social Stratification

and Inequality. New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc.,
231-233. ISBN 0-07-034258-X. In the more social sphere,
class has direct consequences on lifestyle. Lifestyle includes
tastes, preferences, and a general style of living. These
lifestyles could quite possibly effect educational attainment,
and therefore status attainment. Class lifestyle also affects
how one raises his or her children. For example, a working-
class person is more likely to raise their child to be working
class and middle-class children are more likely to be raised to
be middle-class. This perpetuates the idea of class for future
generations. Kerbo, Herald (1996). Social Stratification and
Inequality. New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc.,
233-235. ISBN 0-07-034258-X.
CLASS CONFLICTS
Class conflict, also class war or class warfare, is both the
friction that accompanies social relationships between
members or groups of different social classes and the
underlying tensions or antagonisms which exist in society due
to conflicting interests that arise from different social
positions. Class conflict is thought to play a pivotal role in
history of class societies (such as capitalism and feudalism)
by Marxists who refer to its overt manifestations as class war,
a struggle that is viewed by them as a product of capitalism.
Class conflict can take many different shapes, for example

direct violence such as wars fought for resources and cheap
labor, indirect violence such as deaths from poverty,
starvation or unsafe working conditions; coercion, such as the
threat of losing a job or pulling a much needed investment, or
ideology, e.g. trying to convince people that the power should
be in the hands of the working class or the capitalist class, or
instilling passivity and consumerism with advertising.
It can be open, as with a business lockout aimed at destroying

a labor union, or it can be hidden, as with an informal
slowdown in production that protests low wages for an
excessively fast or dangerous work process.
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Class conflict is a term long-used mostly by socialists,

Marxists, and anarchists, to describe social conflicts between
two or more social classes. Marxists and many anarchists
define a 'class' by its relationship to the 'means of production'
--- such as factories, land, and machinery. From this point of
view, the social control of production and labor is a contest
between classes, and the division of these resources
necessarily involves conflict and inflicts harm.
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• Class conflict in pre-capitalist societies
Where societies are socially divided based on status, wealth,

or control of social production and distribution, conflict
arises. This conflict is both everyday, such as the common
Medieval right of lords to control access to grain mills and
baking ovens, or it can be exceptional such as the Roman
Conflict of the Orders, the uprising of Spartacus, or the
various popular uprisings in late medieval Europe. One of the
earliest Marxist analyses of these conflicts is Frederick
Engel's German Peasants War. One of the earliest analyses of
the development of class as the development of conflicts
between emergent classes is available in Peter Kropotkin's
Mutual Aid where he analyses the disposal of goods after
death in pre-class societies, and how inheritance produces
early class divisions and conflict.
• Class conflict in Capitalism
The typical example of class conflict described is class

conflict within capitalism. This class conflict is seen to occur
primarily between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and
take the form of conflict over hours of work, value of wages,
cost of consumer goods, the culture at work, control over
parliament or bureaucracy, and the nature of general social
culture. The particular implementation of government
programs which may seem purely humanitarian, such as
disaster relief, can actually be a form of class conflict. Apart
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from these day to day forms of class conflict, during periods

of crisis or revolution class conflict takes on a violent nature
and involves repression, assault, restriction of civil liberties
and murderous violence such as assassinations or death
squads.
Class warfare is a term long-used by many socialists

(including Marxists and communists, but also anarchists,
democratic socialists, etc.) to describe social and political
conflicts between classes (groups of people with a different
relationship to the means of production, and to each other).
In this view, capitalism consists of two social classes: the
wage-workers (the proletariat) and the business owners or
capitalists (the bourgeoisie). The wage-workers do not own or
have control over the means of production, and must sell their
labor-power to the capitalists in order to survive. The
capitalists own and control the means of production, and
subsist by exploiting the workers.
Therefore, a socio-political imbalance is said to exist between
individuals of extreme wealth or power and those with little
or no wealth. This imbalance was probably first recognized
by Adam Smith:
"The masters [i.e., employers], being fewer in number, can
combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorizes,
or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it
prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of
parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but
many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes the
masters can hold out much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a
master manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not
employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two
upon the stocks which they have already acquired. Many
workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a
month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the
long-run the workman may be as necessary to his master as
his master is to him, but the necessity is not so immediate."
(The Wealth of Nations, volume I, ch. 8, paragraph 12)
Going beyond Smith, the interests of the wealthy are seen to
conflict (often dramatically and violently) with the interests
and needs of classes without power.
Corporations are seen to function as a vehicle for combination
of individual capitals, transcending the bounds of mortality
and liability that accompany an individual-owned enterprise.
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Arguably, there is little fundamental difference between the

class warfare that existed between the Victorian era monarchy
and the common public, and a modern corporation and its
workers.
In any class society, each of the two main classes has its own
divisions, so that neither is monolithic. Concerning
capitalism, Marxist theory argues that the working class has
both an "objective" class interest as a collective group, and a
large number of individual interests of workers. Class interest
may thus differ from "trade union consciousness",
economism, and the like. Similarly, the capitalist class may be
driven by the difference between the long-term collective
interest of the class and the profit-seeking of individual
capitalists. In a revolutionary situation, convergence of
individual interests and class interests is expected; this might
be seen as a polarization of society.
The empirical manifestation of class antagonisms depends on
the specific (concrete) historical situation in which they
operate. For example, other societal divisions -- concerning
issues of nationality, ethnicity, religion, language, and gender
-- can interact with, confuse, and/or mute class tensions.
Sometimes class can be simultaneously moderated by ethnic
issues (as between white proletarians and capitalists in
apartheid-era South Africa) and intensified by them (as
between blacks and whites there).
Class struggle, Class consciousness, Social class, Slave
rebellion, Revolution, Economic inequality, Economic
stratification, Exploitation, Labor union, No War But The
Class War, Class envy, Popular revolt in late medieval
Europe, sharecropping, taxation, Conflict of the Orders,
Johnson County War are all related to each other.
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• Labor (the proletariat or workers) includes anyone

who earns their livelihood by selling their labor power
and being paid a wage or salary for their labor time.
They have little choice but to work for capital, since
they typically have no independent way to survive.
• Capital (the bourgeoisie or capitalists) includes
anyone who gets their income not from labor as much
as from the surplus value they appropriate from the
workers who create wealth. The income of the
capitalists, therefore, is based on their exploitation of
the workers (proletariat).
What Marx points out is that members of each of the two

main classes have interests in common. These class or
collective interests are in conflict with those of the other class
as a whole. This in turn leads to conflict between individual
members of different classes.
An example of this would be a factory producing a

commodity, such as the manufacture of widgets (a standard
imaginary commodity in economics books). Some of the
money received from selling widgets will be spent on things
like raw materials and machinery (constant capital) in order
to build more widgets. Similarly, some money – variable
capital – is spent on labor power. The capitalist would not be
in business if not for the surplus value, i.e., the money
received from selling the widgets beyond that spent on
constant and variable capital. The amount of this surplus
value – profits, interest, and rent – depends on how much
labor workers do for the wages or salaries they are paid.
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This surplus value is higher to the extent that workers spend

time at work beyond what they're paid for and to the extent
that they exert effort beyond the cost of their labor-time. Thus
the capitalist would like as much "free time" (unpaid labor
during official lunch breaks, after official closing time, etc.)
and as much worker effort as possible. On the other hand, the
workers would like to be paid for every minute they work
under the capitalist's authority and would like to avoid
unnecessary and unpaid effort. They would also prefer higher
wages and benefits (such as health insurance, defined-benefit
pensions, etc.) and less of a dictatorial or paternalistic attitude
from employers. Working conditions must be safe and
healthy, rather than dangerous.
Not all class struggle is violent or necessarily radical (as with

strikes and lockouts). Class antagonism may instead be
expressed as low worker morale, minor sabotage and
pilferage, and individual workers' abuse of petty authority and
hoarding of information. It may also be expressed on a larger
scale by support for socialist or populist parties. On the
employers' side, the use of union-busting legal firms and the
lobbying for anti-union laws are forms of class struggle.
Not all class struggle is a threat to capitalism, or even to the

authority of an individual capitalist. A narrow struggle for
higher wages by a small sector of the working-class (what is
often called "economism") hardly threatens the status quo. In
fact, by applying "craft union" tactics of excluding other
workers from skilled trades, an economist struggle may even
weaken the working class as a whole by dividing it. Class
struggle becomes more important in the historical process as
it becomes more general, as industries are organized rather
than crafts, as workers' class consciousness rises, and as they
are organized as political parties. Marx referred to this as the
progress of the proletariat from being a class "in itself" (a
position in the social structure) to being one "for itself" (an
active and conscious force that could change the world).
Marx thought that this conflict was central to the social

structure of capitalism and could not be abolished without
replacing the system itself. Further, he argued that the
objective conditions under capitalism would likely develop in
a way that encouraged a proletariat organized collectively for
its own goals to develop: the accumulation of surplus value as
more means of production by the capitalists would allow
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them to become more and more powerful, encouraging overt

class conflict. If this is not counteracted by increasing
political and economic organization by workers, it would
inevitably cause an extreme polarization of the classes,
encouraging the revolution that would destroy capitalism
itself.
The revolution would lead to a socialist society in which the

proletariat controlled the state, that is, "the dictatorship of the
proletariat". The original meaning of this term was a workers'
democracy, not a dictatorship in the modern sense of the
word. For Marx, democracy under capitalism is a bourgeois
dictatorship.
Even after a revolution, the two classes would struggle, but

eventually the struggle would recede and the classes dissolve.
As class boundaries broke down, the state apparatus would
wither away. According to Marx, the main task of any state
apparatus is to uphold the power of the ruling class; but
without any classes there would be no need for a state. That
would lead to the classless, stateless communist society.
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In every state and in every period, class contrasts, class

struggles, and class domination depend,
(1) Upon the degree of unity or of diversity in the citizen

body; these citizens are formed into groups by race,
occupation, distribution of income and property, intellectual
and religious culture, etc.
(2) Upon the type of distinction and of organization peculiar

to the classes;
(3) Upon the strength and organization of the civic

government, this stands for the unity and peace of the society.
Every great society exhibits historically a picture of a social

differentiating process. A counterbalancing process also goes
on by virtue of the force of common heredity, common
language, common morality, common religion; in short, the
aggregate of cultural factors, and finally the unity of law, of
institutions, of the civic power. Every actual situation is a
diagonal of these two opposing series of factors.
The smaller, more primitive, ruder the social bodies are, the
minute the class contrasts. Great, ancient, civilized peoples
always have important class contrasts. They grow, in the first
place, with the great economic advances. The increase of
money and entrepreneur economy has done most to intensify
these contrasts and to lead to class conflicts. The decisive
factor in this latter development has always been that along
with the growing economic contrasts there was the
dissolution of the older psycho-moral and religious unity of
the folk. In these periods the upper and progressing classes on
the whole increased more in intellect and in technico-
economic ability than in social and political virtues. The
lower classes easily lagged behind in development of the
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intellect and of economico-technical qualities. They lost a

part of their old virtues (fidelity, obedience, temperance) and
they did not at once gain as a compensation increase of other
higher qualities. The recovery of unifying supreme ideals of
morality and of societary constitution has been difficult in
such times of the dissolution of the old societary constitution
and of religious conceptions. Indeed it was often wholly
impossible, often possible only after long struggles and
mistaken endeavors.
Accordingly the degree of class contrasts, of class conflicts,

of class domination, varies greatly in different peoples. We
must now get at, first, an understanding of the nature of class
conflicts; second, of the nature of class dominance; third, of
the opposing legal and constitutional development, as well as
of the adjustment of the class conflicts:
a) Wherever there are different classes, they have on the one

hand various, distinct, even contradictory interests; but on the
other hand they also have common interests. The former or
divergent interests are predominantly of an external, practical,
and economic sort; they aim at immediate ends. The latter, or
common interests, are of a more ideal and spiritual sort. They
refer to the total purposes of society and state and to the
future. To a considerable degree the former are unorganized,
or only loosely organized. At any rate they have a compact
organization only under particular circumstances. The latter,
or common interests, have also a loose organization of
customs and morality; but in state and church, in law and
institutions, they have always a certain firmly jointed
organization of force, which, to be sure, possesses at different
times very different degrees of power. The more strongly the
common feelings and the great national purposes emerge, the
firmer the civic organization of power eventually becomes,
the more will the particularized class interests in time be
forced to subordinate, co-ordinate, and adjust themselves to
one another. In the larger states, with pronounced class
structure, however, these special interests in turn will always
occasionally assert themselves, and rightfully, for progress
results only from certain frictions and trials of strength. From
these the victory of the better is at last gained. The whole
interior development thus rests upon the relations of tension,
upon the struggles and peace treaties of the social classes,
upon the craft and the circumspection of the government,
upon the skill and power of its leading minds in arranging
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their peace agreements and in winning the victory for the total
interest over the separate class interests.
Accordingly the history of folk-economy, of society, and of

the state falls into epochs of social peace and others of social
disturbance. Even in the former, class antitheses are not
lacking. They are, however, either latent, wholly controlled
by common feelings, interests, and organizations, or after
certain struggles they have withdrawn from prominence,
because certain legal principles and institutions have
furnished a basis for suppression or conciliation; that is for
arriving at a tolerable point of equilibrium. Especially in
times of long industrial and technical stability will such a
peaceful condition occur? The feelings and relationships of
classes will have adjusted themselves to a given distribution
of power, of callings and of possessions, and to a certain civic
and legal order. The social frictions are reduced to a small
total. So far as there is class dominance at all, it is more or
less recognized as rightful by all.
Contrasted with these periods are those of social conflict.

They always occur if the division of economic or other labor
is modified, if new upper classes are formed in the course of
technical, intellectual, or other progress, if existing or new
lower or middle classes are threatened with destruction or
with a change for the worse in their condition. Then there
must take plague a struggle of classes, not merely of
individuals. It is an incident of the universal striving/or power
and control. It is precipitated by the new conditions of life. It
may last a longer or a shorter time. It may lead to reforms or
revolutions. It may start the destruction of the states and the
peoples concerned. Or it may end with some sort of
equilibrium, with a pacified social condition.
The struggles will always have reference to three points:
(1) To the constitutional law, to the filling of civic offices, to

the appointment or choice of officials, choice of general or
local officers,. to the rights of organization, of assembly or of
the press, to organization of the army and of the courts, to the
position of church and school, to the removal of
administrative abuses;
(2) To class and family law in the strict sense, to class

privileges and their abolition,
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(3) To the distribution of income as affected on the one hand

by the play of free forces in the market, and on the other hand
by legal molding of economic life. Both of these factors are
affected by the existing distribution of power, in connection
with the contemporary morality and customs.
Chiefly, however, it is the law and the great institutions which

favor or embarrass the position of the particular classes in
their struggle for economic advantage, and which aid or
retard their access to profit and property. The entire legal
boundary between common and private property, between
Common and private thrift is decisive for the favoring of the
upper or the lower classes. The higher economic classes have
always understood more or less how to develop customs and
laws in their favor, how thereby to increase their incomes and
their property, how to give themselves an advantage in
commercial intercourse. The middle classes have to a certain
extent attempted the same thing, as opposed to the upper
classes. Their success has been variable. The lower classes
have always been most unfavorably situated for that sort of
influence, but custom and law have sought to protect them,
and every intelligent state government has had the same
purpose. Wherever the self-consciousness of these classes
awoke, wherever their culture and working efficiency grew,
wherever they could form organizations, under such
circumstances, like the middle class,. they have striven for
lightening of their burdens, for better means of getting a
living, for easier labor conditions, for higher wages, or even
for equal distribution of property and income. What in a more
remote time everyone held to be proper and tolerable in all
these respects appeared to a more refined sense of justice hard
and intolerable. Accordingly, it was in part this actual unequal
distribution of goods, in part the growing opinion about the
same, that ever again, after temporary rest, summoned the
social classes into the lists for struggle over change and
improvement. In earlier times the issue was joined directly.
The upper classes retained the lion's share of conquered lands,
of captured cattle, of slaves or serfs, without stopping for
justification. On the other hand, the lower classes, when
temporarily successful, carried out large confiscations of the
property of the rich, new apportionments of the soil,
restrictions upon quantities of land and cattle to be owned by
the well-to-do, release from debt or reductions, gifts of farms
in the colonies, or even free entrance to the theater or to the
representative assembly, distribution of bread, and similar
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measures. The more complex a folk-economy is, and the

more it is necessary to deal with very diverse classes, with an
old division of labor and class structure, the less is it to be
expected that such direct attacks, such bungling attempts at
reformation and redistribution, will succeed. To be sure, some
of these radical attempts have occurred in recent times. Legal
emancipation of slaves and serfs, from 1500 to 1860, the
abolition of burdens upon the peasantry, the creation of a free
peasant class and free landed property, were extraordinarily
radical measures. The introduction of craft freedom,
indispensable for the new molding of folk-economy, was a
deep slash into the existing legal order of industrial life. It
immediately raised the higher class of entrepreneurs, just as it
depressed the artisans and the laboring class. The struggle
over taxes and other civic burdens has been at the forefront in
all social conflicts, and every profound change (such, for
example, as a new rapidly progressive income and inheritance
tax) may greatly encourage one class while it severely
embarrasses another. On the whole, however, even
radicalism, the right wing of the social democracy, has today
become relatively reasonable. Its standpoint is that no fairly
earned property rights should be impaired, that means of
production should be changed into collective property only
with proper compensation. At the same time the more
moderate of the radicals no more demand equality of all
wages and incomes than they demand abolition of all private
property. Gradual reconstructions, working toward more
equitable future adjustment of the social organism, are
becoming more and more the passwords, even among the
radicals. The violent revolutionary movement is of course not
satisfied with this program. The question is whether a more
violent program can be restrained.
b) All the class conflicts appear to be the consequence of that

which we are accustomed to call "class dominance." The
concept should be defined. Linguistic usage in this case is of
two sorts, the one less inclusive, the other more inclusive. In
the former case we understand by class-dominance the social
dependency relations which result from the customary
industrial connections between the upper and the lower
classes, between masters and slaves, between entrepreneurs
and laborers, between creditors and debtors, between the
strong merchants and the weak buyers. We have treated these
relations in the whole of the preceding book. They rest upon
the ground of private law. They have their origin in the
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spiritual, technical, economic culture of the persons

concerned. They exert their share among the social influences
of the situation according as morality, law, institutions, or
civic constitutions are developed. The higher these latter have
ascended, the easier it will always be to restrict or to abolish
the worst abuses incident to class dominance. In the second
case we understand by class dominance (and this second
sense is more correct: we are now using the phrase in this
way) that dependence of the weak class upon the strong
which comes about from the fact that the latter influences and
controls the civic power, that the strong class exploits not
merely its economic superiority, but the political power, the
sovereign rights of the state, the machinery of government,
for its special purposes, for its economic advantage. Wherever
anything of this sort is the case the above-pictured abuses of
private rights will be the more excessive. In this sense also we
are concerned, under the concept of class dominance, with the
more extensive, the more significant, the quasi-constitutional,
concept of class dominance. This occurs not merely as a
quasi-natural, never entirely alterable, phenomenon, but
always at the same time as degeneration, as a fact to be fought
with all the means available. For it is a part of the essential
idea of the sovereign power that it is to be used in the interest
of the whole society, not in the special interest of a class.
If we disregard very minute communities, consisting of

members who are almost entirely equal, and which
consequently are able to govern themselves democratically by
means of rotating presiding officers, and an assembly of all
the citizens, not calling into requisition a compulsory force or
machinery; with these exceptions all states of any size have
developed a dominating civic power with far-reaching
sovereign rights, with strong compulsory force, because
power is essential to the nature of the state, because the
domestic government of the state cannot possibly be on a
high level without paramount power in the hands of the
authorities, because the state cannot be strong against external
enemies without this power. This power can never rest merely
upon individual persons, and no more can it be exercised
directly by the totality of thousands and millions of citizens.
In order to be capable of decision and action it needs an
organization of functionaries, of rulers and subjects,
controllers and controlled. There must be groups of fighters,
of priests, of noble families, of officials. The compact
organization of these under a central head is the secret of the
Sociology 21
existence of the power of the state. With a chief or king

supported by an aristocracy, a senate, we have the beginnings
of all the higher civic constitutions of ancient times. The mass
of the folk, originally participating in the national assemblies,
sink more and more, even while retaining certain rights, to the
condition of mostly passive members of the civic body.
Slaves and serfs, moreover, have no voice at all. The kings,
who’s excesses and abuses 'were much more in evidence than
their salutary functions, were, as we have seen, set aside by
the aristocracy in Greece and Rome. The aristocracy, freed
from control by a superior authority, easily fell eventually
into the same abuses, and class dominance in the strict sense
began. The attempt was made to reform the abuses by
extension of civil fights to larger numbers -- as in Rome by
the admission of the rural plebeians. There was success along
this line when, as in that case, the official and governmental
laws were definite and comprehensive, and when the
enfranchised had gone through a special discipline in the
discharge of public duties. If this was not the case, there was
danger that the masses would prevail with selfish, short-
sighted, impossible demands dictated by class interests.
Revolution and destruction followed. A dictatorship then
became the only recourse. This has been the termination of
almost all the great social revolutions and civil wars.
c) Accordingly the history of social classes and of

constitutions in the larger and more complex states seems to
run through the following stages:
(1) Establishment of a definite civic power, which rests

exclusively upon the prerogatives of given monarchical or
aristocratic groups. These narrow groups at first govern well
and justify. In time, however, they fall into abuses of power,
and class dominance begins.
(2) The attempt is made to admit wider groups to power,

electoral and legislative suffrage, and eligibility to office. At
last the whole democratic mass is thus equalized. At first, if it
is done wisely and temperately, this leads to good results,
particularly so long as the administration remains in the hands
of a firm, strong government. If the movement goes too far, if
political incompetents gain too great influence, if the
democratic masses acquire merely momentary advantage and
profit, there follows, instead of the older aristocratic class
control, the still worse democratic class control. All firm,
Sociology 22
secure civic leadership then ceases and with it all just

government.
(3) This can be prevented only if improvement and

strengthening of the civic apparatus keeps pace in Free states
with the increasing influences of egoistic class interests. It is
necessary also that the civic power shall remain in clean
hands and shall continue to be stronger than the power and
influence of the classes. This is possible through progressive
development of a more and more precise and just
constitutional and administrative law, by the education of
civic officials of a non-partisan type in positions superior to
class control, and who from highest to lowest govern state
and society in harmonious co-operation.
We are thus in the presence of the perception that on the one

hand there has been no folk of high civilization without
certain onsets and inclinations toward class control; indeed,
that all extensions of civil rights in the first instance increase
the dangers of such class control; that, on the other hand,
every folk of high civilization in the constitutional state has
sought and to a certain degree has found in the development
of the sense of law and of legal control a counterbalance
against class dominance and abuse of civic power.
The evolution of the moral and legal judgment of countless

generations worked toward the end that certain principles of
law became the supreme power in the world. The most
barbarous chief who administered law, or who professed to do
justice, tanned to act in the interest of all. It became more and
more necessary for all rulers to consider the total interests,
and to restrain their class egoism. In spite of all
retrogressions, of all new class abuses, history exhibits
progress, which rests on the one hand upon growing insight
into political and social interdependences, upon increasing
development of more refined sense of justice in the ruling and
the ruled classes, and on the other hand upon the development
of the legal institutions and the constitutional forms which
hinder class abuses, and, in spite of those which cannot be
prevented, make just government easier than formerly, and
which consequently tend to assure to all classes their
legitimate influence, while turning the mastery over to no
single class. Of course this goal will never be fully reached.
The great political movements however are incessantly
making in that direction.
Sociology 23
The Greek ideals of the state, the Roman administrative law

in the time of the free state, the severe emporium of the
Caesars, the law of the Middle Ages humanized by
Christianity, the mediaeval church with its institutions, the
incipient modern civic power, enlightened despotism, with its
struggles against the control of society by feudally stratified
classes, with its endeavors to establish a good judicial system,
to maintain upright administration, the later constitutional
organizations, with their guaranties of rights, the attempts of
modern democracies to assure a more favorable position for
the lower classes -- all these are stations along the difficult,
thorny path of humanity in its progress toward a great and
firm government, with its minimum of class abuses.
It was the historical ro1e of Caesarism and of hereditary

monarchy to establish the strong, immovable civic authorities
supported by police power, civil officials, and the military
organization. It was the ro1e of the constitutional and
democratico-republican movements to fight down again the
abuses of these powers. In the degree in which it proves
possible to have firm, permanent civic authorities also in
aistocratic and democratic republics, and particularly such
authorities without class domination, monarchy as a form of
the state will perhaps retire. Up to the present time this does
not seem probable. The great republics of today, and the weak
monarchies which are close to republics in essentials,
manifest either plutocratic or feudal class dominance, or a
civic form which inclines toward an autocracy of popular
statesmen and dictators. The European states, accordingly,
which combine with a secure hereditary monarchy a free
constitution, appear for the time being still to afford the best
guaranty against too great abuses by classes.
The task of such modern monarchies will be lightened

principally by the following circumstances:
(1) By the political division of labor, this has created

particular strata and classes, which devote the work of their
lives to the service of the state and to public interests.
(2) By the increasing power of public opinion.
(3) By the fact that the social classes of today, while more
strongly organized and in conflicts more selfish than
formerly, and in the great European states more widely
Sociology 24
divided than ever, still are restrained by the law from

irresponsible conduct, and they hold one another reciprocally
in check.
Even in the ecclesiastical states the relatively good

government rested upon the fact of a special training of its
rulers for their functions. To a certain extent this was also the
case in the military aristocracy. Plato's idea of a government
by philosophers springs from the same thought. This thought
has been thus far very imperfectly carried out under the
monarchical regime in the construction of the civil service. It
was only in recent centuries that in the majority of European
states a group of jurists, civil officials, military officers,
clergy, and scholars has been created, drawn often from all
strata of society, yet all alike trained at the universities,
secured in their economic positions partly by their own
property, partly by salaries, and devoting life entirely to
public affairs. Sometimes these very groups have degenerated
into narrowly selfish and self-centered classes. This was
especially the case where the public power and the
participation of the other citizens in public Hie did not
prevent the abuses of the bureaucracy. But on the whole this
sort of division of labor, this training of the rulers, with the
traditions and standards of propriety which incidentally
developed, have given to the civic machinery a strength and a
compact organization which they have never had before, and
on the other hand have made them a bulwark against class
domination such as never existed in ancient or mediaeval
states.
These groups are the bearers of an ideal conception of the

state and of its economics. Even so far as they are of feudal
aristocratic or of bourgeois origin, their horizon is no longer
that of their economic class. They understand the interests of
the middle and lower classes with whom they come into daily
contact in transacting the business of their respective
positions. In this respect they are much broader than the upper
strata of business men. Together with the lawyers, physicians,
artists, journalists, they constitute a sort of neutral zone, in
contrast with the really struggling classes. Besides all this we
have today the public opinion, in so far as it is free, not
bought up by the ruling classes.
Along with the entire phenomenon of the cleavage of classes

and of passionate agitation for class interests, our modern
Sociology 25
literature and the press, much as they have also in certain

cases served class interests first and foremost, have still been
factors in developing a sound public opinion, the cardinal
function of which is to be an emotional reaction against
governmental and class abuses. Often as public opinion is
petty and shortsighted and obstructive of reasonable reforms,
yet at last it always flows into strong accord with the noble
and the good, with right and truth. Every efficient and wise
government has at last the support of public opinion,
whenever it opposes class egoism and class abuses.
Government can do this the easier today because modern

society in great states is never divided merely into two
classes, a controlling and a controlled, but into a whole series
of classes with very different interests. To be sure, even in
those simple conditions in which only two classes were in
question, a princely authority that was sure of its aims has
time and again made common cause with the folk against an
aristocracy hostile to the monarchy, and has strengthened its
position by the policy. In ancient times all kingly power
rested on this basis, as in later times the enlightened
despotisms or the Caesarism of Cromwell and of Napoleon.
Particularly was and is this true of the policy "divide and
conquer," wherever a rural or an urban class of property-
owners, or land-owners and manufacturers held each other in
check, wherever in addition to these an aristocracy of money
operators pursued independent interests, wherever an
influential stratum of liberal callings had been formed, which,
with little or no property, constituted a cardinal factor of
government and of public opinion, and which voted now with
the higher propertied classes, now with the lower and non-
propertied. By the side of the aristocratic influential classes
there is today in most countries a large middle class of
peasants, farmers, small artisans, and traders, ready to
antagonize the class egoism of the upper and lower classes.
All sorts of leagues of laborers with landed proprietors, with
the bourgeoisie, with the middle class, occur today. The
talented representative of a purely socialistic conception of
the history of classes, Loria, admits this; and he makes it the
explanation of most of the social advances that have thus far
occurred. If the English Tories were the decisive factors in
carrying through the English legislation for protection of
laborers, and i/Bismarck traded with LaSalle, and offered
universal suffrage as his play against the bourgeoisie, these
things are weighty evidences of the effectiveness of such
Sociology 26
combinations of different class interests and of their power to

overcome opposing class interests.
d) We believe that we may thus prove that necessary internal

causes of civic development can and will progressively limit
class dominance. We have not therewith proved that class
struggles will disappear. We may hope nevertheless that the
types of their manifestation and the ways in which they will
be settled will become better, fairer, and more reasonable.
The more inchoate law and state were earlier, the more easily
did social conflicts lead at once to extremes, to uprising, to
revolution, to violence, to wholesale executions, to great
confiscations. In antiquity whole centuries were filled with
such occurrences. In modern history they have at least been
less frequent. It is worth while to add a remark about the
causes which led to the decision in the respective class
conflicts and about the way in which the adjustment was
made, whether by revolution or by reform.
Of course the most important matter is always the strength

and power of the government, the degree of its insight and
justice; then the strength and organization of those classes
which defend the old and of those which promote the new. In
this view the foregrounds are occupied by the legal situation
with respect to the organization of classes, and by the
possibility of the psychical development of a strong class
consciousness (cf. Vol. I, §§ 135-36). As has been pointed
out, in ancient times the upper classes alone easily formed
compact organizations, while today the lower classes are
often more strongly organized. Along with the type and
strength of the organization of classes and parties, much
depends also upon the entire public law situation, upon its
rigidity or flexibility, upon the degrees of permitted public
discussion of abuses, upon the possibility of winning over to
the side of reforms the civic organs, the responsible popular
assemblies or parliaments. The more flexible public opinion
has become by means of modern constitutions, the more is it
possible to avoid explosions.
Yet these have always occasionally occurred. Still more

frequently have they been stamped out? Usurpers have also
succeeded by means of bloodshed. By no means was the
unsuccessful party always wrong or the successful party
always right. 0nly too easily have accidental circumstances;
Sociology 27
lack of judgment and of tact on the governmental side,

cleverness or unscrupulousness in the revolutionary leaders
the intervention of foreign powers, given to class a temporary
victory, which afforded no guaranty of permanence.
Consequently there followed the easy sequence of reaction
after revolution, as for example in Greece, Rome, and the
mediaeval cities. The outcome may easily be a chain of
upheavals, a long sequence of troubled periods. Under such
circumstances the lower classes very likely fall into worse
conditions than before. Government, even the most arbitrary,
is better than perpetual anarchy. Hence, in earlier times, and
occasionally even now, foreign domination and military
dictatorships are among the outcome of class conflicts.
All reasonable people have therefore constantly demanded

reforms, but have condemned revolutions. Antiquity had
successful social reforms, like that of Solon, and those of
Rome between the fifth and the third centuries before Christ.
But the passions of the masses, the pressure of social wrong,
have ever and again led to revolutionary programs supported
either by the upper or the lower classes. This is in spite of the
fact that revolution is always the most precarious of all games
of chance. With all our condemnation of revolution, and with
all our efforts to prevent it, we may not forget this, viz., that
the formal law is often dubious; frequently the real issue is
between a higher real law and a worm-eaten formal law. Even
successful revolutions may operate upon subsequent times
and upon other states as salutary influences. And in case far-
sighted and able leaders succeed early in checking the
disorder and in establishing better conditions, the later world
has always acclaimed them. The new cannot always succeed
by the victories of peace.
Nevertheless, we may hope today, and at all events we should

wish, that free discussion -- publicity -- will suffice to
accomplish in a peaceful way even the great reforms; that it
will not be left to violence and terrorism to achieve them; that
a responsible government will be won over to them, will
establish them by legal means, and will thus give them the
guaranty of permanence. In this way alone is it to be hoped
that changes which are genuinely social will gain a place in
our institutions, changes which correspond with the personal,
psycho-moral qualities of the different classes, and new and
better rights which show that only those classes will gain new
and better rights which show themselves to be the themselves
Sociology 28
to be the bearers of progress, the rise of which coincides with

the total interest of the state.
We may say that even in the past no class was permanently

elevated which did not on the whole benefit at the same time
state and folk thrift; no class fell to a lower plane unless it
forgot its duty toward the whole, and retrograded in qualities
and capacities, in political or economic virtues. Whenever
middle is threatened, it will maintain itself only when it
regenerates itself economically and spiritually, when its
existence and activity are still salutary for the general
development. No lower class can permanently raise its social
level by merely using clubs, by merely stirring up hatred and
suspicion toward the upper classes, by merely chasing
unattainable Utopias. It can win greater political rights and
greater income only when it advances technically,
economically, and morally, when it proves itself to be a bearer
of the total progress, when it develops within itself obedience
and discipline and subordinates itself to competent, temperate
leaders, and not merely to demagogues who are instigators of
revolution.
Class abuses and class dominance will never wholly

disappear. Renan once said that the Jewish spirit has worked
in universal history as the bearer of social justice, but it
everywhere seeks to destroy every fixed powerful
government, because, taking human beings as they are, such a
government is unthinkable without certain social abuses.
There is a truth in .this. The spirit of social justice has to
arrange compromises with powerful governments, and in the
last resort it does this in such a way that extreme democracy
ends at last with tyrants and Caesarism.
Theories
regarding
Class
Conflicts
Sociology 29
• Theory of Karl Marx
Overall, there are six elements in Marx's view of class

conflict.
1) Classes are authority relationships based on property

ownership.
2) A class defines groupings of individuals with shared
life situations, thus interests.
3) Classes are naturally antagonistic by virtue of their
interests.
4) Imminent within modern society is the growth of two
antagonistic classes and their struggle, which
eventually absorbs all social relations.
5) Political organization and Power is an instrumentality
of class struggle, and reigning ideas are its reflection.
6) Structural change is a consequence of the class
struggle.
The "classes" that Marx distinguishes within a capitalistic

society have a continually fluctuating membership. Class
affiliation under capitalism is not a hereditary quality. It is
assigned to each individual by a daily repeated plebiscite, as it
were, of all the people. The buying public, the consumers, by
their buying and abstention from buying, determine who
should own and run the plants, who should work in the
factories and mines, who should play the parts in the theater
performances, and who should write the newspaper articles.
They do it in a similar way in which they determine in their
capacity as voters who should act as president, governor, or
judge. In order to get rich in a capitalistic society and to
preserve ones once acquired wealth one must satisfy the
wishes of the public. Those who have acquired wealth as well
as their heirs must try to keep it by defending their assets
against the competition of already established firms and of
ambitious newcomers. In the unhampered market economy,
not sabotaged by concessions and exemptions accorded to
powerful pressure groups, there are no privileges, no
protection of vested interests, no barriers preventing anybody
from striving after any prize. Access to the Marxian-
designated classes is free to everybody. The members of each
class compete with one another. They are not united by a
common class interest and not opposed to the members of
other classes by being allied either in the defense of a
common privilege, which those wronged by it want to see
Sociology 30
abolished, or in the attempt to abolish a legal disability which

those deriving advantage from it want to preserve.
The champions of modern political freedom and laissez faire

asserted: If the old laws establishing status privileges and
disabilities are abolished and no new practices of the same
character? Such as subsidies, discriminatory taxation,
indulgence granted to non-governmental agencies like unions
to use coercion and intimidation? Are introduced, there is
equality of all citizens under the law. Nobody is hampered in
his aspirations and ambitions by any legal obstacles.
Everybody is free to compete for any social position or
function for which his personal abilities qualify him.
But Marx saw things in a different light. He maintained that

capitalism did not abolish bondage and did not do away with
the servitude of the working and toiling masses. It did not
emancipate the common man. The people merely changed
their masters. Formerly they were forced to drudge for the
princes and aristocrats; now they are exploited by the
bourgeoisie. The division of society into "social classes" is, in
the eyes of Marx, sociologically and economically not
different from its division into the castes of the status society.
The bourgeois of the modern age is no less a predatory
extortion than were the noblemen and slaveholders of ages
gone by.
The only retort that Marx, Engels and all their followers down
to the Russian Bolshevists and the European and American
professorial admirers of Marx knew to advance against their
critics was the notorious ideology doctrine. According to this
makeshift a man's intellectual horizon is fully determined by
his class affiliation. The individual is constitutionally unfit to
reach out and to grasp any other doctrine than one that
furthers the interests of his own "class" at the expense of
other "classes." It is, therefore, unnecessary for a proletarian
to pay any attention to whatever bourgeois authors may say
and to waste time refuting their statements. All that is needed
is to unmask their bourgeois background. That settles the
matter.
This is the method to which Marx and Engels and later

Marxians resorted in dealing with all dissenters. They never
embarked upon the hopeless task of defending their self-
contradictory system against devastating criticism. All they
Sociology 31
did was to call their opponents stupid bourgeois and to

ascribe their opposition to their bourgeois class affiliation.
• Dahrendorf’s theory of class and class conflicts
The ideas of Marx spawned a rich literature; much of it is

polemical and political, but some authors have tried to avoid
the historical or empirical errors Marx committed, to learn
from changes since his time, and to apply the spirit of his
sociology to contemporary industrial society. The best of
these efforts is Ralf Dahrendorf's Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society (1959).
Dahrendorf recognizes two approaches to society, which he

calls the Utopian and the Rationalist. The first emphasizes
equilibrium of values, consensus, and stability; the second
revolves around dissension and conflict, the latter being the
mover of structural change. Both are social perspectives;
neither is completely false, but each views a separate face of
society. Unfortunately, he feels, the consensus view has
dominated contemporary sociology, especially in the United
States, and he sets out to create some balance between the
two views by developing and illustrating the theoretical
power of a class-conflict perspective.
He begins as he must with a review of Marx's writings, a

clarification of his model, a discussion of the sociopolitical
changes since Marx. A review of subsequent theoretical
works bearing on class is followed by a sociological critique
of Marx. These necessary scholarly chores completed,
Dahrendorf presents his own view of class.
He sees Marx's defining characteristic of class (as property

ownership) as a special case of a more general authoritative
relationship. Society grants the holders of social positions
power to exercise coercive control over others. And property
ownership, the legitimate right to coercively exclude others
from one's property, is such power. This control is a matter of
authority, which Dahrendorf defines, according to Weber, as
the probability that a command with specific content will be
obeyed by certain people. Authority is associated with a role
or position and differs from power, which Dahrendorf claims
is individual. Authority is a matter of formal legitimacy
backed by sanctions. It is a relation existing between people
Sociology 32
in imperatively coordinated groups, thus originating in social

structure.
Authority, however, is dichotomous; there is always an

authoritative hierarchy on one side and those who are
excluded on the other. Within any imperative group are those
who are super ordinate and those who are subordinate. There
is an arrangement of social roles comprising expectations of
domination or subjugation.
Those who assume opposing roles have structurally generated

contradictory interests, to preserve or to change the status
quo. Incumbents of authoritative roles benefit from the status-
quo, which grants them their power. Those toward whom this
authoritative power is exercised, and who suffer from it,
however, are naturally opposed to this state of affairs.
Super ordinates and subordinates thus form separate quasi-

groups of shared latent interests. On the surface, members of
these groups and their behavior may vary considerably, but
they form a pool from which conflict groups can recruit
members. With leadership, ideology, and the political
(freedom) and social conditions of organization being present,
latent interests become manifested through political
organizations and conflict.
How does Dahrendorf define social classes? They are latent

or manifest conflict groups arising from the authority
structure of imperative coordinated organizations. Class
conflict then arises from and is related to this structure. The
structural source of group conflict lies in authoritative
domination and subjugation; the object of such conflict is the
status quo; and the consequence is to change (not necessarily
through revolution) social structure.
It should be stressed that Dahrendorf's theory is not limited to

"capitalist" societies. Since authoritative roles are the
differentia between classes, classes and class conflict also
exist in communist or socialist societies. Classes exist insofar
as there are those who dominate by virtue of legitimate
positions (such as the Soviet factory manager, party chief,
commune head, or army general) and those who are
habitually in subordinate positions (the citizen, worker,
peasant).
Sociology 33
• Max Weber
The seminal sociological interpretation of class was advanced
by Max Weber. Weber formulated a three-component theory
of stratification, with class, status and party (or politics) as
subordinate to the ownership of the means of production, but
for Weber how they interact is a contingent question and one
that will vary from society to society.
SOCIAL CLASS CONFLICTS W.R.T

PAKISTANI SOCIETY
Class
structure
in
Pakistani
society
• The social structure of Pakistan is a vaguely defined

concept which includes several commonly used terms that
use educational attainment, income and occupational
prestige as the main determinants of class. While it is
possible to create dozens of social classes within the
confines of Pakistani society, most Pakistanis employ a
six or five class system. The most commonly applied
class concepts used in regards to contemporary Pakistani
society are:
• Upper class;
Those with great influence, wealth and prestige. Members

of this group tend to act as the grand-conceptualizers and
have tremendous influence of the nation's institutions.
• Upper middle class;
The upper middle class consists of white collar

professionals with advanced post-secondary educational
degrees and comfortable personal incomes. Upper middle
Sociology 34
class professionals have large amounts of autonomy in the

workplace and therefore enjoy high job satisfaction.
• Lower middle class;
Semi-professionals, non-retail salespeople and craftsmen

who have some college education come into this category.
Out-sourcing tends to be a prominent problem among
those in this class who often suffer from a lack of job
security. Households in this class may need two income
earners to make ends meet and therefore may have
household incomes rivaling the personal incomes of upper
middle class professionals.
• Working class;
According to some experts this class may constitute the

majority of Americans and include those otherwise
referred to as lower middle. It includes blue as well as
white collar workers who have relatively low personal
incomes and lack college degrees.
• Lower class;
This class includes the poor, alienated and marginalized

members of society. While most individuals in this class
work, it is common for them to drift in and out of
poverty.
Class conflicts
with reference to
Pakistan
The social deprivation of the poor and dominance of the elite

in Pakistan has seen Pakistan to the verge of disaster as the
country has just become like an absolute bombshell waiting to
explode anytime. The capitalistic social system has been a
bane in the heart of the society throughout the life of the
country. The rich has been always on the ascendancy and the
Sociology 35
poor has seen his living standard getting worse and worse.
The political and the social elite have dictated the terms
throughout the history. Social injustice and inequality has
always been prevailing that has hampered the growth of the
country and the social development as well.
The self-employed (petit bourgeoisie) — these are people

who own their own means of production, thus work for
themselves. In Pakistan these people are being swept away by
the march of capitalism, such as family farms being replaced
by agribusiness, or many small stores run by their owners
being replaced by a supermarket, and so forth.
Managers, supervisors, white-collar staff, and security

officers – these are intermediaries between capitalists and the
proletariat. Since they are paid a wage, technically they are
workers, but they represent a privileged stratum of the
proletariat, typically serving the capitalists' interest that does
not do any good in elevating their own living standard and
this creates frustration inside them. The mounting frustration
is one of the basic causes of the class conflicts in the country.
The lumpenproletariat – the chronically unemployed. These

people have at most a tenuous connection to production. The
problem of unemployment growing more acute as capitalism
goes on so these people have to snatch their living from the
elites of the society.
Peasants, who still represent a large part of the population

well. Capital for such workers — for example, a tractor or
reaping machine — is in most parts of the country is
unthinkable, The landlords and the feudals have been
dominating them for centuries and the peasants work day and
night to earn his living. They have been deprived of the basic
facilities that are necessary for living.
The feudals have been doing everything that can suppress the
peasants and that can make them realize that their lives are
dependent on their so called “godfathers”.
These things have haunted the country for decades as the

class struggle is going on and on which does no good to the
productivity and the development of the country.
Sociology 36
The British left the Indian subcontinent in 1947, and in the

wake of the Indian partition, Pakistan was created as an
independent nation, but with the solid imprints of the colonial
history in the shape of an ‘overdeveloped’ (Alavi, 1972)
bureaucratic- military structure. Soon after its independence,
Pakistan plunged into a trap of global neo-colonialism as a
post-colonial state. Pakistan as a state has always played a
very active role, enabling global neo-colonialism to hold its
foot firmly on Pakistani soil. As discussed earlier, the colonial
state facilitates the penetration of a colonial country’s capital
directly. This role was continued after the so-called
independence in the shape of allowing neo-colonialism forces
to penetrate into the country’s economic structure. This role
only changed the shape of dependency from unilateral to
multilateral.
The death of a local entrepreneur class in Pakistan created a

vacuum allowing the global neo-colonialist bourgeoisie to
take over. This phenomenon was very common to almost all
post-colonial states because “it is not established by an
ascendant native bourgeoisie but instead by a foreign
imperialist bourgeoisie” (Alavi, 172:61). A very small number
of non-Muslim industrial/ merchant classes existed and
migrated to India before the Indian sub-continent’s partition.
Nevertheless, the direct control of the foreign imperialist
bourgeoisie was ended at the time of Indian partition, but by
no means had its domination
become history. This foreign imperial class was later on
known as the neo-colonialist class and surfaced in the
economy of Pakistan. As a consequence of the global neo-
capitalist class’s economic hegemony in Pakistan, the weaker
indigenous bourgeoisie came to form an alliance with it as an
inferior partner. Therefore, the alliance of local and neo-
colonialist bourgeoisie very significantly shaped their
relationship with the Pakistani state. This alliance became a
triple alliance when the landed aristocracy jumped in and
sought its share of money-making from the local and neo-
colonial bourgeoisie.
In areas that comprise today’s Pakistan, agriculture has been

the predominant lifestyle due to the increased land for
cultivation through irrigation. This settled agrarian based
lifestyle and increased land for cultivation gave birth to large
land holdings and this evolution eventually emerged in the
shape of a society based on feudal relations. The British
Sociology 37
colonial government in the Indian subcontinent devised a

system of political and administrative control by securing the
feudal interests of the local feudal lords. This system worked
for the British as well for the local landed aristocracy to share
the power over the local people (Ansari, 1992). These big
land owners remain very powerful due to their political power
base in the shape of land and people, and that increased their
socio-economic position to bargain with other two emerging
classes — the local and neo-colonial bourgeoisie. Thus, in the
backdrop of this tripartite economic power sharing, there
emerged a Pakistani state which “mediates between the
competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the
metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the
landed classes” (Alavi, 1972:62).
This conglomeration of the class base in Pakistan leads its

macro economic structure to the definition of
indetermination. As stated earlier, that economies of the post-
colonial peripheral countries have indeterminate modes of
production due to the multi-mode production system (pre-
capitalist, capitalist and transitional). In this way, no single
economic class has sway in power relations (Gold et al., 1975
& Trimberger, 1977). This indeterminacy in terms of the
mode of production leads the post-colonial Pakistan state to
greater autonomy as opposed to relative autonomy of
capitalist state. The greater autonomy of the Pakistani state is
evident from the dominance of military and civil bureaucracy,
since mid-1950s. The first martial law was imposed in
Pakistan in the year of 1958, and thus stage was set to
accommodate the Western neo-capitalism to enter into
Pakistan. Jalal (1990) puts this situation as follows:
It was during the first decade of independence that an

interplay of domestic, regional and international factors saw
the civil bureaucracy and the army gradually registering their
dominance over [political] parties and politicians within the
evolving structure of the state (p.295)…there were strong
domestic, regional and international compulsion for the
bureaucratic military axis want to depoliticize Pakistani
society (p.301). These international factors or compulsions
were the forces of global neo-colonialism making it a
dependent society. Therefore, the garrison state became an
ideal state structure for the global neo-liberal powers to make
their power base stronger in Pakistan. During the first military
government of General Ayub Khan (1958-1969) there were
Sociology 38
no means to restrict the operations of the global neo-liberal

capital which rendered local capital weaker vis-à-vis its
international counterpart. If we briefly look at the political
history of Pakistan, it is evident that much of the period is
taken up by direct military rule and the rest is quasi or
procedural democracies. From 1971 to 1977 was the only
epoch in the political history of Pakistan when first popularly
elected Prime Minister of Pakistan Z.A. Bhutto challenged
the power base of neo-liberal capital in Pakistan and tried to
dismantle the power structure of landed aristocracy through
land reforms (Esposito, 1974; Gustafson, 1976). As a
consequence, he was hanged by another military ruler
General Zia in 1979. From 1985 to 1999 Pakistan witnessed
the emergence of quasi-procedural or controlled democracies
under the tutelage of the Pakistani military. In 1999, the
present ruler of Pakistan General Parvez Musharaf overthrew
the controlled democracy of Nawaz Sharif, when he
attempted to assert an all powerful role of the Pakistani army.
The macro economic history of Pakistan is dominated by the
nexus of three propertied Classes, as discussed above, under
the auspices of the military junt a. However, the military
bureaucracy, despite differences, has sought help from the
‘overdeveloped’ (Alavi, 1972) civil bureaucracy. The notion
of ‘overdeveloped’ refers to the state machinery developed by
the British colonial government/bourgeoisie to control all the
indigenous social classes. The civil bureaucracy under
colonial rule was also known as a steel frame of the British
government. In post-colonial Pakistan, however, the nexus of
the military and civil bureaucracies emerged as a viable and
effective apparatus of the garrison state to further the cause of
the tripartite alliance of the three propertied classes of
Pakistan. Alavi (1972) calls this nexus a military-bureaucratic
oligarchy and argues that besides performing a role of
mediation between these three dominant economic classes, it
“assumes also a new and relatively autonomous economic
role, which is not Paralleled in the classical bourgeoisie state”
(Alavi, 1972:62). The civil bureaucracy of Pakistan, as a
legacy from colonial government, reproduces itself in the
post-colonial Pakistan to maintain the hyper-authoritarian
mentalities of the Pakistani state. This partly happened
because the democratic forces were explicitly thrown out of
the political arena and civil society was also refrained to
assert its power out of the state. This military-bureaucratic
oligarchy vested itself with extreme administrative powers,
because in Pakistani state discourses the y were termed as
Sociology 39
highly efficient and equipped with the administrative acumen

to implement and oversee the country’s development process.
The local or indigenous bourgeoisie has failed to assert its
active and productive role in the economy and paved the way
for the greater autonomy of the Pakistani state to assert its
own entrepreneurship. Simultaneously, corruption was
heightened in the so-called military-bureaucratic oligarchy
and enabled these civil and military bureaucrats to enter in the
arena of entrepreneurship, either directly or indirectly through
others. However, the Pakistani state’s role in entrepreneurship
is a form of a new dependent development in the periphery of
the world capitalist economy. Capital is gaining visibility in
Pakistan due to the capital generated through heightened
corruption of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy and its
investment in the business and industry. The interaction of the
Pakistani state with the landed aristocracy is in the shape of
tax relief and forthcoming corporate farming. The largest
beneficiary of this collaboration is international capital to
gain maximum privileges from the Pakistani state. Evans
(1979) calls it a ‘triple alliance’, because dependent
development in the periphery of the world capitalist system is
between the peripheral state and both international and local
capitalist classes. In the case of Pakistan, I call it a quadruple
alliance, because dependent development in Pakistan is a
Collaborative strategy among the peripheral state, both
international and local capitalist classes, and the landed class.
Since the local /indigenous capitalist class is weak in terms of
its operational capabilities, the post-colonial Pakistani state
started assuming the role of problem solver through building
an infrastructure, devising an institutional base to favor
international monetary organizations, and bargaining with
transnational corporations and Western core capitalist
countries. The state of Pakistan has practically moved into
spheres which traditionally are the domain of private sector.
Sociology 40
Feudalism and
Class conflicts in
Pakistan
• Different facts related to Feudalism
• Feudal mentality:
Throughout history, feudalism has appeared in different
forms. The feudal prototype in Pakistan consists of landlords
with large joint families possessing hundreds or even
thousands of acres of land. They seldom make any direct
contribution to agricultural production. Instead, all work is
done by peasants or tenants. The landlord, by virtue of his
ownership and control of such vast amounts of land and
human resources, is powerful enough to influence the
distribution of water, fertilizers, tractor permits and
agricultural credit and, consequently exercises considerable
influence over the revenue, police and judicial administration
of the area. The landlord is, thus, lord and master. Such
absolute power can easily corrupt, and it is no wonder that the
feudal system there is humanly degrading. The system,
which some critics say is parasitical at its very root, induces a
state of mind which may be called the feudal mentality. This
can be defined as an attitude of selfishness and arrogance on
the part of the landlords. It is all attitude nurtured by
excessive wealth and power, while honesty, justice, love of
learning and respect for the law have all but disappeared.
Having such a mentality, when members of feudal families
obtain responsible positions in civil service, business,
industry and politics, their influence is multiplied in all
directions. Indeed the worsening moral, social, economic and
political crisis facing this country can be attributed mainly to
the powerful feudal influences operating there. Almost half
of Pakistan's Gross National Product and the bulk of its
export earnings are derived primarily from the agricultural
sector controlled by a few thousand feudal families. To begin
with, the Pakistan Muslim League, the party laying Pakistan's
foundation 53 years ago, was almost wholly dominated by
feudal lords such as the Zamindars, Jagirdars, Nawabs,
Nawabzadas and Sardars, the sole exception being the
Jinnahs. Pakistan's major political parties are feudal-oriented,
Sociology 41
and more than two-thirds of the National Assembly (Lower

House) is just composed of this elite class which is alarming
as well. Through the 50s and the 60s the feudal families
retained control over national affairs through the bureaucracy
and the armed forces. Later on in 1972, they assumed direct
power and retained it until the military regained power
recently. Thus, any political observer can see that this
oligarchy, albeit led by and composed of different men at
different times, has been in power since Pakistan's inception.
• Socio-economic effect:
In the agrarian sector, it is the landowner who is excluded

from the production process, while in industry; domestic
technology is almost absent or kept at bay. Industrialization
over the past five decades has, to a large extent, been
established and operated with foreign capital, technology and
raw materials. As a result, native technology has remained
stagnant and the rest of the economy is not integrated or not
at the same frequency with industry. Today, Pakistan depends
mostly on foreign aid for industrial raw materials and spare
parts. This dependence has caused severe weakness to its
economy. Coupled with these shortcomings, nationalization
in the industrial sector has brought further injuries. Many
industries, after nationalization, suffered substantially.
Consequently, the industrial policy has not only failed to
create a sound industrial base and employment opportunities,
but has instead increased unemployment.
In this connection, it can be pointed out that while much has
been said against the families who accumulated wealth, there
was little actually done against such a system. In such a
system, a vast income-differential also exists which adversely
affects Pakistan's balance of payments. One knows that higher
income invariably leads to a much more and greater tendency
to import. An analysis of an import bill would reveal that a
substantial proportion of goods consist of non-essential
consumer and luxury items. For example, a significant
percentage of imported medicines consisting of vitamins and
night pills for the fastidious rich rather than to combat or
prevent disease. Further, the demand for luxury household
appliances and electronic equipment proved to be so great
that the ban on their importation was ineffective. These
imports have led to international balance of payment deficits
which foreign aid is attempting to bridge. As a result
Sociology 42
Pakistan's economy today is as aid-oriented as it was 10 or 20

years ago.
• Political effects:
The influence of feudalism has been most predominant in the

political sphere. As stated earlier, Pakistan's administrative and
political agencies are almost totally controlled at the higher
echelons by feudal lords. Just as the salt in Pakistan's soil has
retarded the growth of crops and vegetables, the feudal
influence in the country's political soil has hindered the growth
of democracy. The relationship between the feudal mentality
and the authoritarian tendency in Pakistan's political life is not
difficult to perceive. Where feudal lords occupy positions as
political executives, they tend to consider the country as their
property and the citizens as their subjects. Authoritarianism is
thus entrained in the feudal personality and is as essential to the
feudal system as oxygen is to human life. Freedom of thought
and intellect, and freedom of speech and expression, invariably
lead to the exposure of social inequities and injustices,
mobilize public opinion and generate movements for
establishing an egalitarian order. Therefore, the first target of
any feudal regime is the suppression of the press and academic
institutions so as to give the regime the freedom to control,
influence and manipulate to their own ends. A feudal regime,
ultimately, may be conceived of as a regime of intellectual
tyranny. The political power of the feudal class is derived from
their economic power, while their political power enables them
to consolidate and expand their economic power. This
combination has given them control over national affairs and
enabled them to thwart democracy in maintaining their
hegemony.
Reflecting on all this, one could be sympathetic to General
Pervez Musharraf's claim of Nawaz Sheriff's Government
being corrupt, since the majority of National Assembly
members belong to the feudal class. One of the greatest factors
that caused Nawaz Sharif's downfall was his mismanagement
of statecraft. His Government was accused of authoritarian
rule, hypocrisy, massive bribery and administrative failure.
Under Sharif's rule, Pakistan's bureaucracy, police and public
services were so infested with corruption and political
favoritism, and so starved of resources, that few Pakistanis
expected anything from government except employment.
Sociology 43
In any case, according to Akbar Zaidi’s research, the larger

landholdings have shrunk. For instance, in 1939, 2.4 per cent
owners controlled 38 per cent of the agricultural land which
changed later. Between 1950-55, 1.1 per cent owners
controlled 15.8 per cent of land with farm sizes varying from
100 to 500 acres; 0.1 per cent of landlords owned 15.4 per
cent land with a farm size of 500 acres and above. This seems
to have changed within years, with farm sizes being reduced.
This development is attributable to problematic land reforms
and laws of inheritance which distributed land.
Another important development relates to the fact that most

major landowners have become industrialists or successful
entrepreneurs. They no longer have private armies. Instead,
they run large industrial units such as sugar, ginning and
textile mills. But does this data mean that feudalism is no
more? The answer is no. In fact, the issue is that as the
institution of feudalism was diluted it led to two separate but
interdependent developments.
First, the landlords diversified in terms of their capital-

generating capabilities and became industrialists and
entrepreneurs. The logic was that since agriculture did not
ensure greater profit margins, business and industry were
selected as the new course. These big landlords also had the
advantage of being in politics which was essential for
negotiating loans and manipulating the state bureaucracy. So,
in this respect the feudal landlord diversified the source of
capital formation. He either did it himself or in partnership
with other elites. The land was not just an asset but it also
became a source to provide the collateral against which loans
were obtained from banks.
However, land continued to have its symbolic worth in the

form of expression of power. Resultantly, other elite groups
also started to mimic the landowning class and began
acquiring land. The wonderful farmhouses around Islamabad,
Karachi and Lahore are not just an expression of individual
economic strength but a symbol of the political influence of
an individual as part of the extended elite.
Hence, it is not surprising that other elite groups such as those

comprising industrialists, generals, senior bureaucrats and
educated professionals who acquired capital were inclined to
buy farmland. During the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s, the
Sociology 44
elite of the civil and military bureaucracy were not interested

in retaining or exercising control of the agricultural land
which they got from the government. Most would either sell
the land to local landowners or neglect it.
After the 1980s, especially after the value of land increased

and the bureaucracy started to institutionalize its role in the
state, the owners became interested in actively becoming
farmers. Those who had the institutional support used it in
one form or the other to establish better control. Thus, a new
class of agriculturists was born. It had no links with the soil
but willingly became an influential factor in far-flung areas.
Many generals and senior bureaucrats, for instance, became
Numberdars of their villages. While they were not performing
the role of collecting taxes, which a Numberdar is supposed
to do, they enjoyed the authority which comes with the office.
Land ownership also had an impact on elite culture and ethos.

The culture of farmhouses was not about having large houses
but in many ways replicating the decadent lifestyle of the old
Nawabs and the feudal elite. For instance, the huge parties,
Mujrahs and the flaunting of money which takes place in
these new settlements reflected the desire of the inhabitants
for copying the traditional landowning elite. They were not
rejecting a redundant culture but accepting it as a superior
norm. The culture also portrayed a negative development.
Second, the new economic groups and non-landowning elite

acquired the attitudes of landowning feudals in the form of
the exercise of authority. In a traditional feudal culture, there
is an essential relationship between the lord of the manor and
the vassals.
In modern terms, the new elite started to behave like the lord
of the manor with those in subordinate positions being treated
as vassals or minions. There was, hence, the proliferation of a
certain kind of attitude which permeated different vocational
groups. As long as an elite group dominated an organization
or profession, the attitude could be replicated. New feudals
were created from amongst the entrepreneurs, industrialists,
the military and civil bureaucracy and professional groups.
The late Hamza Alavi defined the professional group as part
of the Muslim Ashraaf (elite) of pre-Partition India.
Sociology 45
These new groups also represented the diversification of

methods of capital formation which was no longer tied to
agriculture. However, such diversification did not necessarily
create a capitalist society but resulted in a hybrid form of
feudalism which one could categorize as pre-capitalism in
which the seeds of capitalism were sown in a solid base of
feudalism.
The results have been damning. The feudal attitude and the
culture of power have proliferated and entered all institutions.
The key, of course, is the concentration of power and the
subservience of groups of people under a central authority.
Resultantly, the MQM is as feudal as the lord of the manor
who operates from interior Sindh or other parts of the country.
I
s
l
a
m
a
n
d
C
l
a
s
s
c
o
Sociology 46
n
f
l
i
c
t
s
Before we discuss Islam's attitude regarding the concept of

classes it may be useful to try to understand what is generally
meant by a "class system". In medieval Europe, for instance,
there were three distinct classes: the nobility, the clergy and
the common people. The clergy had their own distinctive
clothes. In those ages the power of the church was equal and
at times opposed to that of kings and emperors. The Pope
claimed that it was he who conferred power on kings but they
strove to get rid of his influence in order to rule
independently. Owing to the property donated by the religious
people and the exactions imposed on them, the church
became so rich that at times it could have armies of its own.
On the other hand, the nobility inherited nobleness from their
forefathers and passed it on to their descendants. A man
belonged to the nobility by birth and remained as such until
his death regardless of whatever noble or mean actions he
might have done in his lifetime.
In the feudal age the nobility exercised absolute powers over

the common people who lived in their estates. All the
legislative, judicial and executive powers were in their hands.
Their whims and fancies were the laws by which they ruled
over the people. Since representative councils were composed
of members belonging to this class, it was only natural that
the legislations they made would aim at protecting
themselves, safeguarding their own privileges and interests
which they surrounded by an air of inviolability. As for the
common people, they had no privileges or rights. They
inherited poverty, slavery and humiliation and passed them on
to their descendants. The significant economic development
which took place afterwards led to the emergence of the
bourgeoisie: the new class which aspired to displace the
Sociology 47
nobility and to assume their privileges and prestige. It was

under the leadership of this emerging class that the common
people launched the French Revolution which seemingly
abolished the class system and declared in theory, the
principles of liberty, fraternity and equality.
In modern times, the capitalist classes have replaced the old

nobility. It will be noticed that such replacement took place in
a disguised manner and was accompanied by certain changes
necessitated by economic development. But the basic
principle has never changed. The fact is that the capitalist
class still has the property, the power and the ability to steer
the government's machinery into the direction they desire.
Despite the appearances of freedom manifested in democratic
elections, capitalism knows how to sneak into parliaments
and government offices in order to achieve its shady ends by
crooked means and under various names.
The class system is based on the wrong assumption that

property means power and that the class which owns property
has the power as well. Such a class will exercise an influence
over the legislative power. Consequently such a class will, by
direct or indirect means, make legislations which protect it
and subject the common people to its own authority, thus
depriving them of their legal rights.
In the light of the above-mentioned definition of classes, it

may be truly said that there has never been a class system in
Islam. This can be clearly seen from the following facts:
There are no laws in Islam which aim at keeping the property
in the hands of particular persons. The Holy Quran plainly
says: ''In order that if may not merely make a circuit between
the wealthy among you" (Iix: 7). Therefore, Islam made laws
that ensured continual fragmentation and redistribution of
wealth. According to the Islamic law of inheritance, inherited
property should be distributed among a large number of
persons.
An inheritance is never passed on to a single person except in

the very rare case where such a person has no brothers, sisters
or any other kindred. Even in such rare cases, Islam took the
necessary precautions by prescribing that a portion of the
Sociology 48
inheritance should go to the deprived people who are not

related to the dead man. This provision may be regarded as a
predecessor of modern inheritance tax. The Holy Quran
prescribed that "if at the time of division (of inheritance)
other relatives or orphans or poor are present, feed them out
of the (property) and speak to them words of kindness and
justice" (iv : 8). It was in this way that Islam solved the
problem resulting from the accumulation of property.
Property goes to individuals as such and not as members of a
particular class, because when they die the property will be
redistributed according to new proportions. History bears
witness that property in the Islamic society was constantly
changing hands without being confined to a particular faction
of the nation. This leads to an important conclusion:
Legislation in Islam is not the prerogative of a particular
class. In the Islamic state no one is allowed to make the
legislations he desires because all people are treated
according to the same Islamic laws which were revealed by
God and which hold no distinctions among people. It follows
that the Islamic society is a classless society. It will be
understood that existence of classes is closely connected with
the existence of a legislative prerogative. Where such a
privilege is non-existent and no one can make legislations
which safeguard his own interests at the expense of others,
there will be no classes.
Now let us explain how two relevant verses which, if read

carelessly might lead to some doubts.
"God has bestowed his gifts of sustenance more free/y on

some of you than on others" (xvi: 71).
“We raised some of them above others in ranks" (xliii:

32)”.
Do such verses mean that Islam recognizes the class

system?
These two verses merely describe what is actually taking

place on earth, be it under Islamic rule or otherwise. They
state that people differ in rank and livelihood. Let us take
Russia for example. Do all people get the same wages or are
Sociology 49
some people more privileged than others in livelihood? Are

all the conscripted people made officers or soldiers or are
some of them raised above others in rank? The existence of
differences among the people is an inevitable fact. The two
verses do not give a Particular reason for such differences.
They do not even state that such preference is based on
capitalist, communist or even Islamic considerations. They do
not say that such preference may be just or unjust by our
standards. The two verses merely say that such preference
exists everywhere on earth. But, of course, all that takes place
on earth falls within the sphere of God's will.
It must have become clear by now that the Islamic society is a

society without classes or legislative privileges. It will be
noticed that the existence of differences in wealth and
property should not be confused with the question of classes
unless such property and wealth conferred upon their owners
any legislative and individual privileges. Differences in
wealth will not lead to the emergence of classes so long as all
people are-actually, not in the theory only-equal before the
law.
C
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
Income inequality is one of the most important consequences
of social class. Although class status is not a causal factor for
income, there is consistent data that show those in higher
classes have higher incomes than those in lower classes. This
inequality still persists when controlling for occupation. The
conditions at work vary greatly depending on class. Those in
the upper-middle class and middle-class enjoy greater
Sociology 50
freedoms in their occupations. They generally are more

respected, enjoy more diversity, and are able to exhibit some
authority. Those in lower classes tend to feel more alienated
and have lower work satisfaction overall. The physical
conditions of the workplace differ greatly between classes.
While middle-class workers may “suffer alienating
conditions” or “lack of job satisfaction”, blue-collar workers
are the ones who have to worry about health hazards, injury,
and even death. In the more social sphere, class has direct
consequences on lifestyle. Lifestyle includes tastes,
preferences, and a general style of living. These lifestyles
could quite possibly effect educational attainment, and
therefore status attainment. Class lifestyle also affects how
one raises his or her children. For example, a working-class
person is more likely to raise their child to be working class
and middle-class children are more likely to be raised to be
middle-class. This perpetuates the idea of class for future
generations. The real problem is that this system has become
historically obsolete. Either it can be uprooted by a revolution
and a socialist system being established or we can accept the
defeat and fall into the abyss of barbarism and die. The
human race will not die, it will live. Now the only option left
for its survival is a Socialist victory through a class war.

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Sociology 1

Social class Conflicts in Pakistan

Most societies, especially nation states, seem to have some

1) The most important criteria in distinguishing classes.

2) The number of class divisions that exist.

3) The extent to which individuals recognize these divisions if

4) Whether or not class divisions even exist in the society.

The theoretical debate over the definition of class remains an

The most basic class distinction between the two groups is

In the less complex societies, power/class hierarchies may or

In so-called non-stratified societies or acephalous societies,

In societies where classes exist, one's class is determined

Although class is rarely hereditary in a strict sense, it will

Social Mobility. Subsequently, it is also the degree to

Those who can attain a position of power in a society will

• Costume and grooming

Finally, fluid notions such as race can have widely varying

but this is not necessarily an indication that race is a factor in

Income inequality is one of the most important consequences

and even death. Kerbo, Herald (1996). Social Stratification

Class conflict can take many different shapes, for example

It can be open, as with a business lockout aimed at destroying

Class conflict is a term long-used mostly by socialists,

• Class conflict in pre-capitalist societies

Where societies are socially divided based on status, wealth,

• Class conflict in Capitalism

The typical example of class conflict described is class

from these day to day forms of class conflict, during periods

Class warfare is a term long-used by many socialists

Arguably, there is little fundamental difference between the

• Labor (the proletariat or workers) includes anyone

What Marx points out is that members of each of the two

An example of this would be a factory producing a

This surplus value is higher to the extent that workers spend

Not all class struggle is violent or necessarily radical (as with

Not all class struggle is a threat to capitalism, or even to the

Marx thought that this conflict was central to the social

them to become more and more powerful, encouraging overt

The revolution would lead to a socialist society in which the

Even after a revolution, the two classes would struggle, but

In every state and in every period, class contrasts, class

(1) Upon the degree of unity or of diversity in the citizen

(2) Upon the type of distinction and of organization peculiar

(3) Upon the strength and organization of the civic

Every great society exhibits historically a picture of a social

intellect and of economico-technical qualities. They lost a

Accordingly the degree of class contrasts, of class conflicts,

a) Wherever there are different classes, they have on the one

Accordingly the history of folk-economy, of society, and of

Contrasted with these periods are those of social conflict.

The struggles will always have reference to three points:

(1) To the constitutional law, to the filling of civic offices, to

(2) To class and family law in the strict sense, to class

(3) To the distribution of income as affected on the one hand

Chiefly, however, it is the law and the great institutions which

measures. The more complex a folk-economy is, and the

b) All the class conflicts appear to be the consequence of that

spiritual, technical, economic culture of the persons

If we disregard very minute communities, consisting of

existence of the power of the state. With a chief or king

c) Accordingly the history of social classes and of

(1) Establishment of a definite civic power, which rests

(2) The attempt is made to admit wider groups to power,