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Passion and War: Reincorporating the First Image

by Jonathan Berohn

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The most correct maxim for accurately appraising the intentions of men is to examine their interests, which are the most common motive for their actions. But a truly subtle politician does not wholly reject the conjectures which one can derive from mans passions, for passions enter sometimes rather openly into, and almost always manage to affect unconsciously, the motives that propel the most important affairs of state. Cardinal de Retz1

Abstract

Political scientists have been puzzling over why and how states fight since Thucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian War. While passion has long played an important role in theories about war, present day political scientists almost universally ignore it. From neorealism and rational choice to neoclassical realism, current theories focus instead on systemic forces, cost-benefit analysis, and domestic politics. Building on the traditions of classical political thought, I propose a new model of war. This model, drawing inspiration from Clausewitzs trinity of war, returns passion as an important causal variable in the outbreak, conduct, and resolution of war. Returning passion to the study of warfare brings explanatory power to bear on anomalies and specific decisions that neorealism, rational choice, and current strains of neoclassical realism cannot successfully address.

Introduction
1

Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 45.

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Political thinkers have been studying war for well over 2,000 years. Yet in all that time, nothing like a consensus has emerged about the causes, conduct, and termination of wars. Two broad schools of thought dominate much of current international relations scholarship about war: realism and rational choice. For all the advances these theories have made, they have thus far generally omitted any first level, or human nature factors from their works. Ignoring the first image has allowed these schools to produce some elegant and parsimonious theories, but these advances have come at the expense of the significant explanatory power that first image factors can add to the understanding of war. Certainly, there are far too many potential first image factors to do them all justice in one paper. Furthermore, attempting to add in every potential first level influence on policy would quickly end up in a theory of everything that would explain nothing. Instead, I focus on the irrational or passion element of war. This is not to say I am developing a theory of irrational actorsfar from it. By definition you cannot predict what irrational actors will do. Instead, I am developing a theory of how actors attempting to act rationally respond toand more importantlyare constrained by the irrational passions naturally present in every individual and any society. While in many ways this line of reasoning flies in the face of existing international relations theory, it is certainly not new to political theory. Political thinkers from Thucydides onward have noted and stressed the importance of the irrational to understanding politics and international affairs. What this paper attempts to do is bring this longtime understanding

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of the importance of passion back into the contemporary study of international relations in general and war in particular. Specifically, I intend to address two puzzles that the dominant theories of warrealism and rational choicecannot address. The first puzzle is realisms (specifically neorealisms) inability to address causes and conduct of specific wars. Neorealism offers great insight into necessary conditions for war based on systemic factors, but it purposely ignores individual policy decisions. To maximize its explanatory power, any theory of war ought to be able to go beyond this limitation and address the specific as well as the general. As for rational choice, the puzzle lies in rational choices failure to explain why wars last longer than the theory predicts. The source of the puzzle, I will argue, lies with rational choices attempt to make sense of a phenomenon that is driven as much by passion as it is by rationality. Adding passion to the mix allows for far greater understanding of and explanatory power about war than a model based solely on the presumption of rational actors. As mentioned above, both realism and rational choice have made significant contributions to our understanding of war. I certainly do not intend to suggest that neither has anything to contribute. I wish rather to build on the advances these theories have made by integrating first-image factors into the analysis of warfare. Such an undertaking is far from unprecedented. Neoclassical realist scholars, for instance, have made important strides in their attempt to add second image domestic level factors to neorealisms system-centric approach. The neoclassical realists, too, however, also fail

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to address first image factors. In some sense, this paper picks up where neoclassical realists leave off. In another sense, this paper also represents a return to the pastat least in terms of inspiration. In On War, Carl von Clausewitz famously defined the trinity of war as a union of rationality, creativity, and passion.2 Despite its age, this maxim can still help define the mechanism for filling the passion gap the study of war. In other words, Clausewitzs trinity of war offers an insight into to how to add these first level factors into the study of war in a parsimonious manner that significantly increases explanatory power.

What Is Passion?

I define passion as simply the irrational support (or lack thereof) for war. By irrational I mean, of course, not inexplicable but irrational in the classic rational choice sense. In other words, passion is support or opposition to a policy independent of cost/benefit calculations. The sources of passion can range from religion and ideology to emotions such as fear and hatred, but the thing they all have in common is their irrational foundation. The expression of passion, on the other hand, occurs on two levels: individual and societal. As passion is, by its nature, a psychological phenomenon, it is essentially an individual response to a stimulus, war in this case. A societal expression of passion is the
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Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

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overall level of individual passions in a society. This is not to say that a societys passion is the simple sum of individual passions. In fact, the mechanism for translating individual passions into a societal expression of passion is far outside the scope of this project. It is also unnecessary. The only assumption necessary for building a theory about passion and war is the assumption that societies will express some general passion reaction to the initiation, conduct, and resolution of wars. This reaction is determined by individual passions, but the exact translation is less important than the ultimate societal expression and its impact. The individual expression of passion is still important, though, when assessing actual decision-making. That is because, in short, decision-makers are also individual members of society. To build a theory based on the presence of irrational passions in members of society without also accounting for the same possibility of irrationality in decision-makers does not make sense logically. It is obviously trite to say that decisionmakers are people, too, but in this case it is an important assumption for the theory. To sum up, I will examine both how passion affects individual decision-makers and how decision-makers perceive and react to passion in their societies.

Why Passion? The Historical Role of Passion and Irrationality in Political Theory

The study of international relations is often deemed to have begun with Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War.3 Indeed, realists of all persuasions
3

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1987).

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repeatedly point to the Thucydides as the great-grandfather of realist thought. What this assessment misses, though, is the importance that Thucydides places on the irrational forces that help guide the course of the war. Spartan fear of rising Athenian power certainly gets at the idea of self-help in an anarchic system and policy decision-making in response to material calculations, but it is not coincidental that Thucydides uses the word fear. Sparta and Athens had fought together as allies in the past, but something about Athens rise during the period Thucydides writes about leads to fear in Sparta. This fear is part of the universal human nature that Thucydides sees as the reason his work will endure. Certainly, an argument can be made that the use of fear is simply a word choice by Thucydides to describe the calculations Sparta was making about the inevitable outcome of an increase in Athenian power. Nonetheless, the underlying animus between the two states that helps bring about this fear cannot be so easily explained away. Certainly, when Thucydides presents Pericles funeral oration, the impact of passion on policy is quite clear. Pericles, when rousing his fellow Athenians to war, chooses not to emphasize rational cost benefit analyses, imperfect information, or enforcement problems but instead a pure raw appeal to the glory or Athens. Athenians of that time believed in glory, and Pericles certainly believed in the value of using that belief to build support for the war. Another classical theorist who is often mentioned as a forbear of realism is Machiavelli. Certainly much of Machiavellis thoughts presage many of the principles of realism. Act out of necessity rather than the way things ought to be; worry primarily

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about preserving power; focus on military strength.4 At the same time, however, there is again a strong current of the importance of the irrational in Machiavellis work as well. For example, in Chapter 12 he belittles the effectiveness of mercenary troops since they will have no love for the prince to inspire loyalty. More generally, the dual theme of fear and love of the people for the prince runs consistently through Machiavellis entire text. He clearly recognizes the importance of irrational impulses in determining foreign policy outcomes. In short, passion plays a role in Machiavellis understanding of foreign policy decision-making just as surely as it does with Thucydides. The parade of realism precursors including passion in their arguments can continue with Hobbes assertion that the quest for glory is one of the inherent causes for conflict in mans nature.5 Support for passion as a driving force of international politics, however, does not only surface in the thinkers traditionally deemed to fall in the realist camp. For example, even Rousseau felt that the idea that reason ruled passions in mens decision-making was simply inaccurate.6 Other thinkers like Smith, Montesquieu, and Steuart felt that capitalisms main virtue was that it diverted men from pursuing only their passion by introducing interests (the pursuit of money). 7 In other words, left to their own devices, men would naturally pursue their passions. In short, the importance of passion for understanding politics and decision-making appears in classic political theory of all stripes and colors.
4

Niccolo Machiavell, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 5 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1985), Chapter 13. 6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1972) Book 9. 7 Hirschman.

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Why Passion? More Recent Approaches

The fact that passion has slipped out of the cannon of international relations scholarship does not mean that all political scientists ignore it. As Walker Connor points out in a study of the literature on identity, political leaders have long been aware of the powerful pull of emotional appeals. He cites both Bismarck and Mao as just two of an innumerable list of leaders who have appealed directly to passion to garner support for their policies.8 In an early speech, Abraham Lincoln also noted that the struggle against passion was the key to successfully navigating the perils of the 19th century.9 One obvious question arises here: if passion is so widely recognized as important by statesmen, why is it generally unstudied by political scientists? Connor offers two answers that apply to psychological factors in general and passion in particular: intellectual discomfort with the non rational; and the search for quantifiable explanations.10 Whether or not this gets at the true motivations of political scientists is in many ways not important. What is important, though, is trying close the gap in knowledge that this inattention to passion has created. Of course, stating that international relations scholars have neglected first image factors in no way denigrates the contribution of other first image scholars. The study of
8

Walker Connor. Ethnonationalism. in Understanding Political Development: An Analytical Study, eds. M. Weiner and S. P. Huntington (Boston: Brown Little, 1987), pp. 196-220. 9 Abraham Lincoln, "Address before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois," 27 January 1838, Douglas Archicves, http://douglassarchives.org/linc_a69.htm. 10 Connor, p. 205.

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identity, for example, is quite a hot topic in political science of late. In addition to Connors psychological approach, scholars have looked at identity using everything from ideology11 to rational choice.12 While the causal mechanisms these authors suggest are widely in variance with one another, they all point to the importance of trying to incorporate first image factors into an understanding of politics. Just as obviously, the political psychology literature attempts to bring an understanding of first image factors to bear. Political psychology scholars such as, Margaret Hermann, Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley, Michael Young and Marc Shafer13 focus on such diverse psychological topics as personalities, leader types, social identity theory and normative constraints, and cognition. For all the light they shed on the importance of looking at first image factors in foreign-policy decision-making, though, they still ignore half the picture. The psychological factors this literature looks at are those that impact the decision-maker directly. The model that I propose is concerned both with the psychological factors that impact the decision-maker and those at work in a

11

William Safran, Language, Ideology, and State-Building. International Political Science Review 13:4 (1992 ):397-414. 12 David Laitin, Identity in Formation : The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 13 Margaret Hermann, Explaining Foreign Policy Characteristics Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders, International Studies Quarterly 24:1 (March 1980) pp. 7-46.; Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann, Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How? An Empirical Inquiry, International Studies Quarterly 33:4 (December 1989) pp. 361-387.; Margaret Hermann and Charles Kegley, Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology, International Studies Quarterly 39:4 (December 1995) pp. 511-533.; Michael D. Young and Mark Shafer Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International relations, Mershon International Studies Review 42:1 (may 1998) pp. 6396.

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countrys population. While the political psychology literature opens one door to access passion, it does not fully address the scope of passions impact on war.

Clausewitz and Passion

Of all the thinkers who deal with passion and international affairs, Clausewitz deals with it most explicitly. In addition to observing that that war is merely a continuation of policy by other means,14 Clausewitz also noted that war consists of a trinity of rationality, creativity, and passion.15 Taken together, these insights can help lay the foundation for incorporating the missing first image factors into a theory of war. By rationality, Clausewitz means the rational attention to international affairs by statesmen. Creativity is the application and use of military force by commanders. Passion is the spirit of the people either is support of or against the war. To Clausewitz, the conduct and progress of a war flows directly from the interplay between the three elements of this trinity.16 In other words, statesmen try to determine a nations political objective in war rationally, and commanders try to secure that objective using their skills. All the while, both statesmen and military commanders try to focus public passion in support of their goals. At the same time, however, public passion also influences statesmen and commanders, as well. Statesmen try to follow policies in line with public passions, and commanders try to avoid military options that the public passion will not support. In
14 15

Clausewitz, p. 87. Ibid., p. 89. 16 Ibid., p. 89.

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short, Clausewitzs system is a synergy between all three elements that a nation brings to bear in a war: statesmanship, military power, and national will. Passion, to Clausewitz, is nothing more or less than human nature in play. The hatred, affinity, or disinterest a people has for a potential enemy goes a long way in determining how a nation will wage war against that enemy.

The General Mechanism of Passion and War

As I mentioned above, I do not seek to supplant the contributions made by either realism or rational choice. Keeping this in mind, it should come as no surprise that rational decision-making retains its place in the mechanism I propose for adding passion to a theory of war. The general causal mechanism I propose is that passion acts as a second independent variable alongside rational decision-making to determine war outcomes. In short, here is the causal pathway:

Rational Choice

Passion

War

Note that unlike some attempts to go beyond the limits of realism and rational choice, this model does not specify passion as an intervening variable. For example, Gideon Rose defines the neoclassical realist addition of second image factors to realism as an

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intervening variable.17 Similarly, by prescribing that political scientists first must understand the baseline rational model before attempting to understand the impacts of both second and first image factors, Fearon also implies that any additions to rational decision-making would probably have intervening effects.18 The model I define here takes quite the opposite approach. Passion cannot be an intervening variable for rational decision-making about war, because, as an essential element of war, it makes no sense to think about war independent of passion. In other words, with rationality and passion, the classic chicken and the egg problem emerges. While you certainly cannot have war independent of the decisionmaking process, you also cannot have war independent of passion. To again hearken back to Clausewitz, war simply arouses passions. These passions may not always sway statesmen and decision-makers, but they are certainly present every bit as much as rationality.

Independent Variables

Rational Choice: The rational choice independent variable starts with the traditional rational choice decision-making model defined by James Fearon as its point of departure.19 Note, however, that this model explicitly includes second level, or domestic
17

Gideon Rose, Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, World Politics 51:1 (October 1998) pp. 144-172. 18 James Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organizations 49, 3, Summer 1995, p. 409. 19 Ibid.

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politics, considerations as part of the rational cost-benefit analysis. Fearon, of course, does not rule out the importance of the second image, but his baseline model intentionally moves the second image into a position of secondary importancean issue to be addressed once the baseline model of rationality and war comes into focus.20

Passion: As mentioned above, I define passion as irrational support or opposition to a policy independent of cost/benefit calculations. Again, the sources of passion can range from religion and ideology to emotions such as fear and hatred. Expressions of passion surface both in individual decision-makers and society at large.

Dependent Variable

War: Specifically, the dependent variable is decisions relating to war: decisions that lead to war, decisions about the conduct of war, and decisions that end wars.

The Specific Passion Effect

This overall model I describe is similar in form to the models proposed by Alastair Johnston and Judith Goldstein.21 But where Johnston focuses on strategic culture and Goldstein on ideas, I look at passion as the variable of interest. I am also not presuming
20 21

Ibid., p.409. Alastair Ian Johnston, Thinking about Strategic Culture, International Security 19:4 (Spring 1995) 32-64; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

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any a priori hierarchy of choices or interests. In my model, which I will call the passion model, passion can act in one of three basic ways (with, of course, variations along the spectrum): 1) Negative: strong passions against a policy can deter policy-makers from adopting one or more potential courses of action. 2) Neutral: policy makers enact policies independent of passions. 3) Positive: strong passions in favor of a policy may induce policy-makers to adopt a certain course of action. Note that all of these impacts can apply to both decision-makers individual passions and the general level of passions within a society. Of the above impacts, the neutral is the most complicated. When passion has a neutral impact on policy, one of two mechanisms may kick in. First, there may indeed be no strong popular sentiment about the issue. In such a case, the causal pathway would be indistinguishable from the classic rational choice model that Fearon proposes. A second mechanism may be at play here as well, though. In this second case, when there is some discernable passion but policy-makers ignore it, some other calculations must be at work to prompt the decision-makers to adopt such a course of action. Rather than betray a flaw in the theoretical reasoning of the model, these last cases provide some of the most useful insights into the theory. Unlike the rational choice model, the passion model allows for circumstances when the variable of interestpassionhas no effect on outcomes. Rather than simply having to stare down or write off an anomaly, the passion model

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provides us with causal mechanism with which we can evaluate both how it has an impact and why and when it may not. It is also important to understand the mechanism through which passion makes its impact on war decisions. The mechanism for the impact of leaders inherent passions is fairly straightforward. Simply put, decision-makers have to deal with their passions somehow when they make decisions. They must let either their rationality or passions guide their actions ormore likelycome up with some sort of compromise. As for passion in society at large, while there is no passion-meter leaders can refer to, political leaders are certainlyto a greater or lesser degreein touch in some way with popular opinion. It is through this contact with the people that leaders can judge the underlying passion and determine an appropriate response (or lack thereof) to it.

Why Passion? The Need for New Theory

The obvious question at this point is exactly why do we need a new theory of war that adds passion to the mix? Might it not be the case that systemic pressures overwhelm first image factors like passion when it comes to serious decisions like war? On the other hand, might not statesmen be able to make rational decisions when the stakes are so high? Certainly neorealism and rational choice respectively have sustained quite a large number of adherents who would argue for one (or both) of the above propositions. If any new theory of war is to make any contribution, it must improve upon the explanatory power offered by neorealism and rational choice. A theory of war that includes passion as a

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causal variable does just that. Theory that does not incorporate passion and human nature will inevitably fall short when trying to explain policy decisions without reference to the underlying human nature at play. The question of importance has a similar answer. Briefly and most obviously, all things being equal (and ignoring parsimony for a moment) a theory that explains more is better than a theory that explains less. With the advent of religiously inspired terrorism, some accounting for how human nature affects international relations and conflict seems particularly relevant and crucial. Historically as well, wars that seem to come not from dispassionate evaluations of interest and material factors argue for the importance of trying to include human nature into international relations theory. From the Melians vainly resisting the Athenians and the Crusaders spurred on by religious zealotry to the Japanese attacking the United States in war they believed they would lose, history is full of wars were driven by diverse motives such as religion, ideology, and honoraspects of human nature that current theories about war do not fully address. Specifically, incorporating human nature by way of passion into a theory of war should shed light on many of the empirical anomalies that realism and rational choice cannot explain. Once the passion of the people comes back into play theoretically, we can attempt to make sense of such empirical puzzles as why the US and Great Britain are allies, why Germany and Japan have not rearmed, and why Israeli Palestinian conflict is so hard to solve. In short, incorporating human nature into a passion model of war greatly expands both the cases the theory can address and its potential relevance for modern policy-makers.

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The Limitations of Realism

Realism has not always focused on systemic level factors. For example, Hans Morgenthaus initial formulation of classical realism relied heavily on the insidious nature of man and his lust for power as the explanation for recurring conflict in the world.22 It was not until Kenneth Waltz proposed neorealism that the international system replaced human nature as the driving force behind understanding international relations. In Waltz, the impetus for replacing the first image with becomes clear. Simply put, Waltzs perception of political science limited his inquiries into general patterns of behavior rather than specific policy outcomes. By focusing on this level of analysis, the natural shift to system level variables was perfectly logical.23 Realism as a permissive cause of war has always been the central focus of Waltzs argument. Waltz himself agrees that realism only explains why war will occur. It does not explain why or when a particular war will occur, or why war will not occur. To Waltz, this level of prediction falls out of international outcomes, and down to foreign policyand area that Waltz purposely avoids.24 He does, however, acknowledge that any attempt to explain foreign policy decisions mustof necessityinclude the second and first level images in order to have any explanatory power.25 That Waltz feels any
22 23

Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948). Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (Columbia University Press: New York, 2001), pp. 233-235. 24 Waltz, pp. 233-235. 25 Ibid., p238.

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such theory would be too messy to be political science leaves us two options. We can agree and keep our focus strictly on systemic factors that help us explain the nature of international outcomes but offer no insight into specific policy decisions, or we can attempt to go beyond Waltz and try to incorporate non-systemic variable into a theory that tries to explain policy decisions.

The Neoclassical Realist Revision

Neoclassical realists are one group of realist scholars that have tried to move beyond the limitations of systemic outcomes. They attempt to explain individual policy decisions by adding unit-level or second image factors. While recent developments in neoclassical realism do a good job of attempting to come to terms with unit-level factors that influence policy, they do not address the passion or human nature aspect that underlies many of these unit-level factors. For example, in his work on WWII, Schweller ascribes policy decisions to countries internally driven perceptions of their interests. Germany chose to rearm and ultimately pursue war because it saw itself as revisionist.26 This assessment, however, neglects entirely the underlying motive of why Germany saw itself that waynamely the passion of the people was such that Hitler could rely on them to support his plans. In short, while neoclassical realism can improve realisms explanatory power when it comes to individual policy decisions, by neglecting passion and first image factors it still comes up incomplete.
26

Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitlers Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

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The Limitations of Rational Choice

The idea of incorporating irrational factors into a theory of war is also not new to the rational choice approach. In fact, one of James Fearons conclusions is that a better understanding of what the assumption of rationality really implies for explaining war may actually raise our estimate of the importance of particular irrational and second image factors.27 Rational choice scholarship, however, has tended to focus on developing this baseline theory of rationality to the exclusion of relaxed models that include irrational factors. For example, in Dan Reiters restatement of rational choice as the bargaining model of war, he focuses exclusively on the assumption of rationality.28 At the same time, including passion in a theory of war does not mean excluding rationality. In fact, quite the opposite is truerational self-interest calculation remain remains a key causal factor in any theory of war. It is the mechanism for including passion that is the major difference between my theory and Fearons. As mentioned above, where Fearon is interested in defining the baseline rational model then relaxing his assumptions to ultimately examine irrational factors, I maintain there is no baseline model of war that excludes passion. As passion is an essential element of war and decision-making about war, it makes no more sense to try to understand the process of going to war, waging war, and concluding wars without passion than it does to try to understand them without
27 28

Fearon, p. 409. Dan Reiter, Exploring the Bargaining Model of War, Perspectives on Politics 1:1 (March 2003): pp. 27-43.

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rational self-interest. A closer examination of the rational choice models proposed by Fearon and Reiter illuminates the shortcoming in their approaches caused by the omission of passion as a causal factor. Both Fearon and Reiter describe issue indivisibility as one of the potential causes for war in the rational choice framework. While Fearon essentially dismisses the importance of this idea, Reiter acknowledges that substantive work into this area is underway.29 Nonetheless, the short shrift both give this issue is telling. If issue indivisibility is at all common, the rational choice / bargaining approach to war has a serious problem. Even if issue indivisibility is rare, in those cases where it does occur, rational choice has very little to say about it using Fearons framework. This is precisely the kind of case where including passion yields valuable insight. Passion lets us look at why issues may become indivisible, and how this indivisibility affects and constrains policy-makers. To be fair, Reiter does point out that several rational choice scholars are trying to explain these cases using pure rational choice reasoning, but the idea of indivisibility arising simply over leaders fears of setting compromise precedents30 does not seem to add much to the explanatory power here. This sort of explanation also fails to answer the question of why this happens sometimes and not others. Again passion offers one potential explanation with a much more convincing micro-foundation to build upon. Issue indivisibility also points to one of the fundamental problems with rational choice, in general, and the bargaining model of war in particular. In defining the
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Fearon pp. 381-382; Reiter, p. 30. Reiter p. 30.

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bargaining model, Reiter bases part of his authority on the claim that Clausewitzs view of war fits into a bargaining perspective.31 Upon closer examination, this appears to be a serious misreading of Clausewitz and a large hole in the theory behind the bargaining model of war. Certainly, as Reiter argues, Clausewitz points to the importance of understanding limited wars and the importance of fighting. What Reiter misapprehends, though, is just what the nature of that fighting is to Clausewitz. To Reiter, drawing on Werner and Smith and Stamm,32 combat and fighting in war serves mainly to reveal information to the warring parties that ultimately enables them to reach a mutually agreeable settlementthe bargain. Whats missing here, of course, is any consideration of the passion that Clausewitz found so essential in describing the nature of war. As an alternative, I propose to flesh out Reiters definition of the role of combat by reinserting passion. In short, combat has three general purposes rather than the two that Reiter identifies: 1) Military victory 2) Revealing information 3) Breaking the enemys will The first two purposes essentially mirror what Reiter describes. Nations use combat to try to further their political goals and convince the other side that defeat is inevitable. The third point, however, is both the key omission in the bargaining model of war and the
31 32

Ibid., p. 28. Suzanne Werner, The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms, American Journal of Political Science 43:3 (1999), pp. 913-934; Alastair Smith and Alan C. Stamm, Bargaining and the Nature of War, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:6 (December 2004), pp. 783-813.

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key contribution of the passion model for understanding war. In short, there is no magical peace switch that gets flipped when countries garner enough information to make reasonable assessments about the course of a war. That is where will and passion come into play. If a country still has the passion and will to fight, it will often continue on, even in the face off overwhelming evidence of its ultimate defeat. The American Civil war and World War II (especially in Europe) offer good examples of this phenomenon. In fact, this puzzles that countries may have perfectly good information about what the likely outcome of a war is yet proceed to either engage in or prolong conflict is one of the major challenges facing the bargaining model. Including passion lets us attempt to explain the fact that wars in addition to those mentioned above (notably civil wars) tend to last far longer than the models suggest they should. Again, while rational choice scholars have made some inroads into trying to explain this phenomenon33 the empirical studies to date have failed to explain the variance in duration through survival analysis using variables that try to measure rational calculations. This unaccounted various, I argue, will remain unexplained not, until as Fearon suggests, measurement improves, but rather until the studies try to define and measure the passions involved. In short, it is willfueled by passionthat keeps countries fighting when rationality suggests they should find a peaceful solution.

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James Fearon, Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others? unpublished manuscript, 2002; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Mans Soderbom, On the Duration of Civil War, Prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Civil Wars and PostConflict Transitions, May 2001.

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Just how to go about measuring passion, of course, is the key question. One argument against trying to incorporate passion into decision-making is that its simply impossible to measure. All we can do, this line of reasoning goes, is to craft models with those things we can measure, and realize thateven though these models are abstractionsthey are the best we can do. In addition to simply being intellectually unsatisfying, this excuse for omitting passion underestimates the possibilities for measuring at least the expressions of passion. Certainly, even if you could poll citizens in countries facing war, you could not simply ask people what their passion about the issue was and come up with any sort of meaningful measure. What would a 6 passion mean in relation to a 7 or a 5? Rather than try to come up with such an abstract measure, however, several avenues exist for measuring passions impact on outcomes. For example, comparing battle deaths to prisoners of war in a large n study could give you some indication of the passions involved in a war and certainly reveal variance such as seen between the propensity to take prisoners on the Western front in World War II versus that of the Eastern front and the Pacific theater. Similarly, examinations of protests, political activity, and even propaganda could tell us quite a bit about the passions at play in a given wartime decision. Certainly states believe in the value of propaganda in stimulating passions. An examination of it ought to yield insight into the impact it has on passions.

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Of course, what this brief outline of possible large n studies ultimately points to is the importance of case study for assessing the passion model. Truly understanding the mechanism behind passions impact requires in depth case study of actual decisionmaking. Where large n studies are useful in pointing toward interesting cases, the case studies will offer the best venue for testing the theoretical claims of the passion model. Specifically, case studies for testing the passion model should focus on identifying three main things: 1) The presence of and nature of passion (both in leaders and in society) 2) Leaders knowledge and understanding of popular passions 3) The impact of 1 and 2 on war decisions

Causal Complexity: Parsimony vs. Explanatory Power

Incorporating human nature into a theory of war, I must acknowledge, sacrifices the parsimony of neoclassical realism and rational choice. To use the standard political science test of trading parsimony for explanatory power, however, the trade here seems well worth it. As discussed above, adding passion to the mix significantly improves explanatory power. The ultimate loss in parsimony, at the same time, is relatively minor considering the benefits gained. While this pronouncement might at first seem counterintuitive, another look at the way in which further research will proceed indicates otherwise. Again, you certainly cannot circulate a questionnaire and measure passion, but thats where the benefit of case study comes in. In such an approach, attempting to

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add an appraisal of passion is far less difficult than in quantitative approaches to international relations. Certainly, it is still not an easy task, but it is no less daunting than conducting a thorough case study. Furthermore, as case studies focus on unit-level factors, to neglect one of the underlying causes of many of these unit-level factors in the name of parsimony seems negligent, at best. This is not to say that empirical testing of the passion model should avoid quantitative study. Indeed, scholars like Bear Braumoeller are making great strides into crafting effective quantitative tests for theories with complex causation such as that suggested by the passion model.34 In short, as with virtually any puzzle in political science there are plenty of econometric tests available for quantitative empirical study once a rigorous theory is in placeagain the question of gathering data notwithstanding. All in all, testing the passion model is the perfect opportunity for mixed method research. Ideally, large n studies would identify cases where passion played either a larger or smaller role than expected, and case studies would shed light on the particular causal mechanisms in play. Additionally, once again in terms of policy relevance, if passion is indeed an important factor to consider, policy makers need to know its details, not that it is too messy to try to tackle. Certainly even with passion included, any theory of war will not, and cannot pretend to be some panacea for policy-makers. The passion model can, however, offer them a more thorough understanding of international relations and policy decisions for their use. Certainly theoretical parsimony is a noble goal, but broader
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Bear Braumoeller, Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics, Political Analysis 11:3 (2003), pp. 209-233.

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explanatory power can be much more useful to statesmen. It does not help much to know you should balance. It can be quite useful to understand the underlying passion behind a conflict or potential conflict.

Further Avenues of Research

Obviously, the passion model is a theory in need of empirical support. First, though, construction of a detailed formal model would seem to be in order. Not only would such an exercise further refine the theory and place rigorous demands on its logic, but the full elaboration of the causal mechanism in a formal equation should also illuminate sub-mechanisms that would be ripe for empirical testing. The heart of the empirical testing of the passion model will, as mentioned, be case study. I plan, however, to augment the case study research with large n econometric analyses when possible. For the quantitative analyses, I do not have any illusions that I will be able to craft one perfect equation that will churn out the coefficient for passion. Instead, as mentioned above, I will concentrate on discovering the impacts of passion through concrete measures of actual policy implementation (and domestic reactions to such implementation when appropriate and available). One area that seems especially ripe for a re-analysis in terms of the passion model is war duration and termination. Once I have been able to identify interesting cases with a quantitative approach, I will then conduct qualitative case studiescases that either exemplify or confound the general conclusions of the econometric approach. Of course, when a quantitative

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approach is not tenable, I will pursue a case study strategy fro the outset. Whatever the method, the first subjects of empirical study will focus on four main topics: 1) Wars fought where one side has no real chance of winning. Relevant cases would range form the classic Melos-Athens conflict through the American Indian Wars to the Japanese attack on the US in World War II and modern terrorism campaigns. 2) Cases where systemic imperatives suggest that war would be likely yet did not occur. Relevant cases include the rise of US hegemony at the expense of the UK, US restrain when confronting a non-nuclear USSR immediately after World War II, and the lack of conflict in post-war Europe. 3) Wars that did not end when rational choice / bargaining models suggest they should have. Relevant cases include the US Civil War, World War II, and the Iran-Iraq War. Going back in history, the Thirty and Hundred Years wars are also obvious candidates for study. 4) Wars the militarily stronger side lost. Relevant cases include the Vietnam War and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The conclusions these case studies produce would go along way toward demonstrating the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the passion model of war.

Conclusion

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The current US War in Iraq demonstrates quite emphatically that force is not dead in international relations. It also demonstrates the need to look past systemic imperatives for the motives behind war and other policy decisions. Neoclassical realism takes a strong first step in that direction by including unit-level factors in its theories. This step is incomplete, though, in that it omits the very important first level human nature factors from consideration. By borrowing from Clausewitzs trinity of war the passion model begins to close this gap and reincorporate human nature into our understanding of policy decisions.

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Braumoeller, Bear Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics, Political Analysis 11:3 (2003), pp. 209-233. Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom, On the Duration of Civil War, Prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Civil Wars and Post-Conflict Transitions, May 2001. Connor. Walker, Ethnonationalism. in Understanding Political Development: An Analytical Study, eds. M. Weiner and S. P. Huntington (Boston: Brown Little, 1987), pp. 196-220. Fearon, James, Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organizations 49, 3, Summer 1995, pp. 379-414. Fearon, James, Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others? unpublished manuscript, 2002. Goldstein, Judith, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Hermann, Margaret, Explaining Foreign Policy Characteristics Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders, International Studies Quarterly 24:1 (March 1980) pp. 7-46. Hermann, Margaret and Charles Hermann, Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How? An Empirical Inquiry, International Studies Quarterly 33:4 (December 1989) pp. 361-387. Hermann, Margaret and Charles Kegley, Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology, International Studies Quarterly 39:4 (December 1995) pp. 511-533. Hirschman, Albert O.. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Hobbes, Thomas, The Leviathan, (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1985), Chapter 13. Johnston, Alastair Ian, Thinking about Strategic Culture, International Security 19:4 (Spring 1995) 32-64. Laitin, David, Identity in Formation : The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

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Lincoln, Abraham, "Address before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois," 27 January 1838, Douglas Archicves, http://douglassarchives.org/linc_a69.htm. Machiavell, Niccolo, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948). Reiter, Dan, Exploring the Bargaining Model of War, Perspectives on Politics 1:1 (March 2003): pp. 27-43. Rose, Gideon, Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, World Politics 51:1 (October 1998) pp. 144-172. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Confessions (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1972). Safran, William, Language, Ideology, and State-Building. International Political Science Review 13:4 (1992 ):397-414. Schweller, Randall L., Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitlers Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). Smith, Alastair and Alan C. Stamm, Bargaining and the Nature of War, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:6 (December 2004), pp. 783-813. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1987). von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State, and War (Columbia University Press: New York, 2001). Werner, Suzanne, The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms, American Journal of Political Science 43:3 (1999), pp. 913-934. Young, Michael D. and Mark Shafer Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International relations, Mershon International Studies Review 42:1 (may 1998) pp. 63-96.

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