Women and Reason in Arab-Islamic and European Philosophy

Nausikaa Schirilla

Reason (aql) has to control desire (sahwa) and thus men women, states the Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi after her analysis of various philosophical and religious texts of the Islamic Middle Ages.1 Mernissi argues that in these texts women are presentend as chaotic, irrational, unreliable and sexually active. In order to satisfy their strong sexual needs they ignore any moral or social laws and thus present a danger to the moral and social order. In the view of Muslim theologians Muslim civilisation is based on Gods will and reason, desire is viewed as chaos and as a threat to reason and civilisation. This dangerous power is projected onto women and will be controlled by controlling women. Fatwa Malti-Douglas, who analysed literary and philosophical texts in Islamic writing, came to a similar conclusion. In the texts she analysed womens body is seen as problematic, it is threatening because of its sexual power.2 It is important to note that this kind of analysis can be applied to Western thinking as well. It seems as if there are clear parallels in Western and Islamic ideas on women and reason. Women philosophers in the Western tradition have described the image of women in philosophy as follows: women are presented as lacking in reason, being close to bodily passions and desire and not capable of autonomous moral judgement. But if they are properly guided by men they will be the most virtuous beings.3 These ideas are put forward in many periods of western philosophy: Aristotle stated that women are incomplete men with less reason Rousseau stated thar womens desire is stronger than mens, women have to refrain from abstract thinking and moral judgement Kant admired womens beautiful and pleasant intellect, and stressed that it is different from mans abstract reason.
Topoi 17: 5762, 1998. 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

It is interesting to realise that we find these models in the thought of philosophers of the Enlightenment, too, although they advocated the universality of reason and the equality of mankind. A conception of reason that excludes women (and a conception of the feminine as being constituted by the exclusion of reason) is to be found in the texts of many philosophers and is a prevailing concept though it is not the only one. Already Plato held egalitarian views, we find them in Platos Republic, in early Enlightenment Poulain de la Barre stressed the equality between the sexes, so did J. S. Mill. too. The idea of the equality between the sexes is also to be found in Arab-Islamic philosophy, for instance in some works of Ibn Rusd (Averroes), who lived in the 12th century. 4 But these views were expressed only by a minority. There are obviously parallels in the thinking of two different cultures that are normally presented as being very different. It is also important to see that there is a strong rationalistic tradition in both cultures. This contradicts the image presented in our media of Islam as being irrational and static.5 And this also contradicts a Western self-understanding as being the civilisation of emancipation, equality and thus being superior to other cultures. There exists, however, a rationalistic tradition in both cultures and an image of woman that depicts women as lacking in reason, being incapable of moral judgement und as being close to bodily passions, emotions and desire. These parallels need to be analysed further. I will do so by approaching the rationalistic traditions from a womans perspective from the perspective of the excluded others. The analysis will be focussed on the image of women of two outstanding philosophers of both cultures. After a presentation of their image of women I will try to interpret their ideas of women in the context of the whole body of thought. Furthermore we have to ask if we can outline an intercultural perspective of women on these grounds.

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The first philosopher to be presented here is Ibn Sina, also known as Avicenna. He lived from 9801038 in Usbekistan und Iran. He was a renowned doctor of medicine and philosopher of the Golden Age of ArabIslamic philosophy and an influential representative of Islamic Neoplatonism that provided a Muslim and Neoplatonic reading of Aristotle, based on certain Aristotelian and Pseudo-Aristotelian texts. Ibn Sinas most important philosophical work is the sifa (Healing of the Soul). We find the metaphysics in the fourth part. Metaphysics is completed by practical philosophy in the tenth book that contains prescriptions for marriage and the role of woman.6 Ibn Sina states that man is a social being, who lives in a community, and the very basis of the social order is the smallest unit of the community, e.g. marriage. Stability and peace in society are secured by the stability of the conjugal union. Stability of marriage is secured by the fact that women have no right to divorce, whereas men can repudiate women at any moment. Ibn Sina explains this prescription by describing womens character. He says In reality women are lacking in reason (aql) . . . they are rather led by desire and temper.7 Womens behaviour, says Ibn Sina, is characterised by dispute, spiritual confusion and instability. Their sahwa (desire, sexuality) is greater than mens. It is easy to deceive them so women have to veil their bodies and stay at home. Similar assertions are put forward in the politics of Ibn Sina, the Kitab as-Siasa. In the third chapter of this book Ibn Sina describes his ideal of marriage and the ideal relationship between the spouses.8 Marriage is based on male authority and virtue, thus man has to guide woman. But if he is not capable of governing his wife, the wife will become too strong and she will contradict him and try to subdue him. It is dangerous if women succeed in governing men, the results will be chaos und general decline. Furthermore, we read in Kitab as-Siasa that if a womens spirit is not properly bound by household obligations and children, the woman will turn her attention to her beauty and seductiveness, try to seduce other men and seek extra-marital sexual contacts. It seems that women are extremely unreliable. As marriage is such an important basis of society and as women tend to pervert its stability, women represent a permanent danger to the social order. The topos of dangerous female seductiveness is depicted also in one of Ibn Sinas allegorical works,

The story of Salaman and Absal.9 Ibn Sina tells the story of two noble brothers, Salaman and Absal. Salaman is married, whereas Absal is chaste. Salamans wife falls in love with Absal and uses various tricks to seduce him. But Absal is not interested in her and in the end the women takes revenge by inciting to poison him. But Absals soul survives and he convinces his brother of the vile nature of his wife, who is killed in the end. Some of the ideas on women expressed in the Sifa and Kitab as-Siasa are of Aristotelian origin womens lack in reason, marriage as a hierachical relationship where man has the guidance.10 Ibn Sinas treatment of marriage and the women question can be read as an rational legitimation of the prescriptions of the saria (Islamic Law) on Aristotelian grounds. But there are features in his image of women that are definitely not Aristotelian: the notion of womens active sexuality and their dangerous power. In the Aristotelian view women are completely passive. This notion cannot be traced back to the sacred text, the Coran either .11 Here women are subjected to mens guidance on a political level, but not spiritually. Furthermore, apart from pharaohs wife, who tried to seduce Joseph, women are not presented as seducers (not even Eve), but as rather chaste. Nevertheless, the conception of woman as sexually active and an active social force is inherent in the Islamic tradition we find these ideas in many texts of adab and religious literature mostly of the middle Ages.12 But there is also a philosophical notion in Ibn Sinas image of women. The status of women as lacking in reason and being close to bodily passions is related to Ibn Sinas concept of the soul, which is at the very center of his rationalism.13 For Ibn Sina the soul is an independent spiritual substance establishing the link between the intelligible and the sensous world. The soul has various faculties, a practical rational faculty and a theoretical rational faculty. The practical faculty is directed towards the body and bodily reactions. The theoretical faculty is directed towards the intelligible world and finally to the highest principle, that is sheer intelligibility, where it originally came from. The destiny of the rational soul is to stay in the body and use it as an instrument, but to overcome the body in order to contemplate the highest principle. Although the individual soul owes its existence to the body being born in a body is the principle of individualisation of the soul the body can hinder the soul from realising its ultimate aim. Bodily functions detract from the

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rational faculty and turn it away from the intelligible, thus preventing it from reaching the aim of contemplation. Ibn Sina presents this conflict as a strong fight that can only be won by the theoretical rational faculty if it subdues the body completely. The theoretical rational faculty has to govern the practical one. There is a very strong dichotomy in this model of the soul, the practical rational faculty hinders the soul and must be fought and dominated. The story of Salaman and Absal is an allegoric reading of this conflict and helps us to interpret the role of the image of women.14 Salaman represents the practical rational faculty and Absal the theoretical faculty, the women represents the bodily functions, that try to hinder the soul and try to seduce and deceive. The seductive powers of the body threaten theoretical rational activity and must be controlled or destroyed. This conflict is expressed in the imagery of a sexually active dangerous women that must be controlled by men. In Ibn Sinas model there is an aporetical relationship between the body and the soul: the soul is dependent on the body and has to be independent. This independence is realised through domination of the body and its destruction. Women represent the danger of the body and must be dominated. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give other examples that show a similar imagery in Arab-Islamic philosophy and theology, but Ibn Sina has many predecessors and followers concerning his views on women.15 Yet we have to take into account that this kind of imagery is by no means confined to medieval Islamic or Neoplatonic thinking. Even for philosophers of the period of Enlightenment women represent bodily and emotional powers and must be controlled by men. One of the representatives of this thinking is JeanJacques Rousseau (17121778), who lived in France and Switzerland and was very famous and influential at his time. Especially his novel Julie ou la Nouvelle Heloise, where he depicts the role of woman, were most successful. Rousseau argues that the inequality between the sexes is a rational and natural institution that must be re-introduced into society as civilized society moved away from nature and reason. Two works of Rousseau, Emile or On Education and Julie ou la Nouvelle Heloise treat the women question and the relation between the sexes explicitly. In Emile Rousseau presents Sophie, the ideal wife for Emile and expands his ideas on women. Rousseau insists on inequality, women are and have to be different

from men, they are weak, passive, want to please and are modest.16 We read in Emile that women should not develop reason as men do and should refrain from abstract thinking.17 Women have to develop got (taste), they have to be oriented towards sentiments and detail, and have to apply the principles that are established by male reason. Women should not study and deal with abstract thinking. Female reasoning is extremely harmful to society, as it destroys internal spontaneous feelings which are very important. Female reasoning is harmful as it keeps women away from fulfilling their duties as housewife and mother. Everything that a women does must be founded on an internal spontaneous inclination and not on reasoning or conviction. Consequently women have no political rights and are legally dependent on men. Rousseau also states that womens desire is stronger than mens and can be destructive for men. He says: the working of their desires is stronger than ours, it can shake the human heart completely 18 and goes on to say that womens strong desires can even bring death to a man. As their desire is so strong and as women are so emotional they have to develop modesty. Modesty is an internal emotional attitude. Modesty veils and weakens the strong female desire and makes it less dangerous. Modesty also weakens mens desire. Whereas men regulate desire by reason, women do it by modesty. Again women have to show an internal emotional quality in contrast to male reasoning. The character and importance of female sentiments is well illustrated in Rousseaus novel Julie ou la Nouvelle Heloise. The female protagonist renounces a passionate but destructive love-affair and becomes a caring housewife and mother.19 Furthermore, women have to develop moral feeling instead of reflecting on moral jugdement. In Emile and mostly in Julie, ou la Nouvelle Heloise Rosseau discusses male and female morality. Whereas moral judgements can only be founded on reason and reason is the realm of male activity, women have to develop a particular internal virtue that is characterised by an orientation towards others and a moral feeling based on natural pity. Rousseau says: Men rather reflect philosophically on the human heart, but women rather read in the heart of a man.20 Women are to have a social instinct and natural taste. Their moral quality is a premoral feeling (bont) whereas mens morality is based on a reflected judgement. Although Rousseau is very critical towards reason, reason is for him the

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superior quality and he relates morality to the insight of reason into social und natural laws. So female morality is different from mens and under mens tutelage. The female protagonist of the novel Julie undergoes significant change in the novel, she refrains from passionate love and self-determination and choses instead to be guided by her husband and dedicate herself to a warm relationship with her man, her household and her children. If we consider other writings by Rousseau e.g. Discourse on the origins of Inequality we see, that the image of women is related to certain aporetical structures in Rousseaus thinking. Rousseaus assertion that women have to refrain from abstract thinking must be seen in the context of the extremely ambivalent character of reason. In Rousseaus thinking, we live in the negative state of society that is inhuman und disastrous, as instrumental and individual self-love prevails and kills any kind of soldarity. As men are dependent on one another in the state of society and as self-interest prevails, men fight each other. Reason is on the one hand a product of this civilisational development and this belongs to the very negative and destructive elements of human history.21 Man developed reason in order to increase and refine the fulfilling of needs. Thus reason is characterised by an instrumental orientation, too. But Rousseau states on the other hand that we can overcome the state of nature and re-establish a new state of nature only by reason.22 Reason has got to weaken individual self-interest and master it by leading to a new social and political order. This order will be based on reason and not on self-interest. In a developed society reason has to realise what the feeling of natural pity does in the state of nature, move men to control their individual self-interest and act socially. So there is a social orientation in reason, too. But the question arises whether reason has not been corrupted in the process of civilisation, too, and become incapable of fulfilling its great task. Therefore Rousseau wants to preserve a pre-civilisational element in women.23 There is a similar contradiction in Rousseaus views of ethics: moral judgement and moral order of society can be founded only by independent reason. But morality is on the other hand based on emotional and personal grounds: the feeling of pity and a spontaneous social orientation. So Rousseau splits moral concepts up into a male subject led by reason and a female social being endowed with moral feeling. Both have to be

different. They are complementary, but reason is superior. I would like to point out to another contradiction in Rousseaus thought. In the first Discours as well as in Emile Rousseau stresses the importance of autarky and independence Emile is educated according to these principles as well. We said that the state of society can be overcome with the help of reason, reason reconstructs natural pity and social orientation on a new level. Rousseaus political ideal is the Republic.24 The Republic is formed by the union of the citoyens who must be prepared to give up their self-interest and submit to the general will. But this ideal of social orientation contradicts Rousseaus ideal of autonomy. This is why he constructs a female being that is characterised by social orientation, but inferior to man and excluded from politics.25 Rousseaus ideas and particularly his ideas on women had a decisive impact on early bourgeois society. If we analyse the positons of Kant, Hegel etc. on women, we will find similar positions. 26 Rousseau is an outstanding example of a discourse that propagates universal reason but excludes women from reason and morality and stresses the emotional and internal qualities of women. I have presented two philosophers who state that women are lacking in reason, have to be guided by men and have stronger desire and emotions than men. Despite certain differences there is a great similarity in the image of women. For both authors, the relationship between the sexes is a hierarchical one, but Rousseau understands it as a complementary relation. Both authors state that man has to guide woman because women are lacking in reason, are unreliable and incapable of moral judgement. Here Rousseau also stresses the aspect of complementarity of female moral feeling and male moral judgement, but insists on the superiority and guidance of man. Ibn Sina rather sees women as a danger to the social order. Rousseau places women in a pre-civilisational state, Ibn Sina sees in women an anti-civilisational force. We also saw that for both authors woman is closer to desire and feelings. But whereas Ibn Sina gives prominence to the great power of sexuality, Rousseau desexualizes women in making her modest and caring. It is not possible to explain these parallels im terms of historical influence. Ibn Sina and Rousseau belong to different cultures, different epochs and different traditions of thought. I will argue that there are nevertheless systematic parallels in the ideas on women of

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both authors, as the pattern of the construction of femininity is the same. As we have seen, the thinking of both authors is characterised by aporetical or dichotomic patterns (bodily versus intellectual functions, instrumental versus social dimension of reason). Certain items are viewed in a contradictory setting, are split up and projected onto women. The mechanisms that determine the construction of the female are splitting, dispersing and projecting. There are similar structures defining the status of women. The image of women always expresses an element of a theory or hints at an element that has been suppressed by a theory. It can be the body, dependence, desire etc. The image of women leads to a hidden agenda in a text. It represents one side of a dichotomic structure of the subject or of reason, that is made inferior and dangerous. Body, feeling, communication have an inferior status and are placed outside reason. Feminist philosophers have stated that in our Western philosophical tradition women are placed outside the philosophical discourse and their place can be characterised as being beyond reason, truth, order and culture.27 This analysis cannot be applied to Western philosophy only but also to Arab-Islamic philosophy. The inferior status of women is to be found in the philosophical tradition of both cultures. Thus we can conclude that womens status is inferior in both cultures. The image of women contains many elements that have been excluded from the discourse, that are hidden and forbidden elements. What these elements are, may vary (the Other of reason, body, desire etc.). Woman represents that which is excluded, the image of women represents the Other of male discourse. As there are parallels in the status of woman in the thought we may ask if there are parallels in the structure of thought and in the concept of reason. For Ibn Sina philosophy is metaphysics. Truth is also the good and the beautiful. All being is based on the purely intelligible highest principle, it is the source of being and its origin. Roussseau however conceives of reason as a genetic force that is developed in the process of social evolution. Reason is seen as an attainment but it is also the source of true being. Logos is no longer the highest all-encompassing principle but it is deferred to the subject himself. Derrida shows that the pattern of reference to an origin and the concept of presence of logos or reason prevail even in Rousseaus thinking.28 With Derrida we can locate both authors in a logocentric tradition.

The Algerian philosopher Mohammed Arkoun goes even further.29 He analyses the metaphysical character of Islamic thinking and shows that orthodox reason (religious discourse) and classical reason (philosophical discourse) are oriented towards an origin. Their origin is either revelation or reason. Everything is related to a source that originates thinking and intellect.The reference to an origin works as an exclusion: the source (i.e. revelation) defines a realm of the thinkable and excludes a realm of the unthinkable (i.e. heresy), or the rational (reason) and the irrational (i.e. body, emotions). Many philosophies in the greco-theologian tradition are characterised by this pattern. This is also a very dichotomic pattern as the realms of the rational and irrational contradict and exclude each other. Reason is always constituted by excluding a non-rational or irrational: body, feeling etc. And, we could add, by excluding women. In these theories woman is the Other, not a contingent Other, but a necessary Other. Our feminist analysis started from two culturally different starting-points and led us to questioning a concept of reason that constitutes itself through exclusion. We see that here are parallels in some strands of Western and Arab-Islamic philosophy. Now one might ask which consequences are to be drawn from that fact. I think we are confronted with the task to conceive reason in a different way. We have to find a concept of reason so that reason will not exclude everything irrational, negate emotions, the body and the female etc. At the beginning of this article I have asked whether there is a common perspective of women in different societies and cultures. First I think the project just mentioned is a cross-cultural one. I assume women in many cultures are confronted with patriarchal and exclusive concepts of reason and have to develop new concepts, starting from approaches that are orientated towards interaction or integration. This is a cross-cultural project. Furthermore I think women adopt similar strategies of critique and women place themselves a comparable position towards the intellectual heritage of their societies. In many societies women question the hegemonic symbolic order, criticize and deconstruct the images of women. Though the contents of these images may vary there is the same intention of critique. Analysis from a womens perspective means questioning dominant ideas that bound and shape women. Women decode the images and hidden messages and contradictions, that bound, ignore, exclude and devalue women.

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NAUSIKAA SCHIRILLA Ibid. p. 448, see 448f. Ibn Sina, Kitab as-siyasa, in Louis Malouf et al. (Ed.), Traits indites danciens philosophes arabes, Beyrouth, 2e dition, 1911. 9 Henri Corbin, Avicenne et le Rcit Visionaire, Paris, Teheran 1954. 10 Aristoteles, Die Nikomachische Ethik, 1616a 2124, see 1155a ff, 1160b 3235. 11 Engineer A. A., The Rights of Women in Islam, London 1992. 12 Fatna Ait Sabbah, Malti-Douglas. 13 Ibn Sina, Kitab an-Nagat: Avicennas Psychology, An English Translation of Kit b al-Najat Book II, Chapter VI by F. Rahman, London 1952. 14 Malti-Douglas. 15 Schirilla N., Die Frau das Andere der Vernunft. Frauenbilder in der arabisch-islamischen und europischen Philosophie , Frankfurt am Main 1996. 16 Rousseau J.-J., Emil oder ber die Erziehung, Paderborn Mnchen Wien 1991. 17 Ibid. 393f, 420ff. 18 Ibid. 378ff. 19 Rousseau J.-J., Julie oder die Neue Heloise, Mnchen 1988. 20 Emile: 421. 21 Rousseau J.-J., Diskurs ber die Ungleichheit. Discours sur lingalit, Paderborn. Mnchen. Wien, 1984 pp. 85ff, 149. 22 Ibid. 151. 23 Steinbrgge L., Das moralische Geschlecht, Weinheim 1985. 24 J.-J. Rousseau, Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag [Social Contract], Stuttgart 1977. 25 See Schirilla N. 26 LLoyd. 27 List E., Die Prsenz des Anderen. Theorie und Geschlechterpolitik, Frankfurt 1993. 28 Derrida J., Grammatologie, Frankfurt am Main 1983,. S.:12f, 26f, 174ff. 29 Arkoun M., Pour une Critique de la Raison islamique, Paris Arkoun M. 1984, Essais sur la Pense islamique, Paris; 1987.
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In the background of this activity there exists no heritage that is better, developed or superior. Regarded from the perspective of women, Arab-Islamic thought is not the Other of Western thought. It is different, but not essentially different. Furthermore there is a cross cultural movement of feminist critique and deconstruction. In many cultures and societies women are marginalised and question the cultural heritage. That is an effort common to all. All over the world women question myths of a glorious past and deconstruct its fondations. We have to see this process as a cross cultural activity that departs from similar starting points: the marginalization of women. In a cross-cultural perspective we can analyse how women rebel against their status of the Other of male discourse, thus subvert this discourse and insert themselves in a discourse of liberation.

Notes
Written under pseudonym, Ait Sabah F., La Femme dans lInconscient Musulman, Paris 1982. 2 Malti-Douglas Fatwa., Womans Body. Womans Word Gender and Discourse in Arabo-Islamic Writing, New York 1991. 3 Allen Prudence, The Concept of Woman The Aristotelian Revolution, Montreal. London,1985; Doeuff Le M., Ltude et le rouet, tome1, Paris 1989; Fox-Keller Evelyn, Liebe Macht und Erkenntnis, Frankfurt am Main 1986; Gould Carol./Wartofski M.M. (Ed.), Women and Philosophy Towards a Theory of Liberation, New York 1976; Harding S./Hintikka M. (Ed.), Discovering Reality, Dordrecht 1983; Lloyd G., The Man of Reason, London 1984. 4 Plato Politeia 451c ff; Lerner R., Averroes on Platos Republic; Steinbrgge L., Das moralische Geschlecht, Weinheim 1985. 5 Said E., Orientalism, New York 1978. 6 Ibn Sina, as-sifa al-Ilahiyat, La Metaphysique du sifa, Introd., trad. et notes par Georges C. Anawati, 2 tomes, Paris 19601985.
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University of Frankfurt/Main