Survival and Experience Author(s): Barry F.

Dainton Reviewed work(s): Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 96 (1996), pp. 17-36 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545226 . Accessed: 07/01/2013 21:24
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II*-SURVIVAL AND EXPERIENCE by BarryF. Dainton I

I am to survive until some later date, what must happen,and what mustnot happen,over the interveningperiod?I am talking here about survivalin the strict sense. Take an earlierand a later person, if they are one and the same, what is it about them that makes this so? In addressingthis question the preferredtool has long been the exploitationof imaginaryor science fictioncases. We are asked to reflect on scenarios in which an ordinaryperson is subjectedto some unusualtreatment whicheffectively removesone or more of the elements that usually accompaniespersonal persistence. If we think the subject survives the treatment, the conclusion is drawnthat the elements removed are not necessary to personalidentityas we conceive it. The hope is thatthe repeated use of this method,with a varietyof scenarios,will finally produce a convergence of intuitive responses as to what is necessary and sufficient for survival. Unfortunately,this method has failed to produce the goods. The literatureis brimming with cunningly constructed scenariosyet consensusas to whatpersonalpersistence involves seems as elusive as ever. So it is hardlysurprising thatthe methodhas come in for some criticismrecently.Thereis a feeling thatmuch time has been wastedon devising fantasticstoriesabout which many people have no firm or reliable intuitions.Hence the demand for a different approach.As for the direction the new approachshould take, a general trendcan be detected:a focusing on human beings, biological entities of a particularkind, with species-specific identity conditions-a move away from science fiction, towardsscience. I shall be arguinghere thatthis responseis premature. Although it would be a mistaketo expecttoo muchfromthe standard method,
*Meetingof the AristotelianSociety, held in the SeniorCommonRoom, BirkbeckCollege, London,on Monday,30th October, 1995 at 8.15 p.m.

If

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it delivers at least one significantresult:thatof the several strands thatmake up a humanlife, we believe thatone particular strandis of overridingimportance in regardto ourcontinuedexistence.More specifically, I thinkimaginarycases indicatethe need for a wholly experientialaccount of personalidentity.There are variousways of developingthis basic idea;the pathI follow here leads to a quite generalconceptionof whatit is to be a self, applicableto all manner of conscious beings. In virtueof its very generalitythis conception does not capturemuch of what makes a humanlife distinctive;but it does capturethe essence of survival.I will startby giving some reasons why the experientialapproachmight be more believable thanthe alternatives,and then go on to suggest a particular way in which this approachcan be developed, and end by reconsidering the issue of intuitive convergence. Much recent debate about personal identityhas focused on various secondaryissues. Is our survival absolute or not? What would happento a person if they were to divide into two? These are interestingquestions, but my concern here is exclusively with the centralquestion:what does personalpersistenceconsists in?' II Considerfirst the main planks of currentorthodoxy:the Psychological theory and the Physical theory.Each can be developed in variousways, but for presentpurposes what mattersis theirmain thrust.The Physicalapproach is straightforward: a personsurvives for as long as theirbrainexists and is in reasonableworkingorder. The intuitive appeal of this idea is borne out by most people's responseto hypothetical brain-transplant cases:a persongoes where theirbraingoes. But this very same fact motivatesthe competing Psychological account. Our brains are importantto our survival becauseof theirrole in securingthe continuation of ourmentallife; if our mental life directlydependedon our heartsratherthan our brains,we would take a differentattitudeto hearttransplants. So why not define our survivalconditionsdirectlyin termsof whatwe value most: the continuationof our mind or mental life? The
I In 'Time and Division', Ratio, Vol. V, No. 2, December, 1992, I argue that fission is survivable,in the strictsense.

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questionnow is how to spell out what this involves andrequiresin wholly mentalisticterms.The Psychologicaltheoristdoes this in a distinctiveway, by focusing on mentalstates thattypically persist through time, e.g. memories, beliefs, desires, intentions and personalitytraits.A memoryor belief thatpersistsfrom one day to the next amountsto apsychologicalconnection;overlapping chains of suchconnectionsgenerate We can then psychological continuity. say thatan earlierpersonis identicalwith a laterpersonif the latter is sufficiently psychologically continuous with the former, irrespective of how similar they are psychologically. So as to distancehis accountfrom the Physical account,the Psychological theorist insists that while psychological continuity normally requires a continuously existing brain, it can (conceivably) be realizedor broughtaboutin otherways. If a mind-reading machine were to lift my psychology from my brain,destroyingthe latterin the process, and impose it upon a new brain,I would now inhabit this new brain.Whatmatters,fromthe pointof view of preservation of psychological continuity, is that the right kind of causal dependenceobtainsbetween earlierand laterpsychological states and systems. So for example, an earlierand laterbelief stateof the same type (or content)are to be consideredas instancesof one and the same stateif the existence of the laterstatecausallydepends(in the rightsortof way) uponthe existence of the earlierstate. Now considera simplefantasy.Supposethatsix minutesago,God annihilated the world;exactly five minuteslaterhe createdit anew. The re-createdworld is just the way the originalworld would have been five minuteslaterhad it endured:clocks have moved on five minutes,as have conversations andbroadcasts, cakes in ovens have risen a little more, moving vehicles re-appearwhere they would have been five minuteslater,and so on. Let us furthersupposethat duringthe five-minutehiatusthe world was not completelyempty: God ensuredthat each of our streamsof consciousness continued on, in just the way they would have done (with respect to phenomenologicalcharacter) if the rest of the world had still been there. That is, our thoughts, perceptions, sensations, feelings, imaginings,all continuedas if nothingunusualhadoccurred-with the consequencethatthe disappearance of the world goes entirely unnoticedby everyone. At the end of the five minutes,our streams of consciousnesscontinuedon theirway, sustainedby ourbrainsin

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the usualmanner.We mightcall this case thefive minuteCartesian nightmare.But this is somewhatmisleading;there'sreally nothing nightmarishabout it, since we do not notice the world's sudden departure-for us, phenomenologicallyspeaking,it is as if nothing of hadhappened,the eliminationandrestoration out of the ordinary the world does not impinge on anyone'sconsciousness at all. God ensuresthat we can rememberthe experienceswe have duringthe five minutesas well (or as badly) as we can usuallyrememberour past five minutes. Suspendfor a momentanydoubtsyou mightwell have abouthow possible this really is-I'll come back to this point shortly.As will doubtless have been noticed, I've told this story in a questionbegging way:I've assumedthatwe all remainin existencewhile the worldis absent.But it is difficultto believe otherwise.Is it possible to believe thatyourconsciousnessshouldbe exactly as it has been, the past six minutes,yet you now phenomenologically, throughout be a different person than the person you rememberbeing six minutes ago? One thing I think this example makes clear is this: survival and the streamof consciousness are inseparable,in that provided your current stream of consciousness flows on, its phenomenalcontinuityunimpaired, you continueto exist. So farso familiar. The case illustrates theCartesian pointthatwe can imagine of ourselvesexisting independently ourbodies andbrains.The fact thatwe can envisage continuingto exist in this manneris the main reason the Physical theory can seem so implausible, and why reliance upon the fantasy method usually leads to some sort of mentalisticapproach. Butthecase hasanother aspect.I saidthatGod annihilates everythingexcept ourstreamsof consciousness.I meant everything, includingwhatwe wouldnormallytaketo be ourminds. When the world vanishes, so do all our memories,beliefs, desires, intellectual abilities-everything except our streams of consciousness, whichremainjust as they wouldbe wereboththe world and our minds intact. You may well have serious doubts as to whetherthis is really possible, but again, suspendthese doubtsfor the moment, and ask yourself: have you survived these past few minutes? And again, given the hypothesis that your stream of I thinkyou will find experiencehas flowed on withoutinterruption, it hardto deny thatyou have indeedsurvived,andfurthermore, that in remained existence you throughout the five minutesin question.

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The point of this scenariois doubtlessnow evident:it serves as a counterexample to both the Physical and the Psychological accounts. For neither Physical nor Psychological continuity is preservedacross the crucial five-minutes,despite the fact that we survive throughout this interval; what is preserved is the phenomenalcontinuityof consciousness. A Psychologicaltheoristmightclaimthatthe case is only another instance of psychological connectednessbeing furtheredin nonstandardways (via divine volition). Even if we grant this, there remainsthe factthatwe persistfor five minuteswithoutanypsychological systems whatsoever,as mere streamsof consciousness, so psychological continuitycan hardlybe necessaryfor our survival. Moreover,the claim thatpsychologicalcontinuitycan be preserved in this mannerdoesn't strikeme as very plausible.But ratherthan enteringinto a murkydispute,we can simplychangethe story:let it be a matterof brutecontingencyor chance thatthe world vanishes andthencomes back.Now thereis no vestige of causaldependency betweenpsychologies eitherside of the gap. I do not want to claim that such extreme scenarios are real possibilities.If some formof the psycho-physicalidentitytheoryis true,mentaleventsjust arephysicalevents, so it would be logically impossible for consciousness to continue in the manner just envisaged;or it may be impossiblefor a subjectto enjoy complex experience without an appropriate psychological system. But we can learn from our responses to scenarios which are merely imaginable,providedthey are clearly imaginable;such responses can help us see which of the variousstrandsof our lives we value mostin regardto survival.Consequently, suchscenarioscan helpus find the most suitabletermsin which to framea believableaccount of personal identity. The cases we have been looking at are suggestivein thefollowing respects.First,given theease withwhich we can envisage survivingcomplete rupturesin both Physical and Psychologicalcontinuities,thereis reasonto thinkneitherof these continuities should play the central role in our account of what survivalrequires. Second,if we arelookingfora mentalistic account of survival, we should clearly take a closer look at consciousness and its distinctive mode of continuity,for this continuity alone appears sufficient to guarantee survival. Admittedly, this sufficiencyclaim is most obviously truefor the kindof scenariowe

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have just been considering,where our streams of consciousness continueon muchas theyusuallydo, phenomenologically speaking; thingsarelikely to become less clearas we envisageourexperience continuingon in drasticallydiminishedor alteredforms. But then, borderlinecases are difficult, and there are borderlinecases of Physical and Psychologicalcontinuitiestoo. Nor shouldwe forget that we all began life with much simplerconscious lives than we have grownused to, a conditionto which some of us will doubtless be returned. These considerationsprovidethe motivationfor an experiencebased approach to personal identity, i.e. trying to construct an account of our survival conditions around the continuity of conscious experience, a form of continuity that seems more intimatelyassociatedwith our survivalthanany other.Any wholly experientialapproachfaces a significanthurdle:the continuityof consciousnessmaybe sufficientfor oursurvival,butit is clearlynot necessary for it. Our lives do not take the form of a single streamof consciousness.We need an accountof how uninterrupted we manage to survive periods of unconsciousness (such as dreamlesssleep or coma). I shallreferto this as the bridge-problem. But before proceedingany further, it will be useful to take a closer look at consciousnessandits distinctivemode of continuity. III It goes withoutsaying thatour everydaystreamsof consciousness exhibit unity and continuity,but it's a differentand difficultmatter to say exactly whatthese involve; so I won't try to. All I wantto do in this section is say enoughto lend some plausibilityto this claim: our streams of consciousness exhibit a quite distinctive form of unity and continuity,of a kind thatis very differentfrom, and not obviously reducibleto, eitherPhysicalor Psychologicalcontinuity. Consideryourcurrent thoughts,emotions,bodily sensationsand perceptual experiences, everything that goes to make up your currentconsciousness.These diverse elements are boundtogether in a distinctive way: they are all (what I shall call) co-conscious. This relation of co-consciousness is as familiaras can be, and, I suspect,too primitiveto analyzein any informativeway. Focus on your currentauditoryand visual experiences.There's an obvious

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sense in which these very different types of experience occur together, ratherthan separately,and they occur together within consciousness itself-the co-consciousness relationshipis itself somethingthatis experienced.What more can we say aboutthis? We might say that we are aware of co-conscious items occurring together,butwhile this wouldnot be wrong,it mightbe misleading: although this togethernessis certainly an experientialfeature, it does not depend on our focusing our attentionon our experience. Yourauditory andvisualexperienceremainco-consciouswitheach other (and with your thoughts, feelings, etc.) even when your attentionis focused elsewhere. If co-consciousness is a type of awareness,it is awarenessof a passive, unreflectivekind. Whatof experienceas it unfoldsover time, withinourstreamsof consciousness,whatsortof unityis therehere?The answer,I think, is that exactly the same kind of unity is found here as in the synchroniccase: the immediatelyadjacenttemporalphases of a single streamof consciousness are themselves co-conscious. The stream metaphoris apt: consciousness is in constantflux, as the varied contents of one's current consciousness are constantly renewed. This constant flow of content is something we are constantlyawareof in consciousness.This awarenessseldom rises to thelevel of thought.I amnotsayingthatwe areconstantly thinking thatour experiencesxhibits a distinctivecontinuity;the awareness in questionis usually of a passive, unreflectivekind.But it is there nonetheless(and so thereis a sense in which we are always aware of the passageof time). This pointis usuallymadewithreferenceto a single sensory modality:e.g. imagine listening to a sequence of musical notes, C-D-E, played quickly.Do you hearC, then hearD while only remembering hearing C, and then hear E while rememberinghearing D while rememberinghearingC? No, you hear one continuoussound of C-followed-by-D, and D-followedby-E,andyourhearingof D in thefirstof thesetemporally extended experiencesis not distinctfromyourhearingof D in the second:the two experiences overlap by containing a common auditory sensation.The standard visualillustration: comparetheexperiences of watchingthe minuteandsecondhandsof a clock. Examplessuch as these bringthe pointhome, but can also mislead:for each of the componentpartsof theadjacent phasesof a streamof consciousness are mutuallyco-conscious. Diachronicco-consciousness (like its

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synchronic counterpart)is a relationship which binds diverse experientialcontents. There is clearly more to be said about this, especially about borderlineand pathologicalcases. But it is surelydifficult to deny that, from a phenomenologicalperspective,and from moment to momentour typical streamsof consciousness exhibit a distinctive diachronic unity, a unity that can be accounted for in purely experiential terms, exactly the same terms that account for the synchronicunity of consciousness. How does all this connectup with the topic of personalidentity? Like this: if we know that two experiences are co-conscious, we know that they belong to the same person or conscious subject. Co-conscious experiences are, we can say, co-personal. Call this the C-thesis. This thesis seems beyond dispute.Now consider an uninterrupted streamof consciousness. At any given moment, its contentsare co-conscious, and so co-personal.Adjacentphases of the streamare also co-conscious, andso co-personal.Non-adjacent phasesarenotco-conscious,butareconnectedby a seriesof phases thatareco-conscious;let's call suchphasesindirectlyco-conscious. Co-personalityis a transitiverelation:take any three experiences p, q and r, if p and q are co-personal,and q and r are co-personal, thenp andr areco-personal.Consequently, indirectlyco-conscious experiences are co-personal. Thus the C-thesis provides a solid basis for an accountof survival:it providesa criterionfor assigning experiences to subjects both at and over times, albeit within the confines of an uninterrupted streamof consciousness. What is the relationship between this purely phenomenal continuity, and Psychological and Physical continuity? A big question,but for presentpurposesI don't think we need wait on a precise answer. Although the relationshipbetween Physical and Psychological continuity is controversial, most Psychological theoristsarematerialists (of some persuasion), yet they nonetheless taketheiraccountof personalidentityto be distinctfromthatoffered by thePhysicaltheorists. Theyarerightto do so, sincetheseaccounts of oursurvivalconditionsareformulated in termsof very different, and very probably irreducibly different, concepts. Now, at the conceptual level, an account formulated wholly in terms of phenomenal continuitywoulddifferfromeachof themoreorthodox approachesby at least as much as they differ from one another.

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an adherent of the experientialapproach Consequently, would be at least as justified in takinghis accountto be a genuinely alternative positionas an adherentof eitherof the othertwo options.After all, over the years, attemptsto reduceexperientialconcepts to wholly non-experiential concepts(even mentalistic conceptssuchas belief) have proven to be as unsuccessfulas attemptsto reduce psychological conceptsto wholly physicalconcepts. All this presupposesa willingness to recognize the existence of experiential phenomenaper se. But a reasonablerealism about here. experienceis somethingI am simply presupposing IV Let us return now to the bridge-problem. When temporally streamsof consciousnessbelongto the sameperson,what separated makes this so? We could say: they are connected by a bridge of Psychological and/or Physical continuity. An awkward hybrid solution of this kind is obviously less than ideal, but might be acceptableif nothingbetterwere available.But I thinkwe can do better.When we fall unconscious,we remainin existence; we are
no longer conscious, but we retain the capacity for consciousness.

The difference,afterall, between sleep and deathis the possibility of waking up-regaining consciousness-and this possibility is nomological ratherthan merely logical (it is no miracle that we wake upeach morning).Whenwe lose thecapacityto be conscious, we cease to be. If we assume a moderatelynaturalistic framework on the mind-body question, our capacity for consciousness is causally grounded in our brains. Given these assumptions,the problemthatfaces us is how to specify what it is to have andretain a capacityfor consciousness in wholly experientialterms. I shall call nomologically groundedcapacities which produce
conscious experience (of any kind) when activated experiential powers. I shall furtherassumethatexperiential powers areto some

degree modular,i.e. thata person'soverallcapacityfor experience at any given moment consists of a variety of different and independent experiential powers, e.g. a capacity for auditory experience,a capacityfor visualexperience,a capacityfor thought, conscious ratiocination,mental imagery, various emotions and

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bodily sensations. This modularity assumption is certainly an but it will serve for presentpurposes. oversimplification, Experientialpowers are to be thoughtof as typically persisting dispositional properties, akin to inertia or electrical charge. Temporallocation aside, they are individuated by referenceto the following factors: (i) The type of experience they produce when activated.(ii) The types of circumstancewhich triggerthem. (iii) Their other non-experiential effects (i.e. the causal effects experience might have on a subject's physical behaviour and psychology). (iv) Theirbase or ground-for presentpurposes,we can think of experiential powers as possessed by brains, and groundedin the physical constitutionof brains, so simultaneous in terms of their experientialpowers which are indistinguishable causes andeffects are numericallydistinctif groundedin different brains,or differentregionsof the same brain.Some commenton (i) is needed.Experiential in termsof their powerscan be distinguished effects in more or less finely-grainedways. I could think of my capacity for visual experience as a single experientialpower of a richlycomplex sort,a capacityfor theentirerangeof differentvisual experiences(eachforminganentirevisualfield) whichI amcapable of having. Alternatively,I could regard my overall capacity for visual experience as composed of a collection of different experientialpowers, one for each differentcolour and shape I am able to experience.Therearegoing to be manyoptionshere,butfor presentpurposesnothinghangson which we adopt. These preliminariesout of the way, we can turnto the task of defining the conditions under which experiential powers are co-personalin purely experientialterms. We can do this without appealingto anythingmore thanthe C-thesis. The first step is to define co-personalityfor experientialpowers existing at any one time (or over a minimallybrief period).What is it thatmakes a collection of experientialpowers partof a single mind,or belong to a single subject,at a given moment?Recall the C-thesis: co-conscious experiences are co-personal. There is a naturaland compelling way to extend this to experientialpowers: by defining the co-personalityof experientialpowers by reference to the co-consciousnessof theirpotentialmanifestations. Applying this to the synchroniccase, we can say this much: at any given moment,those experientialpowerswhich areactive andproducing

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co-conscious experience are co-personal, as are those which would

be producingco-conscious experiencewere they to be active. Let us call experientialpowers that are so relateddirectlypotentially co-conscious (or DPC-related), with the understanding that properly speaking it is not the experiential powers which are potentially co-conscious, but their manifestations,the forms of conscious experiencethey producewhen active. This takescare of a subject'sexperientialcapacitiesat any given moment, but we have as yet no account of what is involved or required for a subjectto persist.We can providethis as follows. We first introducethe notion of a persisting experientialpower. The power is just the persistence experiential persistenceof a particular continuousexperienceof a partiof a potentialityfor experientially cularkind, a potentialitywhich may at times be active and at times The dormant (althoughit may be always activeor alwaysdormant). co-personalityof the successive phases of a persistingexperiential power is securedonce again by co-consciousness.We can thinkof a persistingexperientialpower as divided into a succession of thin fora briefexperience. temporal slices, each of whichis a potentiality Those temporalstretchesof a persistingexperientialpower which areactiveandproducean uninterrupted flow of consciousnesspose no problem, since the manifestationsof immediately successive temporalslices of thepoweraredirectlyco-conscious.But the same applies to the experiences which successive temporalslices of a dormantpersisting experientialpower would produce if it were active. These too would form co-conscious parts of temporally extendedexperiences.So heretoo we canappealto theDPC-relation of experiential to accountfor theco-personality powers,butnow the relationholds across (briefintervalsof) time, ratherthanat a time. In both the synchronicand diachroniccases, what binds potentialities for experience into co-personalensembles is the ability to generateco-conscious experiences. What makes different persisting experiential powers The answeronce againis theco-consciousnessof their co-personal? actual or potential manifestations,or DPC-relatedness.Two persisting powers of equal durationoccupying the same temporal intervalare co-personalif throughoutthis intervalthey are either active and producingco-conscious experience, or would do so if they were both active at any given moment.But persistingpowers

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subjectscan gain to be co-personal; need notcoincidein thismanner and lose experiential capabilities. To accommodate temporally non-coincidingbutoverlappingpersistentexperientialpowers, we need simply hold thatany two such powers are co-personalif they the intervalduringwhich they overlap. throughout areDPC-related Most subjects, of course, possess a vast number of persisting experiential powers, some of which may last throughouttheir butthisis of no consequence:there existence, some moretransitory, is no limit to the numberof differentpowers which can be DPCrelated.The careerof a subjectcan be thoughtof as a rope or cord, and madeof manystrands,some long, some short,but overlapping bonded togetherat every point along the length of the rope. Each strandis a persistingexperientialpower, and the binding agent is DPC-relatedness. At the heartof the analysis is the streamof consciousness, the unificationof experienceby experience.However,ourconcernhas now shifted from accounting for the co-personality of actual experience to the co-personalityof experientialpowers, and the has evolved fromthe centralnotionin ouraccountof co-personality initial C-thesis. To account for the co-personalityof experiential powers we need a broadernotion of co-consciousness, and the meetsthis need.Gapsbetweenstreams conceptof DPC-relatedness A cycle of of consciousness are no longerin the least problematic. beingconscious,unconsciousandconscious againis only one of the innumerableforms the manifestationsof the underlying set of co-personal experiential powers could have taken during that is thuswell andtrulysolved, andsolved period.Thebridge-problem by appealingto nothingotherthanco-consciousness. Whatof the world-gapcase consideredearlier?Forfive minutes our streamsof consciousness were not the productof experiential powers, they were the direct productof divine volition (or brute contingency) rather than the activation of any natural or nomological capacities. A subject reduced to this attenuated condition, a mere streamof consciousness, I shall call a minimal subject.Since a minimalsubject'sexistenceis phenomenologically fromourown, I see no reasonto supposewe could indistinguishable not surviveas minimalsubjects,if such thingsarepossible (whichI thispossibilitywe needto modify leave open). Butto accommodate This is easily done. We our accountof experientialconsubjectivity.

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alreadyknow that co-conscious experiences are co-personal,and this appliesto experiencesthatarepower-produced (as it were) and those thataren't.A non-power-produced experienceis co-personal with an experiential power if the experience in question is co-conscious with experienceproducedby the power or would be if the power were producingexperience.To sum up, let us say: (1) DPC-relatedexperientialpowers are C-related. (2) Co-conscious experiencesare C-related,whetherthey are or not power-produced (3) Foranyexperiential powerP andany non-power-produced experience E, if E would be co-conscious with the experiencethatP would producewere it active, thenE and P are C-related. (4) C-relatednessis transitive. The claim that C-relatedness, thus defined, is necessary and sufficient for the co-personalityof both experientialpowers and experiences,amountsto whatI shall call the C-theory.As it stands, this account needs to be refined to accommodatecertain special cases, and the degree to which the modularity assumption is justified needs to be explored,but since my concernhere is only to sketch in the main lines of a general approach,I will leave the elaborationfor anotheroccasion.
V

Thereis more to us, of course,thanconsciousnessandthe capacity for consciousness. We have bodies and psychologies. But we are now in a position to assign these to subjects on the basis of their to the enduringpotentialitiesfor consciousness which relationship constitute the essential core of a persisting self. So, roughly speaking,at any given moment,my body is thatbody which houses my persistingcapacityforconsciousness,andmy psychologyis that psychology which can directly feed into my consciousness and capacity for consciousness. A subject survives so long as their capacity for consciousness persists (as defined by C-relatedness), irrespectiveof any vicissitudes in physical or psychological continuity. However, the precise relationshipbetween C-relatedness

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andPhysicalandPsychologicalcontinuitiesis a complex issue, and again a fuller treatmentmust await anotheroccasion, but a few commentsarein order. Although I've been assuming that experiential powers are groundedin ordinarybrains,the C-theoryapplies in more exotic circumstances.Experiential powers areco-personalwhen they are C-related, irrespectiveof the degree of physical continuity that exists between the materialsystems thatpossess these powers. A subject's experientialpowers could (conceivably)be groundedin differentbrainsat differenttimes, or in spatiallyseparated portions of matter. That the C-theory is conceptually distinct from the Physical theory could not be clearer.2Now, although I've been workingwithin a naturalistic framework,it's worthnoting thatthe is C-theory perfectly compatible with psycho-physical dualism. C-related experiential powers are co-personal irrespective of whetherthey are groundedin one immaterialsubstanceor many, synchronically or diachronically(and as Locke and Kant both noted, it seems conceivable that a subject's mental life could be sustainedby a numberof differentimmaterialsubstances). The C-theory'srelationship with the Psychologicaltheoryis less since to a largeextenttheseaccountsareconcerned straightforward, with the same items. To simplify matters,I have tended to use capacities for simple forms of sensory experienceas examples of experientialpowers. But beliefs, memories,intentions,desiresand manyotherpsychologicalstateshave theirown experientialmanifestations(e.g. whatit's like to consciouslybelieve, desireor intend something), and those that do should be regardedas experiential powersin theirown right.Mentalitemssuchas thesecanbe assigned to subjectson the basisof C-relatedness. Psychologicalstateswhich cannot directly generateforms of experience (assuming there are suchthings)can be assignedto a particular subjectin virtueof being able to directly causally influence (in an appropriate way) one or moreof the psychologicalstatesalreadyassignedto thatsubjectvia
2 1 differ here from Peter Unger, in his (I think, admirable)Identity,Consciousnessand Value(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1990). Unger also thinks survivalrequiresthe preservationof capacities for consciousness, but chooses to concentrateon describing ways in which their 'physical realizer'must be physically continuousif such capacities areto be co-personal.By deliberatelyeschewing a moregeneralaccounthe does not shed as muchlight as he could have on whatit is for experientialcapacitiesto be co-personal.

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C-relatedness.But the important point is to be clear on here is the difference between C-relatednessand Psychological connectedness. Two mental items (e.g. an earlier and a laterbelief with the same content) are Psychologically connected if the later item causally depends-for its existence or mental character-on the earlieritem in a suitablydirectmanner. Two mentalitems X and Y are C-related if they can produce co-conscious experiences, irrespectiveof whetherX can causally affect Y(or vice-versa)and irrespectiveof whetherthe existence or character of X is causally dependent on the existence or character of Y (or vice-versa). in one sense, C-relatedness mightbe said to be a causalrelationship since it rangesover itemsthatpossess thecausalcapacityto produce co-conscious experience.However,this kindof causalrelationship is clearlydifferentfromthe state-statecausal dependencvthatconstitutes Psychological continuity as standardlydefined. The Ctheoryis thus conceptuallydistinctfrom the Psychologicaltheory. were It would be a differentmatterif analyticpsychofunctionalism true, but if recent philosophy of mind has established anything beyond reasonable doubt, it is that phenomenal propertiesand relationscannotbe reducedin this way to purelycausal properties andrelations. How essential to our survival is our psychology? I have raised the possibility of minimalsubjects,consisting of a mere streamof consciousness and nothing more. There's anotherpossibility that should be mentioned:simple subjects, consisting of nothingmore than a capacity for simple sensation. How close to simplicity, in this sense, can we get withoutceasing to exist? My own inclination is to go all the way, and accept thatI could surviveas a simple and minimal subject. Others may not be inclined to go this far. The C-theoryis compatiblewith a spectrumof opinion on this score. VI By way of conclusion, I returnto the issue I opened with: can imaginarycases producea convergenceof intuitionon a believable Williams conceptionof the self? In 'Theself andthe future'Bernard exploited a series of thought-experimentsto suggest that our intuitionsare irresolvablydivided between bodily and mentalistic accounts of personalidentity.In effect, Williams uses the fantasy

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method to undermineitself. More recently, Mark Johnston has exploited Williams' scenarios in arguingthat our intuitionsdo in fact converge, but on a conceptionof the self thatis unacceptable The upshot of both argumentsis the same: our if not incoherent.3 responsesto imaginarycases cannotbe trusted.I thinkwe are now go wrong. in a positionto identifywhereand why these arguments (which I argument Reduced to its barest essentials, Williams' assumeto be familiar)runsthus.We have at ourdisposala machine capableof recordingand re-locatingpsychological states (beliefs, memories, personalitytraits, and so forth). If this machine were used to shift your psychology into a different body, while simultaneouslyimplantingsomeone else's psychology into your body, wouldyou go with your psychology into the new body?You would if the Psychological theorywere true,andthereare ways of developing the fantasy which make this result seem intuitively plausible. But, as Williams points out, this procedurecan also be and isn't effective form of brainwashing, viewed as a particularly Is your capacity to feel brainwashingsomethingwe can survive'? memories,beliefs and personpain dependentupon the particular ality traitsyou have at a given time?Surelynot, being brainwashed is not equivalentto a generalanaesthetic.So isn't it morelikely that you remainwith yourbody?If so, the Psychologicaltheoryis false. aboutthe outcomeof the Williamshimself finds the uncertainty psychological transferthe most disturbingfeatureof the case, but tentatively favours the brainwashinginterpretation.When you imaginativelyfocus on an experienceof painto be felt at some later body,could you ever be certainthatyou would time in yourcurrent notbe thereexperiencingthispain?Doesn't thissuggestwe believe, deep down, thatour selves and ourbodies are inseparable? Not in the least: if we now consider these cases from the the mistof confusionclears perspectiveof theC-theory, experiential and a quite differentlesson emerges. Pain is a conscious state,and torturing yourbody would only producepainif yourbody houses a consciousness; moreover,you would only feel this pain if your consciousness were involved. It is hardlysurprisingthat we find
Williams, 'The Self andthe Future',ThePhilosophicalReview,79, 1970;Mark 3 Bernard Johnston,'HumanBeings', TheJolrnialof Philosophv,84, 1987.

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Williams'scenariosso baffling:no mentionis madeof whathappens to the subject at the experientiallevel. Indeed, if experience and self-identityare inextricablylinked,Williams'scenariosshould be baffling;we don't know whatto make of them because we are left in the darkabout what is essential to personalpersistence.We can make sense of both scenariosonly because we are free to assume (tacitly) what each requiresin orderto be intelligible:first thatthe subject's consciousness (or capacity for it) is transferredto a different body accompaniedby his psychology, second that the subject'sconsciousnessremainsunmovedwhile his psychology is replaced.If we expandthe Williams scenarios,stipulatingthatthe hapless subject's stream of consciousness remains uninterrupted throughout,and in one case remains rooted in his original body despitethe psychologicaldisruption,and in the otheraccompanies his psychology into a different body, I think it's clear where the subject himself goes-with the flow of experience in both cases. the ficklenessof ourresponsesto imaginary Ratherthanillustrating cases, Williams'scenariosmerelyillustratean obvious point about the correctuse of the fantasymethod.Whendescribinga particular case, care must be takento include the maximumof relevantdata, and minimize ambiguities about the outcome of the various envisaged procedures.If this is not done, the significance of any intuitions generated by the imaginary scenario will be greatly reduced,and the upshotmay even be serious confusion. I suggest Williams' scenarios are guilty on each of these counts, hence the confusionthey induce. Johnston interprets Williams' scenarios in a manner which I havebeen approach threatens to undermine thekindof experiential defending, while simultaneously recognizing its intuitive Johnstonsuggeststhatourresponsesto thescenarios attractiveness. reflect or reveal a commitmentto a conceptionof the self as (what he calls) a bare locus of mentallife. Our 'pureconcept'of a person, the concept which is revealedby our reactionsto the full rangeof imaginarycases, is of a centreof consciousness,the persistenceof by bothphysical and psychologicalfactors which is unconstrained to the extent thatthereare no determinate necessaryconditionson the tracing of any bare locus through any imaginable psychophysicalvicissitude.This is why we can makesense of the different interpretations of Williams' psychological transfer scenario.

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maintainsthatthe barelocus conceptionis one we Johnstonfurther on the intuitivelevel. Given the mustreject,whateverits attractions lack of constraintson the behaviourof bare loci, how can we be justified in supposing our ordinary evidence for personal persistence, which takes the form of mentalandphysical continuities, is in the least bit reliable?How do I know thatthe barelocus I now am is the same bare locus that inhabitedthis body and this mind yesterday? Given these epistemological problems (I have only here), andassumingthatthis is crudelystatedJohnston'sargument the conceptionof the self to which the fantasy method ultimately leads, Johnstonconcludes thatwe should abandonthe method.As he recommendsthatwe shouldbegin with the viewan alternative, point of 'scientificallyvalidatedcommon sense', the position that species. we are animalsof a particular I am inclinedto agree thatthe barelocus view is unsatisfactory, for several reasons,but before acceptingthatthis is the view upon which our intuitionsconverge, we need to take a closer look at the sort of thing these bare loci are meantto be. Johnstonstresses the independenceof bare loci from physical and psychological continuities, but are they similarly independent of experiential continuities?It is difficultto see how they could be, since they are nothingbutcentresof consciousness.In fact, nothingJohnstonsays commits him to the idea thatthe movementsof his bare loci (or of of experiential continuity(whichwould ourselves) areindependent allow bareloci to flit betweenstreamsof consciousnesswithoutour noticing). He says there are no determinatenecessary conditions on the tracing of a bare locus. This is quite compatiblewith the persistence of such entities being governed by certain sufficient conditions, and phenomenalcontinuity is the obvious candidate. Moreover,when pointing out the difficulties involved in keeping track of bare loci, Johnstonfocuses on occasions when we fall unconscious. As he rightly points out, we do not believe we are beings which must always remain conscious; even bare loci can sleep, and sleep dreamlessly.This leaves us with the problemof findinggroundsfor assigningsuccessive streamsof consciousness by to one andthe same self, given thatbareloci arenot constrained physical or psychologicalcontinuities.In effect, this is the bridgeproblem,and Johnston'sview seems to be that if we rely on our intuitions,the problem has no solution, or at least no non-trivial

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solution. Given any futurestreamof consciousness, a streamthat of my presentexperience,thatstreamis either is not a continuation definitely mine or definitely not mine, and if it is mine it need not be related to my currentexperience by any form of mental or physical continuity. The co-personality of temporally separated streamsof consciousness is, on this view, a primitivefact. I hope it is clear by now thatJohnstonmoves too quickly to this conclusion. The C-theory provides a non-trivial solution to the and does so in wholly experientialterms.Earlier bridge-problem, andlaterstreamsof consciousnessareco-personalif they aremanifestationsof co-personalexperiential capacities,whereco-personal co-conscious experiential capacitiesarethose capableof producing Johnston's we can experience.Adopting idiom, simply say: a bare of life is an locus mental uninterrupted potentialityfor consciousness, a potentialitythatmanifestsitself only intermittently. But doing so does not disposeof the primitivefact view. Granting thata conscioussubjectexists as a locus of potentialas well as actual couldpressthisquestion:Canwe not make consciousness,Johnston intuitive sense of ourselves enjoying an absolutely intermittent existence?Mightnot some futureconsciousnessbe mineeven if not connectedto my currentconsciousnessby any form of continuity, C-relatednessincluded?If so, there is no non-trivialanswerto the question of what makes that futurepotentialityfor consciousness mine ratherthananother's.And so we arebackwith the notionof a primitiveidentity-fact.However, at this point we need to consider whether ourintuitions reallyleadthisfar,orwhetherthey do so clearly I and unambiguously. suspect they don't. By way of a test case, suppose you die and do not linger on in any form whatsoever,not even as an immaterialsoul. Could God re-createyou at some later date?Perhapsyourimmediateinclinationis to thinkhe could-why not?Butconsider:while it is certainlywithinGod'spowersto create anexactreplicaof you (perhaps as you werejustpriorto yourdeath), is it withinhis powersto makethis replicayou? Considertwo cases, one in which the newly createdpersonis you, andone in which the newly createdpersonis merelysomeonewhoexactlyresemblesyou. Whatextraingredient does God addto his creationto makeit a later version of you? Is there any ingredienthe can add to make this difference, a difference that is all-importantso far as you are concerned? It is not clearthatthereis. So faras untutored intuition is

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concerned(if thereis such a thing), I thinkmost people's responses to this kind of case are confused and unstable,and so shouldn'tbe areotherwise,I suggest,in relationto the takentoo seriously.Matters conception of the self as an uninterrupted potentiality for consciousness.
Departmentof Philosophy The Universityof Liverpool 7 Abercromby Square LiverpoolL69 3BX bdainton@ liv.ac.uk

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