Tank defense weapons ( 3 7 ~ 1 ~ guns b especially for tmk defense) follow Close behind t h penetrating infantry1 a p o r t i o n of t h e a n t i a i r c r a f t i s

timely brought forward*

364. The rupture of the h o s t i l e defense on a broad i h n t i s t h e indica-

t i o n of approaching victory.

Further advances of the infantry i n i t s pra.vi ous at'tack d i r e c t i o n s up to Me s e i z u r e of t h e h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y c o n s t i t u t e s i t s next task. Premat u r e flanking movanents a r e t o be p r e v ~ t e d u n t i l the enemy i s , & e f i n i t e l y brokep through. The troops in the penetration must be assured t h a t t h e i r flanks a r e protected, Advancing reserves prevent stoppage of t h e a t t a c k , r e p e l counterattacks, and ankmnte the forward movement. Th$ a r e t o be employed where a success h a s oceurred i n o r d e r ' t o exploit it with a l l force. Likewise t h e employment e f troops t o r o l l up the h o s t i l e l i n e s i s a m t t e r for resdrves, which a r e especinlly employed for ' t h i s purpose. New reserve-s a r e faraec? from t h e r e maining u n i t s , from-pinched out .and dispersed elements. ' b a t i s not destroyed by the break through and t h e f o l l o ~ f i n gonvel-
opment must be pursued.

365. Should t h e eeihy succeed i n reestablishing his defense o r of defending f u r t h o r t o the rear, the attack.must bi: renewed. -Fordthis purpose t h e time and spaoe-unity of the a t t a c k must be sccured amw, a s well a s t h e nocossary f i r e support ordered.

. 366. Should we be unable t o carry the engagenent through t o a decision p r i o r t o darkness, then, a s a r u l e , the troops arrange t h e i r defense. Conside r a t i o n should be given the p o s s i b i l i t y of s k i r t i n g f o r c e s during the night i n order sat dam t o a t t a c k decisively in Q more favorable area. I t might a l s o be reckoned t h a t the enemy o m r e g a i n h i s freedom of mov.w,nt during the night and t h a t on t h e next morhing we -selves may. see a d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n opposite This POB s i b i l i t ~ e x i s t s e s @ c i a l l y when an -envelopment cannot Be carried US. - t o completion d u r k t h e day. Reconnaissance: , r a i d s must obtain inforinktion. Night attacks a r e able t o r i .x t h e e n m y a t the same time. ,
If no e s s e n t i a l changes in t h e h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n are t o be expected) 367. t h e orders for the a t t a c k on the following day must be issued s u f f i c i e n t l y early, so t h a t a l l arms, espeoially t h e a r t i l l e r y and 'tanks, can pfoperly d o ' t h e i r preparations. Higher e o m d e r s must n o t fear, occasionally, t o issue t h e i r orders before they have a complete picture of the,'dayls b a t t l e .

The night can be u t i l i z e d t o advsno e the iiifm%ry nearer the enemy ,in order t o obtain by daylight a favorable l i n e of departure for t h e continuance of t h e att6.ck. S o m e t i ~ e s night a t t a c t s a r e recommended i n orcler t o secure t e r r a i n important for the further execution of t h e a t t a c k . Relief, of units, even though very exhausted, must be the excepl;ion. h r i n g tilo night, by i r r e p l a r harassing f i r e s , insofar a s m u n i t i o n permits, and by' a i r bombing deep behind tho h o s t i l e l i n e s , must t h e enemy communication i n tho t o r r a i n hold by him, a s well a s roarward thoreof, be made d i f f i c u l t , especially for the bringing up of reinforcemtmts and m u n i t i o n .
368. %=the trnops succecdod by daylight i n socurin;: favorable areas of d o p r t u r e for the bra& through, a uniform a s s a u l t can be begun a t a fixed how. Hwover, the a r t i l l e r y w i l l be able t o s u ~ j p o r ta ? e a r l y morning attttac1.r only i f tho l i n e s of d q a r t u r e of the i n f a n t r y und the h o s t i l e s i t u a t i a n have been oommunioatod i n ample tina, and i f it has adequate information f o r unobserved f i r e , . Observation i n tho e a r l y morn* i s oftrn impossible bccause of v i c i b i l i t y oonditions. Therefore it may be nehessary to s e t a l a t e r time for t h e inf ait r y advance,

By f i r e s upon othor a r c a s the .enemy i s deceived a s t o the time and

t h e decisive a r e a q f the penetration.
Report No. 14,507.

369. Though i t be uncertain whether the s r t u a t i o n m i l l e s s e n t i a l l y change, nevertheless a l l preparations a r e made so that the attack can be launched the next day, The determination of the time of the attack can be reserved.

370. If e s s e n t i a l changes i n the h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n a r e calculated, the attack must be b u i l t up around new reconnaissance.

371. Arter a successPully executed a t t a c k should the forces be i n s u f f i cient t o advance further, the t e r r a i n already gained i s to be.held. The assumption of t h e defense, whether it be merely a suspension of t h e a t t a c k or a rapid reorganization and espurely defensive measure, most be ordered. tablishment af the infantry, i t s heavy weapon a s well a s i m e d i a t e new regul a t i o n s f o r t h e a r t i l l e r y a c t i v i t y a r e important. The a r t i l l e r y wncerns its e l f n o t only with the defense against h o s t i l e infaatry but with the counteracting of hostile. a r t i l l e r y f i r e which in such a s i t u a t i o n usually f a l l s heavi l y on our Waxtry.

Tr

372. A meetiag engagemnt ensues when two approaching enomios-snter into b a t t l e vnthobi long preparation therefor.

Docisions and conduct o f t e n a r e enshrouded i n uncertainty. Uncertainty and i n c l a r i t y , which l e a d t o c o l l i s i o n , a r c t h e greate s t causes of meeting engagancats.
373.

Likewise, a m e eting engagement ensues whea, although the approaching opponents a r e cognizarrt of each other, one or both a t t a c k immediately o r Such a decisioil can have i n mind the a f t e r only hasty assembly positions. u t i l i z a t i o n of greater readiness f o r combat, the occupation o f important t e r r a i n or the r e a l i z a t i o n of other t a c t i c a l ihtentions. I t a r i s e s only from a f e e l i n g of superiority. Moreover, individual u n i t s i n the courss of an engagement meet situations which .have t h e e a r m r k s of a meeting engagement.. 374. According t o the i n i t i a l siixdntions the meeting engagement takas d i f f e r e n t forms. Often the course of the engagement by the forward elements i s of sigaificanee for the depleyment and conduct of the l a t e r engagement.
. With immediate a t t a c k s f'rom m r c h formation by both opponents t h e r e can devel'op t h e scrge back and foi-th, i n which the independence o f a c t i o n and c a p n b i l i t i e ~of lower l e a d e r s m d .troops a r e decisive,

I n apo$her manner t h e meeting 6ngag&mnt develops, . i f both opponent: from the fir.st -engage deployed i h combat and 'one, a f t e r t h e f i r s t enoounter, holds himself back tnihile waiting, or i f bosh from the f i r s t t r y t o increase thc b a t t l e readiness of t h e i r for'ces by assembly positions,
tiwljr

Finally, should one of t h e opponents givs up his advance and mwe into a defensive position, t h e other may, according t o cirnunstanoes, be required t o organize h i s a t t a c k a s against a position, 375. Success i n meeting m ga unent s f a l l s t o bim who a n t i c i p a t e s t h e enemy ai~dhnlds him i n d e p e n d m e fwikhout freedom of ontiox.), Quick peroeptli ;f Lavorable siturrtions, rapid conduct i n unclar i f i e d s :.'i.;l:ations, bmediato or;Iers a r e necessary presumptions.

The s u r e s t b a s i s for suecress i s t h e advantage 6 e a r l i e r ) ef b a t t l e preparation. This advantage forces the enemy t o f i g h t against superiority and f a c i l i t a t e s tine f u r t h e r combat i n t h e desired direction. Report No. 14,5a7.

376, Only excoptiomlly a t the time of meeting w i l l the i n t e n t i o n of t h e enemy be c l e a r t o us* Shod&,,an important t e r r a i n area l i e between t h e opponents, a rapid ad~fmccof the h o s t i l e advshce guard m ~ s be t reckoned with. Restraint on t h e p a r t -of the e h m y i s t o be expected if he has not t h e advantage of b a t t l o preparation or i f h s has no particu1r.r t e r r a i n advantage on h i s side. As a r u l e the i n i t i a l engagements w i l l bring a c e r t a i n c l a r i t y 3 exeeptf c n a l l y may t h i s c l a r i f i o a t i o L b e waited f c r r 3774 If t h e commander has timely information about +Re advance of t h e enemy, by the kinri and time of the deploynient w i l l he seek 50 f i x t h e beginning and course of the b a t t l e . 378. Has the conunander no timely information of t h e s i t u a t i o n , it may be necessary for t h e column c o m d e r s i n a m r c h of several cei?&s t o make independent decisions of considerable conseq.uence. These must ..k6ep t b t h e i r o r i g i n a l missions a s long a s the suppositions (oonditiozG) r a i a i n unohanged. Should an adja.ccnt march column enter into b a t t l e , then must it be determined v&ether p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h i s engagemurat, i n tile e v ~ n tsuch a c t i o n devia5es f r s m the mission and mareh objective, does not lead t o t h e renunciation of greater suecoss.
I t i s the mission s f the comand6r t o regain quickly contr8l of t h e situatien'wbich.the subordinate leaders, b y independent action, have brought absut. 379. T h e m i s s i r n nf tho advanceguard, t o secure freedom of docision for the conunder of the march colunm, t i m f o r the b a t t l o preparation of t h e f o l l e d r g forces, and good observation conditions f o r tho m s s of tho a r t i l l e r y and t h e heavy infantry weapoas, can be accomplished offensively or defensively. Decisive a c t i o n vrill often lead t o success. A l i m i t e d retirement i s to be considered against a superior onemy and i n unfavorable t e r r a i n and thereby shorten the time of' o w mn dcplopwnt.

380, The b a t t l e readiness of t h e advame p a r d i s to be secured quickly. Early- employment of heavy i n f a n t r y weapons and of t h e advmce p a r d a r t i l l e r a s s i s t s i n breaking the f i r s t h o s t i l e resistance, brings the h o s t i l e moveme t o a stop, and draws out the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y f i r e . Should tanks be attached t o the advance ~ u a r d , a s u r p r i s e a t t a o k b y these can b e of treat effect.
I f immediate a t t o c k by the infantry i s indicated, it i s mployed, without f u r t h e r preparation, i n the decisivc: direction, under protection o f a portion of the heavy infantry weapons quickly going into position, or it a t tacks a f t e r only a s h o r t assembly position.

Should the advance guard c o m n d e r decide t o defcnd, it may be s u i t able t o bring the advance guard a r t i l l e r y into p o s i t i o n s widely separated i n order t o deceive t h e enemy a s t o our strcngth q d t o f o r c e him t o roundabout m d cautious conduct. Lil<evrise, the i n f a n t r y o f t a n occu;)ios u brobdor frone thnn i t s s t r m g t h would authorize in a decisive b8ttle. In d e w of i t s e a r l y r e l i e f by the main force t h i s a c t i o n i s unobjectionable. The udvmce guard r e l a t i o n i s t o be annulled ns soon a s t h e advance

hes nccomplished it s *a&.

381. Early advance and deployment of additionnl n r t i l l e r y gives support t o the b a t t l o f r o n t a l r endy forme d. U n i t ~mploymcnt of tkie a r t i l l e r y i s t o bo s t r i v e n for. Yet frequently must the comnanders of individual m r c h columns employ i r @ e p ~ n d & l y t h e i r qttached a r t i l l e r y . Ths higher cormniinder can take care of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y by distributint; t h e a r t i l l e r y i n t h e march columns and specifying tho attachments. TIE stronger the a r t i l l e r y he r e t a i n s under h i s ooirtrol an4 th s u r e r and more r a p i i i s the comunicatian t o the march column, the e a r l i e r in -the s i t u a t i o n can he omploy tho mass o f t h e a r t i l l e r y i n accordnmi: with his w i l l . Roport 14,507. . No. .

Early employment of the a r t i l l e r y and i t s nieans of.obs8rvktion secure. b e s t an a r t i l l e r y .preponderance over the enemy. Therefore, it can be i-ecomnded t h a t the e n t i r e a r t i l l e r y be ordered i n t o action:bifore ... . . the init i a l engagement has entire1 y c l a r i f i e d t h e s i t u a t i o n , The forming up. of the a r t i l l e r y i n a M e t i n g enng'agbent i s determined by the s i t u a t i o n * preMous develbpment,, t h e kind of. i l i i t i a l Contact, dis-. t r i b i l t i o n of the a r t i l l e r y t b individual march cblumns and' according t o t e r $tiin, each s i t u a t i o n being d i f f e r o n t i Frequently unitkry mploymmt is a t t a i n ed only gradually, Oftsn t h e i n i t i a l . 6rdel' of t h e comander t o t h e a r ' t i l l e r y can contain pnly the general i n t e n t i o n and S a t t i e misdlons of the a r t i l l e r y i n general terms. I n t h e f i r t h e r , c o u r s e of the engagement the 0 0 4 d e r e x e r t s his influence w e r the artillery by assigning b a t t l e missions *ich deVelop a s the s i t u a t i o n clears. . . On the basis of t h e . p r e L i m i m r y (covering force) esgagement and, i f 852. pos s'ibie, his pa rsonal ground .reconnaissanc e, t h e cormnandar. Efccidos how he w i l l f u r t h e r aonduct the engngment. Should he decide, in order t o m a W a i n an advantage ivhichha helds, t o attack (without assembly p ~ s i t i o n s - ) ,he launches. t h e main force d i r e c t l y into <he a t t a c k from march columns and gives the onaoming elements individually or a s a &ole tho order f o r the a t t a c k .
,

T1x attack order, which, i n does &%xi$ With the mar oh oonditions of t*ry u n i t s t h e i r b a t t l e missions, t h e i r etc.), zones or boundnrios and 8ccuri.s . ing arms.
.. ,. .:.

so f a r a s has'not bci?n.previously done, tha main body, points 6ut t o t h e i n f a objectives, organization (attachments, t h e i r suprjort i n the attitck by coopernt-

The attack order f o r t h e a r t i l l e r j r sontains the b a t t l e missions end orgnnii&tion md f i n a l w p l o y m t s t i p u l a t i o n s . A r t i l l e r y n o t nttaohed t o individual i n f a n t r y for thc n t t a c k rover* t o a r t i l l e r y oontrol (division a r t i l lery officer).

Troops employed from the r e a r ham t o c l a r i f y ' t h e s i t i a t i o n i n t h e i r f r o n t inunoditltely b y b a t t l e rcconnaissance and to reconnoiter q d sccure @ . n unprotected flank ngainst surprisr.

It i s .the t a s k of a l l leaders t o be e s p e c i a l l y watchful that, i n a quick launched attack, the thoro@ness of the coopera%ion between tho arms i s not lessened.
383. Should the wrmnsnder's i n t e n t i o n and the conduct of the enemy n o t require the further adwnce of our infm.try d i r e c t l y from m r c h column into b a t t l e , the commander nevertheless prepares the remaining u n i t s f o r combat. Here e n t e r s a l s o the question of anticipating t h e enemy by rapid action. Holding the troops up pending further c l a r i f i c a t i o n or wide roundabout measures a r e o r d i n a r i l y i n these s i t u a t i o n s not proper. Should f u r t h e r troops be required before tho completion of the assembly, there should be no hesita.tion i n employing them,

384. Whether t h e i n f a n t r y a t t a c k i s launched from a n assembly position o r not t h e r e is no d i f f e r e v e i n i t s conduot; it i s 'conducted in a c c o r d m e with 371, i n c l us ive. paragraphs 355

385. Should the prel&ninary engagement and t h e t e r r a ' i i ' i a d i c a t o t h a t t h e immediate advancement of the a t t a c k does not promise success; or t h a t the employment if the mnin forces cannvb be e f f e c t i v e the same day, t h e n vrithhalding t h e a t t a c k i s recomended. Likewise considerntion of the ndjaaent wits may' influence the decision &ether o r no+ ta carry further the covering force engagemnt by the ,mplo~rmentof t h e main forces. Report No. 14,507.

-Qz-

At.tack of Positions. Thr measures used by the ~ t t ~ ~ depend k o r on h i s intention,

tho constrengths, t h ~ s i ' t u a t i o n ond s t r e n g t h of t h o
duct of thq enemy, t h e r e l a t i v e h o s t i l e ' p o s i t i o n ancl tb& 'tcrrain for tlie a t t r i c k * ,

386.

Should we be unable t o avoid or envelop &e h o s t i l e p o s i t i o n , h i s

f r o n t must be attacked and a penetration sou&t for.

387.

The execution of t h e f r o n t a l a t t a c k is determined according t o t h e manner the attc.c!cer can bring h i s forces and means, i n accordance with time and space, i n t o e f f e c t , Should "hese forces pad moans be i n s u f f i c i e l i t f o r a brc& through, a l o s s extensive objective must be i a d i cotod.
Tl+e t i m e required prior kc ti-ie beginning of t'nc n$tack i s $opendent 988,. .on whether the' a t t s d e r has i n h i s .possession the t o r r a i r i immediztely i n f r o n t of .the p o s i t i o n or must f i r s t sdc&o it, ard the t i n e required fox- prcparat i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r the o s s ~ m b l yof tho f o r c e s j n qssembly positions.

The more d i f f i c u l t t h ; a t t a o k appears, the moru thorough must be

) a r t of tho a t -
t h o preparations. The time required for p r e p a r c t i o n s on t h ~ p tacker i s also favorably ~ t i l i ~ by e d the
dofcndir.
The amouqt of f o r c e s and means required depends upon t h e s t r e n g t h
o f t h e h o s t i l e defense. An atta&.undertaken w2th i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e s m d
means ccn l e a d to a grievous reverse.

389. To properly dispose our f o r c e s it i s important to know e a r l y t h e

dominnting p o i n t s of tho h o s t i l e position. For tho decision a s t o t h e deci-
siue a c t i o n s of t h e at-l;aclc t h i s i s an important m t t e r .

390. Systematic reconnaissance o r d i n a r i l y provldes the f i n a l b a s i s f o r

the a t t a c k preparations and d i s p o s i t i o n s . This reconnaissanoe combines infor.
mation f o r t h e advance and f o r t h e attack. Gassed a r e a s and t h e i r extent i n
front of t h e p o s i t i o n n r e t o be e s p e c i a l l y i d e n t i f i e d .

A thorough examination of t h e m p w s t be m d e .

A i r roconnaissmce, conducted e a r l y enough, w i l l f i n d the enemy a t work. B y memis of phctogrc-phr- and v i s u a l reoonnaissance t h i s reconnnissance securos an insight into h o s t i l e dei'cnse measures, both i n advance of and i n t h e p o s i t i o n . Flyers can a s s i s t and a o c e l e r a t o long rmge f i r e , Attcclc aviat i o n proteots our uir reconnaissance and att.acks h o s . t i l e a i r reconnaissance m d captive balloons.

Ground b a t t l e r c c o n n a i s s ~ n c c rounds o u t t h e a i r reconnaissnnce.

B a t t l e rewnnuis sanoe must b e pushed through.
A r t i l l e r y cbs ervuki on meFuls a r e employed early. The commder d i r e c t s r oconnnis sanc e g d info rmnt ion means.

591. With t k E ad-rmc e tO .the h i s t i l e p o s i t i o n the question m i n e s : *ere does the main b a t t i o f i e l d begin? In t h e t e r r a i n lying'before t h e posit i o n tho enemy w i l l aonduct delaying action. I n f r o n t of tho main b a t t l e posft i o n t h e a t t a c k e r must reolcon with advanced p o s i t i o n s and o~!tpost positions.
Thc #attackor must s t r i v e to actvunce quickly r.nd energetically, A r t i l l e r y f i r e from considerable distances must not hold him up, Hostile bntt e r i e s must b e silenced quickly. A s a rulo t h s a d v w t ; devel,aps into numerous small a t t n c k proup8 which a r e composed of i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y , and, accordReport No, 14,507.

-75-

m e d s j of tanks, .Pbq s e must quickly break through or push back t h e eneny. 'Cf possible, we push past h o s t i l e advanced positions i n order not t o hold up the actvance* Should the p o s i t i o n of the main b a t t l e p o s i t i o n be unclarified, should the enemy accomplish timely and tenaoious resistance or. should we des i r e t o avoid a premature advance into t h e h o s t i l e p o s i t i o n ' s e f f e c t i v e f i r e zone, the approach must be made by bounds. IIowever, because of * t h i s t h e troops cannot be denied the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of u t i l i z i n g favorable opportunities, The goal of tho approach march i s the securing of t e r r a i n for t h e 8 a r t i l l e r y deployment and a r t i l l e r y observation of t h e b a t t l o field.

392. Meeting a closely bit infantry defense supported by strong a r t i l l e r y echelaned i n depth usually is proof t h a t tho a r e a of the h o s t i l e main b a t t l e p o s i t i c n has been reached. The f o r m r d i n f a n t r y d i g s i n m d tnkos over protection of the davelopment and of t h e a r t i l l e r y observaiticn positions. I t must be in p o s i t i o n t o repol h o s t i l e thrusts.
The m s s o f t h e i n f a n t r y and the other arms not yet necessarily employed can be held back beyond t h e e f f e c t i v e range of h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y .

333. The f u r t h e r reconnaissance and . i n f o n a t i o n provide d e t a i l s of t h e h o s t i l e p o s i t i o n s-?d for t h e conduct of the a t t a c k . Therefore, the h o s t i l e butpost must o r d i n a r i l y be driven i n .

Ry continuous observation. .ef the a t t a c k t e r r a i n i s the information obtained whereby we oan properly assign objectives t o .tho a r t i l l e r y and heavy i n f a n t r y weapons . ..

.,

A r t i l l e r y aviators, balloons, end observation b a t t a l i o n s a r e employed f o r t a r g e t reconnaissance. They o f t e n d e l i v e r t h e f i n a l bases f o r t h e a r t i l l e r y deployment. However, t h e deployment cannot be ..delayed. &vatting these agencies. ... . . . . . Fhotogra~hicreconnaissance e s t a b l i s h e s tho probable main ba.ttle f i e l d . Commanders anrl troops reoeive t h e necessary pictures. P o s s i b i l i t i e s fir t a n k anplnyment a r e t o be recannoitered. Engineers determine t h e p a r t i o u l a r k i d and sl;rength of blocks and hinder anoes The h o s t i l e camunication system i s imrestigatod by means o f l i s t e n ing devices and methads, Security of our uvm system against similar h o s t i l e devices i s necessary. By a r t i l l e r y f i r e f r o ~ nd i f f e r e n t positions and by reconnaissance r a i d s the enemy i s made t o divulge h i s strength, Heconnaissanct, a t t a c k s ( r a i d s ) a r e e s p e c i a l l y important i f l o c a l retirements of dummy positions a r c t o be reckoned with. The timc neceesary for reconnaissance and information cannot be m d e t0.o short. Only by r e l i a b l e ar.d exaet reports can t h e cooperation ef tho arms be offectedr Later c h g e s cause l e s s o r time, a r e difficult of execution and a r e aecompaniod by losses.
394. On t h e b a s i s of t h e reconnaissanao and i n f b r m t i o n r e s u l t s t h e commander individually deoidcs upon the conduct of t h e attack.

forccs a r c t o be mncentrated against those areas wh&e the a t t a c k moans e&be br ou@t t o % l l effect. Areas of . p c n e - t r t i o n are. n o t t o be chosen so small t h a t t h e pcnetf~itiilg'troops a r e e+os&d t o t h e united f i r e of the defender. Success a t one a r e a of penetration must be c a r r i e d over t o the others so t h a t t h e portion? of thc .position lying between a r e quickly overcome. It may be expeditious t o i o mound or envelop strong points af t h e h o s t i l e
,

.$tiring

. ,

Report No. 14,507.

position. Areas avoided must be held dom or by other mean% diminated. High points upon which the defender can bring oonoentrated a r t i l l e r y f i r e , ordinari l y a r e more quickly tnken by an advance on e i t h e r side thereof. Points which l a t e r a r e important for our onn observation and favorable t a n k t e r r a i n may be decisive i n t h e choice o f t h e penetration zone. Likewise, the t e r r a i n i n t h e r e a r o f t h e h o s t i l e p o s i t i o n i s t o be given consideration.
395.

According t o t h e sizo of t h e force the objective i s dlose or d i s t a n t ,

If t h e a t t a c k cannot be c a r r i e d through with one impulse, several attacks, following one another as quickly a s possible, must be.executed, each with a limited objective. The r a p i d u t i l i s a t i o n of a sucoess must not be deni e d a s a result. 396. Opposite t h e h a s t i l e a r t i l l e r y prepared for aetion our ~ r t i l l e r y must execute deployment circumspectly. I n accordance vkth t h e i r missions, t h e i r d e k d s for observation and t h e t e r r a i n the b a t t e r i e s a r e c a r e f u l l y dist r i b u t cd.

Tho a t t a c k preparation and t h c ammunition supply f o r a r t i l l e r y re-

quires t i m e .

397. The a r e a s from mbich the Inf&try launches i t s attack must be ad-
vanced a s near a s possible t o t h e enemy, must provide cover f o r t h e deployed
infantry aad mke pos s i b l o observatian f o r t h e heavy infantry weapons and t h e
a r t i l l e r y f o r t h e i r immediate support of the attack.

Often must t h o f i n a l arons of departure p r i o r t o the Infantry a t t a o k be gained by combat.

398. A t t h e l a t e s t , the cgmmander, a t t h e time he makes h i s decision t o
attack, i s s u e s t h e Srders s t i l l neaossary f o r the a r t i l l e r y , for tho Infantry
attack organizntion, f o r tho cemplction of t h e b a t t l e oommmications net and
i t s connection with tho special n e t s and for t h e other a t t a c k preparations.

399. Upon recommcadations of t h e a r t i l l e r y commander, the commander Crd~rs t h e a r t i l l e r y d i s t r i b u t i o n in accordance with i t s t a s k s , Therefore, i n c e r t a i n oases, the spli%ting of individunl u n i t s , and i n p a r t i c u l a r of heavy a r t i l l e r y , must be made. The morc d i f f i c u l t t h e attack appears, the more important i s it t o be able t o concentrate superior a r t i l l e r y f i r e on t h e deoisive a t t a c k zreas.

In t h e corps, should d i v i s i o n s fight beside one w*other i n small zones, it may be s u i t a b l e for the corps commander t 6 give special ins-tructions t o the divisions f o r the organization of t h e i r own and e s p e c i a l l y a l l o t t e d a r r t i l l e r y and t o assign tasks outside t h e division zone. Normally the r e t e n t i o n 'under immediate corps control i s l i m i t e d t o the heaviest b a t t e r i e s mplsyad for d i s t a n t missions.
400, Tho a t t a c k plan of t h e commtlnder i s t h e b a s i s of t h e a r t i l l e r y and
js.fantry f i r e plan. The commander may charge t h e a r t i l l e r y cnmmander with
drawing up a f i r i n g plan, mbich aceording t o thc s z v e r i t y of t h e a t t z o k i s
gcncral or specific. I t may be, against strong pcsitionii, a regulator of the
i n f a n t r y attack i n time and i n the securing of objeetivcs.

The Infantry and ArtiLlory f i r e p l m s must bc;. i n harmony. Tho g r e a t +estioA i s t h a t a l l previously knmn t p r g e t s must'be eggaged and thr-t' a11 t a r g e t s appmaring a t the beginning of o r during the course of the attaok, and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e s e which from neighboring zones a r e el'fective' against our advance, must be engaged. The Infantry and A r t i l l e r y f i r e plan8 must 6onsiaer t h e rearward p o s i t i o n @f the t e r r a i n of the attack.. For a l l of these tasks, it is necessaqy t h a t compatible arrangements be made betvrem. .-the lower Infantry and A r t i l l e r y cemmariders cooperating i n t h e i r individual zones, It i s t h e i r t a s k mutually to h e l p eeoh other and inerease the f i r e effeotiveness and consequently t o be sure t h a t by f i r e attacks new t a r g e t s a r e f i r e d upan. Report No. 14,507. . .

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Should t h e A r t i l l e r y and t h e Minenwerfers havc t h e ' s m e t a r g e t s , i n some instances it may be suitable t o a t t a c h the Minenvrerfers t o t h e a r t i l lery. o . hos401. From t h e advanoe of t h e Infantry up t o the e n t r a n ~ ~ i n tthe t i l e main b a t t l e f i e l d , we must even s t r i v e for f i r e s u p e r i o r i t y over the host i l e a r t i l l e r y . Such s u p e r i o r i t y i s indispensable for t h e advance of oIir Infantry if t h e 6n6my has strong a r t i l l e r y which h a s b e e n w e l l a'djusted. Likewise, the h o s t i l e a i r defense b a t t e r i e s must be beaten dovm early.

The a r t i l l e r y qf the defender w i l l attempt t r , viithdra$,.f,rom t h e enl ~ preverited By good observation means and an gaganent4 This can o c ' c a s ' i o ~ lbe Otherwise i s t h e i r enegement f i r s t possible a c t i v e b a t t l e a i r reconnaissance. when our Infantry a t t a c k forces the defender t o show h i s b a t t e r i e s i n t h e i r fin@ f i r i n g posi tionsb The known, and those with eonsiderab l e c e r t a i n t y determinccj, host i l e b a t t e r i e s m u s t be ago.ged p r i o r t o the advanc? of t h e Inf6ntry a t t a c k so t h a t they can n.o longer f i r e cffectively. Then i s it possible t o hold t h e s e dnwn with m a l l units, t o place tk mass on newly appearing b a t t e r i e s and t o support effectively, s u f f i c i e n t l y and immediately tho Infantry4 Should t h e ' ~?ianyshow, a i thc beginning of tho Infantty a t t a c k , new and strong a r t i l l e r y , f i r e s u p e r i o r i t y 'ovcr t h i 8 must be secured, depending on conditions, As a r e s u l t of t h i s , a d'drresponding pause ill the Infantry a t t a c k p u s t be made.
of The more . d i f f i c u l t the engagemcnt ( ~ o u n t e r b n t t e r ~ ) the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y , tho mcrc important i s t h e blinding of hootilo a r t i l l e r y obsvrvation i n docisive moments of t h c attack. Cmly r a r e l y w i l l it be possible to begin with surpriso tho ongagemsnt of the a r t i l l e r y (courrterbattPrp) j u s t before o r a t the beginning of t h e n the other hand, no other choice may be possible with unInfantry attack. O favorable v i s i b i l i t y and observation conditions, if t h e time of the Infantry a t t a c k i s not postponed.

402. The preparations of t h e attacking Infantry i n the a r e a s of depart u r e depend upon the p r o t e c t i o n which these o f f e r against h o s t i l e f i r e and upon the time of t h e : b e g i n n N of t h e Infantry a t t a c k , If t h e areas of departure a r e unfcvorable and t h e t i m of a t h & yet undecided t h e s e positions a r e occupied l a t e . Cwerzd avenues of approach a r e t o bu reconnoitered.
403. The success af tb a r t i l l e r y counterbattery, t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of Infantry preparation i n the a r e a a of departure and t h e r e s u l t s of t h e a s s i d i ou~ly continued b a t t l e reconnaissance a r e bases f o r the time of tho Infantry attack, t h e order f o r i s issued a s l a t e a s possible. 404. A t t h e tba ordered the infantry advances from the a r e a s of departure. The exeoution of the Infantry a t t a c k and t h e speed with which it i s c a r r i e d forward depend upon: ( 1 ) the proximity of t h e area .of depaarture t o t h e main h o s t i l e position, ( 2 ) the t y p e o f t e r r a i n over which t h e a t t a o k must advance, (3) t h e command tho h o s t i l e f i r e has over t h i s t e r r a i n , and ( 4 ) t h e strength of tho h o s t i l e occupatinn.
If t h e af-eks af d e p a r t u r e l i e disk& and s-i;rong a r t i l i o r y fire i s t o be reckoned with, it m y be vcry s u i t a b l e t o malce the i n i t i a l advances mder.covering darkness. Snioke i s u s e f u l i n f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e advanee over, a d the winning'of, t e r r a i n without cover. Vkenevcr tho Infantry i s held up by h o s t i l e f i r e , it d i g s in. Gradmlly it works for-mrd, n w a t t h i s place, now a t t h a t , u t i l i z e s tho 'cooper~.ting f i r c s of heavy infantry weapons and art i l l e r y t o aclvmoe %nd' a g a i n d i g s i n * Thus t h e infunbry advance can extend over days, against a strong, x e l l organized p o s i t i o n .&a ovcr t e r r a i n 8iffi.e c u l t f o r tAe attackor. In such s i t u a t i o n s the Infantry, e t the baginning of t h e a t t a c k , by advancing i n a deeply organieod, t h i p l i n o fermatinn can e n t i c e out t h e h o s t i l o f i r e and f o r c e t h e enemy t o omploy h i s heavy i n f a n t r j weapons and a r t i l - l e~y.

Report No. 14,507.

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405. If t h e above intentiof? i s accomplished and t h e r e i s a noticeable su~eriority of our own a r t i l l e r y , by f u r t h e r working forward the Infantry eng,aies i n a stronger f i r e .fight nearer t h e enemy. I f necessary the most advanced e1oirent;s pire reinforcad, The heavy infantry weapons must be employed acair~st those areas which Yie a r t i l l e r y cannot effectively reach, V h r e a s against weak resistcuicc 'the penctrc~tioc, a ? imnied,i8tely f o l l m - t h e working forward t o the main b a t t l e - p o s i t i o n , against a tenacious defense t h e penetration must b e prepared by t h e combined f i r e of a l l arms deployed i n depth i n ard,.-r t o wear 'do.em' i;hs encmy cud croaic n softening.
. In accordance mith the strength of the h e s t i l o main l i n e t h e penetra.Gon shapes i t s e l f d i f f e r e n t l y . Against a weak_ defense it k i l l o f t e n come about through the indspendsnt a c t i o n of lower commanders and on t e r r a i n not prepared therefor. Against a tenacious defense it m y be necesskry t o prepare a coordinated penetration attack. T h e infantry during .the n i & t preceding, concentrates tho forward elements and attempts t o ad+anos a s near a s possible t o the enemy so t h a t it can u t i l i z e f u l l y i t s f i r e support; The penetration i s o r d i m r i l y a ooordimtad asoault, launched a t a p a r t i c u l a r hour. The hour of a t t a c k i s t o be kept secret. The a t t a c k i s t o be launched a t dmm, i f t h e attaoking infantry is. t* avoid -'exposure t o h o s t i l e observed f i r e during brightness. Thc infantry, without turning a s i d e and followin@,tho a r t i l l e r y sxd .' heavy infantry weapons f i r e , pushes through t e i t s objective. It may be necessary t o use e~igineers -to destroy hinderances erected by t h e ehomy. P a r t s of the ~ r t i l l o r y a r e to be made available e a r l y t o scaompnny the i r f u n t r y -&ich breaks through nnd should be a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o ; b a t t e r i e s which recognize t h c p o s s i b i l i - t i e s of advancing do 30 of t h e i r own v o l i t i o n .

I n the cooperation between f i r e anti the advancing assault and vsith 406, t h e cooperation of a l l arms the enemy, a f t e r t h e penetration, i s beaten down (see p a r a ~ r a p h s363 and 364) i n tho depth of the p o s i t i o n i n nmarous individual engagements up t o the complete break through or u n t i l the atthidment of t h e f i r s t obj,octive. Should e i t h e r of these f a i l of accomplishment, t h e t e r o rer a i n already won i s defonded and h?ld u n t i l the a t t a c k om bk renbvred.: N connaissance and information measures a r e t o be taken. 407. During t h e ccurss of t h e a t t a c k the enemy may attempt t o reestabl i s h the defense i n a rearward p o s i t i o n i n order t o f i g h t bhercin under more favorable conditions ; also he ray wish to withdrav! from f i r t h e r combat. In both instances ha w i l l ordLmrily a t t m p t to break off contact during t h e nigM

Ordinarily tho most forvmrd troops rewgnizo it f i r s t i f t h e enemy w i l l not continuo tho cngagunent i n h i s present position. The ahnrpcst v i g i lance must bo m i n t h i n o d over a l l h o s t i l o movements and actions. Likewise o f t e n w i l l the impulse t o follow ernaneke from the most advanced troops. Every e f f o r t must be made, by sharp and deoisive'following up, t o maintain close contact ~ 5 t h the enemy. Reconnaissance i s made for gassed areas. Should t h e enemy delay upon a p o s i t i o n lying not too f a r t o -the r e a r , it i s t h e task of the f i r s t l i n e traops (forward) t o force t h e reconnaissance of and information &out the nw! p o s i t i o n and t h e conditions of approaoh thereto,' I n a night withdrawal by the enemy, strong troops can only fellow a t daylight. Tnese, i n t h e faoe of: t h e expected counterniocisures of t h e enemy, arid e s p e c i a l l y of h i s artillery, must ad-.,ante b y bounds and only then can do'so >&en the mass of our a r t i l l e r y has be en advanced t o new posttipns ~ n d i s proparod t o fire.. . :. In the instsnce where t h e enemy r c t i r e s f a r -f;o the r e a r and the purs u i t csnnot, be immcdi-toly undertaken, the comander spcoifios t h o conduct of t h e a r t i l l e r y , regulatoo thi: follm-r up by the j.nfrzLtry Fin? 1leci6os the location of t h e reserve. OPtm %ill the niass of t h e i n f a n t r y not be bble t o 'cdvanoo bvcr t h e previous front l i n e p r i o r t o daylight. If possiblc, thc encmy must be overtdcon. Rcport No. 14,E07,

Countorattacks by tho r e t i r i n g enomy must Bc expected. 408, Abbrevktod a t t a c k propdrations a r e i n ordet i f t h e onemy, through previous e'ngagm&nts, hVs been s h & q or .if ho i s n e t preparod for. defense, or i f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y i s offered t o su$prise him and use our ovm superiority. Upon thb 8 i t m t i o n , the s t r e n g t h of t h e h o s t i l e position, sad. the depth of t h e objective, is determinod t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e r e c o n n a i s s q c e ana.:bnfarmation measures and a t t a c k preparations can be abbreviated. Rapid deployment of t h e a r t i l l e r y and quick~developmentof' the i n f a n t r y close t o t h e enemy position make possible t h e u t i l i z a t i o n quickly of a f a w r a b l e s i t u a t i o n . Under conditfons favoring t h e i r employment, the e a r l y p r e p r a t i o n s md use of tank u n i t s w i l l f u c i l i t a % : et h e c,t.tnck. . Smoke, i n favorable weather and t o r r a i n , must be considered.
n g delay ix action,. .the a t t a c k e r w i l l a r r i v e . 409. Against im cnemy Pi&t L more quickly a t h i s objective if he a t t a c k s a t one. place v&th stro:ig forces. An ntt6clr pushed through quickly and deeply forces tho cnomy t o evacuate e a r l y the whole f r o n t . Should he succeed in w'itfldrawing then me should, by a rapid follow up and the nssignwnt of dis't& objectives, not l e t contact be broken and- thus shou3.d we prevent him reforming hi% front,. .Should t h s enemy occupy 4 rearward p o s i t i o n we should, a s circainistmeos permit, launch a new a t t a c k a t nnothbr area on h i s f r o n t i n order t o s u r p r i s e him olld provide tho p o s s i b i l i t y f o r an e a r l y bronlc through. For t h i s purpose tho new a t t a c k groups must bc formed early. The m s s of t h e a r t i l l e r y i s t o b e , h p t ' w e l l advanced; tank em-. p l o p e a t mzy be quit;a. suitable, engineers should be well forward cnd anly the mcst necessary camunioctions a r e c j l l c d for.

VII.

Pursuit.

410. Tiredness of t h e troops m y never be the b a s i s f o r not pursuing,

The l e a d e r is cuthorizcd t o dr-nond t h e z p p r e n t l y impossihle. Boldness m d
dcring must guide him. Everyone nus t do h i s utmost,
411. Measures f i r t h e pursuit nro t o be taken seasonably. AD overestimation of m approaching success may lead t o the donger of a serious s e t back. Forces which a r e launched t o o e a r l y i n pursuit may endanger the suocess of t h e victory. 412, The v i c t o r pursues on a broad front and always s t r i v e s t o outflank the enemy, t o outdistance him, t o s t r i k e h i s r e t r e a t i n flank, or t o force him away from his line of commmications. Obsteclos pl.aced i n t h e r e a r of the enemy a s s i s t t h e pursuing troops.
. 413. When tho c o m q d e r , through a i r and other troops' reports, through tb advance of h i s ' troops, .through the r e l a x a t i o n of t h e h o s t i l c coun.termeasures, and a t t i m s through r e p o r t s of neighboring troops, recognizes t h a t t h e ' enemy cannot maintain h i s p o s i t i o n , -he spurs o n t o the utmost t h e " w i l l of victory" of the 1 m e r commzders, he puts. into motion i n tho decisive pursuit, d i r ection a l l available troops, and a s s o n bs possible arlvmces. roformed or newly formed pursuit groups. VJoaporls of high. spec?d and mobility. a r e t o . b e pushed forward with the foremost troops. Lucrative missions a r e of,fered e s p e c i a l l y to army savalry md strong motorized forces. Motorized engineers, bank defense weapons and a u t i a i r c r a f t elements should accompany the motorised elements. WhQl tho p u r s u i t cannot bc oxecutnd'by outdistnno ing tho cnemy r t r the route thereto i s too f a r , the pursuing troops a r e t o b e pushed through o.t t h e break through area. A t such a r e a s coordimted~oonu~~and must' bc secured..
t

414. Attack and bombardment a v i a t i o n i s to be cnploycd against t h e r e t r e a t i n g main h o s t i l c forco. This a v i a t i o n increases thc d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e h o s t i l e f o r c e cmd d i s r u p t s the t r a f f i c on the roarward main roads, a t c r i t i c a l p o i n t s and a t r a i l r p a d s t a t i o n s . Rtport No. 14,507.
-8%

Observation aviation reconnoiters t h e roads along which the enemy r e t r e a t s and observes p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r r e i n f o r c e m n t s l a s t i n g f o r m r d ; 416. As soon a s the enemy yields, t h e lower commanders immediately and' vrithout a k i t i n g ,orders, t a k e up t!m p u r m i t . - They must a c t boldly nnd indeIt is against t h e pendently. 'Every advantage i s taken. of h o s t i l e weaknesses. enemy tha.t .contact and &operation with adjacent unit^ aresought..
' I n the pressure of (he S r s u i t r e p o r t s ooncerning objectivcs gained must not be forgotten.

416. Ammunition-supply for a l l arms i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e for t h e e f f e c t i v e

carrying on of the f i r e pursuit. .
417. Because of' i t s long range and mobility the a r t i l l e r y i s e s p e c i a l l y
suitable. f o r pursuit. Where ~ d m i s s i b l e , the f i r e i s of g r e a t violcnco.

A portion of t h e a r t i l l e r y remains i n position so long a s t h e vrith-

drawing enemy con be engaged with observed and plenned f i r e . Espeoially a r e distant t a r g e t s t o be taken w d e r f i r o r the advnnce of thc pursuing i n f a n t r y
cannot be hinderod. Long range f l c t t r a j e c t o r y b a t t o r i o s osver t h e roads of r e t r c a t and r a i l r o a d s t a t i o n s with strong f i r e s of interdiction. Strong a r t i l l e r y e1mcntt.c p r e s s on i n conjunction with the pursuing infantry,. prevent the enany consolidating a position, eagage co.mtemttacks and $ r a d u ~ l take l ~ over t h e fir0 missions of t h e elanents s t i l l r o m ~ . ~ i n bog hind . 418, By f i r c ' a r d s t r ~ ~ ' ~ r e s s the ixa i n f a n t r y assures tho complete def e a t of t h e enmy* necc;ssnry, it f i @ t s with hand grenades md bayonets. The heavy i n f ' n n t ~weapons must,not h e s i t a t e t o go into p o s i t i o n close behind or among t h e foremost elements. I t - p u s h c s past strong h o s t i l c resistance, t h e removal of t h i s r e s i s t m c e being l e f t t o -tho rearward elements, &ich advance where t h e pursuing $roops must quickly gain ground. Too e a r l y change of f r o n t i s t o be awidcd. 419. Terrain poisoned by the cnemy i s t o be a w i d e d ,ad t h e troops f o l lowing must be informed thereof, Troops on motor v e h i c l c s can push through t h i s t o r r a i n , A t a r e a s e a s i l y dogassod ( s t r e e t s and t e r r a i n without g,rowth) passages a r o made a t the e a r l i e s t time possible. 420. Engineers which have not been sent t o outdistw.ce tNe enemy and t o plaoe obstacles along the routes o f r e t r e a t , repair t h e s t r e e t s and roads i n r e a r of t h e pursuing troops. 421. The s i g n a l troops do tbfr utmost t o maintain comunicai;ion between the commander and t h e pursuing troops. Comunication must o f t e n be maintained by means of radio. The d i v i s i o n a l signal b n t t a l i n n pnskas forward the trunk l i n e i n t h e main p u r s u i t direction,. Should t h e enemy renew b a t t l e , an advanced message cent e r i s established for oonm~unicationby ?&re t o each flank and reanmrd,

During t h e pursuit every e f f o r t i s made t o intercept enemy messages .. and comunications. 422,

A l l commanders accompany or closoly follow the pursuing troops.

423' Positions m d renr guards must not be al1,wed t o drav t h e pursuer from the dboisive d i r u c t i a n . n o r t o corrtairi large forces, W i y attempt must be made t o $ t r i k e t h e m i n h o s t i l e force. Correspondingly the reserves a r e pushed forward and when necessary new s t r i k i n g troops a r e fo'med from t h e s e t o carry un the purst1,ujt with renermd energy. Report No. 14,507. -81-

Should t h e enemy r e e s t a b l i s h himself i n t e r r a i n from vhich he cannot

be d i s l o d ~ e da t onoe, the attack must be again coordinated and be supported ~ d t b

strong a r t i l l e r y f i r e . ~rgdzation of t h e u n i t s ; supply of ammunition, b a t t l e needs and 424. rations t a k c , ~ l ' a c i i " d u i n g t h e m w w n t forward. These m s t nqt i n t e r f e r e with t h e r @ i d advance o f - t h e purmit.. : The- wnmsr.der must r e l i e v e the' piigsuing troops of supply m d cvacuntion w o r ~ i s. e Ouring a night pursuit t h e i n f a n t r y pushes forward f r o n t a l l y , along 425. the s t r e e t s , while t h e a r t i l l e r y executes t o i t s f u l l e s t capacity and up t o i t s b a t t a l i o n s t ~ ty o follorv and greatest ..range : f i r e s of i n t e r d i c t i o n . I n d i v 2 d u ~ l go into position according t o t h e map. .Theso extend the depth of tho interdic.: t i o n f i r e s and occasionally c m take p a r t i n t h e closo cambat of the infantry.. . Reports concerning objectives reached by: t h e advanc od elements should be sent reanvard so t h a t t h e s e el~rments a r e nat f i r e d into by o;lr own a r t illery..
,

Night air a t t a c k s can inorease the a r t i l l e r y e f f e c t i n the rearward hostile termin. I f possible, encircling elements a r e pushed forward during t h e night
426.

Only s n orders of t h e high cormnand i s the p u r s u i t swpended'or stopThe p u r s u i t cmn@t be stopped i n one area. VIII., Defense.

ped.

427. The defenqe i s primarily effectcd by f i r e . Therefore t h e defender must seek t o secure ilbe maximum f i r e e f f e c t . To t h i s end a thorough knowledge of the b a t t l e t e r r a i n a s s i s t s i n b e t t e r u t i l i z s . t i o n of the t e r r a i n and i n bett e r f i e l d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , which a t the same t i m provide better. cover and a superior f i r e e f f e c t against t h e attacker. . 428, The f a c t that, the: cle,f;nse has. n i t the i n i t i a t i v e a s does the attaoker, demands t h a t contact with the enemy he made a s e a r l y a s possible 9 t h a t ever? reconnhissance agency bs employed to determine 'the:direction of. tKe h o s t i l e spproach, the composition and strength of h i s forces. Likpwise, it.: is:.important to secure the p o s i t i o n c a r l y i n all d i r e c t i o a s from which,n suddsn a t t a c k might be launched. o must be abl'e Curing the defense orgnnieation a d arrangements w t o occupy the terrain- against n s u r p t i s e attack. For t h i s purpose t h o troops a r e so d i s t r i b u t e d during t h e establishment of the defeme.
,

429. The t e r r a i n on v,hich tho defenso i s made detcrmincs the locntion of t h e forvrard elem~nts. Good observation f o r t h e a r t i l l e r y and h c a q i n f i n t r y %-enp& i s . or d i m r i l y the most h p o r t s n t c o n s i d c r ~ t i o n f oi- effektive, strong f i r e . Yet, accordiy: t o the t e r r a i n t h e nesessity of placing nur infalltry out of h o s t i l e ebservati on may be of grent importzuco. The necessity of defenso against tank a t t a c k may c a l l f e r the u t i l i z a t i o n of n a t u r a l obst~.eles such a s r i v a r s , swmps arid stoep slopos.

nm~ be ' ~ ~ r t h l e for s s defense.

Terrain very strong f r o n t a l l y but mhich i s very VUlndrahle i n f l a n k Somtimos opm t e r r a i n ; which can be cornandad by f i r e during t h e dey and with f a v ~ r a b l eobscrvr.tion, provides :far-reaching f l a n k defense. T , k dcfenso i s m d e stronger by gassing areas,
'

Seldom can one find favorable t e r r a i n k i a l l p a r t s Of the defensive area, especially i n l s r g e areas, Report N o . 14,507.

-8 Z-

I f t h e offensive i s l a t e r t o be assumed, the choice of t e r r a i n must be governed thereby.

If conditions permit, +-he t e r r a i n must be reconnoit;?rsd a l s o from the h o s t i l e point of vie%

430. Capable u t i l i z a t i o n of. t h e n a t u r a l t e r r a i n and good camouflaging of t h e defensive a r e a preserves t h c ' r i i t u r a l t e r r a i n picture and makes morb d i f f i c u l t t h e t a s k of the h o s t i l e reconnaissance end information agencies. Occasiollally l e s s favorab'le .terrain oan be more favorable f p r tile defcnder than a stronger t e r r a i n a r e a whrlch l e t s t h e i n t e a t i o n and orgollization of t h e defender be r e a d i l y rcoognized.. . . Where t h c t e r r a i n i s not n a t u r a l l y strong, it m u s t be a r t i f i c i a l l y strengthencd. I n i t i a l l y this i s o r d i n a r i l y aacomplishcd by obstticles and hinderances, I f t h e r e a r e s u f f i c i e n t forces a d . time, l e s s f o v o r a b l o . t e r r a i n can be m d e exceptionally s t r o r ? ?by u t i l i z i n g n a t u r a l f e a t u r a s (streams, ete. ). 431. Every p o s s i b i l i t y i s t o be u k i l i z c d t o s u r p r i s c the-enany; t h c a t tacker must be doooived a s t o the f i e l d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , the occupation by and strength of our troops a s woll os about t h e kind of: defense and i t s tunacity. Insofar a s the a m u n i t i o n supply peiztzts and i f our intentions a r e 432. not t o wait and @pen close range s u r p r i s c f i r o , our f i r o e f f e c t must be u t i l i z e d a t the greutesi; ranges. As the cncmy advmces ho should come under stronger and strorgor Yir e. The commdcr i s responsible for the f i r e fight * duct presupposes conplctcd communication nets. I t s uniform con-

433. A s a r u l e it i s f i r s t i n the attack, but sometimes during t h e approach, t h a t we learn of the h o s t i l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of forces and t h e a r e a chosen by him for the ]rain a h a & and consequently v~herethe focal point of our defense must be. The employment of our force nust be based on t h i s consideration, For t h e protootion of a n open flank strong reserves a r e necessary. Ctherwisc, the f i r e paver of a defensivc frorit omnot be weakened through the r e t e n t i o n of strong reserves. 434. If h o s t i l e contact has not been made t h e n the commander can, i n general, choose h i s t e r r a i n and troop distribution. Further freedom of aot i o n can be secured by the e a r l y delay of t h e h o s t i l e approach.

If it remans unclear a s t o where t h e enemy w i l l come then it can be recoliunerded t h a t t h e dofense place himself in d c f e ~ s e assembly position The rap i d assumption of the intended dofcnse must (Abwehr Bereit stellungen ) be preparcd and secured.

435. Should t h e defensive be assumed innnediately before or a f t e r t h e f i r s t contact, the choice of the defense tcrrr.in c w no longer ire %ladedependent upon tim-consuming rrucomaissance. I n ttnf&vorable t e r r a i n t l l ~ r b coines t h e question whothcr we should not r e t i r e t o more favorable t s r r a i n , 0r;if t h e defense must be assumed, whethcr it i a not aclvisable, by a quick blow, t o s e i z e t h i s t e r r a i r i from the emmy. . .
The assumptlcn of the dcfomsu i s moot + J Q y , i n several columns or from the dovclop&,

oxeouted from a marcn

436.. Should the abtack be given up and t h e troops pass t o the defense, the defense i s .iwlediately estsblished* For t h i s t h e , f i r s t .necessity i s t o . make the forward l i n e @la 8 t h and t o organize i n de2th, ...~ ACCOWE~T? c i r oums'qanoes o G may b e compelled t o advmce or r e t i r e i n many places f r o m t h e l i n e reached in.the .att&& i n order t o secure b e t t e r defense possibilities. Report . No, . 14,507.
-85-

The t r a n s i t i o n t o delaying a c t i o n ensues from t h e defense.

4 3 7 . I n a l l s i t u a t i o n s t h e r e must be no doubt a s t o t h e intended act i o n t Defense i n position o r delaying action.

Defense
438.

The t e r r a i n i n vhich troops defend i s c a l l e d t h e i r "position".

The most important p a r t of every position i s t h e main b a t t l e posi-

t i o n ( ~ a u ~ t k a m ~ f f e l d It ) . is
held t o t h e l a s t . I n every "position" ( s t e l l u n g ) t h e r e a r e &anced positions and covering foraes i n f r e n t of t h e main b a t t l e position. For t h e i r conduct, see - 456. and 457.
439. A p o s i t i o n can m l y f u l f i l l i t s aim i f it forces t h e enemy t o
a t t a c k a r causes. him t o give up his a t t a c k inkentions. I t must be based upen
t h e troops available.

A f l a n k pa s i t i o n should farce t h e enemy t o a t t a c k i p a d i r e c t i o n which t a k e s him from h i s o r i g i n a l d i r e c t i o n of advance. The neoessity for such an a t t a c k i s forced i f t h e enemy can* avoid t h e flank position by turn? ing aside and i f he cannot a t t a c k it i n flank.

4 4 0 . The defender's prospects a r e most favorable i f t h e enemy i s forced t o a t t a c k the p o s i t i o n frqntally. I n order t o be able t o meet an envelopment of h i s p o s i t i o n t h e defender must be so disposed a s t o be able t o bend back o r t o echelon h i s threatened flank. Against h o s t i l e attempts t o go around t h e .position w e must a c t offensively.
441. Should t h e defender advance i n f r o n t of h i s position against t h e
attacker, he must not thereby endanger t h e security of t h e p o s i t i o n end i t s
completion and ho must not s p l i t h i s forces.

4 4 2 . The defense of the main b a t t l e p o s i t i o n d e m d s t h e organization

i n d q t h , of a l l forces. This s p l i t s t h e h o s t i l e f i r e , makes possible t h e
thiokening. of our oum fir.e from t h e rear, permits l m n l withdrawals in t h e
face of superior f i r p a n d permits t h o defense'to continue even i n t h e f a c e af
h o s t i l e penetrations- i n t o t h e main Lmttle position. The organization demands
t h a t t f u , mass of t h c heavy and t h c g r e a t e s t number possible of t h e l i g h t in-
f r n t r y woapons mst be able to f i r e i n f m n t of t h e main.battle position.

Tho auth6rization f o r . local. ~ v i t h d r a y a l si n the .face of superior

f i r e can be given b a t t a l i o n wmmmders by the next higher oonnnandor and t o
subsrdinate commmders by t h e battn.lion wmmander provided such withdrawal
does not endanger tlie defense and does n u t p m m i t t h e enmy t o e s t a b l i s h him-
s e l f in t h e main b a t t l e pasition.
443. The width and dapth of t h e defense stand i n close r e l a t i o n .

oo.sily obscrved t o r r a i n p o k i t s g r e a t e r breadth thah h i l l y and not e a s i l y obsorvcd t e r r a i n , Strong natural obstacles makc it possible t o employ Only securi.ty -forces. Doplated or. s o r e l y exhausted troops require more narro7kr sectors, darkn6s.s : . .: or l i g h t v i s i b i l i t y more dense occu* pation of t h e POrvmrd line. By occupying t h e t e r r a i n i n groups groater breadth can be assigned, yot whon t b d o f e n s , e i s of considerable durntion a more o r l e s s .continuous l i n e of occupatipn i s t o be established. . . Faact f i g u r e s cnnnot be given for s e c t o r widths. A s a guido it may be s a i d t k n t i n not unfavorable t e r r n l n the sector breadths may r.pproximately dbuble t h e breadth of zoms i n the nttaok. Rep'ort N o . 14,507.

c la<

444. According t o the time, working forces and means avai$able t h e posit i o n i s completed i n strength or only temporarily (hastily).
A well -finished b a t t l e position, a s a rule, embraces a s e r i e s of mutually supporting defensive areas with obstacles, trenches and n e s t s of individual arms. The positions a r e d i s t r i b d e d i r r e p l a r l y and strongly i n depth and a r e erected i n the sequence of t h e i r importance. A t p a r t i c u l a r l y inlportant a r e a s strong points of different arms shouM be l a i d out. The plan of defense should be d i f f i c u l t of recognition both on the ground and from t h e air. Adjacent sec%ors must be able t o support each pther. Too great s t r i v i n g ' for flanking support must not invalidate the f r o n t a l defense. Especially i n darkness and invisible weather i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of s u f f i c i e n t f r o n t a l defense of g r e a t importance.

radially

a sure connection betwem aL1 s e c t o r s must be b u i l t up.

Obstacles, dmy.viorks, measured points i n t h e t e r r a i n i n f r o n t o f , the' hosition, thc, removal of fiistj,pctive objects ! n ' t h e pesition, oamouflage, obsird&i.on po,gts and communication trenches complete the def cnsive. layout.

Ordinarily the commander determines from the X$ip, t h e ' k i n b a t t l e 445. f i e l d and a s s i g s a general l i n e a s a guide f o r t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e main l i n e 7f resistance. With t h i s l i n e he se&es t h e w n t i n u i t y of the defensive position. T h m l w e r commfmders must fix t h e main b a t t l e l i n e on the t e r r a i n , since only on t h e t e r r a i n can the d e t a i l s of t h e defense, the l o c a t i o n of t h e l i n e and i t s occupation, be decided.
The main l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e i s placed s u f f i c i e n t l y f8.r i n f r o n t of t h e a r t i l l e r y and heavy infantry weapons observation3 it i s so located t h a t t h e h o s t i l e obsorvation and f i r e a r e deprived of e f f e c t thereon a s long a s -r t h e possible; moreover t h a t ' b y i t s l o c a t i o n it gains s u r p r i s e ov,. enemy. Therefore we must search t h e t e r r a i n 'carefully for h o s t i l e obsorvation p o s s i b i l i t i e s and adapt ourselves accordingly. I n h i l l y t e r r a i n the r a i n l i n e o f r e s i s t a n c e may be located on reverse slopes i f t h e r e i s danger t h a t it vvould be e a d y koovered on a forward slope and could n o t be long maintained against h o s t i l e f'ire.

(a)

The dofenqe of the main b a t t l e p o s i t i o n must bc so prgpared through 446. the f i r e of a l l arms a t t h e l a t e s t the encmy breaks i n front of t h e M . L . His progress must be h d w n to a l l arms. R.

twt

he OPs of the a r t i l l e r y and heavy infantry neaporrs n u s t , f o r t h e 447. engagement which t a k e s plnoe i n advance or" the main b a t t l e position, provide d i s t a n t observation into h o s t i l e t e r r a h of attack. On the other hand, it may occasionally be necessary t o be c o n t w t with limited observation f o r t h e immed i a t e defense of the main b a t t l e p o s i t i o o r Should thc f o r a n o s t . p s r t i o n of t h e main b a t t l e position (BIILR) l i n e on t h e reverse slope, the a r t i l l e r y and heavy i n f a n b y weapons m u s t have ,advanced observers, t h e s e being on the. fonnfard slopes and under Proteetion of the b'hpos't. Keight s i n roar an6 flank observat i o n are used where possible.
For t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e OPs of the a r t i l l e r y nnd heavy i n f a n t r y weapons, see par. 334. A ~ ~ ? ~ l i a r y m u s t be prep wed, OPs
448, For roconrmissnnco, security and b a t t l e , t h e p o s i t i o n i$dividod into sectors. The sector boundaries a r c t o . b e so drawn t h a t they, i f possible, It may be necessary t o takc eSpeoialmeasures dono't dividb defensive works, f o r p r o t e c t i a n of the s e c t o r boundariest i n case of necessity, security detach; ments a r e t o be expressly e n p l o p d f. o r . t h i s purpose, a@ especially a t night o r during 'weather of l o w ' v i s i b i l i t y .
',

Report 14,507. . . Xo. .

449. Reserves i n ' t h e sect.or..cf the employed i n f a n t r y h u e the following functions r t o ' r e i n f o r c e 'ehe fo1;ward ekiients; .by oourrternttack t o hukl back t h e enemy who has a foothold: t o pro,vide l o c a l r e l i e f s .

~b &qloyment ' 6 f " t h reskrve depends on t h e situation, impoktant p o s s i b i i i t i e s a r e t o be prepared for.

The most

450. I n the cvurse of a long defense r e l i e f s of u n i t s may become neoessaryr Ordinarily r e l i e f s a r e effected during darkness. Each r e l i e f must be prepared and securcd, m d t h e time of the taking over and r e l i e f expressed i n orders. Simultaneous r e l i e f of a r t i l l e r y and infnntry can lend t o a serious disturba~iceof the b a t t l e a c t i v i t y .
'Nhen a r e l i e f i s mado t h o r e i s a t r a n s i t o r y l n s s by the troops of fanliliarity with tho t e r r a i n , t h e enemy and t h e loch1 b a t t l e conditions.

a rearward position i s t o be recommended. I n is made nnly under severe aonditionsi It s h a l l be locathd sc b r to the r e a r t h a t it forces t h o onemyto a new b M l l c r y doIts construction depends upon the s i t u a t i o n , the time and t h e plsyment. force available. The f o r c e s nscessary, f o r the b a t t l e mwt n o t be depleted i n m d e r t o construct t h i s position.
c '

The r o t k m e n t to a rearward position can be ordered i f it i s rocog-

nieed t h a t t h e former p o s i t i o n can bc held only with d i s p r o p o r t i ~ n a t c l ygroat s a c r i f i c e and if other mnditions do not forbid t h i s action.

452.

The defense of

t h a t of

0x11.

R positibn, h a s t i l y prepared m d not reinforced, and completed with all means, i s conducted on t h e same princi-ples. . , :
.
,

The dethiled conduct of +.he defender depends upon. kiis his strength m d mearis, the nafhral. and a r t i f i c i a l strength of t h e position and t h e .. time for+ preparation.

453. Tho a r r a r y m n t s for t h o dofens9 must provide for t h e cooperation of a l l anns, which b s s e n t i a l l y a r e s u i t e d t o c e r t a i n t e r r a i n areas and whose effgct i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e l i n i t e d by the terrain.. he c l o s e cooperation of a l l arms with reference t o time' and. space and t h e i r f u l l u t i l i z a t i o n occasionally makes it necessary t o order detliils which a r e otherwise matters l e f t t o lower commanders. . , . 454. The defender must seek t o l e a r n e a r l y t h e attaclc i n t e n t i o n s of t h e e observes the? reconnaissance md information measures of t h e a t t a c k e r ; enemy, H he i n t e r p r e t s h i s r a d i e nst and seeks t o i d e n t i f y t h e extent and d i s t r i b u t i o n of the apprcaching forces. The banditions behind t h e h o s t i l e front; t r a f f i c , a i r p o r t s , f o m a r d landing f i e l d s , etc., must ba ob,served. W e cen.mnke important deduotions f c r the measureswe should take by reconnoitering the t e r r a i n i n which the anelriy may cancefitrat,e or dovolop, esand O.P, p e s a i b i l i t i e s ; i i k e ~ i s e p e c i a l l y as to a r t i l l e r y f i r i n g p o s i t i ~ n s through rreonnaissaribe of t&k a n p l o p n t t e r r a i n - a n d . fivbrable t e r r a i n f o r host i l e infantry attack. ,. ., .. . . By means of a t t a c k (p&suit) .aviat'i'oi, A&, troops;- non-use of radioi and o t + r measures we can. screen . our q n d e f e p e prapcra1;ions.
,

.,

Reconnaissance, info mation, and screening measures s.nd ' t h e evalua. . . . t i a n of all r e , a l l t s must l i e i n one hand. .
,

Report No. 14,507.

-2j:>-

455. Trocps forward of the b a t t l e p o s i t i o n execute delaying action, a s a rule under the immediate conymnd of t h e a r e a commander. Increased speed I n .the f i r e ' l i n e they should and mobility a r e of advantage t o these troops, be made strong i n a r t i l l e r y and heavy infantry weapons.. The cooperution of neighboring u n i t s i s arranged tnrough higher cornand. The delaying a c t i o n i n front of the p o s i t i o n can be more , e a s i l y executed if obstacles and n a t u r a l hinderances can be u t i l i z e d and i'f a r t i l l e r y within the p o s i t i o n can f i r e The coqtander of t h e area arranges upon t h e enemy a s he apprcaches nearer.. for the r e t i r e m e n t of the advanced forces i n t o the p o s i t i o n and t h e i r b a t t l e a c t i v i t y within the seetor. 456. Advanced positialis must the attacker securing early, commanding ground i n advanoe of our outpost; the u t i l i z a t i o n of advanced a r t i l l e r y OPs tmkes it possible t o deceive the a.tta.cl;er a s t o t h e remainder o f - t h e positior, and causes him t o develop his a r t i l l e r y prematurely. In general, advanced positions a r e chosen so f a r forward i n the d i r e c t i o n of t h e enemy so t h a t they can be supported . by . a p a r t of t h e a r t i l l e r x i n the main b a t t l e position. The a r e a commander ( ~ r u p p o n d h r e r )orders i f and where advanced pos.itions s h a l l be taken and under wh$m t h e troops operate. Should these troops be subordinate t o a scotor commander within whose boundnri.es,'they l i e , t h e a r e a coiunander can a s a i m t c the troops of t h e seoter t h e tasks, steength and conduct ef the advanced positions. Advanced positions a r e t o be espeoially provided with heavy machine guns, tank dofenso weapons and l i ~ h batterie's. t The advanced posit i o n s must not be exposed t o p a r t i a l defeat. They a r c t o be withdrawn timely* Their r e t u r n t o t h e main b a t t l e p o s i t i o n i s t o be secured. Their retirement must not, if possible, hinder the a c t i v i t y ?f the outpost troops.

457. Outposts provido time f o r the troops of the main b a t t l e position t o prepare themselves, mpplcment the observation of the main p o s i t i o n i n t o t h e attack. t e r r a i n , and deceive the enemy a s t o t h e l b c a t i o n of the .main position, They a r e d i r e c t e d t o &at extent thsy s h a l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n the engagements. of the advancea p o s i t i o n and how long. t o continue t h i s action. The strength a f t h e outpost, i t s distance from t h e main b a t t l e p o s i t i o n and i t s conduct depend upon the mission and the t e r r a i n , The outpost must not be beyond t h e e f f e c t i v e range of the l i g h t a r t i l l e r y i n the main position. The outposts may be weak so long a s advanced positions a r e forward cP them; likovrise by day i n e a s i l y observed t e r r a i n . Ordinarily the outposts a r e established by the Infantry u n i t s of t h e main position, to whom they belong or are a t t a c k d . As a rule, h e cornxander ( ~ r u ~ ~ e n f k rorders e r ) the approximate s t r e r i ~ t hof the outpost, i t s most udvanced l i n e of resistance. and the. length n a broad f r o n t different conduct i n different secof time i t simll hold. O t o r s may be suitn.ble. The conduct of t h e outposts of adjacent ~ e c t o r s must be harmonized. The retirement of t h e outposts must be so arranged t h a t it dees not hinder the f i r e af t h e main p o s i t i o n ind so t h a t t h e outpost troops a r e not thereby endangered. Prearranged s i g n a l s between t h e outpost and the main batt l e position w i l l f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r cooporation. Snall, prepared attacks with limited objectives and under t h e p r o t e a t i o n cf the autpost can d i s t u r b the h o s t i l e preparations and secure worthwhile information.
4584 The d e f a s e af the m i n b a t t l e i s based upon t h e systematic a l l y prepared f i r e a c t i v i t y of all e m . This i s expressed i n a f i r e plan which i s arranged ss i r d i c a t e d i n par. 400.

Report No. 14,507.

he arrahgemnts for tkese f i r e s , t o incl'dude those a* diStant rmges, t h e i r udity, the cooperation &tween Infantry and A r t i l l e r y , t h e strong f i r e ~oncent~ati'ons:the 'rapid' concenkrtttions on ser idusly threa'iened points a r e tasks 6 f . t h e h k h e r commander ,md o'f the comiander& of s e c t o r s i n which the various ai(ms' m u s t &operate.
If possible, the e n t i r e t e r r a i n i n front bf t h e main b a t t l e posit i o n t o include long r q e s must V e thorou&hly commarded by f i r e . The individual arms must, according t o t h e i r p e c u l i a r i t i e : and based on considorations of t e r r a i n s t r u c t u r e anti cover, supplement eaeh other.

The near&$ the enemy'app~achkstfi& main b a t t l e posit'i'on, t h e more must o w f i r e . b e oonc&ratod a&iiist.him. .
Likevuise, against an enemy who has made a l o c a l penetration i n t h e main position, must the E i r e and cooperation of a l l a m s be directed. . . . ., ., .. . . . , . 459, he a r t i l l e r y engagec t h e approaching enemy from advanced positions, and if wcessafy from positions i n front of t h e main b a t t l e position. Interd i c t i o n and harassing f i r e s tire executed with the a i d of observers pushed well forward ivho omploy wir e l e + 6dmunication. A r t i l l e r y a i r p l h e observers and a portion of the observation b a t t a l i o n a r e t o be employed. Under c e r t a i n canditions e x i s t i n g talephone l i n e s o r . prearranged l i g h t signals can be u t i l ized, It may be s u i t a b l e t o l i m i t . t h e number of b a t t e r i e s &ich execute t h i s a c t i o n i n order not t o give-to the enemy an e a r l y insight into our strength. . .. . - , . . . . , . ~ , ... . . .. .. . . . . . , As 'the.'defom e of. *he ..rplain..ba.%tle.position.i s gradually undertaken, the organization of the a r t i l l e r y therefor .must b e i n depth. This organizat i o n i n ' d e p t h and cooperation with the I n f a n t r y must be prepared e a r l y and timely. - Every e f f o r t - i s t o 6+ &cle t o assuro t h a t t h e majority-oi' the b a t t e r ies, even with the denial o f advanced and main observation, can f i r e upon + & e a t t a c k e r and also can engage with success an enemy who has penetrated the main position. Finally, i t my o f t e n be ;ecessary' f o r b a t t e r i e s t o chanze 'their positions durine the nibht preceding t h e expected a t t a c k against the b a t t l e position i f it i s expected t h a t the 'enemy knovrs t h e i r location.
, ,

I n order t o achieve i t s f u l l e s t offect, the a r t i l l e r y must be employed with great mobility. I.t.s v e r s a t i l e employment roquir6s careful preparations with r e s p e c t - t o OPs, f i r i n g positions, f&ille d a t e , change of posit i o n s and carr~uflagingof a l l movements a @ paths to and from the positions.

460. The mass of the a r t i l l e r y must be able t o lay concentkated fyre both far and near i n f r o n t of the main b a t t l e posi-ki'on. As long as possible the a r t i l l e r y regimental commander controls t h e f i r e . According t o t h i s p r i n c i p l e are the org a n i z ~ t i o n of the a r t i l l e r y and t h e assignment of f i r e missions t o be . . made.

An army corps comarvler hciving assigned' corps a r t i l l e r y l;o divisions, can give instructions f o r the organization of the a i . t i l l e r y i n t h e divisions (attached and assigned) and can assign a r t i l l e r y b a t t l e t a s k s t o thom cutsido t h e i r innnediate sectors. I n general, the corps commander r e t a i n s under h i s c o n t r o l only .. heavy b a t t e r i e.. s for emplqment e s + c i a l l y on d i s t a n t missions. The division coinmender decides upon the a r t i l l e r y d i s t r i b u k o n , with which Infantry u n i t s the a r t i l l e r y elements w i l l uvrk together, which w i l l be d i r e c t l y supported by a r t i l l e r y and &ich w i l l have a r t i l l e r y attached. I n order: t h a t h e may d h y s have a d e c i s i v e element i n h i s 'cwp hand,^ the division c o ~ ~ must e r r e t a i n a p r o P o r t i ~ r ~ a t e l ~ " sat r rt oi l l e r y ' ~ i t under the imnmd i a t e control of t k e divisioxt, .that i s , uncler tho a r t i l l e r y ccmander.
' . A r t i l l e r y u n i t s which d i r e o t l y supnor$ i n f a n t r y G i t k i n t h e defense of the main b a t t l e position rjlus $rovide ;.&m~micatign.witht h e 1hantt-y commanders. The commanders of b B t h ' ~ ~ % must s maintaSn'this comunication. A s f o r the other wnsiderntions, t h e cooperation beteeen A r t i l l e r y and Infantry corresponds t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s enwlciated i n par. 329 ff.
,,

..

Rcport No. 14,507.

461. Whcn the s i t u a t i o n , especially the ammunition s i t u a t i o n , permits, the a r f i l l e r y f i r e s t o t b l i m i t of i t s rmgc,

I t r a k e s more d i f f i c u l t t h e h o s t i l e approach: it f f r e s upon the hos-
t i l e a r t i l l e r y going i n t o position,, it$ OPs and t h e i r i n s t a l l a t i o n s 'and inter-
rupt s t h e h o s t i l e cormnunicution and ammunit i o n supply Thereupon it begins t h e
engagkment of the h o s t i l e b a t t e r l e s an3 m t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y . See paragraph 3 5 8 i The f i r e of the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y must be dram out earljr so t h a t we can locate h i s b a t t e r i e s and engage them, Should t h i s n o t be done, then we must gradually engage t h e s e b a t t e r i e s a s they a r e located;. 'Against a h o s t i l e a r t i l lery superiority or i f we.wish t o surprise t h e enemy,: vre must sometimes r e f r a i n from an e a r l y engagement of the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y , .

...

, posts,

TIE ad.rancel of t h e ho.s-tile i n h t ry into assembly areas, t h e command t h e mmmunications and supply of the enemy a r e t o ba combatted with f i r e s of i n t e r d i c t i o n and s u r p r i s e : ? i r e s i n conjunotion vdth t,hose of thh heavy Inf~ntry weapons. .-Assembly areas a r e t o be taken under f i r e ,

'

Then the h c s t i l e infantry p l a c e s i t s e l f i n assembiy positi.on f o r a t f tack, t h e m s s of: the - & r t i l l e r y should be. employed against t h e s e elements. O spe6iol importarice i s the engagement of t h e h o s t i l e heavy Infnntry weapons, . Attention is. d i r e c t e d t o the approach and assembly of tanks. Only t h e most necessary portion of the a r t i l l e r y i s continued in'oounterbatteryr A t decisive momcnts t h e h o s t i l c OPs a r e t o be blinded by amoke or neutralized byobserved fire.
462, The infantry. opens i t s f i r e a s soon a d a s strongly a s possible. I t s s~ fire a c t i v i t y r e s t s upon.the f i r e plans f a r the heavy and l i g h t ~ ~ e a p o nWhsn v;e a r e weak i n a r t i l l e r y , ' the heavy machine guns and o f t e n the minenv?crfors must .engage thc approcching enemy. a t long distame. For t h i s purpose a h o r t i s n of t h e heavy Infantry weepom a r e looated i n i h e forwerd p a r t of t h e main b a t t l e p o s i t i o n or even i n advanoe thereof. As the enemy, approaohes tLe defense located deeper i n t h e p o s i t i o n also takes part. For t h i s purpose heavy weapons of reserve u n i t s are, i n case o f need, employed. The heavy machine guns must be located i n ooncealedpositions, and must have covered a l t e r n a t e positions from which they ban deliver flanking f i r e . The nearer the att,ackF.P approaches, t h e more the l i g h t i n f a n t r y weaprns engage .in t h e f i r e f i g h t . . . Should the h o s t i l e f i r e 'cause @ips i n td i k f & t r y f i r e defense, t h e local commander must r e c t i f y t h i s condition vd.thout +delay, Rermnnais sance must determine c ,t h e v a ~ i o u spos s i b i l i t i e s f o r tho emlhcse dig i n and prepare t h e i r l o c a l ploymont of- support and reserve u n i t s . defense. These may be permitted, i n strong h o s t i l e f i r e , ta l o c a t e themselves i n areas not so e a s i l y f i ~ c d upon. 463. Should a p o r t i o n ef tha main b a t t l e p o s i t i o n pi? l o s t , vre must f i r s t s t r i v e through f i r e to a n n i h i l a t e t h e enemy who has penetrated. Our infantry e l e r e n t s and supporting weapons uhich a r e i n p r & i m i t y ' of tho penetration endeavor by immediate 1.ooal w u n t s r a t t a o k t o h u r l back, the enemy before he has opport u n i t y t o e s t a b l i s h himself. These e l m n t s can be e f f e c t i v e l y supported by a r t i l l e r y f i r e l a i d i n r e a r cf t h e enemy rho has penetrated the position. However, they must not be dependent upon 4 3 1 0 a r t i l i e r y cooperation. . . , Shoula t h e nbove'measuresfai>, or. should t h e enemy make z'!farge penctratLon,- the higher aommander decides whether a general oounterattaak d l 1
be made.to r e s t o r e the. position or whether the m a i n b a t t l e position i s t o be
taken up. f u r t h e r t o the r e a r , The oounterattaok, wllere possible, i s t o be
launched against t h e h o s t i l e flank. Tho couneerattaqk require$, especial.ly
when undertaken by strong forces, thorough preparation, Assembly positions,
time, objeotive, 'zones, a r t i l l e r y support, onployment of tanks and a i r force
u n i t s must be controlled by o n e oommander. Too great h s t e leads-to f a i l u r e Report No. 14,507.
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Reserves in'ocnded for tho counterattack must be so assembled or during the Course of t h e attack-so s h i f t e d that' they a r e quLclcly available.

484) - A t a l l . t i m e s a l l weapbns must be prepared t o r e s i s t a surprise attack by night, during weathbr of l e w v i s i b i l i t y and i n t e r r a i n of poor v i s i bilityA
No?rdalllyj defensive f i r e s a r e l a i d G e d i a t e l y i n front of "the batt l e pdsition. These must be prepared- and a r e executed upon signal, especial demands, or by .order, T h s e a r e limited a s t o time and space.. The l i g h t a r i t i l l e r y and heavy infantry weaponsplace t h e s e f i r c s on l o c a l i t i e s which t h e l i g h t infantry rieapam c.annot reach. T h e execution of tha' defensive f i r e , t h e weapons engaged t h e r e i n , the duration, the ammunition allatment, t h e reinforcement o r extension thereaf by r'einforced b a t t e r i d s must be p r e ~ r r a n g e d . ~cgulat'iono concerning the a u t h o r i z a t i o n af the defensive f i r e must b- prepared, A batterjr can execute defensive f i r e only on so ari area a s it can expent ta..coVer effectively. The h o s t i l e approach must be i d e n t i f i e d early. The increased reccr+aissance a c t i v i t y , l i s t e n i n g posts, and i l l m i n a t i o n of the t e r r a i n f a c i l " i t a t e t h i s i n f c r m t i n a . Enemy wWch has penetratad the maia b a t t l e p o s i t i o n a r e oxpclled by local counterattack (Gngenstodd), i f necessary, by the bay@net.

..

Every individual must be instructed a s t o his oondunt i n a ' s u r p r i s e attack.

465. Sure order and information transmission imply a deeply organized, c16ssly k n i t comunication net. Such a n e t i s S u i l t up t o the greatest. axtent po.fisible. Lateral . c o m m i c a t i o n i s of g r e a t important e. I f possible, t h e radio remains s i l e n t u n t i l t h e b a t t l e i s j o i n i d .
In addition ta t h e wire & m m i o a t i o n t o the sector commandera~iho arn immediately uuder t h cormnand ~ of .the division .com~?der', the rlivision sigria1 t a t t a l i o n has t h e primary duty of e s t a b l i s h i n g communication between tho a r t i l l e r y commander and h i s u n i t s aria t o make possible cooperation with the a r c t i l l e r y aviator, observation b a t t a l i o n and balloon units, As time p e r p i t s gradually must special n e t s for infantry, a r t i l l e r y , balloon, antiair.ora@ and a i r force units, etc., be established.
,,

The npss of t h e signal mans i s employed i n the main b a t t l e position. Advanced p ~ s i t i o n s(forward of outpcsts) &d outposts must he ccmected; wireless means of copmunication a r e e s p e c i a l l y suitable. Alternate arrangments a r c t o - b e prepared, Signal c o ~ u n i o a t i o nfrom the ;nain b a t t l e pcgition t, the r e a r m u s t be maintained and improved. The wire net, according and f r r c e s available, i s laid by cable. to S i p a l reconnaissance i s important.. O u r o w signal t r a f f i c must be r e s t r i c t e d and screened.

The commander controls t h e assignment of and- changes i n l i g h t sicnals.

. .

466'. Engineers a r e wployed i n the t e r r a i n i n advance of the p q s i t i o n t o create obstacles. end execute hindering mrics. Within tho b a t t l e p o s i t i o n they a r e emplopd to e r e c t obstacles, communications, camouflages, etc. h g i n e e r s may be attached ;to i n f a n t r y u n i t s confrontbd with. heavy defensive tanks. I n g & 8 ~ a l , the commandor places the Z ~ ~ i n e e ri s n' reserve a t t h e beginning of t h e a employ them *ere t h e i r technical assistance beeones most d e f d s e , i n order ' necessary.. .
: 467. T&kr, a r e enployed off&ivdlyr They a r e dacisiw reserve'in the han6s af t h e c o d o r , c ~ p s o i a l . $s~ u i t a b i e for general co:unterat.iaclc (Gegenang r i f f y a r f o r the engagement of h o s t i l e tanks. . '

.Rop~PtNo. 14,5e7.

Ordinarily t h e i r a s ~ a n b l ~ p o s i t i o in s f a r t o the r e d r o&

of e f f e c t i v e h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y range, Direct observation of the b w t t l e f i e l d i s de-
sired. The various emplo~perrtp o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e reconnoitered,
I n general, tanks a r e employed on orders of the highe'r commander, ' v h b controls t h e t i m e and obJectivu.of t h e a t t a c k and the cocperati.on of other arms. 468. A r t i f i c i a l fog (smok*) can serve t o conceal the s h i f t i n g qf reserve@ and displacement of a r t i l l e r y . Agninst.air observation such movements can be concealed only i f they s t a r t from one ntitural cmo-uflage (~mods, v i l l a g e ) and lead t o another, and the gaps between w e s i l f f i o i e n t l y long, covered by smoke. Likewise b a t t e r i e s which must f i r e during a c t i v e *ir reconnaissance
can be qamouflaged i f smoh screens a r e placed not only over the b a t t o r i e s but
a l s o a r e employed where b a t t e r i e s a r e not f i r i n g . (Feint camouflage)
Gas i s mployed according t o Section XVIII ( ~ e c r e t ) . 469. A i r forces may suppart t h e defense6 P u r r n i t uhititn disrupt h o s t i l e a i r reconnaissancer With s u f f i c i e n t strength avhilab'le our a i r u n i t s are a l s o
able t o attaok the approaching h o s t i l e grouDd forces: Abwe a l l ; bombers a r e
t o be launcked against h o s t i l e a i r ports and detrainmelit$,

8 . .

The main a c t i v i t y of the pursuit ( a t t a c k ) and bombardment a v i a t i o n

takes place i n the t i m immediately preceding t h e a t t a c k on the main b a t t l e

position, A t t h i s time, if possible, strong pursuit Tomnations a r e t o be em-

ployed i n order t o beat dovm h o s t i l e f l y e r s . For t h i s purpose s e c t o r s not
attacked must be denuded of a i r fqrce planes, Like~visd, during t h i s time, as-
sembly positions, reserves, f i r i n g b a t t e r i e s and captive balloons ean ba a t -
tacked.
470. During the approach of the enemy aur a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y must
above a l l prevent h o s t i l e air reconnaissance. For t h i s D U r D O S R same i s
pushed w e l i forward, i f necessary, i n f r o n t of the main position.
With the beginning of t h e h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y deployment the a n t i -
a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y i s to be employed t o g r o t e c t our a r t i l l e r y and m u n i t i o n
dm-%.
Imediat~ly before a d during the attack, besides the p r o t e c t i o n
of t h e a r t i l l e r y , i s the p r o t e c t i o n of reserves important. I f it i s lcnom
where the e n b y d i r e c t s h i s decisive a t t a c k , it i s i n t h i s l o c a l i t y t h a t our
a n t i a i r c r a f t proteotion is concentrated. A t areas *ere attacks i n depth a r e
expected individual a n t i a i r o r a n b a t t e r i e s or AA machine gun companie's a r e
pushed forward.
471. I f t h e defense i s t o be renewed i n a rearward positian, the break-
ing off of the engagement, the r e t i r e m n t and the resumption of thc defense
must be prepared be forehand, T h e nnintenance of the coherence of t h e r e t i r i n g
troops i s e s p e c i a l l y importmt.
The commander must make his decisions and t h e prepare.tions be so
handled t h a t t h e enemy.cmnot l e a r n t h e intention. A l l measures must be able
t o be carri.ed through tvithout p r e c i p i t a t i o n , The retirement must be seoured
and i n cozljunction vrith neighboring sectors,. I f weather ef low v i s i > i l i t y ,
a r t i f i c i a l smoke or favorable t e r r a i n cannot b e employed, tnen night should
be chosen f o r 'the > d i r m e n t ,
..
'

The enemy' gust b e deceived into believing; sr) long as. possible, that; our occupation of the o r i g i n a l position continues.. For t h i s purpose i s t h e niaintenanck of the f i r e ackivity of a l l ' arms i n - the o r i c i n a l position most suitable. 'fhe fo llrwing. enemy must be delayed t o t h e maxim& which i s
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most s a t i s f a c t o r i I y accomplished by early. a g t i l l e r y f i r e readiness i n t h e new position. Should the new p o s i t i o n l i e f a r t o the r e a r , a r t i l l e r y i n intermed i a t e p o s i t i o n s i s most advantageous. Gassing a r e a s i n and behind t h e former p o s i t i o n s a r e mos'l; e f f n c t i v e delaying measures. Should t h e h o s t i l e a t t a c k break d m , with adequate forces t h e do-
472, In an a t t a c k o u t of our p o s i t i o n we must
fender should p a s s t o the offensive. %reckont h a t %ha enemy i s deeply organized and t h a t he has a r t i l l e r y s u p e r i o r i t y , Should no p o s s i b i l i t y a r i s e t o beat dom the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y or t o break throu$ the enemy, -the a t t a c k '3ut o f t h e position w i l l lead t o a severe f r o n t a l n enveloping a t t a c k . o f f e r s the g r e a t e s t s t r u g g l e with. u q e r t a i ~ results. A prospects of success. Under som oonditions the i n s t i t u t i o n s of an e n t i r e l y nemf cperation must be cansidered.. I f tho defender intends D o pass t o delaying a c t i o n he must rBckrn
473. with a f u l l y developed enemy. Therefore t h e f i r s t rearward l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e
must be s e t well t o t h e rear.
Should t h e b a t t l e end i n d e c i s i v e l y or should a l u l l come i n t h e 474. general operations, the s i t u a t i o n can a r i s e i n which t h e opponents stand oppos i t e i n s l i g h t combat and the oonditions approach those of p o s i t i o n warfare. Then it must be decided whether t h e former p o s i t i o n w i l l be held o r a new posit t i o n f u r t h e r t o the r e a r w j l l bc chosen. In the l a t t e r case, t h e farmer posit i o n can be u t i l i z e d a s an advnnced p o s i t i a n or a s the outpost p o s i t i o n of t h e new M.L.R. I f the p o s i t i o n i s held, it i s f u r t h e r strengthened, weak a r e a s a r e reinforced or given up. So f a r a s possible outposts %re pushed forward. I n order t o conserve t h e f o r c e a rearrangement of t h e b a t t l e troops, Obstacles a r e reinforced, dugouts for men and ammunition a r e construoted. The gas defense i s increased. Through p o s i t i o n s prepared a r t h e r t o the r e a r a strong support can be rendered t h e f u r t h e r defense.

thc reserves, and t h o s e i n support i s made,

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e measures, provisions f o r the c a r e of t h e troops a r e made i n and behind t h e p o s i t i o n provisions for water, t h o wounded and t h e sick. Delaying Action,
475, Delaying action.may be forced by t h e h o s t i l e s u p e r i o r i t y or it may be executed v o l u n t a r i l y by our forces, 111 t h e . l a t t e r instanea it f u l f i l l s its mission only if ~ u p c r i o rh o s t i l e forcos follow. It can often be advantageously employed a s an introduction t o an engagement o r a s a s s i s t a n c e during an engagement.
_..i
'

--

. ' .

,&laying action i s executed f r o m a Line o$ r e s i s t a n c e and aceordiag . . , 476. t o condit,ions .continued from other rearward l i n e s of resistance. The a c t i o n
may o f f e r strong r e s i s t a n c e o r m y be conduceed without c l o s e engagement.
The defense i n the l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e must force t h e enemy e a r l y and with considerable forces, t o time consuming and cost1y b a t t l e preparations, . ., , The defense between the l i n e of r e a i s t a n s e must delay the enemy and
w$q , .ti&& , f.s r , u s t p prepare our next l i n e of resistance.

477. A l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e i s favorably located i f ebservation and f i r e e f f e o t , are. effeotLve therefrom f a r i n t o t h e t e r r a i n o f approach, i f it l i e s on a . , s t r s n g * i s i t i o n , p r ' i f d e f i l e s l i e before it, from .whichthe enehy must do.vei@p. Should t h e l i n e .of. r e s i s t a m e l i e in woods, t h e observation and f i r e effect:,conditions a r e equally unfavorable f o r defender and attacker. . O n the other h&d,"the defender can b e t t e r u t i l i z e the t e r r a i n f o r resistance, wfiile t h e a t t a c k e r i s l i m i t e d i n movement and cannet f u l l y e x p l o i t h i s superiority.

Report No. 1 4 , s 7.

Cover t e r r a i n w i t h i n and behind t h e l i n e of r e s i s t a ~ ef a c i l i t a t e s the breaking o f f of' combat and t h e withdrawal. Obstacles of a l l kinds can materially a s s i s t t h e delaying a c t i o n Field forfrom thi: l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e and that between l i n e s of r e s i s t a n c e . y works a r e o f .calue. t i f i c a t i o n s a r e an exception. h The unit commander (Truppenf'uhrer) orders t h e general l o c a t i o n of 478. ' t h e l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e . The dis1;ance between l i n e s of r e s i s t a n c e i s determined by t h e t e r r a i n , observation p o s s i b i l i t i . e s , o u r i?tentions and t h e conduct of t h e e n w r In t e r r a i n with mod observation t h e distance must. be so g r e a t t h a t t h e hosI n avods t h e distance may til'e a r t i l l e r y i s forced to. a change of p o s i t i o n . be short. 479. .Ordinarily t h e l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e marks t h e p o s i t i o n af t h e a r t i l l e r y and heavy infantry weapons observation. The weapons a r e located close behind t h e l i n e ef resistance.
It

'

W h e n the t e r r a i n i n front of the l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e i s open, t h e employment of the t r o o p s i n the L . of R. i s normally limited t o t h e protecShould t h e l i n e of r a s i s t a n c e l i e t i o n of tho OPs and the f i r i n g positions. behind stream liqqs, e t c . ( a s t r o n g or behind d e f i l e s , t h i s advant a g e i s exploited through the bocupatior. by s t r o n g e r forcos and longer defense. As a r u l e occup'atipn by strong f o r c e s i s required i n t e r r a i n , not r e a d i l y observed. I n woods, inf<ant;ry normally bear t h e brunt of dnfense.
480. The length and strength of .tke defense i n each l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e and i n the intervening t p r r a i n v a r i e s according to conditions, The commander e x e r t s h i s influence through t h e organization and d i s t r i b u t i o n of h i s f o r c e s and the allotment of a m u n i t i o n . 481. The defense i n a l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e must be so seasonably stopped t h a t well regulated retirement t o the next l i n e of resistance q d the resumpt i o n of t h e defense thereon can be accomplished. Terrain which i s open and i n t o which the enemy can r e a d i l y observe demands, a s a m l e , e a r l y evacuation. 482. Acoerding t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s , the commander orders*t h e time of withdrawal t o t h e next l i n e of resistance. In t e r r a i n w e r which pbservation i s d i f f i c u l t and on wide f r o n t s he can leave the decision a s time of withdrawa l t o l a v e r commanders or r e s t r i c t himsel: t o designating a general l i n e , whose c r o s s i n g by the enemy i n strength d i c t a t e s t h e time of withdrawal. 483. A u n i t f i g h t i n g delaying a c t i o n s should, upon withdrawing from one l i n e af resistance t o another, have t r o o p s already on the r e a r l i n e . Can t h e withdrawing troops n o t be supported from t h i s second l i n e , then i n general must they break off e a r l y the engagement, r e t i r e without having t o f i g h t and, moreover, s e l e c t t h e next l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e w e l l t o t h e rear. We& f o r c e s must be employed which f m i l i t a t e the breakin& away of those f o r c e s engaged with the enemy and which prevent t h e enemy from immed i a t e l y following. 484. The longer the delaying a c t i o n i s continued, the more necessary a r e rearward troops t o receive.thn r e t i r i n g forces. It must be considered t h ~ t t h e rearward troops a r e taken from the forward command.. The width of s e c t o r s depends upon t h e number of t r o o p s requircd i n the rearward position. N o general r u l e oan be s t a t e d a s $0 the, breadth of *on+,. A s e. guide it may be said t h a t i n t e r r a i n favorable f o r delaying. aciufon ,the s e c t s r s c a n be about double t h e 'breadth of t h o s e i n defense (12 t o 20 k m . . ) . Report I T 'o . 14,507,

485.

The terre.in i s divided into sectors.

The boundaries serve for t h e l i n e s of resistanoe, and intermediate positions, f o r reconnai ssanoe, security, defense and retirement. Ordinarily u n i t s of combined arms a r e employed i n the sector. These u n i t s a r e given b a t t l e missions which they coordinate with adjacent sectors. The strength and composition of the u n i t s a r e determined by the mission, width of s e c t o r and t e r r a i n . The forces within each sector form groups of resistance. They supp o r t each other by flanking f,ire. In darkness, weather of l o w v i s i b i l i t y and i n t e r r a i n not readiljl obsurved those groups must have close contact. By ret a i n i n g some a r t i l l e r y under h i s i m e d i a t e control the commander preserves for himself t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of supporting the individual u n i t s an& of r e l i e v i n g them df d i s t a n t i n t e r d i c t i o n and harassing f i r e . Execution. 486. For reconnaissance, information and.counterreconnaissanke, see 454.

487. When the distance of t h e enany, and t h e strength, r a p i d i t y o r mobili t y of our own troops and the t e r r a i n a l l permit, the movement of t h e enemy f a r i n f r o n t of our l i n e of resistance i s t o be harassed and delayed. 488. In advanoe of the l i n e of resistant e outposts with heavy i n f a n t r y weapons and individual pieces of a r t i l l e r y nrtlce t k h o s t i l e approach d i f f i o u l t I n covered t e r r a i n l i g h t machine guns and riflemen delay t h e h o s t i l e approach and deceive t h e enemy a s .to the kind o f defense and the l o c a t i o n of the l i n e of resistance. Gradually a l l elements forward of t h e l i n e of resistance r e t i r e therein. They r e i n f o r c e . t h i s l i n e o r a r e employed on the next l i n e l a t e r t o support the withdrawal

489. The defense from the l i n e of resistance i s begun by timely a r t i l l e r y harassing f i r e against the host'ile approach and by support of t h e forward elements. Advanced a r t i l l e r y observers and f l i e r s a r e employed. The commander may delegate t o t h e a r t i l l e r y commander t h e execution and regulating of i n t e r d i c t i o n and b r a s s i n e , missions. Gradually our a r t i l l e r y engages the h o s t i l e a t t a c k preparations i n f r o n t .of us. From the f i r s t our a r t i l l e r y f i r e must be directed mostly against the hos t i l e infantry. The oooperation between a r t i l l e r y and heavy infantry weapons, tile d i s t r i b u t i o n of tasks must be governed by orders or by mutual agreement, I f the munit ions s i t u a t i o n and o t h e r ciroumstanc e s p ermit, every a t t e q t mustbe macle t o 'deceive the enemy through the l i v e l y f i r e a c t i . v i t g o f t h e a r t i l l e r y widely d i s t r i b u t e d and from various positions.
490. The Infantry executes p r i m r i l y t h e defense fram the l i n e of r e s i s t ance by i t s heavy weapons. 'In general, t h e s e f i r e from covered pesitions. In open positions they-should be advanoed only so f a r a s t o pennit r e a d i l y t h e i r l a t e r withdrawal. W h t i good cover in or in f r o n t of the l i n e of resistance, l i g h t machine guns and riflemen a r e employed.

491. T h e breaking o f f of tb engagement i s most e a s i l y accomplished i ? t h e l i n e M resistance can be held without serious engagement u n t i l dark. J.3 t h i s case t h e troops r e t i r i n g usvally withdraw a t once t o the next l i n e , under protection of r e a r elements,

Should t h e s i t u a t i o n demand t h e m8intenance of the l i n e of r e s i s t ance htil dark and close combat ensues therefmm, the troops must pass t o t h e defense, The deterlr.ination of the p o s i t i o n needs c a r e f i l oonsideration. If a l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e i s evacuated by day t h e heavy i n f a n t r y wea492.' pons and the a r t i l l e r y must be doployed i n depth therefor, The communication betwoen t h e s e weapons and the most advanced i n f a n t r y must be maintained.
If t h e enemy i s to be held up by an i n t e m d i a t o p o s i t i o n (between l i n e s of r e s i s t a n c e ), the troops assigned t o cover t h e withdrawal of t r m p s from t h e forward l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e execute t h i s mission; I n a deep intcrmed i a t e p o s i t i o n it may be necessary i n t u r n t o have t h e troops t h e r e i n supported and t h e i r withdrawal covered before they reach tho next l i n e of resistance. Such a c t i o n may danand l e a p frdgging of t h e trnops i n t h e intefmediate p o s i t i o p i

493. The unified conduct a d handling of a l l elements i s .furthered by t h e e a r l y determination and rekonnaissance of t h e next l i n e of resistanoe.

I n individual instances it may be s u i t a b l e t o designate a l i n e t o which i n extremity withdrawal may be made i n one day.
494. The length of t h e defense i n a l i n e of resistance depends e s s e n t i a l l y upon, i f and when the enemy recognizes t h a t we a r e execoting delaying acIf t h e eneniy prepares f o r an attempt a t penetration, it i s e s s e n t i a l t o tion. withdraw from t h e threatened area i n ample time. B y no means does the withdrawal i n one area along an Lxtended l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e demand the general withdrawal even of neighboring elements i f t h e s i t u a t i o n does not so danand. From t h n t p o r t i o n of t h e f r o n t s t i l l i n posit i o n ' a n enemy advanciag r a s h l y o m be placed i n a serious p o s i t i o n by flanking ' firs, whose e f f e o t i n c e r t a i n conditions can be increased by advatming our For adequate p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r flanks i n such s i t u a t i o n , troops refrcnt. maining i n p o s i t i o n a r e responsible. The o r d e r s for tho occupation af t h e next l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e must 495. w t be reconnoitered by a l l troops and prebe given e a r l y enough. This l i n e m parations made for i t s occupation, 496. A s the withdrawing troops approach the new l i n e of resistance, s o r ~ of t h e a r t i l l s r y a d hgavy i n f w t r y weapons must b e i n p o s i t i o n t h e r e , R i f l e companies a r n employe& t o the f u l l effectiveness of t h e i r defense c a p a b i l i t i e s a s s e c u r i t y elements in the l i n e of r e s i s t w o e .

497. Leadership and b a t t l e a c t i v i t y of the troops d e m d r e l i a b l e communications between t h e commanders of a l l grades.

The commander, s e c t o r commanders, and t h e l a t t e r through l a t e r a l communication, when feasible, must have wire communication. The a r t i l l e r y oommander must have inmediatr: and d i r e c t communication t o the a r t i l l e r y d i r e c t l y under h i s control.

Frequently ccmmunioation t o individual areas must be l i m i t s 1 1 t o r a d i o I n such s i t u a t i o n s , motor vehicles, horses and prearranged signal; must augment t h e radio. Commanders belorg a s f a r forward as, on one side, t h e proper leadership of t h e troops and communications with neighboring u n i t s demand, on t1.a o t h e r side, t o the extent h i s own communications n e t to advanced elements ,c-rmits, Often a n l y with extreme a o t i v i t y c m t h e commanders meet t h e s e dem?, ?,:,
The higher oommmder gives i n s t r u c t i o n s for t h e r e m v a l or i n t ~ : - rot i o n of permanent comunioation means. A 1 1 commanders a r e oharged with t h e timely removal o r d e s t r u c t i a n of a l l communication means i n t h e l i n e of resistmca.

Report N o .

14,507.

Engineers a r e employed e a r l y to e r e c t important obstacles before 498. t h e l i n e o f resistance' and i n the a r e a betmeen l i n e s of resistance* Antitank units must prevent a h o s t i l e amored unit penetration 499. along t h e s t r e e t s o f approach of t h e enemy and i n open t e r r a i n ; 500. A n t i a i r c r a f t troops make d i f f i c u l t the h o s t i l e a i r reconnaissance. I n r e a r areas they a r e employed against a i r attacks. fEntiaircr~ft b a t t e r i e s may be q l o y e d exoepti onally t o deceive t h e eneinyc 501. Sometimes we msy employ irncred vehicles i n short t h r u s t s t o f a c i l i sel'dom a r e tanks available i n delaying action. t a t e t h e \vithdra%ml. H&ver,

y on open. t e r r a i n , but our em502. Smoke may be employed advantapousl ' pl-oyment also may be of' value t o the. enemy.
Gas, e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r r a i n poisoning, cw. delay the h o s t i l e followU P*
T h e advance guard r e l a t i o n is t o be annulled a s soo,ri a s the advance acconplished i t s task.

Report No. 14,507. -86-

M Brualcing o f f a n o u ~ a g e m e n t -

Rotironc~it

- Rotrsat.

503, A b a i ; t l ~i1my 30 brolron off ( 1 ) whon. it has sorvcd i t s pur.posc4 of t h o t r o o p s ( o r o r ( 2 ) when conditi.onc dcinand t h c crz.plo~mo?~t oa finothor f r o n t o r lvilon it sex&? more a d v n r ~ t n p o u s-to employ thr:m e l s c where, o r (3) whcn a continu?.tion of t h o b n d t l c e i v c s no- prom!.sc of su'ecess: o r (I.!) when t h e ongagcn~cintmust bo brokon off i c ordi:r t o :rvoid dcfi:n.t. Tho brcdri;lg off of a bat1;le may bo volun'mry o r forcod; e i t h e r t h o dooinion of t h o immcdia-Lc o r h i g h e r conun:~ndor. It i s o f t c n s u i t nblo t o F-.form -tilo trcreps o f t h e .r.c a s n n f o r t h o vol~mn+arydcoi:;iou t o "brcak off" t h c co~nbat.
011

504. Intention and s i - b u a t i o n , c s p c c i n l l y .tho oonduct of t h e cnomy and t h o c o n d i t i s n . o i ' o u r own t r o o p s a s w c l l a s t h o t o r r a i n a r o dot.om:!ning fsc?;ors a s t o t h o t i m i ; and t h o c x c c u t i o n of t h e "br :nking- offt'. 505. Troops vririch brcnk away from an c n g a ~ o m c n talmost always r o q u i r c a rcanvnrd p o s i t i o n o e t a 3 l i s h c d f o r t l i c i r r c c c p t i o n , c s , i c c l a l l y if t h o cn&?gc!ncnt has bcon onc; of hc,avy f i g l ~ t i n g . Thcrc *hero t h o onuiny most t c u a c i o u s l y p r c s s c s ; must o f t e n t h c pos-iti.on bc hold l o n g e s t and f o r thc:jc t r o o p s i s t h o "rcceDtiha:. p o s i t i o n " t o t h o r o n r of t h o g r e p L t c s t importaacc.

506. The brcnlcing of;' proccsfi i s r&mdot h o o?.sicr, tho morc i.t i s ca.nouflagod and scrconcd, t h o morc: d i f f i c 1 : l t t h c c l c s o r c o n t a c t a i ~ dt h o moro scvcro fighti.:ig w i t h t h o cnc~ny.

507. It

i s c:nsi.ost a f t o r a succcss.

508. Should it bc nocusznry t o brsa:: off c a n 6 a t which has a s y o t l c a d t o no doci.sion, LI d n y l i g h t w i t h d r a ~ v r li s of-tcn accnmoani~d. by so-n:rc In, rresrk$:- c v c r g inst::rLcc 13:1r,t, ;rro xvr3t.t drrkncss t o ini.t..\ at,:. t h o lossos , n ~ s s r; ious withdr:;i;i-1, -~rhich of ooursc i s n q u c s t i o n of d o f c i i d i n . i sit~~ri;io u: n~ t i l dzrk. Should t h i s bo impossi.blc, ivi: must oxocutc d c l z y i n g So!ncti?rcs smoko c c t i o n , a ~ v c i t i n gt h e d - r k n c s s f o r t h c actu-1 "brcck off". can bo uscd f o r t h o snrnc c f f c c t o ; dzrlcncso.

509. It i s t h c most d i f f i c u l t t o "hrcnk of:' ~?hc:iour 'oxn frocdom of

n a t t c r f?rach indioidnal c o t i o n has bocn l o s t . I n s u c h s i t n r t i o n s it i s : c o m n n d c r t o cncourcgo t h c -troop8 by vcirconal cx?.mylo, by.coolncss, and b y c c r t - i n k y of ?.o-tion m d . ordor, :ind v ~ i t fill ? ~ nic-..ns : ~ v ~ ~ j . l : . ~ tb ol ~ mnj.nt::in o t h c > ~ o r c l oof t h c t r o o p s .

II

If tht, comc.ndcr s t i l l has, r c s e r v c s , i.n gcricrel it i s bcttr:r t o use t h o s o end t h o a r i ; i l l i . r y e t j . l l c?pc.blo of being displaced t o t h o r c n r dcEcasc f u r t h s s rcr.r:-rlrd then t o v c ~ t u r i : them i n t o a n t o cst::bl.ish a no~~r ong'?gcorncnt vihicll o.?fcrs nu pl-ospcct.
P u r s u i t rind co~b?.rdmr>nta ~ z t . i o i i ,t:inks ~ rnntori.:illji a s s i s t th: c:ithdr:~.ml i n silch si-but-.!;i.ons.
~

cl~cm'lcal 1 ~ 1 t r o o p s c:in

510. "'Arcnk3.t?g o f f " from t h o cno!?y can bc noocs:?ry cngngamcnt

i n coory kind o f

5vh::n

-if[.

bCt:rc!c

Fassi:ig -1-0 t h o dofcnsc i.s t l l c f i r s t s t o p i n h r c a k i n g off coli'c::.ct h;..vc bccn :sttr,.cking, ui~ii:ss t k oncmy i?zs bccn d c f o ~ t , o do r our h2.c oxhnustod i . t s o l f ,

8"13"36-hck

In

:r

picmuit if,i.s su<i'ioicnt t o susporld p a r n u i t .

Coac-rning "brdnkfng of:C" an cn~,?.gcmczti n o r + r t o c s t ? . b l i s h :lo t o oxocut,; d::ll:y:~rr: 3.o.t;i 511 tilo dufcasc in L r;;:!.r.r-rrd posit:.oi~ as -JJ.:!~.I so,? pars. 1 1 7 1 491. Concorning "br;:.;.ki!:g par. okf" coriilxt
:ii t11

nit unbrokon cncinoy, so c

513.

511. T'nc d o c i s i o n t o rztrc>::t i:i:x;,r o i ~ l ybe idado -r~hcn. n l l p6ssj.bili.tics of v i c t o r y a r o cx1-1:-.ustcd rind t!lo con%innc.ti..on of tho b a t t l o > , s i l l lu:.ri! c i t h c r t o dcfo:it o r .to l o s s c s 7,rhich z r c c r l t i r c l y o u t of p r o p o r t i o ? ; t o t h o purpose

battle.

Thcrcforo only c x t r o ~ n on c c o c s s i t y c3r1 j u s t i f y a r(;tl.<:~.'i, from : : It i s n o t s c l d m -thr.t a b c t t l c i s l o s t bocausc.tho coimaridor con, n o t sn'fic:lcu~t t o sidc:rccl it l o s t . Loccl f c i l u r u s o r dofo:~ts iz1on~::rc J u s t i f y n dcdi.sion t o rctrc:..%, I n d o u b t f u l sitv.xtions prssovcrc?ioc i s i d . N o lowcr cominr:d~r, c o x t r z r g t o !?is m i e s i n n , i s r.i:liiorizcd t o ::rcil. o r d e r a rctrc::t baocus~.-of u n i ' ~ v o r : b l c c o i i d i t i s n s r o p o r t c d i n ? ~ . c t h , . . r Evoil r i l ~ c r ct h o . s i t u n t i o ~ i s sovcro, -the ordor frail h i g h s r i l c ~ d q u a r t o r s nus st be z:~x.itod.

512. In a r c t r c . : t t h e f i - r s t r2:,tin considor::ti.en i s t o p1c.c~ d i s t ~ n c c bctwcdn t h o c n c r ~ yr.nd oursclvca. lriitho7ut u r g o ; ~ tr c n s c n s , n o u n i t a1z.y ng?in "f:icc thc- f r o c t " bucnuso t h o s h a k i x off o f t h o cneniy i s t h e r e b y r.adc morc 1ncrc:t::od ~ n a r c hr ~ . t c sitlust b~ dcnundod of.-Lhosc. troc:,s irhi.ch difficult. havo sh::kc~~ off' thc. onciny. Tho forrari';ic!n of m;ny m:;.rch, colilmns f s c i . l i t r . t o s t h o rctro3.t. Ivit.rci, discipline, above ?.I1 iil t h o t r j i n s of tiit: t r o o p s 2nd ihi: r-::,r s o r v i c o . :c?wlons, :m~s.i;. bu ixi in-t.incd :;t c tli.i;h. l o w l .

..

513. Tho pro.cr:ss of "bro?.Eing offi' the ong::goincnt :;nd t i l o - o r d o r l y cxo c u t i o n -of t h o rctru9.t rcquiras; 1-toll c o ; l s i d o r c d prop,c.ri.tions, p r o p e r o r d ~ r s and purposeful 1,codornhip.
Tho com?r,ndor ordurs wilich t r o o p s , 2ud vr'nr:rc t k o e c s h d . 1 covcr t h o r c t r i ::t of thc: nxkss.
It i s of gr:.a.t .c.dv:~n'~ngcii' f q r * h i s covoring o r ro::r guc.rd f o r c c a r t i l l c r y i n d w.chLu.c g u ~ ~ s p, r o t ~ : c t c d by n o b i l c i;roo~;s, a n . :~rlcquc.to, .thus p c n . ~ i i ; t i n gt h o Infi:!-Itry u n i i ~ t o r r u p t o dr i : t r a a t .

514.

P o s i t i ~ x z str:kcn by t h o rc2.r gh?.rd should covcr ti-ic roo.!;c; of rctrc::t, fcrckng tlic' frsl?.tr.l u!?cm>i t o tiz.o consuining ,novc:a~:nts ir: goii3.g arouad .tho p o s i t i o u s . It m y b c fa-ivoi-riblc, 1 , 1 1 1 d l d o r so~1.ccnndj.ti::r~.s, t o t a k e of !;i!.c line o-i" r c t r c ? . t . p o c i t i o n s on tl11: fl:~uk Tho dcngor of ho;:l;j.lc c : ~ c i r o l i n gL~O.,W~XCII%,S must 11c mot. To ncot this i;.hrc2h9 n:.pid n o b i i e t r o o p s c ~ r e bost' omploycd. Thc.so sliould be oquippcd w i t h t:;.i* dofcnsc t~:c::i?cns. Should it hc Chc i n t c n t i o i : .to dcfnnd in : ; u~vqp o s i t i o n , tPSs ponitioir shoui~i. b? c l ~ c s u n;.:s f n r i;o tEic rutlr a s p o s s i b l e and ur~dci* rrll c o n d i t i o n s sr, ,fc.r t o t h c r c a r ns t o f ~ r c c t h c oncmy t o ni?';r' pruprrai;ions f o r t h o att-clc. i'hc cox3u':.nd.or dctcrr.inos i t s locn.t5:o!-1, tflc d i . s t r i b u t i o n o f t r o o p s ?ad t h o i r n c c t o r s t h < : r c i n bascd on t h o : ~ a p . HI? o r d c r s thc. inncdi?.kc rcc:)i?.u~:~~.scr.ncc of t h c ;>u:;itio~~. c.nd t h o r o u t b s lo;!.ding thcrwto. A l l

anns send rccon?;::is s:iiicc groups. Tho rn!?loyr~otrtof t h o o b s e r v a t i o n l?:.tttal, i o n i n t h c 1101-i p o s i t i o n ;>us-tbo tiraoly,

515. Hagc.;:o rti?d ncrvico t r : . i l s -re s c t :.n a l r c h , i f noccsszry un8or e s c o r t , t o . their now 1ocr.tior~s i n o r d a r t o c s t z . b l i s h t h o supply cchcloizr
I n o r d c r t o a&.nlnistor t o t h o v$oun&cd d u r i n g t h o r o t r o a t a port i o n of t h o i?cd?-cal u : n i . t r m s t be !ccpt fon-jard.

-516, Troops vthi.ch can bc s9nrod a r c nmvcd o f f w i t h o u t delay. T~hc a s s i g n i n g of bour~d+ricr:f o r -the rct7:ost w i l l fac i1it:;tc t h e mo7c;ncii.t Individu-1 u n i t s 7w.y be assignc+. s p e c i f i c r o u t c s .

Thr; l ? c n t i o ? l of t h o now lnnding f i e l d n u s t ba ordr>rcd'c~.~.rly.

517. T r ~ . f f i cn u s t b e r c z u l n t o d . It i s c d v i s . ~ b l c t o n s s i g ~o::ficors ~ w i t h tno inoccss-ry ;Ion and m z n s f o r 'the r c g u l n t i o n of tr::l?ic i n l:ovms, t:t d c f i l o s nnd : ~b tr i d g e s . Troops should bo c".bli: e a s i l y t o icictltii'j t h e s o o f f i c c r . s and 1-~lcn. . . 518. Orders n u s t be i s s u e d co:lpcrning t h c mai.ntcn:~.i~ccof o r l i r . ~ i t a t ? . o n of rndi'o t r p . f f i c i n o r d c r t o :;~nl:c morl: d i f f i c u l t t h o c n c q lj.stcni:ig i n s c r v i c o . Light s i g u n l i i n g i s o r g r c a t i:~portui~cc.,
Colx:iunicxki.o:~s l i n e s n o t : ~ b s n l u t c l ynoccssnr~yciro talccr, up. If tiinc docs not cxis-l; t o etiivxgo thor.1, t h o l i n o s o s s c n t i . a l f o r t h o ordors ! : . ; i d oxocution of t h e r o t r o a t a r c dcstroyod n f t c r t l r c i r pnrponc i s served. S i g n a l u n i t s should bc 'sent back c c r l y i n ordor t o coristruct t h c s i g ! u l s y s t c : ~i n t h o ncvr p o s i t i o n .

519. 0bst;c.cll;s ::re of g r c t v*:luo i.n a s s i s t i n g t;io r c t r ! ; z t , uspocj.ally ag3i.cS.t Onoircli:1g ! . ~ o v ~ ! i l ~ n Tho t s ~ loc:~t i o n and kj.nd of obst?.clc:s should be y;mdc i:no~;n t o our o;un t r o o p s . ' Tho r o t i r i r g t r o o p s shou.1~2not bc cud o ~ ~ g c r cby d our t c r r c i n p o i ~ e i l i n g .
Engineers n.ro s c u t haclc i,,.rly i r ordor t o i:lprovo r o a d s , b u i l d o r r e p a i r bri'dgos, and loc-tl? ohsi,lcl!:s o r d c s t r o y b r i d g o s riot t o 130 uscd by our troops.
,

'

520. S t r o n g 1i.h. ~?ro.tcci;5.on inust ho o s t n b l i s h o d o x r l y t o p r o t c c t t1zrc::toncd poi:!t:;, c s p c c i n l l y bri.dgcs and dof i l c s

521. Tl?c srnpply of inuiitionc, 6s.s : . i d o i l , nrld r z t i o n s ::rid for:i;;c i m s t urld b e ?.s~:-ucd. It i s of-ton :tdsis:\'>l.o t q c s t z b l i s h duxlps of m a u n i t j . o ~ i r a t i b n s along tiic r e i i t c s of r o t r o n t . 5'22. Tho .ooi:~~?ixridor ordors t h o scqucnoc nnd tir~loof t h o c~ovcr~lcnt tiway t~ bo cmploycd, inc1udin.g . t h e i r stroi~gtii :rnd co,iduct.

f r o i n t h o er.oi?y, t h o s c c i ~ r i t y f'orccs

5F5. ITsiizg r:ll r o u t e s av:ril?.blc which i r e pcr?cnciicular t o t h e f r o n t arid a l s o c n s i l y t r a r o r s c d t e r r a i n . , %,hi: i ? . f n n t r y r.i:tirt?o on r. b r b t ~ df r c r i t and i n .tho forn?.'tiior~ it hod p r i o r t o t h o ,rc.trcn,t.
k p o r t i o n of khc ar.kil.l.iry i-~sint::.ir.8 us lent; iou prjssiblc. i t s forinor f i r e ; ~ c t i v i t y i n ordor t o deccj.vc t h o onemy and a s s i s t t h o infc!ztry i n "brcckifig .avt:::rU. Thcsi o l o n ~ ; n t s lii't i n .posit.ion raust cxcrt; t h e i r utr?ost zntl -nust iiot be afrr,.irl of l o s iilg s,e~?eguns Thc. '1t.s~ of t:hc h.cavy b a t t c i r i o s a r c s c u t back f i r s t , t h e l i g h t battc!rios l n a t . A p o r t i o n of t h o >rt.lll~:~ry i s t o i!c s o i ~ t bnc!? t o t h o new pos%t:io:; o r to t h o c o v ~ r i u gp o s i t ion,

Thc ccr.r?:;rdnr. :i:id t h o n r t i l + r y coi:m:..i~dcr hnston bzclc t o t h o r:rc. of t h o r i c ~ pns i t i c n , one0 .tlic-j k;vo convii?ccd' t 1 ~ ~ ~ s c thlLt, l - ~.th.cir ~ ~ s crclsr:: f o r t h o r c t r c n t :.rc' b c i n g oxccutod aria t h o i r prcscncc ~~~~~~~rd no Thcsc lo:?gor j.s n r i ~ s s i n g . OthcrnEsc t h c y scr.d 2 rcprcsov.tr:tiv!: b:\clc. co!ydctc t h o ~ c c o c ~ ~ o . ~ : ~ ! :rind N:cc i s s c o f . ~ r t h c : r ncccssary ' u r d c r s . Tho lcvrcr cox%;:.ndcrs ro?-::<n v i t h t h o t r o o p s t o -ai~.t~x.:.ncohosion ::nd ordcr.

524. Rcnr cc-q,cring f o r c c s p r n t c o t tlrc xi-thdr:~vr.l of tlic ~.rnirif o r c c and Thcsn c l c mki? t h c ci.c>.iy b c l f c w t i i c p o s i t i ~ < xii s s t i l l f u l l y occuwicd. i ~ c i l t sr.rc f o r r ~ e df r o n t r o o p s i n c l o s c s t ccntr:ct w i t h t h o c n c ~ : ~c ,ithcr '\-rholo t c c t i c ~ . lu i ~ i t sor olcr.~ctit?f r o n scvcml-. Thcy should be f u l l y c It i s not cft;cn p o s s i t ~ l ot o c.ssign cquippcd w i t h a!?lunitio!l ::nd fl::rer,. Ordcra nua-k bo issucif ccnccrnc s i n g l e cozuw.udc+ f o r such ; : broad front.. i n g t h c t i . n c t h o s c c o v i r i n g f o r c c s s h , a l l w i t h d r w and ha7 t h c y sh-11 a c t if t h e cncrry zttr\c!cs early. Thcy can c i t h c r bc d i r e c t o d t o f o l l w ! t h c !.lc.in body o r t o r c n a i x in ccnt:t;lct 'with -tho cncny u n t i l hc bogies 'GO ::dv-ncc.
T h o ' c n r l i c r n c cxpcct t h o c ~ o t~ oy f o l l o w up t h o s t r o n g e r ~?.ust bc t h c s o ci)vcring f c r o c s i n za-till.cry incl hcn-v i ~ l f z n t r y wcapons. Thcy Engineers zrc: o:.xploycd , u t i l i c c t o t h c =\xirun thiiir. crigi:lr.l p o s i t i o n s t o p r c p t r c arid l n y c b s t z - , l c s . Sr.lcLlo!ro " n d gas cnit bc of assistm.cc t o then.

..

It i s of ;~dvc.nt'-.gc wllcn t h c fcrmcr cornnunj.cr.ti~!n,nct c ~ p:rtly n bi. l c f t f o r t h d c c v s r i . l ~f o r c c s . Whou t h i s i s d o n c a b .:?iisi; c f t c n lct, y o r t j o n s of t h r not f::ll .i??to cncny k~:zcls. Evsry offort: ?.lust hc ~w.dc.t n havc t b c con3unication tr:.rf.fic c.p:)czr n o m l i n t h o o r i g i m 1 l positioi?.
,
. .

Rc:lr cfjvcringg forces :Ire 0rdinari'l.y supported b y c.nd r c c c i v o d i n t o a r c ? n J c r d p o s i t i c n (dclnying p o s i t i o n ) .

525. Thosc r c w w a r d o r " r 6 0 c p t i o t l n o s i t i c i l s " a r c Eivon up vihcn. t h c i r

nissi-on t-nnco

ir,

accm~pl.is!!.cd ~

i l d -thc

n\ain i'orccs havo &?.j.nod s u f f i c i . w t d5.s-

526. hs thc d i s t a c c frui?.. t h c o n c ~ i yi n o r c n s c s , t h e T o t i r i n g t r o o p s a r c a b l c t o for-1 ~ : x ~ r cool.un:-is,' p r c t c c t c d by r o a r gu:~riIc. As. t i i t h e h n i s s i o r . , s t r c r l g t h cnd c o ~ p o s i t i o nof r c n r guards .sco 'par. 252, Xh.crc posnj.blo rc2.r p i l r d s a r c f o w c d f r o r ~ f r e s h troops. . Fcrccs olq;lcycd i n " r ~ c c ~ t i c :( ~d" c l ~ * . ~ i n ?~::;sFtions ;) m y b~ used t o forin r o w g u c ~ ~ d s .Rear guar.ds c f t c n c::~ploy d c l c y i ~ a c t i o n i n o r d c r t o g?in t i x f o r tlrc -7.ain " : y us0 i s body. Thorough blocking of rorbds ::nd r o u t e s y h i c h t h c oncr.ly i inpcrt%~-.t. Should i h c cnciiy push hard n f t c r , ' t i - n c l y dofonsc i w x t 130 i-c~.dc o v c r n t t h c r i i k of c o n s i d s r a b l c l o c s c s . Linit'cd n b j o c t i v c :ittacks by rcilr guzrdc 21.c ?.mrlc ~ 1 7 ~ 1 s1 u c h attno1.c~a s n 3 s t in t h o v.i,rlln& o f t i z i c :ind d i s t a i ~ . c cf o r t h o :=\in forco. .
Bic;rclists c!cui?tor! ~..-vi. - -li:tcrizcd t r o o p s , i:~,sof::r :IS t h o y cn.nnot be cr~ploycd3i;ni::s.t t h c fl.?.nl;s :n d r c ? r of .the cntny, hold tctlr,ciously t o t h c l a s t njiainst t h o cilc:?;.. Thoir spood nnc? n o h i l i . t g p o r n i t .thoi.l t o gut' away quic!cl.y and r.gr:ln r o g h i n c u ? k n c t :iit:? t h c rm?.i.?diir of t h o i r f c r c c s . Tho c:.~ploj~..ncntof :>ursuiC xnd bo!~?nrniic;l.t -r$i.:xti':n~ ?.as i s t c i n dclnying t h c h o s t i l c & ~ u ~ s u i ..~.nsr!f:ir t. a n t h o i r n i n z i o r 'of pr:,tcct;in(i: t h o n z i n bnrly p.n::its, ufiit:: 'c!m bi: cr:ple;y>cL .to i ~ ; k c1:1oro r i i f f i c i ~ l t)rhc hus-tilc :iir r c d o r i n ~ i s s ~ . n oa cncl -to dooo'i.vc> t ~ l concry.
'

527. P.c?.r ;;unr.de rcLi.ri: by bounds whc!ii- co!~dii;ians p o r n i t , t h 0 j . r r c s t s s h o c l d bc no nri.cingod r:s t o t::lci ~b~ivc.?t:~.~c n f !$hc c o m i r cnd c',>ncc::l~mnt nffordcd b y t h c t b r r n i ~ r .

528. Thc.ro c h ~ u l dbe ::rlcquatc and okrtn5.n coax!-.ic:itioX f a c i l i . t i o 6 bctxcc:? rar.r ij~.:~rcis :iricl t h o .oc;-onc.\-.d.~r of th(: viholc f o r cos or :oo~xr,.~dors or rc . sq ~ ~ o ~prc!of t h o v a r i o u s :.~?.rch cclun!~s. fii~i-choolunn ~ o r ? ~ ? ~ d f tly

. .

~cribc t h c ti!= ?rhcu t h o r s n r gudrd fihall f c l l c v ~ ~

529j Whcn :;hi. co:iduct : ~ ft h o uncny no lo!lgcr f o r c e s :r dcvclopcd o r dci t h e p c r t of tlic r c x r guards, t h o s e fern. r?cr guard ploycd f e n n x t i ~ ?o,? ~ xnnrch co11u:nsr The r c t r c o t t h e n bccosics a "narch t o t h o roar;"
530. D u r i ! ~ t~ h c "rmrdh t o t h o r o a r " t h e o f f o r t r u s t always bo i:lr.de t o win g r z a t c r ' <?i.sd;cnccfror.1 t2ic c:~c:-iy mld g r o a t o r frocdon of a c t i o n f o r t h e cezm~;nrlcri This r c d u i r c s incroasc,cl m r c h r.ccmplishncnts, r i g h t t ennarchos o r c:'.rly dcpnrturos a s vrcll a s s a c u r i t y a g a i n s t ::tLc;lpts : c i r c l c n c n t b r t h o c~orzyc Railroads cnn only bo used v~rhenadequate proparat5.ons have been madei Destrudt5.cn of t h e r z i l r o a d l i n e s and a i r nttaclcs a g c i n s t s t i t i o n s where. unlondiugs t a k e pluce, nake d i f f i c u l t t h o enemy's attempt t o use t h e lines

.,

g engagements.

Note: The Germin r e g u l a t i o n s make a d i s t i n c t i o n between "Iiinhaltendes ~ a f o c h k " ( d e l a y i n g engagemenl;~)and "Hinhal-tender Widcrstnnd" (dc'l.ayirlg a c t i o n , r e s i s t a ~ . c e ) . Thc former i s more t h o coacdption of t h e h i g h c r c o m n d c r , t h c l a t t c r morc t h e manncr i n 1vh:ich t h i s aonccption i s c a r r i e d out by l o ~ v o ru n i t s .

531. Tho aim of "delaying en~:.gcmonts" can, based upon t h e intcr.tion, t h o s i t u a t i o n , t h o s t r o n g t h and tile a c t i o n of t h e cncqy and t h o t e r r a i n , b c achicvnd by dofcnsjvc a c t i o n , h y a t t a c k s w i t h i5.mitcri o b j c c t i v e x , by f e i n t cngagcmcnts, and a l s o by l o c a l avoidance of ccmbut ( l o c r r l avoidnncc of combat i s i n r c n l i t y dolayini; c.oCion.). Tho cncny i s m i t c d f o r o r hc i s sought out. O p p o r t u n i - t i c s t o i n f l i c t damc.gcs on t h o cnony a r c utS.lized or tiro broxg!;~:. ::lrcut. Thr? :?:tin o1,jcci; i s t o conso;?ru cur f o r c c s ?.nd t o i n f l i c t t h c g r c a t c s t p o s s i b l c l o s s on t h o cncmy.
Tho l o n g c r n "delaying cngagcmi?ntl' i s t o b c c a r r i o d on, t h o g r o a t c r i n t h o territory r c q u j r c d f o r i t s cxccution.

532. " D ~ l o . ~ iaac ~ t i o n " i s t h e cI?l.cf mcnns of c ~ r r y i n gthrough "dolayi n g cngngcmcntl!.

I

533,. 13of,>nsi: i s only a tompor?.ry no:is?lro.

5311, Attc.cks w i t h l i m i t c d o b j c c t i v c s arc. cxcctrtcd, according t o t h o c o n d i t i o n s , :lg;.inst t h c flcLnl:, dcep f l a n k and r e a r of t h e cnemy o r n g a i n s t a 1~cnk spot i n his front.

In ordcr t o u t i l i z c t o t'nc utm-ost fc.vorablc opportunities which a r i s o , t h o l o ~ r c rccrw!.aud~rsrn~i~st bo givcn ccnsidor:~blo frccdcm as t o a g g r c s s i v c conduct.

935. F924t sng::g.cmcnts c :n bc c:~rrj.odt h r o u $ h d c f o n s i ~ o l yo r cf:Pcn.. . s i v c l y . They l a c k r c s e r v o s :uzd n.rc o n l y o f f c c t i v c when t h o cnomy, considcrine; bhc s i t u a t i o n and tht: t c r r c i n , ;nilst rcckon viith oovcrc ccribzt 2nd h i s r c c c n ? ~ a i s s m c o has boon mads di~fifi.cult.
I)ccc&%inn of t h c c n m y must Fo zchicvod p r i m r i l y by t h c f i r o ncti:~ity of our n r t i l l c r y ?.nd hc::uy i n f z n t r y ivcnpons. Dummy works cnn support t h e "faint dofonso"

536. %.rying conduct, 'mobility, spcod,. ~ u r p r i s c , sorocning and s p e c i a l dccaptioilv incrcirso t h c offootivoncss o f "dclnylng cnGagcmcntsl', r c l j ~ o v o our f o r c e s t c m p o r a r i l y from dcpondonco upon t h o oncnyt.s m i l l and do1r.y him longcr.

I-iavcvir, i.n opon, ccrs:l.ly O b s c ~ o d tcimrain, it i s d i f f i c u l t t o dvccivc L1:u d h c v :?or LLIIJT corlsidcr:.blc tjlnc a s t o c u r psrposc, csp0cir.j. l y who11 ho h?s favor:J?lc a i r rcconnzissa!nca.

517. S i n c c "dul?.ying cng:.gcr~ctitsl' a r c o r d i n a r i l y exccutod on n broad f r o n t , t h e f o r c c c ar:d :-tho mi.~nitionsiclu~tb(: c o : ~ c o n t f ~ ~ . t ~ p :thC :t docisivc The rcm.indcr of tilo f r o l i t must b;: i ~ a l d vii-th 'irczlc a r o a of t h c cn@gc:ncnt. f o r c e s , t o which o f t c n d i f f i c u l t m i s s i o n s arc. assigned.

578. It ;3 n,c(:cssnry t o i.lfor3 :,,I1 co:.maildcrs of t h c purposo of t h c "dclr.>jing cr,g:.g:l!Iiont", hovr it v f i l l b,? cxdcutcd i n . dctc.il Llld of t h o t:isks of neighboring u n i t s i n ordi:r t o socurc u n i f i c d ccnduct .from 1mrt:r comx.%ndc r s w3o o f t c n :rrc f o r c e d t o quiok, i.t:dcpcndcnt c l o c i s i c n . ~ .

In darlcncss o r fogs.

539. Engngc1x:nts vrhich cxtcnd u n t i l d-rkncss o r suddcn mnoctiags n i g h t o r d i n a r i l y l e n d t o st?nd;nc f i r c f i c l i t s o r t o a si~spcnsj.onof t h o b3-ttlc c c t i v i t y . I n gcn%?r,:.l, thcx-oforc, n ni.ght cngr.gcmcqt c-.IT bc c a r r i e d through only, cftc.r prcconccivcd p l a n s znd. nrrangc.mcnts ..
5iL0. Lca.dzrs:~ip of t h ~ trocips : i s ~ m d cnlorc d i f f i c n l t by d r l c n c s s ; t h c imncdiatc i;Lflucncc, of5 ::ll comn-ndcrs i s losscncd. Tho f i n d i n g of t h o proper roittc, ra c'Qn::aissnnoi:, and s c . c u r i t y , c o n t a c t , movcmo!lt and abovc a l l thi? b n t t l c i t s c l f ?,.re 6xcoui;cd undcr &iff icu1.t conditions F r i c t i o n znd a grr:c.&cr r o l o thr.n i n d - y l i g h t opcrnt:ons. t h c r c s a l . t s of c!lnnco p l ~ y E s & c c i a l l y great -.ro t h o difficulties f o r t h o c.t-t:.ckr.r. Firmness 02 t h e ' t r o o p s i s o p r ; r c q u i , s i t c A f o r t h c successful csccuti.cn of nigh-t o n g ~ g r m c n t s ,

541. A d c c i s % v c ~omnc.nrlor w i l l n o t 11csitr:tc t o . c-rry : suocccs, t o w i n import2.u.t ctti..cic t o canplot& o r r,xplcit : t h c r opcr;vti.?ns o r t o f is tino cncrny. T h o c s t i n z t c of .the worth i s oY importr.ncc i n iuxlcing t h z d c o i s i o n f o r n n i g h t

thro:rgh a tlight .kcrrain f o r f u r cn0;nyf.s b ~ . t . t l c :!:tt:is.k.

I n oxccpti~jnc.1 circ.umst::nccc. : : niglit nt:;r.c:: .?.g.inst n b c t t c r c q u ; , p c d cnony w i l l g!-.in a success rr;~ichcould not. bc zchicx:cd d u r i n g dr.ylight. Consj.dcrn~icn, m ust ?.lso bo r,iv<!n t o n i g h t f c i n t at-l;ackc.

542. I n gcncrnl t h o c x t c n t o f a n i g h t a t t n c l ; m:L~st+bc lifnitcd, i t s

o b j c c t i v b limi-led. This docs not a p p l y t o thr: p u r s u i t of:n s l l i i t t ~ r c dctIomy.

5143. Simplj.ci.ty of pl::ri, c - r ~ f u l pr;:p;:r:!.t;t?.ons, sur;>risc m d cmploymoat of t h o simp1rrs.b form~.-.'t?~cns a r c csscn i ?.l t o succcssful. n;.ght opcrC.ti o n s , i n c l u d i n g t?iosc of 1c:ssar dim~:nsinas: r o c o ~ n a i s s n i ~ cr?.ids o ~ n d siilc.11 n u r p r i s c attnclcc

R i g h t attr.cks should bc o~;:ocl:~ll.y ,ilr.do b:y t r o o p s i n tnc; f o m r L r d qiomy, c o f t o n c a otllcr f o r c e s i s r c ' l i n c s and i n c l c s c c-?ritcct'v ~ i t k ~ t b Scrvc w i l l 1::: emplqyod. 1-6 i s o f t c n su:it?t,lr: t o l e ? v c t h c .cxccutj.cll of t h o ~1tt:lck i n t h o l~.?.ncls of -tho cor,una!ldcrs of t h c f o ~ r m r t itroops. $:.!ollld ncn t r o o p s b c dc.;igr.c.tcd t o o x c c i r t ; ~t:~c n i g h t ant::~k, t h c y must be c:;rcf;~l?y .ins.truc%dd oorrcorning..tho torrt:in of nt.l;r.ck, t h o d i r o c t i o n and t h o ob,joctivc. licccnu:.i. sonncc 1 s 3 . ~ d i s ; ? c n r , i b l ~ .T h c ~ ccr(? f tho t r o o p s , ;nust h a i s s u o d i n nmplo time. o r d c r f o r t h c t!ig?rt: a t t f - c k by r l c ~

51~4. Tim c x n c t t t m u o f t h o c,tt,:ck s h w ~ l d bc ho1.d sccrc,t n s l o n g ns

pozsiblo.

I n ordcr t o pcrmit t h e onciny l i t t l c r c s t , i n o r d r t o dony him ti;nc t o c c n s o l i d ~ ~ t hi:; v p o s i t i o n ,

i n o r d c r t o provont h i s c ~ c u . t i o nof t h c posi.tic11 b c , f o r ~ . dny l i g h t , &:I i a t i i ~ c kd u r i n g t h e hours s h o r t l y n f t c r dnrlc
i s zdv?.nt:,.gcous, An n t t - c k i n t h c o r - r l y morning d:..rKncss :llla;.s us t o
concc?.l our inton.ti.ons longcr and t o cr.rry tl:roush t h o dtlyligh'; ?.tt::ck
immcdi:~.tcly f c l l o ~ < i the: r~
r~.j.ciit:xt?;ncB..

545, Shoula t h c t r c o ~ s r!~:xkiug t h e n i g h t ?:ttxcl< k.uc t o m i ' k c L : ;il:irch p r i o r t h u r c t o , t h i s m?.rch mu::t b c s h o r t :~ndmuat be pro':;octcd by t r o o p s w ith. t h c cnclny. Thc r o u t e s cnd oi.'tcn t h c asscitibiy :. . nlrc:~dy iz c o n t : ~ t p o s j t i c n s must bc f i x c d ; Comp:.~ss directions a r c givcn ncd guiclcs arc. h e l d rccdy. Conccr.liacnt a g n i n s t h o s t i l c observation of n nic~rchmndc &&ring t w i l i g h t must not bc d i s r c g . r d c d .
I n s1w.11 u n i t s iihc a ~ p r o a c hi:: b e n t inado i n n march coli.~mn. If
s c v c r a l 3-tt:tck dct~.chmcnts;re fornlcd, iLirge i n t c d l s ?.rc proaj-dcd i n d i f
p o s s i b l c 5.ndcpon.dcnZ; a t t a c k m i s s i o n s n r c 2.s signcd i n oFdcr t o r~veid. the
nixiilg of u n i t s and mutu:il Izindcrnnco.
s h o r t b n l t s t o ,insure t h e i i i t c g r i t y of u n i t s i s o f t e n adm.n.tacc-
ous i n thl: :~ppro:icii m.rc1.1.
.tho dc546. If t h e a t t a c k i s :lot nw-xlc from 2.n ":.sscnbly p l o p e n 0 jncl dcvclopmcnt a n : mcdc 2s lutc a s pi>csiBlc;. Ordin:,.rily f o r t h o fii~al ad-rnncc a s k i r m i s h l i n c , t r o o p s nut vcidoly soy:"r;..-tcd, i s p r o f c r z b l o , Supports card r e s e r v e s 0 1 1 0i n . ncrrm:, doop f o r n ~ a t i c nZ Y I ~CLS c l o s e l y a s possible. dnimcls and v c h i c l c s do not accompany t h e t r o o p s . P r o k c c t i o n of t h c f l?.!* i s ?.mport::nt. .

. i n

Tho hczvy inr'nntry .:rc:rpum tS::Cc(;mw:.zly t h o fcrvt::rd lini;, zri; p1::cod p o s i t i o n f o r fl:*uk ] ~ r o ? ; c c t i o n and then f o l l o w w i t h t h c supports 2nd r c s r r v c s . SYzo11l.d they b r crnpl.oyad i n ror.r;::.rd po::i.ticins t o support t h o ,?,tt:!.cB, cvory prc c c u t i u n must bc t::kcn t o ?.void't h c i.rltcrf croncc of t h e i r f i r c w i t h t h c ar1v::ncc of t h o at$,-.eking infantry.
It m n a y b c nd~~i:;?.blc t o h v c ir~dividu.1 p i c c o s of artil!.cry ::ccompany t h c I'orl;c.rd i n f a n t r y olcmonts

51~7. ,U.n6il contc.ct

i n r;ili?nco.

i s mnc. dc w i t h t h c cncmy a11 mi>vcmcnts must bc m d c

Lights c-rc f orbiddon.

1Sbis o r d i n : r r i l y nccccs'ary t o tnlcc v.casurcs f o r t h c ?nutun1 i d c n t i f i c ? t i o o of o w ol-rfl troops.

L

I n gcncr-1 it i s b c t t c r t o lcnvc r i f l c s unPortdcd. b h i s ?.:lvisc.blc f o r rc:,.r c l e ! ~ c n t s . B.>Lyo3cts:-rc f i x o d .

Espccir.lly is

~!~8 If . t h o a t t a c k i c inunchcd w i t h f i r 0 prcpnr:.tion, t h c attr.ckcr scoks t c g 2 i n S U C C C G S by s l - l r p r i ~ crbnd w i t h s h o u t s nil& c o l d s t c c l throws hhnsclf upon t h c cn.cr,ly. iicilvy iuf:.ntry r~cc'poi?s2nd ::rt;.tlcry ?.re h e l d i n rcr.dincss t o block off by f i r c the; :crcc. o f ' i t t n c k or should tincrc bc . s c v c r l nti;r.c!c d c t n c h c n t s t o ccvor b y f i r , , t k c :.rcr.s b o b ~ c o nt h e d c i ; , - . c h c r ~ t Tho o b j c c t i v c n u s t bc lcno~tn t o :~ll. In a n d i t i o n , t h c ~ r t i l l c r y tr:los known hos-Lilc n r t i l l c r y and i!fl::iitry n o r t a r s (~'dincnwcrfcr)undcr f l r o .
Should t k c att:'.ck bi: proccdcd by f i r c prcpnrF!.tion, t h i s p r c p a m t ion. nor:nally c o a s i s t s of n s h o t , m i s u r p r i s c f i r c , vrhich i s admbnocd L n accord:iuoc vrith n timod p l a n , I n o t h c r p::rtici.~l:.rs t h o a t t n c l i is conductcd a s i s i;ho:t n i t h o u t f i r c prcpnrction.

I n ovcry i;~st.::noe t h c f i r c p l ~ ~must ii bc p r c p a r c d d ~ i r i n gdnylight. Upon conta.ct w i t h t h e oi?cmy, it : : m y bc: suit::hlo t o illurnitt~.tc t h e cor,lb:rt crcr. b y mcnns of f1::ros. C o o c ~ r n i i i g$his, o r r l ~ ri m s t he i s s u e d bcforohand.

549. Thc conduct of t h o t r o o p s ?.f-tor t h o ntt?.clc nust ordors p r i o r t o t h o a t t a n k .

550. Dcfcnsc during d>rl.mcss l c d g c of t h c t o r r n i n .
c:'..~

l16 spcci.fj.cd i n

tnlcc ,?dvr.ntngo of t h c h c t k c r !cnmf-

A3 a rule dclnyi.ng a c t i n u d u r i n g t h e ni.ght c:+.rr bd cxccutc'd only by .rrcakcr f o r c c s , w h i c h f i g h t znd r c . t i r o along t h c roads nnd t r a i l s .

Thc dcfcndcr i ~ l i cc x p c c t s n n i g h t c.%'t?.cl< r c i n f o r c c s h i s fcn,?ord l i i i o ?.nd . c h ~ n g c c his d c f c n s i v c lccc.ticns Vshon. ha h c l i c m ~ sthorn icx!ixcn t o thc: cncmy. By s t r o n g o u t p o s t s , ',ctivc rcoonnaissc.nco nnd irregular l i g h t $1 hc cndc,?.vcrs t o p r o t e c t himself a g a i n s t surprise. i n g o f nno n?.nfs 1::nd Dcfcnsi-vc f i r c s m;:t 'oc quic1cl;r arc3.lr.blc; c:jpcci::lly c z r o f u l p~:' p n r a t i c n s coilcorning t h c dur:;.tion of f i r e s im~s?; h c .n:tdc i n ordor -:to :?void C-Pic u s c l c s s cxpcnditurc of p , n x ~ n i t i o n .

%mny rcs.>ccts t h i c k f o g ha:; t h o s:mc i!lfl:ldnco 0 1 : comb;:t is Thc.:roforo t h c p r i u c i F l c ; ; :lpplici:blc t o aw.lb:.t during dnrkncss h o l d gc!n.cr::lly f o r ociiunt iin fog.
docs d?.r?cncss.

551. I n

Tt i s n o t ! x x s i h l ~ ct o l i g h t . n r t i f i o i : ! . l l y t h e b c k i l c f i e l d . Thcrcf o r c t h o r i s i , b i l j r t y i s gcr:orr.lly kcos.' A t ?ll t i w s coiwidcs::.t.iorn mst b c g i v e n t h e quj.cic l i f t i n g of t h z fog. P."horcforc cvory d c c i s i o n which i s bnzcd upoi; t h e uti!.iz?.tion of f e i nuot ricw?.rid r - p i d cxccu.tLon c f t h o p1r.n 2nd n ~ i n tconfiidcr t h c noz::?.'bi.ll-ty of the: r n p i d l i f - L i n ~of t h o fog. Sndd:znl.y d c s c c n r l c g . ? o ~ I $ o r ~rc:thk..r (jf l a ?v i s i b - i . l i t y can bc u t i l i z e d f o r s11rpri.s~ ::dvnnccs.

,Engagemetits:in Cities) Town& Villages (@Localities") :. , I sr ,. waged in and around towns, villages or 552. Comb&t is freqtwxtly cities and in thickly settled areas the entire engagement may be *colored . by the "localitiest*. . 'The significjnce of these %calitie$~~ de'pends w5on their location in the terrain, their type of construction and siz& Closely connected groups of buildings, such as industrial or minin'gb plants have a significance similar to the ?localitie's@ above mentioned. Large cities may in themselves comprise a battle ares. 553. tTLocalitiesw offer concealment against gr'bund observation, make more difficult the air recomaissanoe and when con$-tructed of stone or brick provide a certain amount of protection against rifle fire,, minenwer'fcrs, medium caliber artillery fire, small air bombs and armored vehicles, On the other hand they draw hostile fire and air attacks, ' increase fire hazards nrzd prolong the eff&Avcness of gas. ~Loealities~, especinlly in favo.rible terrain, form natural strong poiti-tx, they. can easily be the decisive.areas in an engagement but they c'zn also be of greater dxsadvantagc than advantage to the force using them. "Localiticsn lying in the hostile zone of fire must be traversed .only ix? deployed formations. : SEEN, sasiljr visible localities can be tise.d 01~1~.for' small, weak forces. They we ww.$table sfor the lowtion of roservcs, .. In YocnlitiesH v$xich do not lie in the forwwd must be taken agGnst artillery fire, gas and fire. . arcas, precautions

554. Combat in ~loc~litie~sn quickly consum& the force, ol"con without influencing the decisive action, It is fought at close range and its outcome ordinarily depends upon the indcpendont conduct of loww ccmmanders. 555, In an attack, frequontly the main force will advance avoiding the Locality. The oncmy &thin the t'locality" is held dovm by fire, by gas or is blinded by smoke. The' nlocality" is -t&on by cmployxnent of lowsor forces against its flank or row. attack against. ~1,"localityw is tho moro difficult 556, Tho fro&al the wider and doepor it is and ihe grcatcr time the olricmy has had-in which $0 fortify it. Careful r&onnaissanc.o, including air pho*tographs, is neces-. Should rmomxd.ssance indicate that the "locality"' is tcnclciously sary. , dcfendcd in de,pth, ~2dctailcd plan of at-tack is neccssar~. Preliminary cncrgctic bombardment of the '*locality" is indisponsablc, Salients in the "lo&lity" zwo -t&on first, in ordor to oliminatc flanking fire, As for the rest, the attack agz&wt the defenders will be mado under support of the ctrtillcry and how-y ixfantry ~qczpons, ospccially %nenwor.fcr*8, up to tho cdgo of' the "locality". As the infnntry apwozchos the edge of the mlbcality"f tho artillo~y.lifts its fire. Should the heavy infzxxxtry weapons bo inadoqtiato, individual artillery picccs or platoons should be attached to *the infantry. Those follow as closely as possible,. Their v~?rluw incrcc2scs as the normal tbc artilhYy fire czn no lol?gor dkxtly c slid at fixed distc'lncC:s support .I. infantry, As the artillbry fire .is lifted the infantry-ru'shcs' the Tf30calityw. Thcy.advrncc themsclvos with tbc bayonet aud hand-grc&dco. Th;d.for$zwd w 'olcmonts drive rr,s far for&x-d as they czn,9.f possible, to thc.f&r cdgc, without lcttZn$ thcmsclves be draxE: into side issuc~.'~ They must advnnco through yards .and courts as ~~3.1 c?,saloyig the strcots: l-6-37/hf . -1@5-

Against an cnomy who tenaciously defcnds a docp "locali-by", tho advmcc 1ci.11 o r d i n a r i l y bc m d c by dcgrcos. It m y bc ncccssary i n i t i a l l y t o d i r c c t t h c a t t a c k t o advmco by bounds. Housos aid farmstcads vd~icha r c stubbornly dcfo.ndod must bo mil battorod by a r t i l l c r y and " M i n c n ~ - ~ r f cboforc r" tho i ~ f a n t r y a s s a n l t . Enginocrs c a n providc ~ w r t h whilc a s s i s t m c c vdth domolit5.ons and "flnmc throfnrs". Crovrding must ' . , bc avoidcdj rcscrvos a r c hcld ready a g a i n s t a sot-back. Aficr a " l o c a l i t y " i s tzkon, it i s organizod f o r tho dcfonso, c a r c f u l l y combod and clcarcd of tho cilcmy. This t a s k bolongs t o r o a r Caro must bc olamonts of t h o attacking troops (supports and rcscrvos). t d c c n against hiddcn mincs. Tho dcfcnsc w i l l frcquontly ham t o malcc usc of " l o c a l i t i c s " , 557. ospccial.ly whon those o f f o r b r o t c c t i o n against tank a t t a c k s and favor tho dcfcnsc ag-inst such attacks. $-3 Tho forward cdgo o f t h c main b a t t l o t i c l d (main l i n c of rc s i s t a n c c ) i s b o t t c r placcd c i t h c r f o r l a r d of t h c cdgc of, o r within, tho Tho dofcnsivc po-mrs aro incrcascd by f i o l d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . "locality". Housos, gardcns, hedgcs ~ h i c h form s a l i o n t s aro u t i l i z c d f o r flanking f i r 0 along tho edge o f t h c "locality" and along o b s t a c l c s a s .mil os f o r sweeping .tho s t r c o t s by f i r o . Largo " l o c a l i t i c s " a r c organizod f o r dcfcngo i n t h c i r cnti'rc dcpth. Individual farmstoads' and buildings a r c uscd a s strong points. Should t h e oncmy pcnatratc tho "locality", ovory soctor, ovory group of buildings i s t o bc acfondod. Rcsorvcs a r c ,omplcycd t o oxpcl t h o cncmy urho has ponctratod. I n order t o prcvcnt t h c cnomy pushing past and outflanking a "locality", i n a d d i t i o n t o forcos v-ikhin t h e " l d c a l i t y " which a r c chargcd ~ 5 t h t ho cxccutioh of flanking f i r c , wbhor forcos should bo i n rcadincss outsiao t h c "locality" ~rhcscmission i s t o r c p c l an attcmptcd oncmy advancc t o c i t h o r side. Units i n a " l o c a l i t y " whi'i5h havc bee;; surrcundcd by thc,cnsmy and which cnnnot brcnlc through can i n E l i c t sorious dmagc on tho cnomy by maintaining t h c i r p o s i t i o n tcllacicusly.

558. O r d i n a r i l y " l o c n l i t i c s " a r c admntagcously omployod i n dolaying a c t i o n 'to lcavo t h c crscmy i n dmtbt a s t o tho kind and s t r o n g t h of t h c dcfcnsc.
~Toodsf i g h t i n g ?bods scrvc t h o approach of troop's on t h o b a t t l c f i o l d . 659. Especially i s t h i s t m c f o r t h o voalcor force. Tho strong& i s o r d i n a r i l y i n mcrc opon tcrrciin more c f f c c t i v c l y supported by i t s supcrior b a t t l o moms, Combat vrithin q i d f o r ~modcdarcas can materially influcnco t h c courso of c&cngagomcnt. l~~oods providc conccalmcnt from grom~dobsorvation and according against a i r observation. Thcy hindor cbsorvcd f i r c , p r o t c c t primarily against t m k attacks, faoilita'co tho placing of obstaclcs and bloclcadcs and l c s s c n t h e cffoctivcncss of f i r o .
'

5 : \

560.

t o ,tho t i m c of t h o yoar, t h o i r thiolclless and typo of t r c o s ,

In largo wodod arc a s tllc maintcnarloc of comunication, c s p c c i a l l y ~,4.thn c i g h b o r i ~ gu n i t s i s d i f f i c u l t . Roads and paths d o c n s i o r t h c l o c a t i o n of t h o m y and d i r c c t i c n but t h c i r use o r d i n a r i l y causos groatcr lonscs. Excopt along r ~ l dcfinod l rcutos, b f t c n tho d i r c c t i o n c m only- bc m i n t a i i m d by tho us0 of t h o compaeis.

I n m o d s f i g h t i n g tho oommandors c a s i l y losc control of t h o i r troops. I n tho f r o n t l l n c s t h c ccmmondors havc influoncc o n l y i n closc proximity t o themsolvcs. The l i i l i t c d obsorvaticn and tho oxcitcncnt a r i s i n g from closc combat and t l ~ c iizcrcascd t c n s i o n load t o nistnking f r i e n d f o r cnomy and t h c rcvcrsc.

Woods f i g h t i n g i s c s p c c i a l l y strcnucus. Aftcr a combat i i h voods tho rcorganizcxtion of t h c foPc'c i s d i f ? i c u l t and r c q u i r c s timc. Troops vihich have bcon ongagcd i n s o r i c u s cohbat i n f o r c s t s (large) oftcn rcquirc cxtcndod r c s t poriods i n a rest arca. Tho l a r g c r and dohscr t h o vncdcd a r c a t h c morc aro mcvcmont and b a t t l c a c t i v i t y hmpcrcd. S m l l mcdcd arcas a r c c s p c c i a l l y t n r g c t s f o r ai-tillcry f i r c , a r c favcrablc f o r t h c cmploymcnt of gas and aro casily' cbscrvcd from both a i r and ground; i f possiblc t h c y should bc avcidcd.

561. Clcsc combat by t h c i n f a n t r y o r d i n a r i l y dccidcs a ccnbat i n vmcds. Light nachinc gulls, r i f l c s , hand grcnadcs and baycncts a r c t h c primary vmapcns cmplcyod. Hcavy m c h i n o guns can c f t q n f i r c a t short rangcs only but arc c s p o c i a l l y c f f c c t i v c When so cnplcycd. Oftcn t h c h c a v mchinb guns and l i g h t and mcdium llMincnl;nrfcrl' must t&c t h c placo of a r t i l l c r y , Enginocrs prcparc blocks ,and c b s t a c l c s o r opcn routes through cncmy b l c c l ~ sand c b s t a c l c s f o r t h c i n f a n t r y a:ld cpcn routcs f o r t h c ndvancc of horso-drav:n clcments. Flame t h r c ~ m r sasc w r y c f f e c t i v c i n t h e attaclc. Thcir c f f c c t
continuos f o r n ccnsidcrablc timc and i s vcry dcstructivc. against t h c
cncmy

As a r u l c a r t i l l c r y i n mass can bc cnplcyod only outsidc t h c wocdod a r c a s and c f t c n can t a k c undcr f i r b c n l y t h c r c a r m r d h c s t i l c F i r i n g p o s i t i o n s 'for individual t c r r a i n o r clcascd arcas w i t h i n t h c vacds. hcwitzcr b a t t c r i c s o r gun b a t t c r i c s a r c t h o c a s i c s t t o l c c a t c . Gcncrally ' individual guns o r platoons nust be attachod t o tho forward i n f a n t r y u n i t s . trails'. cation. Tclcphcnc l i n e s f o r any distancc n u s t bc l a i d a1cr.g roads and Ordinarily rzcsscngor dogs and radio f'urnish t h o quiclccr ccmuni-

562. Thc a t t a c k e r -;rill attcmpt .Lo sccurc small irncdcd a r c a s by cnvclcping t a c t i c s . Tho a r t i l l c r y b c a t s dovm h o s t i l e mqpcns i n t h c vnods which a r c cxocuting flhnlcing f i r c o r it cmploys smckc t o b l i n d t h c cncmy within t h c vmcdcd arca. S m l l vboded arcns can bc gassed or' poisoned, vrhich of course prccludcs t h c use of t h o arcn f o r cur troops.

563. Thc a t t a c ! ~against a ~mcdcda r c 3 i s ' d i r c c t c d f i r s t against t h c s a l i c n t s which must bc cngagcd f r c ~ t h c f i r s t by a r t i l l e r y and "nincnvarfcrs". Thcsc must n a i n t a i n t h c i r d i r c c t fir0 support a s long a s ' possible, supporting t h e approach of t h e inkantry t o t h c v ~ o d ' scdgc.

& vmods of small dcpths t h e a t t a c k pushes on b m c d i a t o l y t o

t h c f a r cdgc. h c d i a t c l y a f t c r t%c ontcring of docp vmcds t h c t r o o p s arc gptton i n hand and i f ncccssiry a r c c r g a l i z a t i d n is' affcotcd. Thc kind of r c o r & a n i z ~ ~ t i i cs n dctcrmincd by t h c typc of ~vccds. I n t h i n 'ocds -k;zP. y i t h l i t t l c undcrgrcvhl~t h c attacl: can 'scnctincs bd ccntinuod i n t h e same formatian a s c x i s t c d p r i o r t o o n t r y thorcin; h c t a w r suppci-ts and rcserves a r c brought n c w c r a1d flar~Icsn u s t bc prctcctcd. In largo, t h i c k xmcds ~ri7if;hccnsidcrablc undcrgrcwbh it i s advisable t o cnplcy c n l y tho b a t t l c rcccnnaissancc agcncies on a broad front, 'organizing t h c w i n f c r c c s i n dopth and i n p r c p c r t i c n a t c l y imrrovu f r o n t s . . Cc1u.m~a r c g c f i c r h l ~ y morc s u i t a b l o f o r an a d v q c e through w c d s t h a n a r c slcimish l i n c s i . A l l cqm.andcrs must c x c r t thcnsclvcs t o t h o &nost t o prevent t h c ~ s s c r . ~ b l i n g t r o o p s on o r ncar' roads and t r a i l s of vihcrc t h e y w i l l s t r i k c tho strongc'st cnony r c s i s t m c o . Thc cnony must bc h i t sky fro11 t h o roads mld t r a i l s . During t h c advancc t h i s must be borne i n mind. Hn advancc by bounds nay bc ncccsswy i n ordcr t o prcvdilt confusion and cim clim t r o o p s - f i r i n g i n t o one mothor, a s a r c s u l t of uncvcn advances. Rcscrvcs arc t o bc hbld s u f f i c i c n t l y f a r back so t h a t they do not bcccmr: t o c . o a r l y involvcd i n tho combat of t h c fcr&rd clcmcnts a ~ s do t h a t t h c y can bc cnplcyod vrhcrc t h c a t t a c k a d k n c c s bost.

Befor'e emerging from t h e woods reorgdnization must be accomplished and' suppbl-t'bjr a r t i l l e r y and t h e heavy i n f a n t r y weapons The 0.P.s must o r d i n a r i l y be advanced t o t h e forwnrd must be arl'anged. edge of t h e woods. Vehicles con, i n t h i c k woods, only be advanced along roads and a i l Their movement must be cure'fully regulated; t h e y should not be I n mods o f not so g r e a t depth t h e allotvcd t o mass &d block t h e routes. vehicles can be held outside t h e wooded edea u n t i l t h e troops have reached t h e f a r side.

at 564. The defense ordina*ily w i l l avoid e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s M.L.R. w i l l be l a i d e i t h e r w e l l i n f r o n t of o r t h e edge o f t h e woods. The M.L.R. deep within t h e woods. If deep i n t h e vnods t h e b a t t l e outposts vvill be advanced up t o t h e edge o f t h e vmods. Iildividual rifiemen o r l i g h t muchine guns oah f i r e effectively from p o s i t i q n s i n t h e t r e e s (eievated abow t h e ground).
I n m o d s t h e necessary f i e l d of f i r e must o r d i n a r i l y be prepared
and t h e co&ections bctwaon u n i t s of t h o main b a t g l e p o s i t i o n musk be
established.

It may be s u i t a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h strong points a t road crossings

vdthin t h e \-mods.

E f f e c t i v e flanking f i r e , e s p e c i a l l y over'open spaces i s t o be

provided by means of machine guns and "minon%~crfer".
By means of obstacles of a11 kinds tho a d a n c e and development
of t h o enemy i s t o bc hindored;also by such means should hc bc l e d i n f a l s e
d i s c c t f o n s and brought undcr f l d i n g f i r e .
Direct support by a r t i l l c r y i s mu'de d i f f i c u l t i n vmods. 460 and 461 apply a s a &olo t o ~voods combat.
Pars.

Routos f o r m r d and r b a r t o a l l p o s i t i o n s a r c t o bc rcconnoitored

and mado known t o a l l conccrnod.
Should t h o p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t mhercbythc cncmy can conduct h i s attrick c i t h o r sido t h e r~oododarcs., wo must, bo abla t o angagc him with flanking f i r 0 from t h o vroods ahd v n must a l s o havc forces outside t h o ~ ~ m o d s prcparcd t o rcpaz h i s admncos.
565. Tho dclaying a c t i o n o m u t i l i z o wooded a r c a s advantageously a s docs t h o dofonsc. E s p c c i a l l ~cun t h o cnomy bc deccivpd concorning tho sizo and i n t c n t of t h e forcc. Tho u n i t oxocuting dolaying a c t i o n can allow t h a cncmy t o approach ncaror, it can morc o a s i l y r o t i r e and' o f f c r resistance again a t s h o r t o r distances t h a n i s possiblc i n opon t c r m i n . O n t h o othor hand, tho loadobship i s t h e more d i f f i c u l t tho broador t h o f r o n t of t h o dclaying eorccs.

566. Combat i n vmods demand's indcpondcnt a c t i o n of a l l l o w r commanders and o f t h o i n d i v i d u a l mon. Personal bravory i n hnd-'to-hand o r . elosc-in f i g h t i n g i s or" morc importuncc thbn superior numbors. In mods f i g h t i n g hand-to-hand combat o~Yon r c s u l t s , Whorb suddon closc contact r d t h t h o oncmy i s probablo bqronots must be fixed, A s tho onomy i s m t hc i s ovcr~&olmcd ~ ~ 5 fti h r 0 o r r o s o l u t c l y attackad ~ d t h hand grcnadcs and bayonct. Thc Crossing and Dcfcnsc of Rivcrs and othor Wators. 567. Rivcrs' which c r o s s t h c d i r o c t i o n oP t h c attack, fumn an obstacle t o t h o attack, an a i d to. t h a dcTcnso. Thcy a i d t h o scrocning a g a i n s t t h o h o s t i l e ground roconnaissanco. The s t r e n g t h of a riwr s o c t o r grows with t h o brcadth, dcpth and spccd of t h o r i v e r . The n a t u r a l s t r e n g t h i s morco%r dopcndent on tho course, tho condition o f t h o banks and adjacent t c r r n i n , on o x i s t i n g fords, on f s l a n d s und t r i b u t w i e s , upon tho kind o f bod a s v n l l 3 s upon tho timo of tho ycar hnd t h o kind of weather ( f r o s t , ice, r a i n , drynoss, stormy uvc%.t;hor, etc. )

Watcr c o u r s c s which i n thcmsclvcs a r c of l i t t l e consoqucnce may, a s a r c s u l t o f oxtondcd sitmpy banks, h i g h ~ m t o ro r a r t i f i c i a l damming, bccomc s t r o n g s c c t o r s . Watcr o b s t a c l o s , c s p o c i a l l y .vJficn t h e y h'avc muddy bottoms and
s t o o p banks, a r c t h o most c f f c c t i v c t a n k obstaclcs.
Should wo havo t o reclcon vsith dostroyod b r i d g o s o r s h o u l d it 568. bc p ~ p b a b l c t h a t t h o r i v c r c r o s s i n g must bc forccd, t i m o l y and adoquato mcasures f o r r o c o n n a i s s m c c o f roads, f o r r y i n g and b r i d g e l o c a t i o n s and f o r t h o assombly of onginccr troops, f o r r y i n g and b r i d g e m t c r i a l must bo *&on. In i h r g c r commands a s c n i o r cnginccr. o f f i c o r i s chargod w i t h a l l preparations. Ifo bocomcs o s s c n t i a l l y a n onginccr l c a d c r 011 t h o s t a f f (Engineer s t a f f o f f i c e r f o r t h o r i v c r c r o s s i n g ) . Iic mu'st bo o n r l y informod
concorning t h o qituat3.cn and t h o commmdcrls i n t o n t i c a s .

569. Tho' r a p i d g a i n i n g o f t h o f a r s i d c i s t h o chicf. co:lcern i n n

r i v c r crossing.

E x i s t i n g b r i d g c s must bo q u i c k l y t a k c n ; when noccssary o n g i n c c r ~ who a r e ~ c l formabd l r o p a i r damaged bridgos. Carc must be- talcen a g a i n s t dclayod c x p l o s i v c s. Bridgcs c o n s t r u c t o d from propwod o r a u x i l i a r y m t c r i a l complcmcnt o r t a k o t h o plaoc of f i x o d bridgos. Tho g r c n t o r t h o numb02 of b r i d g o s which c m bc b u i l t t h c m o r c r a p i d procccds t h o crossing. As a r u l c b r i d g o s ~Jfiicha r c t o bc usc'cl by hcavy l o a d s and f o r supply columns must c o n w c t h a r d s ~ ~ r f a c o d roads. The c o n s t r u c t i o n of b r i d g e s from a u x i l i a r y m . t e r i n l o f t e n r e q u i r e s much t i m e and considerable'man pomr, f r e q u e n t l y t r o o p s e s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d f o r t h i s purpose. Rapid b r i d g e s ( l i g h t ) have l i m i t e d c a r r y i n g capacity. The c b d s t r u c t i o n of b r i d g e s i x a l s o ' sought by d a y l i g h t b u t demands s t r o n g A.A. p r o t e c t i o n . Should. t h i s A.A. prot'eotion be lacking, u s u a l l y o n l y . f e r r y i n g w i l l be exocuked during d a y l i g h t . The requirements i n time and Torces, f o r f e r r y i n g , a r e c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r t h a n f o r b r i d g e construction. appendix
A s t o c a r r y i n e c a p a c i t i e s o f b r i d c c s and & r r y i q means see (TO d a t e s e c r e t ) .

A i r p r o t e c t i o n b o t h by t h e t r o o p s themselves and by A.A. 570. t r o o p s must be provided e a r l y . P u r s u i t p l a n e s can be a l s o employed.

571. Smoke can conceal b r i d g e c o n s t r u c t i o n and l a r g e f o r r i e s *om ground e b s c r v a t i o n , b u t n o t from a i r obsergation. It i s especially valuable, d u r i n g t h e f i r s t f e r r y i n g o p e r a t i o n s , i n diminishing t h e h o s t i l o f i r e effect. I t s employment r e q u i r o s f a v o r a b l e vsind and rmather c o n d i t i o n t abundant chomicgls and s u f f i c i e n t chcmicnl t r o o p s i f t h e h o s t i l o ground observation i s t o bc e f f e c t i v e l y b l i n d e d f o r a long time and ovor an a r e a adequatc b o t h i n b r o a d t h and depth. Smoke s c r e e n s o f s h o r t d u r a t i o h ovor smq.11 a r e a 6 m y be c f f o c t i v c l y employcd t o docoive t h o enemy. I n o n smolrc i s cmployod t h o r o u t c s loading t o t h o f e r r y i n g and b r i d g e l o c a t i o n s must bo c a r o f i l l y markod. 572. O b s t n c l c s i n t h e r i v o r , i n d i v i d u a l guns and machine guns a r e cmploycd t o 2 r o t c c t a g a i n s t s o l f - p r o p c l l o d mincs and firds f l o a t i n g tormrcl t h o bridgos.

573. Should t h o cncmy as qv.i?kly a s p o s s i b l o on a s i d e and secure t h o f b r t h c r by protecting b o t h s i d e s of

bu s t i l l approaching t h o r i v c r vrc must a d v 3 . n ~ ~ broad f r o n t a c r o s s t h c r i v c r , occupy t h o f a r c r o s s i n g bf our forcos, undor circumstanccs tho river.

574. Should t h o enomy a l r o a d y be a t t h o r i v e r an important c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e s u c c e s s f u l c r o s s i n k i s t h o maintenmco o f sccrocy and t h e sorccning o f o u r propai.ations i n o r d c r t o deceivc t h o ononly a s t o our F c i n t a t t a o k s ( c r o s s i n g s ) a r o a l s o of g r o a t contemplated c r o s s i n g area: a s s i s t a n c e i n d e c e i v i n g him.

If vn: can cxccutc a s u r p r i s e a t t a o k t h o p r o p a r a t i b n s a r c t o bc 575. shortenod, From.the f i r s t , s t r o n g elements must be put ovor, B y daylight a s u r p r i s e attaclc i s p o s s i b l e o n l y vhen n a t u r a l fog e x i s t s o r ovor a narrow r e As a r u l e an a t t a c k over a broad r i v e r must be made during darkness ( j u s t bcforc daylight.
Should vjc b e l i e v o t h o enomy i s excouting dolaying a c t i o n o n l y a t t h e r i v o r , ~~e proceed a s i n d i c a t o d i n Par. 409. 576. The attaclc a g a i n s t a defended r i v e r l i n e 4s made i n accordance r d t h t h e p r i n c i p l e s enumerated f o r an a t t a c k a g a i n s t a p o s i t i o n . O r d i n a r i l y t h e h o s t i l e main b a t t l e f i e l d b e g i n s a t t h e r i v e r ' s edge. Te s h a l l o f t e n f i n d weaker f o r c e s on o u r s i d e of t h e r i v e r whose mission i s t o d e l a y our advance. 577. A s a r u l e t h e a t t a c k w i l l be launched i n s e v e r a l a t t a c k groups i n o r d e r , (1) t o u t i l i z e f a v o r a b l e t e r r a i n , ( 2 ) t o be a b l e t o execute t h e i n i t i a l c r o s s i n g on a broad 'front u s i n g l i g h t m a t e r i a l and ( 3 ) t o deceive t h e snemy a s t o t h e d e c i s i v e a c t i o n and t h u s cause him t o d i s p e r s e h i s f o r c e s . The s t r e n g t h and composLtion of t h e attaclc groups a r e determined i n accordance with t h e i r s p e c i a l t a s k s and t h e g e n e r a l plan. The i n t e r v a l s between neighboring a t t a c k groups a r e t o be measured, j r one group can be f u r t h e r e x p l o i t e d i n so f a r a s possible, 80 t h a t a success b by another. 578. The choice of t h e c r o s s i n g a r e a depends upon t h e s i t u a t i o n , upon t h e t e r r a i n on e i t h e r s i d e a s v f f i l l a s upon t h e c u r r e n t and c o n d i t i o n s of t h e river.
579. Favorable c o n d i t i o n s f o r a n a t t a c k a r e : good, hard s u r f a c e d road n e t , r o u t e s of advance c o l c e a l e d frbm a i r and ground o b s e r v a t i o n , good assembly and approach p o s s i b i l i t i e s , dominating t e r r a i n on c u r s i d e of t h e r i v e r , bends i n t h e r i v e r which envelop t h o h o s t i l e banks, c l e a r o b s e r v a t i o n over t h e r i v e r , open c r o s s i n g a r e a s and, s u i t a b l e t e r r a i n f o r t h e f u r t h e r a t t a c k beyond t h e r i v e r .

T e c h n i c a l l y t h e execution of t h e c r o s s i n g i s e a s i e r a t narrower b r e a d t h s mith moderate and even curremt's, with e a s i l y a c c e s s i b l e benks, x t t h g e n t l e o.nd firm s l o p e s and ~vhena u x i l i a r y m a t e r i a l i s a v a i l a b l e . 580. O r d i n a r i l y ground reconnaissance oan be' executed up t o 2nd aci-oss t h e r i v e r o n l y a f t e r h o s t i l e f o r c e s on t h i s s i d e have beep d r i v e n a c r o s s . I n .order t o r e c o n n o i t e r and determine d e - t a i l s of tlie c r o s s i n g p o s s e s s i o n of tlie r i v o r bank on o u r sido i s normally necessary. I n o r d e r t o g a i n f u r t h e r lcno~vlcdgo concerning t h e f a r bnnlc an& beyo,nd it may be n e c e s s a r y t o d i r e c t wide o u t f l a n k i n g ground r c c b m a i s s n n c o . 581. Airplanc photographs w i l l >>rovide most r a p i d l y t h o i n i t i a l c l u e s as t o t h e c r o s s i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Thcsc complcmcnt t h o maps and add t o t h e informtition concerning t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e r i v c r . E i t h o r t h o cornandor i n i t i a t e s t h e ground roconnaissancc o r hc a s s i g n s zones of recolnaisoance t o subordinate commanders f o r which t h e y a r e responsible. The comnandcr o f oach a t t a c k group can a s s i g n i n d i v i d u a l m i s s i o n s t o o f f i c e r s of t h o s e p a r a t e arms o r hc om- d i r e c t them t o accompany t h o r e connai ssagce groups.

According t o t h e mission assigned reconnaissance p a r t i e s a r e

provided with ( 1 ) l i g h t ' c r o s s i n g mean's, ( 2 ) measuring instruments, ( 3 )
means f o r r o u t e marking, and (4) maps.
S i g n a l o f f i c e r s r e c o n n o i t e r t h e a r e a of c r o s s i n g n o t o n l y f o r
t h e permanent l i n e s on t h i s a i d e o f t h e r i v e r b u t f o r t h e pushing a c r o s s
of f i e l d l i n e s .
The e v a l u a t i n g o f a l l r a s u l t s must b e made by t h e commander
concerned.
Should it be n e c e s s a r y t o assemble i n g r o a t depth f o r t h e
582. a t t a c k , i n i t i a l l y o n l y weak f o r c e s w i l l b e advanced t o t h e r i v e r , t h e s c
t o p r o t e c t our o m and t o h i n d e r h o s t i l e reconnaissance.
Depth i n assombly, n o t o n l y o f t r o o p s butr of m a t e r i a l , i s
i n u n c l o a r s i t u a t i o n s , i n o r d e r t o bo a b l e t o change
t h e a r e a of d e c i s i v o a c t i o n . Tho l a t e r advance t o t h e rivcr, e s p o c i a l l y
during darkncss and i n m a t h o r o f law v i s i b i l i t y , i s f a c i l i t a t o d by t h o
marking o f r o u t c s and t h o c l o s o r e g u l a t i o n o f t r a f f i c .

especially necessary

Basod upon t h e rocommcndations of t h e cngi3oor comm3ndor

583. s u f f i c i e n t engine-Ss and engineor m a t c r i a l a r o t o bo a t t a c h o d t o t h o
a t t a c k groups t o guarantee t h o i r c r o s s i n g on a broad f r o n t . Thc s o c r c t
assombly of cnginoor m a t o r i a l and o f a u x i l i a r y m a t e r i a l domzhds most
c a r c f u l proparation.and o r d i n a r i l y can bo dono o n l y a t n i g h t *
From t h o f i r s t , s t r o n g engincor olomonts should bo omploycd.
Enginbor and m a t c r i a l r c s o r v o s must bo assomblcd sufficiently f a r from t h o
They scrvc t o r c i n f o r c c t h o c r o s s i n g a t t h o d o c i s i w c r o s s i n g ai-oa
river. o r a t t h o a r o n whoro t h o c r o s s i n g i s proving most foasiblo,' "choy scrvo t o
oqualizo l o s s o s and t h o y a r c cmploycd i n bridgo c o n s t r u c t i o n .
When t h o attachment of t h o onginoers t o t h o a t t a c k groups i s no
longor noccssary t h o y a r c rovortod t o t h o onginoor commander.
Tho command p o s t s o f t h e cnginoors a r c t o b c connodtod by t h e 584. ' d i v i s i o n s i g n a l b a t t a l i o n t o t h o main d i v i s i o n t r u n k liflo and t o t r c o m n d postst h o oktack groups. S i g n a l communications n e c e s s a r y f o r t h c technical operations o f t h o c n g i n o o r s a r o o s t a b l i s h c d by t h o cnginoors. I n cxooptional circumstancos t h o a t t a c k gro'Ups may b c
585. ochclonod (according Co timo ) f o r ' t h o i n i t i a l crossing. A roinforcomont
of, o r a n incroaso in, b u r f i r e should n o t bo pcrmittod t o b o t r a y t h o
bcginning o f t h o a t t a c k .

S ' Should t h c r c b c i s l a n d s prosont, it i s w o l l t o t n k c t h o s c

bcforohmd.

Tho oxocution of t h o a t t a c k bogins whon t h o l i g h t m a t o r i a l of 586. t h o i n i t i a l l y c r o s s i n g ti-oops h a s beon brought forward t o t h o f i n a l cover on o u r s i d o o f t h o r i v b r . Tho f i r s t vavc c r o s s o s on a bi-ond f r o n t and c l i n g s t o 'tho f a r s i d o . F u r t h e r waves folloi.r, cach according t o t h o cir'cumstancos. Areas i n v b i c h h o s t i l o fir0 i s hamporc'd should bo cxploitod. Tho massing of t r o o p s a t t h e r i v o r i s t o bo avoidod. Tho succoss o f t h o i n i t i a l c r o s s i n g i s prdinarily dcpondont upon t h o i n i t i a t i v e nnd c a p a b i l i t y of t h e l o m r commandcrsr To t h a t o r thoso a r o n s whorc tho' c r o s s i n g i s most successful, roarward f o r c o s and m a t o r i a l a r c adhncod. O n t h o bank o f t h o r i v c r movomonts t o t h o f l a n k a r c t o b c avoidod, Ow? ?x.rPow S t r o o m v k t h n o t t o o r a p i d . c u r r o n t s f o o t b r i d g c s can bo omploycd. Hoavy i n f a n t r y -mepens, a r t i l l o r y , s i g n a l mcans, ~ m n u n i t i o n and, undor c o r t h i n circuastancos, t r n k s f o l l o ~ r on f c r r i o s ; E L f possible, h o r s o s s v h over. Thoso v o h i c l o s c s s o n t i a l t o ' t h o c o n s t r u c t i o n of f o r r i o s must bo p r o p o r l y assomblcd a t s u i t a b l o arcas. A f t c r t h o f c r r i c s a r e plaood i n o p o r a t i o n t h o omploymcnt o f t h o simplor means of c r o s s i n g can w r y o f t e n bo suspoi~$ed.

Tho commandor of t h o i.holo ordors proparations f o r tho l a t o r Tho bridgos aro oonstructed i n accordance with bridge oon'struction. t h i s ordor.

To p r o t c c t t h e ferrying, t h e bridge construction and t h e uses 587. of t h e bridges a g a i n s t d i r attack, automatic a n t i - a i r c r a f i cannon and machine guns must be advanced e a r l y t o t h e h o s t i l e shore. Every e f f o r t t o place a , p o r t i o n o f t h e .anti-aircraft a r t f l l e r y on t h e must be f a r bank before t h e construction of t h e bridges i s begun. The mass of t h e A.A. mapons remain on our s i d e t h e river u n t i l mast of t h e ccmb'at' t r o o p s have reached t h e f a r side. It i s a l s o necessary t o p r o t e c t by A.A. troops important bridges used f o r supply t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and f o r s p e c i a l t k a f f i c , t h i s p r o t e c t i o n t o continue a f t e r t h o a c t u a l crossing i s completed.
Tho i n f a n t r y elomonts which are across have ospoc'ial mod f o r 588. flank p r o t e k t i o n by a r t i l l e r y s t i l l on our sido of t h o r i v e r . Thcroforc tho' f i r s t a t t a c k ob.jective must be bbsormblo from t h o i n i t i a l a r t i l l c r y .s. na,xlon, S h o u l d t h c clemcnts across ho strong oncugh and should 'their f u r t h c r q t i l l e r y support be assured, those push on s t r a i g h t ahcad. Tho bridgchcad p o s i t i o n must be advanced a s f a r ns possible so t h a t tho one cannot employ ground o b s o m t i o n f o r fir0 against t hc b r i d e aroa. bridgohoad i s t o be roinforcod immediately; l a t c m l comunications b c t ~ w o n bridgchcads t o bo ostablishod vsithout dolay.

589. I n i t i a l l y communica%ionbctvvoon forcos on b o t h banks r r i l l be soourod o n l y by tvircloss means. As soon a s possible t h o d i v i s i o n s i g n a l batt'alicn e s t a b l i s h e s t h o trunk l i n e over or through t h o f i v e r t o t h e f a r sido. Tho a t t a c k e;roups connect t o t h o l i n o ~ r h i c h has boon pushcd across
A s protection t o tho f o r c e s advancing i n t o and holding the 590. bridgohoad tho n r t i l l o r y must push i n d i v i d u a l b a t t o r i e s a c r o s s t h o r i v e r . La;ter t h o a r t i l l o r y c m a n d c r must advaqeo t h o mass of h i s artillc'y, a portion ac*oss t h o r i v e r , a portion closo t o tho bank on t h i s side. Tho b a t t o r i o s first pushed a c r o s s should be attachod t o t h o i n f a t r y . A l l mcasurcs, including ommunition supply, a r c t o bo t a k e r so t h a t countora t t a c k s can be succcssffilly conbattcd and dofoat of t h o troops alrcady a c r c s s ' c a n bc prevented, O f groat importance i s r c l i a b l c s i g n a l comunication.

Tho comolcandor c r o s s e s & o n s i g n a l cormnica'tions t o t h o far bank have bcoh cxtablishod. 591, Should tho s u r p r i s e crossing' f n i l a t i n d i v i d u a l mcas, a s a r u l o a ronevffid attcmpt a t t t h c s e a r c a s must be delayed u n t i l t h o o f f c c t of our ISOS SUCCCSS. f i r c o r t h c succcss a t oother a r c a s pron'
l

592. As soon as t h e s i t u a t i o n pcrmits tho comaridor ordors t h o bridgo cbnstruction. As a rule, t h c construction i s undcrtnkcn during darkness. I n gencrnl, tho mass of t h o cnginoors and t h o bridgc m t c r i a l a r c given t o tho onginocr commandor f d r t h e construction of tho bridgc (s). Ferryihg i s continued i n so frrr a s it does not delay t h o bridgo construction.

vbothor a bridge has been taken under f i r e i s t o bo remqvod and l a t e r , a t t h e same place o r a t b o t h e r , put i n t o operatioh, depcnds upon tho mount of f i r e , t h o s i t u a t i o n a n d tho a v a i l a b l e time. The removal of bridgcs and t h e d e t o u r h g of t r a f f i c cost t i m o . Auxiliary bridgc l o c a t i o n s a r e t o V e reconnoitcrod and, i n so ' f a r a s personnel and ma'iorial . pqrmit, proparqd.
A i r atta'oks can f o r c e t h e tomporary suspension of f c r r y i n g and bridge orossing,

Dof cnso

593. Tho vcluc of a r i v c r l i n o t o t h o dofensc doponds upon ?tho s i t u a t i o n , upon i t s n d u r a l s t r e n g t h and upon t h o dcfcnding force. The advmtago of tho f r o n t a l s t r c n g t h i s opposod by t h o disadirantagcs t h a t tho r i v e r bccomcs a n ' o b s t a c l c vd~cn.thc dofondor v&shcs t o hinder t h o shijttiilg of f o r c e s by t g e a t t a c k o r o r vhcn t h o dofondok vcishos t o follow a dcfcat of t h o a t t a c k i n g force by a countsroffon$ivc. Moroovcr tho r i v o r hs a skrong frolrt?l obstacle l o s c s worth i f t h o cnomy i s not forccd t o attac'lc t h o r i k r line.' I n such a a i t i m t i o n it i s o f t o n morb corroct t o plao6 t h e mass of tho f o r & i n i t i a l l y i n assombly positions.
594. Elemcnts', ivhich have boon pushcd foryard to. tho f a r sido of t h o r i v c r , v~honforced t o r e t i r c , rcoross c i t h e r a t crossing arcas t o tho flanlc and outsidc tho h o s t i l e f i r e offoot b r by adcquatoly prcparod crossini So f a r a s possible a u x i l i a r y moans madc rcady i n t h c i r r c s p e c t i w ioncs. m a t e r i a l i s cmploycd f o r t l i i s purposc. Troops on our ovrn sido of t h o riwr cover t h i s withdraval. P a t r o l s and rcconnaissanco groups rcmain on tho h o s t i l c sido t o 'dotormino t h o assombly a r c a s and crossing places t o bo used by tho cncmy. I f ncocssary those rocomlaiosaaoo agoncios rcoross by swimming.
y t h o propcr u t i l i z a t i o n of t h o r i v c r a s an obstaclc troops
595. B cxocuting dclaying a c t i o n not only o m forco t h o cnomy t o t h e consuming
a t t a c k proparations but can ropol wcrl:or crossing attcmp-bs. Special con-
s i d c r a t i o n i s t o be givon probablo cqossing points, roads lcadin'g t o t h o
r i v e r , lilcoly bridgc locations and t o s a l i e n t s i n tho r i v e r l i n c .
Brcaking o f f of kho r o s i s t a n c c and rctircmcnt 'arc morc c a s i l y accomplishcd bchind a r i m r .
596. I n defense tho forvard clefcnsive l i n c of t h c main b a t t l c From tho main p o s i t i o n \,till orton bc along our sido of t h o r i v o r bank. b a t t l c p o s i t i o n v e must bc a h l c t o command tho' r i v c r by gaploss f i r c and t o ccnccntr~.tc f i r c on probablo crossing arcas. Should tho h o s t i l e shorc dominato opcn t c r r a i n i n our main b a k t l e position, and e s p e c i a l l y i n ' s a l i c n t s prcduccd by t h o river's courso, t h c s e areas should bc only ' wcdcly occupied by day and bc protcctcd by f i r c from rearvnrd positions.

Tho illumination of t h o r i v c r must bo assbrod. of outpost boats i s rcoomildcd on vcry broad r i v e r s .

Tho cmploymcnt

Tho brcadcr tho scctor which t h e a r t i l l c r y must covcr, tho grcator must bc tho fir0 mancuvcrability o f t h o batteries i n ordcr t h a t thoy may bc ablc t o conccntratc on t h e i n i c t i a l l y unlmoum h o s t i l c crossing aroas. Whore f r o n t a l f i r c i s d i f f i c u l t , o f f c c t i v c scrvicc can bo rondcrcd by pushing a small portion of t h o a r t i l l c r y forvnrd t o cxccutc flanking fir, along t h e r i v c r . Engincors block by obstacles and minos tho .probable h o s t i l o routos of approach, assombly a r c a s and crossing points. Mines placed in' tho vratcr a r c c f f c c t i v e i n dclaying tho oncmy a t probablo crossing arcas. Ibroovcr, f l o a t i n g mincs, f i r c boats and s i m i l a r contrivcnccs 'arc hold i n rcadincss. Tho t a s k of tho a o r i a l do80nsb troops i s abom a l l t h o prcvcntion of h o s t i l e a i r rcconnaissanoc. Thcso a r c omployocl, i n arcas favorable t o crossing, s o f a r f o m d t l n t tho h o s t i l c a i r rcconnaissanco can c v o r ~ h o r o bc c f f c c t i v o l y combattcdr 'Proparations n u s t bc madc f o r tho r a p i d displaccmcnt t o thrcatcnod arcas. Tho s i g n a l not must assurc t h o r a p i d comunication f r o n t h o fcrlrnrd l i n o s t o t h c cornandor an8 t h o quick transmission of h i s o r d c r s t o t h e a r t i l l c r y m d t h e rcscrvcs.

Should t h e r i v e r be considered a s only a r e l a t i v e l y wak obstacle, under c e r t a i n conditions it i s b e t t e r , there, where t h e crossing of t h e enemy i s expected and t h e t e r r a i n t h e r e f o r i s s u i t a b l e , t o base t h e defense upon a ra$id, prepared counterattack (general) of It must be considered t h a t i n such strong forces held i n reserve. s i t u a t i o n s t h e a r t i l l e r y and t h e heavy i n f a n t r y wapons of t h e enemy ~611 generally be i n t h e i r o r i g i n a l positions on t h e f a r s i d e of t h e r i v e r .

597. Should t h e r i v e r l i n e be u t i l i z e d f o r . t h e purpose of attacking and defeating t h e a t t a c k e r a s he i s astride.th-9 r i v e r , our a t t a c k must be launched a t t h e c o r r e c t time, a t t h e correot a r e a and i n t h e decisive direction. I n such a s i t u a t i o n our defense of t h e r i v e r should be only strong enough t o f o r c e t h e enemy t o employ prepared f i r e f o r h i s crossing and t o enable. us t o d i f f e r e n ~ i a t e b e t w e n t h e decisive and t h e f e i n t crossing attempts. Simultaneousljr o u r defense gains time f o r t h e executiol of our a t t a c k (counter o f f e n s i w ). The mass o f t h e troops are held i n readiness t o t h e rear. They aavance t o t h e a t t a c k asssoon a s t h e main h a t t l ? e c r o s s i n g i s -recognized. T b ,attaok i s prepared beforohand, including tho d i r e c t i o n o f advance.' Tho a r t i l l e r y must be able t o concentrate i t s f i r o i n t h i s direction. Tho enemy must be s t r u c k before he has e s t a b l i s h e d himself with strong f o r c e s i n a bridgehead. We must provide f o r t h e blinding or' elimination of tho h o s t i l e a r t i l l o r y observation on t h e f a r sidc. Employment of tanks against t h e enemy alrea* across a s m l l a's a t t a c k a v i a t i o n a g a i r i s t those 'crossing can produco enormous r e s u l t s . The. highest readiness f o r b a t t l e and r a p i d com~unicatiogsare p r o r c q u i s i t e s f o r r a p i d conduct o f t h e troops.
'

598. I n a retirement o r r e t r c a t before an oncmy pressing after us, t h e forward march columns should be dircctcd t o use thoso a v a i l a b l e bridgcs which a r c out of range of tho h o s t i l e a r t i l l o r y f i r e . Should bridges bo lacking o r should t h e i r number bo inadequate, tho construction of bridges and t h e orcnaration o f adoouatc crossine means should be bcnun. Won d f i c i e n t time i s available, a u x i l i a r y m a t c r i a l must he employed. A l l a v a i l a b l e a i r dofensc t r o o p s a n ~ ~ i ~ o from t both o d b&&s tho building of fcho bridgcs and o f the-ferries' and t h o r o t r c h t across tho r i v c r . . Ifiotorized columns ( l i g h t i n f a n t r y arid a r t i l l e r y , c t c . ) and disponsiblo vohiclos. arc push0.d across f i r s t , Some of tho a r t i l l o r y , above a l l t h e long range f l a t t t r j o c t o r y mapons, should be brought e a r l y i n t o p o s i t i o n on the f a r s i d e of t h e r i v o r . Detailcd i n s t r u c t i o n s conoerning march soquonco,' .especially f o r motorizcd olomonts, rout0 marking fox night marchcs and tho maintenance of s t r i c t t r a f f i c regulation: f a o i l i t a t e t h e rotircmont across tho r i v e r .

Thosc elementr, s t i l l i n contact with -the cnomy have tho mission of so holding up t h e cncmy t h a t hc cannot bring cffcc.tive f i r e upon t h e mass a s it crosscs t h e r i v c r . These elements w i l l be brought across on a broad f r o n t on propared f o r r i c s and b o d s constructed a s f a r a s possiblo from a u x i l i a r y matorial. The t r o o p s on t h o f a r s i d e must covor t h e i r crossing. Bridges construct&d from prcparod m a t c r i a l (pontoons etc. ) aro t o be tnkcn up i n adequatetimc. ,Fixed bridgcs and thosc mado of a u x i l i a r y m t c r i a l a& wcll a s organic forrfing and bridging m a t c r i a l vhich cannot be savcd a r e t o bo thoroughly destroyed. Combat ' i n Mountains 599. Tho p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h o leadorship of troops and t h e combat of comb5nod arms i n mountainous apcaa correspond t o those cmployod i n tho lovrland. Tho p c c u l i a r i t i s s of mountain t e r r a i n , namely, l b i t c d r o u t o s and different vmathor conditibns, place many obstacles i n tho m y of omploying t h o same princi'plcs. The doviation therefrom i s dopcndcnt upon tho typo o f tho mountains.

600. Tho g r e a t c s t differonccsoccur i n t h e highor mountains. In gcnoral, spocial mountain 'croons, o s p c c i n l l y t r a i n e d must bc cmployod a t high altitudes. ,1141-6-37/hf

In t h o mountains o f modium h c i g h t t h o d i f f c r c n c b s dccrcaso. In thc I n small mountains no g r o a t d i f f c r c n c o s i n p r i n c i p l e h r i s c . mountains o f medium s i z o nnd h c i g h t and , ~ h i c ha r e h c a v i l y s n o m d up and g l a c i a t e d and vhich h v c cxtcndcd b a r c and roclcy a r c a s y 3 a r c confronted w i t h d i f f i o u l t i c s o f t c n a s g r c a t a s t h o s c i n t h o h i g h mountains. Extcndod wooded nrcas, c s p c c . i a l l y when t h o mountains a r c not' ruggcd i n c h a r a c t o r w i l l o f t c n p t o v i d c t h o same combat p o c u l i a r i t i c s which TFO f i h d i n o r d i n a r y woods com6at. Excopt f a r woathcr c o n d i t i o n s , t h o broad, c u l t i v a t c d , g e n t l y s l o p i n g a r e a s of t h c mountains of medium a l t i t u d c ,provide no s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f c r c n t prcblcms f o r combc.t t o t h o s o v c f i n d i n t h o lovrland; O r d i n a r i l y , ovcn in wintor, a l l t r o o p s can bo cmployed i n d i f f i c u l t modium a l t i t u d c mountains, providod t h e y have s u i t h b l e c l o t h i n g and equipment and havc, i n case of necos'sity,.a s h o r t timc f o r preparation.
601. Thc d i f f e r e n c e s i n a l t i k u d o r e q u i r c a different and e s p e c i a l l y c a r e f u l c a l c u l a t i o n of t i m e and spacc. These d i f f e r e n o e s , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h f e v e r rcdds, r c t a r d t r o o p movcnlcnts, t h o employment o f s i g n a l means and t h e supply. Thoy can f o r c e t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e cmploymcnt o f i n d i v i d u a l vmapcns and i n c r c a s c t h e strcnuousncss f o r t h o t r o o p s . Dcployment and dcvclopnent a r c r c t a r d c d . The d i r e c t i o n o f a l l movcment i s o r t e n dctormined by t h o course o f t h e m 1 i e y s and t h e s i t u a t i o n of t h c passes. Theso can bc of d e c i s i w impcrtancb. Limits a r c drawn a s t o t h e s t r c n g t h of f o r c c s which c a n bc employed.' The r a p i d cmploymcnt and displaccmcnt o f r c s c r v c s i s mjdc morc d i f f i c u l t . Of'tcn a d j n c c n t u n i t s a r e unablc t o o f f e r mutual support. On t h o o t h c r hand, s i t u a t i o n s i n mountains can bc such a s t o perniit t h c a t t a c k o r t o bo s u c c o s s f u l w i t h fcwcr t r o o p s t h a n t h o defcndcr has. Moroovor, oppoi-tunity i s o f f c r c d small u n i t s f o r indcpcndcnt, @ i c k and b o l d conduct. Opportunities t o deccive t h c encmy a r c n m r c u s . Tho comander i s l i m i t : $ i n t h o choioc of h i s C.P. c o m a n d c r s must r c m i n v x l l l for:,ard.
All

I n t h c g r o a t d i f f c r c n c o s of 01cvatio:l f i r i n g r o q u i r c s s p c c i a l c c n s i d c r a t i o n and i s scmotimcs wry d i f f i c u l t . Dcnd spaoos providc f a v o r a b l e ccvcrzd upproachcs and asscmbly a r c u s and f a v o r s u r p r i s c a t t a c k . On t h o c t h c r hand h c i g h t s can provirlc f a r d i s t a n t c b s c r v a t i o n , can facilitate t h e conduct o f fir0 and o f t c n m k c ' i t p c s s i b l c t o comand t h e t c r r ~ i nf o r a c r c n t d i s t a n c c vrith w d c f o r c c s . Weather c c i l d i t i c n s o f t o n u n d c r ~ or a p i d and s h a r p chsnges i n h i g h c r a l t i t u d c s . Fogs vrhich appear q u i c k l y and low clouds m k c obscrv a t i o n , t h c f i n d i n g o f d i r c c t i c n s mid l c a d o r s h i p d i f f c r o n t ; y c t t h c s c m y favor o c c a s i o n a l l y s u r p r i s c attc.oks. Tho t r m c r s i n g of ddop snow and t h e p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t c o l d vnathor may r e q u i r c s p e c i a l prccctutions. Lack o f towns and s c t t l c m c n t s and o f m t c r must bo talccn i n t o considoration. l o c a l s u p p l i c s and vlil'tcr a r c l a c k i n g t h o t i m e l y advance of supply i s of d c c i s i v c importmcc. This may, i n w i n t c r and i n d i f f i c u l t t o r r a i n , dcmc.nd s p c c i a l *ic"surcs.

mere

Tcrrain rccannaissmcc i s indispcnsiblc, c s p o c i a l l y bcforc combat, b u t a l u a b l c time should n o t bo l o s t thorcby. Rcconnaissanco i s m d c morc d i f f i c u l t i n mountains. Thcrcforc, every by t h o ccmndcr roconnaissancc a ~ c n c y must bo mployod. Local i n h a b i t a n t s cm g i v c v a l u a b l c i n f o m r r t i o n conccrning t h c vmathcr and a r c t o bc u t i l i z c d a s guidos. Hcports of vmathcr buroaus should bc sccurcd c a r l y .

602. Tho loadorship, bocauso of tho groat nunbor bf hindering influences on movomont a d b a t t l o , i s somcv~lmthindorod. As a gonoral rulo,' it i s not possiblo t o conduct t h o b a t t l o coordinately on' a broad 1 1 1 general, independent individual combats arc fought. O n the front. other hand, o f t e n only by t h e employmclit o f our force8 on a broad front, thereby producing a dispersion of t h e h o s t i l e forces can vr e c r e a t e a t individual a r e a s a s u p e r i o r i t y f o r our forces. Therefore t h e comnander must o r d i n a r i l y dbcide e a r l y on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n b f h i s f o r c e s and' guarantee by h i s employment of these f o r c e s a s u p e r i o r i t y a t inportant areas. Envelopmllt tmd tui-ning novemel~tsmust be env'issged.in t h e i n i t i a l employment o f t h e forces.. These can be espec'ially e f f e c t i v e &en t h e enemy i s Lovsr comanders must be able l i m i t e d t o p a r t i c u l a r routes of retr'eat. t o execute t h e i r t a s k s independently. To t h i s end, t h e i r missions must not be t o o limited, t h e y should havo adequate t r o o p s and supply means assigned them.
Large roserves ~~5.11 be held out only vrhcll t h e y can bo r a p i d l y displaced. The s e n s i t i v i t y ' o f our om1 f l a n k s and r e a r demands continual a t t e n t i o n by a l l comanders. 603. I n mountains where t h e conditions a r e d i f f i c u l t t h e following p r i n c i p l e s apply f o r t h e employment of those vsapons immediately supporting t h e riflemen:
Reconnaissance i s t o be anticipated mil i n advance. t a s k s are t o be assigned carly.

Firing

Changes once tho vm'apons w o i : i p o s i t i o n and o;.onded changos of p o s i t i o n aro ti70 collsuning. Thereforo a l l f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s a r e t o bc so chos.cn, i n so f a r a s possibl& t h a t from t h e i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n s ' t h c i n f a n t r y can be supported u n t i l it broaks i n t o t h e onony position. E m r y o f f o r t should bo made t o cnploy t a c t i c a l u n i t s a s u n i t s , but o f t e n individual platoons and i n d i v i d u a l guns must bo soparatoly onploycd. The mass of t h e heavy i n f a n t r y weapons ( i n f a n t r y cannon and heavy machine guns) must o r d i n a r i l y be employed w e l l forward since lack of space w i l l o f t e n n o t i?ermit t h e i r employment f u r t h e r i n depth.

e f j n d favorable opportunities f o r overhead Nearly always w i l l v f i r e and flanking f i r e . These opportunities must be utilized. Likewise, i n mountains vreapons &ich i n l e v e l t e r r a i n a r e unsuitable f o r overhead f i r e , can e f f e c t i v e l y employ overhead f i r e . F i r i n g over t h e heads of troops who a r e a t t a c k i n g u p h i l l can o f t e n be e f f e c t i v e u n t i l t h e y break i n t o t h e h o s t i l e position.
Weapons employing d i r e c t laying should i n general avoid t h e highest points a s f i r i n g positions. F i r i n g p o s i t i o n s on t h e slope, concealed a s f a r a s possible, v d l l o r d i n a r i l y accomplish t h e same r e s u l t s with a saving of f o r c k s and time and simultaneously making h o s t i l o obsorvation moro d i f f i c u l t . Where doad spaces cannot bo eliminated by f l d c i n g f i r e , i n d i v i d u a l 'riflomon and l i g h t machinc guns must bc pushed f a r enough f o r w r d t o take those arcas under f i r e . Booause of tho d i f f i c u l t y of supply, economy of mimunition must bo practised.
604. I n mountains, ospocially i n unfavorable m a t h e r , i h f a n t r y i s t h e most r e l i a b l o arm and t h o main exocutor of roconnsissance. I n f a n t r ~ p a t r o l s , pushcd w11 out i n r r o n t and equipped with adoquato signal means, can rondor cxcollont sorvice.

Decisive importaAcd must bg dssigned t o r i f l h o n and cspe-cially t o -sharp khoo-bing infintrym&. i Thoso o a f most easily ovcrcomo t c r r p i n . d i f f i c u l & i c s . In high, not casiljr travcr'sod t c r r a i n , tho infantryman i s dcpondont 'on himself: alonc.

In d i f f i c u l t ' t c r r a i n , tasks, which i n own, more l o v c l t c r r a i n a r c assigncd t o heqvy machinc guns, must o f t c n bc assigncd t o l i g h t machinc guns,
In a d d i t i o n t o t h o i r most important mission, t h c support of t h o rifleman, heavy machino guns can, from oonocalcd positions, o r t c n ccvcr for a long timc w l l o y routcs, 'stream crossings and paths without t h o enemy bcing ablc t o dislodgc'thcm. Thc omploymcnt * o m conccalcd positions i s o f t c n a s s i s t o d by 0.P.s from h c i e h t s i n roar.
with f i r c . Mincnworfcrs a r c s u i t a b l o abom a l l o l s c tc.cover &cad spaces Thcy must t a k e t h c placc o f a r t i l l c r y , which i s o f t c n lacking,

605. A r t i l l c r y i s confincd t o roads and passablc t r a i l s . Mountain a r t i l l c r y i s able t o f o l l o w tho i n f a n t r y through morc d i f f i c u l t t c r m i n . Thcrcforc, individual guns and platoons of artillery vhich arc attachcd t o t h e i n f a n t r y ' should, a s f a r a s possible, bc takcn from mountain a r t i l l c r y units. High m g l e f i r c i s t h e typo l c 9 s t Kindcrcd. . F l a t t r a j o c t o r y
f i r c can o f t c n bo cmploycd only a t long rangos. Thcrcforc t h e high anglo
f i r c a r t i l l c r y ( l ~ c ~ ~ v i t z cand r s ) t
h c mountain a r t i l l b r y must go i n t o positions forvard of t h c f l a t t r a j c c t o r y a r t i l l c r y . I n i n d i v i d u a l ins'tanco hcavy f l a t t r a j c c t o r y menpons pushcd f a r forward can bc w r y offcctivc.

Larger a r t i l l c r y u n i t s must ordinariay go i n t o p o s i t i o n i n v a l l c y s or i n g l n d ~ ssinco u s u a l l y on t h o heigbts a r t i l l c r y can bc cmployod only a s individual guns o r platoons. I n orclcr' t o scoure a thorough o b s o m t i c n of t h e t c r r a i n objcctivcs, t h c 0.P.s must be c a r c h l l y rcconnoitsi-cd and assigncd and f u l l u t i l i z a t i o n o f forward obscrvcrs must bo made. Tho cmploymcnt of sound and rango finding b a t t ' c r i c s i s s t r i c t l y lifiitod,: a i r observation and adjustment a r c d i f f i c u l t . Ground ob'scrmticn t h c r c f o r c i s of utmost impcrtancc and must be established carly. Gas a d smokc can be advantageously cmployod i n v a l l c y s and savinc s. 606. Enginocrs a r c cmployod t o place o r rcmovc obstacles, t o r c p a i r o r b u i l d roads and t o construct bridgcs, using both o r g a i c and a u x i l i a r y material. Thcy must'bc cmployod s u f f i o i c n t l y carly. 607. I n d i f f i c u l t mountain t c r r n i n t h e radio a f f o r d s o r d i n a r i l y tho most r a p i d and r c l i a b l c oomunicaticn. Visual s i g n a l mcans can rcndor c x c c l l c n t scrvicc b u t a r c dcpondont upon t h o dcgrcc o f v i s i b i l i t y . Likcvrisc t h o rcconnaissancc mcasur6s nccossary f o r tho cmploymcnt of t h c s c v i s u a l signal m a n s cftcn rcquirc ccnsidcrable timc. Wim c o m n i 'cation o r d i n a r i l y domnrids a trcmcndcus amount o f timc and m?.tcrinl. Mcsscngor dogs can bc cmployod i n h c a r l y cvcry s i t u a t i o n > bccauso o f h a ~ k sand c a g l c s pigccns f i n d only occasionihl cmploymont. 608. Tho cmploymcnt of cdmbat a v i a t i o n i s madc d i f f i c u l t through a lack o f good landiilg places and, undcr somc conditions, of a i r p o r t s , through tho i l ~ c c s s i ~ y f l y i n g ofton a t g r c a t hoightn t o c l c a r tho of mcuntc$'in c r c s t s and through w a t h c r ' conditions (low f l y i n g clouds and fog). A lorn f l y i n g a t t a c k against troops i n Valleys and passos i s o f t c n hindorcd by t h o narromoss of t h o arcad- O n t h c c t h c r hand thcro o x i s t s t h c p o s s i b i l i t y o f g r c a t succoss.

609.. E n p l o - p n t of a n t i - ? i r c m f t Porccs i ' ofton madc d i f f i c u l t because. of a lack o f godd roids, iiliado+&o b'ridgc s and limited obsorvat i o i p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n tho arca t o .bd dof0ndad. .: :~horoforg,i n open t c r r a i n , of high f l y i n g attack: a n t i - a i r c r a f t maohinc guns, and ~ i n ' a r o a s ~ ~ ~ o r o d m go r oxists,, ant%-aircraft a r t i l l c r y should bo brought i n t o position a s soon t h o momtains, importmt intora s possib16. Entrmcb in%o and c i i t ' ~ r 6 m soctions i n v a l l c y s and passo$ must b e protcctcd. 610. P o s s i b i l i t i c s f o r Lthc cmploymont of mountod, bicyclo and mptorcyclc troops a r c limited. I n -pursuit thcsc can bo advmtngcously omployod.
611.

'Tanlcs can bc onployod i n broad ~ a 1 1 0 y s o-lld i n platcau arcas. Tnnlc dcfcnsc i s madc c a s i c r .

o an cnomy n o v h g s1c:rly 612. Aorizl t a c t i c n l r ~ c o n n ~ i s s m cagainst a$ along tho fcvr vnll dcfincd routcs i s of groat importance t o supplcmcnt tho t a c t i c a l ground reoonnaissnnco

Thc b a t t l c r c ~ o n n a i s s ~ m cof c tho various ams' can bc facilitated by taking advmtago of favorable hoights f o r observation.

..

In sncvw areas p a t r o l s on s k i i s should be employed.

poizlts should be considered i n t h e march dis613. The follovAn~, posit ions rnd arrangements:
1 .

Troops must not be oxhaustcd when Ohey reach tho mlcmy.

2. I n aeeas of considorable differences i n elevation it i s b e t t e r t o prescribe d i s t a ~ c o s bct~acn elomnents i n timc r a t h e r than by l i n c a r noksuroment'. It may bc sdaisablc t o ordcr greator than :lorn1 distances.

I n gonoral, advancc and r e a r guards nust bo strongor, t h c i r security d i b t m c c s from tho nain body arc o r d i n a r i l y greater. Since it i s ofton not possible f o r tho various arms t o bc oolunns must bo orgaixized considering tho probablo adploymcnt i n t i n e of tho various arms. Enginoors should bc ~ a l 1 f orlard. %hen contact ~ 6 t th h e oncmy i s mdo tho r,~ass of tho a r t i l l c r y should, Yf possiblc, bo ablc t o go i n t o position f r o n i t s l o c a t i o n i n t h e column.
displaced fcrwnrd from tho roar, t h e

Dis'ckibution o f t h o narchi% troops upon a l l usablc and through routes m k c s norc d i f f i c u l t t h c task, and s p l i t s up tho a o t i v i t y , of thc h o s t i l c a i r foroos, incrcasos our prospect of quickly brc&ing thbcugh h o s t i l e rcsistanco ,and b c t t c r u t i l i z e s a m i l a b l o quamcring arcas.
A mrch i n a ~ n l l c y mhst o f t c n bo protoctod by flanl.. guoxds along tho hoights on o i t h o r sidc. The t i n o advzntagc which n u s t bc' g i v i n thoso f l a n k guards dophnds upon tho t c r r a i n and tho situation. Undor sono condi'tions, flank guards must bc rclioved by fr8sh forces a t valloy crossings. I f nocossary, tho m s s of t h c troops halt. Should p a r a l l e l routos bc laclcing, tho flanlc socurity must bc l i n i t c d tb tho occupation of doninant t c r r a i n on c i t h c r sidc tho routc of narch. Ordinarily t h o s ~f l d c protoction troops r c g s i n contact with tho m i u forco only a f t o r a groat l o s s of tino.

Tho ~ m i n body must froquo;ltly bc admncod by bounds, e w n though such a n advanco c o s t s timo.

Rosts dopond upon tho nission,' tho longth and d i f f i c u l t y of tho. m r c h qnd: tho condition of tho troops, On long mmohos, fro'quoirt . . 'taken, in addit5oixt-o-t h o. . oustomry lo;% r o s t . short ..ziests'nus~,bo, 614; !men t h e eneny i s primari.ly .fa!~itedt o t h e roads and paths, e our s e c u r i t y during r e s t s nust be d i r e c t e d m i i l l y t a these routes. V cannot alvpys ohcqpy .hiih firomd.vKioki nay a f f o r d tho ener.ly observation over our troops. :TO rvhat'extent t e r r j i n , o t h e r t h a n t h a t it.~.~ediaVely i n proxinity t o roads, nust be secured depands upon tho conditions. Seldom can vm provide dcontinuous l i n e of security.
,

615.

I n mountains s u p e r i o r i t y of leadership plays 5 dor~inentrolo.

The a t t a c k e r o f t e n needs only a l o c a l and l i n i t e d s u p e r i o r i t y i n nunbers and b a t t l e means. Apparently strong heights and rocky 1 individual 1 plateaus can be ~.mdet o f a l l i f vre succeed positions a s ~ ~ a s i n enveloping, o r turning these positions, o r by brealcing through on a quite s n a l l front. The e f f e c t of such an attaclc a s a r u l e i s quickor and nore decisive i n nountains t h a n i n the lowlands. Therefore t h e defender nust, from t h e f i r s t , oftell protect vxtalr positions by m a n s of forces ljnich can imxediately launch n counterattaclc i n a prearranged and recoimoitered direction. When such a countervnrn out fron t h e i r t i r i n g asc'ent, a t t a c k s t r i k e s tho eneny vho i s -<el1 gonorally be suaoessful. A such a counterattack i s ~ ~ 1 1 - t i n oand.vdl1 d well-timed countorattack executed i n s u i t a b l e t e r r a i n f r o n above, against an enemy bolo~r, assures tho defender both bodizy and n o r a l superiori%. 616. Mooting combats are i n general l i n i t o d t o t h e forvnrd elenents which must ofion strilce quickly. I n u n c l a r i f i e d s i t u a t i o n s and i n sharply broken t e r r a i n ' t h e troops, a s a r u l c , must be advanced on a broad f r o n t and by bounds. I n sharply brolccn, d i f f i c u l t t o r r a i n , asse~ably uroas f o r the attaclc imst be choson near 'the eneny, i n ordor t o r e l i e v c tho troop's of a too long, t i r i n g approach. Dead space should be nado f u l l use of. It i s important, i n long ascents and dosccnt's, t o 1:ecp dovm t h a oncrly f i r c u n t i l our 01x1 troops ontor tho f i r e fight. I n '$iff i c u l t mountain t e r r a i n , t h e reinforced b a t t a l i o n i s o r d i n a r i l y tho l a r g o s t u n i t vhich can bc onploycd a s a u n i t in t h e attaclc. Small u n i t s v r i l l oftbn achiovi l o c a l dcbnis'ions, Tho r o s o l u t o oxploitntion of these successes i s o f utmost importance. h e t h o r t h o attaclc s h a l l be conductod along t h e valloys o r upon t h e heights, doponds upon t l ~ e v i ~ d b h tho v a l l e y s , tho condition of of the i m e d i a t e l $ adjacent heights, upon,thc covor and c p n c o a h e ~ ~ t thc , passability, 'the vnather, and tho strength, t h e conposition and oquipmnt of t h e troops. Largor forcos ordiimrily, upon xiecting t h e enemy* m i l l attaclc sinultancously along tho v a l l e y ( s ) and tho innogliatoly adjacent heights, nnd especially' i s . t h i s ' triro i f fron tho hoights t h o v a l l e y can be comandcd by f i r e . Tho' a&'jjaoont heights. incsrenso: i n importanco a s thc b a t t l e s l a m down i n moricnont. . . Tho objectivos o f t h e a t t a c k aro o r d i n a r i l y t e r r a i n points, such a s passes o r h e i g h w n d tho e x i t f r o n t h e valloys o r the nountabs, Eithor by a turning movement, by onvclopnci~t, o r by ponotration, t h e a t t a c k e r has l o s s i n t c r o s t i n r o l l i n g up tho h o s t i l o f r o n t and flanlcs: h i s i n t e r o s t l i o s prlnmrily i n c u t t i n g off tho oneny r o t r o a t , which a s a %lo nust follolr p a r t i c u l a r routos.

617. The inore t h e t e 2 ' r a i n pro'kec$b t h e r e t r e a t i f i g enemy from our pursuing troops. and tire, .tlrie htore.mus5 t h e p u r s u i t b e d i r e c t e d against t h e h o s t i l e avenues of r e t r e t. .a . . .... Q n l y i n wi'hte'r;.'in 'high iiltikydbs,' h e n :the e n c i r c l i n g pursuit li&k t h e p?,puit t o t h e r o u t e s i s g r e a t l y .hiridef&d, .may i t b e 'necessary along which t h e eneiny .is."i+e-treati%ig, Even i n sUch i,~$&nc.es the encircling p u r s u i t must be charged t o .. r. b b p s o n. s.. kiis. , .~ .. . . , . c

to

618. I n general, i n mountains . . t e defense r e q u i r.e s . a greater force .h , ~. than. i n t h e lowlands. . . . .. The defense b f : t h e d i n battl.6 $osition i s accomplished is
groups! t h e most important-poin2;s a r & i j r e l ? a r e d f o r a l l around dofense.
Careful reconnaissance must precede + h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e main l i n e of
r e s i stande and t h o e s%ablishment of contadt a r e a s ' b e t w e n adjacent' groups.'
.Where t h e t e r r a i n . permits l i t t l e depth t o t h e 'main ba%tle pogition, it i s recormnehdod t h a t individual M.G. n e s t s and combat group's be pushed well forward. These a l s o serve t o cover dead spaces by f i r e . I f t h e pushing forward of these elom6nta i s n o t possible by day, t h e dcad spacos must be ' covered by i n f a n t r y cannon (Elinenv~rfer), mountain a r t i l l e r y 'and hovritzers. The assignment of s e c t o r s must be so made t h a t e i t h e r flanking f i r e or f i r e from t h e r e a r can c o w r t h e gaps b c t ~ w c nscctors,, i f necessary, special u n i t s are assigned t h e mission of covering gsips beymen: t h e scctors.
,

Tho more d i f f i c u l t t h o dofenso o f the k&n b a t t l o p o s i t i o n

appcars t o be, t h e more important i s it t o s t o p t h e enomy early, employing
f o r t h i s purpose advancod f o r c e s and outposts, gas, obs$acles and
hindrances. A c a r e f u l l y regulated o b s e w a t i o n sorvico must constantly
obscrve and r e p o r t t h e h o s t i l e approach.
Forces which arc t o be employed i n counterattack against an enemy which breaks i n t o t h o main b a t t l c p o s i t i o n must bo held m l l forward. 619. b l a y & g a c t i o n 5 s fnvorcd by hcights ?hich givc a f a r roaching
view, by t c r r a i n h which thO enemy i s l i m i t e d t o a fciv Poutas o r advancc,
by strenms and by favorable o b s t a c l c and hindrancc p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Tho
r o s i s t a n c c nccd o f t c n be conccfitrated only along'the roads and valleys,
t h e t c r r a i n lying b o t w c n being held only under observation. Eroops not
rcquired i n . t h c b i n rosistancc are' employed on tho ncxt l i n e . o f r c s i s -
tanco o r i n t h c intcrircning t c r r a i n .
The unified.contro1 and c o h n d of troops F o t i r i n g along
d i f f c r c n t routcs rcquiros assurod communications. Laoking t h i s communi-
c a t i o n t h e c e n t r a l i z e d control must bc secured. by moans .of assignod
.missions.. Excaptionally, t h e rctircmcnt o f soptiFated u n i t s can bc regulated according t o :a time schedule. .. uniformly - .

If t h o combat .ei&ot b c bi;ok& o f f .early 'pno~gh, t h e r c t m a t

. . e s p e c i a l l y . & i f f i b u l t . I t i 6 o f t h e u t ~ o s t importnncc '
that.. h l l sido roads, likewise d i f f i c u l t ~ ; i a p p d r c r i $ l y , uqpassablo boutcs,
ho blocked,, i n -0r6er %o hitider a n ' o n c i r c l i n g p u r s u i t ' q d , t o hold opcn t h c
r o u t e s of r c t r e a t .

ih mountains i s

620.

t~ groat advantage.

Tho r e t p c a t which i s timely bogun can ofton u t i l i z c t h o t c r r a i n

Capably l e d small dotachmcnts can, by s t r i k i n g tho
cnemy f r o n t a l l y and i n flank, acoomplish c f f o c t i v c deco&ion and dolays.

Combat a t and around Defiles

--

621.. ~ e f i l e s l,i m i t - +e, are+ f9.r n h n e u ~ yan4 , combat; they favor

t h e placing . of. . . o b.s t a . c l e s ,md hiqdrances,

~ostile a i r reconnaissanoe. :is' made eas,ier a t d e f i l e s ; d e f i l e s a r e 'especially favorable f o r a i r attacks. They increase t h e e f f e c t i v e . .ness of .. gasand ~ ! c e . . D e f i l e s increase i n importance i n r a t i o t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y
of t h e adjacent t e r r a i h (mountains, lakes, swamps) and t o t h e i r depth.
Roads i n t h i c k f o r e s t s , which have' but few r o u t e s through them,bridges
and dams may be t r e a t e d a s defiles..
I n general, d e f i l e s ' favor t h e defender and hinder t h e a t t a c k e r . Often t h e a t t a c k e r can b r i n g h i s svperior f o r c e s only gradually and t h e n not completely against t h e defender. I n an'advance against a d e f i l e which t h e enemy has not y e t 622. reached, he who reaches t h e d e f i l e f i r s t has t h e advantage. The occupation of a d e f i l e before t h e enemy reaches it can o f t e n be of g r e a t influence on t h e f u r t h e r course of an engagement. It i s only when t h e troops have t h e d e f i l e behind them t h a t t h e y r e g a i n complete freedom of action. Should t h e enemy already have reached and occupied t h e e x i t s
623. of a d e f i l e , it w i l l cf'ton be b e t t e r t o make an enveloping a t t a c k o r a
t u r n i n g movement against t h e h o s t i l e force.
Likewise;.-vhen'the two f o r c e s come together i n t h e defile,'
t h e a t t a c k e r w. i. l l of'ten more qyiekly sooure succesS by an envelopment.,

. .

Should it 'be necessary t o f i g h t t o secure 'an e x i t from t h o

d e f i i e it i s of prime hpo.rtahce t o sc.roen t h e t h e , t h e d i r e c t i o n and
tho size. of t h e a t t a c k up till t h e l a s t poss.ible minuto. Tho s h i f t i n g
of troops . i n mountains r e q u i r e s much t5me. Often it i s not possible t o
displace forces of dccisivc importance. .
'

624. I f tho a t t a c k e r omploys h i s forces against s e v c r a l d e f i l e s simultaneously, he can bring strongor f o r c c s ~ g a i n s t h c onemy and can u t i l i z e t h o advanco i n ono t o t h e advantago o f troops a t adjacent d e f i l e s .

I n an advanco from sovoral d e f i l e s in the face of a strong

enemy it i s advisable t o m i t u n t i l tho e x i t s of a l l d c f i l o s (passes)
have been rcachod, i n ordor t o avoid t h o d e t a i l o d dofoat of t h o soparatc
columns.
Shouid the ononly have already roachod t h e d e f i l e and should
625. good p c ~ s i b i l i t i o so x i s t f o r a t t ~ c k i n g him a s ho omerges, t h c s c should
bc takon advantage of.
I q pursuit wc must bcnd ovory e f f o r t t o rcach t h e f a r sidc
626.. of tho dofile, employing . a l l . . a d j a c e n t routcs f o r t h e cnciYcling movement,
i n order t o . bio.clc -the e x i t s . Under some conditionrs it may bo possiblc
t o employ only a i r forcos jnd long r a g e a r t i l l e r y . These should be
employod t o delay.
Tho dcfenso o f a d e f i l e can be exccutcd o i t h o r (1) i n f r o n t of, 627. o r (2) within, o r ( 3 ) bchind t h o d e f i l e . The main b a t t l o f i o l d i s ohoscn i n f r o % of t h e d o f i l o whon
t h e d e f i l o must be' &old opon f o r f o l l o v ~ n ~ forces.
I f our aim forcos
permit it, our M.L.X. mu& bc s u f f i c i e n t l y Tar i n ' f r o n t t o p r o t e c t t h e
e x i t s against strong h o s t i l e a r t i l 3 o r y f i r e . . I f nocessnry, wo must win
by combat t h e t e r r a i n no.cosspry. f o r our b a t t l e p o s i t i o n . . The d o f i l o
i t s e l f must b c protected,

A dofonse..;@th?.n .$h6r,dofilc . i o q u i r c s . t h a t tho adjacent t o r r a i n t o tho g r e a t e s t extorit possible precludes, an onvolopment o r turning .movement by the.oaomy. I n mountains,'tho hcigh'cs o i t h o r sidc t h e v a l l e y should be ineludad' i n . t h o defensiv6 $sition, b s p o c i a l l y i f tho dd8onse i s t o be maintained fo r a considerable poriod. . . . .

..

The:main ba%tl'o p o s i t i o h ' b e h i ~ d t h e d o f i l o m ~ 'forcc i t tho

attaclter t o make h i s e x i t i n t h o face of t h o strongest possible f i r o .
ghould t h e h o s t i l e a t t a c k be repulsed and should conditions pcrmit us t o
pass t o *:he attack, .every o f f o r t must be'm&do t o 'press i n t o tho dofilo
eit.hor beforo o r simultanedusly 'with tho en&my.
. .. . . . 628.' Delaying a c t i o n can b e s t utiinize d e f i l e s a s rol~oows:
,

I n short d e f i l e s , behind t h e d e f i l e . I n long defiles, within t h e defile.

In a r e t k a t through & d e f i l e , tho c n t r q o a t h e r e i n must be

629, socurod against a pursuidg onomy. The mwement must be closely directed,
t r a f f i c shnrply rogulatod. Countbr movoment must bo eliminated. Behind
the d o f i l o provision must be made, when necessary, f o r the covoring of
tho retirement from t h e dofilo. The placing o f obstacles and t h e dcfensc
against odvclopmont a r c of great importmoo during t h o passage through
t h c dofilc.

Frontier Dofonsc
630. The f r o n t i o r dofonse secures tho f r o n t i e r against a ground
onomy; o r d i n a r i l y it has only uank forces. By tho followin moans it can
oqualize i t s i n f e r i o r i t y t o tho cnemy t o a c e r t a i n dogroc: 71) b e t t e r
knowledgo of t h e t o r r a i n , ( 2 ) thorough u t i l i z a t i o n of tho rcsoucoos of
the arcp, ( 3 ) f n m i l i a r i t y w i t h tho cxccution of tho defonsc measures, ( 4 )
choice of. and reinforcement of favorable t o r r a i n , (5) cmploymcnt of
obstacles, hindorances,. dcstruCtZon and d m y mrks, ( 6 ) by t h o rapid,
scoret s h i f t i n g of troops,. (7) good, scoured signal means and, abovo a l l ,
( 8 ) by tho thorough u t i l i z a t i o n of thc establ'ishcd tolophono system and
t h e manifold omplcymcnt of dcccpt5.cn measures.

6811.

General l o c a l f r o n t i o r dofonso t a s k s arc: (1) Protccticn and bloclcing of tho f r o n t i o r ;

( 2 ) O btaining a r c l i a b l c picturo of t h e cncmy prcscnt i n tho f r o n t i e r nrca.
(3) Dcfcnso against an enemy who attompts t o dross tho boundary.

632. The allotmcnt of troops t o a f r o n t i e r a r e a and t h e i r d i s -

kribtihicn within sootors and sub-sobtors a r c , dotermined b$ t h o migsions
and tho t e r r a i n . Thc great .t&deh assignod a s . a '&ontic< scotor n6rmally
. requires , . t h e concontration of troops i n groups a t . t h o s o areas vrhoro t h r u s t s of tho qncmy scom most likoly.

633. The immed'iate security of t h c f r o n t i e r i s scoured by p a t r o l s .and standing patrols. Tho main force's of tho f r c n t i o r defense w i l l be located i n a f r o n t i o r do fonso position. Dependent -upon tho distance of theso forces from tho f r o n t i e r and upon t h o . 'terrain, ndvancod f r o n t i o r dofonso positions may bc cs%ablishod a s a support t o t h o f o r ~ m r & * m c u r i t clcments y
( p a t r o l ) and a s aeaurity f o r tho.makn forooi. Tn f r o n t of t h e &ontier defense
position' outposts should be estzblished.

?he c?m+nder a f t h e inrhole. determines t h e g e n e r a l l o c a t i o n cf .the fxontier defense podition&" As a rule,.coqsidering t h e weakness of $he forces, e + r y e f f o r t . w i l l be'.made t o u t i l i z e t h e t e r r a i n t o t h e b e s t advantage t o shorten the lines; Therefme,, t h e position w i l l not generally conform t o t h e boundary line: .It i s a l s o t o be recommended t h a t the position be f a r ehough from the boundary a s t o ' b e out of the e f f e c t i v e range o f a r t i l l e r y on t h e f a r s i a e of t h e ' f r o d i e r . The f r o n t i e r defense sector commanders are.responsible:foF 'tfib:detailed location of t h e position, f o r i t s preparation and censtructionand. f o r t h e advanced positions. The higher commander, i s responsPble f o r , c o ~ u h ' ~ c a t i o n ' b e - k m e n adjacent
sectors.

It i s desirable t o hold out reservei, but t h e i r maintenance

should not jeopardize e f t h c r l o c a l l p o r i n t h e whole, t h e proper
dccupation of t h e position.

Reserves of large f m n t i e r d a f e n s e u n i t s are t o be held i n

r e a a i n e s s a t points from nhich they.:cUi r a p i d l y be s h i f t e d f o r great
distances e i t h e r & t h t r a i n s held i n readiness, trucl: columns, o r vdth
.. . vehicles of 811 kinds o y b i b y c l e s . . ~. . . .. . . . . employed a t . important r c a r Roserves :of small u n i t s ' c . a n be . areas a s security against surprise: When t h e . f r o n t i e r . defense i s Eg '-'continue a cdnsiderable time, provisions must be made f o r t h e regula.r'reli.ef of the' u n i t s ; moreover 'occasional changes iq t h e positicin 'should be provided. . . , . . . . . The protection and blocking of %he boundary s h a l l prevent
forbidden t r a f f i o aoross t h e border:and within t h e defense arca, s h a l l
protect t h e f r o n i i o r land from e.xkortion and plundering, s h a l l makc
possible t h e evacuation of tlm area, s h a l l scroen other m i l i t a r y measures
and d o h o s t i l e operations more d i f f i c u l t by bperating against h o s t i l e
ground roconnaissance and i n f o m a t i a n services. The blocking of:roads,
t h e i n t e r r u p t i o n ' o f r i i l r o a d s , t e lephono and telegra@h l i n e s arc, when admissiblc'and pro;ler, taslcs of t h e scctor commander.
634.
'

..

I n cooperatios 'vdth customs, postal, police a<d f o r e s t r y o f f i c i a l s , t h e follovrin&measuroi a k c a r r i e d out: ( 1 ) defcnse against t h e hostdle intblligonco sorvico, ( 2 ) protection of tho above and . . underground tolophone not, of the r n d i o m d pigoon mossongcr t r a f f i c , ( 3 ) t h c regulation and camouflagingof our own signal coiununioation and ( 4 ) t h e s e c u r i t y of i n s t a l l a t i o n s m d importjnt public vmrlcs 'against surprise destruction, e s p e c i a l l y by h o s t i l e agents.
,

635. The reconnaissance by t h a f r o n t i e r dufensc includcs a carbfully regulated, uninterru@ed observation of t h e hrea beyond tho boundary. It may bc advisable t o e r e c t o b s e r m t i o n t o m r s .

Should tho f w h t i e r defense be pormittod t o cross t h e border, an e f f o r t should be made t o secure i k d m t i o n of the enom$, omplojring patrols, surprise attacks and hand-to-hand combat f o r t h i s purpose, Guidos $&liar with tho area should be employed. I n general, the s i z e of t h e f r o n t i e r defense force precludes any great undertaking o f f c n s i w l y . Every available moans must be u t i l i z e d t o 'aecurc information of t h e encmy. Contact once gained must be maintained,
636.

Should a w a k enemy cross tho f r o n t i e r , he i s t o bo thrown back. Against a strong enemy, tho dofenso bogins a t t h c boundary.

Should dclayirig action be our mode of operation, t h o f r o n t i e r b~:qom~...tbe . f i r s t main l i n e of resistance. dofonse p o s i t i o n (see. par. ,633): . be: t o g i v up, ~ $his line; . t h c , r e t i ~ c m e n thore t from Should .the, ... ..intont5o.n . to h h ~ noxt l i n e !off' r q s i s t w e o 2s: .m&accorcling t o , t h e s i t u a t i o n , with o r without combat.. Efrcry: affo* i s m d o 60 securo l i n e s o f resiskance with Piank, protection.: .. 637. . 1 c . a sectb'i o r po,rtioq 0% thq fko.nt,ier .6~,Penso withdraws o r should . i t bc broken through, ad$accnt soctor's~ which arc favorably ongaged o r vrhich have' n o t boon attacked,. arq t o . h o l d . Should: tho s i t u a t i o n so a & .tho mission o f ]oxecutine;' damagc on tho onomy permit', tbcsc: u n i t s h advancing on t h e i r flank c i t h c r by f i r c , by f e i h t attacks; by undertakings agaiast h i s r c a r communioations or by night surpriso a t t a c k s from t h e flank. Likcwiso, t h o omployncnt of strong r c s o m s . against t h e h o s t i l e flank, e i t h c r a s a b'lockingmcasurc .OF in. a t t a c k vdth lifnitedobjoct'ivc, can be morc effeotivo than t h o i r omplpyment on tho withdi-awing front.
. , Should th?,.frcp+ioy do-Penso-bo brokon a t 'any area, t h e troops
should be assemblcd and..:omployed a t anothar position.
. ., . , i p i t i a l l y t h e arc& i n vrhidh-'the 638. It i s i-ecommendod t o f r o n t i e r dcfcnse 7611 conduct i t s operations, The t o r r n i n i n r c a r of t h e f r o n t i o r dofohso p o s i t i o n must be rooonnoitered f o r t h e various emplojrmcnt possibilities, and i t s u t i l i z ~ t i o n f o r thecombat preparod beforehand.
,

fix

639. Whcn t h e troops arc omployad i n groups and on a broad f r o n t and normally i n grcat dopth, t h b c o m n d e r s of f r o n t i e r dofcnsc u n i t s normnlly must a c t indcpondcntly. Thcrcforc, t h e comanders should bc carefully Ehoscn and thoroughly i n s t r u c t e d a s t o tho s i t u a t i o n and t h e mission, i n t h c cxeoution of vrfiich t h c y are g i m n t h e i r .froodom. Rapid comand and information trahsmission must bo assured, with tho corrosponding choico of command posts. IJoroovor, t h c connnandcrs must bo able t o movo quiclcly Srom arca t o arca.
640. Thc f r o n t i c r dofcnsc can depend on only a limited replacement of ammunition, arms, matcrial and equipment. Col-cful husbanding of t h a t prcscnt i s t h e duty of both commander and troops.

641. Thc f r o n t i o r dcfonsc must maintain commimication vcith tho a i r observing and rwrnlng p a t r b l s cmploycd iahbho arca.
. .. .. 642. . ~ u o r i l i a wnrfarc i s u mcons which suppdrt's our clan main operation and makes morq d i f f i c u l t . t h a t df:the'onemy.. In general, g u e r i l l a varfarc ('smaly warfare) i s of importance only i n connoction with other var mcasurc s', . A h o s t i l o ; . m r l i k c population can make g u e r i l l a -marfare impossiblc. !&ore t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of giiorilla vrarfnre e x i s t s , i t s u t i l i z a t i o n i i dcpcnaent: upon .v,+pther' t h o f o ~ cs c and mdans' t h c r o i n employcd produco an equivalent rcturn.

Guerilla vmrfo,r.b i s cmploy~dagainst t h e front, tho flanks, 643. but e s p ~ c i a l l y against t h e =ear. o f t h c cnomy.
.~ .

'644, . ~ h d i v i d u amissions. l of t h c g u e r i l l a ~varfaroa* : (1) t o distui-d, t o d w g c , t o deceive t h e onomy, ( 2 ) t o divcrt h o s t i l c forces, (3) t o m k o morc d i f f i o u l t h i s r c connaissahoo, h i s command a d information transmissibnj (4) t o d i s t u r b h i s a c t i v i t i e w behind tho f r o n t and cspocially h i s supply.

645. , $or t h &' o j t d h u ~ ~ ~ h : : o f ~ ~~ ~a e~ r if~ i lx small.,raiding la c parties 31-0 most su%tablh,:;&osb <stieagth,:cqtaipmcntl nnd mobility a r c s u i t o d t o thg , &ntpn'dccl'pitr'posc; CdIjhbilikjr of lca&ers', oxpcrieaca: nnd reliability o f ' t h o forcc' %i-b'mare i m p b r t ~ ~ t.nhbcrs;.v&ieh
~ ~ n ' in f a c t : can be &otr-ontnl t omobill+$ and smpisc.6 . :
~.
~

..

The g r e a t b i t c+isc&kiokr in&. 'secrecy m.?ndispcnsable t o

SUCOCSS.

. ,., 646; ~ ' d a c k sby t h e rai&i-g. ni-c .tb; bc.,madc a s sur'prisc nttaclrs. I)c cepti-on jnd cunnii&j h r c to' bobmploycd: t o thG f u l l e st.. Encircloment .. . of t h o encmy i s t o bo sought. Terrain i s t o be choson v~hieh malccs observation and mobility
our ~~~ si uc rp rr
i s e appoarmco and difficu1t:~or the c ~ c m y , . . v ~ i c W , n i d ~ . ~ , .rapid disappearance. . . Careful prcparations and reconnaissjnec, good maps; guides
h y to
m arcns f q n i l i a r 76th t h o aren f a c i l i t a t e tho oxceution. ~ d f t c r -the undortakirig must be e l c a r l y undcrbe. roached by a l l clomcn~s stood bcforohand. Aftor tho execution of t h o task, a11 troops r e p a i r i m c d i a t o l y t o thcsc ( t h i s ) areas. Evory e f f o r t should bc made t o mlcc tho attaclts a t night,
and, i h s o f a r a s possible, marches should be madc a t night. During 'day-
l i g h t t h o troops should bo hcld concealed avmy from tovms und roads.
Rniding p a r t i c s operatihg in r c n r o f t h o onemy domaad Thcjr 'must bc equipped vvith a l l ossontials t o l a s t a .long time. ..

especially bold l e a d o r s a n d troops.

necessary

Should sovcral raiding p a r t i c s bc cmploycd simultaneously, t h e i r undortalcine;~ must be coordinated a s t o time and spacb. The detachments arc t h o r e f o r c hcld together i n spocificd areas. Changing method's, f e i n t undertakings, spreading of f a l s e information favor surprise. B y continual t h r o a t and by f r u s t r a t i n g h i s counter mcnsuros, t h e enemy i s t o bc hold i n suspense, It i s indispon'sablo t o keop a l l mowmcnts sccrot, not onljr from tho h o s t i l c m i l i t a r y forccs but: from a h o s t i l c mindod populntion. 647. Usc should be made of o b s t a c l e s and hinderanees. Thcse most effectively dmago tho encmy vhon cmploycd on r o u t e s which must bc used by t h o cncmy and near vrhich a r c no a u x i l i a r y routes.

By dostroying bri.Sgcs c t e . behind tho f r o n t , tho h o s t i l e

supply i s mado morc d i f f i c u l t .

Tho' highcr eommdcr, i n general, decrcos t h o .mount and dcgrce pf destruction. Tho woal~crt h c r a i d i n g party, tho more must it 'concontrato on and l i m i t i t s d c s t r u d i o n t o t h e most important i n s t a l l a t i o n s . Commanders c n t r u s t c d 1 6 t h missions of doetruetion must bo i n s t r u c t e d concorning tho 'importance and t e c h n i c a l p o c u l i a r i t i o s of tho o b j e c t i v e s t o bc destroy6d.
648. Tho highcr c o m n d e r must be 1ccp-t so i n f d m d a s t o bo able t o influence t h o a c t i k i t y of t h o r a i d i n g p a r t i e s and t o provide them with erdcrs. Thoroforc proVisions must be madc t o maintain some kind of communicationr

6 4 9 ; ' I'Tho dbforisa ajSirinsti.~arrill&:~nrfaro i s - t h o ? t h s k of tho pp alc~ ia troops c 6 ~ & b r m d . , Ik.may:r bo - n ~ ~ & $ s ~ r j r . t o : . os ~ yl. forces i n tho
roar,&usaB;- ;Thoso arc t o b c ' h e l d ' l ' ~ a d y u t important a r c a s f o r immodiat'c
oaplo@nt:.jnd: p+~parxtiiib.s 'arb-.to:.be.mdC for. t h o t r r a p i d displacomont.
Tho
Armorod vohicles and armorod:a&%f%ond-.%rain$'sro o fioh of %luo. nooassity f o r tho rapid transmission of information conobrning h o s t i l e
raiding ~p&i-tJ'os'~myrcquiro:
t i a l c o r n m i c a t i o n means. osp
Should h o s t i l o raiding pai-ties cntor our r e a r aarca, an'
sttom&~must bo mado, ..using surprise, . t o suri+ound and dastroy thom. A
plimcdj .det&iYcd mapping up.:may bo nocessmy, but ordinal'ily roquiros
strongcr forcos.
XII. 650. areas:
Quartering.

Troops a t r e s t may be provided one o r a l l of t h r e e kinds of

1. Ortsunterkunft

- quarters i n towns o r c i t i e s , i n buildings. (TOX.II quartering)

i n buildings antt p a r t l y i n t h e open.

2.

3.

- i n t h e open. Ortsbivouac - p a r t l y i n towns

Bivouac

651. 0rtsunterku;ft provZdes protection against bad weather and

cold and gives t h e opportunity of caring well f o r man and beast a s well
a s t h e opportuhity t o bring arms, equipment, clothing and m a t e r i a l i s t i c
good condition. Even narrow and poor Ortsunterkunftgives t h e troops
g r e a t e r protection than re'st i n t h e 'open. EspecialLy f o r animals i s any kind .of s h e l t e r preferable.
'

652. Ortsbiwuac protects i n l i k e manner those troops quartered i n :towns;lessens t h e uncomfortableness . ( f o r t h e wfiole) of t h e bivouac and 'increases.the march.and b a t t l e readiness. Those elements not quartered i n towns bivouac nearby. For those elements under s h e l t e r the regulations applicable
t o Ortsunterkunft apply, for those in bivouac, the bivouac regulations.

653. If.:proximi$y :of t h e enemy, t h e mi's5 of the troops, special t a c t i c a l considerations which l i m i t the troops t o specified areas, o r l a c k of to.**-proh+bit-%he use o f . Ortsunter1mft o r ,Ortsbivouac a l l troops bivouac. Threat of a i r a t t a c k and d a a g e r o f long r&ge f i r e , danger of gas o r t h e necessity f o r secrecy may be t h e causes f o r avoiding towns and . . cities, . . .. . .. re i n the-.bivouac area: a%d - a r e quickly
664. ~ r o o ~ s , . a assbmbled ready..for, . . march. ,comba;tr . . .. .

The bivouac i s not bound t o l o c a l i t i e s ; can o r d i n a r i l y be

quickly rea'chod and i n accordance with t h e t a c t i c a l requirements quickly
established,. -The bivouac area must bo prbtected::fro&i ho6tile ground
reconnaissance and, - in so f a r -as possible, -from a i r reconnaissnnce and
attack, from, long rangc f i r e and gassing.
655. Arrangement of bivouacs by u n i t s o r march groups facilitates tho choice of s u i t a b l e areas ahd increases, ospocially i n large connnmds, . .. tho march and b a t t l o rcadinoss.

Jn general. bi&uhcs p r o ussignod corre iponding ' t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the' tro6p.s Eased 'bn tho. tn&i&@l situation. The f r o n t C.onsid6rations ~ Y c o y C ,:and r tho l a t o r ' m c h may i s toward thi: .e!Ibiy. .bccasion doviatiobi,: O f docisiee influcnbe on t h e grouping for bivouac a r e (1) t h e torrairi, ( 2 ) accossiblo md Sd6quato *tor and wood and, ( 3 ) t h c spccial needs of tho various armsr Spe'bijl Valued cspcci?lly f o r motorized u n i t s , i q plpcod on good appr,o?ch and o m i t routcs; if noco.ssbry those must be @r.ep&cd, 6 y t . t h e y sho,uld M t betray tho bivouac krea t o h o s t i l o 'aviation.'

656. The b.iwuac.nr8a ehould havo dry, firm ground and' when possible, should provide protection aga'inst k#nd hnd v@a.l;h?Cc Light nods normally f u l f i l l these conditibns. Meadovrs are usually unsuitnblo, even though thoy sccm absolutoly d r y . The noarnoss t o w t o r , t o svmps and pools 'is nomai1.y undesirable because o f fog and probablc unhealthful conditions.

During cold m a t h o r t h e troops must bo givcri tho opportunity t o kcop warm (digging i n tho cdgcs of tho t e n t s , using hot stonos, using double t c n t s viith straw and foliage a s a f i l l e r , tho l i g h t i n g of f i r c s and similar mcasurcs). Protootion against wiiid i s socurcd ill and bohind ~ n o d s , bohind stoop slopos and i n defiles. ' Should contaot v i t h the e<omy on t h e ground bo out of tlic 657. question, f i r s t considoration i s givcn t o ' t h c comfort of tEe troops. Thc follovdng conditions dotermino t h e oxtcnt of t h o aroa assigned f o r tho re st: (1)
(2)
.(3)
(4)

The numbcr and s i z e of tho t o m s i n tho aroa. The l o c a t i o n of these towns r c l a t i v c t o t h e routes of march. Tho dopth of t h e mai-ching troops. Tho distance marchod and t h o ncxt propo'sod march.

( 5 ) Tho timo sot for tho rcsumption of tho march.

I n goncral it i s simplor and more comfortable f o r tho troops vhon tho a r e a assigncd approximtss tho march dcpth. Tho d i s t r i b u t i o n of tho troops i n thc to?pms i s dotormined by tho c x i s t i n g troop d i s t r i b u t i o n o r . t h o . d i s t r i b u t i o n intcnded f o r tho ncxt march. It i s rocoimncndod. t p occupy t o f u l l c s t capacity tho torms along tho routo of march. Who3 various hrm's Lrc quartered togcthcr a l l rooms and ' s t i b l o s must bo f u l l y u t i l i z c d . Should thero be a lack of to~.ms, somc troops must bivouac near tho routcs of march. Thc baggngc t r a i n s can bo scnt' forvard t o tho troops.

658. VJhcn coatact ~ 6 t h tho micrny on tho can bo dxpcctcd, t a c t i c s 1 considorations must govern. The rcbt aroa v f i l l be docroased i n siio. strong illfantry elements i r d l b c givcn'araas of r e s t . tb t h c front;on oxpvsed flanks and, under some cbnditions, i n tho roar. They m y be reinforcod b y ' ~ a & dcfenso clcmonts'. Troops mhich i n thcmsclws arc not capablc of defending against a surprise a t t a c k arc quartored (bivouaokod) 76th i n f a n t r y and. i n a protcctod arca.

I n towns it i s ortenexpodi-ent t a . : i $ s u e i q s t r u c t i o n s f o r t h e greater. readiness, o f . f r i d i v i d G l , elemants.:or .of the:vhole, such a s t h e h o 1 d i . k together, i n c l o s e ' b i l l 6 - E ~ and . i.pstructZons cdnc&niy t h e m a r i n g b f c l o t h i n g w d . t h e re'adiness'bf;:equi&nt, e t h ; . - ' E v e r y close b i l l e t must h a & l i g h t ' andia. guard. T f neces$aiy and 'oohsiileri% t h o required t r a f f i c , t h e ' exits o f a town should be .blooked and t h e difknse ..o r .t h e quartering ... a r e a be ,.pr.epared.
. .

I n bivouacs (tonts,' c t c . ) if;may bo necessary t o talcc spccial

pr4cautions against long r a g e f i r e and a i r attack, f o r oxamplo, camou-
flagod cover trcnohes.
Trains should be hcld tho f u r t h o s t from t h e encmy, when
possible behind stream l i n e s .
The advance of t h e baggage' t r a i n depends on t h o s i t u a t i o n and
i s detcrmincd by t h e highor comandor.
659. Should t h o forcc be thin attacking distance of t h e main
h o s t i l e force, t r p o p s bivouac corresponding t o tho b a t t l e considorations.
Troops vhich a r e engagcd i n combat re'st during piuscs i n t h e
cngagomont on t h e ground whore thoy happon t o be.
660. Concerning 'the r c s t of army cavalky and motori'zcd u n i t s sec
pars. 212, 224 and 225.
661. I n tho shoicc of quartcrs f o r t h e highor and lowcr commanders
s p e c i a l considcration must bc givcn t h c nccossity f o r f r i c t i o n l o s s
i;ransmission of r c p o r t s and ordors i n t h e shortost timo. Both t h e s i e n a l
communication and t h o condition of tho roads must bo considcrcd.
! f % s bivouacs t h e highcr conunandcrs and t h e subordinate
commanders dovrn t o includc thoso of rogimcnts should, if possible, bc
quarterod i n t o m s ,or housos.
662. Tho protcction g i w n t h e r e s t a r c a by anti-hircrai't forces shauld bo basod oh t h o rocomendat'iohs of thosc troops. I n an oxtcndod r c s t a r c a t h e A.A. protcction by A.A, t r o o p s i s , i n general, l i m i t c d t o t h o a r c a s donsoly occupied and t o tho placos of issuance (supplies). Tho a n t i - a i r c r a r t .xcapoiis of tho t r o o p s v d l l bc omploycd c i t h e r
by t h c t r o o p s thcmselms o r i n accordance 76th bivouac o r Ortsuntcrkunft'
comander. The highcr comhander. spocifio's tho obopbration b c t ~ o r tih o A.A.
troops and t h e .A..A. vcapons. o'f tho, troops. Tho perso&ol o f t h o A.A.
\capons w i t h t h o t r o o p s 'di'stributcs. i t s e l f . amorig tho o b s e r 6 t i o n and
warning scrvic6 of thd.LA. t r o o p s 0.r. indop.ondently -executes t h i s scrvice.
Thcrc sKould be no r c s t r i c t i o n on 6 opining of f i r e against h o s t i l e
aircraft..
Thc a i r defcnse i s complomcntcd by preoautionary mcasuros i n t h e bivouacking o r quartoring of t h e troops; such a s t h e avoidance of small, narrolq v i l l a g e s , of small; sharply definod vcods, t h o u t i l i z a t i o n of conmaled ground o r s u i t a b l c underground quartcrs f o r t h o bivouac, choosing t hc bivouak a r c a a t a tlistance from s t r i k i n g 'loridmarks, and creating d m y installations. Vohiclcs should be c o ~ c c q l o d o r irregularly ,p:lrl:ed and onmouflagcd. I n tovms, t h e looation of c o l l a r s and o t h e r such possib i l i t i o s of dofcnsc p g a l n s t a i r a t t a c k must bo mado h.lom. A t night v c must bo ablo . . t o darkon complc.tcly tho Ortsunterkunft.

663. A I ~a m i l a b i o c x i s t i i < s i g n a l communications should bc omploybd i n t h o :quarteririg' ( r e s t ) a r e a i n ordor t o conscrw tho s i g n a l o arc troopsb - Should,th6r.k b6 no o r l i t t l e f a c i l i t 5 c s available, &on v a t a distanco from thc'oriom$ v&rc comunication obtained by t h c bivouac groups c u t t i n g - i n t o t h o d i v i s i o n trunk l i n c v s i l l o r d i n n r i l y suffice. I n s i t u a t i o n s v h o p tho. cnomy. i s i n closc proximity, it i s necossary t o conncct 'tho higher c o m n d c r and tho bivouac groups by menns of a s p c i a l :wire net.

he b troops y should be made 664. The r e s t areqs t o be o . c c ~ i ~ t~ kno:.rn' early, during t h e maroh or, i f s u i t a b l e , i n t h e order f o r t h e march. Should t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e r 3 s t a r e a s k b e made knorrn l a t e , t h e t r o o p s a r e permitted t o r e s t along t h e route and nro f e d while t h e a r e a Unnecessary h a l t s and -reversal of r o u t e s i s reoomoitere'd and prepared. must be avoided. I n so f a r a s conditions permit, r e s t areas should be prepared
665. be f orehnnd.
bo ,nrrange'd with t h e c i v i l 666.. If possible, quartering i n tovms %%ill a u t h o r i t i e s :and t h e quartoring s t a f f w i l l n o t i f y t h e t r o o p s . Precautionary mcasures against espionage a r e rocomcnded. The issuance of quartcring s l i p s guarmtces an o r a e r l y procedure and should alvnys be done :hen time i s available. Lilcewise, i f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f troops t o r e s t a r e a s i s made a f t e r t h e march begins t h e scnding fornard of quartcring to rost t h i n i f tho p a r t i e s promises a more r'zpid t r a n s i t i o n from troops appear unannounced. B y questioning t h e c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s or i n h a b i t a n t s it must be
detohnined if any and -;that kind of discaso o r epidemic i s prcsont i n tho
town. Housos and s t a b l e s i n which t h e r e i s siolmess are t o bo marlred nnd
unoccupied by t r o o p s o r animals. I n ordor t o u t i l i z c tho s t a b l c s t o t h e
f u l l o s t , ' t h o mixing o f t h e an5mals of sovcral arms m y bo nocossnry and
suitable.

667. A s h o r t e r procooding .(~>ihcn timc f o r f u l l reconnaissance and questioning of t h e l o c a l o f f i c i a l s docs not c x i s t ) c o n s i s t s i n as'signing a n ' a r o a of tho town t o a unit, s t ~ c t a snd houses t o i t s clcmontn, S t a f f s s h o u l d b e quartored togother. Whon possible o f f i c o r s should bo s e ~ t for7:m-d. Those t&o over t h o a r c a assignmcn*~. Tho sonior proforably i s nil o f f i c o r of tho s t a f f of tho a r c a (tovm) 'commnndcr: t o him nro attnchod o f f i c o r s of t h o i n d i v i d u a l s t a f f s aud units. 668. Tho various districts of t h e Ortsunterkunft must have e a s i l y recognized boundaries. I n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of a r e a s canside r a t i o n must
be given t h e defense oP t h e a r e a s and t h e s u i t a b l e quartering or^ t h e
troops.
669. Everyone i n t h e Ortsunterkunft must lmow where h i s next senior,
every commander where h i s n z subordinate i s t o be found.
670. I n order t o reconnofter and define t h e areas, t h e bivouac
commander, accompanied by o f f i c e r s of t h e various u n i t s , precedes t h e
troops.

As each u n i t ar'rives it proceeds immediately t o t h e preparation of i t s bivouac. Any l a t e r s h i f t i n g of troops means t h a t much l e s s r e s t and only under most pressing circumst+noes should it be required o r permitted. '

.. . . . 671. ~nteikunns:~u@@in (ITi'k~e6g*ups j ;re assigned several and,

often, various kiadx. o : . . q ~ a % e r i n ,
a~ rias. T~i?se groups a r e formed if t h e quartering and t,k'.<$st&$&i& of o r d e i s during t h e :rest a r e co irrespo~d , t o thq fo'rmer o r contemaccelerated. A s 9 ' k x . e the&' g G ~ p plated. m r c h o r eohba4. .groups:.. l'h6.$rtering of %,he " b i l l e t group" i n e iecpoX"Gs t o t h e t h e quartering a r e & i ; leiY t d t h e Rroup corrdnandcr'. H higher c o p a l d e r his.:diupcsitions . a n d ' i n s t r u c t i o n s .
672. UQess otherwise ordcred by t h e higher co.?mnand t h e senior
o f f i c e r i n e a c h O r t m ~ t e r k n f t i s t h e t o & omGndcr. Regimental
commanders and conm&dors of u n i t s iiiigar t h a n < ' r e g b e n t a? authorized . t o dclogato t h i s d.&y t o another o f f i c c r ( s t a f f o f f i c e r ) . '

If it '.ms not becn donc.beforeliand, t h e town commander assigns H e i s rckponsible 'for t h e s e b u r i t y t h e a r c a s t o be ( ccupicd by each unit. mcasurcs, t h c rcndiness of t h e comm%nd and t h o . i n t o r i o r organization. Especially i s P.3 chotgcd-w i t h de'tormining the, numbor a n h ' t h e t a s k s of tho s c c u r i t y and t L e i n t e r i o r guards. H e complomcnts t h e ' i n s t r u c t i o n s issued by t h e various, u n i t s eoncorning readiness and alarms) hc i s s u e s rogulations concerning t r a f f i c , control of tho p o m l a t i o n and countir-espionage, concorning s'sroct patrols, tho soizurc of arms, tho s e c u r i t y and guarding of supplios., firc-provontions, hc i s s u c s i n s t r u c t i o n s concerning v ~ l l s and vmtor 'mpply and t h o sourccs t o be usod by m r i o u s u n i t s : hc issuos i n s t r u c t i r . n s about s p c c i a l nodical and v c t c r i n a r y provisions and concerning t h e quar';oring of s i o k and woundcd Inon and h n i m l s and when ncco ssasy comcrnJ.ng t h e nocoszary dcgassing mcasurcs. Hc' assurcs h i n s c l f t h a t u n i t s ?.atcr t o a r r i v c v d l l bo properly .quarterad.
Whon a portion o f t h o force must r c m i n i n bivouac & i l c a port-.on i s i n Ortsuntcrkunft, t h e town cornandor i s s u o s tho nocossary i n s f r u c t i o n s f-utilization by tho bivouackod troops. o f t h o facilities i n ';hc.. town. Tho m t c r supply must bc so rogulatcd t h a t t h e tovm vrill not. bc ondangcrod 2s. a r e s u l t of f i r c . Tho rogulations prcmulgatcd by t h o t o m homandcr must be supportod by t h o mutual coopcratibn of t h o various units. .. . , ., .
,673. Tho occupation by many t r d o p s of lclrgo towns :and y i l l a g o s f o r which prov5cus arrjngcnicnt s have n o * b c o n madc, f o r o&omplc, tcv,qs captured id combat, d c m d s t h a t -*own cornandor bo provided inrmcdiatoly . . w h t i strong, and if possiblo fresh, t r o o p s f o r tho cstablishmclit of t h o ncccssary s c c u r i t y and f o r t h o nCodod 'guard s q b i o c i n t h c t o v i ~ . Among t h c i n i t i a l nicasurcs t o bo i n s t i t u t e d a r c tho ostablishmcnt of an adcquato guard sorvicc and tho cmploymcnt of numcrous p a t r o l s t o scareh hcusos, t o sock out planted donlolitions, t o .scizd anapons and t o l c d.a t .c and guard . m a t c r i a l l c f t 'by tho 'cnemy. .
'

674. The bivouac ccnmmder bf every bivouac i s , without f u r t h e r order, t h e senior o f f i c e r present. H e determines t h e s e c u r i t y measures t o be t a k e n al;ainst both ground $nd enen~ies:, a s ,mil a$ prescribing t h e necessary e r e c t i o n of obst6cles and hinderancc's. H e de signcites t h e a r e a s t o be occupied by t h e various u n i t s and r e g u l a t e s t h e use of t h e various resources (WIZS, springs, etc. ) ~6 i s e s p o c i a i ~ ~ r e s p o n B i b t lh cat 0 . 1 1
available (straw, -mod, &to. ) i s &di'3.t&lj and oquitc.bly
d i s t r i b u t e d o r a l l o t t e d so t h a t t h e troops zrc a b l e quickly'to p r o t e c t
themselves against t h e m a t h e r m d t o m k c us0 of t h e r e s t period.
According. t o t h e ~ciseuinstances, he pe&its o r f o r b i d s f i r e s .

dr

675. I n oveq 5 o m (bivouac) t h e to&n (bivouac) commmder 'appoints

an o f f i c e r o f t h o day (guard scrvicc). I n l a r g e eommimds t h i s o f f i c e r
7 1 h l l bc a s t - f f officcr. H c i s a t t h c disposal of tho comandcr i n tho
promulgation of a l l measures conrerning c u t e r s e c u r i t y (outposts )., and
i n t e r i o r guards.

Thc o f f i c b r of t h e b y (guard s c i v i c e ) i s tho s c n i c r officer of. t h e g u a r d sarv.$cd. .The. pasting of, t h c - i h s t r u c t i o n s t o , and t h o inspo'cti,ons of,.: tho ~ u a r 8 : a n d o u t p o s t.a1*c' . . undcr .'his .;jurisdiction a t a l l timos. I n bivouac 'the i n t c r i o r guird.i's: handlad by an o f f i c c r of t h c guard, t h e goncrap superior of a.11~ t h o guards h y bn -officer. o f t h c day (guard sorvicc.);

Inspecting o f f i c o r s arc amployod a s nccdod.

Tho t o m (bivouac) cornandor dcsignatos t h c modtcal and tho 676. votorinary o f f i c c r from t h c porsonncl provided f o r town (bivouac) scrvico. Thcsc advisc t h e commander on a l l mcdicnl m d v c t o r i n a r y mattcrs and must bc always a m i l a b l c t o him. EvcPy u n i t ( i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n , cavalry rcgimont, a r t i l l c r y b a t t a l i o n , c t c , ) designates an c f f i c c r , onch smallor Yndcpcndent u n i t a non-commissionod o f f i c e r Far t o m (bivouac) scrvicc. As soon a s t h e i r u n i t s roach t h c quartoring a r c a %hose roprcsontativcs r c p o r t t o t h e town (bivouac) b f f i c c r of t h c day i n order t o procurc from him tho i n s t r u c t i o n s and c r 6 c r s . Within t h o i r j u ~ t s d i c t i o n st h e y aro rcsponsiblc f o r quiet and ordcr and f o r tho zcemcution of a11 mcasurcs 'promulghtod by t h o tcvm (bivouac) cornandor and t h c i r u n i t cornandor. Xbcn but onc u n i t occupics a tovm o r a bivouac t h c guard and
town (bivouah) sorvicc a s indicated abcvc i s porfcnncd viithout sub-
distribution.
I n many instances outor guards a r c noccssark; thcsc may bc
677. pushcd boyond t h e cdgo of t h e ~ o v m o r t h e bivouac area,' They pcrfcrm
t h o i r mfssicns i n accordanco with tho p r i n c l p l c s of par. 212. Thcir
thorc a r c s e c u r i t y
t a s k s , strength arid cclnpcsition depond upon ~ h c t h e r 9orcos f u r t h c r cut. I f ncccssary t h c y tdco ovcr t h o a i r cbscrvaticn
scryicc (662): Nhon c a l l c d for, t h c y control t h o 0utwqi.d t r a f f i c of t h o
inhab.itants o f t h o town and prevont ogrcss of . c i v i l i a n s i b t c ~bivcuacs..
.Communication rriith ncighbcring u n i t s should bcmiint3;incd. I n ovcry r c s t a r c 3 i n t c r i c r guards v i i l l bc postcd. Thcsc may 678. : a l s o bo 'chargod with t h o scrvicc of vmrning a g a i n s t a i r and ground onemics, I n tho troops, according closo quastcring, t o tho population "tcvm quartcr" cach u n i t i ' s c a l l c d upon t o provido
t o t h c nood, f o r tho guard. Policc consider-ticns,
a l a r g c numbcr of arcas t o bo ~ n t c h c d , unccrtdinty a s
otc., may demand largo and numorous posts.

Tn bivouac oach u n i t providcs i t s i n t e r i o r gumd basod on i t s

o m heeds and ordcrs. The s t r c n g t h of t h i s guard i s bascd on t h e numbor
of posts, &ich should bc hcld t o tho minimm.

Tho conduct of t h c i n t c r i o r guard i s based oil t h a t of t h o

i n t s r i c r guard i n tho poxmvcnt garrison. Hcv~cmr, no honors aro
rcndcrcd.
I n small comands and i n b'ivouac, outor guards can a l s o
pcrform.thc d u t i o s of i n t c r i o r guards. Thoir conduct Sn tho cxccution
of tho outor s c c u r i t y i s not changcd thoroby.

679.

E w r y guard must h m a buglcr attachod.

680. .Tho quaflbrs 'of thc+gwn c o ~ q d c q ,-.o f iho . c f f i c o r of t h o day I g d , r d s c r v i c c ) a s >all ii..,th&:'co@qnd post of t b c conunmdcr must be
lpovm and c u s i l y rb$ognizod by' dny . qnd ;by,night. .: :Tho r b u t e s loading
t h c r c t o must bo c l i a r l y q+rkcd. Gu~sd'sa ~ d posts . must bc informod of
thcsc iociftions so t h a t mosscngcrs otc. can bc quickly d i r e c t e d thcrc.

A t t h e ccmmond post, of t h e bown e o m n d o r a slcotch showing

t h o conunuiiication n o t and containing l i s t of t h e s t a f f s and troops
quartored in t h c nroa should bc posted.> . This-skotch vrill a l s o show vhc'rc
t h e ' .mrieus. connections: . . . t o t h e va$icus s t a f f s and u n i t s arc established.

'

Tho l o c a t i o n of spocial cstablishmcnts, such a s gas s t a t i o n s ,

h o s p i t a l s , e t c . , should bc indicatod by signs and m r k c r s , i n d i c a t i n g t h o
rcutos t h c r c t o ,
Tho q u a r t c r s o f tho m r i b u s t r o o p u n i t s a r e dcnotcd and
fiarkod i n ' t h e usual m y (flags, okc, )
661. Tho bivouac commander bivouacs at o a s i l y rccognizablo
a r e a whoso l o c a t i o n i s madc kncvm t o a l l guards.
682. Tho o f f i c c s of t h o s t a f f s must bc c l c a r l y and o a s i l y
recognizablc day and night (flags, markcrs, l i g h t s ) . \Vhcn c f f i c c r s and
ncn-commissioned c f f i c c r s arc temporarily a t a hendquartors f o r t h c
recoption of o r d c r s t h e i r mounts add o t h c r moans of. convcyancc a r e t o bo
taken carc of near t h c hendquartcrs.
683. Whcn tho prosence o f s t a f f s or t r o o p s i n a p a r t i c u l a r a r c a
should be hold sccrct, it may bc necessary t o l i m i t tho means of
iddntifYcation o r e n t i r e l y t o f o r b i d them.
684. When t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e population i s uncertain, s p e c i a l
prctcotivc measures, such a s t h r o a t s of punishmont, seizure of hostagc s,
t h e rep&iromont t h a t a l l houscs be accessible and unlocked, ctc., may bc
noccsshry.
Inccnsidoratc trentmcnt of a quiot pcpulacc i s wrong. I n a11 s i t u a t i o n s , r c % t r a i n t and rcscrvc t o tho pcpu1ation.i.s tho b c s t policy. CEmcorning measures of countor cspicnage sec pars. 190 and 193. 685. Vehicles, which i n Ortsuntorkunft c&ot bc hold near t h c animcils, should be so plnccd, and on t h c side avmy from tho cncw, t h a t tho animals, cap be .quihkly b r o u g h t , h h m s s c d and i h c m h i c l o s drikcn off. Motor vohiclgs rcquiro ,good routes. of approach and dcparturo, an i c c c s s i b l o supply of vator and goad -p&king ground. B.ccausc of f i r b hazards, f ucl vehiclcs must not $0 parkcd'vsithin 50 yards of buildings. Smoking ncar t h c s c .vchiclcs i s forbiddon., 'Vckiicles parked along s t r c c t s must bc i n d i c a b d by lantcriis
a t night.
686. The carrying out of t h o mcdical ahd vcterS1mry moasurcs dccmed lmcessary i n ' a t o m quarter' must be enforced. Drinking v a t e r sourccs a r c t o bc markcd. Watcr~sourccsabout vhich thcrc i s d o u b t d must bc t c s t c d t o dcterminc vhothor tho vntcr can o r cannot bo' drunk v.cithcut boiling. It may bc nocessaiy t o construct l a t r i n c s i n tovms.

I n bivouac garbage and rofuso from slaughVoring must be

buried doc$ly onough t o . , p r ? , w n t... .. a ~ ~ .. dieeing .,l s . , , . it up. S i m i l a r l y must
a ... . , - . . :.

l % t r i n o s.bo d u g .sufficiently &op, .. . . ::". . During ~ m r m 'bathor moro stririgont k n i t a r y and modioal
moasuros may bo :rcquirod.
. . . : .. , . For g . long st&$. ia on; .qu&r$or.'thc3ncdical and veterinary 687. nfoiicnsuros must bo b r o u g h t t o pcrfe,ctidn. Tlic Spbcial 6stablishmonts can bo e n l a r g e d hnd made. s*i$ar t o 5hok.o i n ' t h o p e h o n t garrison.' Arrange- . monts f o r t h o convonionco ind.comfort bf. tho troops must 'bo mciclo.
~
'

'

'

688. Orde'r, clennlinoss and d i s c i p l i n e must bo m i n t a i n c d i n t h o

quartoring area,

. . .

I n Ortsuntcrkunft t r b o p i o x t o i d t h c snmo c o u r t e s i e s vjhich r.ro shorrn i n t h o pormanont garrison. It mhy bc advis,ablo and necessary t o ordor a n c a r l i o r closing of t h 6 stpros, t o forb'id t h e s a l e o r use of .'. . alcohol and t o roquiro t r o o p s t o r o t i r o e a r l i o r . Stringont mocsuras must bo talcon a g a i n s t thc.misuso of arms,
wanton damago t o o r $0 s t r u o t i o n of proporty belonging to'onomi~s, of
supplios and storba a s m11 i s against i n d i v i d u a l a r b i t m r i n o s s ;
689. An "Alarm Assembly Placen i s d e s i g n a t e d f o r t h e individual
u n i t s i n an Ortsunterkunft ( t o m quartor). These places are -to be so
chosen t h a t t h e troops can qui'clcly assemble without interfe'nence of one
group with another. - T r a f f i c t o t h e s e points cannot be bloclced. It i s
o.ften s u i t a b l e t p have t h e "Alarm plake" f o r horse-dravm and motorized
u n i t s a t t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e vehicles.

'

I n general, in' bivouacs, t h e "!arm u n i t s i s t h e bivouac area.

lace"

o f t h e individual

:.

690.' For t h e "alarm" the s i g n a l "alarm" i s blown. The s e n i o r o f f i c e r o r the town (bivouac) connnander gives t h e order f o r t h e alarm. .When danger t h r e a t e n s every guard recognizing t h e danger must give t h e alarm; every o f f i c e r and every platoon. leader i b a u t h o r i z e d on h i s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t a cause the alarm t o be soundkd. 691. I n order t h a t each u n i t , Ortsunterkunft and bivouac can be brought quickly t o t h e a l e r t and be 1 s assembled without unnecessary noise and blown signals, "quiet alarms" must be prepared and employed. 692. Upon t h e "Alarm signal", troops i n f u l l equipment assemble a t t h e i r "alarm assembly places" o r occupy previously designated points. All vehicles a r c made rcady t o march. The d e t a i l s f o r t h e conduct of t r o o p ~~hihon t h e "alarm" i s given, i s proscribed by t h e u n i t comrlmnder when but one u n i t i s concerned; otherwise by t h e town o r bivouac commander. The mounted and motorized u n i t s , t r a i n s hnd v e h i c l e s r e p i r e
spacial i n s t r u c t i o n s , even more so f o r night alarms.
'Nhen,mounted u n i t s occupy a town considcrtion must be given whether it s h a l l bo evacuated, 'employing $emporary resistance, o r whcthcr it s h a l l be dofended with a l l .available forces. Every a l e r t e d u n i t must prcscrvc quiet and order. Tho conduct of t h e guard ( o u t e r ) i s specified by t h e town
(bivouac) commander, that of t h e i n t e r i o r guard by t h e u n i t commandcr.

. ; 693.- .The -time required .....f . .o .q -~~ ,the ~x e . ~u t $ o op f .; t h e "alarm" i s

which, .on. . t h,e o t h e r tyoops, .. . . shortened by an: iacreased: re,adiness :of,the . . . . . . . . . . hand, l e s s e n s t h e r e s t of t h e +rqops , . .. . . , , ,

.In espec+~Jl,y~&ense..,sitwaticns a,nd. a sjgqltaneous t h r e a t e n i n g it may b i k d v i s a b l e .to @i&rter t h e t r o o p s a s a t t i t u d e of t h e complete units. O f f i c e r s remain with t h e i r platoons; t h e men remain f u l l y clothed, .weapons and, s q u i p e n t - close .at hand. I f .necessary t h e hoi-ses . remain b r i d l e d a n d saddled. ,arid .pi&ke,tted?utsi,de' t h b ,stables, i n ... : .... scme:lnstances ,even o u t s i d e ,t,+town. .. . .~.
.......
..
~~

igaiis.t s u s p r i s e attack, 694. Every manmust l%ol"'&at he i s t o and he. must have h i s arms .and' equipnent. so l a i d o u t t h a t he can movc out : i n t h e s h o r t e s t time possible.

db

Should t h e enemy i n a . s u r p k i s e a t t a c k penetrate t h e tom%

.
everyone- defends himself where &e is. . .
i-

695. The tpwh o r b&ouac c o m n d e r gives t h e order t o sound t h e I n sudden dinger ovcry' o f f i c e r and platoon leader signal "Gas Alarm". i s ,authorized. t o give t h e alarm against gas.
s on h i s gas mask o r seeks t h e gas Evcry man immediately proof s h e l t e r . The t o m (bivouac' comander i s s u e s t h e d c t a i l o d i n s t r u c t i o n s concerning gas defense.
696. The approach o f h o s t i l e a t t a c k plaqes by day i s made known by elements of t h o " p a t r o l and warning servicett. Upon mm'ing, t h e pcrsonncl of t h e Ortsuntorkunft o r bivouac seek concealment. A l l o t h e r movoment stops.

P"

Icon an a i r . a t t a c k t h r e a t e n s t h e s i g n a l "Fliegeralarm4' ( ~ i r a t t a c k ) i s givon by clemonts of t h e "patrol and mrning' service". A l l olements immcdiatcly sock protection i g a i n s t t h e attack.

"
Ordinarily no alarm i s given a t night against f l i o r g , The decision i n t h i s matter r c s t s vrith tho t o m (bivouac) comhnder, who must make known imnediatcly any c h n g c i n t h c i n s t r u c t i o n s . Tho s i g n a l s "P.larmn And " F l i c g b r 697. i m e d i a t c l y by t h e , buglers and trumpotcrs. .
...............

~l:rm"

a r c tnken uh

. . .

Thc s i g n a l "Halt", givon on ordor o f t h e tovm o r bivouac commander, releases' tho commmd from tho conditions imposod by t h o "Gas" and "Fliegcr Alarm",
. . . ... . .
. . .

The. t o & ( ~ i v o u a c )oommander i s s u o s i n t h e t o w (bivouac) ordor t h e . i h s t r u c t i o n s covoring ( 1 ) rcadinoss, ( 2 ) conduct aga5.nst a surprisc a t t a c k , (3) vm-nings aga'inst'aviation and, a i r attack, ( 4 ) alarms . and ( 5 ) "Gas" and "Fliogor Alarm".
698.
~

.
.

. . .

.,

XIII.
.
,

Army Cavrrlry.

motorized

Bocauso Army Cavalry i s compo.sod of moudted, .horse-dram and b n i t s it can mote more r a p i d l y than a kit i n which i n f a n t r y i s prcscnt. ~ o d t c d u n i t s ham break cross-country mobility.

699.

The g r e a t o r spood makcs possiblo t h o covoring o f grcator distances i n t h e same timo. The mobility of t h o mounted u n i t s i s of g r e a t significance on t h e f i e l d o f b a t t l c .

-. . ~. It $6 p d s 8 i b l e ~ f g ranny"Favalry t o b6 brought quiclcly from . a aistaxice dnd throv& into: a.&?bat .. It )can 'rai3idi.y 'dovolop i t s e l f f o r battle: i ' can c@velop, i n . a short t&ilO; i t s f o r c m on a broad f r o n t o r concpnt;r?:tto theni a$ .& d e c 5 s . i ~ amar. Upon brealcihg' o f f combat it oan . mpidlr~pu. tciis&~< bet,vmcn itso3.f and t h o eilcmy,' . . .
,
i

,~

. .>: . .,.. .

'~

'

spoed, mobility and f i r o p o w r make army cavalry s u i t a b l c f o r Those f a c t o r s som6timcs make-it superior t o a many kinds of missions. . strongor but slovmr moving enemy.. '

...

'.

On . t h e ath& h a i d , ? h i t s must bc dravm i n tho empioyment of

t h c army cavalry because of t h e depende.nc6 upon the' c a p a b i l i t i e s of tho
animals and t h e d i f f i c u l t y of t r a i n i n g replacbments. After strenuous
: t a s k s , opportunity must be given t h e cavalry t o rocuporate i t s s t r e n g t h and regain i t s march capacity. Tho g r e a t s e n s i t i v i t y and m l n o r a b i l i t y of mounted troops t o a i r attacks, e s p e c i a l l y while on t h e march and when assembled, rcquiros tho assignment of strong A.A. troops t o thorn. 700. The army cavali'y r e q u i r e s a largo zone of a c t i o n i n order
t h a t it may remain activo. N o matter how d i s t a n t i t s oporations may be,
it must not l o s e i t s connection with t h o main force.
Tho army cavalry f i n d s i t s main omploymcnt e i t h e r on an o'pon
f l a n k of tho. army o r i n a broad gap b e t m e n t m elements of t h e army.
When t h e t v m main f o r c e s are f a r apart, tho'omployment of t h e army
cavalry t o t h o f r o n t i s of g r e a t importanoc. As tho aroa becomos too
small f o r i t s employment it i s t o be 1,rithdrawn. Should t h i s prove im-
practicable or impossible, e a r l y p l i n s ? a d ' proparations must be mado t o
incorporato t h e cavalry force i n t h e f r o n t .
If no favorable cmploymont i s found f o r t h o army cavalry,
it should bo hold i n reserve, favorably located f o r f u t u r e employmnt.
701. undertakings of decisive iniportance require t h e formation of
cavalry corps vrith strong corps troops. In accordance with t h e mission,
t h e army cavalry u n i t s must be reinforced by other troops.
702. It i s seldom t h a t army cavalry, vihich i s sont on d i s t a n t
missions, can be d i r e c t e d from t h e roar. Therefore, tho mission must
i n d i c a t e a d i s t a n t objective and givc tho cavalry commandor frocdom of
exocution. The commandor of t h o cavalry force must be kept informed
a s t o t h e dcvelo'pont of t h o s i t u a t i o n and t h c f u r t h e r i n t e n t i o n s of t h e
higher commandor,
Changing .the d i r a c t i o n of employment o r withdrayring t h o army cavalry from a movcmont already begun c a r r i e s i.rith it a l o s s of force and of t h o , bcoausc t h e already omployed rcccnnaissanco must be drawn i n nhd tho newly amployod must bo giircn time t o gain distance t o t h e now front. 703. Somctimcs t h e army c a v & y must oporate f a r d i s t a n t from tho army supply services and n u s t cohduct i'ts operations vdthout consideration of i t s o?m supply communidatiens; Tho leaving .behind of f c r c o s t o protect i t s l i n e of comhunications. rkq&ens i t s f i g h t i n g strength; Thorofore i f a r m y . c a w l r y i s ' s e n t on d i s t a i l t hissions; it must bc s u f f i c i e n t l y oquippcd l J i t h aminunition, arms, s t c r c s , gas and o i l , ' andanimals should be ncrrly It ~~5.11 s u b s i s t f r o m t h e lanc shod i n ordor t o make t h e force independent.

,o,ftho taslcs; t h o i r indopondcnt and rapid y 704. Tho m u l ~ i ~ 1 i c . i t solution'and thp., froqu,ont, rtipcd changcs i n tho s i t u a t i o n demand i n tho porsonality'qf.:.thc Mglicr F+lry oownander a high dogroo of mental elasticity, coid-blooaod, daring couragb, bodily a c t i v i t y , and s t r a t e g i c a l understanding, ahd tho a b i l i % yt o m3h-o quick doeisions and issuo short, e 'must socuro ea r l y and froin a .position +ell forvnrd o f f o c t i w or'8ors.. H a personal vicvr of tho s i t u a t i o n *nd t h e terrain. 705, Tho' cavalry corps commandor issuos t h e ordors f o r t h o a i r o proscribe$ tho objoctivos of t h o ground reconnaissance roconnaissanco. H by tho, divisioq's; ho prescribed boundarios, and, t o tho oxkcnt nocossary, r o u t o s of march. ,Nodas'signod missions t o tho divisions ,and, vlnbri rcquirc'd,, d i r e c t s their moveme&s. He. prescribos t h e omplbyr~entof tho A.A. troops. The corps t r o o p s arc under h i s imniidiato. comhnd; BY: sho:rt, conciso ordors ho ooordinatcs h i s divisions. i n Oox~bat. 1 :
. , . . . Division commanders issue t h e orders f o r tho ground reconnai-
ssan0c; The p r i ~ l c i p l o sapplicable t o tho conduct of an i n f a n t r y division
a r c i n g o n o r a l applicable to. a cavalry divicion;

Missions
..
,

706. . For r c c o ~ a i s s a n c o n i s s i o l i s f o r army c a v a l r y soc Section 11,

f o r scraoning missions soo Soction IV.
.. . . .. . . . . . 707. G l o y r n c n t i n b a t t l e i s - cavalry7s c h i c f mission. 'Attack against tho flank and r e a r of ,tho onoKtyi s .tho nost offeotivc.
. .

. .

Such an a t t a c k can b e conducted oithor bofore t h o main kiostilo forcos have bocomo cngagcd,or a f i e r a combat i s alroady i n progress. Undor tho f i r s t conditich, s b c h an.aktac!c can prcparo t h o rrayyfor tho attaolc of our main fcrco: . .! . . . . . , The sending of t h e army oavalry on too d i s t a n t missions takes it too f a r from t h e focal point of t h e battle;' i n f a c t , can cause a too l a t e cavali-y intervention i n t b t h e main combat. Simultaneous operations against t h e h o s t i l e l i n e of communicatiohs can be advantageous i f , by such actipn, our own forces are not dispersed. Attack against an enemy i n position i s , i b generol, no t a s k Per army cavalry. Yet., wheh the holding of the h o s t i l e forces i n position i s necessary, such an a t t a c k may be necessary and hishly advisable. Should army cavalry he employed on missions of flank security,

it should lose no opportunity t o execute t h i s mission agp;ressivcly (by

attacking ).
708. Pursuit by army cavalry has t h e mission of e ~ t e n d ~ n g ' t h e sycces; achieved i n combat and s t r a t e g i c a l l y damgin;; the enemy. I n so f a r a s -the cavalry i s unemployed o r can be w i t h d r a w n f r ~ m t h e combat i t s e l f , it should be made ready t o execute t K @ pursuit a t the proper time, a t t h o proper place and under unified c c m n d ; Notorizcd u n i t s should be attached; it - m . ust be: adequately :suppliad w i t h m u n i t i o n and, vhcn necessary, vsith means f o r degas:sing. Spec>al SnstructionS' should be issued concerning . i t s compnication-and, oonnoo.ticn. with other troops' cmployed i n pursuit, v&th the a i r force, a n d specially, w i t h ' r e c ; a ~~ n ~o~planc units.
'

The me's$ effootiva d i r o c t i c n of pur$uit i;, against tho flank and roar of t h e onomy. E w r y o f f o r t must bo mado t o oncirclo t h o h o s t i l e force.

Aftor a breakthrough, t h c spocd an$.mobility of t h e army cavalry s u i t it S o s t f&yor&ly f o r " t h & p i i k s u i t . ':.Tho sonior cavalry bo&ndor must $orson~l~jr'd&~rm~n~,~t'hc ' s i t u a t i o n nt' t h o breakthrough aroa. a '~ ~cc a + i l F ivhiifi y mst ii;o.ic along roads a r c assigned ~h~scoih~'nts'~6Q th t h o i r routos of adbance. Thc l i n c of oommunications of t h c camilry f c r c c '. must bc mado s e c u ~ , Thc d i r e c t i o n of t h c p u r s u i t i s proscribed: t h o time t h o p u r s u i t i s bogmi by t h c vaf5bus d i v i s i o n s may bc l o f t t o t h o d i v i s i o n .. . .. c o m n d o r s.
:

Cavalry must push past tho disorganizo'd cncmy. i s t o bc broken through by rapid, surprise attack.

New r c s i s t a n c c

Should t h o onomy r c t i r o and s t i l l r c t a i n p r a c t i c a l l y i n t a c t

h i s powcrs of defonsc, ho must be surpr'ised by f i r c from tho f l a n k and
attackcd a t cvcry'fawrhblc opportunity. Important a r c a s i n r c a r o f t h o
cncmy nrc t o bc blocked.

7 0 9 . Army cavalry i s p a r t i c u l a r l y suitod f o r omploymcrrt i n delaying action. It w i l l froqucntly bo omploycd t o protect and sorccn assomblics and mcwmcnts, t o dofond (temporarily) broad strcams, t o dolay a s u p r i o r cncrny, t o hold him a t a distar-co from t h e b a t t l c f i o l d , t o f i x him a t anothcr position, t o doooivo him, t o facilitate t h o brcaking o f f of cbmbat, t cnciroling pursuit. t o covor a r o t r o a t and i n pnrticulnr, t o combat .
710. B y i t s appcaranco a t uncxpoctod a r c a s army c a v a l r y cnn d i w r t t h e attention of tho onomy. It can prcvon't h i s oooupation of t o r r a i n important t o t h o condubt o f t h o ongagcmcnt. It can oporato against h i s l i n o of comunioations. Such undertakings, howovcr, should only bc ordcroc when t h e y a r e rnoro importomb t h a n t h o prcscncc of t h e cavalry a t t h e decisivc arca, o r i f t h o decision i s not joopardizod by t h c abscncc of t h c cavalry. Paculriaritios of tho Movcmont and t h c Combat 711. Tho spocd and mobility of army cavalry shculd'bo u t i l i z o d a t cvcry opportunity t o s u r p r i s c tho oncmy. Surpriso can bo propcrcd by more rapid o r longcr marches. of t h o troops 712. I n t h o assigmnont of r o u t c s a d t h o d i s t r i ' b u t ~ o n thorcto, consideration must bo given t h e various' speods and march capibi'i-ities of tho i n d i v i d u a l -a,rms o,n t h c march. . . For short' distminoqo ;moktcd u n i t s can considerably incroasc t h e i r marching spoed. If tfiky hivc 10% marches bdforc thcl;i, tho'march must bc made mcro slowly i n ordor t o m i n t a ' i n t h o i r m r c h ' & b i l i t y . Long, rapid' marches a r c t h o cxccption a n d s h o u l d bo made only i n urgont s i t u a t i o n s . A n d cvcn so, consideration clust bo' gi%n mhethcr tho lcssons produccd by such m r c h c s crrc o o m n s u r 3 t o wiCh t h c :r-sv.?.ts., ., . . ,

7 I n general, w v i l r y divisidnb mjrch i n scircr:.~l,&rch colunns (regiments o r brigadcs with attachod arms). Tho n o t o r i z ~ dclcmcnts follow as0 nhtorized cchclons o r m ~ r c h a s a notorizcd march column on anothor road; .. . ' , Thc i n t e r v a bctvbon mcqching c c l q m i shc,l.ld r , ~ t bc so groat a s t o prcvcnt tho c c o r d i n ~ t o ' d and ' ~ ~ i f i omploymo?~+. cd r f -t hc d i v i s i o n i f t h c oncmy i s suddoniy and' surpris'ingly not. A n oci..c..lc~.1-mnt of tho various columns dcponds on t h o conditions.

. . . .

. ,:

: b ~ ~ ~ 6 ~ ~ t O ~ 1 di&ributod 1 ~ % B : . i n~t h ~o ~various ~ b ~ march 401-s. . I d $ o ... f ~ ar s t h e s o ~ d ~ n o t - s oout l ~ t foryard. ~ . r . . a r c not

. .~ o l l ~ ~ . % h 6 : . .columns ~02i.
o r h r C h &long a
. . th;ry .in t h q admicc' gd&i& . . . . ....... , . soppratc . , . .
. routc,, . . . . .~ ... ,.:. ...... . . .
% ..
,

. . . As8:~4 rulC,
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. . . .. . . . . . . .

: . . ..

. .

714. The sit;atio'n, t h e te?rain' and vi$;ibility determine t h e

Because of .the g r e a t e r
distance b e t w e n advmce'gukrd and main body. marching speed of cavalry, t h i s distance i s generally greater' than with
f o o t t r o1 o... p s , employing -advance guard of equivalent strength..

A t d o ' d e t a i l e d oi.ganilzat~ion of t h e advance guard i n t g smaller

organizations i s not recomnended. Ordinarily, i n an advance guard of
one o r t w o squadrons (American t r o o p ) , t h e organj.zation of t h e advance guard i n t 0 . a maip body a n a a point w i l l Suffice.
,

Should contact with t h e enemy.be expected, t h e advance guard moves by bounds, The, oloser t h e enemy i s presumed tb be and t h e l e s s t h e opportunity f o r observition ( t e r r a i n conditions), t h e shorter must t h e bounds be, and t h e more c a g e f i l l y must t h e a r e a b e . s e c o ~ l ? i t e r e d . Under some- coridit.ions it i s s u i t a b l e t o have t h e advance guard move for-mrd , . deployed. : . . I n general, t h e .advance guard employs p a t r o l s f o r security.
These are sent out l ; b d i s t a n c e s up t o 10 kilometers ( 6 m i l e s ) both t o
t h e f r o n t and flanks.
The main body of a cavalry column provides f o r i t s immediate
s e c u r i t y by'employing $ main body p o i n t , . p a t r o l s t o e i t h e r flank and a
r e a r point.
The commander of t h e column determines t h e myth sequen'ce of
e normally marches close behind t h e advance guard.
t h e main body. H 715. I n advance guard combats, t h e s i t u a t i o n must be quickly
c l a r i f i e d , employing a l i means akailable,. so t h a t +he ,commander of t h e
&ole may h ~ v e a b a s i s 'for h i s . deci si:on concerp%ng.i,he employing of h i s
.main f o r c e , . . ., . . . . . . .,. . 71%. .%en t h e s i t u a t i o n permits, a t t a c k s a r e t o be pushed through he assignment o f a t t a c k missions t o t h e co~?rtndors of tlic mpidly. mounte'd march col~&s can accelerate t h e beginning and execution of t h e attack. Whenbwr possible, t h e a t t a c k w i l l be made without assembly p o s i t l o n f o r preparation. The heavy mapons should be held towards t h e front. TKese receive t h e i r orders f i r s t so t h a t t h e y chii be able t o open f i r e early.. Under. protection of t h e s e heavy weapons ( N . G . ~ and Minenverfer: and protected by t h e combat reconnaissance and. close-in s e c u r i t y Torces, thc moantod u n i t s r i d e foryard so f a r a s t h e h o s t i l e f i r e w i l l permit. m e n a u n i t can no longei- advance mounted, it dismounts, mounting again when t h e s i t u a t i o n permits. An advance i s accelerated a s a r e s u l t of t h e olose cooperation betveen r i d i n g. .f o rm r d and f i r e . . .
,

. ,Should t h e i t t a c k b e exocuted an a broad front, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of executing a surprisc atLack by t h e mass of %he fqrce a-b a favorable decisive a r e a i s groater. Where t h e s i t u a t i o n permits; t h e a t t a c k should be d i r e c t e d against t h e f l a n k o r t h e r e a r of t h e enemy. Icon t h e irmnediate omployment of tho ~ o l ~ f o r gives c e promise o f a q u i c l c success, an organization i n dapth can bo disponsoa with:. 0therwi.se t h o a t t a c k must be organized i n depth; h 'deop'e&helonment of tKe f l a & p r o v i d o s t h e p o s s i b i l i i of ronovmd envelopment of t h o h o s t i l e ~ f l a d c . Against a mobile oncmy tho continuation of reconnai'ssmce 3nd t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e f l a n k s during combat a r c o s p o c i a l l y important.

For an a t t a c k organized i n rlopth a cdvalry ro-gimontys zono i s

approximately t h ~ o t f an i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n , Par. 326.

Shobld an a t t a ~ kf.a i l t o advance gnd p r o v e . i t s e l f t o be ~ k t h o u tr . e s u l t , such an . i t t a b k . i s suspended and t h e aftem*. i s made t o r e g a i n as g i c l c l y a s possible t h e freedom of maneuver. The breaking off of a cmibat c a o .l?e .more quickly achieved when it has beeh possible t o hold %he 'animals close t o t h e ' dismounted f i g h t i n g troops. The location, t h e s e c u r i t y 'and t h e bringing forward of t h e l e d horses must be c a r e f u l l y regulated. 717. The p e c u l i a r i t i e s of army cavalry do not s u i t it tb missions of long defense. For delaying a c t i o n it i s e s p e c i a l l y suited. When cavalry i s employed defensifvely, t h e lod hbrses must o r d i h a r i l y be held beyond t h e e f f e c t i v e range of t h e h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y f i r e . Occasionally, t h e spee'n and mobility of oavalry make it s u i t a b l e a s cpiclcly displaced reserves. I n delay5ng a c t i o n small d e t a c b e n t s a t considerqble distances from t h e main force, must oppose t h e enemy. These detsachments hold off an8 delay t h e enemy, t h e n r e t i r e by way of t h e f l a n k s . os r o u t e s not d i r e c t l y i n t h e f i e l d o f f i r e of the main l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e , i n order (1) t o leave open t h e t e r r a i n i n ' f r o n t o f t h i s main l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e f o r t h e e f f e c t i v e f i r e of t h e troops t h e r e i n , and ( 2 ) t o be able b e t t e r t o harass t h e enemy from t h e .flanks. For a limited time, t h e army cavalry can execute delaying a c t i o n on a broader f r o n t ;than can l e s s mobile troops. It can inore quickly form defense groups and' can more n t h e other e a s i l y surprise t h e enemy with f i r e from various d i r e c t i o n s . O hand, army cavalry must break o f f t h e combat from i t s delaying l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e s u f f i c i e n t l y e a r l y t o permit t h e mounting and r i d i n g off of ' : t h e mass of t h e troops engaged t'neroin, without observation by t h e enemy.
A f r o n t a l delaying notion 'can bo supported by surpririso fire and s u r p r i s e limited objective a t t a c k s against the' h o s t i l e flank. bbuntcd u n i t s a r e most valuable f o r these missions.

718. Mounted combat, i n general, occurs only when t w o small h o s t i l e mountcd u n i t s moot or when a weal< eiwmy i s surprised; c h i e f l y i n reconnaissancc servico does t h e mounted combat t a k e place. A mountea a t t a c k against a domoralized enomy can ham great psychological e f f e c t . 719. Horse a r t i l l e r y must be able t o f o l l o w mounted elements' wherever t h e y go; lilce~visemotorized a r t i l l e r y , motorized elements.' Therefore, t h e b e t t e r r o u t e s should%beassigned t h e a r t i l l e r y units. O n t h e march, elements o f t h e horse n r t i l l b r y must be so f a r forward t h a t -tfiey can quiclcly execute t h e i r missions.. Since going i n t o p o s i t i o n c o s t s time and since mountcd u n i t s move rapidly, cavalry advancing mounted must frequently dispense with t h o protection of horse a r t i l l o r y i n readiness o r i n position. Such protoction by t h e horse' a r t i l l o r y ~ m u l d often r e s u l t i n l o s s of contact bbetuvoen t h e t s n elements. Should it be nccossary, i n proximity t o t h e onomy, t o travorso t e r r a i n which aimits t h e nlancuvera b i l i t y af thdmountod t r o o p s &nd vhich thorofore demands f o r them a r t i l l o r : protcction, it i s o f t c n prcfcrablc t o employ motorized a r t i l l o r y , sinco it can follow moro quickly.. X r i n g doploymcnt and during combat t h e a r t i l l e r y should bo w o l l forward. Every o f f o r t must bo mndo t o dooreasc th? distancc %ot~men observation p o s i t i o n s and f i r i n g positions. Should t h e a r t i l l c r y bc a t a distancc it r o c p i r c s adequate protoction from t h e noarc s t troops.

:720. ' . Infant%.-in t r u c k s ~ c i & o ~ ct h ce ~

f , i r 0 pcvmr of axmy caiinlry. . . ti+'m+t-<K _$@&'b~$i;5r i t i s dcpcndcnt on. cthor arms.
For rdconn&ie.s:&cc 1fc:untad p a t r o l s , - t . ~ ~ p o i -..$ .r. i . .i ~ . - l c in, ~ d tyucks, dd cm bc , s c h t with tho motcri:zod irifantryi. It i S q c r y &+it.i* , t o air attaoks. It i s advnnccd by boundS'.dnd b r d ; n a r i l y i s cmplcyoa only s f t c r tho s i t u a t i c a hac bccn clarified. Thc l a t c r a l displaccmcnt of t h i s fcroo i n close proximity i t. s . asscmbly arcn should bc . t o Bhccncmy mu& b6 hwiacd. . ThercFbrc, .. .,...
v c l l t o t h o rear.
, ,

.:

'

As long a s t h o i n f a n t r y i S i n truclcs, i t " i s confincd t o t h c

roads. Thc unloadihg muet t s k o placc b ~ ~ o n d ' c f f c c t i vh c c s t i l c f i r c and
i n a ccnccalcd arca.
Tho cntrkncc of longor timc when a iMrt5.cn t o r o l i e v c cavr-lry, ( 2 ) i n u n i t s (cavalry) vvhich havc motorizcd i n f a n t r y i n t o b a t t l c rcquircs n of t h e animals a r c abscnt. .It i s cmploycd ( 1 ) a r o a r p o s i t i o n t o covcr tho rotiromcn2; of boon f u r t h e r advanccd, or ( 3 ) a t dccisivc nroas.

..

721. Bicycle u n i t s must movc p r i n c i p a l l y on t h o roads. Tho spced

of t h c i r movomcnt doponds upcn tho: condition of t h c . roads, upcn t h t
t o r r a i n , tho t h o of t h c yoar, tho' ;mather and t h o . timc o f t h c dny.
Thcy m r c h r a p i d l y and ccmpnrativcly noisclcss. Thcrcforc
thcy. arb admirably s u i t c d ' t o s u r p r i s e t h c ancmy and cxocutc surprisc
a t t a c k s . Thcy c m bc omplcyod a t night.
Indcpcndcnt roconnaissmcc and more &porkant .co~nbat misoions
can only exceptionally @o cssigncd t h o , bicyglo units.. On'thc othcr hand
thoy a r c v m l l s u i t c d t o occupy imoortant t c , r r a i n near t h c r c u t c s and roads of movomcnt. Ordin&riky t h c y should bc rcinforcod by cthcr arms f o r t h e . . . . . . oxccution o f t h i s mission. . . . . ~. . . . ' . . ,,. Bcccusa of t h o i r speed i n combat t h c y c m bc cmploycd a s an
c f f c c t i v e 1JesCr-m.

Grcator indcpondcncc i s given t h c bicyclc u n i t s i n combat i f

t h o bicyclcs are lcadcd on and t r a n s p c r t c d f o r ~ m r d by trucks.
722. . I n accordance ~rit'nt h c i r ' p c c u l i a r i t l o s , motcrcyelo u n i t s a r c cmploycd s i m i l a r l y t o bicyclc unit's. For .limitod..strqtchos t n c y arc indcpcndcnt of tho roads and paths. Thcir spbcd and r m g c of t r a v c l a r c In night undcrtckiqsthcy considerably groator th& thosc o f b i c y c l i s t s . .:..ro not p a r t i c u l a r l y suited. Lil:cr;Jisc, bccausc of t h c i r spcc'd and c a p a b i l i t y o f r a p i d s h i f t i n g , tlmy form a vmrth sdlilc rcsbrvc. Usually When assigned t h c y vill bc omploycd i n conjuncticl? rsith motorizcd u n i t s . indcpcndcnt missions t n c y should bo r c i n f c r c c d b y o t h c r motorizcd arms. 723. Thc ongincor sC1~ladfcn o f a ,cavg.l>y d i v i s i o n i s omplo t h e crcssing..cf voter ccurscs, ( 2 ) i n destruction' tasks, and ( 3 i n (l) t h e In
rcmcv?.l and.laying o f cbstaclcs, hind0rancc s, ctc. It .may bc nccc scary
t o xssign groups. or platoons t o i n d i v i d u a l cavalry brigados o r r c g i m n t s .
, .: . . ,. . . . . For tlic crossing of brcad'kivcrs a l l availnblo cngillccr squadron; must bc asscmblcd.

pa

,. ..

124. . Ccmmunicaticn~bdtrrcentho. &Ay cz.vciry dhd' next highcr ccnmnndor i s c f t c n pcssiblc o11lyby mcans of rqdio c.nd ai.rplnnc. Availablc communication f a c i l i t i e s a r c t o bc utilized. l i n c c a r c not l a i d by c a v n l r ~ rdivioicns and corps. Trunk