The Arab Spring of 2011 was relatively uneventful in Jordan. There were limited protests calling for economic and political reform throughout the year, which were mainly planned and organized, then realized with little disruption and without mass mobilization. This is due to a number of internal and external factors that reinforced middle class based solidarities.
The Arab Spring of 2011 was relatively uneventful in Jordan. There were limited protests calling for economic and political reform throughout the year, which were mainly planned and organized, then realized with little disruption and without mass mobilization. This is due to a number of internal and external factors that reinforced middle class based solidarities.
The Arab Spring of 2011 was relatively uneventful in Jordan. There were limited protests calling for economic and political reform throughout the year, which were mainly planned and organized, then realized with little disruption and without mass mobilization. This is due to a number of internal and external factors that reinforced middle class based solidarities.
!"#$%&'()%#%*)(+#,&-.)/01)2,$$31)43%(()%&$) %&/,5#16"37/,"& Sarah A. Tobin Dr. Tobin is a Mellon Post Doctoral Fellow in Islamic Studies at Wheaton College. She holds a PhD in Anthropologv from Boston Universitv. 2012, The Author Middle East Policv 2012, Middle East Policy Council T he Hashemite Kingdom oI Jordan was watched closely during the early events oI the Arab Spring in 2011. Many Western analysts expressed concerns that it would be the next country in which large protests and social and political mobilization would shiIt the scales oI power away Irom the ruling regime to the protestors on the street. 1 Despite this anticipation in the popular media, along with widespread desire Ior political and economic reIorm on the part oI Jordan`s populace, the country neither mobilized en masse nor saw their interests culminate in calls Ior an ousting oI the monarchy. The Arab Spring in Jordan was maniIest mainly in media- based activity such as blogs and in rela- tively Irequent, but small, contained and nonviolent protests in Amman. In Iact, the deposing oI King Abdullah never made the list oI demands Ior political and economic reIorm. In comparison to most other coun- tries swept by the Arab Spring, the lack oI large anti-regime protests and revolution are unusual. Why is Jordan an exception? Why did the people`s desire Ior reIorm not material- ize in large-scale protests and revolution? Why has King Abdullah not Iaced the same pressures as other rulers throughout the region? Based on ethnographic feldwork and recent interviews, this paper examines the role oI the emergent middle class in Amman in shaping national politics, espe- cially anti-revolutionary positions during the Arab Spring. I argue that a heightened notion oI middle-class status and 'aspiring cosmopolitanism provides a newly signif- cant Iorm oI social organization in Amman. This reorients the populace away Irom Iailed political reIorms and serves as a means to reinIorce the status-quo, particu- larly in the context oI deepening internal divisions and a region in turmoil. !"#$%"&'()!*!+!,"+ In Jordan, there are serious internal political and economic issues that could become sources Ior amplifed agitation and protest. From perpetual ethnic tensions to economic woes, Irom religious tensions to the lack oI a genuine democratic voice, the Jordanian populace shares many oI the same demographics and concerns as neigh- boring countries that are now embroiled in protest, revolution, rioting and their consequences. The ethnic demography oI Jordan is largely the result oI warIare and reIugee Tobin.indd 96 2/20/2012 12:56:04 PM 97 TOBIN: JORDAN`S ARAB SPRING: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND ANTI-REVOLUTION creation in neighboring countries. Though the government conducted an oIfcial census in 2010, 2 it does not document the population in terms oI ethnicity or religion. Nonetheless, it is believed that the major- ity are not ethnic Jordanians. 3 Rather, the demographic majority are Palestinians (50 percent), Iollowed by ethnic Jordanians (30-35 percent) and Iraqis (15-20 percent), with smaller numbers oI Assyrians, Arme- nians, Chechens, Circassians, Mandeans, Syrians and migrant workers Irom Egypt, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. 4
In terms oI religious identifcation, 8 percent oI Jordanians are Christian, while 92 percent are Muslim. 5 Muslims in Jordan, however, are not a homogenous group. They are overwhelmingly Sunni, and the Salafs among them are growing in number. This is largely attributable to the infuence oI migrant workers returning Irom the GulI countries with Iunds they have earned and religious ideologies they have learned. There are Iew Shiites and Druze, but a larger number oI non-practicing, secular Muslims. There is also a small but notable Suf sect comprising mainly Western adher- ents oI an American convert to Islam who is a long-time resident oI Amman. Such internal diversity raises the ques- tion: 'Who is a Jordanian? In particular, does one need to be an ethnic Jordanian and a Muslim to be 'Jordanian? Through popular media and in public discussions, these questions oI inclusion in the state are regularly raised. In terms oI religious inclu- sion and the state, ethnic Jordanian Chris- tians are not a largely contested group, 6
which is attributable to the longstanding cooperative relationship between the royal Iamily and the native Christian popula- tion. 7 The same cannot be said oI Palestin- ian Christians, 8 or minority Christian sects such as the Mormons or Jehovah`s Wit- nesses. Religious diversity, however, is just one contested Iorm oI state inclusion. Even among the political leadership in Parliament, the question oI Jordanianness and state inclusion came to the Iore when a legal move was passed that required all members oI parliament to hold only one passport a Jordanian one. 9 Categorically disallowing parliamentary members, gov- ernment ministers and senior-level Royal Palace employees Irom holding dual citi- zenship or attaining Iree access to another country provides signifcant challenges Ior political inclusion Ior some oI the most educated and well-trained Jordanians. It creates a symbolic standard against which political aspirants who may also be holders oI Syrian or American passports, Ior example must measure themselves and each other. This move opened a space to challenge those who may make political claims, reminding them that 'real Jorda- nians would not hold multiple passports, thereby raising the bar Ior admission to positions oI political power. Most saliently, the question oI Pales- tine arises in these discussions oI ethnic divisions and state inclusion. Visions and Iears oI al-Watan al-Badeel (The Alterna- tive Nation) have arisen again during this time oI uncertainty, and have been Ieatured in international discussions oI the Iuture oI Israel and Palestine. 10 The concern is that the instability and political delegitimiza- tion oI the Hashemite regime might lead to the creation oI a new governmental struc- ture, one that would establish Jordan as a Palestinian state. The Alternative Nation is a scenario that the ethnic minority Jordani- ans would preIer not to see play out, given their politically privileged status; at least some Palestinians would also hesitate to support it. This is because the Alternative Nation provides justifcation Ior the expul- Tobin.indd 97 2/20/2012 12:56:04 PM 98 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIX, NO. 1, SPRING 2012 tax codes put the burden on the backs oI the poor. Finally, the war in Iraq has eliminated the gas and oil subsidies that provided most Jordanians with aIIordable transportation and winter heating Iuel. De- spite these alarming economic diIfculties, Palestinians in Amman were still hesitant to protest, preIerring to identiIy with the overwhelming majority oI Jordanians in Amman who chose not to protest as well. These were all reasons that many cited Ior not protesting, despite the existence oI signifcant internal divisions. Although the context Ior religious and political inclusion was not ideal, the majority oI terms were tolerable, negotiable and provided a more secure and stable position than the alter- native. But 'better saIe than sorry only explains part oI the reticence to protest and Ioment revolution in Jordan. A closer ex- amination reveals that 'middle-classness and aspiring cosmopolitanism serve as new ways oI elevating like-mindedness and are an emergent means oI constructing internal homogeneity. -$!".(/!))'$(0'&++ As Schwedler has described, 14 the neoliberal economic reIorms implemented by the Jordanian regime have created new space Ior the 'aspiring cosmopolitans oI Amman. Despite the real divides between the economically globalized and culturally emergent West Amman and the members oI the poor and working class who occupy the vibrant but relatively unchanging East Am- man, increasing numbers Irom the east are crossing into West Amman Ior work and leisure. New patterns oI work and leisure have combined with easier access to pri- vate commercial spaces and employment in the service sector. In such spaces, both East and West Ammanis prioritize cosmopoli- tan constructs oI economic, political and sion oI Palestinians Irom Israel and ne- gates the ideological claims Ior the Right oI Return. In this scenario, it is not that Jordan wins or that the Palestinians win per se, but that Israel wins and the Right oI Return is diminished in its symbolic and political power. Though it would provide Ior some kind oI resolution to the reIugee status oI the ethnic-majority Palestinians in Jordan, it would also represent a major shiIt in political realities and Iuture options Ior a large majority oI the citizens. There were additional reasons that many Palestinians were hesitant to protest, which also Iell along ethnic and economic lines. There was the sentiment that Pal- estinians would not protest unless the ethnic Jordanians were already protesting. Without ethnic Jordanian participation, the political read would be that this is 'just more Palestinian complaints. The concern about a weariness with Palestinian dissent on the part oI the Jordanian government emerged in the Arab Spring as well: any calls Ior political reIorm by Palestinians would be dismissed as mere complaints rather than a legitimate demand Ior politi- cal revisions. Along economic lines, many Palestin- ians in Amman indicated in interviews that the Arab Spring in Jordan was 'not my fght, and that the 'real Arab Spring was being Iought by the abjectly poor and the politically disenIranchised, not by those who have some marginal ability to par- ticipate economically and politically. This is notable because, in the last Iew years, Amman has experienced an economic downturn. Infation rose Irom a low oI 1.6 percent in 2003 to a whopping 13.9 per- cent in 2008; 11 poverty rates hover around 13-14.2 percent, 12 and unemployment is oIfcially at 12 percent, but unoIfcially at 30 percent. 13 Furthermore, regressive Tobin.indd 98 2/20/2012 12:56:04 PM 99 TOBIN: JORDAN`S ARAB SPRING: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND ANTI-REVOLUTION aIfliations. The coIIee shop is a point oI entree into shared time, shared space, and a shared Irame Ior meaningIul relationships. These points overlap. Time is spent in a number oI diIIerent Starbucks, Irom the wealthiest residential neighborhood oI Ab- doun to the commercial center and outdoor shopping- mall area oI Sweifya to Mecca Mall, Amman`s largest indoor shopping center. In those places and times, the ability to divulge one`s sense oI selI to another and develop a close Iriendship is engendered. Furthermore, that these neigh- borhood Starbucks are ubiquitous in West Amman is notable, as it places the Iriend- ship, quite literally, on the map. Mapping one`s Iriendship according to the neighbor- hood Starbucks in which you have shared coIIee and time represents an immense re- structuring oI time and space Ior purposes oI meaningIul interpersonal connections. Social and cultural capital are now being built in terms that reIer to commercialized venues, elevated consumption, and leisure time with Iriends over and above the more traditionally valued Iamily arrangements. Elevating consumption with peers over and above Iamily relationships is a signifcant shiIt Ior social organization in Amman. Historically, the city has been understood as Iamily-centered and orga- nized around one`s tribe, in the case oI ethnic Jordanians, or geographic areas oI origin Ior 'West Bankers and Palestin- ian reIugees. 16 One reason Ior this diIIer- ence is that Transjordanians were largely organized around tribal aIfliations that cultural Iorms oI sociality that closely re- semble those oI the elites. They emphasize inclusiveness and democracy rather than 'internecine confict, resurgent nationalism, and all sorts oI bloody othering,` 15 par- ticularly through the practices oI elite and exclusive consumerism learned through service-sector employment and leisure- time patterns in commercial spaces such as malls and coIIee shops. Working-class Jordanians are now able to emulate the consumption habits and patterns oI the elites as 'aspiring cosmopolitans. This aspiring cosmopolitanism carries important implications Ior social organiza- tion. One oI my East Ammani inIormants, in her mid-thirties, is a low- to mid-income (250 Jordanian dinars per month, or $350) Jordanian mother oI a three-year-old girl. Her husband works Ior the Hashemite Civil DeIense, and they live in govern- ment-subsidized housing. She told me: Do you know why we`re Iriends? Because you know what Starbucks is. I can talk to you about my liIe, who I am, and what I really believe. You know, I can`t talk to my husband`s Iamily about my liIe like this. They don`t even know what Starbucks is. Can you imagine?!?! And you and I, we`ve been there. We`ve been to the Starbucks in Abdoun and Sweifya, and Mecca Mall too. So, you under- stand me; you understand this. Starbucks in Amman has become an index Ior a host oI symbolic and social +12345678(9:(&;;2:(<28(4=6>;=(2:( 9:?=@(A>3(2(<>81(>A(8B;4>C96(2:?(8>692C( afliations. The coffee shop is a point of entre into shared time, shared space, 2:?(2(8<23=?(A32;=(A>3(;=2:9:DA5C( relationships. Tobin.indd 99 2/20/2012 12:56:04 PM 100 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIX, NO. 1, SPRING 2012 and are relieved not to discuss the Civil War oI the 1970s and to retreat to their apart- ments and villas in sympathetic disdain Ior Israeli raids oI the homes oI Palestinian Iamily members and Iriends just 60 miles away. They are consumers oI political in- Iormation put Iorth on blogs, news and In- ternet sites, but are not otherwise politically engaged. Instead, they organize around certain places and times Ior consumption and around economic points Ior solidarity. Most saliently, this middle-class orien- tation has emerged as a kind oI imagined community displacing overtly political nationalism and replacing ethnic, religious and other Iorms oI elitism, Iactioning and sectarianism with a class-based cohesion that still carries important political impli- cations. This reprioritization oI modes Ior social cohesion and political and economic solidarity emerged quite strongly during Jordan`s Arab Spring oI 2011. E%,#$+#(&+()!+0,F%+$ When I was conducting feldwork in Jordan during the Israeli bombing oI Gaza in January 2009, protests were a nearly daily event in Amman. Many oI my Iriends and colleagues who worked Ior the U.S. government expressed to me their con- cerns that the numbers oI protesters would grow to disconcerting levels, rendering the public spheres dangerous, particularly Ior Americans, or that Amman might come under extreme political repression in order to end the protests. While U.S. govern- ment employees anticipated a fashpoint, many Jordanians I interviewed expressed deep ambivalence. Protests were, in their experience, nothing more than 'yelling against the wind. Though my Jordanians Iriends appreciated the ability to speak their minds and agitate Ior certain changes, at least to some degree, they Iound protest- cut across class. Palestinians, on the other hand, came Irom a society that highly emphasized class: 'Arab townsIolk and the peasants lived, socially, in two diIIer- ent worlds. 17 By the 1980s, middle-class Muslims were a sizable demographic in Amman, 18 and now many political scien- tists and Western analysts point to a post- Islamist orientation 19 that opens up lines oI social organization around non-political and non-religious interests. Contemporary Amman is incredibly diverse, and the wide swath oI the popu- lace who imagine and orient themselves as middle class and aspiring cosmopolitans are typically proIessionals. They include students who may make as much as 25 JD ($35) per month, government employ- ees who make 200 JD ($282) per month, and service-sector employees, who make slightly more: 250 JD ($352). The highest- income earners are oIten the landowners and business proprietors, who make in excess oI 1,000 JD ($1,411). One resident oI Jordan`s wealthiest neighborhood told me, as he moved his laundry Irom washer to dryer, 'Oh, I`m middle class. I`m def- nitely not elite. Given the wide range oI economic markers, the salient point Ior orientation as middle class is less about monthly income, and more about a set oI social and cultural practices that bring to- gether this diverse society into a new kind oI imagined community. Most selI-described middle-class Jordanians articulate a kind oI suburban consciousness. They have some level oI post-high-school education; they are con- versant in Western particularly American cultural reIerences oI leisure, including coIIeeshops, malls and TV shows. Many Jordanians hone their English by watching 'Friends episodes with Arabic subtitles. They are a population who 'want peace Tobin.indd 100 2/20/2012 12:56:04 PM 101 TOBIN: JORDAN`S ARAB SPRING: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND ANTI-REVOLUTION The frst protests oI the Arab Spring occurred on January 28, 2011, and again in early February. Each one attracted 3,500 people, believed to be Irom the Muslim Brotherhood, trade unions and non-Is- lamist opposition parties. The primary de- mands were Ior the prime minister frst, Samir RiIai, then newly appointed MarouI Bakhit to step down. In addition to calls Ior governmental reIorm, protesters raised their banners, signs and voices in pro- test over ris- ing Iood and Iuel prices, infation and unemploy- ment. Be- yond sacking and reappointing new prime ministers, King Abdullah responded by meeting with leaders oI the Muslim Brotherhood and by putting $500 million into salary increases Ior government employees and subsidies Ior Iood staples and Iuel. The largest protests oI 7,000-10,000 people occurred in late February, organized by the Islamic Action Front in coalition with 19 other political parties. Following these much larger protests, King Abdullah pledged additional governmental reIorms within a three-month deadline. At frst glance, these events oI early 2011 appear to ft into a pattern oI protest and agitation, Iollowed by governmen- tal reIorms, by more protests and agita- tions, and fnally additional governmental reIorms. The back-and-Iorth in this pattern signals that there is a very public fow oI inIormation happening here, albeit con- tained and 'saIe. In these protests the government appeared to be allowing some measure oI Iree and public speech, and ing was not a particularly eIIective means Ior reIorm. Both prior to and aIter 2009, Jordanian ambivalence towards protesting has been in place, yet many Western gov- ernments and academics have not under- stood this disconnect between the ability to protest and the lack oI overwhelming interests or desire Ior change. As Schwedler discussed, protests in Jordan can be understood historically in terms oI law, space and spectacle. 20
Jordan has a long history oI all kinds oI protests that range Irom anti- Israeli/pro- Palestinian public displays to labor strikes and sit-ins. As Schwedler outlines, these public agitations have been going on with regularity since the 1950s. Since 1989, however, the Jordanian government has required protestors to request a permit outlining where the protest will be held, the expected turnout, and the topic and Iorms oI protest. OIten the government would balk at certain requests, noting that planned protests were too large or were scheduled to occur in an unsuitable space. Protest organizers would then alter plans and work with government oIfcials to reach an agreement. These inIormal nego- tiations, as a Iorm oI discourse, both con- tained protests by rendering them 'saIe in the eyes oI the government and provided an outlet Ior the populace to express dis- sent and disapproval. Given this context, the events oI 2011 are signifcant both Ior the discursive negotiations between the government and the people and Ior the absence oI violent clashes. !:A>3;2C(:=D>19219>:8G(28(2(A>3;(>A( discourse, both contained protests by 3=:?=39:D(1<=;(H82A=I(9:(1<=(=B=8(>A( the government and provided an outlet for the populace to express dissent and disapproval. Tobin.indd 101 2/20/2012 12:56:04 PM 102 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIX, NO. 1, SPRING 2012 many pro-reIormists expressed Iears that the government`s anti-riot police would engage the populace much like Egypt`s baltagiva (thugs), who were paid by the government to quell rioters. Considering that 58 policemen and 62 civilians were in- jured and one man died 'oI natural causes according to the Jordanian medical exam- iner, many Jordanians came to believe that the violence wracking neighboring coun- tries might also come to theirs. Maintaining the discursive tenor oI the protest and government response, particularly in the interest oI saIety and nonviolence, prompted activists to return to the permit-seeking, pre-approved space- honoring sort oI protest. The remainder oI the protests approximately one or two per month Ior the rest oI 2011 and the government responses became what Schwedler reIers to as 'spectacle, or 'protesting Ior a specifc audience and gaining visibility. 22 Utilizing the highly visible aspects oI protest particularly by launching multimedia campaigns and using blogs, Facebook and Twitter calls Ior reIorm and their responses can main- tain the discursive qualities oI protest and ampliIy them into the international sphere. As a case in point, King Abdullah visited the city oI Tafleh on June 13, 2011, greeted either by a riotous crowd that threw bottles and stones or a celebratory one that cheered enthusiastically, depend- ing on whose reports you believe. 23 Tafleh is a small city oI primarily ethnic Jorda- nians in the south, known Ior its intense loyalty to the ruling regime, but also the subject oI jokes. Tafleh is a town one passes through on the way to Petra Irom the King`s Highway. When I would pass through, many oI my Jordanian Iriends in Amman would raise an eyebrow about stopping in Tafleh: 'You know, they providing a more responsive and poten- tially democratic approach to resolving internal dissatisIaction, Iurther heighten- ing the Jordanian government`s apparent acquiescence and public response. It reads like a series oI discursive exchanges. However, given the events that Iol- lowed, reading the early Arab Spring in Jordan as a narrative oI protest and agita- tion Iollowed by a resolution by way oI governmental response proves insuIfcient, as it does not account Ior the rising level oI protests and their culmination in the Dakhiliya protests. On March 24 and 25, 2011, the largest and potentially most threatening protests occurred 21 in the Da- khiliya, or Interior, Circle (named aIter the Interior Ministry nearby). The protestors defed the permit requirement and modeled their indefnite sit-in aIter protests in Tahrir Square in Cairo. Dakhliya Circle carries political and economic signifcance: it is the site oI several major government oI- fces including the Ministry oI the Interior, major international hotels such as Le Me- ridien and the Marriot, the Jordanian Stock Market, Royal Jordanian Airlines, the Housing Bank, and a primary traIfc circle Ior those traveling between the north and northwest parts oI Amman and the central and southern parts oI West Amman and its circles and throughways. For the protesters to fagrantly violate the law and disrupt the 'saIe space with claims oI indeterminate occupation rendered the protest 'threaten- ing and 'dangerous. With these calls Ior an occupation and sit-in, anti-reIormists also showed up, surrounding and counter- ing the protesters. AIter Friday prayers on March 25, the two opposing sides began throwing rocks at one another. The circle closed, and the anti-riot police came to quell the disputes between the two sides. It is unclear what exactly transpired, but Tobin.indd 102 2/20/2012 12:56:05 PM 103 TOBIN: JORDAN`S ARAB SPRING: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND ANTI-REVOLUTION cal organization. Most Islamic political organizations in Jordan such as the Muslim Brotherhood have distanced themselves Irom many Salafsts. In mid-April 2011, the police and Salaf mujahedeen returning Irom AIghanistan clashed in Zarqa, a large city to the north oI Amman well-known Ior Iomenting religious conservativism. The mastermind oI the November 9, 2005, attacks in Amman was born in Zarqa as Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh, but changed his name to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi when he became a part oI the mujahedeen in AIghanistan with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. The mujahedeen are now a noticeable presence in Zarqa, particularly due to their showal qamees, the traditional dress Iound in AIghanistan, and their weapons oI daggers and swords, which are reminiscent oI weaponry Irom Central Asia in the nineteenth century or beIore. The April 2011 clash between the mujahedeen in Zarqa and the riot police was documented on YouTube and then brought into the regional news, includ- ing Al-Arabiya. 25 Many oI my Jordanian Iriends laughed at the irony behind the re- turned mujahedeen using 'primitive dag- gers and swords publicized on YouTube and broadcast on a major satellite regional news source. The spectacle oI the protest and riot underscored that the least techni- cally advanced in this case the Salafs relying upon AIghan methods oI dress and weapons oIten lose in the battle Ior technology-based spectacle. While the overall history oI protest in Jordan has been one oI engaging in dia- logue with the government, the underlying threat oI strong, even violent, government response to those who Iall outside the pur- view oI acceptable and 'saIe demonstra- tions such as those Iound in neighboring countries has not gone unnoticed. Rather aren`t the smartest Jordanians. 24 Adding to the spectacle quality oI the protests, the oIfcial government stories called King Abdullah`s reception enthusiastic, warm and welcoming, seemingly tapping into the trope oI Jordanians in Tafleh as ignorant subjects warmly receiving their king. Meanwhile, sources tied to the internation- al media, Internet and radio depicted the Taflehis as engaged, Irustrated and willing to throw bottles in protest. These conficting stories oI King Abdullah`s stop in Tafleh were particu- larly important. On the one hand, the story concerned the loyalists rising up in protest against their king. On the other hand, the government was denying any confict with the 'ignorant loyalists. This revealed a certain tenuousness: iI the government could not even keep the 'idiot loyalists Irom rising up, the more educated, anti- regime portions oI the populace likely carried some political weight and capital. As the Dakhliya Protests showed, how- ever, the populace lacked military might. The Internet-based, spectacle quality oI the protests in Tafleh raised the degree to which the international media would render verdicts on the 'successes oI the protests and Iailures oI the government. Though the populace may have garnered international attention Irom the spectacle oI the Tafleh protests, the military and police power oI the regime continued to be recognized. In another example oI the spectacle oI protest, the rise in the number oI Salafs has not gone unnoticed by the larger populace in Jordan. For the most part, the Salafs are interested in ampliIying public ethics that support conservative values such as restricting the sale oI alcohol, pressuring women to don the hifab and implementing certain rulings Irom Sharia. They have been Iar less interested in politi- Tobin.indd 103 2/20/2012 12:56:05 PM 104 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIX, NO. 1, SPRING 2012 than allowing protest to continue to be co-opted by the regime, the heightened spectacle oI notable, multi-media reports and presentations tap into a wider vocabu- lary oI middle-class cultural reIerence points. This has amplifed the notion that, more and more, discursive protests and their counterpoints will be decided in the public sphere and through the advances oI international media and technology. .,*$%"/$"#(%$+E,"+$+ It is analytically useIul to examine the Jordanian government`s responses to the events oI the Arab Spring as a series oI consumerist political moves designed to distract middle-class Jordanians and aspiring cosmopolitans Irom issues that substantively threaten to undermine the stability oI the country. Parliamentary elections occurred on November 9, 2010, prompting one oI the main complaints during the frst sets oI protests in January and February 2011. The early calls Ior political reIorms oIten revolved around the notion that the elec- toral processes, particularly parliamentary elections, are highly undemocratic. Though Jordan is technically a constitutional mon- archy, this is a rather liberal interpretation. Full executive power is vested in King Abdullah himselI. When elections are held, gerrymandering prevents women, Chris- tians and ethnic minorities Irom gaining political power except by quotas. Palestin- ians are underrepresented based on their demographic majority. Finally, votes are oIten purchased, rendering null any hope Ior one-person, one-vote. In response to complaints about the November 2010 elections, King Abdullah sacked the parliament and the prime minis- ter in February 2011, replacing Samir RiIai with MarouI Bakhit and a newly appointed government later in the month. Further- more, the government set aside $500 million Ior salary increases Ior government employees and subsidies Ior Iood staples and Iuel. Later, in March 2011, King Abdullah established a three-month dead- line Ior the newly appointed government to craIt reIorms. Such announcements con- tinued later in the year. On June 12, 2011, the king agreed to relinquish the right to appoint prime ministers and cabinets, with new election and political-party laws to come. On October 17, 2011, he sacked the prime minister again, appointing Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh in his place. At frst glance, one might be tempted to see the governmental responses as a continuation oI the discursive pattern oI response to protests. However, the pri- mary reason that the governmental oIIers oI reIorm have helped to stem a tide oI increased protest is tied less to any sub- stantive change and more to the political, consumerist distractions oI the middle class and aspiring cosmopolitans in Amman. Holding elections, sacking and reap- pointing government representatives, and increasing economic purchasing power all heighten consumerism and provide politi- cal distractions. Elections, Ior example, are known to 'reorient political discourse. 26
All oI these actions by the government serve to prioritize cohesion and inclusive- ness and oIIer something refective oI what the consuming populace is ultimately hoping to achieve. Furthermore, the speed with which these actions were undertaken is much more representative oI a market- modeled or economic response. The populace wants a new prime minister? A new parliament? With a brushstroke, King Abdullah is able to change the holders oI these powerIul and representative posi- tions. In Iact, the speed oI King Abdullah`s Tobin.indd 104 2/20/2012 12:56:05 PM 105 TOBIN: JORDAN`S ARAB SPRING: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND ANTI-REVOLUTION have, in the past 10 years, managed to establish a credible middle class. But any shiIts in oil prices, economic challenges, that middle class becomes very Iragile. 28 The idea that 'unity is the preserva- tion oI the middle class has now become the overt aim oI the Hashemite regime. This is primarily because previous at- tempts to build a cohesive society based on political aIfliations have not worked. Recent political campaigns and distrac- tions that Iocused on overcoming ethnic and religious diIIerences with promises oI political reIorm have been largely seen as inauthentic and propagandist. 29 Be- tween 2003 and 2006, the three national campaigns oI 'Jordan First, 'National Agenda and 'We Are All Jordan each attempted an internal political unifcation that largely Iailed; the internal divisions run deep. It appears that the next-best hope Ior internal unity is the construction and maintenance oI a broadly construed middle class that participates in political activism as an extension oI their ethics oI consump- tion, thereby diverting attention Irom in- ternal divisions. The Jordanian regime has engaged in a series oI political consumerist practices impromptu elections, sacking prime minister aIter prime minister and passing temporary laws in an attempt to distract the populace Irom the deepening internal divisions that threaten to under- mine this largely unitary outlook and Iorm oI social organization. Such top-down measures have been met with ambivalence. To solidiIy this otherwise tenuous political and economic unity, the regime has also encouraged comparisons to neighboring countries. In doing so, the government has recognized that consumerist distractions responses is more refective oI consumer- ist behavior than democratic ideals: no elections, quorums or external inputs are deemed necessary. The quest to ameliorate the people`s Irustrations or even to make them happy is conducted without insti- tuting substantive reIorms. It is more an endeavor to rebrand the monarchy than to make it more democratic. In Iact, the ethics oI enhanced purchasing power as part oI Amman`s middle-class cosmopolitanism permeates political liIe here. Replacing the prime minister is enacted with the same penstroke as increasing salaries and Iood subsidies. Enhanced purchasing power by the middle class brings Iorth both new governments and new goods. Furthermore, King Abdullah has recognized that such consumerist ac- tions and political distractions tap into the shared middle-class cosmopolitanism oI Ammanis. Just aIter the Dakhilya protests on March 27, 2011, King Abdullah called Ior the populace to avoid 'any behavior or attitude that would aIIect our unity. 27 In perhaps the clearest understanding oI this phenomenon, the king said on America`s National Public Radio: What bothers me in a lot oI countries is |that| society is being led by the street, as opposed to the light at the end oI the tunnel. But we have got to remember that the Arab Spring began and there`s challenges all over the world, including your country because oI economic diIfculties: unemployment, poverty. We have the largest youth cohort in history com- ing into the workIorce in the Middle East. And that is how the Arab Spring started. I mean, Tunis started be- cause oI the economy, not because oI politics.. What keeps me up at night is poverty and unemployment. We Tobin.indd 105 2/20/2012 12:56:05 PM 106 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIX, NO. 1, SPRING 2012 Ior instability came to other neighbor- ing countries. There was little concern or hope that the West would get involved in deposing King Abdullah. The political, economic and symbolic linkages between the king and the West are well known in Jordan. Particularly aIter Mubarak Iell, most Jordanians held to the belieI that any threat to Jordan was a threat to the last bastion oI pro-Western, Arab regimes in the region. Rather than reminding the populace oI harsh rulers, comparisons with Iraq served to remind the populace that, should calls Ior deposing King Abdul- lah be raised, the Iull support oI the West could be invoked on his behalI. Should the situation in Jordan come to that, the costs oI such instability could be as great as Western involvement and a civil war. In Iact, such symbolic linkages served to remind people that Jordan recently had had a civil war; Black September is still pres- ent in local memories. Such linkages also prompted people to ask iI their situations were really so dire that a U.S.-led invasion and another civil war were really worth it. Most agreed that they were not. Given the close proximity oI Damas- cus to Amman, comparisons with Syria were considered most salient. Such com- parisons reiterated the questions about civil war, as they did with Iraq. However, they also prompted questions about the role and power oI the government`s secret police (mukhabarat). Most Ammanis agreed that Jordan`s security apparatus was much less intrusive and alarming than Syria`s. Jordan`s mukhabarat are not as secretive, scary or as likely to be your neighbor as they are in Syria. The consensus was that the Jordanian police will kick you but will not kill you. And, as the events oI the Dakhiliya Protests indicated, the anti-riot police and intelligentsia are not likely to Irom deepening internal divisions are not enough, and that supplementing them with points oI comparison helps to distract Irom internal divisions. $J#$%"&'(0,/E&%!+,"+ This unitary construction oI social liIe in Amman as middle class and anti- revolution is Iurther reinIorced by an outward-looking disposition. At the height oI Western analysts` and media`s anticipa- tion oI Jordan`s movement into the Arab Spring, most Ammanis were frst look- ing to their neighboring countries. The 'wait and see attitude oI most Ammanis stemmed Irom Palestinian reluctance to protest without Jordanians, and Jordanians were not keen to trade the current regime Ior the situations in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Comparisons with each country Iurther confrmed that Amman`s middle-class unity was not based solely on ignoring or overlooking internal divisions, nor was the middle class and aspiring cosmopolitanism alone able to attain the heightened priori- tization oI economic, political and cultural Iorms that prevented revolution. Seeing the experiences in neighboring countries solid- ifed such unity and loyalty to the status quo. Jordan as the Nation oI Security and Stability (Belad al-Amn wa al-Istighrar) was an oIt-repeated niche characteriza- tion in a region otherwise wracked with violence, occupation and civil war, and in need oI signifcant political and economic development. On the Daily Show, King Abdullah characterized Jordan as 'stuck between Iraq and a hard place. 30 Whatever the diIfculties in Jordan, the alternative was worse. Certainly comparisons with Iraq were made beIore the Arab Spring began. How- ever, such comparisons were much more Irequent and signifcant aIter the potential Tobin.indd 106 2/20/2012 12:56:05 PM 107 TOBIN: JORDAN`S ARAB SPRING: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND ANTI-REVOLUTION inIormant said, 'II Egypt suddenly became a place where everyone is happy and pros- perous, there`d be a revolution in Jordan. The notion that Amman is a wealthier space, in which one`s opportunities might grow into a kind oI middle-class, cosmo- politan liIe and livelihood, was common enough that the economic imperative Ior reIorm was Iar diminished and best under- stood as existing 'out there, particularly in Egypt. Many residents oIten repeated the mantra that Jordan is the Nation oI Securi- ty and Stability, asking, 'Is it worth identi- Iying and conIronting the internal divisions that threaten this? For many, the desire was strong to overlook internal diIIer- ences and compare their situations to the instability in neighboring countries Ior the sake oI preventing the violence and harm undoing many neighboring countries. This sentiment continues to be strong. For many middle-class and aspiring cosmopolitans in Amman, it is not worth risking their status in the region. LiIe in Jordan, despite all its diIfculties, is secure and stable, and most believe it is best to keep it that way. E%,+E$0#+(K,%(E,'!#!0&'( %$K,%/ By defecting Irom the more imme- diate internal divisions, jettisoning real debates, and marginalizing those in Jor- danian society with legitimate economic and political claims, the middle-class and aspiring cosmopolitans have secured a new Iorm oI internal unity. This unity is Iurther solidifed when one looks to the repercus- sions Ielt in neighboring countries, includ- ing violence, death and civil war. Negative associations with neighbor- ing countries have prompted links between otherwise disparate and even tense sections oI society. The sentiment that 'we are not round up Jordanians en masse Ior inter- rogations, torture or execution, as they have in Syria. Amman`s middle class and aspiring cosmopolitans compare Jordan to Syria and consider the principles oI inclu- siveness and peaceIul coexistence, even in limited political Iorm, Iar preIerable to Syria`s ruthless internal-security appara- tus. Ammanis preIerred their consumerist distractions over wrestling with diIIerence and diversity in ways that could potentially throw the country into the violence wit- nessed in Syria. In comparison with Egypt, Amman`s cosmopolitan middle class expressed polit- ical, economic and cultural distance Irom the working poor oI Cairo. Comparisons emphasized that Jordan is less internally homogenous than Egypt, and that such di- versity makes revolution less likely. As one Ammani Iriend told me, 'They can have a revolution. They`re all poor and Egyptian. The guiding notion was that the diversity internal to Jordan would result in a less straightIorward experience oI protest- revolution-political-reIorm. The sentiment was that Egyptians can and should have a revolution, given their perceived internal ethnic and economic homogeneity and the overwhelmingly unifed dislike oI Mubarak. Should diverse Jordan destabi- lize, the result would be closer to that oI sectarian Syria than oI homogenous Egypt. Economic comparisons with Egypt Iurther emphasize the role that external comparisons play among the emergent middle class and aspiring cosmopolitans in Amman. Ammanis Iound themselves with space and political-economic opportunity to engage in a reorganization and repri- oritization oI Iorms Ior social liIe, such that their economic Irustrations with the government were not nearly as strongly held as those oI the Egyptians. As one Tobin.indd 107 2/20/2012 12:56:05 PM 108 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XIX, NO. 1, SPRING 2012 1 Oded Eran, 'Is Jordan Next? Haaret:, February 7, 2011, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.haaretz. com/print-edition/opinion/is-jordan-next-1.341727; Joel Rosenberg, 'Revolution in Egypt? And Could Jordan Be Next? National Review, January, 28, 2011, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/ corner/ 258304/revolution-egypt-and-could-jordan-be-next-joel-c-rosenberg.; Ivan Watson and Amy Hybels, 'Jordan Protestors Inspired by Tunisian Ripple, CNN, January 24, 2011, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/01/19/jordan.ripple/index.html?ireImpstoryview. 2 Hashemite Kingdom oI Jordan Department oI Statistics, 'Population oI Kingdom at End-year |sic| 2010, Department of Statistics, January 18, 2012, accessed January 18, 2012, http://www.dos.gov.jo/doshomee/ main/index.htm. 3 This is a well-known and common understanding. Many Western analysts have also debated the possible implications oI this. CI. Robert Fisk, 'Why Jordan Is Occupied by Palestinians, Independent, July 22, 2010, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fsk/robert-fsk-why- jordan-is-occupied-by-palestinians-2032173.html. 4 Wikipedia, 'Demographics oI Jordan: Ethnic and Religious Groups, Wikipedia, accessed December 15, 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DemographicsoIJordan#Ethnicandreligiousgroups. 5 'Maps: Modern Socio-Political, PBS Global Connections. The Middle East, last modifed 2002, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/globalconnections/mideast/maps/demotext.html. 6 'Prince El-Hassan bin Talal: Jordanian Christians Are Fully Integrated,` Middle East Quarterlv (Winter 2001): 82-87, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.meIorum.org/20/jordanian-christians-are-Iully- integrated. 7 Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern Historv of Jordan (IB Tauris & Co Ltd., 1998), 100. 8 Immigration and ReIugee Board oI Canada, 'Jordan: InIormation on Christians in Jordan, Whether Fun- damentalist Seek to Convert Them to Islam and on the Assistance Available to Them, UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agencv, last modifed 2002, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/reIworld/publisher,I RBC,,JOR,3ae6ac3c20,0.html. 9 Naseem Tarawnah, 'Dual Citizenship in Jordan: Not Acceptable, The Joices of the Middle East. MidEast- sPosts.com, October 9, 2011, last accessed December 27, 2011, http://mideastposts.com/2011/10/09/dual- citizenship-in-jordan-not-acceptable/. 10 Lamis Andoni, 'Jordan Is Not Palestine, Al-Jazeera, July 4, 2010, last accessed December 15, 2011, http:// www.aljazeera.com /news/2010/07/2010748131864654.html. 11 Index Mundi, 'Jordan Infation Rate (consumer prices), Index Mundi, last modifed January 9, 2012, ac- cessed January 18, 2012, http://www.indexmundi.com/jordan/infationrate28consumerprices29.html. Egypt, 'we are not Syria, and 'we are not Iraq provides a tenuous undergird- ing Ior political and economic cohesion between Salafs and secular Jordanians, Palestinians and Jordanians, and others. The Ieeling that most people in Amman are not abjectly poor provides economic motivation as well. Rather than the poten- tially stronger bonds oI positive political and economic associations, these negative associations will only continue as long as the political situations in neighboring countries are worse than in Jordan. As long as the negative political associations con- tinue between middle-class Ammanis and Syrians, Egyptians and Iraqis, Jordan can continue to hold together as a coherent, cohesive society. The mantra that Jordan is the Nation oI Security and Stability is true only relative to neighboring countries. The implication is that the Iuture oI Jordan is inextricably linked to those oI neighboring countries, even more so than its own inter- nal political and economic situation would otherwise indicate. Tobin.indd 108 2/20/2012 12:56:05 PM 109 TOBIN: JORDAN`S ARAB SPRING: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND ANTI-REVOLUTION 12 'Field Listing: Population Below Poverty Line, CIA World Factbook, last modifed 2011, accessed De- cember 15, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-Iactbook/felds/2046.html. 13 Index Mundi, 'Jordan Unemployment Rate, Index Mundi, last modifed January 9, 2012, accessed January 18, 2012, http://www.indexmundi.com/jordan/unemploymentrate.html. 14 Jillian Schwedler, 'Amman Cosmopolitan: Spaces and Practices oI Aspiration and Consumption, Com- parative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 30 (2010): 547-62. 15 Ibid., 555. 16 Philip Robins, A Historv of Jordan (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2-3; Eugene L. Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire. Transfordan, 1850-1921 (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 18, 72-76; Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern Historv of Jordan (IB Tauris & Co Ltd., 1998), 130. 17 Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern Historv of Jordan (IB Tauris & Co Ltd., 1998), 130. 18 Janine A. Clark, Islam, Charitv, and Activism. Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egvpt, Jordan, and Yemen (Indiana University Press, 2004) 17, 63, 82. 19 AseI Bayat, Making Islam Democratic. Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (StanIord University Press, 2007), 236-8. 20 Jillian Schwedler, 'The Geography oI Political Protests, in Revolution in the Arab World. The Long Jiew, Mimi Kirk, ed. (Center Ior Contemporary Studies, 2011), 9-14. 21 These protests were well documented by bloggers and in social commentaries by those in Jordan as well as in international media outlets. Dalia Zatara, 'The Day aIter March 25. 7iber.com, March 27, 2011, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.7iber.com/2011/03/the-day-aIter-march-25/; Ranya Kadri and Isabel Kersh- ner, 'Violence Erupts at Jordan Protest, New York Times, February 18, 2011, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/ middleeast/19jordan.html. 22 Ibid., 13. 23 For a report critical oI the government, see Ranya Kadri, 'Jordan: Protestors Clash with Police during King`s Visit to Tribal Town, New York Times, June 13, 2011, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.ny- times.com/ 2011/06/14/world/middleeast/14brieIs-Jordan.html. For a report oI the government`s narrative oI events, see 'Jordan: OIfcials Deny Protestors Attacked King, BBC News, June 13, 2011, accessed Decem- ber 15, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13751299. 24 Tafleh jokes oIten resemble 'blonde jokes in America. One example includes, 'A man Irom Tafleh had been asking God Ior 15 years to be blessed with a child. One night he received a message Irom God that said: Get married frst, you idiot!` 25 'Isaba 83 min al-amn Al-Urduny f tithahira lil Salafyeen, Al-Arabiya News, uploaded to youtube.com April 15, 2011, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?vHlvOaX5jPTc&Ieature related. The frst minute oI the video translates as, 'Hussein Haza` Al-Mijali, leader oI the Police Dept. announced today that 83 members oI the police Iorce were injured in the events oI Zarqa that involved the Salaf fihadin and their opposition, who had called Ior police intervention. The police fred tear gas to separate the two parties. Mijali said that 17 Salafs arrested were involved in attacking policeman using batons and sharp objects. It is worth mentioning that the Salaf Iaction have been calling Ior protests over the last month in various cities, asking Ior the implementation oI Shari`a and the release oI the 200 detainees Irom Jordanian jails. 26 Jillian Schwedler, 'Jordan`s Risky Business as Usual, Middle East Research and Information Profect, June 30 (2010), accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero063010. 27 'Jordan`s King Calls Ior National Unity, Al-Jazeera, last modifed March 27, 2011, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011327203224334931.html. 28 'King Abdullah: Jordan Needs a Stable Middle Class`, National Public Radio, Sept. 22, 2011, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/09/22/140670554/king-abdullah-jordan-needs-stable-middle- class. 29 Batir Wardam, 'We Are All Jordan: The Issue oI Ownership, Jordan Watch, July 29, 2006, accessed De- cember 15, 2011, http://batir.jeeran.com/archive/2006/7/75652.html. 30 King Abdullah II oI Jordan Extended Interview, The Daily Show with John Stewart, September 23, 2010, accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-september-23-2010/exclusive---king- abdullah-ii-oI-jordan-extended-interview. 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