Aquinas Environmental Ethics Providence PDF

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics: A Reconsideration of Providence and Salvation Author(s): FranciscoBenzoni Source: The Journal of Religion,
Vol. 85, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 446-476 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/429574 . Accessed: 21/10/2013 11:24
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Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics: A Reconsideration of Providence and Salvation* Francisco Benzoni /
Duke University
introduction The aim of this article is to clarify the basic parameters to which any environmental ethic must conform if it is to take its philosophical and theological bearings from the thought of Thomas Aquinas. I argue that any Thomistic environmental ethic must be consistently anthropocentric, where this means that nonhuman creatures are nally instruments to the human good. Any duties toward (or restrictions on our activities toward) such creatures must nd their moral grounding in the human good. The point of this article, then, is not to esh out a Thomistic environmental ethic or to offer an argument about its adequacy. Rather, as noted, it is to outline the parameters within which such an ethic must be developed. Still, my larger project is critical of Thomass understanding, and I close with a few brief comments on some fundamental reformulations necessary to sustain a promising strand in Thomass own position. I have found it useful to use Willis Jenkinss thoughtful and provocative essay, Biodiversity and Salvation: Thomistic Roots for Environmental Ethics,1 as a conversation partner to clarify the thought of Thomas. In his essay, Jenkins draws on the thought of Thomas to argue for a Christian environmental ethic that views nature and other creatures noninstrumentally. He also maintains that there is a powerful Thomis* I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and Eric Gregory for pointing me to Willis Jenkinss article. In a few places in the notes, I have included the Latin, or portions of the Latin, where particular, precise terms are emphasized or needed to sustain my argument, or where I thought it might be helpful to demonstrate that the translation I have used accurately reects Thomass intention. 1 Willis Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation: Thomistic Roots for Environmental Ethics, Journal of Religion 83 (2003): 20120. 2005 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-4189/2005/8503-0004$10.00
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tic argument for the preservation of biological diversity. While his argument draws on several intriguing strands in Thomass work in order to develop a stewardship ethic (and I nd the argument attractive in many respects), there are important systemic reasons to reject calling it Thomistic. Specically, the understandings of providence and salvation, as well as the attendant conception of justice, espoused by (or presupposed by) Jenkins are not true to the thought of Thomas. Now, one might argue that Jenkins merely uses certain images from Thomass theology in order to develop a profoundly motivating spirituality that inspires a life of ecological virtue.2 In that case, my argument that Jenkinss approach is not consistent with Thomass larger project is not directly to the point. And Jenkinss and my aims converge, since we both seek a robust ecological ethic grounded in Gods relation to the world in which all creatures are accorded more than instrumental value. But, in fact, as we will see below, Jenkins does insistthough perhaps he need notthat he is deriving his conclusions from the work of Thomas. In this article, I delineate the limitations of a thoroughgoing Thomistic approach to ecological ethics. Jenkinss argument is helpful in achieving this agenda; I have made every effort to give it a fair reading. Where Jenkins nds continuity, Thomas insists upon discontinuity. That is, Jenkinss argument is successful only if God is truly affected by the world and if human beings are truly ontologically continuous with the rest of creation. But precisely these continuities are rejected by Thomas, who insists that God, as ipsum esse subsistens, cannot be affected by the world and that material entities and immaterial entities (which entities include the human soulalbeit in a qualied sense) differ generically.3 The discontinuity between God and the world undercuts the
I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this formulation. Summa Theologiae, trans. English Dominicans (New York: Christian Classics, 1981), pt. Ia, Question 13, Article 7 (hereafter, all Summa Theologiae citations are given as, e.g., Ia, 13, 7). In Thomass day, the question of the soul presented itself in stark alternativesthe soul is the form of the body and perishes with the death of the body or the soul is a complete substance only accidentally united to the bodypitting Aristotelians against Platonists. For theological and philosophical reasons, neither of these alternatives was acceptable to Thomas. Among other places, he addresses this issue in the opening question of his disputation, Questions on the Soul, when he asks whether the soul can be both an entity and a form. An entity is an individual in the category of substance and a form is that by which a substance has existence. Thomass conclusion is that the soul is the form of the body. However, it is a subsistent form that survives the death of body but requires the body for its own essential operation and so is itself an incomplete substance. In short, it is a special kind of form of a material entityone that subsistsand a special kind of immaterial entityone that is an incomplete substance or is incomplete in species. Thomas does, at times, refer to the human soul as an immaterial substance. (See, e.g., Summa Theologiae, Ia, 118, 2; Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. English Dominicans [London: Burns, Oates, & Washbourne, 1934], bk. II, chap. 77
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sensibility of Jenkinss exhortation that human beings ought to preserve biological diversity. God infallibly wills that these species remain in existence in order that Gods primary purpose in creatingthe perfection of the universebe fullled. The discontinuity between humans and other material creatures, which discontinuity is crucial to Thomass understanding of salvation, undercuts Jenkinss claim that nonhuman creatures have something better than intrinsic value. Jenkinss account of Thomass soteriology inexplicably neglects the salvation partthat is, Thomass account of the second perfection of the universe when all motion will cease and, among mixed bodies, only human beings will remain. Let me offer a roadmap. I begin by briey considering Jenkinss argument in order to bring out several features that are germane to the present discussion. I then show that Thomass understanding of divine providence and divine justice undermine Jenkinss account. Once we understand Thomass own position, it is no longer possible to employ his thought to construct an ethic that exhorts human beings to preserve biological diversity. I demonstrate that a strictly instrumental understanding of other creatures is reected in Thomass understanding of providence and in his moral theory. I next further explore some of the systematic reasons for this positionnamely, the discontinuities between God and the world and between humans and nonhumans. I conclude with some thoughts on the need for some fundamental refor[hereafter, all Summa Contra Gentiles citations are given as, e.g., II, 77]; Disputed Questions on Truth, vol. 1, trans. Robert William Mulligan; vol. 2, trans. James V. McGlynn; vol. 3, trans. Robert W. Schmidt [Chicago: Regnery, 195254], Question 19, Article 1 [hereafter, all Disputed Questions on Truth citations are given as, e.g., 19, 1]; Questions on the Soul, trans. James H. Robb [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984], Question 7.) And, indeed, it is, though a unique one. (For an especially helpful work on this topic, see Anton C. Pegiss St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century [Toronto: Pontical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978].) Because they are in the category of substance, the notion that immaterial and material entities are generically different means that they differ metaphysically since there is no higher category in which they can both be placed. Of course, one might argue that since immaterial and material creatures have their source and end in God, then this common feature might be used to show that there is, metaphysically, a common metric according to which they can be compared. However, this does not provide a common univocal designation because source and end do not apply to God and creatures univocally. So this commonality is not, nally, relevant to the claim that immaterial and material creatures are creatures in metaphysically differing senses of creature. There is, as Thomas says, no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things (Summa Theologiae, Ia, 88, 2 ad 1: quia non est sufciens comparatio rerum materialium ad immateriales; see also Summa Theologiae, Ia, 88, 2 ad 3). Or, again, Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances (Summa Theologiae, Ia, 88, 2 ad 4: substantiae immateriales creatae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus). Though they belong in the same logical genus insofar as both are creatures, this is just to say that there are metaphysically differing senses of creature because the bare fact of essence differing from esse does not place creatures in a common natural (or ontological) genusas Thomas recognizes.
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mulations of Thomass project to make justice applicable to other creatures. jenkinss thomistic stewardship ethic Jenkins explores the work of Thomas in order to develop a Christian environmental ethic rooted in soteriology. He proposes that rather passing over those teachings in Thomas that concentrate on the human, there is a way of approaching the traditional (human-centered) doctrines with a view to their environmental virtue.4 He argues that the way of human salvation in Thomas implies a robust ecological ethics.5 Standing within the Christian faith, he maintains, we have powerful soteriological reasons for preserving the diversity of creation. Jenkinss argument rests on what he calls the soteriological epistemology of Thomas. He summarizes this epistemology as follows: While we live on earth we know God through His likeness reected in creatures. The value of every creature is that it is a visable [sic] participation of God and so functions as an icon into the divine life. Clearly here is in Thomas a theological mandate to preserve ecological diversity, for to do so is to preserve the multifarious character of the availability of God for us.6 We name God from creatures, and the greater the diversity of creatures, the greater is our capacity to bless and praise God. Indeed, the loss of biological diversity increases the threat of idolatry, of naming God not from creatures but from things made in our own image.7 This understanding, Jenkins argues, does not result in soteriological instrumentalization (such that nature is understood as solely instrumental to human salvation) because knowing God through creatures does not concern the essence of creation but says something about the intrinsic nature of human beings. Creation is not human gift by essential nature, but by proximate function, relative to human nature and Gods love for us.8 The crucial point is that in coming to know God through creatures, we also come to see creatures as God sees them. The ethic that results entails an understanding of nature as Gods gift for us, and in receiving nature as Gods gift for us . . . we nd something special to say about itsomething like, but better than, intrinsic
4 5 6
Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation, 402. Ibid., 403. Ibid., 408. 7 Ibid., 412. 8 Ibid., 409.
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value.9 The specialness of nature is best afrmed by saying that creation is for us the grace of God.10 And this understanding of creation, as an instrument of grace,11 refutes the very idea of natures instrumentality.12 This is so because this grace allows us to see God and, by seeing God, to appreciate better the diversity of things who also receive Gods grace and communicate themselves to knowers as intelligible only as such receivers.13 Our knowledge of diverse creatures, when such knowledge is formed in faith, both (1) gives us diverse ways of blessing and praising God in whom all the perfections that we see in creatures preexist most eminently and (2) enables us to appreciate the gift, the grace of God, that each of these creatures embodies. As Jenkins says, In the actualization of our desire for God (through our participation in God by grace), we are provoked by sensory knowledge of the natural world to realize something of the character of God, and then in this knowledge to apprehend the perfection of the entity that mediates our vision.14 To repeat, we come to know God through creatures, and, in knowing God, we come to see creatures as Gods communication of graceas God sees them. As Jenkins explains, it is by grace that one will be able to see snail darters more relevantly approximate to the way God sees them.15 In coming to see that other creatures not only lead us to God but also share inare manifestations ofGods grace, we can afrm the specialness of nature as Gods grace. This is better than trying to say that nature is intrinsically valuable.16 Other creatures are intrinsically given-to and so caught up with us into the divine commerce of grace.17 Jenkins argues on the basis of this giftedness of creationboth for us and to other creaturesthat human beings have a responsibility to
9 Ibid., 408. The notion of intrinsic value, Jenkins states, raises some problems in environmental discourses. In a footnote, he states, The point cannot be pursued here, but it seems to me that environmental thinkers nd it difcult to describe an intrinsic value that is at once veriably there and yet does not appeal at bottom to the self-valuing of rational agents (ibid., 411 n. 34). Though Jenkins merely mentions it in passing, it is not at all clear to me that the notion of intrinsic value is invariably problematic. A relational understanding of intrinsic value coupled with an understanding of subjectivity as characterizing all levels of created reality makes irrelevant the notion that intrinsic value can, or ought to be, specied as statically there. Further, such an understanding of intrinsic value does not in any way rely on the self-valuing of rational agents, or, indeed, on creaturely rational agents at all. 10 Ibid., 411. 11 Ibid., 410. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 407. 15 Ibid., 406; italics added. 16 Ibid., 411. 17 Ibid.
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preserve species and wildlands.18 To fail to do so, to impoverish biodiversity, would result in the loss of that by which to bless God.19 It would also fail to acknowledge Gods gift of love (and so being) to other creatures. It is the human responsibility not only to take care of the earth but . . . also our vocation to . . . gather up the various loves of the earth and return them to their Lover.20 When, in faith, we come to know the nature of the relationship between God and creation, it becomes our responsibility to care for and return the love of Godin the form of the being of creaturesto God, to care for creation as Gods own gift. This is eucharistic biodiversity. The sort of anthropocentrism we nd in Thomas . . . is one that centers creation around humanity only insofar as humans receive Gods giving to creation.21 Jenkins draws on Thomass discussion of government to bolster his claim to ground a stewardship ethic in Thomass thought. Jenkins quotes Thomass argument that government has two effects: the preservation of things in their goodness and the moving of things to good.22 Jenkins maintains, Stewardship, therefore, as the mediation of divine providence, is dened by Thomas as being both about conservation and careful tending; we are to protect the participations of goodness and to move things to their ordained end, which is proximately their natural perfection and ultimately is God.23 Jenkins goes so far as to state that seeking the good of every creature under our power, and in manner appropriate to divine wisdom, is how rational animals seek their own good. Providential care of nonhuman beings is integral to the vocation of being human.24 Jenkins puts his stewardship ethic in terms of justice. He argues, For Thomas, stewardship is rooted in justice, and justice is an act of Gods providence.25 Or, again, The ecological task of stewardship is the dispensation of justice, giving each its due according to the equality of proportion,26 so that the work of stewardship is to be a minister of Gods justice.27 To act justly, human beings must be responsible stewIbid., 413. Ibid., 412. Ibid., 413. 21 Ibid., 411. 22 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 103, 4. Cited in Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation, 417. Jenkins also cites Thomass discussion in Question 103, Article 6, where Thomas states, Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself (Summa Theologiae, Ia, 103, 6). 23 Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation, 417. 24 Ibid., 419. 25 Ibid., 414. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.
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ards of Gods creation. Justice demands that we seek the good of all creatures, and so it governs not only our relations to other human beings, but also our relations to nonhuman creatures. gods view of creatures: providence and justice I want now to turn to a critical examination of Jenkinss argument. Jenkins confuses ontological goodness, the goodness each creature has by virtue of its participation in the divine goodness, with what might be termed moral worth, or the worthiness of each creature to direct moral consideration by human beings. All creatures are ontologically good, good in their very being and, insofar, they seek to preserve and augment their own being. But this is a metaphysical or metaethical, and not yet ethical, matter. The bare fact of ontological goodness says nothing about how human beings ought to behave in relation to other creatures; it says nothing about the moral worth of such creatures. While it is beyond dispute that in Thomass thought all creatures are ontologically good, or gifts of grace, and so participate in the divine economy of grace, the moral implications Jenkins draws (e.g., that human beings have a moral responsibility to other creatures and ought to preserve biological diversity) do not follow. To understand the moral implications of Thomass ontology, one must examine carefully his teleologya task that I turn to below and that in signicant and relevant respects Jenkins forgoes. I want to focus on two of Jenkinss central (and interrelated) claims namely, (1) that Thomass position supports an understanding of nonhuman creatures as having intrinsic value (or rather something better than intrinsic value) and (2) that the resulting stewardship ethic can be specied in terms of Thomass understanding of justice. I argue that Thomass understanding of divine providence and divine justice undermines these claims. I begin with Jenkinss claim that Thomass scheme supports something better than the intrinsic value of nonhuman creatures. On Jenkinss reading, once we come to see creatures in faith as gifts of God, once we come to see creatures as God sees them, then a reverential attitude follows that enables us to view, and so to treat, these creatures noninstrumentally. Let us then consider what it would mean, in Thomass thought, to see creatures as God sees them. Far from legitimating a noninstrumental understanding of other creatures, seeing creatures as God sees them lends legitimacy to the view that other creatures are strictly instrumental to the human good. God cares for creatures as God sees them. Indeed, it is precisely because of the way God
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sees creatures that God cares for them the way he does. So one way of getting a handle on how God sees other creatures is to consider Gods providential care for them. Thomass Summa Contra Gentiles, book IIIb, chapter 112, is a rich source for this topic. This chapter is titled That rational creatures are governed for their own sake, and other creatures, as directed to them.28 As is typical in this work, Thomas claries his position through a string of arguments designed to reach his desired conclusion. Each argument in the string of arguments concludes with a statement of how Thomas views Gods providential care of nonhuman creatures, and so how God sees these creatures. So, for example, he states, divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature.29 Or, again, the intellectual nature alone is requisite for its own sake in the universe, and all others for its sake.30 It seems, therefore, that to see other creatures as God sees them is to see them as instruments for the human good. To be sure, they are properly seen as gifts from God but as gifts to be used as instruments and not as creatures with something better than intrinsic value. Indeed, several of Thomass arguments are put explicitly in terms of the instrumentality of nonhuman, nonrational creatures. For example, his rst argument proceeds as follows:
the very condition of the rational creature, in that it has dominion over its actions, requires that the care of providence should be bestowed on it for its own sake: whereas the condition of other things that have not dominion over their actions shows that they are cared for, not for their own sake, but as being directed to other things. Because that which acts only when moved by another, is like an instrument; whereas that which acts by itself, is like a principal agent. Now an instrument is required, not for its own sake, but that the principal agent may use it.31 Hence whatever is done for the care of the instruments must be referred to the principal agent as its end: whereas any such action directed to the principal agent as such, either by the agent itself or by another, is for the sake of the same principal agent. Accordingly intellectual creatures are
28 Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIb, 112. Quod creaturae rationales gubernantur propter seipsas, aliae vero in ordine ad eas. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 The Latin up to this point goes as follows: ipsa conditio intellectualis naturae, secundum quam est domina sui actus, providentiae curam requirit qua sibi propter se provideatur: aliorum vero conditio, quae non habent dominium sui actus, hoc indicat, quod eis non propter ipsa cura impendatur, sed velut ad alia ordinatis. Quod enim ab altero tantum agitur, rationem instrumenti habet: quod vero per se agit, habet rationem principalis agentis. Instrumentum autem non quaeritur propter seipsum, sed ut eo principale agens utatur (ibid.).
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ruled by God, as though He cared for them for their own sake, while other creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures.32
Thomass argument is clear and concise: humans have dominion over their own actions (or, we might say, they have rational freedom or a free will or are causa sui) and so are cared by God for their own sakes; other creatures lack freedom and so are like instruments to be used by the free.33 Nonrational creatures are moved by another; for example, some (like arrows) are moved directly by a rational creature and others (like sheep) are moved by natural instinct. As such, they are slaves34 to be used as instruments35 by the free. Note that by arguing that nonhuman creatures are cared for, not for their own sake, but as being directed to other things36 and nally to human beings, this argument states the strict instrumental ordering of the nonhuman to the human (rather than this instrumental ordering being in addition to any moral worth that such a creature might have). Thomas puts this instrumental ordering in clear, one might say stark, terms when he writes, Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine providence they are intended for mans use in the natural order. Hence it is no wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever.37 The conclusion seems inescapable: to see other creatures as God sees them means to see them as mere instruments to the human good. It is by divine providence that other creatures are ordered instrumentally to the human good. Even cruelty or harm to animals is morally proscribed only because of its effects (or potential effects) on human beings. As Thomas explains, If any passages of Holy Writ seem to forbid us to be cruel to dumb animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young: this is either to remove mans thoughts from being cruel to other men, and lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings: or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either
32 The second argument is similar: That which has dominion over its own act, is free in its action, because he is free who is cause of himself: whereas that which by some kind of necessity is moved by another to act, is subject to slavery. Therefore every other creature is naturally under slavery; the intellectual nature alone is free. Now, in every government provision is made for the free for their own sake; but for slaves that they may be useful to the free. Accordingly divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature (ibid.). 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. From servus (m. and f. as subst.): a slave, servant. 35 Ibid. From instrumentum (n.): equipment, instrument, tool, implement. 36 Ibid.; italics added. 37 Ibid.; italics added. Per haec autem excluditur error ponentium homini esse peccatum si animalia bruta occidat. Ex divina enim providentia naturali ordine in usum hominis ordinantur. Unde absque iniuria eis utitur homo, vel occidendo, vel quolibet alio modo.
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of the doer of the deed, or of another.38 We could continue to look at other arguments in this question. Such an undertaking would only reinforce the conclusion articulated above. Thomass position is clear (as even the title of the question reects): God cares for nonhuman creatures for the sake of human beings and not for their own sakes. (Below, we will examine Thomass claim that such creatures are also for the sake of the perfection of the universe.) Let us turn now to the second point articulated above, namely, Jenkinss claim that his stewardship ethic can be grounded in Thomass account of justice.39 Jenkins rightly sees human justice in terms of divine justice40 and rightly maintains that justice is an act of divine providence.41 Still, it is not the case that one can derive any noninstrumental stewardship ethic from Thomass understanding of justice. On the contrary, precisely because the divine justice is an act of Gods providence (which providential care cares for the lower strictly for the sake of the higheras we saw above) and because human justice is modeled on the divine justice, the virtue of justice cannot include the well-being of other creatures within its ambit. Jenkins is mistaken, then, when he maintains, the ecological task of stewardship [where this includes noninstrumental valuation of nonhuman creatures and the moral exhortation that human beings ought to preserve biological diversity] is the dispensation of justice.42 As we saw above, in our discussion of divine providence, God cares for nonhuman creatures for the sake of the rational creature. Gods providential care for creatures reects the ordering of the universe and so the divine will and the divine justice. As Thomas says, the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God.43 He puts in terms of divine justice what I discussed above in providential terms. It is . . . due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus . . . God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its
Ibid. Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation, 414. 40 As Thomas says, The rst thing upon which the essential character of all justice depends is the wisdom of the divine intellect, which constitutes things in their due proportion (Disputed Questions on Truth, 23, 6; italics added). Thomas also argues that everyone is obliged to conform his will to Gods (Disputed Questions on Truth, 23, 7). A will that is habituated well (i.e., has the virtue of justice) is disposed to follow the divine will. Human justice is modeled on divine justice. (See, e.g., Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, 87, 8; IIaIIae, 64, 2; IIaIIae, 64, 4; IIaIIae, 65, 3; IIaIIae, 67, 3.) 41 Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation, 414. 42 Ibid. 43 Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, 21, 1.
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nature and condition.44 So the divine justice, the divine ordering of the universe, dictates that nonhuman creatures be instrumentally ordered to human beings. That ordering is giving each creature its due. Nonhuman creatures are cared for, and indeed were created, not for their own sakes but for the sake of the human being (as well as for the perfection of the universewhich, as noted, we will look at below). We can see this account reected in Thomass discussion of the cardinal virtue of justice. Equality is the bedrock and foundation of Thomass conception of justice. As Thomas puts it, justice is a kind of equality.45 Or, again, it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with others,46 equality is the general form of justice,47 and the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality.48 Because nonhuman creatures lack the requisite ontological equality with (or are essentially less perfect than) human beings, they are excluded from the ambit of justice. They are beyond the moral pale. (We might note parenthetically that this understanding is also reected in Thomass division of sin according to its object. Thomas holds that sin is ttingly divided into sin against oneself, sin against ones neighbor, and sin against God. There is no room for sin against nonhuman creatures.) Thomass analysis of justice does not, and cannot, ground an ecological ethic of the sort advocated by Jenkins. Justice is divided into two speciescommutative justice and distributive justice. In his account of commutative justice, Thomas considers the vices or sins to which it is opposed. In this discussion, he considers whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing.49 He maintains, there is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect.50 He concludes, therefore, that it is lawful [and so in accord with commutative justice] both to take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God himself.51 Because it lacks the requisite ontological equality, a nonhuman
Ibid., IaIIae, 21, 1 ad 1. Ibid., IaIIae, 114, 1. Iustitia autem aequalitas quaedam est. 46 Ibid., IIaIIae, 79, 1. Ad iustitiam enim pertinet aequalitatem constituere in his quae sunt ad alterum. 47 Ibid., IIaIIae, 61, 2 ad 2. Generalis forma iustitiae est aequalitas. 48 Ibid., IIaIIae, 80, 1. Ratio vero iustitiae consistit in hoc quod alteri reddatur quod ei debetur secundum aequalitatem. See also, e.g., ibid., IIaIIae, 117, 2 ad 3, and IIaIIae, 62, 2. 49 Ibid., IIaIIae, 64, 1. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid.
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creature cannot be the object of an act of (commutative) justice. Such creatures, as less perfect, are ordered to the human being, as more perfect, in a strictly instrumental manner.52 It is lawful to kill living things for human use because this use is the very purpose for which such beings exist.53 Distributive justice might seem promising as an avenue to incorporate direct moral concern for nonhuman creatures into Thomass moral theory. Perhaps there might be some sort of proportion between human beings and nonhuman creatures. Maintaining the equality of proportion would then entail that some of the common goods are due to nonhuman creatures as a matter of (distributive) justice. However, Thomass ontology militates against any proportionality between rational and nonrational creatures. Whatever similarity there is between humans and nonhumans, the immaterial subsistent soul of the human so separates us from other creatures that no such proportionality is possible. There can be no proportion between material and immaterial entities. There is no common metric according to which these two generically different54 types of entity can be compared. To be sure, one might argue that the comparison is not between nonrational creatures and the human soul but between nonrational creatures and human beings (i.e., body and soul). But this approach does not help because the problem remains of somehow comparing an entity without a subsistent soul to an entity with a subsistent soul, when those parts are simply not comparable on the basis of any common metric. Further, Thomass own understanding of distributive justice does not include any mention of the justice due to nonrational creatures and his more general account of justice makes it clear that human justice is only between human beings. For example, he maintains, the matter of justice is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by justice.55 Or, again, justice in the proper sense is always
52 Indeed, as noted, the basis of the claim that transactions between individuals morally binds each of them to treat the other with justice, to render each his due according to equality, to give in equal measure as has been received, is the ontological equality of participants in the transaction. This ontological equality can only be the equality of rational agents. Without presupposing such equality, the equality of justice cannot itself be justied. Outside the relations between human beings little sense can be made of this equality of (commutative) justice. 53 See, e.g., Disputed Questions on Truth, 24, 2, ad 6. 54 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 51, 1. 55 Ibid., IIaIIae, 58, 11; italics added. Materia iustitiae est operatio exterior secundum quod ipsa, vel res qua per eam utimur, proportionatur alteri personae. See also, e.g., ibid., IaIIae, 100, 12; IIaIIae, 58, 2; IIaIIae, 67, 3; Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 93.
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between different persons.56 He even states point blank, There is no justice between man and irrational beings.57 And even though this statement is articulated in an objection, it is clear from Thomass response that he takes this particular point for granted.58 (One might note here that Thomass understanding of distributive justice was strongly inuenced by Greek, especially Aristotelian, conceptions of justice. And, as such, it is thoroughly sociological matterprimarily concerned with maintaining peace and stability within the human community by distributing the common goods to an individual in accordance with her or his position in the community.) Human justice, the virtue of the will, is modeled on divine justice.59 The human will ought to be conformed to the divine will in the sense that human beings act justly when we order our relations to one another and to other creatures in such a way as to conform to the divine ordering of creation, which ordering reects the divine justice. In the present discussion, this entails that human justice cannot include our relations to nonhuman creatures precisely because the divine justice orders the lower to the higher instrumentally, as is made especially clear in Thomass discussion of divine providence. It is interesting that precisely because divine justice orders of all creatures to one another (and orders them as it does), human justice only includes the ordering of human relations. We can sum up this portion of the discussion by saying that seeing creatures as God sees them means seeing them as instruments to the human good and modeling human justice on the divine justice means excluding our relations to other creatures from the ambit of justice (except insofar as these relations might affect human beings). thomass bifurcations I want to consider now the systematic reasons that Thomass conceptions of God and of creatures do not, and cannot, underwrite a noninstrumental understanding of nonhuman creatures. Jenkinss confusion of ontological goodness and moral worth is part of the larger confusion of seeing continuity where Thomas sees discontinuity. First,
56 Disputed Questions on Truth, 28, 1. Iustitia proprie dicta semper existente inter diversas personas. See also, e.g., Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, 100, 12; IIaIIae, 58, 2; IIaIIae, 67, 3; Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 93. 57 Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, 46, 7 obj 1. 58 See ibid., IaIIae, 47, 7, obj 1 and ad 1. 59 See, e.g., Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, 67, 3 obj 1 and ad 1; IIaIIae, 64, 2 obj 2 and ad 2; Disputed Questions on Truth, 23, 7. See also n. 40 above.
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if God was truly continuous with the world, if God was truly affected by the world, then it might be sensible to exhort human beings not to thwart Gods primary purpose in creating, which is that creation be diverse so as to most fully reect the divine goodness. But God is wholly perfect, ipsum esse subsistens, utterly complete, and so cannot be affected by the world. The divine will (fullled infallibly by the innite divine power) cannot be thwarted by the agency of creatures. Since the reection of the divine goodness is Gods primary purpose in creating, then the diversity that is necessary to fulll that purpose is directly willed by God. Human beings cannot affect the divine will. Second, if human beings were truly ontologically continuous with the rest of creation, then one might be able to make a Thomistic case for the moral worth of all creatures. But material entities differ generically from immaterial entities (which entities include the human soul, though in a qualied sense).60 These entities have separate destinies, and only through a further consideration of Thomass teleology can the full moral import of his ontology be claried. This teleology demonstrates the solely instrumental worth of nonhuman creatures. A useful way to organize this portion of our discussion is through a consideration of the rst and second perfections of the universe. The rst perfection is the completeness of the universe at its rst founding.61 This rst perfection concerns the universe and the order among creatures in the created state of time and movement. The second perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the saints at the consummation of the world.62 In the second or nal perfection, movement and time cease. By considering Thomass understanding of the divine will in bringing about the rst perfection, or in creating, as well as the divine providence in preserving this creation, we will see that Jenkinss exhortation that human beings ought to preserve the diversity of species is not sensible within Thomass framework.63 By then considering salvation and the second perfection of the universe, we will see that Jenkinss claim to base the noninstrumental value of nonhuman creatures in the thought of Thomas cannot be sustained. Let consider these topics in turn.
See n. 3 above. Ibid., Ia, 73, 1. 62 Ibid. 63 The obvious fact that this exhortation is, in fact, very sensible is not the point in the present conversation. The point here is to demonstrate that Jenkinss line of reasoning, so evident to us today, is foreign to Thomass way of thinking and indeed offers an implied critique of Thomass understanding of God and Gods relation to the world.
61 60
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God and World Thomas holds, God in bringing all creatures into being out of nothing, himself instated the rst perfection of the universe, consisting of the principal parts thereof, and the various species of things.64 Thomas argues extensively and often that the distinction of things is from God, not from chance or merit/demerit or secondary causes.65 For our discussion, it is instructive to consider one of his numerous arguments that the distinction between creatures is not from chance. He argues the following:
The form of anything that proceeds from an intellectual voluntary agent is intended by the agent. Now the universe of creatures has for its author God Who is an agent by His will and intellect. . . . Nor can there be any defect in His power, so that He fail of His intention: since His power is innite. . . . It follows therefore that the form of the universe is intended and willed by God. Therefore it is not from chance: for we ascribe to chance those things which are beside the intention of the agent. Now the form of the universe consists in the distinction and order of its parts. Therefore the distinction of things is not from chance.66
Unpacking this argument and its implications will demonstrate that Jenkinss exhortation that human beings ought to preserve biological diversity is so far from being grounded in the thought of Thomas that it offers a direct, though implicit, challenge to Thomass conceptions of the nature of God and Gods relation to the world. Because of its relevance to our later discussion, it is worth noting that Thomas maintains that the production of diversity by secondary agents reduces to the production of diversity by chance. Thomas argues against the opinion that does not assign one cause to the entire diversity of things, but a different cause to each particular effect: and the entire diversity of things it ascribes to the concurrence of all causes. Now we say that those things happen by chance, which result from the concurrence of various causes, and not from one determinate cause. Wherefore the distinction of things and the order of the universe would be the result of chance.67 If the distinction of things, the existence of diverse species, were from the concurrence of various uncoordinated
64 On the Power of God, trans. English Dominicans (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 193234), bk. I, Question 2, Article 5 ad 5 (hereafter, all On the Power of God citations are given as, e.g., I, 2, 5 ad 5). 65 See, e.g., Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 3944; Summa Theologiae, Ia, 47. 66 Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 39. 67 Ibid., II, 42; italics added.
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causes, then the order of the universe would be from chance rather than design.68 Thomas argues that, in creating, God directly wills the distinction between creatures. That is, God directly wills the existence of species or grades of goodness. It is helpful here to consider the nature of the will of God. Thomas maintains, The will of God must needs always be fullled.69 One way Thomas argues this is by arguing that Gods will is the universal cause of all things. (One can also say, as Thomas does, that Gods will is infallibly fullled because it is carried out by the agency of Gods innite power.) A particular cause can fail in its effect because of the hindrance of some other particular cause. All particular causes are included in the order of the universal cause, so that the effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. . . . Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns to it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as it lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.70 The perfection of the universe is the universal order, consisting in the order among species. God wills only one thing necessarilyGods own goodness. Therefore, God wills to create freely. And in willing to create, God seeks to communicate Gods goodness to creation. It is the perfection of the universe as a whole that is the nearest thing to divine goodness in the created order.71 The best among all things caused is the order of the universe, wherein the good of the universe consists.72 Therefore, that which is chiey willed and caused by God is the good consisting in the
68 As a parenthetic comment, this conclusion, it seems to me, follows only if one presupposes that the universal cause must act by coercion rather than persuasion. After all, the effect that results from secondary causes could be the result of genuine agency on the part of these particular causes and the persuasive force of the universe cause or the divine agencyand so need not be considered as chance because the causes both act freely and are coordinated (though persuasively rather coercively). 69 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 19, 6. 70 Ibid. 71 See Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIa, 64. As Thomas says in this question, Whoever has an end in view, cares more for what is nearest to the last end: because the other ends are directed to this. Now the last end of Gods will is His goodness, the nearest thing to which among created things is the good consisting in the order of the universe: because every particular good of this or that thing is ordained thereto as its end, just as the less perfect is ordained to that which is more perfect: even as each part is for the sake of its whole. Consequently that which God cares for most in created things, is the order of the universe: and therefore He governs it (ibid.). 72 Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 42.
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order of things of which He is the cause.73 In creating, what God wills above all else, what God wills universally, is the perfection of the universe. And since this perfection consists in the order among species, it can also be said that what God primarily wills in creating is the ordered diversity of species. For Thomas, the diversity between species is not mere difference but is ontologically ordered diversity; it is a scale of being and perfection. As Thomas says, formal distinction always requires inequality, because . . . the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others.74 Species are like numbers in the sense that a species higher in the hierarchy has an additional essential perfection lacked by those below it. It is the order among all these species that constitute the order of the universe and so all are necessary for the perfection of the universe.75 The reason the multitude of diverse creatures in the universe most fully reects the divine goodness is because, in God, goodness is simple and uniform in the sense that Gods essence is goodness itself, completely perfect, ipsum esse subsistens. But in creatures goodness is partial and divided. The whole universe of diverse creatures, then, with all of its species or grades of goodness, better represents the goodness of God than can any single creature.76 The diversity of things necessary for the perfection of the universe refers primarily to species rather than individuals. It is species, and not individuals, that differ in their essential perfections. So it is the order among diverse species that constitutes the perfection of the universe.
Ibid., bk. IIIa, chap. 64; see also Summa Theologiae, Ia, 49, 2. Summa Theologiae, Ia, 47, 2; italics added. Species are arranged in degrees so that, for example, species of animals are more perfect than species of plants. But within each genus, the species are also hierarchically arranged. So it is not simply inanimate creatures, living creatures, living and conscious creatures, conscious and rational creatures, and so forth, that are needed, but all the wonderful diversity of creatures within each of these categories are also needed for the universes perfection. 76 As Thomas summarizes, God brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever (Summa Theologiae, Ia, 47, 1). As he also puts it, the good and the best in the universe consists in the mutual order of its parts, which is impossible without distinction: since by this order the universe is established as one whole, and this is its best (Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 39).
74 75 73
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Species are also more enduring than corruptible individuals. Spiritual substances and heavenly bodies, which are perpetual both as species and as individuals, are provided for on their own account both as species and as individuals. Corruptible things, however, are perpetual only as a species; hence, these species are looked after for their own sake, but the individual[s] . . . [are provided] to keep the species in perpetual existence.77 Though it is not strictly the case that species in this changeable universe are perpetual for Thomas,78 his point here is clear. Corruptible individuals are for the sake of their species because it is the species that continue indenitely and that are necessary for the perfection of the universe. As Thomas puts it, even though the corruption of a thing in the universe is not good for that thing, it is good for the perfection of the entire universe, because the continual generation and corruption of individuals makes it possible for the species to be perpetual; and it is in this that the perfection of the universe essentially consists.79 Thomas maintains that species are maintained for their own sakes precisely because they are necessary for the perfection of the universe.80 In an interesting discussion of predestination,81 Thomas claries the difference between the preordination of the predestined human souls and the preordination of other things. The predestined are determined not only with regard to the total number but also with regard to the identity of the individuals who are so predestined. Without this specicity, the certainty of predestination would be destroyed. This is in contrast to Gods preordination of other creatures. It is instructive to examine the relevant portion of Thomass discussion.
Whosoever intends some denite measure in his effect thinks out some denite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally,
Disputed Questions on Truth, 5, 3. Thomas sometimes puts this in terms of a certain perpetuity. See, e.g., On the Power of God, I, 3, 10. 79 Disputed Questions on Truth, 5, 3. 80 See, e.g., ibid. This discussion has been framed in terms of Gods free creation, in terms of the rst perfection or the perfection of the universe at its rst foundingand so in terms of the divine will. But it can also be put in terms of the divine providence. In demonstrating that God exercises providence over creation, Thomas argues, Things in nature distinct do not converge into one order, unless they be brought together by one controller. Now the universe is composed of things distinct from one another and of contrary natures; and yet they all converge into one order, some things acting on others, some helping or directing others. Therefore there must be one ordainer and governor of the universe (Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIa, 64). In creating, God properly orders diverse creatures to one another in accordance with their diverse essential perfections. In governing, God properly orders the operations of these creatures to one another for the sake of the perfection of the whole. 81 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 23, 7.
78 77
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but only on account of something else, he does not select any denite number per se; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. . . . [God] pre-ordained . . . what number would bet the essential parts of that universethat is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; . . . [including] how many species.82 Individuals . . . are not ordained as it were chiey for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, ies and such like, is not pre-ordained by God per se; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufcient for the preservation of the species.83
Species, as essential to the perfection of the universe, have in some way been ordained in perpetuity.84 God is not directly concerned with the individual members of nonrational species because they are not per se necessary for the perfection of the universe (in contradistinction from immaterial entities), but the species of which they are a part are necessary for this perfection. Therefore, the divine providence preserves as many individuals as are necessary for the continuance of the species. The essential point for our discussion is that God directly wills that species continue in existence. God has assigned to the heavenly bodies the role of preserving the diversity of material creation.85 In light of this discussion, I want to look at Jenkinss statement that in the thought of Thomas we nd a theological mandate to preserve ecological diversity86 both because we know God through creatures (i.e., they are salvically important for the human being) and because other creatures are gifted beings caught up with us into the divine commerce of grace.87 Given our present awareness of evolution, of species generation and extinction, of past mass extinctions, and our present human-induced simplication of the diversity of life,88 it is vir82 This last sentence, in full, in Latin: Praeordinavit enim in qua mensura deberet esse totum universum, et quis numerus esset conveniens essentialibus partibus universi, quae scilicet habent aliquo modo ordinem ad perpetuitatem; quot scilicet sphaerae, quot stellae, quot elementa, quot species rerum (ibid.; italics added). 83 Ibid.; italics added. This last sentence in Latin: Unde, licet Deus sciat numerum omnium individuorum, non tamen numerus vel boum vel culicum, vel aliorum huiusmodi, est per se praeordinatus a Deo, sed tot ex huiusmodi divina providentia produxit, quot sufciunt ad specierum conservationem. 84 Ibid. 85 See, e.g., Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIa, 22; Summa Theologiae, Ia, 104, 2; Ia, 115, 3 ad 2; Ia, 70, 1 ad 4; Ia, 25, 2; Ia, 19, 6; Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 39; II, 42. 86 Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation, 408. 87 Ibid., 411. 88 Though the modern classication of creatures into species took its bearings from Aristotle and though the precise meaning of the term is a matter for debate today, it is nevertheless clear that talking of species in Thomass sense of the term is not equivalent to what is meant by the term today. Still, for the purposes of this article there is sufcient overlap to allow us to bypass trying to sort out what is an undoubtedly complex and contentious matter. Specif-
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tually axiomatic that human beings are responsible forif not morally responsible, at least responsible in the sense of being the cause of species extinction. In this context, it is natural to look to our traditions for grounding moral prohibitions against the activities that lead to such extinction. And Thomas stands out as a giant in the Christian tradition. He thought long, hard, and fruitfully about the moral nature of the universe as well as the place of human beings and other creatures within this whole. However, it is a mistake to look to Thomas for moral prohibitions against human-induced species extinction. For such prohibitions to become operative would entail a sweeping reformulation of his conception of the divine nature and divine providence as well as the human relation to the rest of creation. Thomass conception of divine providence, far from being an ally in Jenkinss argument, militates against it at every turn. Gods primary purpose in creating is the perfection of the universe, and this perfection consists in the order among species. Therefore, God wills that these species remain in existence, as we saw above. And Gods power is innite, and so Gods will cannot be frustrated by worldly agency. One way to put this is to say that God is externally related to the world, though the world is internally related to God. As Thomas states, Since . . . God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him.89 And arguing that the heavenly bodies are the (secondary) cause of material diversity effectively removes any agency from earthly creatures to affect the very existence of species. To argue that Gods will, Gods primary purpose in creating, can be frustrated by human agency is to argue, in effect, that Gods will is not necessarily fullled, that God is really related to or truly affected by the world, God is not ipsum esse subsistens (since if he was subsistent being itself, he could not be so affected), that the effect of secondary causes can act outside or alter the effect of the universal cause. In short, it is to offer an implied, and rather sweeping, critique of Thomass understanding of the divine nature and Gods relation to the world. Whatever the merits of this critique, it is hard to see how a position that implies
ically, it seems safe to say that if we conne our attention to living creatures, both Thomass understanding of species and the modern understanding of species would entail that the greater the number of species the greater the diversity of life. This common understanding of what constitutes diversity (of species), rather than a common understanding of constitutes species themselves, is all we require for the purposes of this article. 89 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 13, 7.
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such a critiqueas Jenkins position doescan be Thomistic. Jenkinss position would, from within a Thomistic framework, make the perfection of the world a result of chance, not in the sense that uncoordinated secondary causes create species but in the sense that they destroy species. Either way, these uncoordinated causes alter the universes perfectionmaking it the result of chance.90 Before moving on, there are two objections I want to address briey in order to clarify my argument. First, one might argue that human beings frustrate Gods will all the time through sin. Second, why does frustrating Gods will imply that God thereby changes? Let me begin with the rst objection. As we saw above, the will of God is the universal cause of things, so that what seems to depart from the will of God in one order returns to it in another. So the sinner falls away from the divine will to the extent he or she can, but never from the universal order of the divine justice, which orders all things. With the destruction of species, it is precisely this universal causality, this universal ordering, that is frustrated. What could be more universal than causing the order of the universe itself and all its parts? Human action frustrates Gods primary purpose, Gods universal purpose, in creating; human action destroys species whose existence God preordained and whose existence Gods providence preserves. It is difcult, then, not to take Jenkinss exhortation that human beings ought to preserve the diversity of creation as a critique of Thomass understanding of God and Gods relation to the world. To move to the second issue, for human beings truly to frustrate the divine (universal) will implies that God changes because, in that case, God must react to the world in order to know it, love it, and save it. True frustration cannot be eternally anticipated or preordained, so God must learn about (and react to) the activities that caused this frustration in real time. Such learning entails change. Humans and Nonhumans (or Immaterial and Material Entities) Not only does Jenkins see continuity between God and the world, he also sees continuity between human beings and the rest of material creation. So let us now turn to a consideration of Thomass understand90 For Thomas, the radical discontinuity between God and the world can be specied in terms of being or esse, which is, in his thought, an analogical term. God is being by Gods own essence, all other entities are being by participation. Jenkinss position, by implicitly maintaining that human beings can frustrate the divine will (by effectively negating Gods primary purpose in creating), challenges this fundamental plank, perhaps the fundamental plank, in Thomas metaphysics. Such frustration of the divine will could only happen if God was affected by the world and, to be affected by the world God, God could not be ipsum esse subsistens.
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ing of the radical discontinuity between human beings and other creatures,91 and the implications this understanding has for a Thomistic environmental ethic. The difference between humans and nonhumans becomes especially salient in Thomass soteriology. It is useful to begin by returning to Thomass discussion in book IIIb, chapter 112, of the Summa Contra Gentiles. In that question, Thomas argues that the instrumental subordination of the nonrational to the rational is not in contradiction to his repeated arguments, especially against Origen, that all the species or grades of goodness are necessary for the perfection of the universe. He writes,
The fact that all the parts of the universe are directed to the perfection of the whole is not in contradiction with the foregoing conclusion [i.e., that nonhuman creatures are instrumentally ordered to human beings]: since all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, in so far as one part serves another. Thus in the human body it is clear that the lungs belong to the bodys perfection, in that they serve the heart: wherefore there is no contradiction in the lungs being for the sake of the heart, and for the sake of the whole animal. In a like manner that other natures are on account of the intellectual is not contrary to their being for the perfection of the universe: for without the things required for the perfection of the intellectual substance, the universe would not be complete.92
Nonhuman creatures, then, seemingly have a twofold end, neither of which is subordinate to the other. Just as the lungs are for the sake of the heart and the whole body, nonhuman creatures are for the sake of the higher creature (and nally the human being) and for the sake of the perfection of the universe. But Thomass glossfor without the things required for the perfection of the intellectual substance, the universe would not be completedoes, in fact, seem to reassert a strict instrumentalization that is in tension with his repeated arguments that the diversity of species is itself necessary for the universe most fully to reect the divine goodness. It drains these arguments of their force to maintain that the diversity is not itself directly willed by God, but what is willed by God is whatever is needed for the human being or the human good (because the human being is essential for the perfection of the universe). And, it turns out, all the tremendous diversity of creation is necessary for the human good and so for the perfection of the universe. If the diversity is not itself necessary, then Thomass position turns out to be not so different from that of Origen. The ordering of
91 92
Ibid., Ia, 51, 1. Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIb, 112.
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creatures to the perfection of the universe seems to be subordinated to their ordering to the human good. But one might maintain that Thomass gloss, or at least this interpretation of Thomass gloss, is not in line with his more systematic conclusionthat nonhuman creatures have two morally relevant ends, the human good and the perfection of the universe, neither of which is subordinate to the other.93 As he says in a passage we will look at more closely below, The end of minerals, plants and animals is twofold. One is the completion of the universe. . . . The other end is man.94 Perhaps, then, we have grounds for holding that nonhuman creatures are worthy of direct moral consideration (because of their relation to the perfection of the universe) and are not merely subordinate to the human good.95 The systematic problem with this reading becomes apparent when we consider Thomass soteriology, which differs markedly, and in crucial respects, from the depiction given in Jenkinss account. Whereas Jenkins focuses on a this-worldly account of salvation as coming to know God through creatures, and whereas Jenkins sees continuity between human salvation and the good of other creatures,96 Thomas offers an other-worldly account in which the nal good of the human is radically discontinuous with the good of nonhuman creatures. Thomass arguments on the need for diverse species and the subordination of the part to the whole97 can only play the role that Jenkins assigns to themthe role of displaying other creatures noninstrumental value or specialnessif we ignore Thomass own soteriology in favor of Jenkinss this-worldly soteriology in which seeking
93 As Jenkinss notes, Thomas articulates a fourfold end for creatures as well. This includes their own perfection and God, in addition to the lower being for the higher and every creature being for the perfection of the universe. But having as an end ones own perfection and having as an end God are identical in Thomass ontology. What Aquinas says in this regard when speaking of things devoid of knowledge applies to all creatures: they seek a divine likeness, as well as their own perfection. Nor does it matter in which way we express it, the former or the latter. Because by tending to their own perfection, they tend to a good, since a thing is good forasmuch as it is perfect. And according as a thing tends to be good, it tends to a divine likeness: since a thing is like unto God forasmuch as it is good. . . . It is clear therefore that all things seek a divine likeness as their last end (Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIa, 24). And that each creature is created to pursue its own perfection, or is ontologically good, says nothing about how rational creatures ought to act in relation to such creatures. It is a metaphysical and not yet ethical matter. Jenkins here confuses ontological goodness with moral worth. 94 On the Power of God, II, 5, 9. 95 Note that this line of argument does not focus on the value of the individual creature per se. This line of reasoning has been undermined by the previous consideration of Gods providential care for creatures. But, as we will see, this conclusion will be further reinforced through an analysis of Thomass soteriology. 96 See, e.g., Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation, 419. 97 See, e.g., ibid., 415.
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the good of every creature under our power . . . is how rational creatures seek their own good.98 Thomass account of salvation yields an order to the ends of nonhuman creatures in which the nal good of the human takes precedence over the perfection of the universe itself in its changeable state. This is so because the entire universe in its changeable state is nally for the sake of the completion of the number of the elect,99 and so is subordinated to the human good. This analysis undercuts Jenkinss claim to ground the noninstrumental value of nonhuman creatures in Thomass thought. The entire discussion of the divine preservation of species is relevant only to this changeable universe. But, as noted, this universe of time and movement is itself nally for the sake of the nal perfection of the universe, when all motion will cease. The entire mutable universe can be considered as ontologically instrumental to the universe in its nal, unchangeable state. The nal perfection is the end of the whole universe.100 This understanding of the nal perfection of the universe inevitably instrumentalizes nonrational creatures because the rational creature alone has an incorruptible soul, making it alone suitable for this nal perfection. I want to turn now to Thomass understanding of this second perfection in order to bring out the implications of this understanding for the moral status of nonhuman creatures. One of Thomass most complete treatments of this matter is in On the Power of God, Question 5, where he discusses Gods preservation of things. In article 5 of that question, Thomas considers whether the heavenly movement will cease at any time. This question is germane to our discussion because, on Thomass physics, the movement of heavenly bodies is the cause of generation of, and diversity among, lower bodies. Thomas explains that because the movement of the heavenly bodies is circular, it does not result in them reaching a whereabouts to which they are inclined by nature. And because nature never tends to movement as such, but movement is always for the sake of some denite result, this circular movement can be natural to heavenly bodies only in the sense that they have a natural aptitude for this kind of movement; they contain in themselves the passive principle of that movement. The active principle, Thomas maintains, must be some separate substance, such as God or angels. Therefore, and this is Thomass point, the permanence of the movement of heavenly bodies cannot be argued on the basis of the
98 99
Ibid., 419. See, e.g., Summa Theologiae, Ia, 73, 1. 100 Ibid.
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nature of such bodies since they contain only an aptitude for such movement. We must then look for the reason why the active principle causes this movement. So Thomas inquires into the end of the heavenly movement. If this end requires perpetual heavenly movement, then such movement will not cease. If this end will be reached in time (and requires that this movement stop), then the heavens will ceased to be moved. Thomas argues, The movement of the heavens is for the completion of the number of the elect. For the rational soul is more excellent than any body whatsoever, even than the heavens: wherefore there is nothing unreasonable in supposing that the end of the heavenly movement is the multiplication of rational souls. . . . Therefore it is a denite number of souls that is the end of the heavenly movement: and when this is reached the movement will cease.101 We have now reached the reason or end or purpose for heavenly motionit is for the completion of the number of the elect. Upon the achievement of this purpose, heavenly motion will cease. There will be no more time, no more movement. Since heavenly movement is the rst principle of generation and corruption,102 since the heavens movement gives life to all nature in its state of mutability,103 let us now consider what happens to plants and animals when the number of the elect has been achieved. Thomas addresses this question in article 9. He begins with the clear statement that in the renewal of the world no mixed body [i.e., no mineral, plant, or animal] will remain except the human body.104 Thomas argues for this view in terms of the four causes. He begins with the nal cause, the cause of the other causes.
The end of minerals, plants and animals is twofold. One is the completion of the universe, to which end all the parts of the universe are ordained: yet the aforesaid things are not ordained to this end as though by their very nature and essentially they were required for the universes perfection, since they contain nothing that is not to be found in the principal parts of the world [namely, the heavenly bodies and the elements] as their active and material principles. Consequently the things in question are particular effects of those universal causes which are essential parts of the universe, so that they belong to the perfection of the universe only in the point of their production by their causes, and this is by movement. Hence they belong to the perfection of the universe not
101 102
On the Power of God, II, 5, 5. Ibid., II, 5, 7. 103 Ibid., II, 5, 7 ad 17. 104 Ibid., II, 5, 9.
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absolutely speaking but only as long as the latter is in motion. Wherefore as soon as movement in the universe ceases these things must cease to exist.105
In light of the nal perfection, Thomas seriously qualies his numerous arguments that the diversity of species is necessary for the universes perfection. Mixed bodies, it turns out, are not by their very natures and essentially required for the perfection of the universe but are only provisionally necessary for as long as the [universe] is in motion. It appears that plants and animals are necessary for the universe most fully to reect the divine goodness only in this changeable state of the universe. Once the universe passes from its rst to its nal perfection, such creatures will no longer be necessary for this perfection, which requires incorruptibility in its members. Further, the universe is in motion for the sake of human beingsfor the sake of the generation of the requisite number of the elect. When the preordained number of the elect has been reached, this motion will cease. And with this cessation of motion, the existence of all mixed bodies, with the exception of the human body,106 will end. By understanding mixed bodies as necessary only to the perfection of the universe in its changeable state and by understanding the changeable universe itself to be directed to the human good, Thomas can maintain both that all species of creatures are necessary for the perfection of the universe (in its changeable state) and that nonhuman creatures are merely instrumental to the human good. To be sure, there is a cost in this reconciliationthe end of the perfection of the universe (at least in its changeable state) is in effect subordinated to the end of the human good. Thomas explicates this issue further in his discussion of the second end of mixed bodies: The other end is man, because . . . things that are imperfect in nature are ordained to those that are perfect, as their end . . . : it follows that plants are for animals being prepared by nature to be the latters food; and animals are for man, to whom they are necessary as food and for other purposes. Now this necessity lasts as long as mans animal life endures. But this life will cease in that nal renewal of the universe, because the body will rise not natural but spir105 Ibid.; italics added. In Latin, the last two sentences are as follows: Unde pertinent ad perfectionem universi sub motu existentis, non autem ad perfectionem universi simpliciter. Et ideo cessante mutabilitate universi, oportet quod praedicta cessent (italics added). 106 Thomass explanation for why the human body continues in existence is as follows: By its perfect union with God the soul will have complete sway over the body: so that although matter, if left to itself, is corruptible, it will acquire incorruption by the power of the soul (On the Power of God, II, 5, 10 ad 3).
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itual: hence animals and plants will also cease to exist then.107 This puts the matter clearly, indeed, bluntly. Human beings need plants and animals as long as we have an animal life. Once this animal life passes with the advent of the nal renewal of the universe, there is no reason for the continued existence of plants and animals. This offers a striking summary statement of the solely instrumental value of plants and animals. When they can no longer serve the human being, their very existence ceases, and, indeed, insofar as they are not suited for the nal perfection, they were created such that their existence must cease when human beings move on to a state where we have no need for such mixed bodies.108 Thomas also discusses this issue (of why mixed bodies will not exist after the end of the mutable world) in terms of formal, material, and efcient causation. He maintains that this understanding is consistent with the matter and form of these material things. They contain matter, the principle of corruption, and are without a self-subsistent form to preserve them in existence. With regard to efcient causation, the very souls of plants and animals are wholly subject to the inuence of the heavenly bodies.109 When the heavenly movement ceases, when the number of the elect has been realized, such material creatures cannot retain movement or life. This analysis is unsurprising since, given the purpose or nal cause for which these creatures exist, the other causes must be consistent with the extinction of nonhuman creatures when human beings no longer have need of them. In light of this soteriology, Jenkinss argument that Thomass thought can ground the noninstrumental value of nonhuman creatures is untenable. The very existence of these creatures ceases when, and because, their instrumental usefulness to human beings comes to an end. It is difcult to formulate a clearer statement of the solely instrumental value of nonhuman creatures.110 Looking ahead to Thomass understanding
Ibid., II, 5, 9. See, e.g., Disputed Questions on Truth, 24, 2, ad 6. See also, e.g., Thomass response to the objection that elements are rewarded for their service to humans during their time on earth as wayfarers, so too then should plants and animals be so rewarded. Thomas responds: The elements are said to be rewarded not in themselves, because in themselves they had no merit; but because men will be rewarded in them, inasmuch as their brightness will conduce to the glory of the elect. As to plants and animals they will be of no use to man like the elements which will be as it were the place of their glory: hence the comparison fails On the Power of God, II, 5, 9 ad 9). 109 On the Power of God, II, 5, 9. 110 This analysis, one might object, is heavily dependent on an obviously outdated and seriously awed physics, so that if we excise this physics from Thomass work, the instrumentalization of nonhuman creatures might similarly fall away. But this objection is misguided because Thomass analysis is guided by his understanding of the end of creatures. He explicates how this end manifests itself in terms of an outdated physics, but the end itself (i.e., that
108 107
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of the end times claries the moral status of nonhuman creatures in the present because it demonstrates dramatically that such creatures are nally for the sake of the human good. Thomass thought systematically excludes the direct moral consideration of nonhuman creatures. Its deep (and nally metaphysical) bifurcations, with the attendant understandings of divine providence, salvation, and justice, make untenable any assertion that this system of thought can ground a noninstrumental environmental ethic. Any Thomistic environmental ethic, then, must be developed within strictly anthropocentric parameters. conclusion I want to conclude by briey considering what is perhaps the most intriguing (ecologically relevant) strand in Thomass thoughthis discussion of government in which he claims that the creature becomes like God by moving others to goodness.111 Though this strand cannot carry the burden Jenkins assigns to itthe burden of grounding a stewardship ethic in which human beings are, or ought to be, the middle cause of the preservation of things112it does offer the opportunity to suggest in summary form the reformulations needed to make moving others to goodness a universal injunction that could ground an ecological ethic. It is the bifurcations between God and the world, and between humans and nonhumans, that undermine Jenkinss claim that Thomass understanding of government can lend support to a stewardship ethic. Within Thomass larger system of thought, it simply cannot do the work to which Jenkins puts it. First, as our discussion above demonstrates, no middle cause can thwart Gods primary purpose in creating. This is Gods universal purpose, the purpose for the whole. And Gods will is infallibly carried out by Gods innite power. Therefore, without rejecting central elements of Thomass theology, it cannot be an operative moral injunction that human beings ought to preserve biological diversity. This much seems clear from our previous discussion. Second, the bifurcation between the nal goods of humans and nonhumans means that one cannot use Thomass thought to susnonhuman creatures are for the sake of the perfection of the universe in its changeable state and are merely instrumental to the human good) does not depend crucially on any particular physics but rather on a metaphysic. (After all, modern physics, it seems fair to say, would agree that the cessation of motion would result in the annihilation of material creatures.) The dichotomy between the changeable/unchangeable is the crucial issue. The point of Thomass analysis is to explain, in terms of the physics of his day, the twofold end of nonhuman creatures. It is this twofold end itself that is of concern here. 111 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 103, 3. 112 Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation, 417.
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tain a universal injunction that human beings ought to pursue the good of other creatures. This point requires some development. In his discussion of government, Thomas is primarily concerned with the good of the one governing, and the good of the one governed only insofar as it contributes to the good of the governor. The pursuit of the good of the governed is a means to the good of governor. Thomas is considering the effect of government on the part of those means of which the creature is made like to God.113 Thomas maintains, There are in general two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; rst, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to goodness.114 There is considerable ambiguity here. The others spoken of might be human others in which case no stewardship ethic would follow. Still, the context indicates that Thomass concerns are broader than this. But a stewardship ethic of the sort advocated by Jenkins follows only on the assumption of a coincidence between the human good and the good of other creaturesan assumption Jenkins seems to make.115 Of course, in an abstract sense there is such a coincidence since the goodness of all creatures is actuality. But Jenkinss argument is tenable only if the human good is necessarily enhanced by human beings pursuing the good of other creatures. It is clear that Thomas does not hold to the coincidence of the human good and the good of the individual nonhuman creature. To the contrary, as we saw, it is morally permissible for humans to kill other creatures or treat them in any way whatsoever.116 More fundamentally, the nal goods of the human and of other creatures diverge irreconcilably. Thomass depiction of the second perfection, when the nal good of the human will be realized and other creatures will cease to exist, displays his strictly instrumental understanding of nonhuman creatures. What, then, can Thomas mean in his discussion of government? Perhaps moving others to goodness means moving others to the good
Summa Theologiae, Ia, 103, 4; italics added. Ibid., Ia, 103, 3. 115 See Jenkins, Biodiversity and Salvation, 419. 116 Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIb, 112. That the death of a creature is not good for that creature seems obvious on its face, and Thomass thought reects this understanding. For example, he states, even though the corruption of a thing in the universe is not good for that thing, it is good for the perfection of the entire universe, because the continual generation and corruption of individuals makes it possible for the species to be perpetual; and it is in this that the perfection of the universe essentially consists (Disputed Questions on Truth, 5, 3, ad 2).
114 113
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of their species or to the good of the universe or, indeed, to the human good (which, after all, is the end of other creatures) rather than their own individual good. These interpretations do not seem to be indicated by the text. But even if one of them is what Thomas intends, they do not help in building a stewardship ethic in which nonhuman creatures have noninstrumental value and in which human beings ought to preserve biological diversity. This is transparently the case when moving others to goodness is interpreted to mean moving others to the human good (since to avoid instrumentalization this interpretation requires the dubious assumption of the coincidence of the human good and the good of other individual creatures). As for the other two interpretations, as we saw, the entire changeable universe is nally for the sake of the human good and speciesthe order among which constitutes the perfection of the universeare preserved in existence by Gods will (through the mediation of the heavenly bodies) and so cannot be affected by human agency. The order among species constitutes Gods primary purpose in creating, and Gods will (as coincident with Gods essence) cannot be affected by worldly activity. Thomass discussion of government can ground a stewardship ethic, then, only if one ignores the larger context in which this discussion is embedded. When one takes this context into account, Thomass argument to the effect that human perfection is greater when a human is not only good in itself but also the cause of goodness in others is unproblematic when circumscribed to relations between human beings. But when these others include nonhuman creatures, Thomass statement can mean one of two things. First, it might mean human beings are to seek the good of other creatures in those instances where doing so enhances the human good, making this pursuit conditional and instrumental to the human good rather than a universal moral injunction. Second, if it is meant as a universal moral injunction, then it stands in contradiction to Thomass larger project in which the nal goods of humans and nonhumans are separate and irreconcilable and in which God infallibly wills that species remain in existence. To summarize, it is Thomass articulation of the discontinuities between God and the world and between human beings and nonrational creatures that nally undermine Jenkinss attempt to build a robust ecological ethic on Thomistic grounds. Reformulating this larger framework in order to make it consistent with the claim that human beings ought to seek the good of all creatures and that humans and other creatures share the same telos is a promising route for one seeking to develop a robust ecological ethic. And understanding God as truly affected by worldly activity can be understood as complementary
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to this conception of human beings as continuous with the rest of creation. If all creatures contribute to the divine good, then all creatures share the same telos, which consists in making a real contribution to the richness of the divine experience. With an understanding of the relation between God and the world such as this, the relation between humans and nonhumans can be truly understood in noninstrumental terms. Nonhuman creatures would have noninstrumental value, or intrinsic value, for the same reason human beings dothey are creative subjects that make an everlasting contribution (each according to its own capacity) to the Universal Good. One could then make sense of the universal injunction that human beings ought to mov[e] others to goodness because by doing so we contribute to the telos of the universe and to Gods experience. In light of our present experience in which human activity threatens the well-being of so many species and ecosystems, it is worth considering seriously this deep reformulation of traditional conceptions of God, human beings, and the rest of creation. Fleshing out the details of this reformulation is the work for another project.117
117 I have begun work in that direction in my book, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming).
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Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics: A Reconsideration of Providence and Salvation Author(s): FranciscoBenzoni Source: The Journal of Religion,

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

Ibid., Ia, 51, 1. Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIb, 112.

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

The Journal of Religion

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