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dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. ACCORDINGLY, the present appeal is dismissed. FACTS: DEPOSITION IN CRIMINAL CASES Appellant Romeo Doriquez was charged with the offense of grave oral defamation before the CFI of Iloilo Six days later, he was indicted before the same court for discharge of firearm Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments He moved to dismiss both informations o One of his contentions is that the institution of criminal action for discharge of firearm places him in double jeopardy for he had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the offense of alarm and scandal based on the same facts. [G.R. No. 108229. August 24, 1993.] DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., respondents. DOCTRINE: Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression. FACTS: Hence, this appeal Sometime in September, 1987 the American President Lines, Ltd. (APL) sued Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmarias specifically denied any liability to the plaintiff , and set up compulsory counterclaims against it. The case was in due course scheduled for trial and on that that date APL presented its first witness. The case was reset for reception of the testimony of two (2) more witnesses in APL's behalf. At the hearing, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan, and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . ." Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "oneChina policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asian Exchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary and it therefore prayed "that commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipei, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the a forenamed persons . . ." The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of APL. The court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc, being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon written interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving crossinterrogatories." Dasmarias sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 on the following grounds: 1. authority of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions has not been established, it not being one of those so authorized by the Rules of Court to take depositions in a foreign state; 2. AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any such authority;

TEST OF IDENTITY OF OFFENSES People v. Doriquez

The court denied the motion to dismiss MR was also denied

ISSUE: WON the said appellant was placed in double jeopardy by charging the offense of discharge of firearm. HELD: For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things, that there is "identity of offenses," so that, in the language of section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, his "conviction or acquittal ... or the dismissal of the case (without his express consent) shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense charged or for any attempt to, commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." It is altogether evident, however, that the offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony. Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article 155(1) of the Revised Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factual setting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a common element), they are definitely diverse in law. Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same felony - alarm and scandal is an offense against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public, while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to kill. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense11 or identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a

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3. 4. to permit deposition-taking by commission without the authority of the foreign state in which deposition is taken constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty; and depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitations and are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility of witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "`most satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "`affords the greatest protection to the rights and liberties of citizens.'" Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory. (Section 12, Rule 24) Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed". Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted states that a commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated . . . either by name or descriptive title," while letters rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state." Noteworthy in this connection is the indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied for and issued only after a commission has been "returned unexecuted," as is apparent from Form 21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court, which requires the inclusion in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the following paragraph, viz.: It further appears that the commission is to be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular No. 4 issued by Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee on April 6, 1987, pursuant to the suggestion of the Department of Foreign Affairs - directing "ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS" "to course all requests for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing abroad through the Department of Foreign Affairs" to enable it and "the Philippine Foreign Service establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;" this, "in the interest of justice", and to avoid delay in the deposition-taking. Petitioner would however prevent the carrying out of the commission on various grounds: 1. The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party. 2. Dasmarias also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits depositiontaking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544). 3. Dasmarias further claims that the taking of deposition under the circumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that it is "inherently unfair" to allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility e.g., "that the witness is out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place

MR was denied because "filed out of time" and being a mere rehash of arguments already passed upon. Dasmarias instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to nullify the orders of the Trial Court. CA restrained enforcement of the orders of March 15, 1991 and July 5, 1991 "in order to maintain the status quo and to prevent the infliction of irreparable damage and injury upon the petitioner." After due proceedings, CA rendered judgment on Dasmarias' petition for certiorari and upholding the challenged orders of the Trial Court. MR denied. Hnce the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witness in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity. HELD: YES Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are no therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay: the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24). Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1, Rule 24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . (stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs . . . "(Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the depositiontaking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).

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of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4, Rule 24, supra, italics supplied) is first satisfactorily established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95 Phil. 754). cdll The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the witnesses in question only by written interrogatories, removing the proponent's option to take them by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and answers and observations of the parties being recorded stenographically. The imposition of such a limitation, and the determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court for the condition that the depositions be taken "only upon written interrogatories" is "so as to give defendant (Dasmarias) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to crossexamine will not be accorded the defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination merely by serving crossinterrogatories. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for review on certiorari. Costs against petitioner. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J. O. NERIT, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. SYLLABUS: REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; REMEDY IN CASE OF DENIAL THEREOF; EXCEPTION. Indeed, the rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie to review a trial court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case. An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory. It is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari (Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744 [1998])." However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the demurrer to evidence), appeal in due time is the proper remedy, not certiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or an oppressive exercise of judicial authority." Consequently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse of discretion, the denial may be assailed through a petition for certiorari. FACTS: Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine from the Solid Cement Corporation. When she went to the corporation's Antipolo plant, however, no machine could be given to her, it appearing that the machine sold had been earlier mortgaged to a creditor, who, unfortunately, refused to release the mortgage. Herein petitioners offered to return the money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and instead filed a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati. An Information for estafa and other deceit based on Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the MeTC. After pre-trial, the prosecution presented as its sole witness complainant Zeny Alfonso. The prosecution then formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case. The admissibility of these documents was questioned by petitioners. Petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, attaching thereto their demurrer. In their pleading, petitioners stressed that all the documents being uncertified photocopies bearing unidentified or unauthenticated signatures are inadmissible in evidence. The MeTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence. The Court noted from the documentary evidence on record that the machine subject of the transaction between the complainant and the accused is mortgaged to another creditor, who, incidentally, refused to release the mortgage on said subject machine. Indeed, this strongly suggests the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant a trial on the merits. On certiorari, the RTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the MeTC to dismiss the case. The CA, however, set aside the RTC decision, and ruled that after denial of their demurrer to evidence, petitioners should have filed an appeal to the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied their demurrer to evidence? HELD: YES, the Supreme Court held that given the paucity of evidence against petitioners, it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny petitioners' demurrer to evidence. There was no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment. The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort to the remedy of certiorari, the trial court judge having committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners' demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt against petitioners. As pointed out by petitioners, all documentary evidence submitted by the private complainant were uncertified photocopies of certain documents, the signatures on which were either unidentified or unauthenticated. Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and their genuineness and authenticity must first be established, either by the testimony of any one who saw the writing executed or by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker hereof. A painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution's sole witness reveals, however, that the due execution and authenticity of these documents were never proved. In fact, the prosecution took no effort to prove the due execution and authenticity of these documents during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent such proof, these documents are incompetent as evidence. . . . Thus . . ., being incompetent evidence, the only evidence the prosecution could rely on to prove petitioners' guilt would be the sole testimony of the private complainant. Unsupported by any other evidence, said testimony is insufficient to sustain a finding of culpability. JUDGMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARILYN RAFAEL VILLAMAR, accused-appellant. FACTS: Villamar and Cortez agreed that the formers baby will be adopted by the latter. Pursuant to their agreement, Cortez executed a Sinampaang Salaysay. However, Villamar had a change of heart and she no longer wanted to have her baby adopted. Villamar went to Cortezs house to get the baby and to destroy the Sinumpaang Salaysay.Cortez refused so

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Villamar became angry and a fight ensued between the two. Cortez suffered various lacerated wounds on the head. An information for illegal detention and frustrated murder was filed against Villamar. The trial court convicted Villamar for serious illegal detention and less serious physical injuries, but at the same time acquitted her on the charge of frustrated murder. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be held liable for grave coercion although the information charges her of the crime of illegal detention? HELD: Yes. While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it must be stressed that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal detention. Still, when Villamar was erroneously charged for illegal detention, such oversight will not preclude a guilty verdict for the crime of grave coercion. In the early case of U.S. v. Quevengco, and, recently, in People v. Astorga, we ruled that the offense of grave coercion is necessarily included in illegal detention; as such, an information for illegal detention will not bar the accused from being convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original charge. Villamar is not liable for illegal detention because she had no intention to kidnap or deprive Cortez of her personal liberty. The actuations of Villamar appear to be more of a product of a mother's desperation and distraught mind when her plea for the return of her child was refused by Cortez, unmindful of the consequences which her reckless outburst would cause to the latter. In a celebrated case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime. Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. In the instant case, there is no showing whatsoever that Villamar wanted to extort money from Cortez prior to their confrontation. The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC are: (a) the offender is a private individual, (b) kidnaps or detains another that will deprive the victim of his liberty, (c) the act of detention is illegal and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances are present the detention lasts for more than five (5) days; it is committed by simulating a public authority, serious physical injuries are inflicted or threats to kill are made and the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer. It is important that indubitable proof be presented that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of his/her liberty, and not when such restraint of liberty was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offender. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION G.R. No. L-52728 January 17, 1990 AVELINO C. AGULTO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Davao; and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: An INFORMATION for bigamy was filed against the petitioner Avelino C. Agulto: That on or about December 30, 1968, x x x the accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Maria Pilar Gaspar, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved , wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Andrea Suico. After the trial was finished and the parties had rested, but before judgment was promulgated, the accused filed a MOTION TO REOPEN THE TRIAL on the ground of newly discovered evidence , a copy of a marriage contract between Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire contracted on July 19, 1960, before Andrea's marriage to the petitioner. The COURT denied the motion: It was filed too late because the accused, with due diligence, could have discovered the so-called newly-discovered evidence sooner and could have presented it during the trial, it appearing that he was appraised of the alleged marriage of Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire on October 17, 1972. Petitioner's MR was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. PETITIONER: The evidence was not available to petitioner at the time of the presentation of his evidence but only after the parties had rested their case. RESPONDENTS: The alleged newly discovered evidence does not bear the seal of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Moreover, the document does not indicate the municipality and the province where the municipal court is located. The xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract is not properly certified and authenticated and on its face, it appears that the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. CA denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely abused their discretion in refusing to reopen the trial NO HELD: A distinction should be made between a Motion for New Trial and a Motion to Reopen Trial. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL: o May be filed after judgment but within the period for perfecting an appeal (1, Rule 37) o In civil or criminal actions, it may be applied for and granted only upon specific, well-defined grounds set forth respectively in Rules 37 (1) and 121 (2). MOTION TO REOPEN TRIAL: o There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court for motions to reopen trial. However, it is a recognized procedural recourse or devise, deriving validity and acceptance from long established usage. The reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence before judgment is not the granting of a new trial o May be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment. o The reopening of a case for the reception of additional evidence after a case has been submitted for decision but before judgment is actually rendered is controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of justice, resting entirely in the sound judicial discretion of a Trial Court; and its concession or denial, by said Court in the exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal, unless a clear abuse thereof is shown. Petitioner's motion to reopen the trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was not supported by evidence that marriage was still existing when Andrea Suico wed the petitioner. Considering the defects of the xerox copied document which the accused Agulto claims to be his "newly-discovered evidence," the trial court's order denying his motion to reopen the trial was properly sustained by the CA. PERIOD TO APPEAL

G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011 JUDITH YU, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. FACTS:

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days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." (2) The provisions of 3 of Rule 41 and 6 of Rule 122, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration . It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed. (3) While the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under 6, Rule 122 since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under 3 of Rule 41 and 6 of Rule 122 of the should be treated differently. It would be an absurd situation because a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.

Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an INFORMATION for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. The RTC convicted the petitioner and it imposed the penalty of 3 months of imprisonment, a fine of P3.8M and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as the fine. 14 days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted, but the Respondent Judge denied the motion. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC , alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. CA, she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from 11/3/2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to 11/18/2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. The respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for his guidance. The prosecution filed a MTDF the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. The prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision. The RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution. Consequently, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision. PETITIONER: The RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes. OSG: Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the Rules. SPOUSES: Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned.

ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases YES HELD: The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law. The PERIOD TO APPEAL is specifically governed by 39 of BP 129, 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus: The "FRESH PERIOD RULE" shall also apply to RULE 40 governing appeals from the MTC to the RTC; RULE 42 on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA; RULE 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and RULE 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the SC. It is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. The 15-day period is counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. EFFECT OF APPEAL TO NON-APPELLANTS SALVATIERRA v. CA FACTS: An information for homicide was filed against the petitioners Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty Two eyewitnesses were presented by the prosecution pointing to Luis Alina as the one who actually stabbed the victim while the other accused did not do anything Accused Asuncion, Ramirez and Salvatierra filed separate motions to dismiss/demurrer to evidence for the alleged failure of the prosecution to show that there were conspiracy with Alina in killing the victim TC did not resolve the motion and found all the accused guilty Accused Alina, Asuncion and Salvatierra appealed o The CA stressed that under Sec. 1 of Rule 122 of Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure the accused Ramirez and Ignacio who did not appeal from the decision of TC will not be affected by the judgment of the appellate court except insofar as it is favorable to them. o However, CA affirmed the TC decision with modifications with respect to the penalty Petitioners Salvatierra. Asuncion and Ramirez filed a petition for review on the principal contention that the conspiracy was not proven.

(1)

BP 129 makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. 39 of BP 129 states that "the period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be 15

ISSUE: WON THE OTHER ACCUSED WHO DID NOT APPEAL SHOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE DECISION. HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 6
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it To our mind, the strict requirement that conspiracy must be proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt was not satisfied by the prosecution. Nowhere in the prosecutions evidence was it shown that the defendants acted in concert towards a common criminal purpose to kill Rolando Samonte. There is no evidence on record to show that the other four accused knew of Alinas intent to kill the victim nor that they were present at the scene intentionally to render physical or moral support to insure Alinas success in killing Rolando Samonte. Rule 122, section 11 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. In the case before us, accused Jun Ignacio and Manuel Ramirez, although they did not appeal from the decision of the trial court, are likewise acquitted of the crime charged for the reason that the findings of this Court with regard to the absence of conspiracy among the accused and that Alina acted on his own are similarly applicable to them. This Court affirms the finding of the appellate court that Alina is guilty of the crime charged. Alina, who did not appeal from the decision of the appellate court, is accordingly bound thereby. RULE 126: SEARCH AND SEIZURE [A.M. No. RTJ-93-964. February 28, 1996] LEOVIGILDO U. MANTARING, complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL A. ROMAN, JR., RTC, Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro; and JUDGE IRENEO B. MOLATO, MTC, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, respondents. SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; NEW TRIAL; REMEDY AVAILABLE TO PARTIES DENIED OF A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. - There is a remedy available to the party seeking the disqualification of the judge. If he is denied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judges bias or prejudice, he can ask for a new trial in the interest of justice which will be granted if that is really the case . ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; WARRANT OF ARREST; BASIS FOR ISSUANCE. - The issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing of probabilities as to different facts. In the case of SEARCH WARRANTS, the determination is based on the finding that (1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and (2) they are found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary that a particular person be implicated. On the other hand, in arrest cases, the determination of probable cause is based on a finding that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it. ID.; ID.; WARRANT OF ARREST; REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE. - It is now settled that in issuing WARRANTS OF ARREST in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: Respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato is the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro. On January 7, 1993, an administrative complaint was filed against him and Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr., who charged them with conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary. On February 21, 1994, after the parties had filed their respective pleadings and supporting documents, this Court dismissed the complaint against the two for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration filed by complainant was subsequently denied. What is before us now is the Supplemental Complaint filed by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr. against Judge Ireneo B. Molato, which charges him with harassment. It is alleged that because of the filing of the first complaint against him, respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of a criminal case considering that the respondents in that case were complainant and his son. Instead, it is alleged, he took cognizance of the case and ordered the arrest of complainant and his son, Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., out of hatred and revenge for them because of the filing of the first case by the complainant. The Supplemental Complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which, in a Memorandum dated 25 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. Nonetheless, the Court required the respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato to comment. In his Comment dated July 6, 1995, respondent judge denies the allegations against him. He avers that on the application by SPO4 Pacifico L. Fradejas, he issued a search warrant which resulted in the seizure from a certain Joel Gamo of a home-made gun, a hand grenade, five live ammunitions for Cal. 38 and three live ammunitions for 12 gauge shotgun; that on August 25, 1993, a complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was filed against Joel Gamo in which the herein complainant Leovigildo, Sr. and his son, Leovigildo, Jr., were included; that finding that the house in which the firearms and ammunition had been found was owned by complainant and his son, he concluded that there was probable cause to believe that complainant and his son were guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and accordingly ordered their arrest. Respondent judge claims that he inhibited himself from the case after he was ordered by the Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. In his Reply complainant contends that as the search warrant was issued only against Joel Gamo and Mantaring, Jr. it was wrong for respondent judge to find probable cause against him on the theory that, as owners of the house in which the firearms and ammunitions were found, they had constructive possession of the same . He likewise contends that respondent judge did not inhibit himself until after the preliminary examination was terminated and the warrant of arrest issued, and only after complainant had filed a petition for inhibition which the Executive Judge found to be well taken. On October 16, 1995, this case was referred to the OCA for reevaluation, report and recommendation. On January 12, 1996, the OCA submitted a Memorandum, recommending dismissal of the supplemental complaint for lack of merit, for the following reasons:
(1) It is erroneous for herein complainant to equate the application for the issuance of search warrant with the institution and prosecution of criminal action in a trial court. (Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249). Complainant cannot insist that since his name was not included in the search warrant, the house designated to be searched did not belong to him, and that he was not present at the preliminary investigation of witnesses preparatory to the issuance of the questioned warrant of arrest, there was no basis for respondent judge to order his arrest. (2) No taint of irregularity attended the issuance by respondent judge of the warrant of arrest against complainant and his son. Neither was the charge that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent judge in the spirit of anger, hatred or harassment purposes substantiated.

2.

3.

To begin with, it cannot be contended that complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. could not be proceeded against simply because he was not included in the search warrant issued against Gamo and Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., who is apparently his son . The determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is based solely on the evidence presented by the complainant, regardless of whether or not the respondent in that case is named in the proceedings for a search warrant. As correctly pointed out by, the OCA, [1] the issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing of probabilities as to different facts. In the case of search warrants, the determination is based on the finding that (1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and (2) they are found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary that a particular person be implicated. On the other hand, in arrest cases, the determination of probable cause is based on a finding that

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 7
a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, the arrest of herein complainant and his son, together with Joel Gamo, was ordered on the basis of respondents finding that the place from where the guns and ammunitions were seized belonged to complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and the testimonies of witnesses presented by SPO4 Fradejas. Of course complainant denies that the house in which the firearms and ammunition were found belonged to him and claims that at the time of the search he was in Manila. The provincial prosecutor subsequently dismissed the case against complainant on precisely these grounds, i.e., that the house did not belong to complainant and he was in Manila at the time the search and seizure were conducted. But to say this is not to say that respondent acted arbitrarily or that he abused his powers so as to give ground for administrative disciplinary action against him. It is only to say that he committed an error of judgment for which complainants remedy is judicial. What we think requires serious consideration is the contention by the complainant that respondent judge should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of the criminal case, considering that the respondent was the present complainant, who had earlier filed an administrative case against the judge and another one. We are not unmindful of the cases in which it was stated that the mere filing of an administrative case against a judge by one of the parties before him is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing a case. [2] An examination of these cases reveals, however, that the administrative cases were filed during the pendency of the cases, and it is evident that the administrative cases were filed only to force the judge to inhibit himself from the consideration of the case before him . As this Court held, if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved were allowed to stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges left to handle all the cases pending in all the courts.[3] On the other hand, there is a remedy available to the party seeking the disqualification of the judge. If he is denied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judges bias or prejudice, he can ask for a new trial in the interest of justice which will be granted if that is really the case .[4] But, in the case at bar, an administrative complaint against respondent and Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr. had previously been filed and it was paramount that respondent was free from any appearance of bias against, or hostility toward, the complainant. The impression could not be helped that his action in that case was dictated by a spirt of revenge against complainant for the latters having filed an administrative disciplinary action against the judge. The situation called for sedulous regard on his part for the principle that a party is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. This circumstance should have underscored for respondent the need of steering clear of the case because he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. For his judgment must not be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest in order to preserve at all times the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any party to the litigation.[5] Indeed prudence should have made respondent judge heed the admonition that a spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must at all times maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. [6] Moreover, we think it was improper for respondent judge to have issued the warrants of arrest against complainant and his son without any finding that it was necessary to place them in immediate custody in order to prevent a frustration of justice. It is now settled [7] that in issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In this case, respondent judge justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest on the following ground: In view of the above considerations [referring to the antecedent facts], it is the honest belief and finding of the Court that there is sufficient probable cause that the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was committed and that the named three (3) accused Joel Gamo, Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and Leovigildo Mantaring Jr. are the ones probably guilty thereof for which reason Warrant of Arrest was issued by undersigned against them. He thus ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest solely on his finding of probable cause, totally omitting to consider the third requirement that there must be a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The framers of the Constitution confined the determination of probable cause as basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants to judges the better to secure the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. Respondent judge failed to live up to this expectation by refusing to inhibit himself even when his very impartiality was in question and worse by issuing a warrant of arrest without determining whether or not it was justified by the need to prevent a frustration of the ends of justice. Parenthetically, the records show that the criminal complaints against herein complainant and his son were eventually dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor, but not without the following parting words: It cannot be gainsaid that respondents Mantarings were greatly prejudiced and suffered damages as a consequence of their inclusion in the criminal complaint. The unfortunate incident could have been avoided had the Honorable Municipal Trial Judge exercised the necessary prudence and judicial perpecuity [sic] expected of an impartial Judge in the conduct of preliminary investigation before issuance of warrant of arrest. WHEREFORE, respondent judge Ireneo B. Molato is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are dismissed for lack of merit. G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994 ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. REGALADO, J.: Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis case through the present petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction. 1 The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals 2 on which there does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:
From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 8
indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco. On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained. On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . . Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners have come to this Court via the instant petition, raising the sole issue: WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. 6 In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, 7 such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein. Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants, summonses, andorders of courts of justice or judicial officers. 9 It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment,10 or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice. 11 2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense. In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we quote:
Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. (b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival. (c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law. (d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us. We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussed seriatim. I Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so. The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. 4 A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. 5 A search

It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same from what may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15. Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 1948 12 or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act, 13 have never required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 9
that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced therein. 14 Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has already been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter. 3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions, 15 invite our attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted by law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court 17 over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise its authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987. We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of general application to all instances involving search warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply to single-sala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections. For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of the subject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch . The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority . The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal.

In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three executive judges the administrative areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129. Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had been filed with the executive judge, among the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered instead that such applications should immediately be "taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes enumerated therein. Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the nonexclusionary nature of that provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant.

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction. This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search warrants. II

Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.

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As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise. 1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed : No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants , in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, 19 said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days 20 but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced. A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court of first instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial court. 22 On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said provision be set out in full:
3. Writs and processes. (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region. (b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.) This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located. 28

search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., 24 the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently nullified for being general warrants. 3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal searches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, 26 and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the tenday lifetime of the warrant 27 would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and liberty. On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent court:

We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region . In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in paragraph (b). 2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a

The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county and made returnable before the justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. 29 In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines. III Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein. Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following POLICY GUIDELINES: 1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another

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court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover. 2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived. 3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court. 4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor. 5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case. WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM, and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents. FACTS: 1. S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, San Jose del Monte Bulacan. 2. The Search Warrant against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US $5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions. 4. Private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and on the same date, submitted their Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible). 5. An ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge Casanova and the following facts had been established to wit: a. That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigails Variety Store; That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigails Variety Store; That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigails Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;

b. c.

6. The respondent Judge Casanova issued its order duly granting the motion to quash search warrant. MR Denied. The Solicitor General commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal order. The action did not prosper. CA dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind -- the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of Abigail Variety Store -- was not what the Judge who issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant. The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant: premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. And the scope of the search was made more particular -- and more restrictive -- by the Judges admonition in the warrant that the search be limited only to the premises herein described. ISSUE: W/N or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant. HELD: NO The case at bar does not deal with the correction of an obvious typographical error involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that

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the judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched -- although not that specified in the warrant -- is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store would have been fair game for a search. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established the following: On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant 5 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.6 The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. 7 After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. 8 They found 12 small heatsealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint9 having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. 10 A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11 After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.12 PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.13 The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.14 For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano. Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.15 When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.16 Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry , and canned goods.17 The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained.18 Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables. 19

G.R. No. 133254-55

April 19, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant. MENDOZA, J.: This is AN APPEAL FROM THE DECISION,1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accusedappellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700, 000.00. Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug , without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.

When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty4 whereupon he was tried. Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3

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After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayorand a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and, 2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00. The accused shall further pay the costs of suit. The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: G R E E T I N G S: It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex "A", the properties to wit: UNDETERMINED PARAPHERNALIA QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned. You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs. Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity. Existence of Probable Cause The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accusedappellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.23 The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated: Q -Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work? A -Yes, sir. Q Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance? A Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose Quezon City, Sir. Q Do You know the person who occupies the specific place? A Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert. Q Are you familiar with that place? A Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the former. Q In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert? A When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir . Q Were you able to buy at that time? A Yes, sir. Q How much if you can still remember the amount involved? A I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir . Q Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff (shabu) were being kept? A Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room. Q How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff? A When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE(SHABU) THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSSEDAPPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. No. 6425 THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT. ACCUSED-APPELLANT is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant. First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 21 provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.22 Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled. In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads: SEARCH WARRANT NO.160 For: Violation of RA 6425 SEARCH WARRANT

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Q Do you know who is in control of the premises? A Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert. Q How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu? A After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12, grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 December 95. Q Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement? A Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram. Q Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily? A Yes, sir.24 However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court, 25 the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. ...In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions "of a warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.

Indeed, in People v. Dichoso29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant: Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30 Similarly, in another case,31 the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P .D. No.1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No.1866, which punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No.1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law. Particularly of the Place Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states: .....While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City," the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.160 contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No.7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as "a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant'.s house and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation.32 The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. 33 For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor.

It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not. Specificity of the Offense Charged Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. 27 It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention: While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with "Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No.628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 28

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However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass." 34 In this case, the location of accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accusedappellant's residence, Search Warrant No.160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant. Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. 35 For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.36 The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case. Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained: What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused . The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused -and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.37 The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.18 The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid. Apparent Illegality of the Evidence The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa39 in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained: Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it; Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer . 40 No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.41 In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld. Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching party in effecting the raid. Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 42 provides: Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim. In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so. WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No.6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED . In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer

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the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Pl00,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED . HELD: The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view doctrine," the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.