Rule 138 ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR RULE 138 Attorneys and Admission to Bar Section 1.

Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America . Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office: I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions . Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination. Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants . All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate,

accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court. No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics. Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics. Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications . All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship. Section 8. Notice of Applications. Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination. Section 9. Examination; subjects. Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing). Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing . Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone. Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.

The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given. Section 11. Annual examination. Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon). Section 12. Committee of examiners. Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports. Section 13. Disciplinary measures. No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court. Section 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent. Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers . Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report. Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course . Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school. The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and

passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject. Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants . An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. Section 18. Certificate. The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice. Section 19. Attorney's roll. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate. Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney: (a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines. (b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers; (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law; (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval; (f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged; (g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest; (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed; (i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions. Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients . Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash. Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees . An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt . When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. Section 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party. A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of

money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client. Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds . A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance . The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant. Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension . No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown. Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio . Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.

Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government . Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect. Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Section 36. Amicus Curiae. Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it. Section 37. Attorneys' liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf. Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner. PARAS, J.:p We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides: There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. ' (Emphasis supplied) Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and

fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. ( Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. ( Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. ( State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions . (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied) Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which

involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc . [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours) The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service. One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. ( Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312) Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23) The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Commissioner will please proceed. MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years". To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal

knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit. This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up. MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit? MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes. MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law. MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. OPLE. Thank you. ... ( Emphasis supplied) Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied) Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15). At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and

the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.). The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. ( State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.). The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687). By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.). In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law. We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making. Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts. In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom. Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity. Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts

and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making. Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry. Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house. A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.) In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. ( Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues. Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself. These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning. Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas. Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied) The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative

efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied) Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes. In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged . Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied) Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos: First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied) Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied) Third Modeling for Negotiation Management . Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point. [Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus: Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such

legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work. Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office . The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions. This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. " Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4). The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo) After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father . During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the partylist system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member. In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied) After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13). In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,

entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied) Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation . Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts , an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied) A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265). Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political

question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied) No less emphatic was the Court in the case of ( Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission , 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied) The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . ( Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200) The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) SubArticle C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides: The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law , which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent. Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is

essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined. Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers. Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? We now proceed: The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. Additionally, consider the following: (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative. (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear. (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate. Finally, one significant legal maxim is: We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that

No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement. In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.) Sarmiento, J., is on leave. Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring: I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting: The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was

the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years " has not been met. The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries." The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with. What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily. Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law. As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:
2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind . In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states: 1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968). Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864). 2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359) 3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra) 4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3 The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law? 2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually? 3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman? Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4 Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position. CRUZ, J., dissenting: I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint. To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review. In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed. If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place. Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation." The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board. The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable." The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions. The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers

like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections. I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result. Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision. There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution. Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits. A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law. Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations? The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed

participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period. I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there? The professional life of the respondent follows: 1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since examinations in 1961 consist of the following: 1. 1961-1963: Pennsylvania M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. his passing the Bar of

candidate),

University

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation 3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation 4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group Corporation and affiliated companies President, Fil-Capital Development

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies: a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc. b. Dataprep, Philippines c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc. d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation Member of the Board of the Following: a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines b. First Philippine Energy Corporation c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation e. Graphic Atelier f. Manila Electric Company g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc. h. Philippine Electric Corporation i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22) There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer. The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful. I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law? The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff , 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited. It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776) For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit: xxx xxx xxx Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned." xxx xxx xxx Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in

these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773) xxx xxx xxx ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied) In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]): xxx xxx xxx ... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112) It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit: l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115) xxx xxx xxx While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]). Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate. I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. I vote to GRANT the petition. Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions NARVASA, J., concurring: I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur. PADILLA, J., dissenting: The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years " has not been met. The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries." The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with. What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily. Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law. As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:
2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind . In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied). It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states: 1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968). Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864). 2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359) 3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra) 4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. The following relevant questions may be asked: 1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law? 2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually? 3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman? Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4 Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position. CRUZ, J., dissenting: I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint. To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review. In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both

possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed. If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments. Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place. Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation." The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board. The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable." The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions. The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the

Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections. I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result. Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision. There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution. Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits. A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law. Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except

that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations? The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period. I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there? The professional life of the respondent follows: 1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since examinations in 1961 consist of the following: 1. 1961-1963: Pennsylvania M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. his passing the Bar of

candidate),

University

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation 3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation 4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group Corporation and affiliated companies President, Fil-Capital Development

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc. b. Dataprep, Philippines c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc. d. Semirara Coal Corporation e. CBL Timber Corporation Member of the Board of the Following: a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines b. First Philippine Energy Corporation c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation e. Graphic Atelier f. Manila Electric Company g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc. h. Philippine Electric Corporation i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22) There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer. The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful. I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the

law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law? The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years." Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff , 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited. It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776) For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit: xxx xxx xxx Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was

not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned." xxx xxx xxx Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773) xxx xxx xxx ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied) In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]): xxx xxx xxx ... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112) It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968). Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115) xxx xxx xxx While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]). Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate. I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. I vote to GRANT the petition. Bidin, J., dissent

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

B.M. No. 2112

July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner, RESOLUTION REYES, J.: On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit: 1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco; 2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date; 3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date; 4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law. The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioners membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. 1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. 2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.3 It can not be overstressed that: The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 1wphi1 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4 Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition: 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship; 2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship); 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; 4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP; 6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues; 7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and 8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office. In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following: 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship; 2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship); 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; 4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC; 5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues; 6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010; 7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and 8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE. The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law. Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar. SO ORDERED. BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Senior Associate Justice (Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice (On Leave) ARTURO D. BRION* Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice (On Leave) JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA** Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice

Footnotes
*

On Leave per Special Order No. 1257 dated July 19, 2012. On Leave.

**

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
1

"I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Petitioner, B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007.
2 3

R.A. No. 9225, Section 5. Supra note 2.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law. Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar. We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3 Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4 Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law. Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar 8 9 examinations; taking the lawyers oath and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10 The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14 Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No. The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." 17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225 . Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax; (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar. SO ORDERED. Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, CarpioMorales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur. Quisumbing, J., on leave.

In Re: Almacen 32 SCRA 562 FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a Petition to Surrender the Lawyers Certificate of Title to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice . He also expressed strong words as against the judiciary like justice is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb. . The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice system. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts. HELD: YES. Indefinite suspension imposed. RATIO:

It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of law.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO, vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION CASTRO, J.: Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows: Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason. Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case. xxx xxx xxx There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity . xxx xxx xxx He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that ... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment." The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words: Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiffappellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time. Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza , L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus: Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case. There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue. Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records. It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional. Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act." In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the

charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument. His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus: At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: "Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes." "Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets." xxx xxx xxx Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law. xxx xxx xxx Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case. xxx xxx xxx Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith. Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines." xxx xxx xxx We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech. xxx xxx xxx The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... . xxx xxx xxx What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what

technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name." xxx xxx xxx We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses. xxx xxx xxx The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more. xxx xxx xxx As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances. He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari. Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the

U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566: A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... . Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable. Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon: In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion. By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed". We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary .A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision. Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra: The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition. If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor

on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down. Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer. 5Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion." The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties. Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11 Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) . Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines ( Hill v.

Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641: No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained. ... . Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." ( Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665). Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. ( State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216) To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196) But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." As Mr. Justice Field puts it: ... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not

merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652) The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. ( In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481) We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967) In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents. 1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that: It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do. The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public. 3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court: We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance: "It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author." Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220. 4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began: Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared: ... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public. 5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said: A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ... Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725. 6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said: We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by

corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct. 7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement: I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here. The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that: ... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client. The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court. 8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge , 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that: The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ... The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private

citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court. 9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook , 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. 10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph: You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows: The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This

was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto. The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ...

No high-minded, manly man would conditions."

hold

judicial office

under such

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute." The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481. Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ... 11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years. 12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general

claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case. 13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred. 14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar. The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices. A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment. 1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation, found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed ... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less

than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... . 2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared: But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... . To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any

other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that ... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.) 3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed: As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction." Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
18

which, in the

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is

now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment. The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardianwas adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent inAlarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon: A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed. Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or nonpendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23 This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that ... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24 Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25 Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions. The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to

make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable. We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26 It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein. Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the

individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity. Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent. Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained. That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance. Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur. Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975 IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent. A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975 IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent. A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975 IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.: Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations. In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for recorrection and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.). Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations. Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied. In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having reevaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the reevaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.). Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.). In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another reevaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation. An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that

he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.). Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do. The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973. Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify. At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination. In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question. In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed: 2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade; 3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark; 4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; 5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such reevaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied). His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements: xxx xxx xxx 3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%; 4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects; 5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances: a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words; b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner; xxx xxx xxx e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied). Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law. I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed . The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee. Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same , carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied) In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that: xxx xxx xxx 3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...; 5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious . Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me: xxx xxx xxx 7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject . I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971,considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that: 8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ... 9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates. 10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it . It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972: 1. xxx xxx xxx 2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing average. 4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list. 5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied). Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that: xxx xxx xxx 2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing . Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question . I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after reevaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject. xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following: xxx xxx xxx 5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate. xxx xxx xxx c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that the said examine failed , herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied). Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law; That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to reevaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;. That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%; That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%; That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and xxx xxx xxx 2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I reevaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did. 3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated: xxx xxx xxx As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that ... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for reevaluation and/or re-checking. It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court. Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable. It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for reevaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers: That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation ; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz". Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith. xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied). On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating: xxx xxx xxx 1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted

to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-aLanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order, 2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question: Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo). With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo). The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941.

While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957. Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment. 3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely: (a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and (b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned; 5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954." Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others; 1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations. xxx xxx xxx 4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business? It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled? 5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf. But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First,

was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were reevaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration. xxx xxx xxx 7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case. xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). I The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court. It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971 , just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.). Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar. Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972 , respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing . Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows: 4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning. Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 7475; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects. Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.). After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects. Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.). Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject . He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.). However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile

Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook. At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook . Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.). At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71% . The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.). Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.). A day or two after February 5, 1972 , when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects , the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66% . Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.). II Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

A UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees. Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.). But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy. We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other. For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of onlyrespondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows: BAI 1. Political Law Public International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. or 30 weighted points BAI Labor Laws and Social Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made. 2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points or 33 weighted points. Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made. 3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts. or 30 weighted points. 4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or 22 weighted points. 5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) = 11 pts. or 44 weighted points. Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made. General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15% Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage

of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz. The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court. Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith. His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown. The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant

consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought. B REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%. Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned. The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.). Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.). Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang. Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He reevaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him. As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should reevaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.). At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows: Labor Laws 3% Taxation 69% Mercantile Law 68% Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows: BA Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 weighted points Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation Civil Law 75% 75% = " Taxation 69% 69% = " Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "

Criminal Law 78% 78% = " Remedial Law 85% 85% = " Legal Ethics 83% 83% = " Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5% (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.) Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are: Political Law 70% Taxation 72% His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows: BA Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation Labor Laws 75% 75% = " Civil Law 89% 89% = " Taxation 72% 72% = " Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9 weighted points Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation Remedial Law 88% 88% = " Legal Ethics 79% 79% = " Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4% (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.). The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo. It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred. As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted. III Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent. A The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law. The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13). In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to. The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the reevaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit reevaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is

correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules. B Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath. That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus: [1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited). [2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710). The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710). Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that: [1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied). Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105). Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission. Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario: The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401]. What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. IV RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents. All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or recorrecion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided. Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied). It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words: Montecillo Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper? A Yeas, your Honor. Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.). Pamatian 3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark; 4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and 5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.). Manalo (c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied). Pardo ... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied). With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163). At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondentsexaminers, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto. V Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162). It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects. It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration. A There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. 1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.] It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972. In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.). Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And

according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances. On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of instrument;August 23, 1972 date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled onMarch 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities , which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities). 2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued atP5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00 , while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00. The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar. During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April

12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt. It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972. Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for: (a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense. xxx xxx xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019). It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court. B There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant. 1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University)

 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.). It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.). Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building. 2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.). 3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar. He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.). He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar

only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country. He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.). On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.). German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.). It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated. WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Teehankee, J., concurs in the result. Antonio, J., is on official leave. Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO CASE DIGEST A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975 Facts: This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter that speaks of the exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-evaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the Bar. Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial). Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU. The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees regular activity that when an examinee has failed in one subject alone, the rest he passed, the examiner in that subject which he flunked will review his exam notebook. Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities. Issue: WON Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed the Bar? YES

Held: It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevos well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorneys certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

LAWYERS OATH

I___________ of ___________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;

and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.