How successful were William II ministers in balancing social and political interests in the years 1890-1914 1890 was

a landmark year in german history, as it was the year bismarcks 19 year domination of german politics came to an abrupt end, leaving Germany with a complex web of social and political issues and without a clear successor. Instead, over the next 14 years William appointed various chancellors to try and fill the Bismarck sized hole in the german political system. Domestically, the new chancellors had a lot of difficulty in balancing politicial interests, not only due to their relative incompetence in comparison with Bismarck, but also due to the additional role as prime minister of Prussia, whch was assigned to them in the german constitution. This office meant that it was very hard to create any constructive domestic policy, as the Prussian aristocrats would challenge any ideas that would even potentially lead to a decline in their status. This was evident especially in agriculture, in which the reforms of chancellor leo von caprivi which attempted to liberalise trade by reducing the protective duties on imports of grain. In theory this was a good, practical idea , but it was met by significant resistance from Prussian land owners in the form of several campaigns against the reforms. These campaigns not only forced the Kaiser to dismiss caprivi but by 1902, they managed to restore the duties on food items to ensure the prices of their own porducts remained at a high level through the Bulow tarrifs. Therefore, despite the fact that a large number of smaller farmers also benefitted from protective duties on wine and imported cattle, one could easily argue that from 1890-1914 the junkers were supported at the expense of the rest of german agriculture in that Bulows grain tariffs hit dairy, poultry and pig farmers, who needed cheap, imported grain and fodder. This bias in terms of putting the political interests of the Prussian junkers before the interests of the german people was based in their dominance of the bunserat, which essentially allowed them to control which reforms passed and which didnt-making it almost impossible for any of the chancellors to balance political interests in germany. The failed electoral bill of 1910 is the perfect example of this, as it was an attempt to remove manifestation of advantage for wealthier classes that was created by the three class voting system in Prussia, which enabled the estate owners in the less rural districts to maximize their strength and thus dominate the bundesrat. However, as with the attempt to liberalise trade, the Prussian junkers prevented the bill from passing to maintain their position at the expense of the rest of the german people. The Prussian junkers were not the only external force that prevented any of the chancellors from achieving a balance in political interests domestically, as the army also exerted a lot of influence on the running of Germany (during this time period, authoritarian conservative militarism was still being imposed on the country to the extent where state-run schools emphasized military education). The army used the fact that there was a whole sector of the economy dependant on it and the Kaisers obsession with the military to apply pressure on the Reichstag, highlighted by the passing of the army bills of 1912 and 1913, and to pursue their own political interests. This was evident during the zabern affair

where a vote of censure was carried against the government and its support of the military in the Reichstag by 293 votes to 54-clearly showing that the public wanted to see some kind of justice against the soldiers who had been at the centre of the riots at zabern. However, the Reichstag hesitated to take further action and the Kaiser and his ministers firmly maintained their support for the army. The failure to take any effective action against the zabern affair illustrates the inbalanced nature of the Kaiser and his ministers attitude towards the army and its interests. A similar point is made by a study the schlieffen plan and its develppment. Militarily, it was a daring plan, yet it was politically indefensible as the plan involved marching through Belgium, and Germany was one of the countries that had guaranteed belgiums neutrality. Despite this, the schleiffen plan became the basis for german military planning for the next 15 years. The fact that no political objections were raised by any of the chancellors in charge during this time period highlights a worryingly consistant failure to balance the interests of the army with the political interests of the country. In conclusion, William II ministers were not successful at all in the balancing of domestic political interests due to the number of external forces that were acting on the german government and the Kaisers policy of sammlungspolitik, which enabled influential groups such as the army and the junkers to effectively control Germany. Socially, the willhemine chancellors attempts at balancing interests were polluted and prevented by the Kaisers personal idiosynchrasies. His fear of socialism dominated his ministers actions. In 1891, caprivi passed many laws to try and improve the standard of living of the working class as Sunday work was prohibited, employment of children under 13 was forbidden and women werent allowed to work for more than 11 hours a day. At face value these may seem like caprivi and the kasier taking the interests of the working class into consideration, however, most of these reforms were not taken well by the working class. Not working on a Sunday meant not getting payed, women wanted the option to work for more than 11 hours a day to try and earn more money and if children werent working they were on the streets. One could say that instead of listening to what the working class really wanted, caprivi and the Kaiser designed policies for what they thought the working class wanted in an attempt to distract them from the socialist threat that the Kaiser feared. The fact that the main socialist party, the SDP, gained 25 seats in the next 3 years in the Reichstag illustrates the failure of caprivis reforms and thus the failure of caprivi to cater to the interests of the working class. After this failure, the Kaiser left the social democrats alone to pursue his policy of weltpolitik-which peaked his interest much more than dealing with socialism. This reflected in his ministers after caprivi, who turned a blind eye to socialism in order to fulfill the Kaisers need for international prestige. It was not just the Kaiser who acted as a block to the interests of the german people, but also pressure groups who prevented social legislation from being passed. This was made evident in 1912 when hollweg tried to reconcile the poles and have them fully incorporated into the german empire. This bill was met with opposition by the conservatves and nationalist pressure groupsand thus failed.