Defining Terrorism

WP 3, Deliverable 4

October 1, 2008

Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 5 2. ACADEMIC DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................. 7 2.1 THE QUESTION OF PURPOSE .................................................................................... 8 2.2 PROBLEMS OF THE QUEST FOR REIFICATION ................................................... 10 2.3 THE ACADEMIC DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM: UNBOUND STILL................ 15 2.4 CONCLUSION: AVENUES OF FUTURE THEORETIZATION ............................... 30 3. TERRORISM, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME .................... 33 3.2 ORGANIZED CRIME................................................................................................... 36 3.2.1 The concept ............................................................................................................. 36 3.2.2 The Nexus ............................................................................................................... 41 3.2.3 The Nexus in practice.............................................................................................. 45 3.3 POLITICAL VIOLENCE .............................................................................................. 49 3.3.1 Violence and the state ............................................................................................. 50 3.3.2 Violence and Legitimacy ........................................................................................ 52 3.3.3 Political violence and terrorism............................................................................... 53 3.4 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 58 4. TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM....................................................................................... 60 4.1 RELATIONSHIP TO THE ACADEMIC DEFINITION DEBATE ............................. 60 4.2 THE TERRORISM TYPOLOGY DEBATE................................................................. 63 4.2.1 Political orientation-based typology........................................................................ 65 4.2.2 Actor-based typology .............................................................................................. 66 4.2.3 Purpose-based typology .......................................................................................... 67 4.2.4 Motivation-based typology ..................................................................................... 68 4.3 SELECTED TYPOLOGIES .......................................................................................... 69 4.3.1 Geographical dimensions of terrorism .................................................................... 69 4.3.2 The role of state: terrorism by whom? .................................................................... 75 4.3.3 Old versus new terrorism ................................................................................. 80 4.4 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 85 5. DEFINING TERRORISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ........................................... 88 5.1 REASONS FOR DEFINING TERRORISM ................................................................. 89 5.2 EUROPEAN DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM........................................................... 90 5.3 DEFINITIONAL ELEMENTS ...................................................................................... 96 5.4 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 102 6. WORKING DEFINITIONS DEFINING TERRORISM IN THE MEMBER STATES................................................................................................................................. 104 6.1 GENERAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION............................................................... 105 6. 2 COUNTRY SPECIFIC RESULTS ............................................................................. 107 6.2.1 Czech Republic ..................................................................................................... 107 6.2.2 Denmark ................................................................................................................ 107 6.2.3 France .................................................................................................................... 108 2

6.2.4 Germany ................................................................................................................ 108 6.2.5 Italy........................................................................................................................ 109 6.2.6 The Netherlands .................................................................................................... 110 6.2.7 Poland.................................................................................................................... 111 6.2.8 Portugal ................................................................................................................. 112 6.2.9 Russia .................................................................................................................... 112 6.2.10 Spain.................................................................................................................... 114 6.2.11 Sweden ................................................................................................................ 115 6.2.12 United Kingdom .................................................................................................. 116 6.3 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 118 7. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................................... 120 8. BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 123 INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS.................................................................................. 137 EU DOCUMENTS............................................................................................................. 138 COUNTRY SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS............................................................................. 138 Denmark ......................................................................................................................... 138 France ............................................................................................................................. 139 Germany ......................................................................................................................... 139 Italy................................................................................................................................. 140 Netherlands..................................................................................................................... 140 Poland............................................................................................................................. 140 Portugal .......................................................................................................................... 140 Russia ............................................................................................................................. 141 Spain............................................................................................................................... 142 Sweden ........................................................................................................................... 142 United Kingdom ............................................................................................................. 143 INTERNET SITES............................................................................................................. 144 APPENDIX I......................................................................................................................... 145 Table 1 European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism ............................................. 145 Table 2 Protocol Amending the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism....... 146 Table 3 Council of the Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism ..................... 148 Table 4 Council of the European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism . 149 Table 5 Commission of the EC Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism ............................................................................................................................ 151 Table 6 Terrorism Act 2000 (United Kingdom) ................................................................ 152 Table 7 Nouveau Code Pnal (France) .............................................................................. 153 Table 8 Cdigo Penal (Spain) ............................................................................................ 154 Table 9 Council Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism ............................................................................................................................. 155 Table 10 EC Council Regulation 2580/2001 ..................................................................... 156

Table 11 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism .... 157 Table 12 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) ................................. 158 Table 13 High Level Panels Report on Threats, Challenges and Change ........................ 159 Table 14 Draft Comprehensive Convention on Combating Terrorism.............................. 160 Table 15 Convention of the OIC on Combating International Terrorism.......................... 161 Table 16 Legal elements in European and other international definitions......................... 162 APPENDIX II ....................................................................................................................... 167 Table 1 Czech Republic ..................................................................................................... 167 Table 2 Denmark................................................................................................................ 168 Table 3 France.................................................................................................................... 170 Table 4 Germany................................................................................................................ 172 Table 5 Italy ....................................................................................................................... 173 Table 6 The Netherlands .................................................................................................... 175 Table 7 Poland.................................................................................................................... 175 Table 8 Portugal ................................................................................................................. 176 Table 9 Russia .................................................................................................................... 177 Table 10 Spain.................................................................................................................... 178 Table 11 Sweden ................................................................................................................ 180 Table 12 United Kingdom.................................................................................................. 182

1. INTRODUCTION

Where natural sciences use numbers to communicate an idea, social sciences use words. Unlike numbers, however, words mean different things to different people. Where anyone with a basic education is able to add 4 to 5 and come to the same result, if we ask a group of people to discribe freedom, we may end up with many different results depending on the particular persons origin, culture, and experience. Words such as freedom do not have the same meaning for everybody and such differences obviously hamper communication. Therefore, when studying terrorism, it is necessary to have a look at what different people, states, and international organizations mean when they use the word terrorism in their everyday speeches or documents. Without understanding the exact meaning of the term, it is hardly possible to analyze what consequences there are to intranational and international relations. Without a common agreement on the notion, there can hardly be any common steps to counter terrorism, whether at the domestic or the international level. This study should serve as an overview of how people, states and international organizations define terrorism. In chapters two and three, we shall analyze the academic discourse and have a look at what the common attributes that scholars ascribe to terrorism are. Whereas the second chapter uses a positive way of defining the notion that is, it asks what terrorism is -, chapter three approaches the task from the other direction and asks what terrorism is not. Namely it searches for differences between terrorism and two related terms, organized crime and political violence. In order to articulate general statements, theories and recommendations, scholars try to group similar phenomena together according to common qualities. As we shall see, terrorism has got many facets that may serve as a basis for such classification. Chapter four focuses on several important typologies that have been reflected in academic literature. The academic discourse is important for our understanding of terrorism and for imbedding it in the theory. But although academia reflects reality, academia does not constitute reality. In order to analyze the current situation and obstacles in international cooperation on counter-terrorism, it is thus also necessary to ask how the term terrorism is understood in different legal

frameworks. Chapter five deals with the international level, paying special attention to the European Unions efforts to reach a common definition of terrorism. Chapter six, then, focuses on the level of member states and draws conclusions from similarities and differences found in the nation states legal orders.

2. ACADEMIC DEFINITIONS

Terrorism may well be the most important word in the political vocabulary these days, as was remarked recently by one of its most prominent students, Alex P. Schmid, Director of the Centre for Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews (2004a: 375). However, one could argue that little has changed since the time when the same scholar concluded in 1984 that [academic researchers from many fields] have spilled almost as much ink as the actors of terrorism have spilled blood and yet have reached no consensus on what terrorism is (reprinted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: Introduction). After thirty years of hard labor there is still no generally agreed definition of terrorism, concludes Walter Laqueur of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2003: 232, quoted in Schmid, 2004a: 395). Despite the fact that terrorism is not an unprecedented phenomenon; it is as old as the hills, confusion prevails in the question of its nature (2004: 49). Terrorism indeed seems a contested and intensely political concept, perhaps not far from a catch-all political signifier (Der Derian, 2005: 23). Elucidating its nature bears relevance in both theoretical and practical terms. This chapter does not aspire to positively answer the question What is Terrorism? Instead, it is aimed to provide a review of existing academic definitions, conceptualize problems related to the attempts to arrive at a consensus on the definition in the field, and point to some potential avenues for establishing a deeper contextual understanding of the phenomenon. It is assumed that by means of presenting existing positions, internal and external tensions and major issues of contention, the following lines could contribute to an expansion of such a contextual understanding even if the polyphonic and dialectical character of the contemporary discourse is projected onto them. In the first section, the academic discussion related to the necessity for arriving at a consensus in this matter is outlined, followed by an account of the perceived problems in defining terrorism. In the next section, a concise review of existing definitions of terrorism illustrating various stances towards the phenomenon in the academic discourse of terrorist studies and international relations with several brief excursions into the legal theory is attempted. In the end, some potential avenues for future theoretizing of the phenomenon are sketched.

2.1 THE QUESTION OF PURPOSE

The lack of consensus in the academic community on the issue of definition of terrorism does not encompass only the question of its substantive content but, as a matter of fact, extends so far that it results in discordant positions in regard to to the question Is the academic definition is really needed?. Whereas some conclude that the academic definition is dispensable and that the attempts to reach a universal one are futile, others provide theoretical and practical reasons to make a case for the opposite. Both positions are outlined in this section. Some authors indeed seem to be content with the notorious paraphrase of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewarts statement on pornography in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964: When one sees terrorism, one recognizes it. Laqueurs scepticism about the possibility of arriving at a universal definition his deprecation of attempts to define terrorism is discussed in more detail in the next section - is based on his conviction that terrorism escapes any definition and that any effort to capture it into a stable, monophonic definition is bound to fail. It almost predisposes him to the following quote: [T]the study of terrorism can manage with a minimum of theory (quoted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 3). The U.K. Ambassador to the United Nations Sir Jeremy Greenstocks remark after the 9/11 attacks What looks, smells and kills like terrorism is terrorism (quoted in Schmid, 2004a: 375) then rather betrays an impatience with concerning oneself with theoretical debates when there is real business to be done. Yet the real business can be spoiled, some authors claim, by the lack of a universally agreed definition of terrorism. An objective definition of terrorism is not only possible: it is also indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism, holds Ganor (quoted in Schmid, 2004a: 375). He thus reiterated his earlier statement on the importance of this issue, in which he had declared that a common understanding of what constitutes terrorism is important, among other purposes, for 1) a development of common international strategies, 2) effective results of the international mobilization against terrorism, 3) enforcement of international agreements against terrorism, and 4) effective extradiction procedures (Ganor, 1998). Similarly, Schmid also points to a positive role of a universal definition in coordinating the states anti-terrorist strategies, quoting Dean and Alexander, who consider the absence of a universal definition of

terrorism as the main factor likely to encourage future terrorism more eminent than, e.g., disagreement as to the root causes, religionization of politics or exploitation of the media (Schmid, 2004a: 378). However, the focus is here shifted from the academia to the fields of strategic and legal discourse, and Ganor and Schmids statements therefore cannot be considered as proper arguments in favour of the universal academic definition of terrorism. Nonetheless, they pave the way to the conclusion that in fact, there is a search going on not for one universal definition of terrorism, but for manifold definitions of terrorism, which, in each of the fields listed above (academic, strategic and legal), are required to play a peculiar role and therefore focus on various issue areas in their quest. Whereas the strategic discourse may be assumed to be primarily concerned with terrorism as a method of combat, in the legal discourse, the focus rests rather with those who can be punished for commiting terrorist acts, the perpetrators. In the absence of a universal legal definition, capabilities of prosecuting those who commit terrorist crimes are limited nullum crimen sine lege and the extradition channels are obstructed. Diversity of definitions in the academic discourse seems to be a rather minor problem in comparison to the preceding fields. Some could even maintain that this plural character is rooted in the essence of the free academic debate as such. Yet there seem to be reasons for trying to find a deeper contextual understanding of the phenomenon, if not a monophonic and uncontested definition of terrorism, in the academic discourse nonetheless. The first reason is that the absence of a commonly accepted definition invites abuse. In view of the delegitimization, stigmatization and securitization issues discussed in the next section, this seems to be a serious case for expanding a common understanding of terrorism. Double standards and the might makes right principle applied both in the international and domestic scene styling resistance movements, guerillas or mere political opposition as terrorists - have in recent times become a favourite instrument of authoritarian governments to legitimize crushing those actors abroad in which the label terrorism is used as a powerful instrument in the hands of the stronger. This should be, it can be argued, prevented on normative grounds. The academia, which ought to be critical towards the realm of politics even if it cannot be detached from it should then play a crucial role in the deconstruction of similar

processes. Yet, to meet such expectations, it should possess useful instruments of analysis. In line with the strategic argument outlined above, Jessica Stern of Harvard University also concedes that how we define terrorism profoundly influences how we respond to it. Yet she adds another reason in favour of the definition its relevance for theory and research: The definition inevitably determines the kind of data we collect and analyze, which in turn influences our understanding of trends and our predictions about the future (1999: 12). The same argument is presented by Schmid, who speaks of the universalist definition as a prerequisite of a responsible theory (2006: 3). Such arguments may be radicalized: arbitrariness in definitions as points of departure for research perhaps not only influences academics results and hinders their comparability, but it also generates a sense of uncertainty that the participants in the discourse talk about, indeed, the same phenomenon at any given point of time, which limits their potential for cooperation. Uniformly defining terrorism in the academia thus seems relevant both in theoretical and practical terms. From the theoretical point of view, such clarification would provide a paradigmatic stable point of departure for the research on terrorism instead of the current state of confusion where results of individual researchers and teams can be compared or complement each other only to a limited extent. From the practical point of view, it would contribute to mitigating the ambiguities associated with the term that invite abuse.

2.2 PROBLEMS OF THE QUEST FOR REIFICATION

The central question of this section is Why is there no agreed definition of terrorism?, if so much hard labour has been invested into the effort to find one, as Walter Laqueurs quote from the introduction implies. Boaz Ganor, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, provides a number of reasons, of which Schmid (2004a: 395) cites four in particular:

1. Terrorism is a contested concept and political, legal, social science and popular notions of it are often diverging; 2. The definition question is linked to (de-)legitimisation and criminalisation; 3. There are many types of terrorism, with different forms and manifestations;

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4. The term has undergone changes in meaning in the more than 200 years of its existence. These explanations are examined in detail below, followed by some other cited causes of the existing semantic boundlessness of terrorism. In the end of the section, a small but fundamental excursion is made to the realm of legal discourse in order to provide a different point of view to the tensions present in the academic debate. The first explanation provided by Ganor often resounds in the notorious phrase One mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter. Philip Schlesinger notes in this context that no commonly agreed definition can in principle be reached, because the very process of definition is in itself part of a wider contestation over ideologies or political objectives (quoted in Schmid, 2004a: 396). In accordance with this opinion, the absence of the Weberian wall between the world of the raging storm of values and that of social science makes scientific inferences about the definition of terrorism all but possible. Perhaps the main reason why terrorism is contested so much lies in its stigmatizing nature, which is reflected in Ganors second point. This stigmatizing label of tangible evil hinders serious debate as, in Herbsts words, conveying criminality, illegitimacy, and even madness, the application of the term terrorist shuts the door to discussion about the stigmatized group or with them, while reinforcing the righteousness of the labelers, justifying their agendas and mobilizing their responses (quoted in Schmid, 2004a: 397). What Jenkins wrote in 1980 perhaps applies now more than ever before: Use of the term terrorism implies a moral judgment; and if one party can succesfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint (Jenkins, 1980a: 1). Terorrism is then what bad guys do. It can consist of almost any violent act by the opponent which is once labelled terrorist (1980a: 2). The attributing and at least to some extent the defining ability is therefore intrinsically related to power and language hegemonies. As Kiras (2004: 481) notes, by denoting certain political violence as terrorist and thus delegitimizing it in this process, states of the Western world have been preserving the hegemonic control over legitimate use of violence in the international system. Even if one does not adopt such a sharp critical stance, the question Who should have the power to define what terrorism is and is not? is

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still of considerable relevance, as the question of defining the term cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency (Schmid, 2004a: 402). Stated in more neutral terms, terrorism has become an important and fairly succesful instrument of securitizing moves to borrow the Copenhagen School of Security Studies terminology (cf. Buzan, Wver and de Wilde, 1998) employed by securitizing actors (e.g. governments and other state institutions and their members) vis-a-vis the general domestic and international public to frame some issues as existential threats.1 The third point, concerning the plural character of the phenomena termed terrorism, was made explicit, e.g., by Laqueur, who argued that any attempt to be specific [about terrorism] is bound to fail, for the simple reason that there is not one but many terrorisms (2000: 28). Jenkins elaborates on the subject: We should be careful not to think of terrorism or terrorists as monolithic. Terrorism is a generalized construct derived from our concepts of morality, law, and the rules of war, whereas actual terrorists are shaped by culture, ideology and politics specific, inchoate factors and notions that motivate diverse actions (2006: 117). The existing diversity of the terrorist phenomena is the core subject discussed in the chapter dedicated to types of terrorism. The question of whether the plural character of terrorist violence illustrated, for example, later in this report on the case studies of various phenomena deprives the concept of any common denominator and thus effectively prevents a definition from being formulated is indeed a relevant one. The positions vary, even between the authors quoted in this paragraph: Laqueur sees the obstacle as unsurmountable, while Jenkins is more optimistic. The historical reflection of terrorism is not to be treated in much detail in this chapter, which is focused on the contemporary academic discourse. What is, however, relevant in relation to the diachronic comparison of the perceptions of terrorism is that unlike the early perpetrators of terrorist acts, their more contemporary descendants resist the label. As Hoffman points, in their titles, the terrorist groups recognized as such, e.g., by The List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations issued by the U.S. State Department now often invoke images of
1

The distinction between terror and terrorism is sometimes blurred in the public discourse, as was pointed out, e.g., by Hoffman with relation to the U.S. administrations references to the war on terror, in which terror refers to a state of mind while terrorism refers to a political phenomenon (2006: 19). Yet this semantic choice could also be deliberate, in which case it would form a natural semantic component to the fervent securitization efforts that ensued as the war on terror may be suggesting an enduring struggle against an abstract and inexplicable evil (Nunberg, 2004).

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freedom and liberation, military organizational structures, or such images that are not at all related to their methods and objectives and the means selected to achieve their goals. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its succesor organizations, and al-Qaeda are fine and, in general, uncontested examples of each of the respective cases. It is frequent, Hoffman notes, that the terrorists in fact project the label onto their adversaries (e.g. the existing governments in case of liberation struggles). Yet, even if this trend may have a certain negative impact on blurring the nature of the phenomenon, it could conversely be indicative in other respects the reason is that this self-denial is in fact characteristic of the perpetrators of terrorist violence (2006: 21-22). This does not necessarily lead towards defining the terrorist, as such reasoning would pave the way to a conclusion that every violent offender denying being a terrorist is one; it does point to the utterly negative associations that the term 'terrorism' has come to bear. There are other problems cited in the literature besides those presented above: for example, the infrequent incidence of terrorism in statistical terms that prevents sound scientific inferences about its nature; reluctance to explore the field because imponderable factors might be involved [besides economic or political]: indoctrination but also psychological motives, in consequence of which, e.g., even when a great amount of explosive material could be present, no terrorism ensues (Laqueur, 2004: 53); or the role of the media. The negative effect of the media is explained in conflicting terms: either it is considered as stemming from their striving for unbiased reporting and political correctness, which makes them prefer designations such as 'separatists', 'guerillas' or 'insurgents' to 'terrorists' (Hoffman 2006: 30) with the essence of terrorism getting lost in the process, or since terrorism is an attractive subject making headlines and breaking news, it is overused and applied to manifold forms of political violence (cf. Jenkins, 1980a: 1-2). Whether this can be considered as an explanation sui generis or a mere consequence or evidence of the previous points, Schmid found that scholars in the field tend to prefer their own definitions to those of others in a response to the survey question Whose definition of terrorism do you utilize?, more than answered 'their own' (58%). The remaining part (42%) favoured a variety of definitions, none of which would gain a particular prominence in being listed significantly more than others (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 25). It could be

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argued that the effect is one of mutual constitutiveness the above stated causes contribute to the lack of a standard academic definition, which makes the researchers use their own peculiar definitions which are needed as departure points for their scientific inquiries and this approach in turn perpetuates the fragmented status quo in the discipline. The above-listed considerations have made some scholars take on a defeatist position: It can be predicted with confidence that the disputes about a detailed, comprehensive definition of terrorism will continue for a long time, that they will not result in a consensus and that they will make no noticeable contribution towards the understanding of terrorism (Laqueur, 2003: 79, quoted in Schmid, 2006). Yet others refuse such a defeatist stance (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 27; Jenkins, 1980a: 2; Ganor, 1998), some of them because of the reasons mentioned in the previous section. Although this issue is not central to the topic in this part, it may still be instrumental for the purpose of this project to make a short digression to existing international legal definitions. The discourse here reveals some similarities, and the quest for the definition of terrorism is faced with several like problems: e.g., whether states should be included among the actors that can perpetrate an act of terrorism or whether one should consider the actors motivation in identifying the nature of the violence for instance, whether the violence can be considered terrorist if it has been commited in a struggle for national self-determination or by the allegedly oppressed, deprived and/or exploited. But the convergence extends even further. In the legal field too, there is a sense of scepticism perceivable vis-a-vis the definition of terrorism, pointing to the existing relativism and moral implications of the label. As one of the Judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) remarked, Terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the target protected, or both (Higgins, 1997: 28). However, despite the continuous lack of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, there has recently been a clearly demonstrated dynamic towards specifying terrorism in international law documents on the level of the U.N. Security Council, the General Assembly or Ad Hoc Commitees. The common denominator of these definitions may be characterized as an individual character of the crime understandable in the realm of law, but controversial if translated

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to less instrumental and more descriptive levels; more importantly, in general, the elements present include violent acts against persons and property with an objective to intimidate the population and/or coerce the government or international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act2. However, such an objective should be considered merely as a medium objective or as a means of attaining the underlying political and ideological goal. Since the debate has been a contentious issue, there has been a trend toward refraining from pointing to the political character of terrorist violence in the recent documents.

2.3 THE ACADEMIC DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM: UNBOUND STILL

After having discussed the question of the purpose and having listed the main perceived problems in defining terrorism, our focus may now be turned to a review of existing academic definitions. A mere enumeration of existing academic definitions of terrorism, however exhaustive, would not be enough for extending the contextual understanding of terrorism. 3 Therefore, this section focuses instead on the discussion of the formal nature of a definition and the origin of the terms terror and terrorism. A presentation of two aggregating projects on definitions of terrorism follows, together with some other academic definitions that illustrate the existing diversity of approaches vis-a-vis the phenomenon of terrorism. In conclusion, main issue areas in the existing academic definitions are identified and discussed. The word definition derives from Lat. definire, to bound. According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, it refers to a statement expressing the essential nature of something and the action or the power of describing, explaining, or making definite and clear. 4 A definition can be described as an equation in which the definiendum (the subject) is expressed by more than one definiens, which, together with the existential verb (to be), form the predicate. The predicate may consist of a few parts in some instances and run for paragraphs in others. A way to recognize a good definition, proposed by Schmid,
2

Cf. for instance the draft of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, Art. 2, Par. 1; this segment has already been approved, unlike Art. 18, which relates to the issue of Who can commit the act of terrorism?. 3 Although the study formulated such an ambition, no generally accepted definition of terrorism followed the publication of Schmid and Jongmans (1988/2005) analysis of numerous academic definitions. 4 See <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/definition>.

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is to transform the predicate into an interrogative sentence and see in a survey what the answer to the question is e.g. if terrorism is defined as violence for political purposes, than the question would stand What is violence for political purposes? (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 5). However, the long definitions can hardly be tested in this manner, and it is debatable whether the term descriptions should not befit them better. Terrorism is derived from the word "terror" (of Lat. terrere, to frighten), which in the most general sense, denotes extreme fear, usually stemming from a vaguely defined, relatively unknown and largely unforeseeable threat (Guillaume, 2004: 537). Terror is therefore a state of mind and, at least to some degree, a subjective category (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 20). Both terms, "terrorism" and "terror", came to the spotlights of the political discourse during the Jacobinic terror period of the French Revolution (1793-1794). Maximilien de Robespierre advocated the introduction of terreur as something just, prompt, severe, inflexible, which is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principal of democracy applied to our countrys most urgent needs (quoted from Schmid, 2004a: 399). Shortly after Robespierres own life was ended on the guillotine, the instrument of Revolutionary terror par excellence, Edmund Burke spoke, in his reflection upon the French Revolution, of thousands of those Hell hounds called Terrorists let loose on the people (Hoffman, 2006: 3-4). Here, clearly, terrorism was related to abuse, and not virtue without which terror is helpless, according to Robespierre (Ibid.) and here lay the grounds of the first definition of "terrorism" in the Oxford English Dictionary: government by intimidation. In the following decades and centuries, the term was reshaped to reflect changing historical realities and employed to denominate acts of various entities with manifold diverse motivations. Instead of following this process (for an overview, cf. Hoffman, 2006: 3-20), the focus is now shifted to the recent academic discourse. It should just be noted that the unstable use of the term in the diachronic comparison is at the foundation of some authors scepticism about our ability to capture the phenomenon in a finite definition. The aggregate definitions are here to stand for the outcomes of two projects in which numerous other definitions were analyzed in an attempt to arrive at a definition that would be acceptable to the academic community. Measured against this objective, neither of the two projects presented here was

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succesful. Yet both of them are illustrative of the various elements that are recurrent in the academic definitions. The first aggregate definition discussed is by Alex P. Schmid. In formal terms, it is a long one and, as such, perhaps description could be considered as a more pertinent title. After having sent a draft definition to the members of the research community in the mid-1980s,5 Schmid projected their reactions into the final version, including the 16 most common elements:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent actions employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assasination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threatand violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 28).

The second aggregating project, presented by a team of researchers composed of Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sican Hirsch-Hoefler (2004), chose the opposite approach. Having analysed 73 definitions appearing in major academic journals in the field (Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Terrorism), the authors decided to refrain from incorporating as many elements as possible and, instead, proposed a consensus definition based on the lowest common denominator:

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental target of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics which form the basis for their selection for victimization. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). This group or class, whose members sense of security is purposefully undermined, is the target of terror. The victimization of the target of violence is considered extranormal by most observers from the witnessing audience on the basis of its atrocity, the time (e.g. peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or the disregard for the rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (e.g. a government) or targets of attention (e.g. public opinion) to changes of attitude or behaviour favouring the short or long-term interests of the users of this method of combat. Quoted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 2.

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Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.

In comparison to Schmids definition, the latter definition is composed of 5 elements and 25 words, as opposed to the formers 16 elements and 114 words. Yet it is subject to debate if the price for parsimony is worth paying whether the minimalist definition, disregarding perpetrators, victims and the terror inflicted toward them, indeed bounds. The issue is the opposite of Schmids definition, which strives for the highest possible description value and is bound to invite criticism merely because there is more to criticize, and this is besides the already made point of the convergence of such a definition with a description, which could in the absence of clear external borders extend for pages to encompass entire volumes. Yet despite the different organizing principles behind both definitions, it is suggested that the base causal structure of the second definition

THREAT OR USE OF FORCE / VIOLENCE

PUBLICITY

ATTAINMENT OF GOALS

is present also in the first definition, which elaborates more on conveying the message (communication element; double victimization) and concedes that the motivation of the terrorists does not have to be merely political, as is the case of the second definition but also criminal or idiosyncratic. Indeed, by including the last motivation, the taxonomy loses much of its theoretical and

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practical relevance as in fact any motivation can now be accomodated with the definition; yet even the political character of the second definition is not without problems, as discussed below. The reference to a model of violence as communication is an important shared element of both definitions.6 It invokes the metaphor by Brian M. Jenkins - another prominent scholar of terrorism, for decades associated with the RAND Corporation contained in the statement Terrorism is theater. What follows from this assumption, according to Jenkins, is that terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead (Jenkins, 1985: 4). Der Derian, in this respect, speaks about the optical character of contemporary terrorism and emphasizes the role of the media, which transmit the powerful images as well as triggering pathological responses to the terrorist event (Der Derian, 2005: 23-26). In similar terms, Jenkins maintains that for terrorists, the most significant technology is not weapons but direct communication with their multiple audiences and points to the enhanced role modern media can play in the process (2006: 125). Speaking of communication, it may be instrumental to recall Osama Bin Ladens early reflection of the 9/11 attacks: Those young men [the hijackers] said in deeds, in New York and Washington, speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere in the world. These speeches are understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs even by the Chinese (quoted in Devji, 2005: 13). Yet as Jenkins remarks, terrorists often lack the ability to communicate effectively e.g. because they choose incomprehensible communication strategies, or because the control over the narrative, at least until the internet gained prominence as a medium of global communication, has been in the hands of the news editors (2006: 125-126). Schmid makes a similar point in saying that the very fact that such a language of blood is used [in the non-state terrorism] tends to preclude dialogue it is ironical that violence, chosen as a means of communication, becomes an obstacle to it (2006: 23). Other academic definitions of terrorism chosen to be included here and following predominantly the criterion of their makers prominence in the field or a peculiar approach to the subject include, e.g., that of Bruce Hoffman, who,

However it may not be readily discernable among the other elements, Schmid elsewhere maintains that communication is of special prominence in his definition (Schmid, 2004a: 382; see also Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 21-25).

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after having conducted a qualitative delimitation of terrorism from other kinds of political and criminal violence, enlists the following definition into the discourse competition, which in comparison to the previous one emphasizes the element of (lacking) power:
[Terrorism is] the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have farreaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and whereby intimidate, a wider target audience that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either the local or an international scale (Hoffman 2006: 40-41).

Jessica Stern provides another example of a definition of "terrorism" with a rather short definition: [Terrorism is] an act or threat of violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing the audience (1999: 11), deliberately refraining from pointing to particular actors or purposes. The contentious issue of noncombatants in time of peace is discussed in the latter part of this section. RAND Terrorism Knowledge Base, a recognized dataset of worldwide terrorist incidents, uses the following long definition:
Terrorism is defined [for the purposes of this database] by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are

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intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.

Two notable elements are included in this definition. The first one is the demand to define terrorism by the nature of the act. Yet disregard for perpetrators and the nature of the causes, declared in the first sentence, is undermined when it is later maintained that the motives of all terrorists are political, a statement whose bounding effect is not insignificant, even if the precise content and boundaries of the political are not subject to a closer examination here (see below). The second notable element is the surreal effect of fear creating an atmosphere in which the target audience may not be able to rationally assess the power of the terrorist. Evaluating incidents of terrorism against this definition, RAND Terrorism Knowledge Base now includes around 10,000 incidences of international terrorism from 1968 to 2007, with the result of some 15,000 fatalities. Instead of defining what terrorism is, some authors, e.g., Thomas H. Mitchell, propose a negative definition: A definition of terrorism must clearly establish what terrorism is not (quoted in Schmid, 2004a: 408). His enumerative exclusive list includes attacks on military installations and equipment, police stations in situation of armed conflict, cases of collateral damage to civilians, assasinations where the victim was the direct target of violence, guerilla warfare and spontaneous acts of collective political violence, comprising riots, demonstrations and even revolts etc. Yet such a definition arguably remains as contentious as any positive one; perhaps even moreso, because the list starting with the phenomena which are, in the authors opinion, most likely to be confused with terrorism (e.g. guerilla warfare), but then departing farther and farther away from the core can, in the absence of external borders, in fact become infinite. In order to come to more general inferences about the nature of definitions in the academic discourse, Schmids quantitative analysis may be useful. Breaking the academic definitions in the sample (n=109) collected in the

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1980s into elements and counting how often these appeared, he presented a list of the most frequent definition elements. The 10 elements that scored most often and some others that are considered to be of interest are (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 5-6):
1. Violence, force 2. Political 3. Fear, terror emphasized 4. Threat 5. (Psych.) effects and (anticipated) reactions 6. Victim-target differentiation 7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action 8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic 9. Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints 10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance 30% 28% 83.5% 65% 51% 47% 41.5% 37.5% 32% 30.5%

11. Publicity aspect 12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character 14. Intimidation 15. Innocence of victims emphasized 17. Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others 21. Criminal

21.5% 21% 17% 15.5% 13.5% 6%

In a more contemporary survey using somewhat different variables, with a dataset (n=165) and criteria for selection (not only academic but nongovernmental definitions in general were included in the sample) which prevent a diachronic comparability with the previous conclusions, Schmid (2004a: 407) reached the following order:

1. Political character 2. Terror (population) 3. Threat 4. Coercion 5. Civilians

68% 59% 42% 38% 36%

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6. Tactic, strategy 7. Illegal, criminal 8. Demonstrative use 9. Communication 10. Psychological warfare

35% 30% 28% 27% 12%

In this survey, Schmid also compared the results reached for non-governmental and governmental definitions in terms of the predominance of the elements listed above: whereas in the 165 analysed academic definitions, the focus was most often on the political character (65%), terror (59%) and threat (42%), in 88 governmental definitions included in another sample, the elements illegal / criminal character (85%), terror (78%) and coercion of the government (53%) scored in most instances. The political character or communication elements do not appear frequently in the governmental definitions (Schmid, 2004: 407), where more emphasis is arguably put on rendering the terrorist acts illegal and making them punishable accordingly; in the academia, more interest is paid to those elements that are more descriptive and often more contested. Departing from Schmids quantitative analysis and adopting another analytical viewpoint, it could be argued based on the quoted definitions and results of quantitative surveys that the academic definitions of terrorism are concerned with several issue areas: namely perpetrators (1), victims (2), objectives / motives of the perpetrators (3) and the means / methods to reach them (4). Some of the definitions listed above are formulated so as to define terrorism with respect to all of the issue areas; some deliberately choose to include only some of them:

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Schmid

Weinberg, Pedahzur, Hirsch-Hoefler

Hoffman

Stern

RAND

Various authors differ in their emphasis and the degree of elaboration on those issue areas. Approaches to these issue areas, and in some cases also the question of their inclusion into the definition, are matters sparking considerable controversy. The brief discussion of these issue areas included below provides an interlude to the discussion of the problems with the definition. Whereas Schmid concedes in his definition with regard to the first issue area that state actors can commit an act of terrorism and Stern and Jenkins affirm that elsewhere States and their leaders can and do unleash terrorist violence against their own civilians (Stern, 1999: 14) and that governments, their armies, their secret police may also be terrorists (Jenkins, 1980a: 3), other definitions leave the issue open. The question of whether there is a "family resemblance" between terrorist acts" commited by state and non-state actors given that not only the perpetrators identity, but also the nature of objectives, methods and to some extent also the direct and indirect victims of violence are different (that is, there are contrasts in all issue areas7) is a thorny one. If acts commited by state actors are indeed included under the label of terrorism, then the state / non-state terrorism division should be considered for the basic division in typologies of terrorism. A frequent concept related to the victims of terrorism (2) in academic definitions is that of targets multiplicity, or double victimization (Crelinsten,

However, it must be noted that this is not the case of state-sponsored terrorism, i.e. a variant of state terrorism in which the targets are not located in the state's own territory.

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quoted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 23), where a distinction is made between the target of violence often chosen indiscriminately or with respect to the symbolic value and the target of terror, demands or attention. In order to denote the direct target of violence, the term noncombatants is sometimes used (e.g. Stern, 1999) in fact not only in the academia, since it currently appears also in the Code used by the U.S. Department of State.8 Such a stance still raises the serious issue of the definition of noncombatant. The term does have a stable place in international humanitarian law, but its employment in times of peace, when there are no combatants or units of the parties of the conflict, however, seems contentious. The U.S. Department of State postscript, which defines this group of persons as civilians another term from the field of international humanitarian law and as unarmed or off-duty military personnel or military units stationed in areas where the armed conflict is absent, does not solve the case either. Another proposed solution to the problem of denominating the direct targets of terrorist violence is to refer to them as innocent, i.e. people who are not part of the causal chain of agency relating to the situation the terrorist fights against (Goppel, 2005). Yet such a solution faces the problems of subjectivity and relativity discussed in the second section. Furthermore, it implicitly involves the notion of (absence of) sin as a reference criterion establishing innocence. Moreover, at least in liberal democracies, people are considered as the ultimate wielders of power in the state, which they transmit in the election process onto their representatives. The number of people who are innocent vis-a-vis governmental policies is thus arguably significantly reduced as citizens of a state are in fact part of the above-mentioned causal relationship. Al-Zawahiri is clear on the issue of this causal relationship: The Western countries were backed by their peoples, who were free in their decision. It is true that they may be largely influenced by the media decision and distortion, but in the end they cast their votes in the elections to choose the governments that they want, pay taxes to fund their policy, and hold them accountable about how this money was spent (quoted in Devji, 2005: 99-100). Illustrative are also Bin Ladens political speeches addressed to the Western peoples, who are invited to

United States Code, Section 2656f(d), Title 22: [Terrorism is] premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

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seek to elect governments that are truly representative of them and that can protect their interests (quoted in Devji, 2005: 144). In electing George W. Bush in 2000, the American people allegedly fell pray to manipulation, but just before the 2004 election they are reminded: Your security is not in the hands of Kerry or Bush or al-Qaeda. Your security is in your own hands and each state which does not harm our security will remain safe (Ibid.). The problem of objectives (3) has been discussed to some extent above in relation to the ambivalences of terrorism. Here, let it just be noted that despite the fact that the terrorists often have tactical success and gain the desired attention to convey their message, according to Jenkins, [their] struggle has brought them no success measured against their own stated goals. In that sense, terrorism has failed, but the phenomenon of terrorism continues (2006: 129). A second remark relates to the political character of terrorism, frequent in the academic definitions. The reference to the political realm appears in most of the definitions cited above, including both the aggregate definitions and those of Hoffman and RAND. 9 In Schmids quantitative analyses, it scores among the most frequent definitional elements. It is not, however, clear what the authors consider as the essence and boundaries of the political. The most elucidating in this respect seems to be Hoffmans definition, reading that terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change, but even here the viewpoints on what constitutes a political change whether emergence of a new political order, rotation of those in power (change of regime or elites) or mere enactment of new or modified policies in various issue areas may differ. What perhaps could constitute a common denominator of these various meanings, without the deep investigation into the essence of the political, is the underlying Utopian motivation Utopian in Mannheims sense of the word, that is, related to a mode of thought (an instrument of a collective action), which mediates a modern mans experience of ideas in such a narrowing way that only the elements of ideas to be negated are perceived the Utopian striving to destroy the existing, status quo reality (Mannheim, 1991). It could be argued, however, that this applies to non-state terrorism only; the terror unleashed by the totalitarian dictatorships was indeed declared to bring about a new political order, but in reality, it arguably served Ideological purposes
9

It should be pointed out, however, that Schmid lists the political cause as juxtaposed to idiosyncratic and criminal causes.

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instead, i.e. the preservation and consolidation of the regime often, terror and propaganda appear as two sides of the same coin (cf. Arendt, 1996), and the latter makes the impact of the former much more resonant (NKVD document, quoted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 24). This function is similar to the role of the media as carriers of non-state terrorist organizations messages to the target audience. Problems inherent to issue areas (1), (2) an (3) led some authors to emphasize the role of the remaining issue area the means or methods. Being the spiritus agens behind the RAND definition, Jenkins (also in his own writings) promotes defining terrorism by nature of the act, not by identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause (1980a: 2). Similarly, Pillar sees terrorism as a problem of what people (or groups, or states) do, rather than who they are or what they are trying to achieve (2006: 28). Even Laqueur, who is otherwise sceptical about the definitions of terrorism, does not seem to resist the temptation to declare what terrorism is, and when he does so, he terms it a contemporary manifestation of conflict (2004: 58). It is not a definition in a proper sense. Nonetheless, it points to an interesting avenue of inquiry about the nature of terrorism in the academic discourse terrorism as a specific mode of violent struggle. Schmid notes that terrorism as a method of combat/action was introduced into the discourse already in the 1930s. In the contemporary debate, it is, for instance, Ariel Merari who compares terrorism to the conventional war and guerilla warfare, employing variables such as unit size in battle, targets, intended impact, control of territory, international / domestic legality, etc. (cf. Schmid, 2004: 383-384). The line between the conventional war and terrorist violence is often perceived as rather unproblematic in the academic discourse; what allegedly distinguishes the two is the existence of ius in bello in conventional wars, limiting the scope of warfare and the non-recognition of the terrorist as a party to the conflict under international norms, on one hand10 and the asymmetrical character of terrorist violence on the other (in terms of power and technology, organization, and will). Consequently, the opposition of terrorism and the conventional (limited)

10

Michael Howard, Professor of War at Oxford, pointed to the problem related to the label war against terrorism in this context, since it provides an implicit legitimization for the terrorists: To declare war on terrorists or, even more illiteraly, on terrorism, is at once to accord terrorists a status and dignity that they seek and that they do not deserve (2002, quoted in Schmid, 2004a: 376nn).

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war is a recurring phenomenon. Terrorists want total war to be unfettered by laws, norms, regulations and conventions. In the terrorist conception of warfare there is no room for the Red Cross (Laqueur, 2004: 60). Der Derian ascribes the new imbalance of terror that has emerged in the 1990s also to the capacity to destroy other without the formalities of war (2005: 26). The refusal of terrorists to recognize limited warfare as a characteristic feature of terrorism is also pointed at by Jenkins (1980a: 2). Terrorism does not accept laws and rules, whereas governments are bound by them; this, in briefest outline, is asymmetric warfare, and the states are likely to continue to restrain themselves at least until the point where their survival is at stake (Laqueur, 2004: 59). Nonetheless, the distinction does not seem that clear, at least in the more precise legal discourse, e.g., as there exist numerous examples of parties to conventional conflicts turning to what could be, under the present international law, classified as terrorist acts or war crimes the Allies bombing of Dresden (1945) intended to break Germans to capitulate looms as one of those dire instances in Europes history. Perhaps even more serious is the blurring of the line between the conventional war and a phenomenon which, from the non-legal academic discourses perspective, is related to terrorism in manifold ways: guerilla warfare. A guerrilla fighter shares with the terrorist not only the employment of asymmetrical tactics 11 and the lack of legal recognition, but also an intense political character which distinguishes a partisan, as Carl Schmitt maintained, from a pirate, for instance (Schmitt, 2004: 18). Moreover, it can be argued that both the partisan and the terrorist meet the same criterion of irregularity, but they also attest to Schmitts observation of a qualitative difference in enmity patterns the friend-enemy distinction, when the latter is not a private (inimicus) but rather a public enemy (hostis), forms the core of Schmitts concept of the political (1996: 26) in the modern total war. Enmity in this conflict which is no more, to use Lenins words, an (a play) is absolute. It involves a complete personal engagement, a total immersion. In enmity, [the partisan] finds the meaning of his cause and of his right, after having abandoned the edifice of protection and obedience within which he previously lived, after the
11

Such asymmetry is at the core of William Lind et al.s earlier concept of the so-called fourth generation of warfare (4GW), in which the distinction between war and peace becomes blurred, hostilities are dispersed and there is no delimited battlefield (Lind et al., 1989).

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laceration of the normative texture of legality from which he could expect legal protection. Then, every conventional play ends (Schmitt, 2004: 75). It is debatable whether it is a characteristic feature of the partisan not to adhere to certain norms of warfare e.g. limiting the activities on the military targets, as has been the case of the Chechen resistance movement, discussed in another part of this volume, where at least part of the rebels bound themselves by those norms and denounced transgressions, some of which could be qualifiable as terrrorist acts. Yet it is suggested that even if the relevance of Schmitts absolute enmity concept for the understanding of guerillas is limited, this does not have to be the case for most of the terrorisms in the fourth definitional issue area left out would be, e.g., criminal terrorism, a modern pirate case. If the concept is to be explored to the most, however, a clear line should be drawn between terrorism and guerilla warfare. The telluric and defensive character of the former can be pointed out, together with the predominant military nature of the selected targets. Yet separating terrorism and guerilla warfare is not a tidy subject some guerilla movements employ terrorist tactics (e.g. in targeting the noncombatant population); on the other hand, the terrorist organization may not have the control over a territory, as is the case of terror networks, yet it can still attack armed forces in order to create an image of one military force challenging another (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 16). To make the case even more complex, recently a concept of the crime-terror nexus has appeared on stage to face the reality of many organizations welter of terrorist activities, guerilla warfare and organized crime (cf. Cornell, 2005). By employing the double victimization concept, the terrorist collective organization still under the conception of terrorism as a mode of combat, where there is no space for the action of isolated individuals arguably enters the realm of unlimited, indiscriminate warfare. The last qualification creates a dependence of this concept on a certain (collective) identity of the perpetrators the first issue area and thus prevents its generalization. Yet for the contextual understanding of terrorism, if the listed restrictions are admitted, this concept seems to bear a certain theoretical relevance nonetheless.

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2.4 CONCLUSION: AVENUES OF FUTURE THEORETIZATION

This chapter aimed at providing the main characteristics of existing academic definitions of "terrorism" by means of both their elements, which were analysed by Schmid and Jongman, and issue areas perpetrators, victims, objectives, and methods. Major existing explanations for the absence of a consensual, universal definition were listed including the contested nature of the phenomenon, the stigmatizing, delegitimizing and criminalizing character of the label terrorism, or the plurality of terrorisms, etc. The lack of consensus concerns not only the content of the definition of terrorism, but it translates even into the question whether there is indeed a need for one. We have argued that there exist relevant theoretical and practical reasons to strive, if not for a monolithic definition, then at least for expanding the contextual understanding of terrorism. There are sound reasons to be sceptical about the likelihood of an emergence of a universal, stable, positive and monolithic definition of what terrorism is. But it is not necessarily so because all reification is forgetting, as maintained by Adorno and Horkheimer (1973: 267). There are numerous internal tensions inherent to the term, and the intense political character does not contribute to uncovering terrorisms essence either; in the research field, there do exist canonical authors the quality of this chapter would certainly be questioned even more than it might be now if Schmid, Hoffman or Laqueur were not cited but despite their prominence, their texts do not seem to provide the discipline with a paradigmatical anchor. There, however, do exist avenues of future inquiries that could lead to expansion of the contextual understanding of terrorism, also by means of clarification of crucial unresolved issues. It has been suggested that the main theoretical chasm in conceiving terrorism lies between its concept as either a material (terrorism as a mode of combat) or non-material phenomenon (terrorism as ideology). In the first case, a distinction may be drawn between tactics (a limited use of violence for attaining an immediate objective) and strategy (a more time-extensive campaign for either immediate or more abstract objectives); terrorism as a tactic could also be embraced by, e.g., guerillas and thus form a part of their strategy, unless it is beyond the control of the guerillas' leaders or the movement is fragmented. In the second case, terrorisms as totalitarian and non-totalitarian ideologies can be

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distinguished, the latter comprising a set of ideas legitimizing terrorist violence for attainment of the actors objectives (e.g. in the case of national liberation movements), whereas the former involves a total immersion, non-recognition and dehumanization of the other. The stated Utopian objectives in this case are so vague that the terrorist violence loses its instrumental character. Arguably, terrorism conceived as a totalitarian ideology escapes the double victimization element that seems to play a rather crucial part in all other varieties of terrorism, and since this form of terrorism still remains rather in the realm of theoretical constructs or ideal types, the double victimization element is considered a valuable core for future conceptualization attempts. So is the related metaphor of terrorist violence as a spectacle, or theater a performance production which, in the case of success, can destroy the existing status quo and substitute it with a constructed but intersubjectively accepted image, distorted from the real (e.g. in evaluation of the terrorists real capabilities). Such performance production thus serves as a vehicle of the Utopian; modern mass and democratic media play a crucial role in the process The issue of the political character of terrorism should be addressed. First, it should be clarified what the political in the context of terrorism is; then it should be decided whether the political intent should be considered a characteristic feature of terrorist violence. Such an inquiry relates to the criminal or psychopathological terrorisms, but, from a certain perspective, it also relates to Islamist terrorism for instance, Devji suggests in this context that a modern jihadi organization like al-Qaeda operates in the global landscape with no organizing principle of intentionality and instrumentality, which is characteristic to the political realm, and the violence is a purely accidental product of their mode of existence (Devji, 2005: 11); closely related is the question whether the terrorists behavior is rational or irrational and whether general inferences can be made about the issue at all. Finally, a critical reading of the securitization narratives related to terrorism seems requisite. It should serve to demask the hidden hegemonies and motives for securitization steps by actors shaping peoples perception about the threat from the other if, for instance, these are not intended to discipline the domestic realm - and to uncover the genealogies behind the abomination of terrorism in the historical perspective that is, to answer the question of where lie the roots of terrorisms stigmatization.

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The last remark relates to the influence of other discourse areas on the debate about the academic definitions. The influence of the political discourse may be seen as negative in the sense that the conflicting political ideologies perpetuate the contested character of terrorism; on the other hand, the risk of abuse of the term terrorism in this realm creates a powerful incentive to proceed in clarification attempts. The influence of the legal discourse could have a significant positive influence, as the recent progressive dynamics towards the legal definition of terrorism (cf. Chapters 5 and 6 in this study) could translate into the academic yet been the case. discourse of terrorist studies. Despite the promising development towards a universal legal definition since the 1990s, this has not

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3. TERRORISM, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME

Before discussing the link and the dissimilarities between terrorism, political violence and (organized) crime, one should first address the following question: is terrorism itself a form of crime? In general, "crime" is seen as a synonym to breaking the law, which also applies to terrorism. To most of us, terrorism involves inflicting involuntary and illegal mental and physical harm. Defining terrorism thus as a form of crime probably seems obvious to the point of banality, but some extra notions should be added to this statement to appreciate the complexity surrounding it. To comprehend this complexity, a first step is to look at what crime is. It is impossible to give a universal description or definition of what crime is. In the normal context, the influences on what people or society consider to be a crime are large in number, varying from media influence and religious beliefs to the factor of time. Thus, in contemporary criminological literature, the conceptualization of an act as a crime is seen as dependant on the context of the act, the outcome of it and the individual or group defining it. This defining is mostly done by codifying certain behaviour or acts, and of course their outcomes, into laws. In short, criminologists argue that crime is socially constructed. To clarify the subjective scope of the construct of crime, an example will be used: rape in marriage. Raping one's wife was not acknowledged as a criminal act for a long time. Even in contemporary times, it does not constitute a crime in some countries, and in many, it is (still) not punishable. Other examples include adultery and homosexuality, which are still harshly prosecuted in some countries and can even result in the death penalty. In other countries, homosexuality and adultery are seen as normal and have not been criminalized at all. Thus, there are basically two different vantage points of conceptualizing crime. The first is that every forbidden act or result of an act can be categorized as a crime (black letter law) (Muncie and McLaughlin, 2002). The definitions of this (narrow) concept of crime vary widely. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, for example, states the following definition: intentional commission of an act usually deemed socially harmful and / or dangerous and specifically defined, prohibited and punishable under the criminal law. This is an even narrower concept of crime; it includes only acts which are codified as wrong in criminal law (written

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laws) and not in common law (civil law), like, for example, the law related to treaties or private law. The second way of conceptualizing crime takes a broader approach and involves looking at socially (un)acceptable conduct (Muncie and McLaughlin, 2002). This includes acts codified in laws and, on the other end of the scope, also forbidden acts that are hardly ever punished anymore because of the influence of public opinion. In most countries, there is a good example of a codified crime which is accepted as non-criminal by such a large part of society that it generally is not punished as severely as was the case previously, such as public drunkenness, for example. This second approach to crime leaves even more room for debate than the first, and it is deemed unsuitable by most criminologists for studying and examining crime in an effective way. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that this approach is a more valid way of reconstructing what crime is because it takes in all aspects of construction, as opposed to the narrow approach.

The above-mentioned complexity also applies to terrorism, and the question posed remains: is terrorism a form of crime? When it comes to terrorist acts, Schmid (2004b) argues that a narrow definition of terrorism that focuses on the mala per se crimes is desirable, since there is widespread international consensus on this type of crime. Terrorism can be seen as a broad concept including a variety of acts ranging from the recruitment of followers to core acts such as carrying out bombings. In this chapter, the view suggested by Schmid focusing on the mala per se crimes is employed because it aims at providing a sensible take on terrorism for the European Commission as an international institution, which relates to the fact that most other international institutions focus on the crimes associated with terrorism. Indeed, the UN definition focuses on the crime character of terrorism, as can be seen in article 2 of the UN Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism:
any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or

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(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems [], resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.

A second reason for opting for a narrow approach is the fact that the scope of this research is aimed at terrorism and the rule of law in Europe. This, in effect, means that deconstructing terrorism according to the legal concepts of the European Union is more suitable. Thus, in this chapter, terrorism is considered criminal because of the rule of law within the European Union and the codification of certain acts and organizations as terrorism as analysed thoroughly in chapters 5 and 6. This, though, does not entail that in this chapter, terrorism is only viewed within its legal frames. Arguably this would mean that this research does not take in different cultural opinions; as the clich goes: one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter. The research will take note of this differentiation, but it aims at looking at terrorism within its EU framework.

Taking the above into account, it is established that terrorism can be considered criminal. Now the focus can shift to the analysis of in what sense terrorism relates to political violence and organized crime. As mentioned above, terrorism is considered to be closely related to, or comparable to, these types of crime or even subcategories of them (Makarenko, 2003; Deflem, 2004; Crenshaw, 1998). In the praxis of criminological research, crimes are usually categorized into different groups, or types of crimes. This is done in order for us to be able to analyse crimes more precisely because there are so many different types of crime to be distinguished. Differentiation can be found by looking at criminal law, where lawmakers distinguish crimes. Another type of differentiation can be made on the basis of the nature of the crime (Ruller et al., 2001). The variables for the types of crime categorization include, amongst others, the perpetrator specifics, the motives, the crime scene, the damage caused and the victims specifics.

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3.2 ORGANIZED CRIME

In this part, we will look at the overlap and subsequently the differences between terrorism and organized crime. First, we will shortly describe and address the concept of organized crime. The second part of the chapter will deal with the isolation process by comparing the two forms of crime.

3.2.1 The concept

We have already argued for favouring the legal approach to a broader way of looking at crime. Therefore, it makes sense to start with looking at the legal dimensions of organized crime - specifically the EU definition. After this, the focus will shift to the nature of organized crime. The EU associates eleven characteristics - some are necessary and others optional - with the construct of organized crime. The definition is used in all EU documents on organized crime, like annual reports, in the parliament and in policy (Europol and the European Commission, 2001). This definition requires the presence of six characteristics, of which the first four are mandatory:
1. 2. 3. Collaboration among more than two people; extending over a prolonged or indefinite period; suspected of committing serious criminal offences, punishable by imprisonment for at least four years or a more serious penalty; and 4. the central goal of profit and/or power.

The remaining criteria, of which two must be present as well, are:

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

specialized division of labor among participants; exercising measurements of discipline and control; employing violence or other means of intimidation; employing commercial or business-like structures; participating in money laundering; operational across national borders; exerting influence over legitimate social institutions (public figures, political parties, companies).

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Applying these mandatory and optional criteria to the reality, organized crime can be anything from well-organized Italian mafia groups to three petty thieves working together while using a window-cleaning company as a cover. In the latter, one of the thieves functions as a look-out, another one goes in to steal the goods and a third is charged with the money-laundering of the profits gained by selling the goods. They also sue everyone who suggests that their business has a bad reputation and that they are stealing from their clients, which completes the required amount of criteria for them to be categorized as organized crime. The criteria used by the EU are grounded in criminological literature as well. However, some distinctions can be discerned, like the EUs choice to make violence an optional criterion for organized crime. Many scholars, like, for example, Maltz (1976) and Ruggiero (1996), argue that violence is a necessary part of the construct of organized crime. The next part of this paragraph will elaborate these specifics of organized crime.

The scholarly effort to define and conceptualize organized crime dates back to the 1920s and 1930s. In the beginning, most commentators viewed organized crime as a static, hierarchically structured way of committing mobster type crimes. Media and political coverage of the subject confirmed this view, and organized crime was almost synonymous with the workings of gangsters and their entourage, like Al Capones racketeering organization. This simplistic take on organized crime gradually became more sophisticated. This does not necessarily mean that there is a consensus among scholars; many arguments on what variables constitute organized crime are issues even today. A good example of this is the aforementioned discussion on violence - whether it is a necessary part of the organized crime construct - and the in- or exclusion of, for example, corporate crime in or from the category of organized crime (Levi, 2002). Some scholars argue that both are the same (Ruggiero, 1996), while others conclude that there are considerable differences (Nelken, 2002). Moving away from the old view of a mafia type of crime, the academics now describe a less folkloristic form of organized crime. In this regard, criminologists like Woodiwiss (1993) note that there has never been an ethnicity based monopoly of crime syndicates like the ones portrayed in movies like The

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Godfather. In reality, there are, and were, thousands of small networks of people which never exist long and have a decentralized structure rather than a hierarchical one. The bases and influences on the formation of these networks are manifold:

Ethnicity based networks Kinship or social ties based networks Type of criminal activity Law enforcement activities and the perceived risks of being caught Socio-economic circumstances Personality of the leader.

The most important of these factors in creating a network seem to be the social ties or kinship between the persons involved in the network and the type of activity employed (Muncie and McLaughlin, 2002). Organized crime generally infests itself in adaptive institutional structures rather than monolithic ones. The adaptability and fluidity of the network enables a quick, profitable and risk avoiding way of operation. A good example of this is the Colombian trade in cocaine. Most shipments (runs) are organized on a short term basis and with different actors in order to be flexible and stay out of the reach of any competition and law enforcement agencies (Williams, 2001; Zaitch, 2002). The changing networks of cooperation are also caused by the fact that the crimes are led by demand and so is the organization of the crime. Less demand means less of a purpose for a large group of people to stick together, which is a costly affair if there arent any turnovers and profits to be made (Hobbs, 1995). Of course there are more hierarchically organized crime groups as well, like the Japanese Yakuza, but even they tend to operate in not too tightly knit networks. As mentioned before, a signature feature of organized crime is to operate in an inconspicuous way, in order to avoid law enforcement agencies or even competition that would intervene in their business (Fijnaut et al., 1998). There are generally three forms of organized crime networks:

1. Large networks based on a more or less hierarchical structure (monolithic) of command.

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2. Fluid, horizontally organized networks with hardly any form of centralized command. 3. A form of organization which falls between the monolithic structure and the fluid network type.

By working together, people are capable of impressive achievements. Organized crime shows features of industrial types of institutions; their activities are led mostly by demand and opportunities creating easy access to money and/or power. The reality of most forms of illegal business is that they fill the gap left by legal agencies. The activities become organized crime at the start of the recruitment and division of labor skilled and unskilled workers in order to satisfy demand. In short, a large part of organized crime can be regarded as the illegal opposite of legal business (Ruggiero, 1996). However, for serious crime groups, the use and threat of violence replace the strategies and tactics of normal business in order to maintain or obtain a profitable position in the chosen market (Hobbs, 1995). Important to note at this point is that organized crime next to meeting certain needs causes damage, i.e. the crime aspect. The disposal of toxic waste into the ocean, for example, provides a valuable service to chemical industries but also causes long term environmental and health problems (Fijnaut et al., 1998). At the extreme end of the scope of functionality are also forms of crime that are totally dysfunctional and meet no specific needs apart from enriching, like subsidy fraud or forced payment for protection. From the old views on organized crime, one feature still holds today, namely the fact that organized crime is a phenomenon intertwined with not only criminal worlds, but all levels of society (Hobbs, 1997). A good example of this is money laundering - giving illegal profits a legal stature for example, by means of starting a legitimate business. Another one is the fact that organized crime networks influence legitimate institutes and figures for their purposes, e.g. the buyoff of public figures, like customs or police functionaries.

Organized crime, as well as legal business and other forms of crime, is not confined within national boundaries. On the contrary, organized crime especially thrives on the national differences and thus opportunities of cross border activities; these differences are called criminogenic asymmetries (Passas, 2001). Trends like ongoing globalization have played a major role in ever widening and

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internationalizing crime networks and cross border activities, from smuggling goods and trafficking human beings to laundering money in states with less social and formal control (Pansa, 2001). Globalization is thus a facilitator making lucrative markets accessible and distances bridgeable and an instigator making markets grow and enlarging differences between countries of organized crime. Regarding the perpetrators and victims of organized crime, there is no clear description. Because organized crime is such a broad form of crime, it contains many types of perpetrators and victims. The only guideline to be given in this respect is a guideline that is true for most types of crime - that perpetrators are mostly young males and in some cases young females (LaFree, 2005). The targeted and untargeted victims of organized crime cannot be categorized, except for the fact that in most crimes, the victims are young males as well. For this chapter, though, the assumption will be that the perpetrators come from all walks of live and that the targeting of victims is indiscriminate. Another important note concerning the victimization done by organized crime is that not only persons but objects can be harmed as well; be they specifically targeted or as collateral damage.

In conclusion, the academic literature on organized crime reveals that the features described in the EU definition of organized crime fit the known reality. For the further purpose of this chapter, the notion that organized crime is a broad construct, especially in the EU definition, entailing many forms of activities in a network setting is important. The most important variables on which to determine the similarities and differences between organized crime and terrorism in the next section are:

Network structure: hierarchical, fluid, horizontal, etc. Illegal and legal worlds mixing Division of labor Basis of the networks Border crossing and globalization influence Threat and/or use of violence Business-type structure Perpetrator and victim specifics

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Criminogenic factors

3.2.2 The Nexus

In this section, we will look at the similarities the overlap and the differences between organized crime and terrorism. We will start with the European Unions definition(s) of terrorism we opted to take the legal approach as the leading viewpoint in order to provide the same basis as in the paragraph on organized crime. A terrorist offence, according to the EUs Framework decision, is an offence which may seriously damage a country or an international organization. These offences must be committed with the aim of intimidating people and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country (murder, bodily injuries, hostage taking, extortion, fabrication of weapons, committing attacks, threatening to commit any of the above, etc.). Such offences may be committed by one or more individuals against one or more countries. The Framework Decision defines a terrorist group as a structured organization consisting of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert. Moreover, instigating, aiding, abetting and attempting to commit terrorist offences will also be punishable (Council of the European Union, 2002).

In general, terrorism seems to have the most similarities to crimes that have ongoing social structures connected to them like organized crime but also gangcrime and political violence. Why? Because terrorism, like these forms of crime, is characteristically organized, and terrorist groups have an organized and structured way of operating (Schmid, 2004b). 12 Such crimes also resemble terrorism in terms of representing a sustained program of violence (LaFree, 2005; Deflem, 2004). One might argue that not all organized crime and terrorist groups operate with the same levels of violence. There are groups, like the so-called eco-terrorists and animal rights groups, that rarely aim violence at persons (Schmid, 1996). On the other hand, one can argue that these groups do not impact the societal beliefs enough to be labeled as terrorists.
12

We are referring to terrorist groups activities, omitting the lone wolf terrorism in the same way as we talk about organized crime and not crime in general.

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Although both organized crime and terrorist groups use violence, there is a difference as well, as Shelly and Picarelli (2002) note. Terrorist organizations emphasize the symbolism of the use of violence, while organized crime groups have a functional goal to achieve, like, for example, intimidation or removal of opposition. Secondly, there are similarities in the network structures in which terrorists, like organized crime groups, operate. Terrorist organizations display a wide variety of organization types, ranging from fluid one-time-use networks to hierarchically and strongly organized groups to a combination of these two opposites (Makarenko, 2003; Stern, 2003). Examples of these organizational structures include terrorist groups like Hezbollah, which is a mostly wellorganized group with different levels of command and also groups like Al-Qaeda, which seem to be organized to a certain extent but mostly function within a fluid and flat organizational structure with a cell-based structure, which provides flexibility and shelters the organization from law enforcement. Thus, terrorist organizations have a lot of variances in their organizational structures. On the one hand, we have traditional hierarchical organizations, and on the other hand, we have modern organization structures. These modern organization structures consist of network organizations and combinations of the two structures mentioned above. The traditional hierarchical organizations rely on a centralized command structure while the modern organizations are mostly based on a decentralized command structure (Muller et al., 2003; Dobbelaar and Haarman, 2005). Terrorist organizations are also mostly categorized by a division of labor. Schmid (1996) has found that, generalizing, most terrorist organizations are based on a three-layered structure:

1. The organizers: the policy and strategy level 2. The planners: the planning, goal determining level 3. The executers: the functional perpetrator level

The people behind the attacks, levels 1 and 2, mostly stay out of the view of the media and law-enforcement agencies, although a shift in this tactic can be seen with groups like Al-Qaeda. They are mostly well-trained and educated people,

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able to run complex organizations; this is more often than not the case for the persons operating at the executers level. The bases on which terrorist networks are constructed are comparable to those of organized crime. This can be deducted from the fact that terrorists also have to deal with trust issues and potential threats to their organization (Schmid, 1996; Stern, 2003; Makarenko, 2003). Schmid (1996) stresses the fact that both groups are in need of some form of internal cohesion, which can be achieved by employing members of the organization that have, for example, family ties between them or are friends. At the basic level, there always seems to be some sort of lifestyle or visionary tie between the members, ranging from nationality to religion or any other shared belief. Thirdly, like organized crime groups, the examples of the above-mentioned Islamist terrorist groups and also groups like ETA and the IRA exhibit strong ties to the legal worlds as well as to the illegal spectrum. Just like with organized crime groups - and maybe even moreso with terrorist groups -, there is no clear distinction between the activities which are confined to the illegal world and those which are confined to the legal world. Indeed, Nam argues that terrorists are a small part of the global networks of legal as well as illegal trade with special motivation (2008: 242). The IRA and Hezbollah, for example, have a politically active part as well, next to their more dangerous terrorist branch. Hezbollah has been an organization that provided if one supported them a great deal of protection and even funds when necessary. This organization is highly intertwined with all spheres of normal (legal) life, but also with terrorist activities. Other similarities between crime and terrorism can be detected as well. For example, the types of perpetrators are alike. According to LaFree (2005), terrorism, just like common crime, is generally committed by young males, usually in their twenties. As is the case with common crime, young women can also be perpetrators (e.g. the suicide bombers in Iraq, Sri Lanka and the Palestine Territories or within the Red Army Fraction in Germany), but in general, they amount to only 5 to 10 % of the total of all terrorists (LaFree, 2005). However, when women commit terrorist acts, they are in the news, probably because they are still an exception. This does not automatically mean that their share in terrorist acts is indeed rising.

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A fifth similarity is that scholars (Crenshaw, 1998; Lafree, 2005) suggest that terrorism, just like sustained organized crime, undermines social trust. Crenshaw (1998) argues that terrorism upsets the social structure upon which the members of a society depend. Terrorism undermines predictability in social relations. Because no one can be sure of what they should expect from others, the levels of trust are reduced and individuals turn inward, focused more on their own survival. Thus, like societies with high levels of crime, societies undergoing constant terrorist activity are likely to have lower levels of social solidarity, reduced cooperation and interdependence and declining levels of trust (LaFree, 2005). In fact, one can argue that upsetting conditions of trust in a society is often a major goal of terrorists. The motivation and basis for the existence of terrorism will be discussed in the next chapter.

There are some differences to be recognized between terrorism and organized crime as well. Firstly, while common criminals usually try to avoid detection, terrorists often seek attention and exposure. Hoffman (1998) argues that terrorists want maximum publicity for their actions. According to him, the modern news media plays a vital part in the terrorists calculus (more in WP 4 on media-effects). Terrorists are looking for exposure and have, in regard to their actions, a symbiotic relationship with the media and governmental impact, which is not the case for organized crime. A second difference is found in the goal of the crime or terrorist act. The overriding objective of terrorism and its ultimate justification is the furtherance of an ideological cause; this will be discussed in length in chapter 3. By contrast, organized crime actors do not have larger ideological purposes, and in general, they are in it for the money (LaFree, 2005). The same act, for example, an assassination, may be considered a terrorist act by some but not by others. Usually the difference is based upon the assumed motivation(s) of the perpetrator(s) or the social standing of their victims (Weinberg et al., 2004). However, as Jessica Stern (2003) suggests, after talking to different supposed terrorists, some terrorists are also in it for the kick or because terrorist acts are part of their way of life. Stern (2003) argues that the reasons for joining terrorist groups are not that different from the reasons for children joining criminal youth gangs: excitement, not wanting to lack behind, following friends and for identity reasons. Brigitte Nacos (2002) in part confirms this idea but emphasizes that

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many terrorists do not fit carefully constructed profiles and commonly held stereotypes. Nor do they limit themselves to the traditional means of communication. Nacos focuses on the role the Internet plays in the forming of objectives and goals. She introduces the word "E-terrorism" and describes the Web of hate. Organized crime groups also make use of the Internet (examples are cyber crime and internet porn) but in secret and within small web communities (Speer, 2000). Terrorists use the Internet as a way to publicize their ideas (preach) and to reach as many people as possible. In addition to the above, there is a difference in the way terrorists picture themselves. Although common criminals vary widely in terms of how they perceive their activities, few criminals see themselves as acting altruistically. By contrast, many terrorists see themselves as altruists. Hoffman (1998) claims that terrorists frequently believe that they are serving a cause that will achieve a greater good for a wider populace.

The last comparison to be made is between the comparability of the influence of growing globalization and mobilization on terrorists and that on organized crime groups. As has been argued in many researches, globalization and the fast impact of new cultures like the western one on the Middle Eastern societies is a feeding ground for terrorist motivations (Deflem, 2004; Hoffman, 1998; Maltz, 1976; Stern, 2003). On the other hand, it creates opportunity, like global media and easy access to goods, and gives rise to ever increasing mobilization (of people, goods and ideas; Lutz and Lutz, 2004; Nassar, 2004). Globalization thus functions as a facilitator and a motivator for terrorism, just like for organized crime. On a more positive note, one could argue that the effects of globalization also have a positive effect on counterterrorism. Nowadays, there are many transnational counterterrorism efforts.

3.2.3 The Nexus in practice

In this part, we will look at the existing links between organized crime and terrorism. The link between terrorism and organized crime, for most academics, seems to be the most profound when they look at the means and ways in which both categories of crimes gather their funds (Makarenko, 2003). By using the

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term of "narco-terrorism" (terrorism funded with drug money), academics attempted to explain why two intrinsically different groups (one motivated by politics and the other by profit) would find it beneficial to co-operate (Makarenko, 2003; Deflem, 2004; Van der Veen, 2005; Weinberg et al., 2004). But there was not that much attention paid to the dynamics and the depth of relations between organized crime and terrorism. This can be explained by the fact that most terrorist groups were not concerned about operational funding as they received state sponsorship. Narco-terrorism was seen as an exception to the rule that organized crime and terrorism were separate phenomena and thus require separate responses. But the post-September 11 environment illustrated an unprecedented interest in ties between the criminal and the terrorist worlds. Scholars are divided on the link (nexus) between terrorism and organized crime. Some argue that the only link between crime and terrorism is the socalled narco-terrorism. Others insist that this narco-terrorism encompasses merely a fraction of the relationship between organized crime and terrorism, or question whether it even exists at all (Naylor, 2002). This controversy could develop because of the lack of in depth research. Since there are not many studies on the subject of the dynamics and relations between organized crime and terrorism, the debate will probably not be settled in the near future. The other problem is that much of the empirical evidence that is presented is anecdotal and based on hearsay.

It is often suggested that state sponsorship of terrorist groups declined in the postCold War era, forcing terrorist groups to find their own sources of revenue (Makarenko, 2003; Gunaratna, 2002). For example, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia) and Perus Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) have shifted most of their postwar attention from their anti-government campaigns to criminal activities, such as producing and trafficking drugs and kidnapping for ransom (Clutterbuck, 1995). Also, in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Chechnya, the drugs-trafficking routes increased in volume after the Cold War. For example, the Chechen terrorist forces have gained power in the narcotics trade over the more conventional crime organizations (Curtis, 2002). And according to Curtis (2002), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is known to rely heavily on narcotics trafficking over a number of Central Asian routes to support its military and

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political activities. But still, as he and Makarenko point out, the current role of regional terrorist organizations in Central Asia is a matter of speculation. Because of the police inadequacy in these countries, it is difficult to get valid data on the extent of the crimes committed. So a whole picture of the current events is difficult to obtain. It is also suggested that Western Europe is a region where terrorist groups are often linked to organized crime groups (Karacan and Curtis, 2002). For example, according to the USA (U.S. State Departments list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations), the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) is a terrorist organization which allegedly has a substantial network that has engaged in terrorist and criminal activities, such as narcotics and arms trafficking in Turkey and Western Europe. Even the ETA (the Basque Fatherland and Liberation organization) and the IRA (Irish Republican Army) are supposed to be connected with narcoorganizations in Latin America, particularly the FARC (Karacan and Curits, 2002). The idea of terrorism funded by crime (the crime-terror nexus) is increasingly used but still not well defined (Makarenko, 2003). The criminologist Tamara Makarenko analysed the nexus between organized crime and terrorism. Although this idea of a crime-terror nexus is not new, Makarenko (2003) added some new views on the subject. She introduced the term "crime-terror continuum" (CTC), in which numerous points in the connection between organized crime and terrorism can be isolated and presented. According to her, what the CTC seeks to establish is that the differences commonly identified between organized crime and terrorism are currently deceased. This is because it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between political and criminal motivations. The structure of arms and narcotics transactions is increasingly variable, flexible and multinational, as are the relations between terrorist and transnational crime groups (Karacan and Curits, 2002; Passas, 2003). Glenn Schweitzer (2002: 288) agrees with this idea and summarizes this as follows: Distinctions that had existed (between organized crime and terrorism) are fading fast. He states that a few terrorist and criminal organizations already rely on the same global infrastructures for their illegal goals. They take advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and enforcement in states under siege and seek increasing shares of the fortunes generated from narco-trafficking and other crimes. Whether mercenaries are hired to do the bidding of drug lords or of terrorist kingpins, the hit teams share a single motive in employing violence

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 earning their financial keep. A gap in his thinking is the concept of other crimes because often, in the beginning, this boundary is not easily drawn. Makarenko (2003) divides the crime-terror nexus into three groups, which are not constant over time: (this also aptly summarizes the practical nexus between organized crime and terrorism)

1.

Alliances between criminal groups and terrorist organizations. They

vary in time (short-term, long-term) and in reasons, such as seeking expert knowledge (money laundering, bomb-making) or operational support (access to smuggling routes). Examples of these alliances on the international drug scene include the FARC/Medellin cocaine cartel-combination. Although evidence is hard to assemble, there are numerous allegations. The cooperation seems to focus on smuggling operations that move various commodities such as narcotics, weapons, and human cargo. For example, it is often suggested that militants linked to AlQaeda established connections with Bosnian criminal organizations to establish a trafficking route for Afghan heroin into Europe through the Balkans (Gunaratna, 2002; Van der Veen, 2005).

2.

Criminal groups acquiring in-house terrorist capabilities and vice

versa. Both criminals using terrorism as an operational tool (using terror tactics and bombings which have tactical rather than political goals; they force government leniency and influence law enforcement) and terrorist groups taking part in criminal activities (the illicit drug trade, credit card fraud, human smuggling) are expanding their operations (Gunaratna, 2002; Passas, 2003). It has been suggested, for instance, that groups like Hezbollah realized the financial gain that could be made by participation in the drugs trade (they would protect heroin laboratories in the Bekaa Valley). But it has to be noticed that hard evidence has not yet been produced. Why do they expand their activities? In doing so, criminal and terrorist groups avoid their relationship problems (Makarenko, 2003). A good example is their avoidance of their differences over strategies and mutual distrust.

3.

The convergence of both groups. At the start of the 21st century, a

growing number of groups simultaneously displaced the characteristics of

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terrorism and organized crime, making it harder to establish differences between the two - for instance, terrorists groups who engage mainly in criminal activities and use their political rhetoric as a facade or criminal groups who use terrorist acts in order to obtain economic and political power and get control over certain sectors of a state. For example, there is the role of the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) in central Asia. For the record, it is still striving for an Islamic state in the region, but in practise, its primary goal for its terrorist activities seems to be the securing of its (drug) smuggling routes.

To sum up, the scholars agree that the connection between organized crime and terrorism has changed. There is not enough relevant in-depth research that would allow us to make conclusions about what exactly this change includes. However, there have been attempts to classify possible modes of cooperation and blurring of the formerly clear distinction.

3.3 POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Political violence is a complex concept, and explaining the nature and root causes of this phenomenon is rather complicated, if not impossible. Demarcating terrorism as a specific form of political violence is subsequently also a difficult task. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed, particularly through the apparently unproblematic application of the term by the media, that political violence is a straightforward and easy to understand subject despite the various forms and dimensions its nature encompasses. There is no doubt that almost everyone has a fair understanding of the topic at hand. Still, the origins of violence are never the same, the ways in which violence portrays itself are numerous, and acts of terrorism make up only a small part of political violence. Violence has always been predominant in human history. Throughout centuries, wars have been fought between civil orders, and conflicts arose from within; adversaries were defeated, and new enemies arose. Within these established civil orders, change of authority, internal divergence or a (rightful) sense of inequality often led to civil unrest and disobedience. To a large extent, this is no different in the contemporary world, with the number of conflicts rising considerably over the last two decades (Worcester et al., 2002: 1; Tilly, 2002:

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13-15). Within this context, terrorism, as a political violent means to bring about change in society, is considered an increasing threat to domestic security. Yet, while terrorist acts are unquestionably political and violent in nature, and thus a form of political violence, political violence is not always terrorism. The following paragraphs will deal with the notion of political violence as a threat to the domestic security of a society. As a result, this section will reflect on violence as a means of expression of an individual or a group of individuals impacting society. Wars or other violent conflicts between states will not be discussed throughout this study, as has been established in Workpackage 2 of the TTSRL project. Paragraph 3.1 will briefly discuss the notion of violence from a traditional state perspective. Then throughout paragraph 3.2., the concept of political violence will be elaborated upon, and subsequently terrorism as a specific form of political violence will be dealt with in part 3.3.

3.3.1 Violence and the state

Thomas Hobbes explains in his famous book Leviathan the natural condition of mankind:

Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. (Hobbes, 1985: 183)

Hobbes continues his proclamation by explaining how the nature of men and his equality leads to quarrels - for gain, for safety and for reputation (Ibid.: 185). For this reason, Hobbes claims that there is a demand for a common power that would control and regulate the needs of men, which would guide them to common prosperity, a common power that would support the foundation of fruitful conditions for Industry and consequently Culture of the Earth (Ibid.: 186). Hence, if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men (Ibid.: 223-224).

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Hobbes classical realist thinking on the formation of nation states is an interesting starting point for understanding the relation between violence and civil order. According to Hobbes, it was necessary for the Civitas to recognize and establish a representational body (in the form of an Assembly) that would organize and facilitate the common interests and necessities of its subjects in order for the greater good, civil order, to be achieved and maintained. For such an objective to be realized, the representational body must have the monopoly of violence within or on behalf of society. Violence utilized to objectify the common good civil orderis commonly accepted and therefore perceived as a legitimate form of violence throughout society. The legitimate use of violence is generally defined as force, whilst the illegitimate use of aggression is labeled violence. (Van den Haag, 1972: 54). It is important to keep in mind that through the establishment of such a state structure, the subject under the Civitas becomes able to enjoy greater amounts of liberty. One is not solely responsible for ones caution against all other men, and there is no need to depend on ones own strength to defend oneself. Rather, one can rely on the greater strength of the state. However, by shifting power from oneself to the representational body of the Civitas, one limits ones individual liberties for the greater good of civil order. Freedom to be right, but also the freedom to err, becomes more restricted (Van den Haag, 1972: 81). Democratic states today reflect Hobbes ideas regarding civil order through the states monopoly of violence, i.e. through force. One accepts that the modern state deals in ones best interest and believes that one shall receive the benefits of prosperity and protection against our own errors and the errors of others. Within that context, one complies with those rules that are set forth by the state. As Van den Haag puts it, it is the right of office-holders to order, and the duty of those subject to their authority to comply (Ibid.: 53). Hobbes focuses on the just causes of authority where justice is the foundation of an ideal order. The ideal order is subsequently characterized by a consensual social relationship between citizens and their leaders: the effective exercise of authority by the officials vested with it, and accepted by those subject to it (Ibid.: 74). Authority, however, should not be taken for granted by those in power or by those subjected to it. Authority can be exercised poorly or reluctantly, and (some of) the citizens subjected to it could, therefore, refuse to accept it. Also, state authority could merely be considered or conceived to be

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poorly exercised by (some) societal partakers or by spectators vested outside of the society at hand.

3.3.2 Violence and Legitimacy

In both developed and developing states, violence manifests itself in various ways, particularly in the form of political, economic, and social violence. Violence, subsequently, is a manifestation of political, economic, and social disputes: a persistence of differences in identity; a tool for those opposing [for instance] the rights of women and minorities (Worcester et al., 2002: 1). Violence is a widely discussed topic, and various academics have taken it upon themselves to conceptualize it. The professor of anthropology Neil L. Whitehead, for example, explains that theoretical and research approaches to violence begin with the assumption that, at its core, violence represents the breakdown of meaning, the advent of the irrational, and the commission of physical harm (Whitehead, 2007: 40). Whitehead hereby presents violence as a given form of human interaction, which can be identified by the infliction of physical harm motivated by the inadequacy of an individual or of a social system. Whitehead continues by positioning the question of whether violence can be
ennobling, redeeming, and necessary to the continuance of life itself? In other words the legitimacy of violent acts is partly defined as a result of how the act of violence is constituted in the minds of the observers, victims, and the perpetrators. Matters of legitimacy are not at all separate from the way in which given acts and behaviors are considered violent in the first place. (Ibid.)

Therefore, Whitehead also establishes that violence is generally considered an illegitimate form of the physical use of force by unauthorized actors and the right to legitimately use force is exclusively reserved for the recognized authority. It can be concluded that violence is commonly accepted as the illegitimate use, or threatened use of coercion resulting, or intended to result in, the death, injury, restraint or intimidation of person(s) or the destruction or seizure of property. (Wilkinson, 1986: 23) Subsequently, when discussing the concept of violence, particularly in the light of todays democratic states, a distinction is made between force, or the use of force as an executive instrument solely at

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the disposal of the acknowledged order, a state or a collective society, and violence, the illegitimate use of coercive aggression. Herein, however, lies a potential danger:

Those who claim to be in the business of social protection must in turn protect themselves from attacks upon their monopoly of force by invoking the mystique of legality and legitimacy: this then permits them to use force in ways accepted as different in kind from the ways of those who act against the state. (Schlesinger, 1991: 9)

Violence as a form of expression could consequently be deemed necessary for the survival of an individual or a system to which the individual or a group of individuals belongs. The victims and in most cases also the observers would perceive such an act of expression as illegitimate, whereas the perpetrator does not recognize it as such - and thus the notorious expression now stands: one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter. It is important to note that despite their monopoly on the use of violence, i.e. force, governments can also act violently illegitimately. Violence should not therefore be merely limited to acts of non-governmental actors. As Merkl rightfully remarks, we do of course have to relate to illegitimate breaches of the political and social order. Government violence and even unjust violent policies are exempt as long as we accord a legitimate monopoly of violence to the state and its duly authorized functionaries (Merkl, 1986: 20). Even though it is rightfully argued that violence is not merely the physical use of force, but that it also encompasses other forms of violent acts, such as the violence of language, hostility or even threats, throughout this effort, these forms will not be taken into consideration. They are considered peripheral phenomena and dependant on the existence of bodily damage and vicious attacks as a substrate to these more ethereal examples of violence (Ibid.; Buijs, 2001: 9).

3.3.3 Political violence and terrorism

Most societies abide the expression of disagreement with or distrust of state policy. More specifically, the majority of societies tolerate the freedom of

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expression and thus also the expression of thoughts considered to be unconventional by societys standards. For obvious reasons, this expression can be produced both from within and from outside a system. In a political system, there is a general acceptance that not all participants share the common interpretation of a given condition. How political systems deal with these divergences differs to a great extent. Manifestations of divergence can be considered as a threat; however, they do not have to be violent. When, however, diverging participants turn to the use of physical force to coerce intended change, the threat becomes violent. When individuals or groups resort to violence to attain change of a political nature, one speaks of political violence. As Van den Haag established, violence only becomes political when used instrumentally to influence or control the distribution of power and the future actions of people. Individual violent acts are political when they have such social claims; group violence is at all times political to all intents and purposes (Van den Haag, 1972: 60-61).

Various academics have conceptualized the term political violence and arrived at various typologies. Nevertheless, a commonly accepted typology has not yet arisen, and the disagreement regarding typologies continues. The sociologist Buijs focused on defining and elaborating upon three central aspects of political violence that can be used to obtain a typology: the instruments that are used, the aims that the perpetrators aspire to, and the effects that are brought about (Buijs, 2001: 9). Buijs, however, does also recognize the limitations of a typology based on these conceptions. With respect to the instruments, a large grey area exists, for example, between civil disobedience during a demonstration and the bombing of a governmental building (objective), of which the latter is in most cases considered a terrorist act. Furthermore, it is clear that the interpretation of violence is perhaps different for the perpetrator and the victim or government (subjective). Regarding the conceptualization of aims, it is suggested that the motivations are clear and that the identity of the perpetrator and the aim are fully understood. Seeing as violence is not the most straightforward method of communicating and efforts to make narratives explicit are not always successful, classifying violence on the basis of aims is difficult and will not always be as precise as intended. The effects concern the desired outcome of the perpetrator (e.g. the relocation of an oil-producing company from

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a specific area, or the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq). Also, when discussing effects, difficulties arise because effects are difficult to measure, particularly when the intended effects are not direct and involve the response of the victim or government to change, for example, greater political structures (idem). A government may decide not to negotiate with terrorists. However, it could be decided that the demand should be granted only years later, whether as an immediate result of the terrorists demands or not. On a final note, a second, rather apparent, facet of effects needs to be addressed: the physical result of the instrument used (e.g. a destroyed building, a kidnapped journalist). This is an obvious aspect, yet a necessity for a threat to materialize. For a greater understanding of political violence, the following typology is useful. The typology is primarily based on Wilkinsons typology in Terrorism and the Liberal State of 1986, but it is moderately altered to include contemporary realities, particularly with respect to terrorism. The scheme provides an adequate overview of mass and small group political violence according to a scale of intensity (Wilkinson, 1986: 32). Here it must be noted that the scheme does not imply any order of escalation.

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To supplement the scheme and shed more light on the general aims or purposes political violence might serve, the following scheme presented by Wilkinson is useful (Wilkinson, 1986: 33).

As demonstrated in the above schemes, political violence can materialize in various forms. While often, particularly in todays world, different forms of political violence are presumed to be interchangeable with terrorism, they are not. Riots, protests and violent demonstrations can be exercised merely by an angry crowd. However, this is more difficult to say about assassinations, kidnapping and bombing:

Often nationalist in origin, sometimes anti-systemic, used both within national confines and across them. This has often gone under the label of terrorism and has contributed to a sense of instability out of all proportion to its material, as opposed to its symbolic, importance. (Schlesinger, 1991: 5-6)

The reason why the term terrorism has been used in such an inadequate fashion is primarily because it has been so difficult to define and no commonly

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accepted definition has yet come to be despite a great amount of effort by both academic and policy-making spheres, as we have already shown in Chapter 2. Terrorism, however, is indisputably a form of political violence, but a form of political violence is not necessarily terrorism. Like the opening statement of Walter Laqueurs renowned work The New Terrorism states, Terrorism is violence, but not every form of violence is terrorism (1999: 8). It appears we lack consensus on a clear demarcation of what constitutes terrorism conclusively within the multiplicity of other acts of political violence. According to Schmid and Jongman, terrorism can be defined on the basis of the acts it involves. Consequently, according to them, violent acts can be categorized as terrorism if they encompass serious forms of physical violence against adversaries, symbolic objects, or non-related targets, with organized and systematic attempts to create fear and direct a change in the political order (Schmid and Jongman, 1988). This definition, however, raises questions. According to this theory, the guerrilla movement in the 1930s and 1940s in China, Algerian insurgents who fought in the 1950s and 1960s against the occupation of the French, and the rebellions in many Latin American states who favoured a change of government over the last century should also be classified as terrorist organizations. Again, this very much depends on the interpretation and association of observers, victims and perpetrators. Such a discussion leads to confusion and much disagreement; and therefore a conclusive and definite answer cannot easily be provided. However, while the definition might not be allencompassing, it does underline what is central to terrorism, namely organized and systematic attempt to create fear. The primary difference between terrorism and other forms of political violence is that terrorism is a strategy that aims at attaining specific political ends (motivation) through the creation of fear, and not through the mere act of violence. To achieve political influence, terrorism depends on its ability to awaken emotions throughout the target audiences but also through other people who might constitute the neutral, the supportive, and/or the antagonistic. (Crenshaw, 1998: 380) As a result, terrorism largely depends on the psychological effects it is able to generate through its violent acts and the threat of more violent acts that particular violent acts produce. Terrorism is generally a coercive strategy that involves the deliberate creation of a psychological effect terror through the use of violence, or a threat of violence, aimed at attaining political ends.

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To sum up, terrorism is a form of political violence. The border between terrorism and other forms of political violence is controversial. It can be argued, however, that the psychological effect related to terrorism can be used to distinguish it from a general political violence. Broadly, this corresponds with the double victimization identified as a key definitional element in Chapter 2.

3.4 CONCLUSION

There are, on an abstract, but also on a practical level, many similarities between the notions of terrorism, organized crime and political violence. Though they are very different constructs, they also share a number of very distinct features. The aim of this chapter has been to attempt to isolate terrorism from these two comparable, and in some cases similar, constructs. The conclusion to be drawn from the organized crime and terrorism comparison in this regard is that terrorism and organized crime share an almost identical organizational and habitual basis. Both are organized, use the same funding strategies and even work together in practise. The most imperative difference is in the criminogenic and motivational factors behind terrorism and organized crime - in other words, in the basis for the existence of both phenomena. Whereas terrorists aim to change things and thus have certain specific mental and motivational processes working within, organized crime groups are in business solely for profit and personal gain. In short, we thus argue that organized crime and terrorism share similarities on the more practical basis of the functionality of organization. A motivational background can be found in the more overarching construct of political violence, wherein terrorism is a certain type of political violence, mostly labeled as such by its victims and a large part of its observers. Terrorism thus finds its motivational factors in a general or specific deprivation of certain groups within a society or from the outside directed inwards. These groups politically motivate their actions in pursuit of change, be it change of a societys leadership or a system of power. Therefore, political violence and terrorism also share a causal relation: both constructs attempt to manifest an unconventional expression, in relation to the standards set by the society, by means of violent

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acts in pursuit of a change in the system. Yet, the account of the degree of the change of the system a society and the order within would separate a terrorist act from other forms of political violence. However, even then the distinct features of terrorism and other forms of political violence lie in the eye of the beholder: the perception and conceivability of the perpetrator, the victim and the observer of such acts of violence.

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4. TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM Within the multitude of methodologies used in social science, there is a number of techniques that allow the researcher to scale and order certain research objects. For example, respondents can be placed on a continuum on such topics as liberalism, social efficacy or IQ. In a comparable fashion, aggregate units can be put into categories by the careful use of scales, e.g. which political bloc a local council department belongs to (Zisk, 1981: 285). A typology is thus a categorization of phenomena and/or objects in order to make them more manageable for analysis. Typologies are useful tools for researchers to frame many facets of, for example, terrorism into a single word or (the other way around) to deconstruct a phenomenon in order to find the multiple facets. A general definition of a typology from the Oxford English Dictionary - is simply: classification according to general type. The guidelines used to make these categorizations or classifications can range from self-defined to theoretical considerations. This entails that the functionality of a typology is mostly defined by the purpose of the user: different objectives make for different typologies (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 39). The user making the typology is an important consideration, which has a profound effect on the number of terrorism typologies in use in academic literature, as will be discussed in the next section. In the rest of the chapter, possible typologies of terrorism used by various scholars are described and classified, and specific questions arising in the current academic, as well as in the legal, debate on terrorism are analyzed in greater depth.

4.1 RELATIONSHIP TO THE ACADEMIC DEFINITION DEBATE The question of types of terrorism is intrinsically related to the problem of definition discussed in the first chapter. Thus a type of terrorism, characterized by common features abstracted from a group of similar cases perception of those features depending, as the general section on typologies in this chapter indicates, on a selected point of view , may become one properly only after it has been located within the field of terrorism. State terrorism as it is often defined, whether inside (terrorizing the own population) or outside (direct involvement of a sovereign state actor in terrorist activities in other countries),

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or criminal terrorism (problematic due to the absence of political aims, which are indispensable constituents in a number of definitions) are illustrative examples in this regard. The fundamental question is whether indeed this or that phenomenon, defined on the basis of shared characteristics in a number of cases, is terrorism in the first place. In other words, in the reflection on the nature of terrorism, the ordering (classification) criteria should follow the delimitation (definitional) criteria, while neither of those can be treated separately. There are almost as many typologies of terrorism as there are analysts, Johnson notes (1978, quoted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 40). The lack of consensus on the nature of terrorism relates to the quests for reification of its boundaries (definition) and its precise content (classification of types). Both seem to reflect the semantic vagueness of the phenomenon, and the plural character of the latter may even become, in Laqueurs view, an insurmountable hindrance to the former: Any attempt to be specific [about terrorism] is bound to fail, for the simple reason that there is not one but many terrorisms (1999: 28). Nonetheless, it can be argued that in these inquiries, the reason for the plural character of conclusions is not identical. In the chapter on the academic definitions of terrorism, it has been suggested that the cause of the absence of a standard definition of terrorism may be its contested and political nature it is a powerful instrument of delegitimization and indeed dehumanization of the other. Yet it may also lie in the nature of the situation in which different definitions are sought for different purposes. In the debate concerning types of terrorism, the diversity in academic accounts may instead stem from the diverse set of criteria used in the process of categorization apart from the more general ontological assumptions of the authors, related to the nature of terrorism, e.g., as a tactic, a kind of political violence, a set of ideas, etc., assumptions which again are related to the position on the definition of the phenomenon as such. These criteria can be divided according to the issue areas proposed in the first chapter, i.e. perpetrators, victims, objectives/motives, and the means/methods to reach them. For instance, most of the items on Schmid and Jongmans list of ten common bases for classification (2005: 40) could be subsumed under these areas (e.g. purpose, demands, motivations, causes and political orientations could all be comprised in the objectives / motives issue area). Since no one set is per se more relevant than the others, the standard typology is unlikely to emerge. It would arguably even be contra-productive because assuming various

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viewpoints in reflection of terrorism is likely to increase academic and political communities contextual understanding of the phenomenon. Schmid and Jongman, for instance, have suggested five conceptual frameworks, which can be utilized while observing terrorist actions (2005). These frameworks refer to the contexts of crime, politics, warfare, propaganda / communication, and religion / fundamentalism. In other words, as Schmid has asserted, such contextual lenses in various situations accentuate certain features whereas they virtually marginalize others. Schmids list is of course not meant to be exhaustive, nor are the frameworks thought to be hierarchically ordered or taken as mutually exclusive (2004: 213-214). While Schmids frameworks to a certain extent reflect the previously often emphasized interdisciplinarity of terrorist studies, they omit a psychological dimension (although the discussions on communication and religion do touch upon this issue). However, as Taylor and Horgan show, a psychological perspective may also offer a conceptual framework that departs from a geographical or root causes means of classification (Taylor and Horgan, 2006). These scholars assert that terrorism should be viewed as a process and focus on pathways into, through and out of terrorism (2006: 5). What seems to be crucial is to study frameworks related to the process of engagement, involvement, and possible disengagement of a terrorist with a terrorist group or action (also see Horgan: 2005). This approach might offer a very different categorization, leading to generalizations that would be reached rather inductively from the case-specific knowledge. These introductory notes connected the problem of typologies with the definitional one. The study dealing with the efforts to define terrorism has mentioned several reasons for the discontent of various communities on the issue of terrorism. It is hence not surprising that the debate on typologies produces similar sentiments. Moreover the proximity of both topics would allow repeating virtually all of the arguments, ranging from political purposefulness, through the border and membership problem, to an essentially contested concept. In addition, Weinberg, Pedazhur, and Hirsch-Hoefler mention other issues which are worth punctuating here (2004). Most significantly, they specify the problems of stretching and travelling, which refer to the bias coming from the social or physical distance of the observer from the actual action. Hence, it can be the case that the distance may affect the observers point of view and alter his or her classifications, evaluations, and decisions (2004: 779).

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Stretching and travelling problems may also lead to the creation of different terms such as narco-terrorism or cyber-terrorism. Leaving aside the critique adverting to the political and ideological background of the former (see, for example, Laqueur, 1999 or Schmid, 1996), the point made here is that these phenomena only rarely involve violence or the threat of violence directed on humans, acts which provide the core feature of the concept of terrorism itself.13

4.2 THE TERRORISM TYPOLOGY DEBATE There is a huge amount of terrorism typologies around. One of the first systematic studies undertaken to catalog all typologies of terrorism in order to make a general definition of terrorism is Schmid and Jongman's 1988 landmark study. It provides the most elaborate analysis on terrorism typologies to date and is therefore the best starting point to discuss the multitude of typologies that exist. Schmid and Jongman (1988: 39-59) state that the construction of typologies occurs by classifying certain units according to the specified characteristics. In the case of terrorism, there are ten bases for classification:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Actor-based Victim-based Cause-based Environment-based Means-based 6. Political-orientation-based 7. Motivation-based 8. Purpose-based 9. Demand-based 10. Target-based

Schmid and Jongman examine three of these classifications more closely. The first is the actor-based typology, which is one of the most obvious divisions terrorism is perpetrated by an actor or actors - and thus typologies to be made for terrorism. Perpetrators of terrorism range from lone-wolf terrorists to states of governments using terrorist tactics.

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For a more general discussion of risks concerning the unexpedient extension and stretching of categories, see Collier and Mahon, 1993, also quoted in Weinberg, Pedazhur, Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004. It is often the case, Collier and Mahone argue, that scholars tend to subsume new cases under a category which was defined through an originally different set of cases. Additionally, they adapt the category by climbing the ladder of generality, thereby obeying the law of inverse variation. As they increase the extension, they reduce the intension to the degree necessary to fit the new contexts (Collier and Mahon, 1993: 846).

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A second typology that Schmid and Jongman recognize is the political orientation-based one. This typology goes beyond the question of the actors involved and classifies the motivational base or origin of the organization. The third typology Schmid and Jongman analyze is the purpose-based typology. The overlying purpose of terrorism is to terrorize a group or state. However, it is quite evident that not everybody is terrorized and that the sowing of terror is not in all cases an end to itself but a means to a variety of objectives (Schmid & Jongman, 1988: 50). Next to these three bases for creating classifications and thus typologies, Schmid and Jongman also address the purpose and existence of multidimensional typologies. These typologies classify terrorism according to more than one of the above mentioned natures, or bases. Moreover, every type identified may be further divided into several subtypes (possibly according to different variables). Schmid and Jongman introduced such a model after analysing other scholars work (see Figure 1). The table identifies three general types of terrorism, where political terrorism may be split up into other sub-categories by the perpetrator. One of them, insurgent terrorism, may cover a number of types based on the terrorists motivation.

Fout!Figure 1: Typology of terrorism

(Key: A signifies State Actor; a, a1, a2 signify Non-State Actors) I. Political T. II (Organized) Crime-Linked T. III. Pathological ("Crazy") T.

I.1. Insurgent T. (a vs. A)

I.2. Vigilante T. (a1 vs. a2)

I.3 State (or Regime) T. (A vs. a)

I.4. State-sponsored T. (A(b) vs. B.)

I.1.a. SocialRevolutionary T. (Left-Wing)

I.1.b. RightWing & Racist T.

I.1.c. Religious T. (& Millenarian T.)

I.1.d. Nationalist & Separatist T. (incl. Ethnic T.)

I.1.e. SingleIssue T. (e.g. Eco-Terrorism)

Source: Schmid and Jongman (1988)

There are also many more contemporary researches available that make use of terrorism typologies. Some of them will be discussed in the following paragraphs. It should be noted that the overview is by no means exhaustive and that it does

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not indicate the usability of these typologies, but it is aimed at providing insight into the types of terrorism typologies used in research. Of the ten types of classification identified by Schmid and Jongman, only four seem to be frequently used in terrorism research: Political Orientation-based, Actor-based, Purposebased and Motivation-based.

4.2.1 Political orientation-based typology As we have seen in the previous chapters, the political component has been a major factor for defining terrorism throughout the academic and nongovernmental debate, appearing in 68% of the definitions (see Chapter 2.3 in this study). The political orientation-based typology works with the notion of political change/persistence, depending on what side of the barricade the actors stand. One of the first to make such a typology was Wilkinson (1974), who distinguished three types of terrorism: revolutionary, sub-revolutionary, and repressive terrorism. The typology (slightly adapted) has been used by many other scholars, notably by Schultz (1978):
1. Revolutionary Terrorism: the threat and/or employment of extra-normal forms of political violence in varying degrees, with the objective of successfully effecting a complete revolutionary change (change fundamental political-social processes) within the political system. Such means may be employed by revolutionary elements indigenous to the particular political system or by similar groups acting outside of the geographical boundaries of the system. 2. Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism: the threat and/or employment of extraordinary forms of political violence in varying degrees, with the objective of effecting various changes in the structural-functional aspects of the particular political system. The goal is to bring about certain changes within the political body, not abolish it in favor of a complete system change. This is perhaps the broadest of the three categories: groups included span the political spectrum from the left to right (). Such means are employed primarily by groups or movements indigenous to the particular political system, though similar elements beyond the systems geographical boundaries may also rely on such means. 3. Establishment Terrorism: May be defined as the threat and/or employment of extraordinary forms of political violence in varying degrees, by an established

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political system, against both internal and external opposition. Specifically, such means may be employed by an established political system against other nationstates and groups external to the particular political system, as well as internally to repress various forms of domestic opposition/unrest and/or to move the populace to comply with programs/goals of the state.

Obviously, not only the nature of change, but also the political orientation of actors may create a basis for categorization. Rapoport (2001) identifies four types of politically motivated terrorism since the beginning of the 20th century: anti-colonial/revolutionary, ethno-nationalist/separatist, left and right-wing, and religious. Such division is not, however, utterly uncontested. Even Rapoport admits that the types may overlap, e.g. religious and ethnic identities often overlap (2001: 421). Similarly, left-wing and revolutionary elements do not exclude each other. Moreover, Richardson argues that the word "terrorism" has lost its meaning in politics because it has been used immoderately by politicians to label opposition activities (2006a: 3). Nevertheless, there are a number of scholars who work with these (or similar) categories and even further isolate various sub-groups. Examples are Armond (1999), who further divides right-wing terrorism, or Leman-Langlois categorization of religious terrorism (Leman-Langlois and Brodeur, 2005).

4.2.2 Actor-based typology In general, actor-based typologies often include other bases too. This is the case of the above-mentioned typologies of Wilkinson and Schultz that include a significant actor-related element. Another example may be the typology of Meleneva (2002), which also encompasses a motivational factor. A similar approach can be found in Antonians work (1998). There are, of course, also primarily actor-based typologies of terrorism. The best example is the one conceptualized by Waugh (1982). He looks at the geographical component of the actor, resulting in a three-category typology:
1. Spill-over Terrorism: the use of violence by foreign nationals against foreign individuals or property. 2. Integrated Internal Terrorism: difference in nationalities of the terrorists and the victims, one group being indigenous to the host state.

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3. External Terrorism: the terrorists are located or the act is committed outside of the territory of the target government, i.e. in the jurisdiction of another government.

The location of the perpetrator (as also reflected by Waugh) has gained some significance in the public debate on terrorism in recent years. The global terrorism has appeared in academic papers as well as governmental documents. The relationship between geography and typologies of terrorism is analysed in more detail in Chapter 4.3.1 of this study. The identification of the actor has been a highly contested topic, especially with regard to the debates over an international legal definition of terrorism (cf. Chapter 5 of this study). The main issue has been the role of the state and how the state-actors fit into the picture. We elaborate more on this in Chapter 4.3.2 of this study.

4.2.3 Purpose-based typology Terrorists purpose has been a popular variable for scholars typologies. Examples of such typologies are most notably those by Thornton and later those by scholars like Boyer Bell. Thornton (1964) argues that terrorists commit their deeds for different purposes, like morale-building (within the terrorist movement itself as well as in that element of the population that is already sympathetic to the insurgents), advertising (the act not only calls attention to the existence of the insurgents but also serves as a reminder of their program and ideals), disorientation (the objective par excellence of the terrorist, removing the underpinnings of the order in which his targets live out their daily lives), elimination of opposing forces (either physically or by neutralizing their effectiveness), or provocation of countermeasures by the incumbents (in combating an elusive terrorist, the incumbents will be forced to take measures that affect not only the terrorist but also his environment, the society as a whole; although this result may be incidental to the aims of some terrorists, terrorist acts often are committed with the express purpose of provoking reprisals).

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Boyer Bell (1975) takes a different, more abstract approach to what categories of divergent purposes there are for terrorist activity. Terrorist purposes can be categorized into six categories:
1. Organizational terror: every revolutionary organization, perhaps without exception, must face the problem of maintaining internal discipline, inhibiting penetration, and punishing errant members. To be most effective, punishment must be swift, harsh, and visible. It is therefore often highly formalized, with trial, defense, sentence, and execution. 2. Allegiance terror: a less restrained variant of organization terror in order to gain mass support. 3. Functional terror: is employed when in the course of armed struggle it is necessary to gain strategic advantage through specific action. 4. Manipulative terror: concentrates on exploiting the deed and escalating its impact to create a bargaining situation, in which the terrorists threaten to destroy seized assets or hostages unless they are granted certain demands. 5. Symbolic terror: must go beyond the organizational and functional and must select a victim who represents the epitome of the enemy. Yet the deed must be more than a simple vengeance.

4.2.4 Motivation-based typology Motivation-based typologies make up most of the currently used typologies in research. Again, motivation is often used in combination with other variables as a base for the typology, such as the identity of the actor or the target (cf. Gross Stein, 1989) or the method used (cf. Loneey, 1995). Some widely used and accepted contemporary terrorism typologies with a motivational base are the ones developed by Hoffman (1999) and by Vasilenko (2004). Hoffmans typology is very basic, identifying four rather self-evident categories: ethno-nationalist, left-wing, right-wing and religious terrorism. Vasilenkos typology follows a similar yet distinct path and identifies the following five categories:
1. Political terrorism: struggle for power 2. Separatist terrorism: aimed at territorial secession, violation of territorial integrity of state

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3. Nationalist terrorism: exclusion of other nationalities and ethnic groups from all spheres of activity-political, economic, cultural, etc. 4. Religious terrorism: recognition of a leading role of own religion, suppression of other religious confessions 5. Criminal terrorism: profit-oriented, suppression and elimination of commercial and other rivals for selfish purposes

Other motivation-based typologies of terrorism have been made by scholars like Antonian (1998) and Avdeev (2000).

4.3 SELECTED TYPOLOGIES In the following sections, selected typologies will be analysed in more depth. The selection is based on the relevance to todays debate on terrorism and the ambiguity of the terms, which deserve further attention. The intricate relationship between geography and terrorism and the role of the state in perpetrating/subsidizing terrorism have already been mentioned in the previous paragraphs. Besides, the distinction between old and new terrorism has been very strong in the current debate on terrorism and is worth of a closer look.

4.3.1 Geographical dimensions of terrorism Dividing manifestations of terrorism in accordance with geographical dimensions has been introduced in WP2 Deliverable 1, section 2.2. Here the concept is first developed in more detail and then exposed to criticism. This criticism focuses on the often drawn conclusion that the geographical dimension of terrorism (domestic, international, global, etc.) is linked to the chronological development. In other words, over time, manifestations of terrorism assumed more and more extensive dimensions (cf. Kegley, 2003; Laqueur, 1999; Crenshaw, 2007). It also deals with the construction of the boundary between the internal and the external, i.e. local and global terrorism, in the discourse. The geographical classification of terrorism introducing categories such as domestic, international, transnational and global terrorism has featured in the writings of a number of authors such as Schmid and Jongman (2005), Wilkinson (1977), Hoffman (1998), Kegley (2003), Kiras (2004) and Reinares

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(2005). Positive criteria used to determine under which geographical category an incident may be categorized include: 1) the state territory where the act occurs, 2) the citizenship of the perpetrators and 3) the citizenship of the target. If either one or both of determinants 2) and 3) do not coincide with the state where the incident takes place, the incident is considered excluded from the domestic realm and elevated to the international one. Examples of definitions of international terrorism as at least implicitly contrasted to domestic terrorism include:
[The threat or use of violence for political purposes where] its ramifications transcend national boundaries (as a result, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanisms of its resolution) Milbank, 1976 (quoted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 41); [] Terrorism committed outside the borders of one or all of the parties to the political conflict [] when it is motivated by revolutionary objectives Wilkinson, 1974 (quoted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 42); and [...] incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select victims or targets because of their connections to a foreign state (diplomats, local executives or officers of foreign corporations), attack airliners in international flights or force airliners to fly to a different country Jenkins, 1975 (quoted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 42).

The MIPT's (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Terrorism Knowledge Base defines incidents of international terrorism as those in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel or equipment. Contrasted to this phenomenon is domestic terrorism, which, according to MIPT, refers to the acts perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target.14 Waugh (quoted in Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 43) elaborates on the concept of international terrorism, dividing it into three subcategories: 1. spillover terrorism (foreign perpetrators and targets in relation to the locale); 2.
14

See <http://www.tkb.org/Methodologies.jsp>.

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integrated internal terrorism (different nationalities of victims and perpetrators, when one of the groups is local); 3. external terrorism (the terrorists are based outside the territory of the target countrys government). From a more historical point of view, Hoffman (2006: 63-64) attributes the advent of what is considered modern, international terrorism to the activities of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which internationalized its struggle with Israel by means of increased mobility of terrorists, targeting innocent civilians from other countries and hijacking airplanes. Since the first intifada and the import of the suicide bombers tactic from Sri Lanka, it could yet be remarked that the terrorism related to the Palestinian cause has become more internalized again. The debate tends to be also blurred by the terminological mayhem. For example, Reinares has elaborated on the issue of international terrorism while remarking that international terrorism is often confused with transnational terrorism, when, in fact, the latter includes the former but not vice versa (2005). For Reinares, transnational terrorism in one way or another crosses state borders, essentially because those who perpetrate it maintain organizational structures or carry out violent activities in more than one country (2005: 2). In other words, acts of transnational terrorism affect two or more territorial units and involve people of two or more nationalities. As Reinares also notes, it would be rather difficult to find today an organization that is systematically involved in terrorist activity but still remains strictly territorially and nationally defined. Most of the organizations are transnationalized and join various clandestine structures to raise the essential resources or enhance their operational capabilities (Ibid.). Similarly, the political background of terrorist activity may often surpass territorial boundaries (this issue will be also discussed later) and even more often involves more national or ethnic groups. Yet, such transnational features do not necessarily refer to international terrorism. According to Reinares, this phenomenon involves at least two essential criteria. Firstly, in regard to the goals and aims of the terrorist endeavour, international terrorism strives for changing the structures and distribution of power in entire regions of the world or even on the global level. Secondly, from the perspective of the perpetrators of the violence, those organizations or structures that are involved in international terrorism have spread their activity into a significant number of countries and regions in adherence with their strategic prospects and goals. As Reinares further notes, the latter criterion

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should not be taken as given, since it is possible to imagine a territorially defined and limited group which might obtain global influence (Reinares 2005: 2 3). Whereas Reinares seems to embrace the global level under the label of international terrorism, some scholars have emphasized the novelty of the recent fourth wave of terrorism (cf. Rapoport 2001). The criteria distinguishing international and/or transnational terrorism from the global tend to be much less explicit, however. The latter phenomenon, seen as an unprecedented contemporary manifestation of terrorism e.g. in the sense that with the death of distance borders no longer serve as barriers to terrorism (Kegley, 2003: 4) -, is perceived as related to major social, political and economic processes such as globalization and reactive fundamentalization, or technological development. The technological advances may relate both to the instruments of violence the employment of, e.g., weapons of mass destruction by nongovernmental actors, however, remains rather in the sphere of the imagined and communication, increasing capacities to target the global public in the media (cf. Jenkins, 2006: 125). The global causes as a determinant factor of the new terrorism are nonetheless, as suggested below, a rather problematic concept, and the technological development cannot be considered as an explanatory variable per se, but rather as a permissive structural condition of creating more extensive impact in terms of intimidation. That terrorism has assumed an unprecedented global face in the recent past due to the emergence of the global jihadi network is a stance assumed by many other researchers too (cf. Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 1999) and also in some previous deliverables of this project (WP2, Deliverable 1, 2.3). While not in general taking the issue at such a position, the purpose of the following lines is to suggest that it rests on assumptions that are very difficult to prove empirically. It is suggested that the notion of a global terrorist network may stem more from the fancies of some of its proponents and/or be part of the rhetorical action intentionally increasing the sense of horror, with the purpose of successful securitization of terrorism as such. First, it may be rather difficult to establish a firm link between recent terrorist incidents that are in discourse commonly subsumed under the banner of the global jihad or al-Qaeda. Devji asserts that the jihads effects agglomerate diverse countries and peoples into relations that are divorced from any prior history and display little if any commonality. Yet it is precisely in this accidental

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universe that the jihad is globalized as a series of effects that have lost sight of their own causes (2005: 9). This assertion may be considered as one possible alternative narrative. Adoption of name, cause and even lexicon by radical Islamic groups after the 9/11 by people who had perhaps never heard of them before (2005: 15) remains an unquestionable fact, but the common purpose of this global network, for which a metaphor of a global enterprise (Jenkins, 2006: 125) or the model of a business franchise are often used, is difficult to establish convincingly. A suggestion that the objectives of some al-Qaeda network (collective) members may be local and telluric is perhaps supported, e.g., by the recent foundation of the Islamist emirate in Iraq by an organization which prides itself with the name of al-Qaeda in Iraq. In fact, there are many other movements around the world that are said to cherish the idea of global jihad in one form or other but whose objectives are rather limited and political in nature, e.g. the establishment of a Salafi-modelled polity on a defined territory. Examples include the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Central Asia or Jemaah Islamiyah in the Philippines. As the case study on Chechen terrorism proposes, despite the overt radical Islamic zeal and symbolic used, e.g., in Dubrovka (2002) and Beslan (2004), terrorist incidents, and the rhetoric of Moscows government since the end of the 1990s, the declared objectives of the terrorists in the Northern Caucasus have consistently been related to the aim of national liberation. Hamas also can be presumed to strive for recognition of Palestine and its government by the international community, i.e. to seek a change in the political order, i.e. a change in its configuration, rather than a change of the political order, i.e. a change of its character.15 At some instances, even bin Laden claimed that one purpose of al-Qaedas struggle was to expulse U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf while in other instances, he opted for a more transcendent rhetoric of battle with the global crusaders (Pape, 2005). Second, there is the question of the alleged unprecedented character of contemporary terrorism. As undeniable as the relations of the movements listed above within the jihadi terrorist network to some extent may be, they could be suggested to be not more intense and global than those between national
15 Securitization of Hamas, it should be added, is not commonly related to the global jihad, but rather if international implications are assumed to Irans policy in the Middle East. It is, nonetheless, one of the prominent contemporary movements involved in terrorism, moreover with a strong religious dimension.

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liberation movements in the 1960s or 1970s, some of which, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Algerias FLN, adhered to terrorism.
16

Besides the global character of the new terrorism, it is moreover proposed that it is, for instance, quite problematic to attribute the undeniable increase of suicide terrorism to its globalizing dynamics or the declaration of the global jihad. Despite Rapoports (2001) linkage of the recent rise of suicide attacks to the emergence of radical Islam around the world, other scholars like Pape (2005) present sound arguments to the contrary. The dataset of suicide terrorism that he assembled shows that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism (2005: 4). Instead, suicide terrorist campaigns are directed towards a strategic objective. From Lebanon to Israel to Sri Lanka [secular, Marxist-oriented Tamil Tigers LTTE holding primacy in number of suicide attacks] to Kashmir to Chechnya, the sponsors of every campaign have been terrorist groups trying to establish or maintain political self-determination by compelling a democratic power to withdraw from the territories they claim (Ibid.). In other words, it is an objective not much different from the ethnoseparatist terrorism of yore. It is then subject to debate to what extent the global terrorism is a (contemporary) result of a linear development of terrorism, to what extent it is indeed global, and to what extent this alleged feature of contemporary terrorism, e.g. the suicide campaigns, is either new or can be ascribed to the global jihad ideology and network. From the critical perspective, pointing out the unprecedented nature of the global terrorism along with conceding that it is manifested at various battlefields may be perhaps even unconsciously an instrument of the definition of the dehumanized Other. Movements whose objectives related to national self-determination could otherwise be considered legitimate are thus represented as parts of a universal contest between the powers of good and evil, and the most extraordinary means of retaliation are allowed to the governments which combat them. It is in this process that the internal threat of local terrorism may become represented as a piece of the global picture and included into or mixed with a universal struggle, its nature thus changing into a global problem, and its objectives becoming unclear, which may add to its declared irrationality and lack
16

Vice versa, the involvement of, e.g., Hizb-ut-Tahrir in terrorist violence continues to be a subject of debate.

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of intentionality. Framing terrorist movements (Chechnya, Algeria), separatist movements (Xinjiang) or opposition movements to authoritarian regimes (Uzbekistan) as a part of a global jihad then legitimizes, under the current paradigm of the war on terror, diverse extraordinary means (including suspension of standard legal procedures or the use of violence) vis-a-vis both the domestic and the international public. Distancing the contemporary terrorist movements and other movements from their real causes whether legitimate or not and elevating their local objectives to the global level may not only be a vehicle of abuse in the realm of politics, but also a serious obstacle to their contextual understanding in the academia.

4.3.2 The role of state: terrorism by whom? The distinction between state and non-state (and state-sponsored) terrorism, outlined in WP2 Deliverable 1, Section 2.2, points to the fundamental question posed already in the section discussing the academic definitions of terrorism: who can commit the act of terrorism? In more specific terms, can a state commit an act of terrorism? A brief overview of various academic definitions positions on the issue and stances of political actors in the debate related to the international law on terrorism in the UN shows that the question is indeed a contentious one. Following this overview, it is proposed if indeed state terrorism is established as a distinct type within the boundaries of terrorism as a general phenomenon that we should distinguish between state terrorism (directed outside the state) and state terror (directed inside the state). Without deciding about the moral issues related to those types both can, in fact, be considered illegitimate , their nature is so different that indiscriminate inclusion of the latter under the label of terrorism confuses the discourse and opens venues to abuse due to the symbolic meaning attached to the words terrorism and terrorist. The authors of the definitions mentioned in the academic definitions section in general either concede that states can be perpetrators of terrorism17 or they do not comment on the issue area of perpetrators of terrorist acts, thus

17

Terrorism is [a] method of repeated violent actions employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 28); States and their leaders can and do unleash terrorist violence against their own civilians (Stern, 1999: 14); governments, their armies, their secret police may also be terrorists (Jenkins, 1980: 3).

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implicitly allowing for any actors direct involvement. 18 Notwithstanding the different means to achieve intimidation and terrorization of the population available to non-state actors (bombs) and the state apparatus (e.g. the abuse of the secret police), it is precisely the impact on the population that indeed makes state and non-state terrorism two sides of the same coin. State terrorism therefore becomes integrated as a distinct type and classification of a state implying a direct involvement of the state institutions, in contrast to the statesponsored terrorism discussed below and non-state terrorism is allowed. In the realm of international law, the situation is rather more complex and arguably more tainted by political considerations. The question whether states can commit acts of terrorism has been intensely debated since the 1970s and currently represents one of the main obstacles to passing the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. It has been the countries of the South and the Middle East which have consistently tended to assume the position that states indeed can commit terrorism (which could be related to Israel) whereas, e.g., National Liberation Movements, representatives of the oppressed nations resisting foreign occupation, should be excluded, and attention should rather be paid to the root causes of non-state terrorism, i.e. the repression by states or colonial empires. Thus Syrias government could claim in an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism in the 1970s that state terrorism is the most dangerous brand of violence, the most often practiced on the most complex scale (quoted in Mushkat, 1980: 449). Such a stance may be shared by many non-state terrorist movements around the world, which tend to account for their activities by pointing to the causal chain of events launched by the repressive states, committing the first acts of terrorism, thereby attempting their legitimization by projecting terrorism onto the nation state which is their principal enemy Russia in the Chechen case, the United States in al-Qaedas case and Israel in Hamas case. The contentious issue whether states can commit terrorist acts and whether terrorists and freedom fighters are mutually exclusive categories (Schmid, 2004a: 389) and, by extension, whether state terrorism can feature as a distinct type of terrorism does not preclude the discussion about indirect

18

To cite but one exception, according to Richard A. Pape, quoted above in relation to the suicide campaigns, "terrorism involves the use of violence by an organization other than a national governmnent to intimidate or frighten a target audience" (2005: 9).

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involvement of states in terrorist campaigns conducted by non-state actors in different areas of the world. This distinct type of terrorism is commonly referred to as state-sponsored terrorism. According to Hoffman, it serves as a deliberate instrument of foreign policy (1998: 186) by channeling finances, equipment, or intelligence to external non-state actors using terrorist tactics to pursue objectives which coincide with the states interests. During the Cold War, statesponsored terrorism was often related to the great power competition albeit cases of state-sponsored terrorism by small states such as, e.g., Libya or supplying the IRAs guerrilla and terrorist activities (see the relevant case study in this volume) were also reported. In the contemporary world, state-sponsored terrorism tends to be linked to the policies of rogue states. This becomes, due to the delegitimating and stigmatizing power of terrorism, an instrument of their securitization as supporters of terrorism (and of the securitization of weak states as non-state terrorist movements harbours). For example, the U.S. State Department has been issuing a list of countries sponsoring terrorism19, including at present Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (Country Reports on Terrorism
20

).

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also

serves

the

territorialization of the

of

threats,

i.e.

their

conventionalization, responses.

enabling

employment

available

conventional

Defining types of state involvement in terrorism, Ganor (1997) proposes the following classification:
1) 2) 3) States supporting terrorism by means of providing financial resources, ideological support and military or operational assistance; States operating terrorism, i.e. those that initiate, direct and perform terrorist activities by virtue of other non-state actors; States perpetrating terrorism using the agencies of the state; and more generally, states intentionally attacking civilians in other countries in order to achieve political aims without declaring war.

This classification effectively distinguishes two levels of indirect involvement of the state in terrorist activities (supporting terrorism and operating terrorism). It also proposes a rather broad definition of (direct) state terrorism. Besides the commitment conventional terrorist attacks by agents of the state the
19 20

or terror; the document uses the terms interchangeably. See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64337.htm.

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Lockerbie incident (1987) representing an example of such direct involvement of a regime of state agencies in such a terrorist attack , any attack on civilians in other countries without declaring war can be classified as state terrorism21. It is worth noting in this context that speaking from an Israeli perspective, Ganor maintains that state acts against terrorists cannot be considered as terrorism because terrorists exclude themselves from civilian community (2005) echoing interestingly Schmitts comment on the status of a guerrilla combatant having abandoned the edifice of protection and obedience within which he previously lived and risking all for the sake of his cause, which, according to Schmitt, leads to total enmity as a mode of hostility (see the section on academic definitions; Schmitt, 2004: 73). Some research (cf. Thornton, 1964; Wilkinson, 1974) introduces the dichotomy between subversive and repressive terrorism. The former aims at the change of a political order. It is motivated, e.g., by a radical Liberal utopian mode of thought (cf. Mannheim, 1991) or by fundamentalist visions of a return to primordial purity in a Salafi polity. The latter, however, manifested in torture, death squads, disappearances, concentration camps (Schmid and Jongman, 2005: 59), purges (perhaps involving the element of randomness, amplifying the intimidation effect on the population; cf. Arendt, 1996 [1951]), etc. aims at preservation or petrification of the current status quo instead. This is a case of a typology in the issue area of objectives (change / status quo) rather than in that of perpetrators (state / non-state actors). It nonetheless bears some potential to shed light onto the nature of acts classifiable as committed by state and nonstate actors and thus to facilitate their discrimination. Neither repressive nor subversive terrorisms are restricted to the domain of either state (not as sovereign collective agencies, but rather as regimes or individual state institutions) or non-state actors, albeit instances of non-state repressive terrorism are rather rare (Latin America, or perhaps Sudans janjaweed). As for the subversive terrorism, non-state actors may, or may not, be sponsored by states, which in the former case partake in the subversive terrorism in an indirect way, i.e. by effecting subversion in other states; the latter case forms an

21

Besides the Lockerbie incident and the subsequent case, The International Court of Justice also elaborated on the issue in lawsuits between Nicaragua and the United States (Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgement on 27 June 1986), as well as in those between the United States and Iran (Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, Judgement on 24 May 1980).

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instance of non-state terrorism. Yet states can take part in terrorist acts aimed at subversion in other states also in a direct way, albeit instances of this, in comparison to the indirect involvement, are also rather rare. As indicated above, states may engage in both repressive (directed inside) and subversive (directed outside) forms of violence. It is, however, suggested that the (desired) effect on the target of violence being in essence the same, qualitative difference in the objectives and methods and last but not least in the consequences, e.g. democides in the cases of some past totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships may provide justification for a more explicit semantic discrimination between these two forms. The clarification would be desirable in the realm of both academic and political discourse, limiting the potential of the label terrorism to be abused in order to legitimize the use of extraordinary means (e.g armed invasion) against rogue states and enabling a more precise description of political issues facilitating drawing appropriate policies. It seems, e.g., useful to discriminate between terrorist and authoritarian regimes employing means of state repression to secure their power, not only because the word terrorism used in this context in discourse would likely create confusion, but also because arguably other policies are requisite to alleviate the problem of subversive and repressive violence. Thus it is suggested that we should differentiate between state terrorism and state terror the former denomination referring to acts of the state institutions outside (direct involvement in the subversive terrorism), the latter to various means of repression of the domestic population. In some cases, it must be conceded that the line between inside / outside, which is crucial for the differentiation between state terror and state terrorism, tends to be rather unclear. Russias actions in the North Caucasus, Israels activities in the West Bank or Gaza and Sudans terrorization of a part of the population via sponsoring the Janjaweed militia can all be, from certain points of view, contested cases22. In the last case, the decision would lie not between state terror and state terrorism, but between state terror and state-sponsored terrorism. Yet any typology, it may be argued, produces border cases as it is by necessity, to a certain extent, a theoretical abstraction from the empiric world. The immediate consequence of the distinction between state terror and state terrorism for the
22

The actions of Russia and Israel can, of course, be interpreted as anti-terrorist operations; janjaweed and the Sudani armys orchestrated raids in Darfur can be interpreted as genocide.

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triad typology of state, non-state and state-sponsored terrorism discussed in this section would be restricting the boundaries of state terrorism to subversive terrorism, i.e. direct involvement of the state in terrorist activities outside the territory over which it has sovereignty.23 The distinct types of non-state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism would not be influenced. Both of the typological debates presented here, the debate on the geographic dimension and the debate on the role of the state, have not, for their own obvious purposes, allowed inquiring into the concept of the state itself. However, this issue has been one of the most essential in the discussions about the future of terrorism and the effects of globalization. Indeed, as Shelley has argued, [t]ransnational criminals and terrorists have been major beneficiaries of globalization because they benefit from more open borders, greater international mobility and faster and more secure communications. (2003: 311). As the studies trying to conceptualize the relation between organized crime and terrorism have shown (see the corresponding study in this project, or, for example, Dishman, 2001, Makarenko, 2004, Picarelli, 2006, Prfontaine and Dandurand, 2004, Schmid, 1996), new attempts in the realm of typology may involve above all the issue of the possible internal weakness of states as well as questioning the relevancy of the states territorial divisions. Whereas the problem of the weak and dysfunctional states has already been sounded in other branches of IR (e.g. conflict or international crime studies), most of the attempts to break the analytical usefulness of the territorially defined state unit have so far yielded very limited results. Moreover, as, for example, Andreas has shown, state borders may neither erode nor remain unchanged, as it is often claimed, but are being recrafted through ambitious and innovative state efforts to territorially exclude CTAs [clandestine transnational actors] while assuring territorial access for desirable entries (Andreas 2003: 80).

4.3.3 Old versus new terrorism The study of terrorism and the academic debate surrounding it have witnessed several trends or paradigm changes. Gutteridge (1986) first published research on the new terrorism. It was, however, not until the 1990s
23

The question whether this sovereignty is real or imagined points directly to the inside / outside problem.

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that several articles and books appeared claiming that a new form of terrorism had emerged (Burnett and Whyte, 2005: 2-3). This new terrorism refers to the changing character of the phenomenon. According to the protagonists of the new terrorism, it involves different actors, aims, tactics, motivations and actions. In 1999, Laqueur described the impact of terrorism to be a mere historical nuisance. According to Laqueur (1999: 4), this period passed because of a greater accessibility to weapons of mass destruction and unchanged human nature. The classification of new and old terrorism implies a fundamental breach of consistency with the past. There are several distinctions to be made in the formulation of new and old terrorism. As noted, Laqueur focuses on the accessibility of weapons of mass destruction (CBRN). Simon and Benjamin (2000: 59) state that the old form of predominantly state sponsored terrorism is joined by a new, religiously motivated form of terrorism that neither relies on the support of sovereign states nor is constrained by the limits of violence that state sponsors have undergone themselves or placed on their proxies. The variables attributed by various scholars to the new terrorism differ, and there is not one commonly accepted definition of the new terrorism 24 . Furthermore, several scholars have claimed that the characteristics attributed to the new terrorism do not differ from what there was before, thus casting doubt on the very term. It is difficult to state the exact point when the new terrorism emerged. However, during the late 1980s, scholars studying terrorism started to write about a new form of terrorism and attributed to it the following characteristics, among others; a decline in the number of terrorist attacks but an increase in the lethality (Hoffman, 1999b; similarly also Rosenthal and Muller, 2008); a heightened probability of catastrophic attacks (Carter et al., 1998); the use of nuclearbiological-chemical weapons, also known as CBRN (Stern, 2000; also see Gurr and Cole, 2002). Examples of these characteristics are the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, the attack with Sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in 1995, and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh in 1995. After the simultaneous bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the concept of the new terrorism gained more
24

Which is not surprising regarding the fact that there is no commonly accepted definition of terrorism in general either.

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attention. The nature of the 9/11 attacks proved the argument made by the proponents of the new terrorism because these attacks harboured the characteristics they attributed to the new terrorism. We shall look at these characteristics in greater depth below. First, the new form of terrorism is conducted with, or with the threat of, weapons of mass destruction. It is believed that terrorist organizations will try to obtain weapons of mass destruction, like the Aum Shinrikyo sect did, which will be chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) in nature, and use these to attack civilian or military targets. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s led scholars to believe that the proliferation of CBRN weapons would allow terrorists to gain access to a large stockpile of these weapons. Although CBRN weapons were used for the first time during the First World War, and reports on terrorism with CBRN have been appearing since the 1970s (Cameron, 1999: 152), there has been only one major attack with a deadly gas in the recent past. The justification by scholars for their belief that terrorists will some day use CBRN has to do with a wider set of circumstances described below. Scholars, secondly, claim that the lethality and indiscriminate nature of the current attacks is rising. The violence used by old terrorists is seen as a rational and discriminate selection of targets to bring a message across to their opponents as well as their constituencies: Terrorists want a lot of people watching, but not a lot of people dead (Jenkins, 1980b: 5). With the new terrorism, the number of terrorist incidents is declining while the number of fatalities of attacks is rising. Indeed, Jenkins has altered his statement in the following way: Many of todays terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead (2006: 119). These arguments in part explain the argument for the use of CBRN within the concept of new terrorism. Yet the following argument is used predominantly to claim that terrorists will use CBRN. Third, the new terrorism is religiously inspired, in contrast to the old terrorism, where the terrorists had a predominantly secular and political character. The more dominant religious aspect of the new terrorism is for many scholars the reason that terrorist groups are seeking CBRN weapons and using more indiscriminate methods. Hoffman (1999a: 94) claims that religion is one of the key characteristics of the new terrorism, which causes radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality and world view. The alternation of the struggle into a religious

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perspective has, according to the proponents of the new terrorism, dire consequences. In contrast to secular organizations, it is argued that religiously motivated groups are not concerned with their legitimization to other people for support. Their struggle is a divine one, and they only answer to their god (cf. Cronin, 2002: 41-42). Political aims and clear goals are lost as destruction and chaos have become an end in itself (Morgan, 2004: 30). Therefore the argument is made that it is more likely that these new religiously inspired terrorists will use indiscriminate violence and CBRN weapons. As Cameron (1999: 152) notes, the heightened danger of nuclear terrorism lies not with the increased opportunities for micro-proliferation, but rather with the changing nature of political violence and the psychological and organizational characteristics of terrorism itself. The fourth characteristic attributed to the new terrorism is the network structure that many of these groups have. In contrast to the past, the new organizations mostly do not have a clear hierarchal organization structure with an ideological, strategic and tactical leadership (Simon and Benjamin, 2000). This loose network structure makes the terrorist groups more difficult to infiltrate and detect. This, in turn, poses a greater risk for states and society. Global communication and the Internet facilitate this development, providing access to terrorist tactics, weapon fabrication, and like-minded individuals with whom ideology and operational information can be exchanged in an anonymous setting. More importantly, the communication between the individuals and the leadership can occur via coded and anonymous messages in the vastness of the World Wide Web. Related to the fourth point is the lack of state sponsorship that the new terrorism seems to have. As can be seen in Chapter 3 of this study, new terrorists provide themselves with funds through a variety of criminal means, like smuggling weapons or drug trading and trafficking. Scholars point out the indiscriminate violence which rules out states backing, for this kind of violence does not serve the interests of states as the controlled violence in the 70s and 80s used to. States would sponsor groups that attacked their enemies but always insisted on plausible denial to conceal their involvement. These attacks were sufficient enough to please the sponsor state my enemys enemy is my friend but the results of the attack would not result in war with the opposing state. Finally, - also related to the characteristics above - the new terrorists are for the larger part amateurs that operate on a part-time basis. The remainder of

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the time, they are a part of the very society which they are fighting against (Lesser et al., 1999: 2). These amateurs or part-time terrorists are able to find all their training material on the World Wide Web (more on the interaction and terrorism can be found in the deliverables for WP4), do not need a state sponsor to back their actions, and are organized in such a manner that they do not need the structural membership of an organization. Even their ideological soul mates can be found online. However, many scholars have contested the particular arguments distinguishing specifically new terrorism. Duyvesteyn (2004: 445) disputes the claim that terrorist organizations of the past were irreligious and points out that nationalist or separatist movements have had religious origins, backgrounds, and constituencies. Similarily, Hoffman (1999a: 87-129) states that religion has had a profound influence on terrorism that dates back to the times when Roman legions dominated the Western world, even if the religion was not their main focus. The rising lethality of terrorist attacks can hardly be contested as documented in collected data (cf. Cronin, 2002). There are, however, scholars who argue that this does not necessarily mark a radically new type of terrorism. Spencer (2006) claims that the lethality of terrorist incidents has been rising since the beginning of the 1980s and thus that it is a trend that has been set in motion long before the new terrorism appeared in the debate. He further notes that technological advances such as remote control and timing devices for bombs make terrorist groups increasingly lethal. Further, the anti-terrorism policies by states often targeted by terrorists have evolved and adapted to terrorist techniques such as hijacking, bombing, assassinations and sabotage, making critical infrastructure and prominent figures less vulnerable for attack. This fortification is not so easily done for some parts of society, leaving, among others, mass transport systems vulnerable for indiscriminate attacks. Similarly, there are arguments contesting the novelty of the terrorist groups structure (Duyvesteyn, 2004: 444; Tucker, 2001: 1-4) as well as the numbers of amateurs/professionals taking part in terrorism (Tucker: 2001; Spencer, 2006: 24). The only new terrorism attribute that remains uncontested is the use or the threat of use of CBRN weapons.

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To sum up, there has not emerged a new form of terrorism; rather, the complex phenomenon of terrorism is evolving and showing new features. This evolution is spurred by internal and external factors. The development of technology in communications and weapons enables terrorist organizations to operate in a manner not seen before. Increasing pressure from security services forces groups into new ways of operating and vice versa. This will continue in the future. The choice for CBRN weapons is spurred by their current availability and the changing dynamics within groups who contemplate their use. Ultimately, terrorism has been a tactic for centuries, which has evolved along with technological, societal, and cultural developments.

4.4 CONCLUSION The subject of terrorism typologies in this paper is closely linked to the definitions chapter of the TTSRL project. In any reflection on terrorism, the ordering (classification) criteria should follow the delimitation (definitional) criteria, while neither of those can be treated separately. As is the case with analysing and constructing definitions of terrorism, the analysis done in this chapter makes it evident that a universal terrorism typology does not exist and, as Schmid and Jongman already indicated in 1984, is virtually impossible to construct. The fact is that a typology serves the purpose of the research and is therefore, just like a definition, bound to have as many forms as the different research objectives require. While the plurality of definitions of terrorism stems from the fact that the definitions are created according to different usages, the plurality of typologies results from using various set of criteria, as well as from varying underlying assumptions of the authors about the nature of terrorism. As in the academic definition debate, also in the discussion of typologies, there is a considerable discontent and an absence of a common paradigm. The first typology analysed in this research is the classification of terrorism on a geographical basis. The territorial aspect of terrorism has featured as an important variable in its classification. National borders, or the lines between the inside and the outside of the state, are a common determinant in these typologies, including, e.g., the division between domestic and international terrorism. The notions of the operational reality of these accounts of terrorism, e.g. global terrorist network, or the suggested novelty of the non-telluric and

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global character of the new terrorism, should, however, be subjected to critical scrutiny and deconstruction. They may, in fact, be used in the discourse deliberately to legitimize new, extraordinary measures (e.g. suspension of standard legal procedures or extrajudicial killings) against those branded terrorists by the security-providing actors, mainly national states. Beside the political bias, elevating the local objectives of terrorist networks to the global level may also pose a serious obstacle to the contextual understanding of terrorism in the academia. The second analysis done was based around the distinction between state and non-state (and state-sponsored) terrorism. This question points to the fundamental questions "Who can commit an act of terrorism?" and, more particularly, "Can a state commit an act of terrorism?" The conclusions in the discourse of terrorist studies and international law do not necessarily coincide in their answers to the question. In any case, the state involvement in terrorist activities is uncontested. Empirical evidence shows that if states are conceded to as possible actors of terrorism, they can either directly or indirectly engage as well as non-state entities in both subversive and repressive terrorism. For the sake of analytical clarity, in view of the different means employed and targets, it is, however, suggested that we should distinguish between state terrorism and state terror the former denomination referring to acts of the state institutions outside (direct involvement in the subversive terrorism), the latter to various means of repression of the domestic population. Neither the typologies concerned with the geographical dimension of terrorism nor the actors (state/non-state) have allowed genuine inquiry into the concept of the state itself. The third analysis addressed the question whether new and old forms of terrorism can be discerned. The current status of this topic in the academic debate is very controversial, with some in favour of identifying the current wave of terrorism as the new terrorism. According to these researches, the most discernable factor is the increased lethality, next to predominantly religiously inspired terrorists, the search for CBRN weapons and terrorist organizations with a flat and fluid structure. The conclusion drawn in this chapter is not that a new form of terrorism has emerged, but rather that the complex phenomenon of terrorism is evolving and showing new features. This evolution is spurred by internal and external factors. Advances in areas such as technology,

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communications and weapons enable terrorist organizations to operate in a manner not seen before.

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5. DEFINING TERRORISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Terrorism has plagued Europe for decades, with few countries being spared the wrath of terrorist activities. For a period of time, these terrorist activities were mainly committed by groups with separatist motivations, and thus were handled by national governments. Dealings with groups such as the Basque National Separatist Organization (ETA) in Spain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its splinter groups in the United Kingdom have varied greatly. As such, these national experiences did not automatically contribute to the establishment of a general European policy due to, first and foremost, the absence of a precise and comprehensive definition of terrorism that could be implemented across Europe and within the Member States. In practise, the politically charged term is often used to describe a variety of acts and methods of violence but has evaded both an internationally recognized classification and a coherent legal definition. Given the rising necessity to differentiate terrorism from other forms of political violence in the interest of protecting vital international community interests and values, a coherent definition of terrorism is needed more than ever before in order to harmonize efforts and ensure closer cooperation in combating terrorist activities at the level of the European Union and abroad. This chapter thus aims to provide an overview of the development and evolution of a definition of terrorism within the European Union. Following a brief synopsis of reasons for defining terrorism, including the effects on human rights and the potential jeopardy to the state and deliberative politics, the chapter will assess the European Unions efforts in defining terrorism through the proposal and adoption of a Framework Decision, a Council Common Position and a Council Regulation established by the different organs of the European Union. Bearing in mind the assets and drawbacks of the Framework Decision as it applies to the recognition and implementation of its content by the Member States, a review of the basic elements of the definition of terrorism will be explored in their application and contribution to a wide-ranging definition at the international level. From this analysis, we deduct six elements that are especially important in dealing with legal definitions of terrorism. Finally, the selected definitions from the various EU measures will be scrutinized on the way they deal with these elements.

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5.1 REASONS FOR DEFINING TERRORISM Terrorisms threat to democracy, human rights and general social development has been reverberated in numerous conventions and official government documents, including the Commission of the European Communities in their proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of September 2001. Citing resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights, the prevailing literature and reports from NGOs point to the potential disintegration effects of terrorism on the freedoms, rights and liberties that also serve as the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (Den Boer, 2003; Van Boven, 2005; Bulterman, 2006; Boyle, 2004; Cameron, 2004a; Cameron, 2004b; Clapham, 2004; Condorelli, 2004; Dinh, 2004; Van Ginkel, 2003A; Van Ginkel & Wessel, 2004; Van Ginkel, 2006; Goldstone, 2005; Gross, 2004; Olivier, 2004; Paust, 2003; Paust, 2006; Reinisch, 2006; i.a.Human Rights Watch, 2002). Furthermore, terrorism can have a destabilizing effect on civil society and poses an eminent threat to democracy or legitimately constituted governments, thus differentiating the offence from other criminal acts, whether politically motivated or otherwise (Saul, 2006: 4). By replacing politics with violence, interrupting individuals freedom to choose governmental, societal and national policies, and supplanting them with the assertion of frightening messages backed by violence, terrorism has a chilling effect on the institutions which constitutionally protect human rights, thereby disrupting societys essential elements of democracy. Thus, a proper definition of terrorism is essential in bridging the gap in different legal treatments of terrorists between countries and invaluable for harmonization in combating terrorist offences. Bearing in mind this necessity, the European Union has had a long-standing history of attempts to develop and refine a wide-ranging definition at the international level. Throughout the years, numerous international legal attempts dealing with terrorism mostly avoided the difficulty of drafting a general definition. The chosen path in the multilateral arena was to tackle issue-specific aspects of terrorism. At the regional level, in some cases, consensus was reached on a general definition (see i.a. SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Convention of the

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Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism). Apart from the obvious reason that drafting a general definition would contribute to harmonizing national criminal laws, there are some additional benefits that flow from a general legal definition (Saul, 2006: 12). One could think of fulfilling the double criminality requirement in extradition treaties, as well as guaranteeing the fulfillment of the aut dedere aut iudicare regime (the "either prosecute or extradite" regime) for terrorist offences as laid down in many treaties. Also with regard to extradition, a definition of terrorism can put an end to the confusion between political offences offering an exemption to the requirement of extradition and terrorism for which no exemption from extradition is allowed in most treaties. An easier execution of international obligations based on the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees is yet another advantage. An individuals involvement in terrorism may be a reason for not granting a refugee status in accordance with Article 1(f) of the Convention. Finally, a general definition will open up the possibility of drafting an international comprehensive convention on combating terrorism, which will obviously have a wider scope of applicability than the sum of all the sectoral conventions that deal predominantly with issuespecific aspects of terrorism, such as hijacking, terrorist bombings, taking of hostages, etcetera.

5.2 EUROPEAN DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM Progressively, terrorism as it is perceived by the public has assumed different forms, ranging from mass murder and threats to peoples lives to the destruction of property and damage to public or private facilities, making it even more difficult to establish a comprehensive definition for criminalization. In Europe, the first and most significant efforts in the fight against terrorism were rooted in the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted in 1977 under the mandate of the Council of Europe. In an attempt to separate political offences from other violent acts inspired by political motives, the 1977 Convention draws up a list of acts that could be considered terrorist offences (see Article 1 of the European Convention in Table 1

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of the Appendix I).

Procedural in nature, the convention also sets forth

guidelines for States in dealing with terrorism, especially highlighting the States responsibility for not regarding the acts as political offences. Additionally, for the purpose of extradition, the exception regarding not extraditing individuals for political offences does not apply for terrorism. Considered the sole common denominator in the field of terrorism, (Dumitriu, 2004: 587) the European Convention addressed a wide spectrum of terrorist acts but did not offer a precise definition of terrorism. The inherent inability of the Convention to oblige States to implement the definition and criminalize such acts domestically, compounded by the events of the 2001 attacks on the U.S., promulgated its revision by the Council of Europe vis--vis the 2003 Protocol Amending the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. The Protocol subsequently extended the number of depoliticized actions as they relate to a definition of terrorism (see Table 2 of the Appendix II). The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, adopted in Warsaw in 2005, although more elaborate when describing different forms of terrorist acts such as recruitment, public provocation and training of terrorists , still fails to properly define terrorism and settles instead for an old trick: namely referring to a list of conventions in which issue-specific acts of terrorism have been criminalized (see Table 3 of the Appendix I). Following the events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S., within the EU, an extraordinary session of the European Council took place with the aim of analysing the international situation and setting the fight against terrorism as a priority objective of the European Union. Yet while the terrorist attacks of 2001 undoubtedly served as an immediate impetus for establishing a Europe-wide policy for combating terrorism, the approach and a plan for policy action were already discussed at the 1999 European Council meeting in Tampere. As evidenced in the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere meeting (European Council, 1999), the European Council called for joint investigative teams to be set up without delay to combat trafficking in drugs and human beings as well as terrorism. While no specific consideration of a definition for terrorism was addressed, the European Council cited the need for a maximization of benefits derived from cooperation between Member States as it applies to cross-border crime.

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With an emphasis on rejecting any equation of groups of fanatical terrorists with the Arab and Muslim world, the European Council at the extraordinary session of 2001 called for an Action Plan with the broadest possible coalition against terrorism, which, inter alia, included enhancing police and judicial cooperation and development of international legal instruments. As one of the stated objectives in the Action Plan, the Council called for a new arrest warrant altering the extradition policies between Member States. As the Action Plan is continuously revised and updated, the proposed measures were eventually incorporated into the Council Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant. In the same year, the European Council and the Commission of the European Communities issued a proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism with the aim of approximating the laws of the Member States regarding terrorist offences in accordance with the Treaty on European Union. Incorporating elements of other international conventions, the proposal for the Framework Decision outlined a number of terrorist offences and laid the legal groundwork for a common definition at the European Union level. The introduction of the key concept of what constitutes a terrorist offence, the legal implication of such offences as distinguished from other forms of violence, and the penalties associated with such offences are among the elements that set the proposal apart from other conventions (see Proposal for Council Framework Decision in Table 4 of the Appendix I). Additional distinguishing factors include the explicit verbiage used in the Commissions proposal, which was disputed by the Council. For example, where the proposal states that a terrorist offence should include actions with the aim of seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country, the Council revises this definition to include actions with the aim of seriously affecting or destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country or of an international organization. As such, the Council highlights the importance of including the intentional aspect of the act. Credence must be paid, however, to the fact that while motivation is an essential element in evaluating a terrorist offence, a lacuna exists with respect to the specific character of such motivation. Similarly, the perpetrators of terrorist acts are not clearly distinguished in the proposal, which mentions that offences

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committed by an individual or group are different from those perpetrated by a computer or electronic devices. Such activities are incorporated into the same broad heading of terrorist offences in Article 3 of the proposal (Table 5 of the Appendix I). Further revisions by the Council include broadening the definition to include threatening to commit any of the offences (see Article 1 of the Framework Decision in Table 4 of the Appendix I). Serving as the cornerstone for the European Union in the fight against terrorism, the Framework Decision attempts to institute a common definition and explicitly highlights a new category of terrorist activities, namely offences relating to a terrorist group, which are not observed in other international conventions (see Article 2 of the Framework Decision in Table 4 of the Appendix I) (Dumitriu, 2004: 590). The document distinguishes three types of offences: 1) terrorist offences (Article 1), 2) offences relating to a terrorist group (Article 2), and 3) offences linked to terrorist activities (Article 3). With a broad list, Article 1 characterizes terrorist offences by two objective elements incrimination under national law and effective or potential consequences - and a subjective aspect which includes the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental structures of a country or an international organization. (Dumitriu, 2004: 592-598) The Commission was widely criticized for including acts of urban violence as part of the explanation of terrorist offences in the initial explanatory memo of the proposal. Additional modifications to the initial proposal therefore included the omission of acts of urban violence as an association with a terrorist act. The distinction emphasized the delicate issue of encompassing such activities within the definition of terrorism, in light of the possibility that utilizing such a broad concept could have a chilling effect on other scopes of political action. Bearing in mind the potential for Member States to limit the scope of democratic freedoms by encapsulating other politically motivated activities, such as political protests and the right to self-determination under the terrorism label, there was a further need for a harmonized definition at the European Union level. The Council Framework Decision remedies such inconsistencies by providing a non-binding Declaration, which clearly distinguishes between acts of terrorism and those acts which do not fall within the frames of the definition outlined in the Framework.

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Specifically, the non-binding clause reads that the definition cannot be construed so as to argue that the conduct of those who have acted in the interest of preserving or restoring these democratic values could now be considered "terrorist" acts. (Van Ginkel, 2003: 224) The wide scope of the list set forth in the final Council Framework Decision, as compared to the initial proposal from the Commission and other international conventions, provides Member States with the structure necessary for criminalization of the offences under their national laws. While definitions of terrorism vary widely throughout international organizations, many European countries simply include terrorism clauses under their respective Criminal Codes, thus leaving it to the judicial system to decide the scope and intensity of the offence. France, for example, created a specific terrorist charge in their Nouveau Code Pnal, which constitutes acts of terrorism as those aiming to seriously disturb the peace through intimidation or terror (Cettina, 2003: 86). (see Article 421-1 in Table 7 of the Appendix I). Similarly, the Spanish Cdigo Penal states that terrorist acts are those aimed to subvert the constitutional order or seriously alter public peace (see Article 571 in Table 8 of the Appendix I). In addition to providing a definition for terrorism, the aforementioned countries also provide specific penalties for terrorist offences, which differ in severity from other ordinary offences. Yet as the broad reaching national definitions are acceptable for country-specific offences, their scope is not conducive to a uniform system of punishment, including extradition of the perpetrators. (For more on the Member States definitions of terrorism, see Chapter 6 of this study.) It is worth mentioning that the United Kingdom produced the largest piece of terrorist legislation of the EU Member States through the Terrorism Act of 2000, where the list of terrorist offences is similar to that offered by the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. The legislation characterizes terrorism as occurring where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or section of the public (see Terrorism Act 2000 in Table 6 of the Appendix I). The offences, however, are exceptionally broad in scope and can be misinterpreted as blur[ring] the lines between protest and terrorist groups. (Cohn, 2004) At the EU level, terrorism is dealt with under all three institutional pillars with exceptional attention concentrated in the second and third pillars following the events of September 11 and the issuance of two Council Common Positions

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of 27 December 2001 on combating terrorism and on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (see Table 9 of the Appendix I) (Council of the European Union, 2001a; and Council of the European Union, 2001b), based largely on the UN Security Council Resolution 1373. As measures of the second pillar the Common Foreign and Security Policy -, the Council Common Positions define the approach of the EU toward particular issues where the individual Member States are required to implement national policies that comply with the position defined by the Union on a given issue. A definition of terrorism is only given in the Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. The interpretation of the obligations stemming from the second Common Position depends on the member states and, therefore, on that definition. Three documents are of particular interest in terms of their use in defining terrorism: the Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, EC Council Regulation No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (see Table 10 of the Appendix I) and the Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of 13 June 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2002; see Table 4 of the Appendix I). The Council Common Position, adopted for the purposes of addressing specific measures to combat terrorism, sets forth a definition which characterizes terrorist acts as intentional acts, which, given its nature or its context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization (see Council Common Position in Table 9 of the Appendix I). The definition provided in this Council Common Position is strikingly similar to that eventually utilized in the Framework Decision. For example, both documents mention serious intimidation of the population, destruction of a Government or public facility, the threat of committing any terrorist acts and participation in the activities of a terrorist group. Apparent differences are observed in the treatment of offences that are linked to a terrorist group. Whereas the Framework Decision distinguishes and highlights offences linked to a terrorist group, including acts of aggravated theft and extortion, the Common Position draws no such distinctions. Similarly, Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, issued in 2001 (see Table 10 of the Appendix I) for purposes of streamlining procedures regarding terrorist organizations in the EU and third countries, outlines specific restrictive

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measures directed to combat terrorism. The Regulation provides a definition and distinguishes the term terrorist acts in the same vein as Article 1(3) of the Councils Common Position (see Council Common Position in Table 9 of the Appendix I). In fact, the Regulation refers to the Council Common Position for the definition of terrorist acts as used in that document. In contrast to the Common Position, the Council Regulation places greater emphasis on defining the financing aspect of measures outlined to combat terrorism. In addition to providing a definition for funds and other financial assets, the Regulation clarifies the concept of freezing of funds and draws out an in-depth list of institutions (including insurance and banking services) that qualify as financial services. In taking a closer look at the references to terrorism in the aforementioned documents, a pattern emerges in the Unions position to cooperate and further harmonize efforts in combating terrorist offences. The final Framework Decision, which was adopted by the Member States in 2002, offers a firm foundation for an internationally accepted definition of terrorism encompassing elements of other international conventions and keeping it broad enough to reflect the normative consensus that terrorism undermines the State and the political process (Saul, 2006: 4-6). It remains to be seen how the Member States will implement the Framework Decision in their domestic laws (cf. Chapter 6), but the identification of the fundamental wrongfulness of terrorism certainly offers a distinct manner in reserving the label for the most serious acts of political violence. Further analysis of the definitions calls for a closer examination of some basic elements often found in other definitions based on international conventions (see below).

5.3 DEFINITIONAL ELEMENTS In spite of all the attempts to draft a general definition on a universal level, various political reasons have precluded any successful efforts. However, all these different attempts as well as the definitions used by various institutions and academics provide us with information on the elements that, in most cases, have been included in a definition and further help us to determine which elements are especially of interest for a legal definition.

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It is possible to identify a number of definitional elements in academic literature. Schmid and Jongman counted 22 of them (Schmid & Jongman, 1988: 5). The underlying perception of the wrongfulness of terrorism is echoed throughout the definitional elements. Ranking from high to low frequency, the elements mentioned include: violence, force; the political; fear, terror emphasized; threat; (psych.) effects and (anticipated) reactions; victim-target differentiation; purposive, planned, systematic, organized action; method of combat, strategy, tactic; extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints; coercion, extortion, induction of compliance; the publicity aspect; arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, indiscrimination; civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims; intimidation; innocence of victims emphasized, group, movement, organization as perpetrator; the symbolic aspect, demonstration to of occurrence of others; violence; incalculability, clandestine, unpredictability, covert nature; unexpectedness

repetitiveness, serial or campaign character of violence; the criminal; demands made on third parties. Although very useful for analysis and the drafting of a definition, a direct copy of these elements into a definition is no guarantee of a sound legal definition. For a definition to fulfill the quality standards required for use as a criminal definition, certain aspects have to be taken into account. Legal certainty demands that criminal offences are defined and prescribed in law. It is therefore essential that individuals can ascertain the content of the laws (Smith, 2003: 252). Such a definition should thus be precise, objective and certain in order to meet the principles of good legislation. Emotive terms should therefore be avoided, as should ambiguous and subjective terms which are incompatible with the principle of retroactivity (Saul, 2006: 20). At the same time, it should be remembered that legislation and criminalization also function as a powerful symbolic mechanism. This is where the knowledge of the definitional elements of Schmid and Jongman comes in handy. Ben Saul, in his Working Paper for FRIDE, after studying several (mostly policy) definitions and taking into account the quality standards set for legal definitions, proposed the following definition:
1. Any serious, violent, criminal act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, or to endanger life including by acts against property; 2. where committed outside an armed conflict;

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3. for a political, ideological, religious or ethnic purpose; and 4. where intended to: a. create extreme fear in a person, group or the general public; and b. seriously intimidate a population or part of a population; or c. unduly compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 5. Advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action which is not intended to cause death, serious bodily harm or serious risk to public health or safety does not constitute a terrorist act.

This proposed definition includes most of the characteristics of the study by Schmid and Jongman, namely the political motivation, the creation of fear, the use of violence, the criminal aspect, the goal of coercion, the intent, and the target group. It is also a sound attempt to be precise, objective and certain. Nevertheless, this proposal also leaves room for interpretation. What, for example, qualifies as a serious criminal act? Moreover, this definition does not deal with the threat of committing terrorism, an aspect that has been included in several other policy documents, nor does it define who could be the perpetrators of the act. This shows, once more, how delicate defining terrorism for legal purposes is. In an attempt to provide a concise definition of terrorism that could be utilized as a foundation for further academic research, Boaz Ganor of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism has proposed that terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims (Ganor, 2005: 6). The broad scope of the definition is based on three elements that Ganor considers to be of utmost importance in establishing an agreed-upon legal definition: 1) use or threat to use violence, 2) the aim of the activity is always political, and 3) the targets are civilians. Interestingly, Ganor contends that the motivation of the act be it religious, etcetera is not relevant for defining terrorism. ideological,

Futhermore, Ganor maintains that an internationally accepted definition of terrorism should be broad, especially when considering how state-sponsored terrorism may fit into the category. However, for the reason that state-sponsored terrorism can be included, Ganor's definition would never qualify as a sound legal definition installing individual criminal responsibility. Moreover, as far as individuals, according to

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international law, can be held individually responsible for crimes committed by the state, these acts would fall under the scope of a different legal regime. For purposes of further analysis and comparison of terrorism definitions as used in EU measures, which is the main focus of this chapter, abstract elements are needed. In another study by Susan Tiefenbrun, using a semiotic approach, five abstract elements were proposed. These are:
1. The perpetration of violence by whatever means; 2. The targeting of innocent civilians; 3. With the intent to cause violence or with wanton disregard for its consequences; 4. For the purpose of causing fear, coercing or intimidating an enemy; 5. In order to achieve some political, military, ethnic, ideological, or religious goal. (Tiefenbrun, 2003: 362)

In this analysis, however, we will use six categories of legal elements of a definition of terrorism. Most of the elements are, in a sense, abstracted from Sauls proposal for a legal definition and also cover Tiefenbruns elements. In order to further focus the scope of the definition, in comparison to Tiefenbruns categories, a category of perpetrators and an exclusion category have been added. Each different legal definition most likely deals with each of these categories of definitional elements in a slightly different way. Assessing the various definitions used by the EU along the lines of these categories will give us valuable information for comparing these definitions. The elements that are identified partly follow the path of a logical construction of a description of a criminal offence, and thus comprise the elements of mens rea (criminal consciousness) and actus reus (the description of the criminal act). The description of the actus reus should, in the case of terrorism, make clear in what sense the offence is different from other criminal acts, such as, for example, murder or assault. Furthermore, the selected elements are, in one way or another, dealt with in most policy definitions. The categories of elements are:

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1. 2.

The mens rea aspect: the intentional character of the acts committed. Purpose of the act: Intimidating a civilian population, compelling a government or other formal institutions to do or abstain from doing something, or another purpose.

3.

Qualification of the act itself: Criminal; the use of some form of violence irrespective of the result, or the result of the act is prescriptive (bodily injury or material damage/economic loss).

4. 5. 6.

Target: civilian, public or military? Perpetrators: individuals, groups, non-state actors, state actors? Scope: exceptions form the scope; justification or not for certain acts?

Next, the definitions, as used in the Council Framework Definition on Combating Terrorism and the Council Common Position on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism, will be scored on how they deal with these elements. In order to be able to compare the European definitions to some other internationally used definitions, Tables 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Appendix I respectively include the definitions used in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, United Nations Security Council 1566 (2004), the proposal for a definition made by the High Level Panel in its Report on Threats, Challenge and Change, the definition of the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, and the definition of the Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism. Put in a chart, this will make it possible to compare the different definitions (Table 16 of the Appendix I). When comparing the different definitions, it becomes clear that all fulfill the definitional element with regard to the mens rea aspect. Most definitions use words as intent, intentionally or willfully. One definition refers to a criminal plan that has to lie on the basis of the actions, which also suggests that there was a prior intention to commit a certain act. With regard to the definitional element of purpose, clearly most definitions use terms like intimidating the population, provoking a state of terror, or compelling a government or an international organization in doing or abstaining from doing an act. The two European definitions also mention the destabilization of political, constitutional, economic or social structures. With regard to the motivation behind the attacks, only the Security Council resolution

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and the Convention of the OIC on Combating International Terrorism stress that no motivation for whatever reason can ever justify the attacks. In the qualification of the attacks, the terms used in the different definitions vary from criminal to offences under national law or unlawful. Only the proposal for a definition by the High Level Panel makes no reference of such a sort to qualify the acts. All but one of the definitions (that of the Convention of the OIC on Combating International Terrorism) refer to death, serious bodily injury or attacks on physical integrity as the main criteria of the attack. Material damage is only covered by the European definitions and the draft Comprehensive Convention. Moreover, the threat to commit certain acts is also only mentioned in the European definitions and in the Convention of the OIC on Combating International Terrorism. It should be mentioned that only two of the definitions give a clear description of the target group, being defined as civilians and non-combatants, namely those of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the proposal of the High Level Panel. In the other definitions, international targets such as are persons, casually governments, mentioned. public The facilities, or organizations Security Council

resolution even states that acts (in general), including those against civilians, can be terrorist acts. With this phrasing, the suggestion is raised that acts against the military could be terrorist acts as well. Most of the diversity between the definitions can be found with regard to the way they address the definitional element of the perpetrators. Three of the definitions make no reference to the perpetrators of the acts whatsoever. Two of the definitions state that any person who commits the specified acts falls under the scope of the definition. The two European definitions are the most precise in the sense that reference is made to persons, groups or entities as the possible perpetrators of the attacks. From that specification, one can conclude that state actors are implicitly excluded. Finally, in the category that deals with the delimitations and the exclusions from the scope of the definition, several aspects are brought forward. One aspect relates to the delimitation between terrorism and forceful resistance against foreign occupation, hegemony, etcetera, and the use of force in the exercise of the right to self-determination. The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, very carefully and in a non-binding declaration annexed to the

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Decision, touches upon this aspect. The Convention of the OIC on the Combating of International Terrorism is far more straightforward on this topic and explicitly excludes these aspects from the scope of the Convention. A very subtle reference is made to these aspects in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as well as in the Security Council Resolution by a general preambular remark on the obligation to respect human rights. Other exclusions from the scope of the definitions are the political offences (mentioned in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism), the use of force against civilians by states (High Level Report), and the acts committed within the territory of one state, or where the perpetrator is a national of the state in which he has committed the act (Draft Comprehensive Convention).

5.4 CONCLUSION In this chapter, an overview has been given of the developments on defining terrorism within Europe. Special focus was paid to the EU documents in which definitions of terrorism were incorporated. A model of six definitional elements was presented, making it possible to compare the different definitions. In comparison with other policy definitions, the aforementioned analysis of the various elements of different definitions illustrates that the formulation of the EU definitions has not taken place in isolation from the developments on this topic within the international community. In sum, the two European definitions are very elaborate in describing the purpose of the acts, but neither seizes the opportunity to symbolically state that there is no justification for terrorism whatsoever. Furthermore, by including material damage and the threat to commit terrorist acts, the European definitions are among the most elaborate in their description and qualification of such acts. However, the European definitions are less elaborate in the sense that they do not give a clear description of the target group. On the other hand, these definitions are the most precise in defining the perpetrators. The delimitation question in the category that deals with the scope of the definition is the most political one. The path chosen, namely to add a nonbinding declaration, is a clear compromise. A balance was struck between the fear that any reference to underlying reasons for being violent might suggest a

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justification for terrorism, on one hand, and the sense for political reality, on the other. After all, against the background of the resistance and protests during the Second World War, one did not want the definition of terrorism to be interpreted in the sense that any political resistance would be criminalized. In conclusion, it can be stated that the EU definitions are in line with other internationally used definitions, notwithstanding some differences in formulation.

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6. WORKING DEFINITIONS DEFINING TERRORISM IN THE MEMBER STATES

It is undisputable that 9/11 has caused a renewed focus and attention on a global level to the concept of terrorism. As such, the Council of the European Union put forward a Framework Decision (FD) on Combating Terrorism in June 2002 (see Table 4 of the Appendix I), which contained a definition of terrorism. As a result of the Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 34(2)), these decisions are binding on all member states, although they leave room for a domestic differentiation regarding the exact procedures and methods. Thus, in order to evaluate the implementation of the Decision, it is inevitable to look at the definitions of terrorism within the national legislation of the member states. This section is also relevant as it is to the best of our knowledge one of the most elaborate internationally comparative analyses of the policy and the legal definitions governments have adopted in the past, as well as in the present, although it cannot in scope and length surpass the publication edited by Christian Walter appropriately titled Terrorism as a Challenge to National and International Law, published in 2004, which has served as one of the main reference points throughout this study. Lastly, the chapter holds relevance for the practise of counterterrorism. As the majority of TTSRL sample countries already had terrorist legislation in place preceding the Framework Decision, it will be interesting to see what the effects of the Decision are with respect to the current counter-terrorism efforts. Even more interesting from this point of view will be the analysis of those countries that did have experience in countering terrorism previous to the FD yet had deliberately chosen not to adopt specific anti-terrorist legislation during their mostly nationally confined struggles. We will see how the introduction of specific anti-terrorist legislation, which contains a definition of terrorism, has changed their counterterrorism policies. The manner in which this research has been conducted is as follows. First, all researchers assembled the necessary information on previous legislation pertaining to the concept of terrorism, including parliamentary sources of discussions, elaborations, explanations, etc. (see also Annex 1 and 2 for an example of the two templates used). This information was then placed within the historical and political context of the individual sample countries through the inclusion of relevant jurisprudence, legal analyses and policy definitions within

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departments. It is important to note that the results will strictly pertain to the definition of terrorism in the legal and political sphere and will not focus on the special procedures and powers often accompanying such a definition. For a focus on definitions plus the special powers they entail, see Lord Carlile of Berriew (2007: 19). For more information on the issue of legal definitions and their relevance, purpose and functionality for counterterrorism, please see the extended version of this paper on the TTSRL website. This chapter is a shortened version of a lengthier study into the legal and policy definitions of the TTSRL sample countries and consequently has a slightly amended structure. The results and discussion of the extended study will be presented in the next section, starting with the general results before introducing concrete, country-specific findings in a more detailed manner per TTSRL sample country. After the presentation and discussion of these results, some general conclusions will be drawn. These will pertain specifically to the effect of the EU definition in general, as well as, where relevant, on a national level. The similarities, differences and other noteworthy developments concerning the EU and national definitions will be summarized there.

6.1 GENERAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The structure used in the EU definition of terrorism (cf. Article 1, Table 4 of the Appendix I) is known in legal research on terrorism as a combination of the subjective and the objective approach. The subjective element refers to the first part of the definition, the intention of the perpetrator, divided into three separate goals. The second part consists of a list of the offences that will, taken together with the intention, be considered as terrorist offences. This sort of listing is often referred to as the objective approach because the classification of whether the offence has occurred or not is quite easy to determine and clearly made explicit within national law. The intention of the perpetrator, however, always contains a subjective element since it has to be interpreted by people. It cannot be proven in and of itself, by pointing to the concrete results, for instance, since the whole element is completely immaterial. Summarizing, the structure of the EU definition is a combination of the objective approach, which classifies certain acts

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as terrorist by finding whether certain offences occurred or not, and the subjective approach, which classifies certain acts as terrorist according to the intention of the perpetrator. As mentioned before, even before the introduction of the European Framework Decision, the majority of the TTSRL sample countries already had terrorist legislation in place. These countries are France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Of these eight, the definitions of France, Russia and the United Kingdom were already quite comprehensive and detailed. All three countries used a combination of the subjective and the objective approach in order to define terrorism, similar to the FD definition that followed theirs. The other five countries had defined terrorism in a circumventing manner, meaning that they adopted legislation that contained the word "terrorism" yet did not explicitly define it. The German approach, for instance, consisted of criminalizing terrorist groups (and consequently everyone belonging to them as terrorists) without mentioning the specific activities of these groups or their corresponding members. The Spanish, on the other hand, employed almost the reverse of this principle by equating certain activities with terrorism only when executed by a member of an armed band or terrorist organization, without explicating what the nature of these organizations is or how they come into being. The remainder of the TTSRL sample countries the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands and Poland only introduced specific terrorist legislation after the FD. Of these, the Czech and Danish definitions mirror the EU definition the most by upholding the same structure and a similar method, not adding, changing or removing any of the conditions. The Dutch approach is slightly more elaborate and broader in scope than what the EU proposed, while the Polish definition deliberately leaves out the second part of the EU definition. It is interesting to note that Portugal and Sweden, despite having terrorist legislation in place prior to the FD, did alter their definition of terrorism substantially in order to make it correspond (almost exactly) to the EU definition. The other countries with terrorist legislation prior to the FD only added the precondition that international organizations can also be the target of terrorist attacks in order to fulfil the international criterion of the EU definition. The circumventing manner, as employed by the legislators of Germany, Italy and Spain, has only been amended in the case of Germany through the inclusion of

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the second part of the EU definition, which Italy expressly left out, while Spain did not alter its definition in any form. Generally speaking, France, Italy, Russia, Spain and the United Kingdom have not undergone any fundamental changes as a result of the FD, while the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Sweden have quite clearly used it as a general blueprint and/or guiding format. Now, a short and concise overview of the most distinctive and changing elements within the national contexts will be given before returning to the comparison with the EU definition and offering some more fundamental and profound conclusions.

6. 2 COUNTRY SPECIFIC RESULTS

6.2.1 Czech Republic

As noted above, the Czech Republic took the EU definition as a blueprint and copied it almost literally to be included in the Czech Penal Code as Act No. 140/1961 Coll. section 95, entitled the Terrorist Act, in 2004 (see also Table 1 of the Appendix II). Before this definition, no other attempts to define terrorism or actual definitions have been found in the history of the Czech Republic. Since the adoption of the definition, certain terrorist suspects have been arrested, but the outcomes of their trials are, at the time of writing, still unclear.

6.2.2 Denmark

Although the Danish definition was introduced a month before the adoption of the EU FD, it is quite clear, given the enormous similarities, that the Danish definition took into account the European efforts already underway at the time of the national implementation of the counterterrorism legislation. The article employed for the definition is article 114 of the Danish penal code, which was formerly used to detain, arrest, convict or deport suspects of terrorism without explicitly mentioning terrorism as such. Instead, the article simply alluded to the use of force to influence public affairs or cause disturbances of the established order as criminalized under Danish law (for the full article, see Table 2 of the Appendix II): [t]he concept of Terrorism is charged and ambiguous and

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therefore unsuitable as a legal term for determining the scope of penalization and [t]he penal code already contains sufficient paragraphs which can be used in any conceivable case (Vestergaard, 1989: 118-119). Nevertheless, since May 2002, the article has been amended to reflect the EU definition containing the objective list of acts coupled with the subjective terrorist intention and supplemented with articles 114 a, b and 2 (cf. Table 2 of the Appendix II, Year 2002).

6.2.3 France

Since the introduction of the Act of 9 September 1986, the French Penal Code contained a definition of terrorism that has been updated at regular intervals through the Acts of 15 November 2001, 18 March 2003, 9 March 2004 and 23 January 2006 which have reinforced the basic legislation and procedural regulations. The definition of terrorism, though, has never been substantially altered. As already described, it makes use of both the objective and the subjective method of defining terrorism by listing at least 39 main and related offences (objective element) that can, taken with the notion of terrorist intent (subjective element), be considered as terrorism (cf. Table 3 of the Appendix II). TTSRL research has not found any amendments to this definition apart from the inclusion of more offences that were not previously incorporated through the above-mentioned acts.

6.2.4 Germany

The old definition of terrorism in Germany, contained in the old Article 129a, distinguished four different types of activities: founding a terrorist organization, being a member of a terrorist organization, supporting a terrorist organization and campaigning for a terrorist organization (cf. Table 4 of the Appendix II, year 1976). The article was part of a law package against terrorism that went into force in 1976 (Albrecht, 2006: 24) and was purely directed against the RAF and other manifestations of German and local terrorism. It had never been altered in a substantial manner by the German authorities until a critical law amendment called for by the FD was introduced and adopted in 2005. Even though the title of

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the article still reads Formation of Terrorist Organizations, it contains some sub-sections now refererring to specific acts that qualify as terrorist when executed by a member of a terrorist organization (for full article, see Table 4 of the Appendix II, year 2005). Henceforth, even though Germany added the objective element, the subjective element as contained within the EU definition has also been implemented within the new formulation of article 129a. The intention to intimidate a population or compel a government or international organization is now explicitly present (see Table 4 of the Appendix II, year 2005).

6.2.5 Italy

The starting point for the definition of terrorism is contained within law n. 15 of 1980, which refers to the offence of associations with purposes of terrorism, including international terrorism, or purposes of subversion of the democratic order. (Montauti and Vettori, 2006: 3) (see Table 5 of the Appendix II, Year 1980) Similar to the German approach, this law does not explicitly define terrorism but leaves that option open to the Italian judiciary, which provided a source for a definition through its decision in 1987.

According to this sentence, the purpose of the term terrorism, as quoted in the title of the original version of the article, has to be intended as the purpose to strike terror in the community through indiscriminate actions. These actions, which aim at undermining peoples trust in the established order and in its structure, are not directed towards people, but rather towards what these people represent. (Montauti and Vettori, 2006: 4).

Through the amendment, introduced by law n. 438 in 2001, article 270-bis also includes foreign governments or international organizations as targets of terrorism (see Table 5 of the Appendix II, year 2001). In 2005, law n. 155 was enacted, which for the first time explicitly defines terrorism within the Italian Penal Code and is based on the FD, even though it only focuses on the notion of terrorist intent (subjective) and does not include the second part of the FD definition, which refers to the objective list of offences (cf. Table 5 of the Appendix II, year 2005).

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6.2.6 The Netherlands

Even though the Dutch had some experience with terrorism in the form of bombings, train hostage takings and other activities listed as terrorism in the FD, the Dutch government in that period deliberately chose not to adopt specific terrorist legislation. The current position of the Dutch government is that the present terrorist threat is substantially different from the old form of terrorism (House of Representatives, 2003-2004: 4) and thus calls for a definition, or at least a classification, of terrorism and terrorist crimes in the Dutch Penal Code. The manner in which the Dutch government has engaged in this is by introducing four notions related to the concept of terrorism: namely terrorist offences, terrorist intent, cooperation and preparation (Koopstra and Ende, 2007: 13). The category of terrorist offences, the second part of the FD, consists of three sorts of offences:

grave criminal offences committed with terrorist intent; other criminal offences that when committed with terrorist intent call for a higher penalty;

newly introduced offences committed with terrorist intent

(see Table 6 of the Appendix II for a complete list of article 83.)

The category of terrorist intent, the first part of the FD, also consists of three sub-categories, mentioned in article 83a of the Dutch Penal Code:

to cause serious fear amongst the population (or part thereof); to force a certain action by a government or international organization; to destroy or disrupt the political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or international organization

(see Table 6 of the Appendix II for article 83a)

All of these articles were incorporated in the Dutch Penal Code on the 10th of August, 2004 and have already led to jurisprudence on various occasions, for example through the trial of the murderer of Theo van Gogh, but also through the trying of other suspected terrorists and organizations. Much discussion has

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taken place since on whether the definition as adopted now is not broader than intended in the Framework Decision, or whether the difference between motive and intent has been sufficiently defined (cf. Dolman, 2003; NCJM Congress, 2004; Netherlands Association for the Judiciary, 2004). Most of the trials executed have led to disputable outcomes, such as court rulings mostly citing problems concerning the evidence. Lastly, despite certain actions by animal rights activists forcing certain businesses to establish offices elsewhere (the businesses themselves cited that they were forced to move!) the government has quite explicitly ruled that such actions would not constitute terrorism.

6.2.7 Poland

According to the Polish Penal Law of 6 June 1997, Poland already penalized terrorist behaviour and activities on the basis of general criminal provisions without specifically alluding to terrorism within national law. Through the introduction of new legislation in 2004, Polish national legislation now contains a specific definition of terrorism, which clearly takes the EU definition as a starting point (cf. Table 7 of the Appendix II, year 2004). There are, however, a few interesting deviations from the general definition as proposed by the EU. Firstly, the Polish definition does not refer to population but, rather simply put, to a group of people, thus increasing the scope and applicability of the concept of terrorist crime. Secondly, it adds to the definition the element that another country can also be the subject of the crime of terrorism, which again widens the scope and applicability of the definition and also creates possible international actions and judicial procedures. Thirdly, it only refers to the disruption, or threat thereof, of the political and economic systems of Poland, another country or an international organization and excludes threats to the constitutional and/or social order. Lastly, it is interesting to note that the current Polish definition does not mention the second part of the European definition that lists possible crimes as crimes of a terrorist nature, similar to the Italian approach. No conclusive answer has been found as to why this part has not been adopted apart from the fact that the Polish government, apparently, saw no need for the inclusion of it.

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6.2.8 Portugal

The first anti-terrorist legislation Portugal adopted and implemented is found in law 24/1981. This law defined terrorism in a circumventing manner, through articles 287/4 and 288, which introduced the notions of repenters and terrorist organizations respectively. These articles, combined with the procedural provisions and powers contained within The Internal Security Law adopted by the Portuguese parliament in 1984 and some amended articles on terrorist organizations and terrorism, as well as terrorist trials, nevertheless did not lead to a clear definition of terrorism. Yet, as there occurred no more terrorist attacks on Portuguese soil, the legislation remained largely unaltered until 2003. On the 22nd of August, 2003, the Portuguese government revoked all of the aforementioned articles with Act 52/2003, the Fight Against Terrorism (see Table 8 of the Appendix II, year 2003). Article 2.1 within this law now refers, quite explicitly and in a very detailed manner, to what the Portuguese legislator considers terrorist organizations. Furthermore, article 4 deals solely with the crime of terrorism, which includes both first- and second-degree terrorist acts. The former are described as purely terrorist in that in and of themselves they are considered as terrorist actions, whereas the latter refer only to those crimes that are instrumental for terrorist actions to be conducted. This leads to the conclusion that not only has Portugal observed the necessary requirements of EU legislation, it has also amended its previous definitions of terrorism into something much more concrete and consequently more legally explicit and clearer than before.

6.2.9 Russia

The first Russian Terrorism Bill, adopted in 1997, defined terrorism as

using or threatening illegitimate violence against persons and entities or destruction/damage of property committed with the aim of undermining public safety, international entities, and the established government structures through forcing government bodies to make decisions desired by the terrorists. (Perstev, 2002: 25, 28-29)

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Which was substituted to a modified list of terrorist acts as described in Articles 205, 207, 277 and 360 of the Criminal Code (Behknazar, 2004: 475) (cf. Table 9 of the Appendix II for the whole 1997 Bill). The articles mention both acts, such as the execution of an explosion or an arson attack, and a purpose of disturbing several concepts, such as societal security, frightening the populace, or exerting influence on the decision-making of the government authorities. The broadness of the definition becomes clear immediately when looking at Article 3 of the Bill. The latter two sections in particular leave a very broad scope for interpretation regarding the difference between violence for personal gain, or raising attention, on the one hand, and terrorism on the other. Furthermore, the Bill contains many more definitions explicitly laid out, such as those of terrorist activity, terrorist action, the international variants of these, and the terrorist crimes. This Bill was complemented with the 1998 Bill on the Fight Against Terrorism (see Table 9 of the Appendix II, year 1998), defining terrorism in exactly the same way as the 1997 Bill, but adding the required legal framework for counter-terrorism activities by the actual newly created departments responsible for coordinating counterterrorism efforts. It should be noted, however, that this sort of definition has not prevented Russia, unlike any of the other TTSRL sample countries, from proclaiming Iran free of terrorist ties and supporting separatist elements in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, Russia has occasionally threatened to support the Kurds inside Turkey, a movement that Turkey labels as terrorist and separatist, if Turkey aided the Chechens (or otherwise displeased Moscow) (Mockaitis and Rich, 2003: 130). On 10 March 2006, the Russian Federation introduced a new Federal Law on Countering Terrorism. This law defined terrorism for the first time as a multifaceted phenomenon. The article referring to terrorism now reads as follows:

terrorism is an ideology of violence and a practice affecting the way decisions are made by national and local authorities or international organizations, related to intimidation of the population and (or) to other illegal violent acts. (CODEXTER, Country Profile Russia)

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Even though the new Bill also contains some new provisions on the procedures, rules and regulations surrounding Russian counterterrorism efforts, it is as of yet unclear how and in what exactly this new definition differs from the old one.

6.2.10 Spain

A first attempt to conceptualize terrorism in Spain can be found in the 1987 Agreement of Madrid on Terrorism, where terrorism was established as the continuous assassinations [] and other forms of violence or intimidation [] which prevent the development of citizen liberties and tolerance (Ministry of the Interior, 1987: 44). This brief statement on terrorism outlines a trend within the Spanish codification process on terrorism or rather the focus on maintaining democracy in relation to the danger terrorist attacks pose to democracy and its values and rights for citizens. This trend can be extricated out of the jurisprudence on defining terrorism of several judicial courts in the period dating from 1993 until the present day. For example, the Spanish Constitutional Court formulated the following in a judgment of March 1993 as characteristic to terrorist activities:

their purpose of or, in any case, the effect of which is spreading an alarm or social insecurity situation, as a result of the systematic, reiterative and, very often, indiscriminate ways of such criminal activity. (Spanish Ministry of Justice, 1993: 2)

This statement incorporates the incentive of the Constitutional Court to pronounce a deductive way of defining terrorism, namely through delineating the intention of terrorist activity to create a situation of fear and insecurity amongst the population, thereby diminishing their democratic right to freedom, safety and public peace as established by the constitutional state of 1978 (Ministry of Justice, 2002: 38). The Constitutional Court complemented this statement on terrorism in 1993 with the addition of the concept of systematic and repeated violence to the definition of terrorism (Martnez Soria, 2004: 518-519). In Spanish penal law, the activities that are considered to constitute terrorism are defined as such, but only when conducted in an armed band or organization (for a complete overview of most of the Spanish legal definitions of

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terrorism, see Table 10 of the Appendix II). An explicit definition of terrorism has been adopted in case law through a High Court ruling of 29 November 1997, which stated that terrorism is:

[a] planned activity that, proceeded to individually or under the cover of an organization, repeatedly or on an isolated occasion, and by carrying out acts aimed at creating a state of serious insecurity, social fear or public peace disturbance, has the objective of subverting, fully or partially, the social and institutional order. (CODEXTER, Country Profile Spain)

Specific amendments adopted after the Framework Decision in the context of counterterrorism efforts have also widened the scope of the definition of terrorism. Thus, the 'conspiracy to perform a terrorist act' and the 'glorification of terrorism' have been included in the criminal definition of what constitutes terrorism (Carlile of Berriew 2007: 25-26). The EU definition is more detailed than the Spanish one, since the former establishes a catalog of terrorist acts that are non-existent within the latter. Finally one has to note that even though the Spanish definition is more general and less precise than the EU definition, it does meet all of the FD criteria (cf. Table 4 of the Appendix I).

6.2.11 Sweden

When in the early 1970s Sweden was confronted for the first time with terrorist attacks with an obvious international connection, the government introduced its first anti-terrorist legislation in 1973. The title of the law 1973: 162 was Law on specific measures to prevent certain violent crimes with international background, and although it did not explicitly define terrorism as such, it did introduce a new concept of the presumed terrorist. This was defined as any foreigner who belongs to or works for an organization or group which can be expected to use violence, threat or coercion (Elwin, 1977: 290). As the law was implemented as a result of certain acts of violence on Swedish soil and admittedly implied certain deviation from principles we otherwise usually follow in our legislation (Swedish Parliament, 1973: 37), it was introduced as emergency legislation for the duration of only one year.

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In the end, the law continued to be in place for two years, after which the provisions it contained were simply with minor alterations transferred to the Aliens Acts of 1975. One of the most crucial alterations in the new law was that a presumption of being a terrorist would be sufficient to claim that someone is a terrorist. In May 2002, the Swedish government adopted two anti-terrorism laws, one implementing the United Nations Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the other adopting the Framework Decision of the European Union Council on Combating Terrorism that was issued in late 2001; yet neither of these contained an explicit definition of terrorism. The criminalizing of terrorist acts only happened after Sweden implemented the European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of June 2002 via the New Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Crimes (see Table 11 of the Appendix II). This new act entered into force in July 2003 and classifie[d] certain crimes such as murder or kidnapping as terrorist acts when they are committed against countries, their institutions, or their citizens with the aim of intimidating, or of altering or destroying political, economic or social structures (Privacy International, 2004). Although certain organizations within Sweden, such as the Swedish Helsinki Committee, have noted the vagueness of this definition, the Swedish government has by this implementation of legislation fulfilled the formal requirements of EU legislation and the definition is more precise than it used to be in the past.

6.2.12 United Kingdom

Although the first British experiences with terrorist tactics and assaults occurred during notable anti-colonial struggles abroad, it was only with regard to the problems on British soil with the (Provisional) Irish Republican Army (IRA), starting in 1968, that the first piece of legislation to combat terrorism was created. From 1974 to 1989, the Prevention of Terrorism Acts (Northern Ireland) were dedicated completely and totally to the Irish situation (WODC, 2006: 27). Article 9 in the first Act states that terrorism means the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear. (Prevention of Terrorism Act (Northern

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Ireland) 1974) As stated in a review on definitions requested by the Select Committee on Home Affairs:

[t]hat definition had major drawbacks. Though it excluded threats of violence, otherwise it was very broad so far as actions were concerned. Notably, it did not require a serious level of violence or a serious damage or risk to health and safety or electronic disruption. Conversely, it was restricted in terms of intention/design, in that it excluded violence for a religious end, or for a non-ideological end. (Carlile of Berriew, 2007: 3).

Additionally, another definition can be found in British legislation, namely in the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 section 2(2), which has a different angle in that it criminalizes people acting in connection with or on behalf of an organization that employs terrorist tactics. Due to certain developments regarding terrorism on British soil, the British felt it necessary to review their counterterrorist legislation in 1996. In this Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism (Berwick, 1996), Lord Lloyd of Berwick concludes that a different definition is imperative in order to combat international terrorism effectively. There is a plurality of reasons given for this, but the most pivotal appears to be that this inquiry finally noted that the terrorist threat had changed markedly and drastically since the first definition of terrorism was put forward. This culminated effectively into the new definition as put forward in the Terrorism Act 2000 (see Table 12 of the Appendix II), which is much broader but at the same time also more specific than the previous definitions. Although there has been criticism from several non-governmental organizations that it would be too broad, all state actors that have reviewed the definition see it as workable, clear, efficient and proportional to the threat derived from international terrorism (for contrasting views of non-governmental organizations and the British government, cf. Amnesty International, 2005; Carlile of Berriew, 2007: 21-22). The whole piece of legislation was finally put in force in February 2001, and it is interesting to note that there has been only one alteration in the definition since - namely, the addition of (an) international organization(s) as (a) possible target(s) of terrorist offences.

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6.3 CONCLUSION

The overview presented above clearly shows the effects of the FD as all TTSRL sample countries have revised or introduced definitions of terrorism based on and specifically referring to the FD. In light of the new definitions and revisions made, the following conclusions can be drawn. In general, most countries use a combination of the subjective and the objective approach, thereby combining the notion of mens rea, which refers to the intent of the perpetrator, with a specific list of actions, which are the ordinary general criminal offences, in order to derive a definition of terrorism. The EU definition also refers to offences specifically pertaining to a terrorist group (see Article 2, Table 4 of the Appendix I). This means the founding, participating in, supporting and campaigning for terrorist organizations, which are also, in and of themselves, considered participation in terrorism as such. In this respect, only three countries (Germany, Portugal and Spain) make use of the criminalization of terrorist organizations and their activities as such, whereas the other countries simply opted for including the activities of founding, participating in, supporting and campaigning for terrorist groups as terrorism. Regarding deviations from the EU definition, one can distinguish certain noteworthy developments. Evaluating the amendments to terrorism definitions already in place prior to the introduction of the FD, one notices that Germany, Italy, Portugal and Sweden have altered their definitions substantially, whereas France, Russia, Spain and the UK hardly introduced any changes as a result of the FD. Concerning the implementation of the definition as envisaged by the EU, it is disconcerting to see that some countries have deliberately chosen not to include the latter part of the definition, consisting of the list of criminal acts. The countries that have not included this specific list are Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The subjective element that is specifically linked to terrorist intent is present in all contemporary definitions, even though in the past, for instance in Germany, this was not always the case. Lastly, all of the observed countries have included foreign governments and/or international organizations operating on their national soil as possible targets of terrorism. This extension of targets offers a significant broadening of the scope and applicability of the definition of terrorism as previously used. As of

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yet, the condition has not been brought forward in any of the terrorist trials currently in progress. Concerning the applicability and broadness of definitions in general, one should note that several NGOs have voiced their concerns over the definitions in the following countries: Denmark, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In general the criticism consists of the fact that the scope and wording of the definitions in those countries would allow for the disruption of legitimate political protest(s) and thus also for the potential arrest, detention and trial of lawful political activists. It is comforting to note that as of yet, there have been no cases brought forward that would give ground to the foundation of these claims in reality.

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7. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

There are many relevant theoretical as well as practical (especially legal) reasons to define terrorism. Many people, states and international organizations have therefore tried to define the term. In this study, special attention has been paid to definitions that appear in the academic discourse and to the definitions adopted by the European Union and some of its Member States in the international context. The more definitions there are, however, the clearer it is that an agreement on a single, universal, and stable definition of terrorism is unlikely. This is especially true for the academic discourse, where scholars use their own ways of defining the phenomenon according to the need and nature of their respective research. Similarly, the international community has widely failed in drafting a universal legal definition of terrorism so far because of the ambiguity of the term, and also because of its political charge. At the level of regional organizations, there have been some achievements, though. For the purpose of this study, the European Unions definition of terrorism as adopted in the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism has been of the greatest interest. However, as we have shown in Chapter 6, even a common definition at the EU level does not guarantee a full compatibility of definitions as they appear in Member States penal codes. Yet, there are several general findings / conclusions that we are able to make about terrorism. Despite the fractionalised academic debate, we argue that the double victimization (or, idiomatically, terrorism as a spectacle) element constitutes and will constitute a core for all conceptualisation efforts. This is less unambiguous for the political character of terrorism, but we still argue that terrorism is a certain type of political violence. The distinction between terrorism and other types of political violence may be difficult to set, depending on the observer and the particular situation possibly the level of desired system change or the level of violence used. However, we suggest that the double victimization or the psychological effect of terrorism may serve well in this respect and offers a strong tool in distinguishing terrorism within this category.

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The border is much clearer between organized crime and terrorism. The two phenomena may share the practical aspects of organization, recruitment, or leadership, but their motivational sides differ fundamentally. Unsurprisingly, the plurality of definitions is followed by a number of possible ways to classify terrorism. This study has offered several typologies of terrorism that have been pronounced in the public discourse lately namely the geographical, actor-based, and new/old terrorism classifications. We have argued that none of them are unambiguous and that all of them entail a powerful political charge. Similarly to the academic definitions, the legal definitions also aim at understanding what terrorism is. There is, however, a stronger emphasis on clarity in order to allow courts to come to the same conclusion in similar cases, the legal definition must be precise, objective and certain enough. This makes the matter even more complicated because the more precision there is in a definition, the more difficult it is to reach a politically plausible compromise. We have offered a tool for analysing legal definitions and came to the conclusion that the definitions agreed in Europe are in line with texts adopted elsewhere. The Europeans have paid a lot of attention to the purpose, perpetrators and exact description of the act, but much less to the target groups. The most political question, that of motivation, has been solved, we argue, in a compromising, non-binding way. This supports the view that a universal definition is hardly attainable. If there is a need for such circumvention in the European Union, where the values of participating countries lie very close to each other, it is difficult to imagine a more precise decision within the international community. Whereas the previous chapters deal with the definition at the level of academic theorizing or international fora, Chapter 6 aims at the heart of the matter the Member States. After all, it is the nation state level where terrorists are prosecuted and tried. As our research has revealed, the adoption of a common European definition of terrorism has indeed influenced the penal codes of the Member States. Some of them have even introduced the definition into their legal order for the first time. Others have altered their laws substantially in order to conform to the European norm. However, we have also shown that some countries have not adjusted their law-books and some, despite amending their penal codes, have even deliberately left out part of the European definition. The Member States decision not to implement the European Unions definition

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fully or at all complicates a possible cross-border cooperation in prosecuting terrorism in Europe. It questions the very achievement of the Framework Decision indeed because if not implemented into national legal orders, the common European definition loses its universality on the EUs territory and cannot have the intended impact. Furthermore, the compromise reached at the EU level loses relevance when the nation states do not make use of it. The reluctance of some countries to implement fully the EU definition further supports the view that a universal definition of terrorism is hardly attainable. To sum up, like so many before us, we have failed to identify a universal, overall definition of terrorism. We have at least shown why it is so difficult to create one (theoretical and legal) and how the discussion currently stands in Europe. In this respect, this study should serve as the basis for further research within and beyond the TTSRL project.

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8. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Symeonidou-Kastanidou, E. (2004) Defining Terrorism, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol 12, no. 1, pp. 14-35. Taylor, M. and J. Horgan (2006) A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process In the Development of the Terrorist, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 1-17. TE-SAT (2007) EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007, The Hague: Europol. Thornton, T. (1964) Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, in H. Eckstein (ed.) Internal War, New York: Free Press. Thornton, T. and C.E. Balck (1964) Communism and revolution. The strategic uses of political violence, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tiefenbrun, S. (2003) A semiotic approach to a legal definition of terrorism, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, vol. 9. Tilly, C. (2002) Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories in Contentious Politics, in K. Worcester, S. Avery Bermanzohn and M. Ungar (eds.) Violence and Politics, Globalizations paradox, London: Routledge. Tucker, D. (2001) What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 1-14. United Nations (1999) International Convention for the Suppression for the financing of Terrorism, United Nations: New York. Vasilenko, V.I. (2004) The Concept and Typology of Terrorism, Statutes & Decisions: The Laws of the USSR & Its Successor States, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 46-56. Veen, H. van der (2005) Drugshandel en politiek geweld, in Justitile verkenningen, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 47-63. Vercher, A. (1992) Terrorism in Europe: an international comparative legal analysis, Oxford: Clarendon. Vervoorn, L. and R. Neve (2007) Contraterrorismewetgeving: Een overzicht van negentien EU lidstaten, WODC, pp. 1-22. Walker, C. (2002) Blackstones guide to the anti-terrorism legislation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walter, C. (2004) Terrorism as a challenge for national and international law: security versus liberty?, Berlin: Springer. Waugh, W.L. Jr. (1982) International terrorism: how nations respond to terrorists, Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications.

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Weinberg, L., A. Pedahzur and S. Hirsch-Hoefler (2004) The challenges of conceptualising terrorism, in Terrorism and Political violence, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 777-794. Wesseling, M. (2007) La coordination des politiques antiterrorists europennes: mission impossible, Eipascope Bulletin, no 2007/1, pp. 19-23. Whitehead, N.L. (2007) Violence and the cultural order, Daedalus, Winter 2007, pp 40-49. Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: MacMillan. Wilkinson, P. (1977 and 1986) Terrorism and the Liberal State, London: Macmillan. Wilkinson, P. (1991) Republican Violence Re-appraised, London: Research Institute for the study of Conflict and Terrorism. Wilkinson, P. (2003) Why Modern Terrorism? Differentiating Types and Distinguishing Ideological Motivations, in C.W. Kegley, jr. (ed.) The New Global Terrorism, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Wilkinson, P. (2006) Terrorism versus democracy: the liberal state response, London: Routledge. Williams, P. (2001) Organizing Transnational Crime: Networks, markets and Hierarchies, in P. Williams and D. Vlassis (2001) Combating Transnational Crime. Concepts, Activities and Responses, London: Frank Cass. Woodiwiss, M. (1993) Crimes Global Reach, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Worcester, K., S. Avery Bermanzohn and M. Ungar (eds.) (2002) Violence and Politics, Globalizations paradox, London: Routledge. Young, R. (2006) Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, vol 29, pp. 23-1050. Zaitch, D. (2002) Trafficking Cocaine. Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (bewerking proefschrift) The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Zisk, B.H. (1981) Political Research: A methodology sampler, Lexington Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company.

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951.

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EU DOCUMENTS Commission of the European Communities. September 19, 2001. Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of 13 June 2002 (2002/475/JHA). Council of the European Union (2001a) Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on combating terrorism, 2001/930/CFSP. Council of the European Union (2001b) Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, 2001/931/CFSP. Council of the European Union (2001c) Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism. Council of the European Union (2001d) Council Decision of 27 December 2001 establishing the list provided for in Article 2 (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, 2001/927/EC Council of the European Union (2001e) Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting. Council of the European Union (2001f) Interinstitutional File, 2001/0217. Council of the European Union (2002) Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism. European Council (1999) Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions. Europol and the European Commission (2001) Towards a European Strategy to Prevent Organised Crime, Working Paper, Europol and the European Commission: Brussels.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS

Denmark Vestergaard, J. (1989) Straffelovens skaldte "terrorismeparagraf" in Korpsforbuddet i 114. I (red.:) Flemming Balvig: Kriminalistisk Instituts

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rsberetning 1989. Kriminalistisk Instituts Stencilserie nr. 51, 1989, s. 117133.

France Loi 86-1020 du 03 Septembre 1986, LOI relative la lutte contre le terrorisme, retrieved from http://www.monimmeuble.com/Lois/loidu09.09.86terrorisme.htm on 1 August 2007. (2006) Visite la cour suprme du Canada: La Lutte contre le terrorisme dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, retrieved from http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/divers/documents/20060426.pdf on 1 August 2007. Baudou, Rmi (2007) French Territorial Security, Presentation UCLA, retrieved from http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=71985 on 1 August 2007. Bigo D. and C. Camus (2006) Overview of the French anti-terrorism strategy, WODC: Eerste inventarisatie van contraterrorismebeleid: Duitsland, Frankrijk, Itali, Spanje, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de Verenigde Staten research in progress, Workdocument No. 2, pp. 1-76. Ministre des Affaires trangres (2006) Terrorisme, retrieved from http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actionsfrance_830/terrorisme_1026/index.html on 1 August 2007. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2001/1274 (Letter concerning French counter-terrorism legislation).

Germany United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2002/11, (Report concerning CounterTerrorism measures taken by Germany). United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2002/1193, (Supplementary report). United Nations Security Council, Enclosure Doc S/2006/527. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2006/547. Albrecht, Hans-Jrg (2006) Country Report on Germany, WODC: Eerste inventarisatie van contraterrorismebeleid: Duitsland, Frankrijk, Itali, Spanje, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de Verenigde Staten research in progress, Workdocument No. 1.

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New Perspectives Quarterly (1995) The New Faces of Terrorism, retrieved from http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/1995_summer.lessons.html on 25 July 2007.

Italy United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2002/8. Council of Europe (2006) Thematic Review: Implementation of Council of Europe Conventions Against Terrorism: Italy. Montauti, M. and B. Vettori (2006) Italian contribution to the NCTB counterterrorism project, WODC: Eerste inventarisatie van contraterrorismebeleid: Duitsland, Frankrijk, Itali, Spanje, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de Verenigde Staten research in progress, Workdocument No. 3, pp. 1-40.

Netherlands Netherlands Association for the Judiciary, 2004. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2001/1264. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2006/682. Dolman, M.M. (2003) Terrorisme, Europa en strafrecht, Amserdam: Vossiuspers UvA. Koopstra, K. and P. Ende (2007) Wettelijk kader terrorismebestrijding, Rotterdam: SDU Uitgevers. NJCM Congres (2005) Terrorismebestrijding met mensenrechten, Leiden: NJCM.

Poland United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2001/1275. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2002/677.

Portugal United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2002/120. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2002/120/Add.1. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2003/1018. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2005/70. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2006/568.

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Russia CODEXTER, Country Profile Russia, April 2008. Online, retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/fight_against_terrorism/4_theme_files/apologie__incitement/CODEXTER%20Profiles%20_2008_%20Russian%20Federation %20E.pdf on 25 May 2008. Russian Federation Federal Law No. 130-FZ (1998), On the Fight Against Terrorism, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/law_980725.htm on 1 August 2007. PONARS Policy Memos (See also: http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/) No. 246, Hill, Fiona (2002) Extremists and Bandits How Russia views the War against Terrorism, pp. 1-4. No. 250, Alexeev, Michail A. (2002) Chechnya: 9/11, the Moscow Hostage Crisis, and Opportunity for Political Settlement, pp. 1-6. No. 281, Kramer, Mark (2002) Oversight of Russias Intelligence and Security Agencies: The Need for and Prospects of Democratic Control, pp. 1-5. No. 300, Hopf, Ted (2003) Putin and Bush, Perfect Together: Yet Russias Alliance with Europe is InevitablyEventually, pp. 1-6. No. 325, Stepanova, Ekaterina (2004) The Challenge of Terrorism in PostSaddam Iraq: A View from Russia, pp. 1-6. No. 345, Baev, Pavel K. (2004) Putins War in Chechnya: Who steers the course?, pp. 1-6. No. 392, Orttung, Robert and Louise Shelley (2005) Linkages Between Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in Nuclear Smuggling, pp. 159164. No. 415, Baev, Pavel K. (2006) Has Russia Achieved a Victory in Its War Against Terror?, pp. 1-5. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2001/1284. United Nations Security Council, Doc S/2006/98. Beknazar, T. B. (2004) Country Report on Russia in Walter, in C. (ed.) Terrorism as a challenge for national and international law: security versus liberty?, Berlin: Springer.

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Mockaitis, T. and P. B. Rich (2003) Grand strategy in the war against terrorism, London: Cass.

Spain CODEXTER, Country Profile Spain, December 2006, retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co%2Doperation/fight_against_te rrorism/4_theme_files/apologie__incitement/CODEXTER%20Profiles%20(2006)%20Spain%20E.pdf Ministry of the Interior (1987) Acuerdo de Madrid sobre Terrorismo (Agreement of Madrid on Terrorism), retrieved from www.mir.es/DGRIS/Documentos_Informativos/Documentos_informativos/D ocInf04.htm. Ministry of the Interior (2000) Acuerdo para las Libertades y Contra el Terrorismo (Agreement in favour of liberties and against Terrorism), retrieved from www.mir.es/DGRIS/Documentos_Informativos/Documentos_informativos/D ocInf06.htm. Soria, J.M. (2004) Country Report on Spain, in Terrorism as a challenge for national and international law: security versus liberty?, Berlin: Springer, pp. 517-556. Spanish Government (1995) On the crimes of Terrorism, Criminal Code art. 571-579, Official State Gazette, No. 281, retrieved from http://www.boe.es/g/eng/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1995 /25444 on 6 November 2007. Spanish Government (2000) LO 7/2000 de la responsabilidad de los Menores con los delitos de Terrorismo (Organic Act on the liability of minors in relation to terrorist crimes), Official State Gazette, No. 307. Spanish Government (2002) LO 6/2002 de Partidos Polticos (Organic Act on Political Parties), Official State Gazette., No. 154, art. 9.2.

Sweden Elwin, G. (1977) Swedish anti-terrorist legislation, Amsterdam: N/A. Privacy International (2004) The Kingdom of Sweden, retrieved from http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=x-34783530 on 15 November 2007.

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United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorism Act (Northern Ireland) 1974, retrieved from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/pta1974.htm on 26 July 2007. Review of the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000, The Home Secretarys Response to Lord Carlile of Berriews Report on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000. Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11), retrieved from www.statutelaw.gov.uk. Aksu, M., Buruma, Y. and P.H.P.H.M.C. Kempen (2006) Strafrechtelijke antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Spanje, Duitsland, Frankrijk en Italie, WODC: Eerste inventarisatie van contraterrorismebeleid: Duitsland, Frankrijk, Itali, Spanje, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de Verenigde Staten Workdocument No. 6. Amnesty International (2005) The Prevention of Terrorism Bill: A grave threat to human rights and the rule of law in the UK, retrieved from http://web/amnesty.org/library/prin/ENGEUR450052005 on 31 October 2006. Carlile of Berriew, Q.C. (2007) The Definition of Terrorism, Home Department, Cm7052. Counter-terrorism-law.org (2007) Review of definition of Terrorism in British Law published, retrieved from http://www.counter-terrorismlaw.org/Carliledefterror1.htm on 1 August 2007. Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Office (2005) Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected Countries. HM Government (2006) Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdoms Strategy, Cm 6888. Lord Lloyd of Berwick (1998) A consultation Paper, Presented to the Parliament by the Secretaryof State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland by Command of Her Majesty, Legislation Against Terrorism, Cm 4178, retrieved from http://www.archive.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/cm41/4178/4178.htm. Mekhennet, Souad and Dexter Filkins (2006) British Law Against Glorifying Terrorism Has Not Silenced Calls to Kill for Islam, The New York Times, August 21, 2006, retrieved from

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http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/08/21/world/europe/21london.html on 3 September 2007. Walker, Clive (2002) Blackstones Guide to Anti-terrorist Legislation, London: Blackstone, pp. 20-30.

INTERNET SITES De la Audiencia Nacional, retrieved from http://www.poderjudicial.es/eversuite/GetRecords?Template=cgpj/cgpj/pjge nerica.html&dkey=31&TableName=PJINFODOCS&DocName=dfAudienciaNac ional&ContentName=dfAudienciaNacional.htm on the 5th of November 2007. Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of 11 October 2001, 20 March 2002 and 21 May 2002, retrieved from www.poderjudicial.es/eversuite/GetRecords?Template=cgpj/ts/principal.htm Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 12 March 1993 and 29 November 1997, retrieved from www.poderjudicial.es/eversuite/GetRecords?Template=cgpj/ts/principal.htm

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APPENDIX I Table 1 European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism

Year 1977 Document Title European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, adopted 27 January 1977 Institution /Actor Council of Europe Definition Article 1 (a) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970; (b) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971; (c) a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; (d) an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious unlawful detention; (e) an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons; (f) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence. Article 2 (1) For the purpose of extradition between Contracting States, a Contracting State may decide not to regard as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives a serious offence involving an act of violence, other than one covered by Article 1, against the life, physical integrity or liberty of a person. (2) The same shall apply to a serious offence involving an act against property, other than one covered by Article 1, if the act created a collective danger for persons. (3) The same shall apply to an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence.

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Table 2 Protocol Amending the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism

Document Title Protocol Amending the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, adopted 15 May 2003 Institution/ Actor Council of the European Union

Year 2003

Definition Article 1 Introductory paragraph to Art. 1 of the Convention shall become paragraph 1 of this article. In sub-paragraph b of this paragraph, the term "signed" shall be replaced by the term "concluded" and sub-paragraphs c, d, e and f of this paragraph shall be replaced by the following sub-paragraphs: - "c an offence within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted at New York on 14 December 1973; - d an offence within the scope of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted at New York on 17 December 1979; - e an offence within the scope of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna 3 March 1980; - f an offence within the scope of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988;" Paragraph 1 of Art. 1 of the Convention shall be supplemented by the following four sub-paragraphs: - "g an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; - h an offence within the scope of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; - i an offence within the scope of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted at New York on 15 December 1997; - - j an offence within the scope of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted at New York on 9 December 1999."

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The Text of Art. 1 of the Convention shall be supplemented by the following paragraph: - "2 Insofar as they are not covered by the conventions listed under paragraph 1**, the same shall apply, for the purpose of extradition between Contracting States, not only to the commission of the principal offences as a perpetrator but also to: (a) the attempt to commit any of these principal offences; (b) he participation as an accomplice in the perpetration of any of these principal offences or in an attempt to commit any of them; (c) organizing the perpetration of, or directing others to commit or attempt to commit, any of these principal offences."

Article 2 Paragraph 3 of Art. 2 of the Convention shall be amended to read as follows: "3 The same shall apply to: (a) the attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences; (b) the participation as an accomplice in any of the foregoing offences or in an attempt to commit any such offence; (c) organizing the perpetration of, or directing others to commit or attempt to commit, any of the foregoing offences."

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Table 3 Council of the Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism

Year 2005

Document Title Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, adopted 16 May 2005

Institution /Actor Council of Europe

Definition Article 1 (1) For the purpose of this Convention, terrorist offence means any of the offences within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the Appendix

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Table 4 Council of the European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism

Year 2002 Document Title Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 13 June 2002 (2002/475/JHA) Institution /Actor Council of the European Union Definition Article 1 (Terrorist offences and fundamental rights and principles) 1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization, shall be deemed to be terrorist offences: (a) attacks upon a persons life which may cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons; (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life; (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life; (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h) Article 2 (Offences relating to a terrorist group) 1. For the purposes of this Framework Decision, "terrorist group" shall mean: a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in

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concert to commit terrorist offences. "Structured group" shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined role for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure. 2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following intentional acts are punishable: (a) directing a terrorist group; (b) participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group. Article 3 (Offences linked to terrorist activities) Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that terrorist-linked offences include the following acts: (a) aggravated theft with a view to committing one of the acts listed in Article 1(1); (b) extortion with a view to the perpetration of one of the acts listed in Article 1(1); (c) drawing up false administrative documents with a view to committing one of the acts listed in Article 1(1)(a) to (h) and Article 2(2)(b) Article 5 (Penalties) 1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail extradition. 2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the terrorist offences referred to in Article 1(1) and offences referred to in Article 4, inasmuch as they relate to terrorist offences, are punishable by custodial sentences heavier than those imposable under national law for such offences in the absence of the special intent required pursuant to Article 1(1), save where the sentences imposable are already the maximum possible sentences under national law. 3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that offences listed in Article 2 are punishable by custodial sentences, with a maximum sentence of not less than fifteen years for the offence referred to in Article 2(2)(b) a maximum sentence of not less than eight years. In so far as the offence referred to in Article 2(2)(a) refers only to the act in Article 1(1)(i), the maximum sentence shall not be less than eight years.

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Table 5 Commission of the EC Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism
Year 2001 Document Title Commission Proposal for Framework Decision, 27 November 2001 (2001/C 322 E/17; COM (2001) 521 final 2001/0217 (CNS)) Institution/ Actor European Commission Definition Article 3 (Terrorist Offences) 1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following offences, defined according to its national law, which are intentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic, or social structures of a country, will be punishable as terrorist offences: (a) Murder; (b) Bodily injuries; (c) Kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) Extortion; (e) Theft or robbery; (f) Unlawful seizure of or damage to state or government facilities, means of public transport, infrastructure facilities, places of public use, and property; (g) Fabrication, possession, acquisition, transport or supply of weapons or explosives; (h) Releasing contaminating substances, or causing fires, explosions or floods, endangering people, property, animals or the environment; (i) Interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power, or other fundamental resources; (j) Attacks through interference with an information system; (k) Threatening to commit any of the offences listed above; (l) Directing a terrorist group; (m) Promoting of, supporting of or participating in a terrorist group. 2. For the purpose of this Framework Decision, terrorist group shall mean a structured organization established over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert to commit terrorist offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) to (1)(k).

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Table 6 Terrorism Act 2000 (United Kingdom)

Year 2000 Document Title Terrorism Act 2000 (Available through the Stationery Office Limited as the Terrorism Act 2000, ISBN 0 10 541100 0) Institution/ Actor United Kingdom Definition 1 (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where (a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within this subsection if it (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use or firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. (4) In this section (a) "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom, (b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and (d) "the government" means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. (5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.

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Table 7 Nouveau Code Pnal (France)

Year 1996 Document Title Nouveau Code Pnal Institution/ Actor France Definition Article 421-1 of the Nouveau Code Pnal sets out that : The following acts constitute acts of terrorism, when they are intentionally in connection with a one-man or collective undertaking, aiming to seriously disturb the peace through intimidation or terror (Law 96-647 of 22 July 1996): 1. Any deliberate attacks on the life or integrity of a person, kidnapping and illegal confinement, the hijacking of aircraft, ships or any other method of transport, defined in book II of the current code; 2. Theft, extortion, destruction, damage and deterioration, as well as offences regarding information technology, defined in book II of the current code; 3. Offences regarding combat groups and disbanded movements as defined in Articles 431-13 to 431-17, as well as offences defined in Articles 434-6 and 441-5 (Law 96-647 of 22 July 1996); 4. The manufacture or possession of machines or devices designed to kill or to explode, defined in Article 3 of the law of 19 June 1871, repealing the decree of 4 September 1870 concerning the manufacture of weapons of war; the production, sale, import or export of explosive substances, defined in Article 6 of Law 70-575 of 3 July 1970, reforming laws regarding gunpowders and explosive substances; the purchase, possession, transportation or illegitimate carrying of explosive substances or devices made with the help of those substances, defined in Article 38 of the decree-law of 18 April 1939 determining the regime with regard to materials of war, weapons and munitions; the possession, carriage or transportation of weapons and munitions of the first and fourth categories, defined in Articles 24, 28, 31 and 32 of the decree-law of 18 April 1939 (Law 96-647 of 22 July 1996); the offences defined in Articles 1 and 4 of Law 72-467 of 9 June 1972 prohibiting the perfecting, manufacturing, possession, storage, purchase and transfer of biological weapons or weapons based on toxins; and the offences foreseen by Articles 58 to 63 of Law 98-467 of 17 June 1998 relating to the application of the Convention of 13 January 1993 on the prohibition of the perfecting, manufacture, storing and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction (Law 98-467 of 17 June 1998); 5. The receipt of the product of any of the offences listed in points 1 to 4 (Law 96647 of 22 July 1996).

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Table 8 Cdigo Penal (Spain)

Year Document Title Cdigo Penal (Official State Gazette No. 281 of 24 November 1995) Institution/ Actor Spain Definition Article 571 of the Cdigo Penal defines terrorists as those who belonging, acting in the service of or collaborating with armed groups, organizations or groups whose objective is to subvert the constitutional order or seriously alter public peace commit the attacks described in Article 346 (attacks on buildings or transportation or communications infrastructure with the use of explosive devices) and Article 351 (arson causing risk of injury or death).

1995

154

Table 9 Council Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism
Year 2001 Document Title Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP) Institution /Actor Council of the European Union Definition Article 1 1. This Common Position applies in accordance with the provisions of the following Articles to persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts and listed in the Annex. 2. For the purposes of this Common Position, persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts shall mean: persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or who participate in, or facilitate, the commission of terrorist acts, groups and entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and persons, groups and entities acting on behalf of, or under the direction of, such persons, groups and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons, groups or entities. 3. For the purposes of this Common Position, terrorist act shall mean one of the following intentional acts, which, given its nature or its context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, as defined as an offence under national law, where committed with the aim of: (i) seriously intimidating a population, or (ii) unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation: (a) attacks upon a persons life which may cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of

155

weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons; (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, explosions or floods the effect of which is to endanger human life; (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life; (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed under (a) to (h); (j) directing a terrorist group; (k) participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the group.

Table 10 EC Council Regulation 2580/2001

Year Document Title EC Council Regulation 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 (L 344/70 Official Journal of the European Communities ) Institution /Actor European Council Definition Article 1, par. 4 For the purposes of this Regulation, the definition of terrorist act shall be the one contained in Article 1 (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.

2001

156

Table 11 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

Year 1999 Document Title International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted 9 December 1999 (A/RES/54/109) Institution /Actor Multilateral Treaty Definition Article 2 1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: (a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. Article 14 None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives. Article 21 Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law and other relevant conventions.

157

Table 12 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004)

Year Document Title United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), 8 October 2004 Institution /Actor UN Security Council Definition Operative paragraph 3: criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature. Preambulair paragraph: Reminding States that they must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.

2004

158

Table 13 High Level Panels Report on Threats, Challenges and Change

Year Document Title High Level Panels Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, 2 December 2004 (Doc. A/59/565) Institution /Actor UN Secretary Generals High Level Panel Definition Par. 146: (a) Recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity; (b) Restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti -terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols; (c) Reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004); (d) Description of terrorism as any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

2004

159

Table 14 Draft Comprehensive Convention on Combating Terrorism

Year Document Title Draft Comprehensive Convention on Combating Terrorism (Document A/C.6/55/L.2) Institution/ Actor United Nations Sixth Committee Definition Article 2 (1) Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, does an act intended to cause: (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) Serious damage to a State or government facility, a public transportation system, communication system or infrastructure facility with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, or where such destruction results or is likely to result in major economic loss; when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. Article 3 of the draft Convention states that the Convention is not applicable when an offence is committed within a single state, and when the offender is a national of that state and is present in the territory of that state.

First propos al in 1996

160

Table 15 Convention of the OIC on Combating International Terrorism

Year Document Title Convention of the OIC on Combating International Terrorism, adopted on 1 July 1999 Institution /Actor
Organisation of the Islamic Conference

Definition Article 1 (2): [T]errorism means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions, perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty or independent States. Terrorist crime means any crime executed, started or participated in to realize a terrorist objective in any of the contracting States or against its nations, assets or interests of foreign facilities and national residing in its territory punishable by its internal law. Article 2 (a): Peoples struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.

1999

161

Table 16 Legal elements in European and other international definitions

Document title Mens Rea Purpose Qualification of the act Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism Article 1 refers to the intentional character of the acts Article 1 refers to the aims of the acts, namely: seriously intimidating a population, compelling a government of international organisation, destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures. However, no mention is made of the motivation behind the acts. Article 1 refers to the fact that the acts should be offences under national law; they can be causing death or be attacks on the physical integrity of a person, and can cause serious material destruction; and article 1 also lists several specific outings of terrorist acts. Special mention is made of the threat of committing these acts Article 2 adds that also directing a terrorist group, as well as participating in, or funding is also considered to be a terrorist offence. No specific mention is made of a delimited target group such as civil population or noncombatants. . Article 1 refers to acts against persons, Government or public facilities. Although no specific perpetrators are appointed, a definition is given of a terrorist group in article 2. A non-binding declaration distinguishes acts of terrorism from political protests and the peaceful exercise of the right to selfdetermination. Target Perpetrator Scope

162

Council Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism

Article 1 (3) refers to the intentional character of the acts.

Article 1 (3) points to the aim of the acts, namely the intimidation of a population, compelling a Government or an international organisation, destabilising or destroying a political, constitutional, economic or social structure. The motivation behind the acts is not mentioned.

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

The intentional character of the act is emphasized in Article 2 by referring to the term wilfully and the intension to cause death and

The purpose of the act should be to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an intentional organisation to do

Article 1 (3) demands that acts should be offences under national law. Moreover, reference is made to specific acts, such as attacks upon a persons life, attacks upon the physical integrity of a person, kidnapping and hostage taking, extensive destruction of a Government of public facility. Furthermore, threats are included as terrorist acts, as well as activities such as directing a terrorist group and participating in activities of a terrorist group. The acts committed must be unlawful. The definition further refers to causing death and serious bodily injury

No specific mention is made of a delimited target group such as civil population or noncombatants. Article 1 does mention however that individuals, as well as Government or public facilities could be the target.

Article 1 (1 and 2) No exceptions are made to the refers to and defines persons, scope. groups and entities as the perpetrators of terrorist acts. Clearly, state entities are not included in these categories.

Targets can be civilians or noncombatants.

Any person can be Political offences the perpetrator. are excluded from the scope of the definition. The lawful exercise of other rights, obligations and

163

serious bodily injury.

or to abstain from doing any act. No mention is made of the further motivation behind the attacks.

UN Security The intentional Council Resolution character is 1566 (2004) stressed.

The purpose of the act should be to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act. The resolution stresses that under no circumstances as consideration of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar

The acts are characterized as criminal. Furthermore acts that cause death or serious bodily injury, as well as taking of hostages fall under the scope of the definition.

The resolutions only mentions that criminal acts, including against civilians, fall under the scope of the definition. This suggests that also states or other organisations can be the target.

No mention is made of the perpetrators of the act.

responsibilities of States are moreover not affected by the scope of the definition. This means that the rightful exercise of for example the right to selfdetermination is preserved. Although no exclusion of the scope in included in the definition, the preambulair paragraph does refer to the obligations under international law that should be adhered while combating terrorism. These rules include human rights, and the for example the rightful exercise of the right to selfdetermination.

164

High Level Panels Report on Threats, Challenges and Change

Acts should have an intention to cause the specified effects.

nature can be justifiable. The purpose of the act should be to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.

Any action that causes death or serious bodily harm with the specified purposes falls under the scope of the definition.

No perpetrators The target group consist of civilians are specified. or noncombatants.

Draft Comprehensive Convention on Combating Terrorism

The intentional character of the act is stressed by reference to the words intentionally, intended, and the intent to cause extensive destruction.

The purpose of the act should be, by its nature or context, to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.

Convention of the OIC on Combating International Terrorism

The intentional character of the act follows from the reference to the fact that a criminal plan is being carried out.

The motives or intentions of the perpetrators do not have any influence on the terrorist character of the acts when the aim is to

The acts should be unlawful. Any means can be used to perpetrate the act. Death or serious bodily injury and serious damage to a State or public or governmental facility, a communication system or infrastructure facility. Acts of violence or threats that follow from a criminal plan.

The target group can be any person, the State or government facility.

Excepted from the scope of the definition is the use of force against civilians by states, since these crimes would fall under the scope of the Geneva Conventions and other instruments. Any person can be Excepted from the scope of the the perpetrator. Convention are acts committed within a single state, or when the offender is a national of that state and is present in the territory of that state.

No specific delimitations as to the target group are given. Reference is made however to people, governments, and

No specifics are given in reference to the perpetrators.

Excepted from the scope of the definition is the struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and

165

terrorize people or threatening to harm them or imperil their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or expose the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty or independent States.

international facilities.

hegemony, aimed at liberation and selfdetermination, as long as these acts are in accordance with the principles of international law.

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APPENDIX II Table 1 Czech Republic

Year 2004 Document Title Czech Penal Code Act No. 140/1961 Coll, 95 Institution /Actor Czech government Definition Art 95 Terrorist Act who with the intention to damage the constitutional order or the defense capability of the state, damage or destroy the basic political and economic or social structure of the state or an international organization, seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling a Government or other government body or an international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, (a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death; or the physical integrity of a person; (b) kidnapping or hostage taking; (c) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (d) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life or endangers property with damage of great scale; (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; or takes over the control, or damages navigation equipment or in greater scale interferes with the operation or give an important false information and endanger human life or health, safety of transport means or endangers property with damage of great scale; manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons or different weapon or fighting mean or explosives forbidden by the law or international treaty or endanger human life or seriously threatens their health or endangers property with damage of great scale by causing fire or flooding or damaging influence of explosives, gas, electricity or other dangerous substances or undertakes similarly dangerous acts or increases such danger or interacts with lowering or averting the danger;

167

Table 2 Denmark
Year 1996 Document Title Danish penal code Institution/ Actor Danish Government/ Ministry of Justice Definition Art 114 :A person who participates in or contributes substantially financially or in other ways to a corps, group or union which has the intention through use of force to influence public affairs or cause disturbances of the established order will be punished with up to 6 years imprisonment. Stk. 2. A Person who participates in an illegal military organization or group will be punished with a fine or up to 4 months imprisonment or under aggravating circumstances with up to 2 years imprisonment Art 114: For acts of terrorism a person will be sentenced with up to life time if the person with the intent to scare a population severely or wrongfully force Danish or foreign public authorities or an international organization to act or abstain from acting or to destabilize or damage a country or an international organizations fundamental political, constitutional, economic or societal structures commits one or more of the following acts, when the act in its character or the context in which it takes place can cause severe damage to a country or international organization: 1) manslaughter ( 237) 2) severe violence ( 245 or 246) 3) confinement ( 261) 4) disturbance of the road safety ( 184, p. 1; 193, p. 1; 291, p. 2) 5) hijacking of means of transportation (183a) 6) gross violation of the law on weapons ( 192 a or 10, p. 2) 7) arson ( 180) explosion, spreading of injurious gasses, flooding, ship wreck, damage of railway or other means of transportation ( 183, p. 1 and 2) hazardous contamination of the water supply ( 186, p. 1) hazardous contamination of objects intended for common spreading etc. (187,1) 8) possession or employment etc. of radioactive substances ( 192 b) This carries into effect the EU decisions on fighting terrorism. Additionally 114 a and b penalizes financial or other types of aid to terrorism to a broader extent than prior. According to 114a it is punishable with up to 10 years to 1) directly or indirectly contribute financially, 2) directly or indirectly provide or collect funds, 3) directly or indirectly provide money, other assets or any financial or other services To persons, groups or organizations which commit or intent to commit acts of terrorism as

2002

Danish penal code

Danish Government

168

defined in 114. According to 114b it is punishable with up to 6 years to encourage, advice or act in ways that contribute to criminal activity or to the goals of a group or organization, which commits one or more of the actions mentioned in 114 or 114 a no. 1 or no. 2 when the activity or goals result in one or more of these actions being committed. These decisions are partly an effectuation of the UN convention on the financing of terrorism and the UN resolution 1373 (2001). A specific decision on prevention of the spreading of weapons of mass-destruction has been added in 114e.

169

Table 3 France
Year 1996 Document Title French Criminal Law Titel II Of Terrorism Institution/ Actor French Government Definition Act no. 96- 647 & Act no. 98-348: The following offences constitute acts of terrorism where they are committed intentionally in connection with an individual or collective undertaking the purpose of which is seriously to disturb the public order through intimidation or terror: 1 wilful attacks on life, wilful attacks on the physical integrity of persons, abduction and unlawful detention and also as the hijacking of planes, vessels or any other means of transport, defined by Book II of the present Code; 2 theft, extortion, destruction, defacement and damage, and also computer offences, as defined under Book III of the present Code; 3 offences committed by combat organisations and disbanded movements as defined under articles 431-13 to 431-17, and the offences set out under articles 434-6, 441-2 to 441-5; 4 the production or keeping of machines, dangerous or explosive devices, set out under article 3 of the Act of 19th June 1871 which repealed the Decree of 4th September 1870 on the production of military grade weapons; - the production, sale, import or export of explosive substances as defined by article 6 of the Act no. 70-575 of 3rd July 1970 amending the regulations governing explosive powders and substances; - the purchase, keeping, transport or unlawful carrying of explosive substances or of devices made with such explosive substances, as defined by article 38 of the Ordinance of 18th April 1939 defining the regulations governing military equipment, weapons and ammunition; - the detention, carrying, and transport of weapons and ammunition falling under the

170

first and fourth categories defined by articles 4, 28, 31 and 32 of the aforementioned Ordinance; - the offences defined by articles 1 and 4 of the Act no. 72-467 of 9th June 1972 forbidding the designing, production, keeping, stocking, purchase or sale of biological or toxin-based weapons; - the offences referred to under articles 58 to 63 of the Act no. 98-467 of 17th June 1998 on the application of the Convention of the 13th January 1993 on the prohibition of developing, producing, stocking and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction; 5 receiving the product of one of the offences set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 above. Art.421 sub 7.: Les dlits d'initi prvus l'article L. 465-1 du code montaire et financier. Which means in combination with the rest of the article that finance of terrorism and monetary offences have been made punishable. To fight terrorism effectively, we must be able to name it and define it: any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. Although there is not an international consensus behind this definition yet, France accepted it from the start. It describes a form of violence that our country has known for more than two centuries.

1996

French Penal Code Govern-ment White Paper: La France face au terrorisme, Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la scurit intrieure face au terrorisme

French Government French Government

2006

171

Table 4 Germany
Year 1998 Document Title Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code): Section 129a Formation of Terrorist Organizations Institution/ Actor German Government Definition Art. 1-7: (1) Whoever forms an organization, the objectives or activity of which are directed towards the commission of: 1. murder, manslaughter or genocide (Sections 211,212 or 220a); 2. crimes against personal liberty in cases under Sections 239a or 239b; or 3. crimes under Section 305a or crimes dangerous to the public in cases under Sections 306 to 306c or 307 subsections (1) to (3), 308 subsections (1) to (4), 309 subsections (1) to (5), 313, 314 or 315 subsections (1),3 or 4, 316b subsections (1) or (3), or 316c subsections (1) to (3), or whoever participates in such an organization as a member, shall be punished with imprisonment from one year to ten years. (2) If the perpetrator is one of the ringleaders or supporters, then imprisonment for no less than three years shall be imposed. (3) Whoever supports an organization indicated in subsection (1) or recruits for it, shall be punished with imprisonment from six months to five years. (4) The court in its discretion may mitigate the punishment (Section 49 subsection (2)) in cases under subsections (1) and (3) in the case of participants whose guilt is slight or whose participation is of minor significance. (5) Section 129 subsection (6), shall apply accordingly. (6) Collateral to imprisonment for at least six months, the court may deprive the person of the capacity to hold public office and the capacity to attain public electoral rights (Section 45 subsection (2)). (7) In cases under subsections (1) and (2) the court may order supervision of conduct (Section 68 subsection (1)).

172

Table 5 Italy
Year 1980 Document Title Law n. 15 of 1980 Institution/ Actor Italian Government Definition Art 270 bis: Associations with purposes of terrorism, including international terrorism, or purposes of subversion of the democratic order 1. Whoever, within the territory of the State, who promotes, establishes, organizes or runs associations aimed at violently establishing the dictatorship of a social class on the other classes or at violently suppressing a social class or subverting the economic and social systems constituted within the State is sentenced from five to twelve years of imprisonment. 2. The same sentence applies to whoever within the territory of the State promotes, establishes, organizes or runs associations aimed at violently suppressing each political and legal system of the society. 3. Whoever takes part in these associations is sentenced from one to three years of imprisonment. 4. Sentences are increased for those who re-establish, including under a false name or fake form, the abovementioned associations whose dissolution has been ordered. Art 270 bis: Associations with purposes of terrorism, including international terrorism, or purposes of subversion of the democratic order 1. Whoever promotes, establishes, organizes, runs or finances associations aimed at the commission of violent acts with the purpose of terrorism or of subversion of the democratic order is sentenced from seven to fifteen years of imprisonment. 2. Whoever takes part in these associations is sentenced from five to ten years of imprisonment. 3. Under penal law, the purpose of terrorism is verified as also including violent acts targeted at a foreign State, institution and international organisation. 4. In the case of conviction for this offence, the things which were used for its commission and those representing the price, product and profit of the offence or the use thereof are mandatorily confiscated.

2001

Law n. 438 of 2001

Italian government

173

2005

Law n. 155 of 2005

Italian government

Art 270 sexies: On Conducts with the purpose of terrorism Conducts with the purpose of terrorism are all the conducts that, due to their nature or context, can cause serious damage to a country or to an international organisation and are committed in order to intimidate the population or force public authorities or international organizations to perform or not to perform a given act, or to destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic and social structures of a country or of international organization, as well as any other conduct defined as terrorism, or committed for the purpose of terrorism, by conventions or other provisions of international law which are binding for Italy.

174

Table 6 The Netherlands

Year 2004 Document Title Crimes of Terrorism Act Institution/ Actor Dutch Government Definition Article 83 A terrorist crime is understood to mean: 1. any of the crimes described in Articles 92 to 96, 108, paragraph two, 115, paragraph two, 117, paragraph two, 121, 122, 157, section 3, 161quater, section 2, 164, paragraph two, 166, section 3, 168, section 2, 170, section 3, 174, paragraph two, and 289, as well as in Article 80, paragraph two, of the Nuclear Energy Act, if the crime has been committed with a terrorist objective; 2. any of the crimes which carry prison sentences by virtue of Articles 114a, 114b, 120a, 120b, 130a, 176a, 176b, 282c, 289a, 304a, 304b, 415a and 415b, as well as Article 80, paragraph three, of the Nuclear Energy Act; 3. any of the crimes described in Articles 140a, 282b, 285, paragraph three, and 288a, as well as in Article 55, paragraph five of the Weapons and Ammunition Act, Article 6, paragraph four, of the Economic Offences Act, Article 33a of the Explosives for Civil Uses Act and Article 79 of the Nuclear Energy Act. Article 83a A terrorist objective is understood to mean the objective to cause serious fear in (part) of the population in a country and/or to unlawfully force a government or international organisation to do something, not to do something, or to tolerate certain actions and/or to seriously disrupt or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

Table 7 Poland
Year 2004 Document Title Kodeks Karny art. 115/20 Institution/ Actor Ministry of Justice Definition A crime of terrorist nature is a crime ... comitted in order to: 1) seriously intimidate a group of people; 2.) force a state institution of the Republic of Poland or of other country or of an international organization to assume or forbear a specific action; 3) cause a serious disruption to the political or economic system of the Republic of Poland, of other country or of an international organization or to threat with such actions.

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Table 8 Portugal
Year 2003 Document Title Act 52/2003 of 22 August for the Fight Against Terrorism Institution /Actor Portuguese government Definition Article 2.1 establishes what a terrorist organization is: A terrorist group, organization or association is a grouping of two or more persons that, acting in a coordinated manner, try to damage national integrity and independence, to prevent, alter or subvert the operation of the institutions of the State foreseen in the Constitution, to force the public authorities to execute, refrain from making or tolerate the making of an action, or to intimidate specific persons, groups of persons or the population in general by committing: a) Crimes against the life, physical integrity or freedom of people; b) Crimes against transport or communication security, including computer, telegraph, telephone, radio or television; c) Crimes entailing the creation, in bad faith, of common danger, through fires, explosions, release of radioactive substances, toxic or suffocating gases, flooding or avalanche, collapse of constructions, contamination of food or water for human consumption or spreading of diseases, plagues, harmful plants or animals; d) Actions that destroy or prevent the operation, or the normal purposes of communication means or pathways, public service installations or installations for the supply and satisfaction of vital needs of the population, definitively or temporarily, totally or partially; e) Research or development of biological or chemical weapons; f) Crimes implying or using nuclear energy, fire arms, biological or chemical weapons, or explosive devices, all manner of incendiary means, bomb letters, provided that due to their nature or the context in which they are committed, these actions may seriously affect the State or the population intended to be intimidated. Article 4 deals with the crime of terrorism: which is any of the previous acts within the scope of terrorist organizations. Article 4.2 includes a series of second degree crimes of terrorism (instrumental), which are qualified robbery, theft or extortion, the forgery of administrative documents, so as to commit terrorist crimes. It contemplates punishment, like article 5, which includes the punishment of international terrorism acts, referring to article 2.1 of the same act (Act 52/2003). Article 1 on Legal definitions includes in article 1.2 a definition of terrorism equaling it to violent or highly organized criminality, referring to articles 2 and 3 of Act 52/2003. It sets forth that behaviors that fulfill the following characteristics shall be deemed as cases of terrorism, violent or highly organized criminality:

2003

Criminal Proceeding Code (Act 78/1987 of

Portuguese government

176

17 February). Subsequent modificatio ns.

a) Integrate the crimes foreseen in Article 299 of the Criminal Code and Articles 2 and 3 of Act 52/2003 of 22 August. Are targeted, in bad faith, against the life, physical integrity or freedom of people and are punishable with prison sentences of 5 years or over.

Table 9 Russia
Year 2006 Document Title Federal Law on Countering Terrorism Institution/ Actor Russian Government Definition Terrorism shall mean the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the adoption of a decision by state power bodies, local self-government bodies or international organisations connected with frightening the population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions. Terrorist activity shall mean activity including the following: a) arranging, planning, preparing, financing and implementing an act of terrorism; b) instigation of an act of terrorism; c) establishment of an unlawful armed unit, criminal association (criminal organisation) or an organised group for the implementation of an act of terrorism, as well as participation in such a structure; d) recruiting, arming, training and using terrorists; e) informational or other assistance to planning, preparing or implementing an act of terrorism; f) popularisation of terrorist ideas, dissemination of materials or information urging terrorist activities, substantiating or justifying the necessity of the exercise of such activity Terrorist act shall mean making an explosion, arson or other actions connected with frightening the population and posing the risk of loss of life, of causing considerable damage to property or the onset of an ecological catastrophe , as well as other especially grave consequences, for the purpose of unlawful influence upon the adoption of a decision by state power bodies, local selfgovernment bodies or international organisations, as well as the threat of committing the said actions for the same purpose

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Table 10 Spain
Year Document Title Institut ion/Act or La Audienci a Nacional Definition

1977

De La Audiencia Nacional (Spain)

1987

Acuerdo de Madrid sobre Terrorismo (Agreement of Madrid on Terrorism)

1995

Introduced by LO 10/1995 de reforma del Cdigo Penal (Organic Act on the reform of the Criminal Code)

Ministeri o del Interior (Ministr y of the Interior, Spain) Spanish Criminal Code

Art. 65: States which criminal offences are assigned to La Audiencia Nacional including offences against the crown and government, money laundering and other offences which affect the organized democratic state and civil peace. Art. 66: States specifically that La Audiencia Nacional deals with terrorist acts. It establishes that terrorism is a State problem. Item 1.3 sets forth that continuous assassination, economic extortion and any other forms of violence or intimidation, as methods of a false political action, threaten to destroy the Basque society itself, prevent the development of citizen liberties and tolerance, and create conditions that prevent the overcoming of the deep economic crisis it is going through.

2000

Acuerdo para las Libertades y

Ministeri o del

Articles 571-579 On the crimes of terrorism. A crime of terrorism is that intended to subvert the constitutional order or seriously alter public peace. The Code contemplates specific crimes (attacks, kidnappings, injuries, devastation, arms possession, etc.) committed by people belonging to organizations or groups, the purpose of which is to subvert the constitutional order or public peace. It categorizes and defines what collaboration with a terrorist organization is (Article 576.2 of the Criminal Code: Reporting on or surveilling people, assets or premises; building, fitting out, providing or using housing or deposits; hiding or transferring persons linked to armed bands, terrorist organizations or groups; organizing or being present in training sessions, and, in general, cooperating, helping or mediating, in any other similar manner, in economic terms or others, in or with the activities of the aforementioned armed bands, terrorist organizations or groups, shall be regarded as collaboration acts.). Article 577 also contemplates serious crimes carried out by persons that are not part of a terrorist organization, but are also made with the purpose of subverting the constitutional order or the public peace. The Criminal Code also contemplates the belonging to an armed band, terrorist organization or group, without defining what these organizations are (Articles 515.2 and 516.1.) It defines the ETA strategy as follows: It tries to spread fear so that citizens and institutions give up their principles, ideas and rights, thus reaching its goals because since these are only

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2002

Contra el Terrorismo (Agreement in favour of liberties and against Terrorism) LO 6/2002 de Partidos Polticos (Organic Act on Political Parties)

Interior (Ministr y of the Interior, Spain) Ministry of Justice (Spain)

shared by a minority, are exclusive and are xenophobic, they would never find a place within democracy. Item 1 of the Agreement states that terrorism is a State problem and item 5 stresses that crimes of terrorist organizations are particularly serious and reprehensible because they try to subvert the democratic order and spread fear among citizens

Article 9.2 sets forth that parties whose activities are against the democratic principles are illegal if they seek to deteriorate or destroy the regime of liberties or to prevent or to eliminate the democratic system through any of the following behaviors, performed repeatedly and seriously: a) Breaching fundamental liberties and rights, promoting, justifying or exculpating attacks against the life or the integrity of persons, or the exclusion or persecution of persons, by reason of their ideology, religion, or beliefs, nationality, race, sex or sexual orientation; b) Promoting, encouraging or legitimating violence as a means to achieve political goals or to eliminate the required conditions for democracy, pluralism and political liberties; c) Complementing and supporting, in political terms, the action of terrorist organizations for the purpose of achieving their goal of subverting the constitutional order or seriously altering the public peace, trying to subject public authorities, specific persons or groups of the society or the population in general to a terror atmosphere, or helping multiply the effects of terrorist violence and the fear and intimidation generated by it.

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Table 11 Sweden
Year 2002 Document Title New Act on Criminal Responsibili ty for Terrorist Crimes Institution/ Actor Swedish Government Definition 2 For terrorism the person who commits an act mentioned in 3 will be sentenced if the act can severely damage a state or an international organization and the intent of the act is to: 1) severely scare a population or a group within a population. 2) wrongfully coerce public authorities or an international organization to act or abstain from acting. 3) seriously destabilize or damage fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a state or an international organization. The sentence will be between four and ten years, or lifetime. If the crime is less severe the sentence will be between two and six years. If a higher sentence is mentioned as the lowest possible in the penal code this will be valid. 3 the following acts can be considered acts of terrorism under the conditions mentioned in 2 in this law. 1) murder (penal code, 1, chapt. 3) 2) manslaughter (penal code, 2, chapt. 3) 3) severe cruelty ( penal code, 6, chapt. 3) 4) kidnapping ( penal code, 1, chapt. 4) 5) illegal confinement ( penal code, 2, chapt. 4) 6) severe damaging of person ( penal code 3, chapt. 12) 7) arson causing loss of life and severe arson causing loss of life ( penal code 1 and 2, chapt. 13) 8) malicious damage ( penal code, 3, chapt. 13) 9) sabotage and severe sabotage ( penal code, 4 and 5, chapt.13) 10) hijacking or sabotage of shipping or aviation ( penal code, 5 a, chapt. 13) 11) sabotage of airports ( penal code 5b, Chapt. 13) 12) spreading of poisons or infections ( penal code 7, chapt. 13) 13) illegal association with chemical weapons ( penal code 6a, chapt. 22) 14) intentional crimes with weapons ( weapons law 1, chapt. 9) 15) crimes according to 21, p. 3 of law 1988:868 on inflammables and explosives. 16) intentional crimes according to 25 and 26 of law (1992:1300) on war equipment that is nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical, devices for spreading radiological, biological or chemical substances and special parts or substances for such equipment.

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17) crimes according to 18 and 20 of law (2000:1064) on control of products with dual spheres of application and of technical assistance, where such products or assistance can be used for manufacturing nuclear-, biological or chemical weapons. 18) smugling or severe smugling ( 3 and 5 law (2000:1225)) if goods mentioned in 14) through 17) are smuggled. 19) illegal threats (penal code 5, chapt. 4) threatening to commit the acts mentioned in 1) through 18)

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Table 12 United Kingdom

Year 2000 Document Title Terrorism Act 2000 Institution/ Actor British Government Definition (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where(a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within this subsection if it(a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. (4) In this section(a) "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom, (b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and (d) "the government" means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. (5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organization.

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