ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO A.

PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents. DECISION TORRES, JR., J.: A word or group of words conveys intentions. When used truncatedly, its meaning disappears and breeds conflict. Thus, it is written - By thy words shalt thou be justified, and by thy words shalt thou be condemned. (Matthew, 12:37) Construing the new words of a statute separately is the raison detre of this appeal. Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case. The facts are not reproduced as follows: disputed, and are hereby

residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985. Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendantappellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the compromise agreement, defendant-appellant Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement, which the court granted in its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution dated August 3, 1982, a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same

On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of

was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283. When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4 1984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N109417 was ssued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as scheduled. On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand, defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed this complaint dated January 11, 1986 on February 5, 1986.[1] The Sajonases filed their complaint[2] in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against Domingo Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The relevant portion of the complaint alleges: 7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of the defendant, have already transferred, conveyed and assigned all their title, rights and interests to the plaintiffs and there was no more title, rights or interests therein which the defendant could levy upon; 8. That the annotation of the levy on execution which was carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegal and invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in view of

the existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by the plaintiffs on the corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses; 9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the cancellation of the said notice of levy but the latter, without justifiable reason and with the sole purpose of harassing and embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and refused plaintiffs demand; 10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of the defendant to cause the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution, the plaintiffs were compelled to litigate and engage the services of the undersigned counsel, to protect their rights and interests, for which they agreed to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000 and appearance fees of P500 per day in court.[3] Pilares filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim[4] on March 8, 1986, raising special and affirmative defenses, the relevant portions of which are as follows: 10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein defendants; 11. Assuming, without however admitting that they filed an adverse claim against the property covered by TCT No. 79073 registered under the name of spouses Ernesto Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceases to have any legal force and effect (30) days thereafter pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529; 12. The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 being effected pursuant to the Writ of Execution dated August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (now RTC) of Quezon City proceeding from a decision

rendered in Civil Case No. 28859 in favor of herein defendant against Ernesto Uychocde, is undoubtedly proper and appropriate because the property is registered in the name of the judgment debtor and is not among those exempted from execution; 13. Assuming without admitting that the property subject matter of this case was in fact sold by the registered owner in favor of the herein plaintiffs, the sale is the null and void (sic) and without any legal force and effect because it was done in fraud of a judgment creditor, the defendant Pilares.[5] Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplary damages in a counterclaim against the Sajonas spouses. The parties appeared at pre-trial proceedings on January 21, 1987,[6] after which, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court rendered its decision on February 15, 1989.[7] It found in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417. The court a quo stated, thus: After going over the evidence presented by the parties, the court finds that although the title of the subject matter of the Notice of Levy on Execution was still in the name of the Spouses Uychocde when the same was annotated on the said title, an earlier Affidavit of Adverse Claim was annotated on the same title by the plaintiffs who earlier bought said property from the Uychocdes. It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442) that actual notice of an adverse claim is equivalent to registration and the subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any

legal effect in any respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim annotated on the title of the Uychocdes. xxx xxx xxx

On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in good faith of the property of the spouses Uychocde even notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors, the Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare of any indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said property or that the same is involved in a litigation between said spouses and the defendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the existence of any bad faith must be established by competent proof.[8] (Cai vs. Henson, 51 Phil 606) xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares, as follows: 1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on Execution annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417. 2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000 as attorneys fees. 3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said defendant. Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs.

Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals[9], assigning errors on the part of the lower court. The appellate court reversed the lower courts decision, and upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title, thus: WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated February 15, 1989 is reversed and set aside and this complaint is dismissed. Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees."[10] The Sajonas couple are now before us, on a Petition for Review on Certiorari[11], praying inter alia to set aside the Court of Appeals decision, and to reinstate that of the Regional Trial Court. Private respondent filed his Comment[12] on March 5, 1992, after which, the parties were ordered to file their respective Memoranda. Private respondent complied thereto on April 27, 1994[13], while petitioners were able to submit their Memorandum on September 29, 1992. [14] Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the appellate court, to wit: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IN SUCH WISE ON THE GROUND

THAT IT VIOLATES PETITIONERS SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. Primarily, we are being asked to ascertain who among the parties in suit has a better right over the property in question. The petitioners derive their claim from the right of ownership arising from a perfected contract of absolute sale between them and the registered owners of the property, such right being attested to by the notice of adverse claim[15] annotated on TCT No. N-79073 as early as August 27, 1984. Private respondent on the other hand, claims the right to levy on the property, and have it sold on execution to satisfy his judgment credit, arising from Civil Case No. Q-28850[16] against the Uychocdes, from whose title, petitioners derived their own. Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice is registered by filing a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the province where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with other dates pertinent thereto.[17] The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.* Noting the changes made in the terminology of the provisions of the law, private respondent interpreted this to mean that a Notice of Adverse Claim remains effective only for a period of 30 days from its annotation, and does not automatically lose its force afterwards. Private respondent further maintains that

the notice of adverse claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, hence, it will be effective only up to September 26, 1984, after which it will no longer have any binding force and effect pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the sale in favor of the petitioners by the Uychocdes was made in order to defraud their creditor (Pilares), as the same was executed subsequent to their having defaulted in the payment of their obligation based on a compromise agreement.[18] The respondent appellate court upheld private respondents theory when it ruled: The above stated conclusion of the lower court is based on the premise that the adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days from the date of registration. However, under the provisions of Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of 30 days from the date of its registration. The provision of this Decree is clear and specific. xxx xxx xxx

notice of levy on execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was already ineffective. It cannot be said that actual or prior knowledge of the existence of the adverse claim on the Uychocdes title is equivalent to registration inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective when the notice of levy on execution was annotated. Thus, the act of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice of levy on execution was proper and justified. The appellate court relied on the rule of statutory construction that Section 70 is specific and unambiguous and hence, needs no interpretation nor construction.[19] Perforce, the appellate court stated, the provision was clear enough to warrant immediate enforcement, and no interpretation was needed to give it force and effect. A fortiori, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of its registration, after which it shall be without force and effect. Continuing, the court further stated; . . . clearly, the issue now has been reduced to one of preference- which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985. In the case of Landig vs. U.S. Commercial Co., 89 Phil 638 it was held that where a sale is recorded later than an attachment, although the former is of an earlier date, the sale must give way to the attachment on the ground that the act of registration is the operative act to affect the land. A similar ruling was restated in Campillo vs. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 513).

It should be noted that the adverse claim provision in Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) does not provide for a period of effectivity of the annotation of an adverse claim. P.D. No. 1529, however, now specifically provides for only 30 days. If the intention of the law was for the adverse claim to remain effective until cancelled by petition of the interested party, then the aforecited provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of effectivity would not have been inserted in the law. Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27, 1984, it was effective only until September 26, 1984. Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated the

xxx

xxx xxx

The reason for these rulings may be found in Section 51 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides as follows: Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by the registered owner.- An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land in so far as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under the Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. (Italics supplied by the lower court.) Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.[20] Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many cases coming before us, the same, however, does not fit in the case at bar. While it is the act of

registration which is the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale.[21] While it is true that under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree, deeds of conveyance of property registered under the system, or any interest therein only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land upon its registration, and that a purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus, one who buys from the registered owner need not have to look behind the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless, bound by the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.[22] In PNB vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the subsequent sale of the property to the De Castro spouses cannot prevail over the adverse claim of Perez, which was inscribed on the banks certificate of title on October 6, 1958. That should have put said spouses on notice, and they can claim no better legal right over and above that of Perez. The TCT issued in the spouses names on July, 1959 also carried the said annotation of adverse claim. Consequently, they are not entitled to any interest on the price they paid for the property.[23] Then again, in Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, we said that the statement of respondent court in its resolution of reversal that until the validity of an adverse claim is determined judicially, it cannot be considered a flaw in the vendors title contradicts the very object of adverse claims. As stated earlier, the annotation of an adverse

claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or has a better right than the registered owner thereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over the adverse claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of title over the property.[24] The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N109417 still in force when private respondent caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said title, considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it was annotated? This is a decisive factor in the resolution of this instant case. If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are charged with knowledge of pre-existing interest over the subject property, and thus, petitioners are entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the certificate of title. For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act reads: Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered lands adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. The statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case, the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble the costs in its discretion. The validity of the above-mentioned rules on adverse claims has to be reexamined in the light of the changes introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides: Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon

filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant. Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Italics ours) In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole.[25] For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated.[26] In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides: The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.

At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads: After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest. If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act. A statutes clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its relation to the statutes totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages of the published Act, its history, origin, and its purposes may be examined by the courts in their construction.[27] An eminent authority on the subject matter states the rule candidly: A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine its intention to the one section construed. It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from the context, some particular

meaning to be attached to any word or phrase usually to be ascertained from the context.[28] Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.[29] It should be noted that the law employs the phrase may be cancelled, which obviously indicates, as inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court to determine whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not.[30] To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person

over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.[31] The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in line with the provision immediately following: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim shall be registered by the same claimant. Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property, the adverse claimant will be precluded from registering a second adverse claim based on the same ground. It was held that validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of the adverse claimant and giving notice and warning to third parties.[32] In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was still in

effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners. This can be deduced from the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons- The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then existing. (Italics supplied) To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a long time to complete payments on their property, convinced that their interest was amply protected by the inscribed adverse claim. As lucidly observed by the trial court in the challenged decision: True, the foregoing section provides that an adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. Does this mean however, that the plaintiffs thereby lost their right over the property in question? Stated in another, did the lapse of the thirty day period automatically nullify the contract to sell between the plaintiffs and the Uychocdes thereby depriving the former of their vested right over the property? It is respectfully submitted that it did not.[33]

As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the subject property, the same should be made to rest on the findings of the trial court. As pointedly observed by the appellate court, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at the time of the sale of the property by the latter in their favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony of Conchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during crossexamination on April 21, 1988.[34] ATTY. REYES Q - Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde and his wife offered to you and your husband the property subject matter of this case, they showed you the owners transfer certificate, is it not? A - Yes, sir. Q - That was shown to you the very first time that this lot was offered to you for sale? A - Yes. Q - After you were shown a copy of the title and after you were informed that they are desirous in selling the same, did you and your husband decide to buy the same? A - No, we did not decide right after seeing the title. Of course, we visited... Q - No, you just answer my question. You did not immediately decide? A - Yes. Q - When did you finally decide to buy the same?

A - After seeing the site and after verifying from the Register of Deeds in Marikina that it is free from encumbrances, that was the time we decided. Q - How soon after you were offered this lot did you verify the exact location and the genuineness of the title, as soon after this was offered to you? A - I think its one week after they were offered.
[35]

encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly mentioned in the ACT as having been preserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would be futile and nugatory.[38] ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 17, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February 15, 1989 finding for the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby REINSTATED. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. [36] Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another. [37] Thus, the claim of the private respondent that the sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge or notice of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondents, nor of any claim by the latter over the Uychocdes properties or that the same was involved in any litigation between said spouses and the private respondent. While it may be stated that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established by competent proof by the party alleging the same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be disturbed. At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of registered land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and all prior claims, liens and

SPOUSES FRANCISCO and No. 142687 BERNARDINA RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,

G.R. Present:

Puno, J., Chairman, - versus Gutierrez, SandovalCorona, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ.

to the Development Bank of the Philippines, which mortgage was later absorbed by the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF) or Pag-ibig. On April 27, 1992, respondents Calingo and respondent Spouses Christopher and Ma. Angelica Barrameda (respondents Barrameda) entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage where the former sold to the latter the property in question and the latter assumed to pay the outstanding loan balance to
[1]

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CHRISTOPHER and MA. ANGELICA BARRAMEDA, and SPOUSES ANTONIO and Promulgated: MARIDEL CALINGO, Respondents. July 20, 2006 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----------x DECISION PUNO, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 7, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48772 and its resolution dated March 31, 2000. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 92-3524. The facts show that herein respondent Spouses Antonio and Maridel Calingo (respondents Calingo) were the registered owners of a house and lot located at No. 7903 Redwood Street, Marcelo Green Village, Paraaque, Metro Manila. The property was mortgaged

the

Development

Bank

of

thePhilippines.

Respondents Barrameda issued two checks in the

amounts of P150,000.00 and P528,539.76, for which respondents Calingo issued a receipt dated April 24, 1992.[2] In a letter dated April 23, 1992, respondent Antonio S. Calingo informed HMDF/Pag-ibig about the sale of the property with assumption of mortgage. Said letter, however, together with an affidavit by respondents Calingo, was served upon HMDF/Pag-ibig on October 2, 1992.[3] On May 29, 1992, respondents Barrameda filed with the Register of Deeds of Paraaque an affidavit of adverse claim on the property. The adverse claim was

inscribed at the back of the certificate of title as Entry No. 3439.[4] On June 1, 1992, respondent Ma. Angelica PaezBarrameda wrote HMDF, Mortgage and Loans Division informing the office that they have purchased the subject property from the Calingo spouses and that they filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Paraaque. They also sought assistance from said office as regards the procedure for the full settlement of the loan arrearages and the transfer of the property in their names.[5] Respondents Barrameda moved into the property on June 2, 1992. On July 13, 1992, a notice of levy with attachment on real property by virtue of a writ of execution was annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the property in question. The writ of execution was issued by Judge Salvador Abad Santos, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 65 in connection with Civil Case No. 882159 involving a claim by herein petitioners, Spouses Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez, against

respondents Calingo. Judge Abad Santos issued the writ in favor of petitioners Rodriguez.[6] On July Nelson A. 21, Loyola, 1992, sent petitioners a letter counsel, to Atty.

respondents

Barrameda inquiring about the basis of their occupation of the property in question. On August 21, remitted purchase to 1992, respondents Calingo Calingo Barrameda amount

respondents

the

of P364,992.07 to complete the payment of the agreed price. Respondents acknowledged receipt of said amount and waived all their rights to the property in favor of the Barrameda spouses. They also guaranteed that the property was clear and free from any liens and encumbrances, except the real estate mortgage assumed by respondents Barrameda.[7] On October 7, 1992, respondents Barrameda executed a joint affidavit stating that they are the owners of the property in question by virtue of a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage; that they registered an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Paraaque; that the Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati, Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, levied

said property despite their adverse claim; and that they have acquired the property long before the levy was made, and therefore, said levy was illegal. They served a copy of the affidavit on petitioners counsel, Atty. Loyola, who made a reply thereto on October 15, 1992. In his letter to Christopher Barrameda dated October 15, 1992, Atty. Loyola pointed out that the alleged deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was not registered with the Register of Deeds and that the records of the HMDF show that the property is owned by the Calingo spouses. He urged the Barrameda spouses to confer with the petitioners to amicably settle the controversy.[8] On November 9, 1992, respondents Barrameda found a Notice of Sheriffs Sale posted on their front gate, announcing the auction sale of their house and lot on December 3, 1992 at 10:00 in the morning.[9] On November 20, 1992, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Court, respondents Barrameda served a Notice of Third Party Claim upon Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, accompanied by their affidavit of title. The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners and dismissed respondents Barramedas petition for quieting of title. It ruled that the annotation of respondents Barramedas adverse claim at the back of the certificate of title was insufficient to establish their claim over the property. It said that respondents Barrameda, as buyers of the property, should have registered the title in their names. Furthermore, respondents Barramedas adverse claim had lost its efficacy after the lapse of thirty days in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. The trial court also found that there was collusion between respondents Barrameda and respondents Calingo to for On December 2, 1992, respondents Barrameda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a petition quieting of title with prayer for preliminary injunction. The petition prayed, among others, that the execution sale of the property be enjoined, the notice of levy and attachment inscribed on the certificate of title be cancelled, and that respondents Barrameda be declared the lawful and sole owners of the property in question.[10]

transfer the property to defraud third parties who may have a claim against the Calingos.[11] The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,[12] the appellate court held that respondentsBarramedas adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title was still effective at the time the property was levied on execution. It said: Therefore, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on TCT No. 83612/57286 was still in effect on July 13, 1992 when the Rodriguezes caused the annotation of the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, they are charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the Barramedas. xxx The court held, therefore, that the notice of levy could not prevail over respondents Barramedas

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts ruling, but the motion was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioners essentially argue that the remedy of a petition for quieting of title was not available to respondents Barrameda as they did not have a valid title to the property in question; that the affidavit of adverse claim inscribed by respondents Barrameda at the back of the certificate of title was not sufficient to establish their claim to the property; and there was collusion between respondents Barrameda and respondents Calingo. The principal issue that needs to be resolved in this case is whether respondents Barramedas adverse claim on the property should prevail over the levy on execution issued by another court in satisfaction of a judgment against respondents Calingo. We hold that it cannot. Respondents Barrameda anchor their claim on the property on the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by them and respondents Calingo on April 27, 1992. The Property Registration

adverse claim.

Decree[13] requires that such document be registered with the Register of Deeds in order to be binding on third persons. The law provides: Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner . An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. (emphasis supplied) It is admitted in this case that the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was not registered, but instead, respondents Barrameda filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. The question

now is whether the adverse claim is sufficient to bind third parties such as herein petitioners. In L.P. Leviste and Company, Inc. v.

Noblejas,[14] we explained when an inscription of an adverse claim is sufficient to affect third parties, thus: The basis of respondent Villanuevas adverse claim was an agreement to sell executed in her favor by Garcia Realty. An agreement to sell is a voluntary instrument as it is a wilful act of the registered owner. As such voluntary instrument, Section 50 of Act No. 496 [now Presidential Decree No. 1529] expressly provides that the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land. And Section 55 of the same Act requires the presentation of the owners duplicate certificate of title for the registration of any deed or voluntary instrument. As the agreement to sell involves an interest less than an estate in fee simple, the same should have been registered by filing it with the Register of Deeds who, in turn, makes a brief memorandum thereof upon the original and owners duplicate certificate of title. The reason for requiring the production of the owners duplicate certificate in the registration of a voluntary instrument is that, being a wilful act of the registered owner, it is to be presumed that he is interested in registering the instrument and would willingly surrender, present or produce his duplicate certificate

of title to the Register of Deeds in order to accomplish such registration. However, where the owner refuses to surrender the duplicate certificate for the annotation of the voluntary instrument, the grantee may file with the Register of Deeds a statement setting forth his adverse claim, as provided for in Section 110 of Act No. 496. In such a case, the annotation of the instrument upon the entry book is sufficient to affect the real estate to which it relates, although Section 72 of Act No. 496 imposes upon the Register of Deeds the duty to require the production by the [r]egistered owner of his duplicate certificate for the inscription of the adverse claim. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. (emphases supplied) In the case at bar, the reason given for the nonregistration of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was that the owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title was in the possession of HMDF. It was

not shown, however, that either respondents Barrameda or respondents Calingo exerted any effort to retrieve the owners duplicate copy from the HMDF for the purpose of registering the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. In fact, the parties did not even seek to obtain the consent of, much less inform, the HMDF of the sale of the property. This, despite the provision in the contract of mortgage prohibiting the mortgagor (respondents Calingo) from selling or disposing the property without the written consent of the mortgagee.[15] Respondents Calingo, as party to the contract of mortgage, are charged with the knowledge of such provision and are bound to comply therewith. Apparently, there was haste in disposing the property that respondents Calingo informed HMDF of the sale only on October 2, 1992 when they served a copy of their letter to said office regarding the transfer of the property to respondents Barrameda. There was no reason for the parties failure to seek the approval of the HMDF to the sale as it appears from the letter of respondent Angelica Paez-Barrameda to HMDF that they were ready to pay in full the balance of the loan plus interest. What is more suspect is that the judgment against respondents Calingo ordering them to pay the petitioners the sum of P1,159,355.90 was rendered on

January 28, 1992, before the sale of the property on April 27, 1992. We also find it unsettling that respondents Barrameda, without any reservation or inquiry, readily remitted to respondents Calingo the full payment for the property on August 21, 1992 despite knowledge of the levy on execution over the property in July of the same year. Any prudent buyer of real property, before parting with his money, is expected to first ensure that the title to the property he is about to purchase is clear and free from any liabilities and that the sellers have the proper authority to deal on the property. Again, we stress that the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the law on registration of real property. Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is clear: Sec. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth his alleged right or interest, and how

or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. xxx The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by respondents Calingo and Barrameda is a registrable instrument. In order to bind third parties, it must be registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. It was not shown in this case that there was justifiable reason why the deed could not be registered. Hence, the remedy of adverse claim cannot substitute for registration. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition

is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati in Civil Case No. 923524 is REINSTATED. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents.

January 16, 2012

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, Petitioner,

DECISION G.R. No. 185064

Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, - versus PEREZ, SERENO, REYES, and BERNABE, JJ. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS,

REYES, J.:

Nature of the Petition

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa (Araceli) and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Ernesto), assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated June 6, 2008 and Resolution2 dated

Promulgated:

October 23, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391 entitled Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto De Mesa v. Spouses Claudio Acero, Jr., et al.

The Antecedent Facts

When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored as the account from which it was drawn had already been closed. The petitioners failed to heed Claudios subsequent demand for payment.

This involves a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which was formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M) issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered under Aracelis name. The petitioners jointly purchased the subject property on April 17, 1984 while they were still merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was later constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.

Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with the Prosecutor's Office of Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) against the petitioners. After preliminary investigation, an information for violation of B.P. 22 was filed against the petitioners with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.

On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a Decision3 acquitting the petitioners but ordering them to Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Claudio) in the amount of P100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio. On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte (Sheriff Samonte) pay Claudio the amount of P100,000.00 with legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.

levied upon the subject property. On March 9, 1994, the subject property was sold on public auction; Claudio was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him.

(collectively referred to as Spouses Acero) filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan against the petitioners and Juanito. In their defense, the petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the subject property. The petitioners deny that they are mere lessors; on the contrary, they are the lawful owners of the subject property and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom.

Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the subject property to the petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito) for a monthly rent of P5,500.00. However, the petitioners and Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent and as of October 3, 1998, their total accountabilities to Claudio amounted to P170,500.00.

On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a Decision,6 giving due course to Spouses Aceros complaint and ordering the petitioners and Juanito to vacate the subject property. Finding merit in Spouses Aceros claims, the MTC dismissed the petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject property. According to the MTC, title to the subject property belongs to Claudio as shown by TCT No. T-221755 (M).

Meanwhile, on March 24, 1995, a Final Deed of Sale4 over the subject property was issued to Claudio and on April 4, 1995, the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan cancelled TCT No. T-76.725 (M) and issued TCT No. T-221755 (M)5 in his favor.

The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens Unable to collect the aforementioned rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina Acero (Rufina) title over the subject property was issued in Claudios name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the

levy made by Sheriff Samonte, the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Claudios Torrens title that was resultantly issued.

In the interregnum, on October 29, 1999, the petitioners filed against the respondents a complaint10 to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) and other documents with damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.

The petitioners appealed the MTCs July 22, 1999 Decision to the RTC. This appeal was, however, dismissed in a Decision dated November 22, 1999 due to the petitioners failure to submit their Memorandum. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied in an Order dated January 31, 2000.

On September 3, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision,11 which dismissed the petitioners complaint. Citing Article 155(3) of the Family Code, the RTC ruled that even assuming that the subject property is a family home, the exemption from execution does not apply. A mortgage was constituted over the subject property to secure the loan Araceli obtained from Claudio and it was levied upon as payment therefor.

Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review7 with the CA assailing the RTCs November 22, 1999 Decision and January 31, 2000 Order. In a December 21, 2006 Decision,8 the CA denied the petitioners petition for review. This became final on July 25, 2007.9

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the RTCs September 3, 2002 Decision but this was denied in a Resolution12 dated January 14, 2003.

demonstration that the subject property is a family home is not required before it can be exempted from On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs disposition in its Decision
13

execution.

dated June 6, 2008. The CA ratiocinated

that the exemption of a family home from execution, attachment or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is not automatic and should accordingly be raised and proved to the Sheriff prior to the execution, forced sale or attachment. The appellate court noted that at no time did the petitioners raise the supposed exemption of the subject property from execution on account of the same being a family home. In their Comment,15 Spouses Acero claimed that this petition ought to be denied on the ground of forumshopping as the issues raised had already been determined by the MTC in its July 22, 1999 Decision on the complaint for ejectment filed by them, which had already become final and executory following the petitioners failure to appeal the CAs December 21, 2006 Decision affirming it. The petitioners then sought reconsideration of the said June 6, 2008 Decision but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution14 dated October 23, 2008. Issues

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. T221755 (M). They insist that the execution sale that was conducted is a nullity considering that the subject property is a family home. The petitioners assert that, contrary to the disposition of the CA, a prior

The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping; and (b) whether the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudios Torrens title TCT No. T221755 (M) over the subject property.

The Courts Ruling

or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount tores judicata in the action under

First Issue: Forum-Shopping

On the first issue, we find that the petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.

consideration.17

There is no identity of issues and reliefs prayed for There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than an appeal or certiorari. Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.16 It is true that the petitioners raised the issue of ownership over the subject property in the ejectment Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of forum-shopping are: (a) identity of parties, case. However, the resolution thereof is only provisional as the same is solely for the purpose of determining who among the parties therein has a better right of possession over the subject property. in the ejectment case and in the action to cancel TCT No. T-221755 (M). Verily, the primordial issue in the ejectment case is who among the contending parties has a better right of possession over the subject property while ownership is the core issue in an action to cancel a Torrens title.

Accordingly, a judgment rendered in an ejectment case is not a bar to action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. Neither shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein. This issue is far from being novel and there is no reason to depart from this Courts previous pronouncements. In Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.,18 this Court had previously clarified that a decision in an ejectment case is not res judicata in an annulment of title case and vice-versa given the provisional and inconclusive nature of the determination of the issue of ownership in the former.

Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases. The issue of ownership was likewise being contended, with same set of evidence being presented in both cases. However, it cannot be inferred that a judgment in the ejectment case would amount to res judicata in the annulment case, and vice-versa.

This issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating the principle that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.

Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the other.

It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.

The petitioners maintain that the subject property Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment would abate an ejectment suit must be resolved in the negative. is a family home and, accordingly, the sale thereof on execution was a nullity. In Ramos v. Pangilinan,20 this Court laid down the rules relative to exemption of family homes from execution: A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is so because an ejectment case is simply designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.19 (citations omitted) Second Issue: Nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M) Anent the second issue, this Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M).

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

The subject property is a family home.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the courts order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either

one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.21 (citations omitted)

Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.23 (emphasis supplied and citation omitted)

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the

In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.,22 we stressed that:

Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

The family homes exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, we nevertheless rule that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA that the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out:

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt

In the light of the facts above summarized, it is evident that appellants did

not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution to put an end to litigation. x x x.24

estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:

The foregoing disposition is in accord with the Courts November 25, 2005 Decision in Honrado v. Court of Appeals,25 where it was categorically stated that at no other time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction:

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter;

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would

In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step involving further

costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale, or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority.

has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now rule that claims for exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff.26 (citations omitted)

In the light of the facts above summarized, it is selfevident that appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution to put an end to litigation. We said before, and We repeat it now, that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that, once a judgment

Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court stated that:

Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not

sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. x x x.28 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.31 However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.

Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption. In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject property is a family home and its exemption from execution and forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime.29 It is likewise without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.30 property to be levied upon and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Aracelis Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudios name, still, the petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed For all intents and purposes, the petitioners negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home. SO ORDERED. The petitioners negligence or omission renders their present assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a mere afterthought and artifice that cannot be countenanced without doing the respondents injustice and depriving the fruits of the judgment award in their favor. Simple justice and fairness and equitable considerations demand that Claudios title to the property be respected. Equity dictates that the petitioners are made to suffer the consequences of their unexplained negligence. JOSE TEOFILO MERCADO, Petitioner, G.R. No. 141019 Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755 (M) and other documents, and the October 23, 2008 Resolution denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

- versus -

by its President, JOAQUIN RODRIGUEZ, AND CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY, Respondents.

VALLEY MOUNTAIN MINES EXPLORATION, INC., Respondent. x------------------------ x

x------------------------ x

HEIRS OF JUAN OLIMPIADA AND HEIRS OF SERGIO OLIMPIADA, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 164281

HEIRS OF JUAN AND SERGIO OLIMPIADA, represented by Fernando Olimpiada as Attorneyin-Fact, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 185781

Present:

- versus -

CORONA,C.J., Chairperson,

- versus HON. GREGORIO M. MONREAL, CITY ASSESSOR, TAGAYTAY CITY, COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALFONSO GARCIA, Judge, RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, VALLEY MOUNTAIN MINES EXPLORATION, INC., represented Respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTR BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

November 23, 2011 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

4867 09959-B 7539 09224-B 7540 09226-B 7541 09225-B 4831-B 09958-B[1]

284,105 8,400 3,907 6,564 121,489

The consolidated petitions before us stemmed from contending claims over lots sold by the

government in a tax delinquency sale and subsequently applied for original registration under Presidential Lot 4867 was originally declared under the name Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada with Rosa Cabrera as the named Administrator in Tax Declaration (TD) 09959-B. The Facts
[2]

Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.

On the other hand, the declared owners of Lots 7539, 7541 and 4831-B are the Heirs of Juan

7540,

Desengao.[3] The heirs of Narciso Olimpiada and heirs Subject of controversy are the following parcels of land situated at Barangay Sungay, Iruhin, Tagaytay City: Lot No. Area (sq.m.)Tax Declaration No. of Juan Desengao were in actual possession of the aforesaid properties.

For failure to pay the real property taxes for several years, the subject lots were sold by the City Government of Tagaytay in a public auction held on November 28, 1983, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property to Purchaser issued in favor of Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc. (VMMEI). Said certificate of sale was registered on December 9, 1983. To save their property, the heirs of Narciso Olimpiada,[4] through their attorney-in-fact, Rosa

covering the subject properties was issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City. [8] Said office also returned the purchase price plus interest thereon to VMMEI on December 11, 1984. [9] However, the checks issued by Mercado in payment of the aforesaid sums when presented for payment to the bank, were

dishonored for the reason Refer to Drawer. Under letters dated April 16, 1985 and October 8, 1985, the Office of the City Treasurer advised Mercado to replace the bounced checks.[10] On April 14, 1986, VMMEI through its counsel wrote then City Treasurer Concepcion C. Daplas

Cabrera Mendoza, executed a Deed of Sale of an Unregistered Parcel of Land With Assignment of Rights and Assumption of Obligations in favor of Jose Teofilo T. Mercado (Mercado).[5] The their heirs of Juan

asserting its right to be reinstated as the highest bidder during the public auction sale considering that no effective redemption was made by the delinquent owners, and expressed willingness to return the total amount of P111,222.07 refunded to it and also to pay additional sums to update the taxes due on the subject

Desengao[6] through

attorney-in-fact

Primitivo

Mendoza likewise executed a similar deed in favor of Mercado.[7] On December 7, 1984, Mercado paid the sums of P58,327.82 and P33,841.49 for the five parcels of land. Consequently, a Certificate of Redemption

properties.[11] Thereupon, under letter dated April 22, 1986, Daplas sought the advice/ruling of the Minister of Finance on whether she can accept VMMEIs repayment

for the total amount of tax delinquency of the auctioned properties and costs without going through the process of another public auction, and issue the corresponding final bill of sale in its favor. [12] No written reply was received from the Ministry of Finance regarding Daplas query. On August 7, 1986, Daplas accepted the amount of P46,400.00 from Mercado as partial cash payment, particularly for replacement of check covering payment of tax receipts # 7495076, 7495036 & 7495075 as evidenced by a handwritten temporary receipt she issued to Mercado.[13] Said amount was immediately deposited with PNB Cavite Branch under SJV No. 86-0921 dated September 5, 1986. On October 7, 1986, a certain Mr. Francisco Zarate informed the City Treasurer that he is withdrawing the payment he made in behalf of Mercado because he realized that the transaction was irregular since the 365 days redemption period allowed by law had already expired when they paid the cash replacement of the bounced check of Mercado.

[14]

However, such money paid by Zarate was never

returned by the City Treasurers Office. The repayment made by VMMEI was eventually accepted and then OIC/City Treasurer Pio Baybay executed the Final Bills of Sale [15] covering the subject lots. Consequently, the previous tax declarations of the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada and Heirs of Desengao were cancelled and new tax declarations for the year 1988 were issued in the name of VMMEI which likewise paid the real property taxes due on the five parcels of land. On May 15, 1988, the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada and Juan Desengao sought reconsideration of the cancellation of their respective tax declarations on the ground that it was illegal considering that the auctioned properties have been timely redeemed. In his letterreply, then City Assessor Josefina De Castro informed that their properties have already been sold at public auction for non-payment of real property taxes in accordance with existing regulations and procedure.
[16]

Still, the said heirs reiterated their request for the

revival or restoration of their tax declarations on September 7, 1989.[17] On September 26, 1989, Mercado filed separate petitions for judicial confirmation of title over the subject lots in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City (Branch 18), docketed as LRC Case Nos. TG-354 (Lot 4867 - Olimpiada Property), TG-355 (Lots 7539, 7540 and 7541 - Desengao Properties) and TG356 (Lot 4831-B - Desengao Property). The Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General entered appearance and filed its Opposition to the petitions filed in LRC Case Nos. TG355 and TG-356.[18] The Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada represented by Atty. Dante A. Carandang (Carandang Group) filed their Opposition in LRC Case No. TG-354, having earlier filed on April 11, 1990 before the same court Civil Case No. TG-1124 for the annulment of public auction sale. The Heirs of Juan Desengao filed their Opposition in LRC Case Nos. TG-355 and TG-356.
[19]

three petitions filed by Mercado.[20] VMMEI likewise filed a separate application for registration of the same parcels of land before the same court, docketed as LRC Case No. TG-383. On April 23, 1991, the trial court issued a general order of default with the exception of private oppositors VMMEI and the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada (Carandang Group).[21] Civil Case No. TG-1124 was dismissed on joint motion of the parties as the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada pursued their opposition in the consolidated cases of LRC Case Nos. TG-354, TG-355 and TG-356. [22]

Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada[23] (Carandang Group) These oppositors led by Teresa Olimpiada and counsel Atty. Dante A. Carandang, claimed to be the lawful owners of Lot No. 4867 as legal heirs of Narciso Olimpiada who died intestate sometime in 1926. They alleged that they were not notified of the public auction sale conducted on November 28, 1983 wherein their

VMMEI, on the other hand, filed its Opposition to all

property was among those sold to VMMEI. As alleged possessors of the land in the concept of owner since time immemorial, they prayed that the court allow them to be substituted as applicants for registration of Lot 4867. A verified application[24] for judicial confirmation of title was subsequently filed by said heirs.

VMMEI In its capacity as purchaser at the public auction of all the five parcels of land subject of Mercados application, VMMEI accused said applicant of

misrepresentation and bad faith. VMMEI contended that Mercados efforts to redeem the properties failed because his checks were dishonored, and hence the

Heirs of Juan Desengao With the exception of spouses Primitivo Mendoza and Rosa Cabrera-Mendoza who refused to join in filing the opposition, the heirs of Juan Desengao questioned the application of Mercado, asserting that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of Lots 7539, 7540, 7541 and 4831-B, subject of LRC Case Nos. TG-355 and TG-356, in the concept of owner for more than 30 years. They denied having sold their properties to anybody.

same did not produce the effect of payment of the redemption price, as in fact the communication sent by the Ministry of Finance dated August 12, 1986 to the City Treasurer of Tagaytay even mentioned that said office was contemplating to file a case against Mercado for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. By virtue of the purchase at the tax delinquency sale conducted by the City Government of Tagaytay, VMMEI claimed it is now the successor-in-interest of the previous owners, the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada

(Carandang Group) and Juan Desengao, which has the right to apply for original registration of title over their lands. As to the request for reconsideration of the

cancellation or the restoration/revival of their respective tax declarations, this was denied by the City Assessor who informed them that tax declarations covering their properties are now in the name of VMMEI as the present owner. VMMEI accordingly filed its opposition to the respective applications of the aforesaid heirs. It thus prayed for the dismissal of Mercados application and for it to be allowed to be substituted in the application for registration as successors-in-interest of the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada in LRC Case No. TG-354 and the Heirs of Juan Desengao in LRC Case Nos. TG-355 and TG356. At the trial of the cases, applicant Mercados witness, Rosa Cabrera Mendoza, admitted that of the five children of Dominador Mendoza, a grandson of Narciso Olimpiada and her first cousin who died before the outbreak of war, only the eldest, Macario, signed the documents without a written authority from his siblings (Timoteo, Catalina,Teresita and Florencia). She likewise admitted that another heir, Josefa Olimpiada, allegedly a retardate, had no participation in the transaction; no proof of guardianship or imbecility of said heir, however, was submitted.[25] Primitivo Mendoza also testified that Catalina, the daughter of his late brother Pascual Mendoza, was still alive at the execution of the Special Power of Attorney but did not sign the same. Catalina left as heirs her children with Lamberto Sumagui. Another daughter of Pascual Mendoza, Cornelia Mendoza, a.k.a Aba Mendoza signed the document. His sister Paulina Mendoza had the following children: namely, Lorenza, Juanita, Juanito and Agapito, all surnamed Mendoza.[26] The widow

Evidenc e Present ed in LRC Case Nos. TG-354, TG-355 and TG356

(Soledad Umali Mendoza) of another heir, Marcelino Mendoza, signed the document for herself and allegedly in behalf of her children with Marcelino.[27] Rosa and Primitivo presented the respective receipts for the amounts (P200,000.00 for the heirs of Olimpiada and P400,000.00 for the heirs of Juan

Mendoza, which was not her true name, in the Special Power of Attorney in favor of Primitivo Mendoza.
[31]

Another witness, Cornelia Mendoza, likewise denied

it was her signature appearing above the name Aba Mendoza and she always signed using the name Cornelia Mendoza her full name.
[32]

Desengao)[28]representing the purchase price they received from Mercado, which were all deposited with Mercados sister, Paulita Mercado Araas, for

Macario Olimpiada testified that he is a great grandson of Narciso Olimpiada, his father Dominador Olimpiada being the son of Victor Olimpiada. He denied the signature appearing above his name in the Special Power of Attorney does in not favor know of Rosa Cabrera the

safekeeping until the titles to the land are issued.[29] Atty. Augusto Del Rosario testified that the subject deeds were executed in his presence. He relied on the representation of the heirs-signatories that they are the only heirs of the declared landowners and it being the custom in the rural areas to trust the word of the eldest in the family. He also admitted there were tenants on the subject properties but these tenants already executed waivers in favor of Mercado.
[30]

Mendoza. He

anything

about

execution of said document nor the sale in favor of Mercado made by his co-heirs. He also did not make any contribution for the payment of real property taxes because it was only through Rosa Cabrera that he came to know that they have a property in Tagaytay. Neither is he aware that the subject land was sold in a public auction nor of its redemption by Mercado. In fact, he does not know anything of what was happening regarding the property.[33]

Loreta Luring Mendoza testified that it was not her signature which appeared above the name Lorenza

VMMEI presented as its witnesses its Treasurer Grace Ramos Abesamis, former City Treasurer of Tagaytay Operations Concepcion Officer of Daplas the and Local Training Office

issued by Mercado bounced. The Ministry of Finance sent a telegram dated December 11, 1985 directing then OIC/City Treasurer of Tagaytay Pio Baybay to appear at said office in connection with the subject properties. The Final Bills of Sale were executed by Baybay in favor of VMMEI in Manila and she signed the

City

Treasurers

Domingo Bayas. Abesamis testified that the refund of the purchase money paid by VMMEI at the public auction was deposited in the companys account but on September 30, 1997, they paid it back to the City Government of Tagaytay by issuing two checks duly receipted by the City Treasurers Office. While the said payment

documents as witness. This was upon the verbal instruction given by the officials of the now Department of Finance (DOF) when on the same date she and Baybay were called to a conference before said officials. The return of the refunded purchase price was made by Joaquin Rodriguez through checks.[35] She also identified the signatures of Baybay and the other witness in the Final Bills of Sale.[36]

consisted of personal checks of Joaquin Rodriguez, VMMEIs President, she explained that stockholders and officers can make advances in behalf of the company.[34] Treasurer Daplas testified that the payment tendered by Mercado as redemption price was only partial and she issued a temporary receipt

for P46,400.00 received only on August 7, 1986. They earlier refunded the purchase price to VMMEI on December 11, 1984 before they learned that the checks

Gaudioso Platero, Bonifacia Platero, Herminia PlateroCastro and Elizabeth Platero-

Fernandez (Plateros)

opposition/application for registration of the Plateros; and (4) the Plateros be allowed to introduce evidence in support of their opposition/application. [37] However, in a

After the parties have concluded the presentation of their evidence, the above-named individuals filed an Opposition/Petition for Registration. The Plateros,

Joint Order dated January 7, 1993, the trial court denied their Opposition and Omnibus Motion, citing that a decision had already been rendered in the case. [38] On April 29, 1993, they filed a Notice of Appeal of the aforesaid Joint Order, as well as the Order dated April 20, 1993 denying their motion for reconsideration.[39]

represented by their counsel Atty. Arcangelita RomillaLontok, claimed to be the owners of a residential land declared in their name under TD No. 013705-A, with an area of 100,500 square meters, which allegedly forms part of the parcel of land applied for by Mercado. They prayed for the dismissal of Mercados application with respect to their ten-hectare property, the segregation of said area from the land subject of Mercados application and the issuance of title in their favor as exclusive owners of the said portion. They also filed a motion to order verification/amendment/subdivision surveys which is necessary to exclude their property from Lot 4867. Subsequently, the Plateros filed an Omnibus Motion: (1) to lift the order of general default; (2) to reopen the proceedings; (3) to admit the

RTC Decisio n in LRC Case Nos. TG-354, TG-355 and TG356

On November 26, 1992, RTC Branch 18 rendered its Decision,[40] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered confirming the ownership of Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., over the five (5) properties priorly owned by the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada and the Heirs of Juan D[e]sengao, subjects of these applications for land registration, and denominated as: 1. Lot 4867 with an area of 284,105 sq.m. TG 354 2. Lot 7539 with an area of 8,400 sq.m. TG 355 3. Lot 7540 with an area of 3,907 sq.m. TG 355 4. Lot 7541 with an area of 6,564 sq.m. TG 355 5. Lot 4831-B with an 121,489 sq.m. TG 356 area of

thus be issued in its name, upon payment of the prescribed legal fees therefor, if any. SO ORDERED.[41]

The trial court ruled that Mercados claim of ownership is founded on the deed of sale and

assignment of rights with assumption of obligations executed by two alleged attorneys-in-fact of the owners, spouses Primitivo and Rosa Mendoza. However, the authority of said representatives was put in question by the exclusion of certain heirs who did not sign the special power of attorney and the aforesaid document of sale. On the redemption price paid by Mercado, the trial court noted that his partial cash payment

of P46,000 was grossly insufficient to cover the amounts covered by the bounced checks. As to the claims of Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada (Carandang Group) and Heirs of Juan Desengao, the trial court noted that while they were represented by their respective attorneys, they lost interest in pursuing their case and failed to introduce substantial evidence as they did not even file their memorandum.

Consequently[,] this Court hereby grants the application for registration filed by Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., over the said properties, placing them under the operations of the new Land Registration Law (PD 1529) so that the same may be registered under its name. Upon finality of this decision, the corresponding decree of registration may

In upholding the claim of VMMEI, the trial court ruled that VMMEI acquired ownership rights over the subject properties when it returned the refunded purchase price to the City Treasurer. As confirmation of such rights, the City Treasurer executed Final Bills of Sale in favor of VMMEI which was attested to by witness Daplas.

that

in

the

approved

plan

of

Lot

4867,

Ap-04-

000778[44] dated April 29, 1976, it was clearly indicated that the land described therein was surveyed for the Hrs. of Narciso Olimpiada, et al. and that the words et al. refer to the Heirs of Juan and Sergio Olimpiada, the co-owners of Narciso Olimpiada. In a Joint Order[45] dated April 20, 1993, the trial court denied the said Urgent Motion as well as the

Heirs of Juan and Sergio Olimpia da[42] (F abella Group)

petition for relief from judgment and motion for reconsideration filed by the Plateros. The trial court said it no longer had jurisdiction to act on the pending motions since it already approved the notice of appeal filed by applicant Mercado. On May 20, 1998, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella

On February 16, 1993, the heirs of Juan and Sergio Olimpiada who are allegedly full-blood brothers of Narciso Olimpiada, represented by their attorney-infact Fernando Olimpiada and their counsel Atty. Gilbert M. Fabella (Fabella Group), filed an Urgent Motion for Reopening[43] of LRC Case No. TG-354. They pointed out

Group[46] instituted before the same court (RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18) Civil Case No. TG-1800 for Annulment of Auction Sale. However, the named

attorney-in-fact was Macario Olimpiada. They prayed that the tax delinquency sale conducted by the City

Government without notice to them as co-owners be declared null and void.[47] VMMEI, defendant in Civil Case No. TG-1800, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs have no personality to sue. They alleged that Juan and Sergio Olimpiada are collateral relatives of Narciso

On May 20, 1999, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. However, VMMEI filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted under the order dated January 14, 2000. The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. TG-1800 stating that plaintiffs neglected to attach copies of such tax rolls or property tax record cards of the lot in question showing who is the delinquent owner entitled to notice of the auction sale. Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
[49]

Olimpiada. There being children and descendants who survived, Narciso, Juan and Sergio were thus excluded from the inheritance, pursuant to Art. 1003 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. VMMEI called the attention of the trial court to the previous dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case No. TG-1124 filed by the children and grandchildren of Narciso Olimpiada against

by

the

trial

court

on

May

15,

2000.

Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a petition for relief

from judgment which suffered the same fate. Their motion for reconsideration of the denial of their petition for relief was also denied under the courts October 26, 2000 order. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on December 11, 2002.[50] The aforesaid orders were assailed in a petition for certiorari filed by the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group in the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

VMMEI. Further, VMMEI argued that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case because plaintiffs failed to comply with the provision of the law that before a court can entertain an action to void a tax sale, plaintiff should have first paid to the court the correct amount for which the real property was sold, together with 20% interest per annum.[48]

74454 entitled Heirs of Juan Olimpiada, et al. v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., City Government of

Tagaytay and Hon. Alfonso Garcia, Judge, RTC Branch 18, Tagaytay City.[51]

Olimpiada, et al. was also denied. The CA noted that LRC Case No. TG-354 was already decided while the motion for consolidation was filed before the trial court

CA-G.R. CV No. 41164 and CAG.R. SP No. 32309

by the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group only on February 5, 1993. As per the report submitted by the Sheriff, the writ of possession was returned unserved for lack of specification of the address of appellees.[53] Meanwhile, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group filed in this Court G.R. No. 110005, Appeal by

Applicant Mercado filed a notice of appeal from the adverse decision of the RTC in LRC Case Nos. TG354, TG-355 and TG-356, the appeal docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 41164.Before the CA, VMMEI filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession, which was granted under its Resolution dated October 20, 1993.
[52]

Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction seeking to re-open the proceedings in LRC Case No. TG-354. Citing the pendency of said G.R. No. 110005, they filed an Urgent Motion before the CA to hold in abeyance resolution of the appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 41164).[54] VMMEI filed a motion to strike out the pleadings filed by the Plateros (who filed a motion for

In the same resolution, the motion for elevation of

the court records in LRC Case Nos. TG-354 and TG-383 and/or remand of the case to the trial court, filed by the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group (who represented

reconsideration of the resolution granting the motion for issuance of writ of possession) and Olimpiada HeirsFabella Group (who filed their opposition to the motion for issuance of writ of possession and motion to hold in

themselves as Heirs of Narciso, Juan and Sergio

abeyance resolution of the appeal). It pointed out that the group of heirs allegedly represented by Atty. Fabella is distinct from the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada who were parties in LRC Case No. TG-354 whose counsel was Atty. Dante Carandang, while the Plateros were not at all parties before the trial court.[55] In a Resolution[56] dated October 14, 1994, the CA denied the motions for reconsideration of the October 20, 1993 resolution, separately filed by the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group, the Plateros and Mercado. The CA likewise granted VMMEIs motion and ordered the pleadings filed by the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group and the Plateros stricken off the records. It was noted that G.R. No. 110005 was already denied with finality in a Resolution dated September 3, 1993. The Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group moved to reconsider the October 14, 1994 resolution, but the same was denied under the Resolution dated January 19, 1995.[57] Aggrieved from their exclusion in CA-G.R. CV No. 41164, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group filed a

petition

before

this

Court,

docketed

as G.R.

No.

119059 (Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada v. Court of Appeals, et al.), appealing the October 14, 1994 resolution of the CA. The Plateros challenged the October 14, 1994 resolution of the CA via a petition for review on certiorari they filed before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 117602. On December 7, 1994, this Court

resolved to deny the petition of the Plateros for failure to show that a reversible error was committed by the CA. The Plateros motion for reconsideration and

subsequent motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration were also denied by this Court.[58] After this Court denied with finality the petition in G.R. No. 110005, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group instituted another suit to challenge and enjoin the proceedings in LRC Case Nos. TG-354 and TG-383. They filed a petition for Annulment of Decision and Orders, Consolidation, Prohibition, Injunction with Prayer for a Restraining Order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

32309. Petitioners therein specifically prayed that said case be consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 41164 pending with the appellate court.[59] In an obvious attempt to evade the charge of forum shopping, Atty. Fabella appended a Certification to said petition

On December 29, 1993, the CAs Thirteenth Division ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 32309 with CA-G.R. CV No. 41164.[61] On November 12, 1997, the CAs Special Seventh Division issued the following Resolution[62]: An examination of the rollo of SC G[.]R. No. 119059 revealed that the heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, et al., petitioners therein, filed a Manifestation with the Supreme Court on September 13, 1995 to inform the said court that they sought the assistance of the DENR to investigate the identity and registrability of the subject land. A certification marked as annex B (p. 260, Rollo) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources was subsequently presented to show that the land subject of this controversy falls within the Unclassified Public Forest of Tagaytay City per LC-CM 10 control map of Cavite. The petitioners argue that if the land subject of this appeal is indeed forest land and is thus, inalienable, the tax sale conducted by the City of Tagaytay is void and the said land cannot be the subject of an application for registration. However, when the DENR failed to submit a full report on the matter on time, the Supreme Court

attesting that they have withdrawn [their] action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Honorable Supreme Court in the case entitled, Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, et al., represented by Fernando Olimpiada, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, petitioners versus The Hon. Judge, Eleuterio O. Guerrero, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 18, Tagaytay City, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Valley Mountain Mines

Exploration, Inc., represented by the President, Jack Rodriguez, under CA-G.R. No. 110005. and even attached the purported Motion to Withdraw signed by Atty. Fabella filed before the Supreme Court on October 12, 1993.[60] As earlier mentioned, G.R. No. 110005 was denied with finality by this Court on September 3, 1993.

issued a resolution dated September 3, 1997, which states: Acting on the petitioners Ex-Parte Clarification (with prayer to defer agenda) dated December 4, 1995 and private respondent VMMEIs motion for early resolution dated April 9, 1996, the court resolved to dismiss the petition without prejudice, it appearing that this case is not yet ripe for the Courts calendar in view of petitioners allegation that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources is still managing to finish the amendment of approved plan of the land subject of this case. The earlier resolution dated February 5, 1997 denying the petition without prejudice is hereby recalled, it appearing that petitioners have already submitted the addresses of the counsel for private respondents. The pendency before the Supreme Court of the issue of whether or not the subject land is registrable is prejudicial to the resolution of the case before us. The appeal before us pertains

to the application for registration of the subject land by appellant Mercado and appellee VMMEI. The petition for annulment of judgment docketed as CA-GR SP No. 32309 filed by the heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, et al., consolidated with the appeal, prays that the said heirs be allowed to intervene in or oppose the application for registration filed by both Mercado and VMMEI. Until the issue of registrability of the subject land is finally resolved this Court would be ill-advised to decide who between Mercado and VMMEI is entitled to registration, as it may later turn out that the land is indeed forest land and not subject to registration. It is settled in our jurisprudence that title issued over forest or inalienable land is void ab initio and cannot ripen into private ownership (Republic vs. IAC, 209 SCRA 90). WHEREFORE, the case is hereby ARCHIVED until the Supreme Court has finally resolved the petition filed by the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, et al. docketed as SC GR No. 119059. SO ORDERED.[63](Emphasis supplied.)

Entry of judgment on the September 3, 1997 dismissal without prejudice of G.R. No. 119059 was

made on December 12, 1997. VMMEI filed in said case the following motions: (1) Motion To Recall Entry of Judgment; (2) Motion To Resolve Petition, both dated September 6, 1998; and (3) Motion to Clarify dated October 6, 1998. In a Resolution[64] dated November 23, 1998, this Court said: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the aforesaid Motions are all NOTED WITHOUT ACTION and the Court of Appeals may now judiciously proceed with the resolution of CA-GR No. SP 32309 and CA-GR CV No. 41164, inasmuch as this present case is now deemed finally resolved and terminated. No further pleadings will be entertained.

immemorial. The appellate court also dismissed CAG.R. SP No. 32309, noting that in dismissing without prejudice G.R. No. 119059, this Court did not reverse or modify the October 14, 1994 Resolution excluding the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group and the Plateros in CAG.R. CV No. 41164. Further, it was mentioned that since G.R. No. 110005 also filed by the same Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group was already denied with finality, the CA can no longer entertain the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 32309 which questioned the RTCs order denying their motion to re-open proceedings in LRC Case Nos. TG-354, the same issues raised by said petitioners cannot be litigated anew. Lastly, the CA held that even

On May 31, 1999, the CAs Fourteenth Division rendered its Decision[65] dismissing the appeal of

if said petitioners were allowed to intervene in CA-G.R. CV No. 41164, still their alleged rights are foreclosed by the fact that VMMEIs mode of acquisition was not by sale made by the Olimpiada heirs but by purchase in a tax delinquency sale pursuant to P.D. No. 464. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court a quo dated November 26, 1992 is affirmed in toto. Likewise, the petition

Mercado in CA-G.R. CV No. 41164 and sustaining the trial courts findings and conclusions as to the defective redemption made by Mercado, the validity of VMMEIs acquisition of the subject lands by repaying the purchase price to the City Treasurer, and the

undisputed open, exclusive and notorious possession of the former owners of the lands since time

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32309 DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against applicant-appellant. SO ORDERED.[66]

is

instruction to then Tagaytay City Treasurer Daplas regarding the auction sale of the property redeemed by him, and which states that as a matter of public policy, all job-related instructions to local treasury officials are usually made in writing and that whether somebody might have given [Daplas] such verbal instructions, the Bureau is not at all aware of the same.[67] In its Resolution dated November 15, 1999, the CA granted Mercados motion for new

On October 12, 1999, Mercado filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of the following: (1) the Notarial Report of Notary Public Crisostomo G. Valle showing that

Document Nos. 809 to 987 appears on pages 67-101 of Book XXI for the month of September 1987 whereas the Final Bills of Sale indicated Document Nos. 977, 978 and 980, Book XXIII, pages 99 and 100, Book XVIII covers only pages Nos. 73-101, series of 1987; Documents 978 and 980 are recorded not as the final bills of sale; (2) Certification from the Clerk of Court, Notarial Section, RTC of Manila which proves the spurious nature of the Final Bills of Sale; and (3) Letter dated October 5, 1999 from Angelina M. Magsino, Deputy Executive Director and OIC of the Bureau of Local Government Finance, Department of Finance, in response to Mercados letterquery if it is the practice of said office to give verbal

trial. Subsequently, however, in its Resolution dated December 1, 1999, the appellate court granted VMMEIs motion for reconsideration and set aside its November 15, 1999 resolution.[68] On February 4, 2000, Mercado filed a petition for review before this Court to reverse the CA Decision dated May 31, 1999 and Resolution dated December 1, 1999, docketed as G.R. No. 141019. CA-G.R. SP No. 74454

While their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 74454 was still pending, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Tagaytay City (Branch 23), docketed as Civil Case No. TG-2406.
[69]

Case No. TG-1800, in which the reliefs are similar to those sought in Civil Case No. TG-2406. It was further argued that the filing of Civil Case No. TG-1800 was itself an act of forum shopping because the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group had previously filed an urgent motion for reopening of Civil Case No. TG-354 before the RTC. In view of this clear and blatant forum shopping, the filing of the mandamus case could not be invoked as legal basis for suspension of the proceedings in CA-G.R. CV No. 74454.[71] On March 31, 2004, the CAs Eighth Division

Impleaded as defendant therein was City Assessor

Gregorio M. Monreal. It was prayed that said defendant be directed to correct the error committed in the issuance of tax declaration as New in 1974 containing the name Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada only instead of the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, et al. as reflected in the approved survey plan (Ap-04-000778). On August 15, 2003, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group filed an urgent motion to suspend proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No. 74454 to await the final resolution of the mandamus case (Civil Case No. TG-2406). [70] In its Opposition, VMMEI contended that the petition in Civil Case No. TG-2406 is defective as it did not also implead the City Government of Tagaytay. Such non-inclusion of the city government was deliberate and made to conceal the forum shopping committed by the

rendered its Decision[72] dismissing the petition for certiorari finding no grave of abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-1800. It noted that petitioners failed to offer satisfactory explanation for not complying with Section 83 of P.D. No. 464, failing to appeal the final orders of the respondent court, and resort to petition for relief from judgment and other motions without

complying with procedural requirements. Additionally, the court found that the alleged extrinsic fraud was not

Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group who had earlier filed Civil

substantiated. The Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group filed a petition for certiorari before this Court assailing the foregoing CA ruling, docketed as G.R. No. 164281. On September 29, 2004, this Courts Second Division resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 164281 with G.R. No. 141019, and the case was referred to the First Division.[73]

court held that allowing the addition of the word et al. in the questioned tax declarations connotes the

inclusion of new owners, hence a real action involving ownership and title. Consequently, such correction can only be made after trial. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group appealed the February 18, 2003 order of dismissal ( CA-G.R.

Civil Case No. TG2406 (Manda mus Case) and CAG.R. SP No. 89657

SP[74] No. 89657). On December 27, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision[75] affirming the assailed order. It noted that the tax declaration covering the subject property is already in the name of VMMEI and that appellants have not established a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of their petition. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA under

On February 18, 2003, the RTC Branch 18 dismissed the petition for mandamus in Civil Case No. TG-2406 filed by the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group against City Treasurer Gregorio M. Monreal. The trial

Resolution[76] dated December 19, 2008. The matter was elevated to this Court by the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 185781.

On February 11, 2009, this Courts Second Division resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 185781 with the consolidated petitions in G.R. Nos. 141019 and 164281.[77] The Consolidated Petitions G.R. No. 141019 Petitioner seeks to reverse the May 31, 1999 CA Decision, as well as its December 1, 1999 Resolution, arguing that the CA erred in ruling that: (1) petitioner did not qualify as redemptioner under Section 78, P.D. No. 464; (2) petitioners redemption was defective, which is contrary to the ruling in Tolentino v. Court of Appeals (106 SCRA 513); (3) petitioners exercise of his right of redemption was not legal despite evidence showing that the certificates of redemption issued to him were not cancelled and that the City Treasurer subsequently accepted his real property tax payments; (4) respondent VMMEI never forfeited its rights as successful bidder at the auction sale despite the fact that it refunded the bid price to the City Treasurers

Office

and

there

is

no

conclusive

proof

that

it

reimbursed the bid price which the City Treasurers Office earlier refunded; (5) the final bills of sale submitted by VMMEI was admissible despite being photocopies, in violation of the Best Evidence Rule and having been notarized outside the territorial jurisdiction of Notary Public who notarized the same; and (6) the motion for new trial filed by petitioner cannot be granted, thus reversing its earlier resolution allowing the petitioner to present newly discovered evidence that the final bills of sale are spurious.[78] Petitioner Mercado and respondent VMMEI filed several pleadings, including motions and counter-

motions for contempt, precipitated by repeated motions to suspend proceedings/resolution filed by the

Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group who cited the pendency of other related suits they instituted in the RTC and CA. The aforesaid heirs who are petitioners in G.R. Nos. 164281 and 185781 even filed a motion to intervene on March 28, 2003 in G.R. No. 141019 alleging that they are entitled to 2/3 of the land subject of LRC Case No.

TG-354 and were not notified of the auction sale conducted by the City Government of Tagaytay.[79]

G.R. No. 164281 Petitioners aver that the CA gravely abused its

On December 17, 2002, Atty. Gilbert M. Fabella, filed his Withdrawal of Counsel And Opposition to avoid conflict of interest such as Forum Shopping or Litis Pendencia, etc.[80] In compliance with our directive, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group through Fernando Olimpiada filed their Comment stating that they had a hard time finding a replacement for Atty. Fabella due to financial constraints, and hence they object to the said withdrawal of counsel.[81] Thereafter, Atty. Fabella

discretion in: (1) not recognizing the fact that the RTC acting as land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners for being not parties in LRC Case No. TG-354; (2) not finding that petitioners owned 2/3 of the auctioned real property by inheritance as legitimate descendants; (3) not awaiting the

resolution of the petition for mandamus filed by the petitioners to prove their ownership; (4) in favoring the tax delinquency sale of the City Government of Tagaytay over the ownership claim of the petitioners; and (5) not appreciating the existence of external, actual and collateral fraud committed by respondents VMMEI and City Government of Tagaytay.[84]

continued to represent them in these cases as shown by subsequent pleadings until the time he was already confined at the Philippine Heart Center. [82] On August 25, 2006, the Olimpiada Heirs through their attorney-infact, Fernando Olimpiada, informed this Court that Atty. Fabella died on January 12, 2006. Their subsequent pleadings in the three cases were filed by their attorney-in-fact Fernando Olimpiada.[83]

Petitioners thus prayed for the following reliefs: (1) declaring the levy and subsequent auction sale made by the City Government of Tagaytay as null and void at least insofar as the 2/3 portion of the subject

land is concerned; (2) declaring the Decision in LRC Case No. TG-354 with respect to Lot 4867 confirming ownership in favor of VMMEI as null and void at least to the extent of 2/3 thereof; (3) declaring the order of respondent judge dated January 14, 2000 as null and void for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion and with gross misrepresentation for

bidder VMMEI is a mining corporation not allowed to acquire agricultural land, besides being a dummy corporation, its claim of ownership over the subject land is a violation of the Corporation Code; (3) the correction of a typographical or clerical error committed by a City Assessor is a ministerial function and is purely ministerial in character; (4) petitioners did not receive any notice declaring them as delinquent taxpayers and of the conduct of auction sale, and neither were they parties to the land registration case; and (5) under the Civil Code, VMMEI is only a trustee of the petitioners when it bought at the auction sale the lot owned in common. Petitioners thus prayed that the CA decision be set aside and judgment be rendered

excluding petitioners as co-owners of Lot 4867; and (4) declaring the March 31, 2004 CA Decision as null and void for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion as it did not await the final resolution of the mandamus case.[85]

G.R. No. 185781 Petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision dated December 27, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89657, setting forth the following arguments: (1) lands which have not been issued patent and certificate of title cannot be the object of an auction sale, and if sold by the non-grantee is a violation of the law; (2) the only

ordering the City Assessor to correct the erroneous 1974 Tax Declaration No. 09959-B.[86] Ruling of the Court The present controversy generated a prolonged litigation on the issue of ownership. On the one hand is the dispute between Mercado and VMMEI as to who had validly acquired rights over Lot 4867 in the tax

delinquency sale conducted by the City Government of Tagaytay and, on the other, is the persistent albeit unsubstantiated claim of the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group that they are co-owners of the auctioned property as descendants of the alleged brothers of Narciso Olimpiada, Juan and Sergio Olimpiada. In G.R. No. 141019, petitioner Mercado assails the CA in affirming the trial courts ruling that the subject lots auctioned by the City Government of Tagaytay were validly sold to respondent VMMEI in view of his insufficient and belated payment of redemption price. There can be no dispute that the RTC in the application for original registration may pass upon the issue of ownership to determine whether the applicant is entitled to the relief he seeks. It had jurisdiction to rule on all matters necessary for the determination of the issue of ownership, including the validity of the auction sale and related contentious issues.[87] However, the trial and appellate courts glossed over the more crucial aspect of the proceedings in LRC Case Nos. TG-

354,

TG-355

and

TG-356

pertaining

to

theidentity and registrability of the lands applied for. Records showed that in a Report [88] dated July 24, 1990, the Administrator of the Land Registration

Authority (LRA) informed the trial court in LRC Case No. TG-354. xxxx 2. After plotting the aforesaid plan in our Municipal Index Sheet discrepancies were noted which were referred to the Lands Management Sector, Region IV, Quezon City for verification and correction in a letter of even date, July 24, 1990, Annex A hereof; 3. Letters of even date (July 24, 1990) were also sent to the a) Lands Management Bureau, Manila, b) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Bacoor, Cavite and c) Forest Management Bureau, Quezon City, Annexes B, C and D hereof, requesting for the status of the parcel of land sought to be registered, if covered by any kind of public land application/land patent and is within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing are initially submitted to the Honorable Court for its information, with the recommendation that the rendition of the decision be held in abeyance until after the discrepancies are corrected and the requested informations are received. (Emphasis supplied.)

3. The Regional Technical Director, Region IV, in its letter dated June 26, 1992, in LRC Record No. N-51844, a copy is attached hereto as Annex C, informed that the correct tie line of Lot 4867 from BLLM #1, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre should be N. 70 deg. 54E., 6543.57 m.; 4. When the furnished corrected tie line was applied in the replotting of Ap-04000778, Lot 4867, Cad-355, in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that Lot A, plan Vs-04-000318, a portion of Psu-179428, applied in LRC Case No. Tg-301, LRC Record No. N-51844 by Primitiva Landicho-Tenido, et. al., & decided on October 21, 1988, is a portion of Lot 4867, Tagaytay Cadastre, applied in the case at bar. Copy of plan Vs-04000318 is attached hereto as Annex D; and 5. LRA letter dated July 24, 1990 addressed to the FMB remains unanswered as of this date. WHEREFORE, the foregoing report is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information & guidance with the recommendation that (1) the applicant be required to submit a subdivision plan in tracing cloth of Lot 4867, Tagaytay Cadastre, Ap-04000478 together with the

However, the trial court rendered its Decision dated November 26, 1992 without waiting for the receipt by the LRA of the abovementioned verification reports on the correctness of the plan and status of the land applied for registration. On January 5, 1993, the LRA submitted to the trial court a Supplementary Report,[89] as follows: xxxx 2. LMB & CENRO informed that the parcel of land situated in Iruhin, Tagaytay City, described in plan Ap-04-000778, Lot 4867, Cad-355 is not covered by any public land application/land patent per its st 1 Indorsement dated September 28, 1990 & letter dated September 6, 1990, copies are attached hereto as Annexes A & B;

corresponding technical descriptions duly verified & approved by the Regional Technical Director, Region IV, by excluding therefrom as a separate lot the portion covered by plan Vs-04000318, Lot A, a portion of Psu179428, applied & decided in LR Case No. Tg-301, LRC Record No. N-51844 & the Forest Management Bureau to submit a report to the Court on the status of the land applied for, to determine whether said land or any portion thereof, is within the forest zone.[90] (Emphasis supplied.)

resolution or order if any, of the Honorable Court relative to our Supplementary Report dated January 05, 1993, for our record as required by existing regulations. In the negative, please include said report in the calendar of cases for consideration of the Honorable Court.[92]

By that time, however, the RTC had already given due course to the appeal of Mercado, and hence the records were being forwarded to the appellate court. As to the other lots applied for in LRC Case Nos. TG-355 and TG-356, though not subject of the petition before this Court, we note that the LRA Report dated August 10, 1990 submitted to the trial court in LRC Case No. TG-355 sets forth the following: xxxx 1. Parcels of land described as Lot Nos. 7539, 7540 and 7541 in plan As-04000064, situated in the Barrio of Sunga, Tagaytay City are being applied for original registration of title; 2. After examining the afore-said plan discrepancies were noted which were referred to the Lands Management Sector

Apparently, the LRA was not notified that a decision had already been rendered as evident from its letter[91] dated January 19, 1993 to the Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 18, requesting for confirmation of the genuineness and regular about issuance the matters of said earlier

decision. Concerned

conveyed to the court and whether these have been properly addressed, the LRA again wrote the Clerk of Court, stating that In connection with the examination of the above-noted case/record, please furnish this Authority with a certified copy of the

(LMS), Quezon City, for verification and correction in a letter of even date (August 10, 1990), Annex A hereof; 3. Letters of even date (August 10, 1990) were also sent to (a) Land Management Bureau (LMB), Manila, (b) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, (CENRO), Bacoor, Cavite, and (c) Forest Management Bureau (FMB), Quezon City, Annexes B C & D hereof, requesting for the status of the parcels of land sought to be registered, if covered by any kind of public land application/patent and are within the alienable and disposable land of public domain. WHEREFORE, the foregoing are initially submitted to the Honorable Court for its information and guidance with the recommendation that the rendition of the decision be held in abeyance until after the discrepancies are corrected and the requested informations are received.[93](Emphasis supplied.)

4831-B, whether it is covered by any kind of public land application/land patent, is a portion of or identical to any parcel of land covered by previously approved isolated survey, and is inside the alienable and

disposable land of the public domain.[94]It should be stressed that a person who seeks registration of title to a piece of land must prove the claim by clear and convincing evidence, and is duty bound to identify sufficiently and satisfactorily the property. Otherwise stated, all facts must indicate that no other person, including the government, will be prejudiced by the adjudication of the land to the applicant.[95]Indeed, a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void.[96] The applicant for registration under Section 14, paragraph (1)[97] of P.D. No. 1529 must specifically prove: (1) possession of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (2) the classification of the land as an alienable and

Again, there is no showing that the above recommendation was duly considered and acted upon by the trial court. It also did not wait for the submission of reports requested by the LRA from the

aforementioned agencies concerning the status of Lot

disposable land of the public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[98] In this case, the only evidence submitted before the trial court to show the character of the lands applied for is the Certification issued by CENRO Records Officer Benjamin Aukay stating the status of each lot as not applied.[99] This hardly suffices to prove the character of the land as it did not even state whether the subject lots are within the alienable and disposable zone of the public domain. It must also be stressed that the tax delinquency sale is no proof of registrability of the land. Both Mercado and VMMEI failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

The Court has recently reiterated the stringent evidentiary requirements to establish the character of the land, as follows: Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call for proof. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the following: a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. However, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Supreme Court overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a

CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable: Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not,

by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable.[100]

If indeed proven to be forest land, then the land registration court has no jurisdiction over the subject properties.[101] Jurisprudence is replete with cases

reiterating that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private

property. Possession of the land by private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership.[102] The Court is mindful of the fact that the Solicitor General, though represented before the trial court by

the public prosecutor, did not appeal the May 31, 1999 Decision in LRC Case Nos. TG-354, TG-355 and TG356. Nonetheless, in view of the serious discrepancies reported by the LRA in the approved plans, the absence of competent proof of the status of the lands subject of application, the trial courts rendition of decision even before receipt of the reports requested by the LRA from the concerned government agencies (DENR-LMS,

G.R. No. 119059, the CA was directed to proceed with the resolution of the said cases. However, G.R. No. 119059 did not actually resolve the merits of the petition and merely declared the case not yet ripe for disposition. Perusal of the records in G.R. No. 119059 reveals that petitioners submitted a copy of the letter dated May 16, 1997 from DENR Regional Technical Director (Mainland Provinces) Benjamin P. Pambid and

CENRO and FMB), we hold that remand of the case (G.R. No. 141019) for further proceedings is in order. We recall this Courts initial observation when G.R. No. 119059 was dismissed without prejudice under the September 3, 1997 Resolution, that the case is not yet ripe for resolution in view of petitioners allegation that the DENR has not yet finished the amendment of the approved plan.[103] This Court, as well as the CA, took note of relevant information supposedly obtained by petitioners relative to Lot 4867, which prompted the CA to temporarily archive the consolidated cases CA-GR. CV No. 41164 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32309. When this Court entered judgment on the dismissal without prejudice of

addressed to their counsel, Atty. Fabella, which reads: This has reference to the 1 Indorsement dated May 07, 1997 by Director S.F. Rodriguez, OIC, Legal Service Office, DENR Visayas Ave., Diliman, Quezon City relative to your request for certification re: Plan AP-04-000728 as contained in your letter dated January 13, 1997.
st

Our cadastral map record shows that there is such a parcel of land surveyed as Lot 4867 and appears in CM 14 deg. 05 N., 121 deg. 01E. The Lot Data Computation, however, does not indicate the name of claimant, which means, that there was no identification obtained during the cadastral survey as to the claimant of the land.

It is much regretted that the record of past issuances of Advance Plans (AP), as shown in log books, is no longer intact. The log book presently in our possession starts with the number Ap-04-005869. In practice, we do not, in the past, keep a second copy of Advance Plans since such kind of plans were just prepared based on existing records of the cadastre. If, however, there exists in court, for exhibit purposes, such a plan denominated as AP-04-000778 in the name of the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, all that will be necessary will be for you to furnish this office a reproduction copy in order for us to determine whether or not the signatures are authentic and is an official issuance of the Regional office.[104]

by Plan Ap-04-000778 falls within the Unclassified Public Forest of Tagaytay City per LC-CM 10 control map of Cavite. 2. Such being the classification of the land, the same, although covered by tax declaration, cannot be the subject of any public land disposition including sales auction by the local government on such ground as tax payment delinquency.[105]

The foregoing vital information should be made available to the Court for proper disposition of this case. The trial court upon remand shall thus receive the completed amendment/verification survey and such

Petitioners also furnished the Court with a copy of another letter dated June 23, 1997 from Regional Technical Director Pambid, which reads: This is in response to your letter dated 30 May 1997 relative to Lot 4867, Cad 355, Tagaytay Cadastre: On the issues you raised therein, hereinbelow are our comments, to wit: 1. As projected by the Forest Engineering Division, Forest Management Sector, Lot 4867 covered

other

pertinent

reports

in

connection

with

the

investigation being conducted by the DENR and those previously requested by the LRA. It may also conduct hearings whenever necessary, and to issue appropriate orders to obtain all relevant data pertaining to the lands subject of application for original

registration. Thereafter, the entire evidence shall be forwarded to this Court for final disposition. The Court will now resolve the other two petitions.

In G.R. No. 164281, the CA affirmed the trial courts order granting the motion to dismiss the suit for annulment of public auction sale.

Even if we decide the case on its merits, the petition still fails. Petitioners cause of action is predicated on the

In filing this petition for certiorari, petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule

absence of notice to them as alleged co-owners.We have previously ruled that it is incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice directly to the taxpayer -the registered owner of the property -- in order to protect the latters interests. Although preceded by proper advertisement and publication, an auction sale is void absent an actual notice to a delinquent taxpayer.
[107]

As to who is the taxpayer entitled to notice, it is the

declared or registered owner as appearing in the tax rolls or property tax record cards of the municipality or city where the property is located. In Talusan v. Tayag,
[108]

the Court held that for purposes of the collection of

real property taxes, the registered owner of the property is considered the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax

delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax sale.[109] As petitioners failed to show they are the declared owners as shown in the tax rolls and tax

45. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.[106]

records of respondent City Government of Tagaytay, the CA did not err in affirming the dismissal of their complaint. Moreover, Section 83
[110]

be

done

when

it

or

he

unlawfully

neglects

the

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and

of P.D. No. 464 states

enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [112] The action lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty. A purely ministerial act, in

that the RTC shall not entertain any complaint assailing the validity of a tax sale of real property unless the complainant deposits with the court the amount for which the said property was sold plus interest

equivalent to 20% per annum from the date of sale until the institution of the complaint. This provision was adopted in Section 267 of the Local Government Code, albeit the increase in the prescribed rate of interest to 2% per month.
[111]

contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.[113] As correctly observed by the trial court, the correction sought would add new owners, aside from the fact that the property covered by the subject tax declaration is already under the name of VMMEI since 1988. It must be stressed that before a tax declaration is issued by the city assessor, he has to ensure that the

In G.R. No. 185781, the same petitioners fault the CA in not ruling that the correction sought in the 1974 tax declaration to add the words et al. to the named owners Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada was a purely ministerial function. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to

taxpayer submits the proper documents which indicate the nature of his right or claim over the property covered by the tax declaration. Clearly, the actual exercise of the city assessors duty to issue tax declarations is necessarily discretionary as it involves judgment on his part in examining the documents presented. Well-settled is the rule that mandamus may not be availed of to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the exercise of either.[114] In asserting their right as co-owners, petitioners presented the approved plan of Lot 4867 indicating that the survey was prepared for Heirs of Narciso

subject land merely plot the location and the boundaries thereof. We have held that while these documents help in establishing the identity of the property sought to be registered, they are completely ineffectual in proving possession of the applicant in the concept of an owner for the necessary period.[116]Much less, therefore, can they constitute evidence of ownership and identities of the claimants/owners of the land surveyed. It did not escape the attention of the Court that G.R. Nos. 164281 and 185781 were spawned by the successive suits and motions of the Olimpiada HeirsFabella Group in the trial and appellate courts, a blatant violation of the rule against forum shopping. These multiple proceedings were initiated and actively

Olimpiada, et al. The words et al. is an abbreviation of et alli (and others) and is often affixed to the name of the person first mentioned, where there are several plaintiffs, grantors, persons addressed, etc. [115]Such et al. affixed to the name of the claimants appearing on the approved survey plan/technical description is not sufficient to establish the alleged co-ownership. The approved survey plan and technical description of the

pursued by their former counsel, Atty. Fabella, who had already passed away in 2006. In any case, the Court deems it necessary at this stage to allow further reception of evidence, taking into consideration those opposition and concerns already entered into the records respecting the subject lands identity and registrability.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 164281 is DISMISSED and the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 185781 is DENIED.

subject lands, other than those which are already part of the records of the case. The trial court shall conduct hearings and issue

In G.R. No. 141019, the Decision dated May 31, 1999 and Resolution dated December 1, 1999 are SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 (LRC Case Nos. TG-354, TG355 and TG-356) for further proceedings. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and Department of

the appropriate orders whenever necessary to obtain all relevant information regarding the status of the subject lands. Thereafter, it shall submit its complete report and forward the entire evidence, testimonial and

documentary, to this Court within ninety (90) days from termination of the proceedings. Let copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General who shall continue to appear in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and file appropriate pleadings or actions pursuant to its legal mandate. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), DENR Lands Management Bureau and DENR-Regional Office No. IV. Said agencies are hereby DIRECTED (1) to conduct an investigation or continue such investigation already commenced, if any, on the status of the lots subject of the application in LRC Case Nos. TG-354, TG355 and TG-356; and (2) to submit their reports to the trial court as soon as their investigation is

completed. The LRA is likewise directed to submit to the trial court all reports and findings relative to the

PHILIPPINE PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent. Promulgated: July 15, 2005

x--------------------------------------------x DECISION CORONA, J.:

In implementing the involuntary transfer of title of real property levied and sold on execution, is it enough for the executing party to file a motion with the court which rendered judgment, or does he need to file a separate action with the Regional Trial Court? This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] from a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53085, [2] and its resolution denying reconsideration,[3] both of which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 51.[4] The undisputed facts of the case follow.[5] Petitioner and his wife are the registered owners of the following real properties: Lot Nos. 2904-A (covered by TCT No. T-36090), 2312-C-5 (covered by

ESTANISLAO PADILLA, JR. Petitioner, PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman -versus-

G.R. No. 141256 Present: SANDOVALGUTIERREZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES and GARCIA, JJ.

TCT No. T-3849), and 2654 (covered by TCT No. T8053), all situated in Bago City. Respondent is a marketing cooperative which had a money claim against petitioner. On April 24, 1987, respondent filed a civil case against petitioner for collection of a sum of money in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. [6] Despite receipt of summons on May 18, 1987, petitioner (then defendant) opted not to file an answer.[7] On March 3, 1988, respondent (then plaintiff) moved to have petitioner-defendant declared in default, which the trial court granted on April 15, 1988.[8] Respondent presented its evidence on October 9, 1989. [9] On November 28, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in respondents favor.[10] Petitioner was furnished a copy of this decision by mail on November 29, 1989 but, because of his failure to claim it, the copy was returned.
[11]

respondent. On August 13, 1990, the certificate of sale was recorded in the Register of Deeds.[12] When petitioner failed to exercise his right of redemption within the 12-month period allowed by law, the court, on motion of respondent, ordered on February 5, 1992 the issuance of a writ of possession for the sheriff to cause the delivery of the physical possession of the properties in favor of respondent.[13] On May 17, 1995, respondent filed a motion to direct the Register of Deeds to issue new titles over the properties in its name, alleging that the Register of Deeds (RD) of Bago City would not issue new titles (in respondents name) unless the owners copies were first surrendered to him. Respondent countered that such surrender was impossible because this was an involuntary sale and the owners copies were with petitioner.[14] On July 3, 1995, the trial court issued an order granting the motion. In a subsequent order dated August 8, 1995, it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed. Four years later, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the order of the trial court. Petitioner contends that respondents motion for the RD to cancel the existing certificates of title and issue new ones in its name was in fact a real action and that the motion was procedurally infirm because respondent did not furnish him a copy. [15] He also

On May 31, 1990, the Court issued a writ of execution. On June 4, 1990, the three lots (Lot 2904-A, Lot 2312-C-5 and Lot 2654), all of the Bago Cadastre and registered in petitioners name, were levied by virtue of that writ. On July 4, 1990, sheriff Renato T. Arimas auctioned off the lots to satisfy the judgment, with respondent as the only bidder. On July 10, 1990, ex-officio provincial sheriff and clerk of court Antonio Arbis executed a certificate of sale in favor of

claims that under Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the execution of the judgment was barred by prescription, given that the motion was filed more than 5 years after the writ of execution was issued on March 23, 1990. [16] He also argues that respondent failed to follow the correct procedure for the cancellation of a certificate of title and the issuance of a new one, which is contained in Section 107 of PD 1529.
[17]

In Heirs of Blancaflor vs. Court of Appeals, Sarmiento Trading Corporation, predecessor-ininterest of the private respondent Greater Manila Equipment Marketing Corporation, secured a writ of execution in 1968 by virtue of which it levied real property belonging to petitioners predecessor-ininterest, Blancaflor. When the property was auctioned, Sarmiento Trading bid successfully and, in 1970, after the lapse of the one-year redemption period, consolidated its ownership over the lot.
[19]

In its comment,[18] respondent claims that the motion dated May 15, 1995 to direct the RD to issue new certificates of title was but a continuation of the series of events that began with the decision in its favor on November 28, 1989, and from there, the auction of the properties and the issuance of a certificate of sale in 1990.

Sarmiento Trading then filed a petition with the Court of First Instance to order the cancellation of Blancaflors title and the issuance of a new one in its name. In 1972, Sarmiento Trading sold the lot to private respondent which, at the time, went by the name Sarmiento Distributors Corporation. In 1988, the Deputy Register of Deeds of Iloilo wrote to Blancaflor requesting him to surrender his owners duplicate copy of the TCT. Blancaflor did not comply and the RD refused to issue a new title. On May 25, 1989, private respondent filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court praying that the petitioners be ordered to surrender the owners duplicate copy of the title. The petitioners refused, claiming that respondents cause of action had already prescribed. Ruling otherwise, we stated: It is settled that execution is enforced by the fact of levy and sale. The result of such execution salewith Sarmiento Trading Corporation as the

The two principal issues for consideration are: (1) whether or not respondents right to have new titles issued in its name is now barred by prescription and (2) whether or not the motion in question is the proper remedy for cancelling petitioners certificates of title and new ones issued in its name. On the first issue, we rule that the respondents right to petition the court for the issuance of new certificates of title has not yet prescribed.

highest bidderwas that title to Lot No. 22 of TCT No. 14749 vested immediately in the purchaser subject only to the judgment debtors right to repurchase. Therefore, upon Sarmiento Trading Corporations purchase of Lot No. 22 covered by TCT No. 14749 at the auction sale, private respondents successor-in-interest had acquired a right over said title. The right acquired by the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate and does not become absolute until after the expiration of the redemption period without the right of redemption having been exercised. But inchoate though it be, it is like any other right, entitled to protection and must be respected until extinguished by redemption. Gaudencio Blancaflor was not able to redeem his property after the expiration of the redemption period, which was 12 months after the entry or annotation of the certificate of sale made on the back of TCT No. 14749. Consequently, he had been divested of all his rights to the property. (underscoring ours) In this case, petitioner[20] states: the rule being invoked by

limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

As should be evident from Blancaflor, petitioner Padillas reliance on Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is misplaced. The fact of levy and sale constitutes execution, and not the action for the issuance of a new title. Here, because the levy and sale of the properties took place in June and July of 1990, respectively, or less than a year after the decision became final and executory, the respondent clearly exercised its rights in timely fashion. In addition, petitioner himself admits his failure to redeem the properties within the one-year period by adopting the facts stated in the Court of Appeals decision.[21] There is thus no doubt he had been divested of his ownership of the contested lots. Respondents position hinges on petitioners failure to redeem the properties 12 months after the certificate of sale was recorded in the Register of Deeds on August 13, 1990. There is no uncertainty about respondents having become the new lawful owner of the lots in question by virtue of the levy and the execution sale.

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action.A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of

On the other hand, the issue of whether to acquire new titles by mere motion or through a separate petition is an entirely different matter. Petitioner is correct in assailing as improper respondents filing of a mere motion for the cancellation of the old TCTs and the issuance of new ones as a result of petitioners refusal to surrender his owners duplicate TCTs. Indeed, this called for a separate cadastral action initiated via petition. Section 107 of PD 1529,[22] formerly Section 111 of Act 496,[23] provides: Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates.Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owners duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel the surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason

the outstanding owners duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.

Respondent alleges that it resorted to filing the contested motion because it could not obtain new certificates of title, considering that petitioner refused to surrender his owners duplicate TCTs. This contention is incorrect. The proper course of action was to file a petition in court, rather than merely move, for the issuance of new titles. This was the procedure followed in Blancaflor by Sarmiento Trading which was in more or less the same situation as the respondent in this case:[24] Petitioners reliance on prescription and laches is unavailing in this instance. It was proper for Sarmiento Trading Corporation to file a petition with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, acting as a cadastral court, for the cancellation of TCT No. 14749 in the name of Gaudencio Blancaflor and the issuance of another in its name. This is a procedure provided for under Section 78 of Act No. 496 and Section 75 of PD No. 1529

Section 78 of Act 496 reads: Sec. 78. Upon the expiration of the time, if any allowed by law for redemption after registered land has been sold on any execution, or taken or sold for the enforcement of any lien of any description, the person claiming under the execution or under any deed or other instrument made in the course of the proceedings to levy such execution or enforce any lien, may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate to him, and the application may be granted: Provided, however, That every new certificate entered under this section shall contain a memorandum of the nature of the proceeding on which it is based: Provided, further, That at any time prior to the entry of a new certificate the registered owner may pursue all his lawful remedies to impeach or annul proceedings under execution or to enforce liens of any description. Section 75 of PD 1529 provides: Sec. 75. Application for new certificate upon expiration of redemption period.Upon the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for redemption after the registered land has been sold on execution, or taken or sold for the enforcement of a lien of any description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser at such sale or anyone claiming under him may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate to him.

Before the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such proceedings.

It is clear that PD 1529 provides the solution to respondents quandary. The reasons behind the law make a lot of sense; it provides due process to a registered landowner (in this case the petitioner) and prevents the fraudulent or mistaken conveyance of land, the value of which may exceed the judgment obligation. Petitioner contends that only his interest in the subject lots, and not that of his wife who was not a party to the suit, should have been subjected to execution, and he should have had the opportunity to prove as much. While we certainly will not condone any attempt by petitioner to frustrate the ends of justice the only way to describe his refusal to surrender his owners duplicates of the certificates of title despite the final and executory judgment against him respondent, on the other hand, cannot simply disregard proper procedure for the issuance to it of new certificates of title. There was a law on the matter and respondent should have followed it. In any event, respondent can still file the proper petition with the cadastral court for the issuance of new titles in its name.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53085 is hereby REVERSED. The order of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City ordering the Register of Deeds of Bago City to issue new certificates of title in favor of respondent is ANULLED.

SO ORDERED.