GROUP 1

Written Report on

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary: Canons 1 and 2

Prepared by: Abon, Paine P. Augustin, Pauline Marie M. Bejosano, Jose Ibarra C. Fabros, Christopher Lambert M. Lazaro, Krizia Lissa C. Oa, Terenze Bernard M. Patawaran, Pocholo Rae N. Santos, Oliver Yabut, Lee Anne

New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary Canon 1 - Independence Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and the fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects. Section 1
Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

In rendering a decision, judges shall reject any pressure from outside sources and base their decision on the evidence and the law and prevailing jurisprudence applicable to the facts. A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. Judicial independence requires that judges must ignore public opinions, newspaper columns, editorials, tv or radio commentaries whether for or against issues on cases pending before them. A judge violates his duty as a minister of justice if he seeks to do what he may personally consider as substantial justice and disregards the law as he knows it to be binding upon him. In Albert V. CFI, the Supreme Court held:
If a judge of a lower court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by the Supreme Court is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land.

In the case of Libarios V. Dabalos, the Supreme Court held that a judge should not be swayed by the fact that the complainant and his sympathizers had staged a rally demanding the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused. It is not a sufficient excuse for the unjustified haste of respondent judge's act of fixing bail without a hearing. Section 2
In performing judicial duties, Judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

Section 3
Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.

In the performance of their judicial functions, judges shall exercise from judicial colleagues by not surrendering their independent judicial decisions. Section 2 seeks to avoid companerismo and the cultural value of utang na loob ; sections 2 and 3 are intended to

address unethical practices among judges. If the consultation is purely on an academic or hypothetical basis, and the judge does not surrender his independent decision, there is no breach of Section 3 or Section 2 of the Code. In Rule 2.9 (A) (3), ABA Draft Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2006:
A judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the judges adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges, provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the matter.

Any attempt, whether successful or not to influence the decision making process of another judge, especially one who is of lower rank and over which he exercises supervisory authority is serious misconduct. In Sabitsana Jr. V. Villamor, the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) wrote a letter to a lower court judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) judge seeking to influence him to hear a case and even intimating that he issue an order of acquittal. The High Court ruled that a judge who tries to influence the outcome of a litigation pending before another court not only subverts the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the peoples faith in its integrity and impartiality. The interference in the decision making-making process of another judge is a breach of conduct so serious as to justify dismissal from service based on a preponderance of evidence. However, if the consultation is purely on an academic or hypothetical basis, and the judge does not surrender his independent decision, there is no breach of Sections II and III of the code. Section 4
Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Parents are protective and supportive of their children and grandchildren. Children are expected to be respectful and obedient to their parents. Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct, the term family is extended beyond that of nuclear members to include those related by blood or marriage up to the sixth civil degree, as well as those who belong to the judges employ and are living in his household. These familial ties may not influence a judge in his or her discharge of judicial duties Friendships are also held in high regard and most often are raised to the level of familial relationships. Filipinos highly value smooth interpersonal relations, commonly called pakikisama. For example, when one makes a request to a friend or close associate, the latter usually grants it even though he would have refused that same request if made by one who is neither a friend nor associate. Despite all this, the maintenance of friendships and the pursuit of pakikisama does not justify using judicial power to grant favors. However, an individual certainly does not divest himself of these relationships just

because he has joined the judiciary. While judges may continue to value these relationships, they must be aware that relatives, friends and associates may try to influence them in the performance of their judicial duties. Judges must always guard against the probability that these people can be potential influence peddlers, trying to sell to others whatever perceived influence or closeness to a judge they may claim to have. A judge should not sit in litigation where a near relative is a party or of counsel; and he should not suffer his conduct to create the impression that any person can unduly influence him or enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the rank, position, or influence of any party. Section 5
Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.

This is a new section adopted in the Code of Judicial Conduct. It deals specifically with the avoidance of inappropriate connections with the executive and legislative branches of the government. The reality in the Philippine political system is that judges can easily get an appointment or promotion with some assistance or support from political leaders, religious groups, military stalwarts, big companies and the affluent. The most pervasive influence comes from leaders in the legislature and those closely allied with the executive department. For instance, most members of the bench have received appointments through the grace of past and present political leaders of this country. It is natural to suppose that considerations of fealty and utang-na-loob would compel the judge to consider such factors when rendering his or her decision. However, acting upon such considerations violate this code. The rule set forth in Section 5 has both legal and practical value. Section 6
Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate

One of the most prominent cases concerning this section happened during the Corona case when there was a five-page motion for leave to intervene filed against former Chief Justice Renato Corona urged from cases involving former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It was discussed further in the Corona trial pointing out that a judge should not handle a case which he might be perceived rightly or wrongly, susceptible to bias and partiality- these being essential in overseeing public trust and integrity of the judiciary:
A summary of the case, as prepared by ABS-CBN News Ryan Chua: Article 1. Respondent betrayed public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo administration from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court chief justice and until his dubious appointment as midnight chief to the present.

ASSIGNED PROSECUTORS: Northern Samar Rep. Raul Daza (lead), Bayan Muna Rep. Neri Colmenares, Iloilo Rep. Niel Tupas Jr. BACKGROUND: Corona violated Article 7, Section 15 of the Constitution which prohibits presidential appointments within two months before the electionswhen he accepted his midnight appointment from former President Arroyo on May 12, 2010. A 1998 Court decision bars midnight appointments to the judiciary. Corona is also biased for Arroyo in politically significant cases from the time he was still a Justice to his eventual appointment to the Courts top post. CORONAS ANSWER: 1. Coronas appointment was not unconstitutional. A March 2010 Supreme Court decision (De Castro v. JBC, et al) ruled that members of the SC are not included in the election ban on appointments. 2. Corona denies being partial to Arroyo. Court decisions are collegial in nature and he casts just one vote. His votes are not consistently pro-Arroyo. 3. That Corona was Arroyos trusted aide before his appointment to the court is a non-issue, because it is not uncommon for SC justices to have worked as professionals with close ties to the president who appointed them. 4. The prosecutors are asking the Senate impeachment court to review SC decisions, which is not allowed under the principle of separation of powers. PROSECUTIONS REPLY: 1. Even if the SC has ruled that his appointment was legal, the people saw it as immoral, felt betrayed, and were outraged. Corona could have refused the appointment and placed the interests of the judiciary and the country above his own. But he did not, giving Arroyo a strong ally in the SC. 2. SC decisions may be collegial, but Coronas individual vote is his personal action and his own responsibility. His votes reflect a bias for Arroyo. 3. Corona is accountable for Court decisions because as Chief Justice, he has special powers other justices do not have: chairing sessions of the en banc, directing the raffle of cases including applications for a temporary restraining order, etc. 4. The impeachment complaint does not call for a legislative review of SC decisions. It merely presents Coronas voting record in those decisions to prove his bias for Arroyo. Article 3. Respondent committed culpable violation of the constitution and betrayed the public trust by the failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII, Section 7 (3) of the constitution that provides that "a member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence" in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which caused the issuance of a flip-flopping decision in final and executory cases; in creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court. ASSIGNED PROSECUTORS: Isabela Rep. Giorgidi Aggabao, Akbayan Rep. Kaka Bag-ao, Cibac Rep. Sherwin Tugna BACKGROUND: 1. The SC under Coronas leadership reversed a supposedly final decision declaring Philippine Airlines retrenchment of thousands of flight crew as illegal, after entertaining a mere letter from PALs lawyer, Estelito Mendoza.

The Court entertained the letter even without seeking the comment of the other party, the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines, showing Coronas lack of ethical principles. Earlier, it also entertained a letter from Mendoza, which caused a flip-flopping in the case of League of Cities versus Comelec (discussed in detail in Article 5). 2. Corona compromised his independence when his wife, Cristina, accepted a 2007 appointment from former President Arroyo to the board of the John Hay Management Corporation, a subsidiary of the government-owned Bases Conversion Development Authority. Her appointment was a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that judges shall not use or lend the prestige of judicial office to advance their private interests, or that of a member of their family. It was meant to secure Coronas loyalty to Arroyo. 3. In JHMC, fellow board members accused Mrs. Corona of misconduct and negligence, and filed complaints against her. Instead of acting on the complaints, Arroyo ordered all JHMC members to resign and promoted Mrs. Coroana as OIC chairman of the board. 4. Corona met with Lauro Vizconde and Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption to discuss the Vizconde Massacre case, violating the Courts rule of confidentiality on pending cases. According to Vizconde himself in a sworn affidavit, Corona told him that Justice Antonio Carpio was trying to influence his colleagues to acquit Hubert Webb. Corona not only discussed a pending case, he also sowed intrigue against a fellow Justice. 5. Fernando Campos, a lawyer and businessmen, accused Corona of unethical conduct when he met with the lawyer of the other party in a pending case. Corona allegedly dismissed his appeal on a ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission against his company with undue haste and impropriety. CORONAS ANSWER: 1. It is a normal practice for lawyers and litigants to write the SC or the Chief Justice regarding their cases. The SC treats all letters as official and acts on them if needed. 2. Atty. Mendoza wrote a letter pointing out a mistake in raffling the FASAP case to the SC Second Division following the retirement of Justice Nachura. Since the Second Division could not agree on the reassignment of the case, the SC en banc took it up. Corona took no part in it. 3. The Courts changing of rulings should not be blamed on Corona. The SC is a collegial body whose decisions are based on the consensus of the majority. Also, Coronas vote in the case was consistent. 4. The Court did not flip-flop in the case of the League of Cities. The two parties filed appeals and the justices had to perform their duties to act on them. More so, only three judges of the total of 23 who took up the case in various stages changed their minds, and these were not in the same instance. 5. In the first place, a judge has the right to change his mind regarding a case. Even the Courts rules recognize that judges are human and commit mistakes. 6. Mrs. Corona was appointed to JHMC in April 2001, even before CJ Coronas appointment to the SC. No law prohibits the wife of a Chief Justice from pursuing a career in government. Her appointment also never influenced Coronas decisions in the Court. 7. The impeachment court is not the forum to hear Mrs. Coronas alleged misconduct as part of the JHMC board. She has answered the charges and is prepared to face her accusers in the proper forum. 8. It was only Dante Jimenez who was supposed to pay a courtesy call on Corona. Lauro Vizconde just tagged along, and Corona was surprised to see him. 9. Corona never told Vizconde and Jimenez that Justice Carpio was lobbying

for Webbs acquittal. Vizconde and Jimenez were the ones who brought up Carpios alleged maneuvers in the case during the meeting. In 2006, a Court of Appeals Justice warned Corona and Vizconde that someone in the SC was lobbying to acquit Webb. 10. Fernando Campos was never able to prove that Corona met with the lawyer of the other party in a pending case. Corona dismissed Campos appeal through a minute resolution because it should have been brought to the Court of Appeals, and because he failed to show that SEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision against his company. PROSECUTIONS REPLY: 1. That Corona sees nothing wrong with entertaining mere letters from lawyers without informing the other party shows that he is not fit to be a judge, more so a Chief Justice. 2. It is not true that Corona did not take part in the FASAP case. The October 4 en banc resolution indicates that he was not one of those who inhibited. In short, he took an active part in deliberating the FASAP case and voted in favor of recalling what should have been a final decision of the SC. 3. Even if Coronas vote in the League of Cities case was consistent, he did not do anything as the SCs leader to prevent the seemingly never-ending change in its decisions. 4. The Courts flip-flopping cannot be denied and has been widely criticized by legal experts. 5. Coronas claim that there was no impropriety in the appointment of his wife to the JHMC board was unsubstantiated. 6. Coronas meeting with Jimenez and Vizconde, even if Vizconde just tagged along, smacks of extremely disturbing impropriety. He could have politely declined a meeting with them, knowing they are parties to a pending case. Article 5. Respondent betrayed public trust through wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the principles of res judicata in the cases involving the 16 newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a province. ASSIGNED Pangasinan PROSECUTORS: Cavite Rep. Rep. Elpidio Marlyn Barzaga (lead), Agabas

BACKGROUND: 1. The SC under Corona flip-flopped or reversed its decisions on a number of cases many times, violating the principle of res judicata, or the immutability of final judgments. 2. The SC ruled on November 18, 2008 in League of Cities v. Comelec that the conversion of 16 municipalities into cities was unconstitutional because they failed to meet the income requirements for cities under the Local Government Code. Denying an appeal by the 16 municipalities, the Court affirmed its decision on April 28, 2009, and it became final on May 21, 2009. Still, the 16 municipalities filed several pleadings, even a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. Their lawyer, Estelito Mendoza, also wrote a letter asking the SC to reconsider its decision and allow the participation of judges who were not present when the November 18 ruling was being discussed. On December 21 of the same year, the Court reversed its decisions and declared the conversion of the 16 municipalities into cities as valid. But the League of Cities appealed the decision, citing the principles of finality of judgment. On August 24, 2010, the SC reversed its decision again and said the 16 municipalities may not convert into cities. Despite this, the Court again entertained an unprecedented fourth

motion for reconsideration from the 16 municipalities. On February 15, 2011, the Court granted their appeal and allowed their conversion into cities, in effect reversing the reversal of the reversal of the original decision. 3. In Navarro v. Ermita, the SC decided against the creation of the province of Dinagat Island on February 10, 2010. The ruling was final and executory, and an entry of judgment was made on May 18 of the same year, meaning it was irrevocable. But months later, the Court reversed its decision, acting on the motions of prospective officials and congressional representatives of Dinagat even if they were not parties to the original proceedings. 4. Associate Justice Arturo Brion said in his dissenting opinion on the Dinagat case, Unlike the case of Lazarus who rose from the dead through a miracle, Dinagat resurrected because the Court disregarded its own rules and established jurisprudential principles. Of course, it can similarly be called a miracle as no reversal could have taken place if just one of the series of transgressions pointed out did not take place. How such resurrection can happen in the Supreme Court is a continuing source of wonder! CORONAS ANSWER: 1. The prosecution may not question the SCs collegial decisions. That amounts to encroaching on the Courts judicial power. 2. Corona was not yet Chief Justice when the SC received letters appealing its original decision on the case of the 16 municipalities. As an Associate Justice, Corona was merely furnished copies of the letters. 3. Corona never flip-flopped; his votes affirming the constitutionality of the 16 municipalities cityhood was consistent. 4. Contrary to the prosecutions claim, the May 21, 2009 decision declaring the cityhood of the 16 municipalities unconstitutional was not yet final because the SC recalled the entry of judgment. Recalling entries of judgment is not unusual. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration filed by the 16 municipalities was allowed. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court allows a second appeal when it grants a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration. This is usually done to correct errors in decisions. A second motion for reconsideration is also not considered so and is thus allowed if it delves on a new issue or presents new evidence. 5. Corona refuses to comment on the cases of Dinagat and FASAP since these are still pending with the SC. PROSECUTIONS REPLY: The prosecution reiterates that the SC under Corona violated the principle of res judicata. No longer can the public look to the Supreme Court for a final resolution of disputes and controversies, for ay judgment, even if final, can still be revisited and reversed, at the whim of the Supreme Court. Article 6. Respondent betrayed public trust by arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and jurisdiction to improperly investigate a Justice of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him. Such authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the constitution in the House of Representatives via impeachment. ASSIGNED PROSECUTORS: Ilocos Norte Rep. Rodolfo Farinas, Cibac Rep. Sherwin Tugna BACKGROUND: The SC under Corona created an Ethics Committee to probe the case of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo, who was accused of plagiarizing portions of several books and articles in international journals in a

decision on Filipino comfort women during the Japanese occupation. Because Del Castillo is an impeachable officer, however, only the House of Representatives through impeachment has the power to investigate him and hold him accountable. Corona in effect disregarded the Houses power by forming the Ethics Committee, which later found Del Castillo not guilty. CORONAS ANSWER: 1. Corona did not create the Ethics Committee. It was established during the term of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and violation of ethical standards, including anonymous Complaints, filed against Members of the Supreme Court, and of submitting findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court en banc. The committee was not created for the purpose of absolving Del Castillo. 2. The SC en banc, not just Corona, referred Del Castillos plagiarism case to the Ethics Committee. The en banc absolved him on a vote of 10-2. Corona cast just one vote. 3. The committees power is only recommendatory. If an offense is impeachable, the SC en banc will refer it to the House for investigation. If not, the en banc will decide on the case and impose sanctions against the erring official if needed. PROSECUTIONS REPLY: 1. A Supreme Court justice may only be investigated and removed through an impeachment proceeding. Thus, it was improper for the SC to refer Del Castillos case to the Ethics Committee. 2. The law allows the SC to discipline members of lower courts, but not its own. Only the House has the power to discipline SC Justices because they are impeachable officers. 3. Corona preempted Congress and protected a fellow Justice from impeachment. Article 7. Respondent betrayed public trust through his partiality in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to give them an opportunity to escape prosecution and to frustrate the end of justice, and in distorting the Supreme Court decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the conditions of the Supreme Court's own TRO. ASSIGNED PROSECUTORS: Bayan Muna Rep. Neri Colmenares (lead), Northern Samar Rep. Raul Daza BACKGROUND: 1. The SC under Corona quickly issued a temporary restraining order allowing former President Arroyo and her husband, Mike, to go abroad despite a watchlist order by the Justice Department. This was done even without heeding the member-in-charges recommendation that a hearing be held first, and despite inconsistencies in Arroyos petition that cast doubts on her sincerity and the urgency of her need to leave the country to seek medical treatment. 2. The TRO for Gloria was extended to Mike because the SC consolidated their cases. 3. Events show the TRO was granted with undue haste: the SC extended its office hours to allow the Arroyos to post a P2-milion bond, and they booked several trips on the day the TRO was released, as if they knew about it beforehand.

4. The SC affirmed the TRO even if the Arroyos failed to comply with one of its conditions that they appoint a legal representative to attend to legal matters during their absence. Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno pointed this out in her dissent. The Court Administrator and SC spokesperson, Midas Marquez, misinformed the public by saying that the TRO was effective. CORONAS ANSWER: 1. The Rules of Court allows the consolidation of cases for actions involving common questions of law. There was a common question of law in the separate petitions of Gloria and Mike Arroyo: whether Justice Secretary Leila de Lima violated their right to travel by issuing a watchlist order against them. The consolidation of their cases was collegial and not just Coronas own move. 2. There was no undue haste in issuing the TRO. SC Justices received copies of the Arroyos petitions and deliberated on them carefully. 3. The en banc is not bound by the member-in-charges recommendations. The decision of the majority prevails. 4. That the SC would take up the TRO on November 15, 2011 was widely known. It is not surprising then that the Arroyos prepared for a possible issuance of it by, among other, booking several flights. The SC never informed them about it beforehand. 5. Corona cannot be held liable for a collegial decision such as the release of TROs. 6. The SC expressly made the TRO immediately executory, and so it was effective even if one of the conditions was not met. The Court ruled 9-4 that the TRO remained in force. Thus, the prosecutions claim that the SCs ruling did not reflect what was discussed in its deliberations is untrue. 7. Corona did not feed Marquez wrong information on the Courts deliberations on the TRO. PROSECUTIONS REPLY: 1. Corona used his administrative powers as Chief Justice to expedite the issuance of a TRO. 2. Coronas own arguments reveal his premeditated scheme to let the Arroyos leave. 3. Majority of the Justices (7-6) voted to keep silent on whether the TRO was effective despite the Arroyos failure to comply with a condition, because they believed it was commonsensical for it to be suspended. But Corona told Marquez to tell the public that the TRO was still in full force. 4. Justice Serenos dissent filed on December 2, 2011, which details irregularities in the issuance of TRO, was promulgated only on December 13. 5. Coronas actions show a clear bias for Arroyo. (Ryan Chua, ABS-CBN News: Corona Trial Summary)

However, according to Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile and Sen. Miriam DefensorSantiago that total inhibition results to dangers in democracy. Enrile said, If all appointees of the president must inhibit when the case is involving that president ... then you have no Supreme Court. If that is the case of GMA, then it is the case of the incumbent of the president like Justice (Bienvenido) Reyes and others. But based on that presumption, there are justices partial to the former. I dont think that is the correct presumption. Santiago gave a similar contention with Enrile:
If a howling mob is allowed to pressure the chief justice or any justice to inhibit, that would serve as a calamitous precedent. Any litigant would then be able to pressure an impartial judge to inhibit, in order to obtain a group decision from the substitute. In effect, the pressure to inhibit is an effort to substitute him

with Carpio. If it can be said that Corona might be biased in favor of Arroyo, it can also be said that Carpio might be biased against Arroyo. We cannot allow the composition of the Supreme Court in a certain case to be determined by an unelected exterior group on the basis of the groups own political biases.

Thus, pressuring any judge or justice to inhibit himself from a case also violates the independence of the judiciary. Judicial inhibition should be under the discretion of the judge and should not be forced upon him. Santiago cited decisions: In Soriano vs. Court of Appeals, she said the Supreme Court held that a litigant may not demand that a judge inhibit himself. Dimo Realty and Development Inc. vs. Dimaculangan also held that judges inhibit themselves on their own sound discretion. In 2006 People vs. Ong, Supreme Court affirmed the discretion of the judge to inhibit himself. Judges are in a better position to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. (Jeannette Andrade, Philippine Daily Inquirier: Corona Pressured to Inhibit Self) Once discussed in the European Court of Human Rights, the following reiterates the concept of impartiality: . . . there are two dimensions in the concept of judicial impartiality. The first, the Court should distance itself from personal bias and influence. The second, the Court should also be impartial objectively; meaning that there should be sufficient guarantees for the Court to dismiss any legitimate misgivings regarding impartiality. Subjective impartiality is a judges personal impartiality as an individual. A judge is presumed to be subjectively impartial until proven otherwise. However, subjective impartiality requires a very delicate effort in judging; judges should endeavor not to have any bias, prejudice, or precondition, and should avoid the appearance of favoring or hindering any party to a case. Objective impartiality is the parties and publics belief that the Court as an institution is impartial. Achieving objective impartiality requires conferral of some guarantees by judges to eliminate any suspicions regarding their impartiality. According to UNs Principles of Judicial Conduct, there can be two kinds of impartiality: subjective and objective. The best evidence to prove the subjective impartiality of a judges decision is its justification section. It should be known that a judge makes judgments and does not serve anybody in particular. When making his/her decisions, a judge looks only for justice. The only mission s/he should have is to bring about justice. A judge should not feel pressure to protect and shield the state from harm or should not act as an officer of the state or government. A judge should not feel pressure to give priority to the official theories of the state, nor should s/he feel pressure to protect the high interests of the state or government. The sentimental and nonsensical talk of the public should not affect a judges decision making. If public discussion does have an effect on a judges decision making process, then it is not possible to talk about the impartiality of judging but it is possible to talk about political judging. In order to talk about political judging mentioned in Supremacy of Laws in the Mind of the State Trap by Mithat Sancar courts do not have to act in accordance with the political will. When making its

decision, if a court, instead of making a reference to laws and justice, makes a reference to the dominant and official ideology, or the mind of the state, then,political judging is at play. (Sahin, Impartiality of the Judiciary) Section 7
Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.

This section should be correlated and read together with section 8 of this code because they both deal with instructing judges to maintain and enhance judicial independence. Section 7 requires judges to encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance judicial independence. Section 7 would strengthen the impartiality of the courts in rendering judgments on any case they would handle. The judges would abide with the law only and the influence of third parties would not affect in their decision making. The public would be more confident with the courts in their ability to render justice. The institutional and operational independence of the judiciary would greatly affect in the development of the legal system as well as in the improvement of the administration of justice. Section 8
Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

Public confidence in the judiciary can of course be attained only if judges are perceived by the public to be fair, honest, competent, principled, dignified and honorable. Accordingly, the first duty of judges is to conduct themselves at all times in a manner that is beyond reproach. In whatever atmosphere or environs they may happen to be, judges must remain conscious of their character and reputation as judges and should avoid anything which will indignify their public positions and demean the institution to which they belong. The word judge is employed to designate a public officer selected to preside and to administer law in a court of justice. Upon his assumption of office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary person. He becomes the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. No position exacts greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.

Canon 2 Integrity Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. Section 1
Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

Section 2
The Behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

The Code of Judicial Conduct not only provides that a judge should act with integrity, but also that he or she should so behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The judiciary must be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty. Sections 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary underscore the importance of public perception in the maintenance of judicial integrity. In the discharge of the functions of his office, a judge must strive to act in a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. His conduct must be free from any whiff of impropriety not only in his official duties but also in his private life. A judge, being the subject of constant public scrutiny, should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. Irresponsible or improper conduct of judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary. In the administrative case of De Guzman v Sison, the Court said that a private meeting with a litigant in a resort undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. It was stated in the administrative case of Nazareno v Almario:
[A] public official whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice, be he a Judge of a lower court or tribunal or a justice of the appellate courts, should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest. It has to be stressed once more to all who are sworn to render decisions in actual controversies that a decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest. It is thus the duty of members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.

Thus, it is clear that judges must be conscious of all their acts whether in their public functions or private life for it may affect the trust and confidence of the people towards the judiciary. Any image of impropriety must be avoided by members of the judiciary in order for the people to maintain their trust in the judiciary. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary. Section 3

Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.

This Section addresses the importance of the competence of the judge as an administrator and vanguard of justice.As in the case of the judge's own conduct, the competence of court personnel must also affirm the integrity of the judiciary. Judges should not be lenient in the administrative supervision of employees. As an administrator, the judge must ensure that all court personnel perform efficiently and promptly in the administration of justice. In Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, the Supreme Court explained:
Oftentimes...leniency provides the court employees the opportunity to commit minor transgressions of the laws and slight breaches of official duty ultimately leading to vicious delinquencies. The respondent judge should constantly keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his employees. He should realize that big fires start small. His constant scrutiny of the behavior of his employees would deter any abuse on the part of the latter in the exercise of their duties. Then, his subordinates would check that any misdemeanor will not remain unchecked. The slightest semblance of impropriety on the part of the employees of the court in the performance of their official duties stirs ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of the judicial administrators. The slightest breach of duty by and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and employees detract from the dignity of the courts and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.

The judiciary would certainly inspire public confidence if all courts headed by the judges and justices were conducted with integrity. Court staff includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks. Judges family includes a judges spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judges household.

Sources: 1. Cosico, Rodrigo V., Book on Legal and Judicial Ethics (2011). 2. Agpalo, Ruben E., Legal and Judicial Ethics (2009). 3. Available at Herrera Melencio, Ameurfina. New Code of Judicial Conduct, Annotated. 2007 (http://www.deontologiejudiciaire.umontreal.ca/fr/magistrature/documents/CODE_PHILIPPINES.pdf). 4. Available at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/01/15/12/corona-trial-summary (Last Updated 01/16/2012 1:13 AM). 5. The Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, et al., AM No. R-97-RTJ, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 269. 6. Sabitsana v Villamor A.M No. 90-474, October 4, 1991, 202 SCRA 445. 7. Libarios v Dabalos 199 SCRA 48. 8. Albert v CFI 23 SCRA 948. 9. Buenaventura vs. Benedicto 38 SCRA 71. 10. Padilla v Judge Silerio A.M. No. RTJ-98-1421. May 9, 2000. 11. Cacatian v Judge Liwanag A.M. No. MTJ-02-1418. December 10, 2003. 12. De Guzman v Judge Sison A.M. No. 99-731-RTJ. March 26, 2001. 13. Nazareno vs. Judge Almario A.M. No. RTJ-94-1195. February 26, 1997.