April 21, 2011

The Ewing Paradox

In the world of professional basketball, great players are often praised over their high statistics. What often isnt highlighted on the nightly ESPN recaps are the efficiencies of these playersonly, for example, that Allen Iverson scored a triple-double, recording double-digit figures in three statistics such as points, assists, and rebounds. While NBA superstars all have remarkable athletic ability and talent, sometimes they do not help their teams win solely by recording such inordinate statistics. If the superstar scores 40 points in a game but misses 15 shots, his high point total may outweigh his low scoring average. Other overlooked examples may include lackadaisical defense or high turnovers, even if a player shoots efficiently and boosts one of the five main statistics: points, rebounds, assists, steals, and blocks. Sportswriter Bill Simmons observed one superstar whose team played better without him, Patrick Ewing's teams (both at Georgetown and with New York) inexplicably played better when Ewing was either injured or missing extended stretches because of foul trouble (Simmons, 2001). In this article, Ewing Theory 101, Simmons identifies the paradoxical nature that some teams improve after their superstar leaves the team. While Simmons claims these counterintuitive phenomena exist in all professional team sports leagues, how often do NBA teams actually improve after a superstar departs and can economics explain these observations? The Ewing Theory may simply describe a series of unlikely coincidences, which after all are statistically likely to occasionally occur.

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This paper will investigate the team value, measured in terms of player and team efficiency and post-departure team wins, of 52 of the NBAs greatest players of all time compiled from NBA all-star and MVP votes from fans dating back to 1960. Sports media and sports fans often express strong cultural desires in sports for the best possible performances. Sports fans demand to seeboth in game and on televisionbetters players increasingly more as player skill rises; it comes as no surprise that fans desire to see exciting highlights of NBA superstars, such as dunks and alley-oops (when a players pass is dunked out of the air). This consumer demandsatisfied by media sources like ESPNhas shaped the professional style of play and maybe even the rules; additionally, it perhaps affirms and reinforces egotistical or closed-minded styles of play. Additionally, the NBAs reverse order entry draft ensures the worst teams can add the best college players to their subpar rosters, thereby increasing this superstar effect. Throughout this paper, I presume a superstar is the best player on a team and has relative absolute and comparative advantages in many basketball proficiencies on his team. A superstar may certainly be a smart asset to utilize during a final play or during scoring droughts to regain game momentum; however, he may also be a detriment to the team if defenses can adjust to his playing a major role in an offense. Employing Berri et al.s win score calculation from Wages of Wins is a statistical player evaluation (or team evaluation) based on nine basketball statistics that lifts the superstar curtain and exposes each players efficiency (Berri,Schmidt & Brook, Wages of Wins, 2004, page 99). According to the list of superstar data,

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some teams ironically improved in win score when calculating the aggregate team win score after the superstars departed from their teams, in line with the Patrick Ewing paradox. The teams increased performancealbeit not necessarily through winscan be explained by economic theory of supply and demand. By analyzing the comparison between superstars wins score and their respective teams aggregate win score, I will bring to light truer values of each superstar. I believe that superstars with higher win scores as a percentage of their overall team win scores will correlate with non-optimal play at the team level and lower numbers of team wins. Assessing a players efficiency necessitates an understanding of win-maximizing agents in basketball. Teams generate higher revenues, and thus higher profits, by maximizing their win production. Since teams operate like profit-maximizing firms, they seek to win as many games as possible in a season and thus aim to maximize overall team win score efficiency. Berri et al. establish that wins are solely a function of offensive and defensive efficiency (Berri et al., Wages of Wins, 2004, 99). Since each team alternates possessions back-and-forth throughout the game, the team that plays with the highest combined offensive and defensive efficiency will always win. Win-maximizing teams will maximize their chances to score the most points possible each possession while minimizing the opponents attempt at the same. Their coaching decisions should reflect this assumption by calling for the most efficient scorer (or otherwise link to scoring), whom is assumed to be the superstar, to shoot the ball.

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In the supply-and-demand curve in Graph 1 below, superstars are assumed to shoot a higher shot percentage than an average player. Following the model, as this superstar increases his supply of shot percentage of overall team shots each game, defensive demand for guarding the superstar will rise with it. The defensive coach will respond to guard this scoring superstar more tightlyperhaps by double covering himthereby forcing him to either take some more difficult shots and increase his missed shot percentage (lowering his field goal percentage) or forcing him to shoot less. The superstars field goal percentage will fall as a result so much that the win-maximizing offensive coach will decide to suppress his original scoring option and instruct him to shoot less. Meanwhile, assuming the rest of the team has a lower field goal percentage than the superstar, it will rise as long as the superstar contributes some shots. Eventually though, if the defense guards the superstar much more, the overall team field goal percentage will fall, potentially even below the team average without the superstar in the first place (Gravity and Levity, 2006). The gray area on the graph is the low team field goal percentage that is one graphical possibility of the Patrick Ewing Effect. One example of this scenario is the performance of the Cleveland Cavaliers with Lebron James. Although James has been dubbed by many the greatest player in the NBA, if the defense could adjust and guard his many shots each game, then the Cavaliers field goal percentage would fall as a team and they would often lose due to this inefficiency (Kubatko, 2011). The equilibrium of this coaching strategy is illustrated by the following models, the first of which I created:

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Graph 1 2006)

Graph 2 (Gravity and Levity,

Given the aforementioned assumptions of the superstar field percentage and the supply/demand curves relationship between superstars and defenses, teams with superstars have the potential to be more efficient than teams without. However, mainly due to talent, superstar hype, and major statistics without efficiency, the models gray area shows some superstars may not only irrationally ignore the teams opportunity cost during game-play but may actually lower the teams productivity altogether had they not been playing. While shot percentage is not the only example of superstar (or perhaps coach) overzealousness on the courtdefenses could, for instance, adjust to box out superstar rebounder Dwight Howard if he never left the paintit serves as a good example with actual data to

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back it up. The second graph shows a negative correlation between field goal percentage and shots per game, illustrating data of superstars Kobe Bryant and Shaquille ONeal (Gravity and Levity, 2009). Superstar presence may also prevent a team from achieving its optimal efficiency by impeding the efficiencies of other individuals, who may even have higher opportunity costs at certain specialized roles. Since there is only a single ball used in a game, according to the law of diminishing returns, increasing the scoring productivity at one position must decrease it at another. Moreover, superstars may impede team cohesionwhich could increase each players productivityby monopolizing ball control, preventing the team from firing on all cylinders. One implication of the Ewing Paradox on profitability is that bad teams may be better off distributing payroll more evenly than acquiring a single superstar. Theoretically, if a team can produce a higher win score without a superstar, they may lose some close games without a strong finisher, but they could very well win more games in a season with an increased team win score. However, championships are rarely won without at least one superstar, so better teams may need to seek acquiring one if they are contending for a championship. With the goal of uncovering more potential, Patrick Ewings who may have reduced or not added efficiency value to their teams, I used a list of 84 all-stars compiled through a formula based on MVP and All-NBA votes since 1960. McChesney (2006) assigned the ranks of each annual MVP vote since 1960 (first place earns ten points, second earns nine points, etc.) and added the All-NBA votes

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(first-team earns five points, while second and third-teams both earned 3 points). When the list was made in 2006, only 84 players received nine or more total points, below which the threshold was deemed too frequently reached to be considered the best ever. Next, I researched the statistics of each player that was traded or otherwise left a team (permitting multiples), only including players that played at least 2000 minutes in both of the two preceding seasons. I then compiled the statistics for each original team for those two years with superstars and the two years following their departures. Teams whose number of wins increased after their superstars departure may have been home to some potential Patrick Ewings. Assessing the new number of wins for each of these 70 instances provided a glimpse of what a further efficiency analysis could uncover. In order to analyze the compiled list of NBA superstars, I utilized Berri et al.s wins production formula, a close variant on his win score formula that he developed based on years of historical statistics in the NBA. Note that Berri et al. do have a more precise model, based on regressions of very complex statistics that were not readily available. Likewise, payroll is an obvious candidate as an independent variable in regressions, but team payroll and salary information can only be found for few years until 2000, often accompanied with a disclaimer that the information is based on estimates. Berri et al. argue that wins are simply a result of a teams efficiency since teams alter possessions and thus control the ball the same amount of timesgive or take one possessionper game. He notes the simple coefficient of possession

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in relation to team points: Over the years we examine (1993 94 to 2004 05) this ratio [points per possession] tended to hover around one, hitting a high of 1.05 points per possession in 1994 95 and a low of 0.99 points per possession in 1998 99 (Berri et al., Wages of Wins, 212). Each change of possession or point scored is recorded by one of the statistics in his equation so that the overall efficiency can be feasibly calculated at both the individual and team levels. He claims to be able to moderately calculate the efficiency of a player based on nine statistics in the following formula:

(Berri et al., Wages of Wins, 113) Wins produced is a statistic that Berri created to calculate the amount of wins produced that a player contributes to a teams wins each season. Adding all of the statistics within the parentheses above yields what he calls win score, which is converted to wins produced per season by dividing by the number of games. By instead dividing the win score by the number of minutes that player played in a season, the calculation yields the wins production per minute played, or per game productivity (WP48) (Berri et al., Wages of Wins, 2004). For instance, Michael Jordan had a high wins produced with almost 12 in back-to-back seasons, a season average 0.25 win production for each 48 minutes he played, while Allen Iverson performed the least efficiently on the 52 player list, ranging from 2.8 to 3.5

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in win production with WP48s of 0.6 and 0.7. Steve Nash performed averagely among the superstars with results of 8.1 and 9.3 in wins produced. The superstar list ranged from wins produced of -1.3, during Pete Maravichs unsuccessful 1978 season, to Wilt Chamberlains 28 wins produced in 1966 (Kubatko, 2011). Table 1 shows win scores for some of these individual players:

Individual Win Score (Table 1)*

Games Player Michael Jordan Team CHI199 2 CHI199 Jordan Allen Iverson Iverson PHI2004 PHI2005 DAL200 Steve Nash 2 DAL200 Nash 3 78 2612 1128 232 687 67 82 2711 1455 234 598 85 75 72 3174 3099 2302 2377 299 232 597 532 180 140 3 78 3067 2541 522 428 221 80 3102 2404 511 489 182 Played Minutes Points Rebound s Assists Steals

Person Turnove Blocks Michael Jordan Jordan Allen Iverson Iverson 9 10 344 248 140 121 75 61 200 207 201 188 rs al Fouls

FG Attempt s FG Made

WINS PRODUCE D WP48

1818 2003

943 992

11.9 11.9

0.25 0.25

1818 1822

771 815

3.6 2.9

0.07 0.06

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Steve Nash Nash

6 8

192 209

134 139

1114 845

518 397

8.1 9.3

0.17 0.19

*Data from Kubatko, 2011 The wins produced can also be investigated over all four years at the team level to show whether the team achieved a more efficient level of playregardless of wins for those seasonswith or without its superstar. Think of this as an aggregation: adding each players wins produced or WP48 would produce the same result as calculating it from the team statistics. Revisiting Simmons article, Elgin Baylor is listed as a great example of the Ewing paradox, as Simmons cites the Lakers 33-game win streak after Baylor abruptly retired (Simmons, 1999). Notice that the team wins produced and real wins actually improve after Baylor and Cowens leave their teams. However, the opposite is true for Shaq because his team became much worse after he left.

Team Win Score (Table 2)*

Tea Player Elgin Baylor m LAL LAL *Early Retire LAL LAL Shaquille O'Neal ORL ORL *Traded to ORL 1994 1995 1996 57 60 45 25 22 37 4462 4073.5 3175 54.41 49.67 38.71 Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 Won 55 46 48 69 Lost 27 36 34 13 WIN SCORE 4500 3875.5 4312.5 5031.5 WINS PROD. 54.87 47.26 52.59 61.35

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Lakers ORL Dave Cowens BOS BOS *Early Retire BOS BOS 1997 1978 1979 1980 1981 41 29 61 62 63 41 53 21 20 19 2894 3029 3911.5 3812.5 3899.5 35.29 36.93 47.70 46.49 47.55

WINS PRODUCE Player Elgin Baylor Lakers 1968-1971 *Early Retire D 54.9 47.3 52.6 61.4 Shaquille O'Neal Magic 1994-1997 *Traded to Lakers 54.4 49.7 38.7 35.3 Dave Cowens Celtics 1978-1981 *Early Retire 36.9 47.7 46.5 47.6

Average Wins Prod. 51.1

Wins Produced Differential Before/After Avg Wins 50.5 5.9 8.0 58.5 Win Diff. Before/After

57.0

52.0 -15.0 37.0

58.5 -15.5 43.0

42.3 4.7 47.0

45.0 17.5 62.5

*Data from Kubatko, 2011 Table 2 shows the overall team wins produced compared to actual wins over a span of four listed years. While the amount of wins produced by Berri et al.s win score estimate did not equal the exact wins that a team had in a season, regressing a teams aggregate win score, with the wins as the dependent variable

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and win score as the independent variable, returned a very high correlation. Additionally, in almost all cases, the win score and wins either both increased or both decreased after a superstar departure, though not always proportionally. Originally, I hypothesized that superstars wins produced would be inversely related to their teams aggregate wins produced, representing the inefficiency of allowing one player to serve such a major role on a team. I also hypothesized that win score differential would be positively correlated with win differential because a team performing more optimally should earn more wins. I modified my original hypothesis by creating percentages for each ratio of player win score compared to overall team wins (I created another for team win score that predictably produced the same correlation). This percentage represents the statistical involvement of each superstar throughout the season, ranging from Bob Cousys 3.2% with the 1962 Celtics to Dikembe Mutombos 63.6% with the 1999 Hawks (Kubatko, 2011). By regressing team wins as a function of individual win score, the analysis returned a negative fit line with a coefficient of -15.11 at a 10% significance level. Every increase of 1% of the player win score : team wins ratio decreased the number of wins in a season by 0.15%.

*Created with STATA In other words, teams that have one player that consistently has a high percentage of involvement, in terms of all the stats that win score measures, the

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lower that teams wins and overall win score. Despite contributing large amounts of wins for a team, superstars that monopolize team possessions generally dont seem to do as well as superstars that are smaller roles of a greater team. And this result makes sensethe lower wins produced can be most likely be explained by presence of other very good players or if the superstar settles into a niche which does not churn out high win scores.

Graph 3, produced by STATA Contrary to my first hypothesis, results showed lower win scores for players whose teams performed better after they left. Regressions showed that

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there is no correlation between wins produced by a teams superstar compared to the teams wins before after that player left his team. The players at the top of the list, such as Michael Jordan and Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, were parts of extremely good teams and exhibited high win scores, throwing off my original hypothesis: Jordans team had little room for improvement after setting the NBA season win record and winning six titles. Interestingly, my second hypothesis, that as the player wins produced : team wins produced ratio rose that team wins would fall was correct. While correlation is not causation, it seems as though due to the decreasing marginal returns of employing high talent in basketball, having a superstar detracts from other players contributions. I must also consider that this trend may occur partially due to the reverse order entry draft that forces some superstars into producing high win score ratios while playing for teams with bad records. The sheer number of players in the data set that were observed in the data set to follow a Patrick Ewing paradox was 21%. Among the 52 superstars, 11 of these players teams recorded better team win scores and overall wins in the regular season after the superstars left their teams: Kemp, Parish, Richmond, McGinnis, Hill, McGrady, Archibald, Cowens, Ewing, Malone, and Baylor. According to this list, an inordinate number of the best NBA players ever actually played on teams that perhaps improved after their departures. While unique player characteristics can boost a great NBA player into the realm of superstardom, fans are generally most attracted to players who post high statistics and touch the ball often. Superstars have the most opportunities to make

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plays for the team and thus increase the demand for defense for that particular player. In doing so, the players efficiency, in statistics such as field goal percentage and turnovers, worsens because defenses adjust to guard the superstar. The superstar may consequently shoot too often and lower the teams productivity to below the optimal level. Aside from the motivation of remaining post-departure players to fill the superstar void and play better in games, the teams optimal efficiency decreases but the actual win score efficiency may counter intuitively increase. An initial glance at the NBA superstar list over the last 50 years would not seem to contain many inefficient players, but improving team win scores and team records has revealed these relevant findings. Likewise, the negative correlation between the player wins produced : team win produced ratio and overall wins helps verify the inefficiency of many team scenarios. Multiple forms views of the win score data show that Patrick Ewing paradox manifests itself at even the highest level of play in the NBA.

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Bibliography
Berri, D. (2004). On The Road With the National Basketball Associations Superstar Externality. Journal of Sports Economics , 7 (347), 1-13. Berri, D. (2006). Stars at the Gate: The Impact of Star Power on NBA Gate Revenues. Journal of Sports Economics , 7 (33), 1-13. Berri, D., Brook, S., & Schmidt, M. (2004). Wages of Wins (Vol. 7). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Gravity and Levity. (2009, 5 28). Braesss Paradox and The Ewing Theory. Retrieved April 11, 2011, from Gravity and Levity: http://gravityandlevity.wordpress.com/2009/05/28/braesss-paradox-and-the-ewi ng-theory/ Kubatko, J. (2011). NBA & ABA Player Statistics. Retrieved April 15, 2011, from Kubatko, 2011: http://www.basketball-reference.com McChesney, R. (2006, 8 13). The Gold Medal Superstar Theory and Championship. Retrieved April 11, 2011, from NBADraft.net: http://www.nbadraft.net/mcchesney001.html Simmons, B. (2001). Ewing Theory 101. Retrieved April 11, 2011, from ESPN.com: http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=simmons/010509a Simmons, B. (2009). The Book of Basketball. New York, New York: ESPN Books.