Responsibility of the Non-Moral Agent

Philip Powers

Philosophy 214: Ethics Prof. Marina Oshana ece!ber 21" 2#12

1 My p$rpose in what follows is to %escribe a theory of !oral responsibility that agrees with co!!on social int$itions abo$t the rightf$l assign!ent of praise an% bla!e" an% also a&oi%s concerns abo$t the appropriateness of either in a $ni&erse that !ay be %eter!inistic. ' %raw on the co!patibilist fra!ewor( a%&ance% in )olf*s +Asy!!etrical ,ree%o!- as well as on .albert*s position on the non-!oral agent" or psychopath" in or%er to s$ggest roo! for consistency between the!.1 .his consistency ser&es as the gro$n%ing for a notion of responsibility as reasonjudging.2 1. Background: Wolf on the conditions for freedom )olf*s !a/or concern in +Asy!!etrical ,ree%o!- is to e0plain how !oral responsibility is possible in the face of the psychological %eter!inist thesis. 'n or%er for a person to be consi%ere% !orally responsible" she states" he !$st satisfy the con%itions of freedom an% value. 'n other wor%s" he !$st both ha&e so!e for! of control o&er the actions he perfor!s" an% it !$st be possible to characteri1e those actions as !orally right or wrong. Now accor%ing to psychological %eter!inis!" a person can only choose to act in one partic$lar way. )hat she will %o in any gi&en sit$ation is ine0tricably tie% to the set of wants" &al$es" beliefs" an% other traits that %efines her $ni2$e personality. 'f so!eone were to ha&e a perfect $n%erstan%ing of this person*s psychology at so!e point in ti!e" it wo$l% be possible to pre%ict her e&ery !o&e fro! that point onwar%. ,$rther!ore" those psychological aspects that co!pel the person are not $n%er her control either. 't wo$l% go against the &ery fa!iliar e0perience of o$r own interests an% %esires to clai!
1 )olf" 3$san. +Asy!!etrical ,ree%o!-. The Journal of Philosophy" 4ol. 55.6 7Mar 189#:. )eb. 1;1-1<<. 2 .han(s to Marina Oshana an% =yle A%a!s for their inp$t on this phrasing. Originally +responsibility as rationality-" it beca!e clear that other conceptions of the rational character 7e.g. power to choose a co$rse of action that is ob/ecti&ely the best a&ailable" practical &ers$s theoretical reason: co$l% !$%%y the waters" when the i%ea ' !ean to capt$re is !$ch looser. 73ee section ;.:

2 that a person %e&elops an interest by force of will> !any of the interests we bear into a%$lthoo% ha&e their roots in a partic$lar $pbringing" to which we were choicelessly s$b/ect. 6 ,ro! a %eter!inist &iew" when a new s$b/ect pro&o(es c$riosity or %ispassion" the reaction is pre%ispose% %$e to whate&er preferences a person alrea%y carries. 7As a note" ' $se +preference- not only to !ean the sort of !oti&e of which a person is aware when they !a(e a %ecision" b$t also !oti&es that wor( to steer her towar%s so!e en%s an% away fro! others witho$t her always being able to notice an% e0plain the!. .o p$t it another way" ' !ean those relati&e %ifferences of personal i!port assigne% to &ario$s priorities.: .h$s" since en&iron!ent 7the %etails of which are o$t of the agent*s control: %eter!ines one*s interests" an% interests %eter!ine one*s actions" the con%ition of free%o! cannot be satisfie% at the sa!e ti!e as the con%ition of &al$e. )olf as(s $s to consi%er two cases. 'n one" actions are %eter!ine% ? people who beha&e in !orally right or wrong ways %o so beca$se the content of their character re2$ires it. 'n the other" actions aren*t %eter!ine% ? people ha&e the free%o!" if they so choose" to act in total %efiance of their !ost closely hel% interests" &al$es an% beliefs. )e wo$l% hesitate to say that s$ch a person is capable of acting !orally" since their actions wo$l% be !ore a !atter of whi! than of reason. )olf*s contention with this &iew is that it !ischaracteri1es the relationship between free%o! an% !orality. Rather than the !oral worth of an action being %epen%ent on whether or not it was perfor!e% freely" she s$ggests" the free%o! of the action is %epen%ent on whether or not it
6 .he psychological %eter!inist pre%icates this clai! on two facts abo$t how interests are ac2$ire% or for!e%. .he first is that infants co!e into the worl% witho$t interests beyon% those necessary for s$r&i&al. .hey !ay be e2$ippe% by e&ol$tion with the tools for s$ch f$nctions as pattern-recognition an% lang$age ac2$isition" b$t no ability to thin( abo$t reasons for %oing this or that. .he secon% is that" before a certain age" !ost chil%ren are not capable of critically e&al$ating the i%eas to which their en&iron!ent e0poses the!. A chil% whose parents en/oy /a11 !$sic an% fre2$ently carry on abo$t the awf$lness of har% roc( is li(ely to share their tastes. E&en if he %eci%es that !etal is the best genre later on" it !a(es an i!pla$sible story to say that this change in !$sical taste happens beca$se he belie&es it o$ght to happen" or tries to !a(e it happen.

6 was a !orally righteo$s one. @er con%itions for !oral responsibility are as follows: a person can only be hel% responsible if he has access to !oral reasons. 'f his !oral e%$cation was so ina%e2$ate that he is not e&en free to respon% to sit$ations as a well-a%/$ste% an% conscientio$s person wo$l%" he cannot be hel% responsible for what actions %i% res$lt. 3o an ele!ent of in%eter!inacy e0ists that %isting$ishes goo% action fro! ba%. 3o!eone with a %ecent !oral e%$cation is not always %eter!ine% by it. .hey can flo$t it to %o wrong 7o$t of la1iness" inconsi%erateness" etc.:" as we see in e&ery%ay beha&ior" b$t the fact that they (now right fro! wrong at all %epri&es the! of the abo&e e0c$se. .his is the fra!ewor( of )olf*s co!patibilist acco$nt of responsibility. Ao$ are an appropriate target of !oral praise or bla!e as long as yo$ are psychologically %eter!ine% in the right way" s$ch that it wo$l% be reasonable to e0pect yo$ to (now better than to act selfishly or cr$elly. 2. Are moral reasons really necessary? 3ay that 3!ith is psychologically %eter!ine% to steal Bones* watch at so!e point in ti!e. 't !$st be the case that the set of interests an% &al$es that her past grante% her !a%e it i!possible for her to ha&e chosen otherwise. .his sit$ation" which can be li(ene% to +stoc( cases- li(e those of the (lepto!aniac or the hypnoti1e% cri!inal" %oes not call for the e&il%oer to be treate% as if her %ee%s are a personal !oral fail$re 7says )olf:. 't is the con%itions that restrict her agency that pro%$ce% the fail$re. C$t is this a int$iti&e an% satisfactory way of han%ling all s$ch casesD .o any b$t the !ost saintly character" it sho$l% feel %iffic$lt to si!ply %is!iss calls for /$stice fro! the !any &icti!s of apparently a!oral cri!es. As effecti&e as )olf*s acco$nt !ay be for /$stifying assign!ents of praise an% bla!e" the scope of people to which it applies appears too narrow. .o accept it wo$l% be to consi%er all cases of psychopathy i!!$ne to" or inappropriate ob/ects

4 of" !oral appraisal. ' hol% that this is !ista(en. Ei(e !any personality %isor%ers" psychopathy has been &ario$sly %efine% in a n$!ber of conte0ts. .he sy!pto!s !ost rele&ant to this %isc$ssion are +a prono$nce% lac( of re!orse an% e!pathy- an% the res$lting %iffic$lties with consi%ering others* well-being when planning an action.4 3trictly spea(ing" psychopaths as %escribe% are not !e!bers of the !oral co!!$nity in which psychologically healthy in%i&i%$als engage. .hey %o not recogni1e concerns s$ch as +'t is goo% to F- as !oti&ation for action $nless Fing has so!e non-!oral &al$e" e.g. financial gain. More i!portantly" .albert says in +Cla!e an% Responsi&eness to Moral Reasons-" psychopaths %o not regar% the !oral badness of F as !oti&ation to a&oi% Fing. Of co$rse" this %oes not !ean that s$ch people reg$larly go aro$n% co!!itting acts of &iolence an% cr$elty accor%ing to whi!. 'n fact" it is their ability to cal!ly calc$late co$rses of action that see!s to %ist$rb $s !ost abo$t the occasional act of psychopathic e&il. .hey consi%er possible options" ele&ate so!e an% %iscar% others in light of anticipate% conse2$ences 7a process infor!e% by e0perience" e!otion" awareness of applicable r$les" etc.:" an% settle on one that best f$rthers %esire% en%s ? all f$nctions of a thin(ing" reasoning agent. .h$s we !ight also %escribe psychopaths as non-moral agents. Eet $s a%% that" while a psychopath %oes not fin% !oral consi%erations personally !oti&ating in an% of the!sel&es" it is li(ely that he has so!e $n%erstan%ing of how !ost other people regar% the!. A !orally blin% person can ha&e perfect awareness of rules" e.g. laws or social con&entions" an% their f$nction of restricting certain (in%s of beha&ior. R$les are present in e&ery society" an% while the psychopath !ay ha&e tro$ble %isting$ishing between !oral %e!an%s an% their socialGlegal appro0i!ations" nothing abo$t hi! st$nts his (nowing that so!e actions ten% to

4 .albert" Matthew. +Cla!e an% Responsi&eness to Moral Reasons.- Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4ol. 98 72##9:. )eb. ;1<-;6;.

; in&ite p$nish!ent or rewar%. C$t the 2$estion of whether or not he can be hel% !orally responsible persists. )hat" one !ight won%er" is the point of as(ing this 2$estion" other than to piece together an acceptable plan for %ealing with %iagnose% psychopaths in or%inary lifeD .r$e-bl$e cases of the %isor%er are %iffic$lt for a!ate$r psychologistsGpsychiatrists to i%entify" an% nigh-i!possible to tell apart fro! other con%itions !ar(e% by antisocial beha&ior. An arg$!ent co$l% be !a%e for the necessity of (nowing if an% how psychopaths can be /$stly p$nishe% for cri!inal actions. C$t ' fin% the greatest &al$e in the 2$estion by thin(ing of what it !eans for e&en !oral agents to be responsible for their actions. )olf*s position &oices a co!!on int$ition that tr$e responsibility re2$ires the ability to engage in !oral senti!ents an% $se the! as a for! of /$stification ? for how can we %e!an% partic$lar choices of so!eone who %oes not $n%erstan% why we &al$e those choicesD C$t" if this person nonetheless can be a proper ob/ect of praise an% bla!e" then concepts of rightness an% wrongness are $nnecessary for a !orally responsible person to ha&e. ' fa&or this answer. 't is !$ch the sa!e as the answer offere% by .albert" who arg$es first that an action is bla!eworthy if it e0presses attit$%es that the !oral co!!$nity wo$l% consi%er angering or h$rtf$l" an% secon% that psychopaths are capable of those attit$%es. .his position has its roots in the wor( of P. ,. 3trawson" who contrib$te% the reacti&e attit$%es analysis of responsibility. Accor%ing to this analysis" praise an% bla!e are si!ply a$to!atic f$nctions of h$!an nat$re> people nat$rally react to %a!aging actions with h$rt" anger" fear" an% other strong e!otional responses. .hey infer fro! the offen%ing action that the agent bears inappropriate or negati&e attit$%es towar% others" an% respon% with reacti&e attit$%es in (in%. .here is no nee% to intellect$ali1e the pra-

< ctice of assigning bla!e.; 3trawson also %escribes !o%ifying factors that te!porarily e0c$se or per!anently e0e!pt so!e people fro! ha&ing their actions interprete% in this way. oes .al-

bert*s &ariation incl$%e !oral blin%ness in this gro$p of e0e!pting con%itionsD No ? psychopathy !$st not be a proper e0e!pting con%ition if we are to say that they can e0press bla!e-in&iting attit$%es" or else psychopaths who %o e&il are not appropriate targets of !oral %isapprobation. )hat bla!eworthy attit$%es can be attrib$te% to the non-!oral agentD )e cannot charge her with the sort of con&entionally %istastef$l beliefs that non-psychopathic people so!eti!es act $pon" s$ch as +@e has a right to property" b$t !y %esire for his wallet is !ore i!portant-. .o thin( this way is to !a(e a positi&e clai! abo$t the !oral stan%ing of another person. 3$ch a clai! i!plies that the thin(er does accor% so!e &al$e to the target*s %esert of !oral treat!ent" altho$gh not eno$gh to o&erpower the thin(er*s !ore selfish !oti&es. A psychopath wo$l% not ta(e e!pathy-%ri&en consi%erations to be !oti&ating at all" e0cept !aybe thro$gh the power that they hol% o&er other people*s /$%g!ents. Rather than %eci%ing the ob/ect*s !oral stan%ing to be ins$fficient gro$n%s to pre&ent har! 7or e&en thin(ing that their !oral stan%ing is none0istent:" she !erely ignores the iss$e an% !a(es her %ecision on the basis of non-!oral reasons only. .his" too" is a rational process ? e0a!ining all possible reasons to act in so!e way an% %is!issing the worthless ones. An% it is h$rtf$l an% %eh$!ani1ing in its own way:
+'f the nor!al wrong%oer*s action" e0pressi&e of a /$%g!ent li(e *P %oes not possess !oral stan%ing" so ' !ay F"* is offensi&e in a way that legiti!ates negati&e reaction attit$%es" then so too !ay be a psychopathic action that e0presses the /$%g!ent *nothing abo$t P co$nts against F-ing.* Coth /$%g!ents e0press assess!ents that are in conflict with a !orally significant aspect of P*s &iew of hi!self.- <

; 3trawson" P. ,. +,ree%o! an% Resent!ent.- Proceedings of the British Academy 49 718<2:. Reprinte% on the web" 1 Apr 2##8. 4-11. < .albert" ;26.

5 Me!bers of a !oral co!!$nity nee% not forgi&e a transgressor /$st on the gro$n%s that she is incapable of ac(nowle%ging so!eone else*s entitle!ent to safety. .o be responsible for one*s actions" e&en in a li!ite% sense" is to possess the cogniti&e fac$lties to !a(e rational %ecisions. 'f psychopaths in%ee% thin( in ter!s of a reason-/$%ging process li(e other people %o" this ability alone is eno$gh to /$stify an interpretation of cri!inal acts 7for e0a!ple: as bla!eworthy %isregar% for others* rights. 3. Responsibility as udgment about moral or non!moral reasons As !entione% in the secon% section" )olf*s acco$nt of responsibility as +the free%o! to be %eter!ine% by the Hoo%- s$pplies an e0planation for how the con%itions of both free%o! an% &al$e !ight be !et ? b$t it also pro&i%es a!ple e0e!ption for cases that !ay well %eser&e to be treate% as bearing !oral responsibility" e&en if they %o not satisfy both con%itons. .albert*s characteri1ation of non-!oral agents clarifies why: the n$!ber of gro$ps )olf e0e!pts is too great beca$se her %efinition of responsibility is too narrow. 't re2$ires a person to be able to act on consi%erations that are $ni2$ely !oral" when this ability is s$fficient b$t not necessary for achie&ing the sa!e stan%ar% for goo% beha&ior.5 3$ppose a con&entionally i!!oral act wo$l% clearly effect a%&erse conse2$ences> the psychopath can e0ercise %eliberati&e power to a&oi% the! by a&oi%ing the act. .reating people with %ecency is one s$ch con&ention" so the correctly %eter!ine% psychopath will try to $phol% it. ,or e0a!ple" i!agine a !oral agent who is o$t for a wal( with a frien%. 'n the par(" the agent consi%ers getting ri% of a piece of trash by tossing it on the grass. N$!ero$s reasons for
5 ' say +s$fficient- ass$!ing that anyone who acts by !oral reasons has the power to act by non-!oral reasons as well. Alternate scenarios wo$l% see! so far-fetche% as to %rift into irrele&ance. 't is possible to i!agine a person whose every !oti&ating factor concerns the rightness an% wrongness of potential actions" s$ch that he co$l% not lace $p his shoes in the !orning witho$t p$11ling o$t the inherent goo%ness of %oing so> b$t for the p$rposes of the %isc$ssion" we will consi%er all !oral agents capable of non-!oral %eliberations.

9 an% against the action occ$r to hi!. 't*s easy> there is no garbage bin in sight> nobo%y enforces anti-littering laws> the gro$n%s(eepers will pic( it $p later. On the other han%" littering is wrong> it wo$l% create $nnecessary tro$ble for others> besi%es" his frien% will see an% be angry with hi! for it. Io!fort an% con&enience" or being tho$ghtf$lD Cy co!paring the pers$asi&e weights of these reasons" the !oral agent co!es to a %ecision base% on the en% he cares !ost abo$t f$rthering. Now re-i!agine the scenario with a non-!oral agent at the hel!. .he &iew that littering is wrong is no longer inherently &al$able> its clo$t in the calc$l$s of action %rops to 1ero. @e also has no %irect incenti&e to care abo$t others* incon&enience. C$t" sensiti&e to non-!oral reasons an% wishing to a&oi% an $npleasant scene" the psychopath !ay still !o%ify his beha&ior so as not to start tro$ble with his frien%. E&en if his reasons are $lti!ately pr$%ential an% arg$ably selfcentere%" nothing abo$t his %isor%er has pre&ente% hi! ? or" in fact" must pre&ent hi! ? fro! a%opting the sa!e !o%es of self-con%$ct that a conscientio$s !oral agent %oes. .here are !any rational /$stifications for obeying !oral r$les: those enforce% by law are the !ost ob&io$s. 3ai% /$stifications nee% not ha&e anything to %o with engaging in partic$lar senti!ents. 3o whether or not one has this ability" the wrong%oer is $n%eter!ine% by the Hoo% $n%er )olf*s &iew. .he psychopath" !aybe being aware of !oral reasons b$t certainly $n!o&e% by the!" is no !ore %eter!ine% by his con%ition to act i!!orally than is the psychologically nor!al person. 't !ay be arg$e% that re%efining responsibility co!pletely in ter!s of the reason-/$%ging capacity warps )olf*s &iew too %rastically ? so !$ch so that the res$lting fra!ewor( bears &ery little si!ilarity to her original thesis. .he free%o! to be %eter!ine% by the Hoo%" after all" is s$ppose%ly attainable only with personal access to !oral reasons. 'f this re2$ire!ent is loosene%

8 to incl$%e those who ha&e personal access to reasons in general" wo$l% not the en% res$lt be so!ething li(e +responsibility is the free%o! to be %eter!ine% by reasons-D 3$ch a concl$sion wo$l% co!pletely neglect )olf*s point abo$t the %ifference between goo% action an% ba% action. @owe&er" this line of tho$ght wo$l% be a !is$n%erstan%ing of how far the i!plications of the theory reach. .hin(ing of responsibility as reason-/$%ging %oes not in any way ob&iate the e!pathetic attit$%es typical of !oral agents. Moral reasons will contin$e to play a h$ge role in the %ecision processes of !ost people" no !atter what. Ion&entional ethical practices can re!ain in place witho$t change" e&en if they as( for beha&ior abo&e an% beyon% the basic re2$ire!ents for personal responsibility. )olf*s assertions abo$t goo%ness contin$e to be tr$e: in or%er for an agent to ha&e the slightest control o&er whether or not she beha&es accor%ing to !oral reasons" the reasons ha&e to ha&e been a&ailable for the agent in the first place. C$t non-!oral agents" too" can recei&e a s$fficient e%$cation to p$rs$e the Hoo%. Psychopaths" where&er an% howe&er they appear" !$st learn the r$les of society by the sa!e !etho%s as e&erybo%y else: by obser&ing" or perhaps recei&ing %irect g$i%ance in the ho!e or at school. 'n an en&iron!ent where the !a/ority of people ha&e at least a r$%i!entary i%ea of how best to appropriately spea( an% act" it is pla$sible for the psychopath to pic( $p an% act on !any of their e0pectations as he grows $p. .h$s if his peers are the!sel&es %eter!ine% by the Hoo%" so !ight the psychopath be 7in%irectly:. Altho$gh they ha&e a natural inclination to act o$t of concern for others ? one that he lac(s ? it wo$l% be easy to thin( of hi! as +swept along- in the flow of or%inary !oral beha&iors that facilitate %aily social f$nction. 'n re%rawing the bo$n%aries of responsible agency this way to incl$%e psychopaths" howe&er" we %o not apply the sa!e treat!ent to all gro$ps e0e!pte% by )olf on gro$n%s of poor or

1# st$nte% !oral training. .a(e the afore!entione% case of the (lepto!aniac as an e0a!ple. At first glance" it !ight see! as tho$gh she is co!pelle% to steal by the sa!e process that co!pels her to %o anything else: she carries o$t a !oti&ational calc$l$s" an% o&er&al$es her reasons to steal 7or $n%er-&al$es her reasons not to: s$ch that they o&erwhel! whate&er !orally-fo$n%e% reser&ations she !ay ha&e. C$t (lepto!ania is better %escribe% as an inability to control certain i!p$lses. .hese i!p$lse thefts are not co!!itte% beca$se of a rational appraisal of positi&es an% negati&es" b$t fro! so!ething !ore a(in to spas!s or tics. .he affecte% person !ight ha&e ha% a perfectly %ecent $pbringing that %isco$rage% stealing" b$t this alone wo$l% not constit$te a co!plete !oral e%$cation ? %isor%ers also affect a person*s power to !a(e %ecisions. 'n this case" e&en if she is able to resist theft gi&en the chance to thin( it o&er" the (lepto!aniac %oes not go thro$gh an or%erly process of %eliberation at the !o!ent the i!p$lse stri(es. @er %isor%er is a tr$e e0e!pting con%ition" since it pre&ents her fro! applying reasons for or against the rele&ant type of action. ". #reenspan on blaming the morally blind Another acco$nt of how bla!ing attit$%es can be rightly applie% to non-!oral agents" a%&ance% by Pat Hreenspan in +Responsible Psychopaths-" hol%s that there is a wi%e range of responses a&ailable to participants in the !oral co!!$nity" an% that so!e !ay apply e&en when others %o not.9 'n her %escription of the con%itions that !a(e /$st bla!e possible" she ta(es as gi&en that psychopaths are li!ite% in their ability to confor! to social e0pectations of co$rtesy an% e!pathy. Ionse2$ently" it wo$l% be $n/$st to react to their wrong%oings the sa!e way as we wo$l% to the wrong%oings of a !oral agent: with e!otional reactions li(e anger an% %isappoint!ent in the agent. .hese are co!ponents of bla!e that i!ply that the target co$l%" an% sho$l%"
9 Hreenspan" Patricia. +Responsible Psychopaths.- Philosophical Psychology" 4ol. 1<.6 72##6:. )eb.

11 ha&e acte% otherwise ? i!plications that are $ngro$n%e% when it co!es to people with afflictions that affect their reasoning. C$t not all types of bla!e f$nction this way. )itho$t f$lly retreating to the %etache%" ob/ecti&e stan%point that we !ight ass$!e when %ealing with gen$inely innocent cases of wrong action" e.g. yo$ng chil%ren" we !ay contin$e to %irect other types of bla!ing attit$%es at psychopaths. ,eelings li(e %isg$st an% conte!pt" which Hreenspan classifies as attributive as oppose% to retributive" e0press only that their ca$se 7a har!f$l action: can be attrib$te% to the agent*s will. Jnli(e anger-base% reactions" these hatre%-base% ones /$stify certain restraining !eas$res 7li(e incarceration: in response to psychopathic wrong%oing witho$t asserting that they %eser&e retrib$tion for actions that were not entirely $n%er their control. ' thin( this acco$nt is pers$asi&e in that it %isting$ishes nat$ral e&il fro! !oral e&il an% e0plains how in/$ries ca$se% by a non-!oral agent co$l% be regar%e% as an instance of the for!er" an% not the latter. C$t it grants too little cre%it to the f$nctioning psychopath*s powers of self-control" clai!ing that a re%$ce% for! of responsibility is s$itable for lesser !oral agents 7if we consi%er the psychopath to 2$alify for !oral agency at all:. 8 't is tr$e that personalities that s$ggest psychopathy ten% to create friction with others" thro$gh socially ob/ectionable beha&ior of &arying %egrees. 'f this occ$rs as i!p$lses of cri!inal beha&ior" li(e the (lepto!aniac abo&e" or as a sort of learning %isability that pre&ents the psychopath fro! ac2$iring a sense for acceptable beha&ior" there is a better case for the agent*s %efense. C$t" thin(ing of the! as intelligent reasoners who ha&e both the tools an% the incenti&e to a&oi% antisocial beha&ior" ' a! incline% to thin( that there are few if any per!anent hin%rances to the psychopath*s ability to interact with 7if not be a f$ll participant in: the co!!$nity of !oral agents. Hreenspan !entions in%i&i%$als
8 Hreenspan" 426-424.

12 who +/$st %o not learn to follow socially acceptable !oral r$les-" b$t notes that this sy!pto! better fits Antisocial Personality isor%er than psychopathy.1# $. %ritical comments .he notion of responsibility as reason-/$%ging or reason-sensiti&ity !ay gi&e rise to the following concern: if the only tr$e e0e!ptions to responsible agency are those who %o not base their actions on reason" it wo$l% see! that cases of people beha&ing irrationally cannot be hel% to acco$nt. Of co$rse" this %oes not cohere with o$r int$itions at all. .here are !any sit$ations in which we wo$l% be clearly /$stifie% in cens$ring or p$nishing actions that are foolish to co!!on sense. Ionsi%er the ga!bler who" ha&ing lost the last twenty han%s" belie&es that she is +owe%- a win> or the %ri&er who thin(s that c$tting across so!eone*s lawn is a safe shortc$t to her %estination. 'n light of these e0a!ples" e2$ating +3he is responsible- with +3he is rational- see!s li(e too si!plistic a %escription. .his concern is best resol&e% by separating the co!!on $n%erstan%ing of rationality fro! the reason-/$%ging capacity. .o call a person rational can !ean that he !a(es %ecisions by way of tho$ghtf$l %eliberation> b$t it also connotes so!ething abo$t his personality. +Rational- in this sense %escribes so!eone for who! %eliberation is a habit ? so!eone who ta(es special care to a&oi% !ista(es in the reason-/$%ging process an% rarely !a(es choices witho$t a clear $n%erstan%ing of their !erit. .his is the type of rationality to which irrationality" a 2$ality of a person who !a(es gross errors in their weighing of reasons" is oppose%. As it happens" irrationality of this sort does act$ally fall within the p$r&iew of the &ery broa% sense of rationality 7as reason-/$%ging: ' s$ggest. 'f we interpret irrational acts 7an% the !ental states that pro%$ce the!: the way Angela 3!ith %oes ? as hol%ing se&eral beliefs that are
1# Hreenspan" 418.

16 in%i&i%$ally tenable b$t which collecti&ely conflict ? then it is easy to see how a person with the basic psychological fac$lty of reason-/$%g!ent can !a(e the !ista(e of" say" greatly o&er&al$ing p$nct$ality an% $n%er&al$ing safety" to the point where +r$n o&er the plastic fla!ingoso$n%s li(e a goo% i%ea.11 &. %onclusion .he set of o$r int$itions concerning what it !eans to be !orally responsible for action is %ense" co!ple0" an% so!eti!es see!ingly self-contra%icting. )olf co!!ents that we cannot /ointly hol% the beliefs that free%o! is in%eter!inacy an% that !orality is %eter!inacy" at least not if !oral responsibility e0ists an% re2$ires both ? +for then a free agent can ne&er be !oral" an% a !oral agent can ne&er be free.-12 'n light of this conf$sion" it is perhaps less s$rprising how !$ch abo$t the nat$re of responsibility there is to learn fro! a personality type so apparently foreign to the lattice of !oral bi%s" offers" an% e0pectations integrate% into a society. Altho$gh the psychopathic !in% is %eficit of e!otions that ser&e as a !a/or !oti&ational force for goo% in !ost people" it %oes not follow that psychopaths sho$l% be gi&en reprie&e for %angero$s or otherwise ob/ectionable acts. 3o long as a person is capable of e&al$ating reasons for action" she is responsible for accor%ing proper &al$e to those reasons> an% so long as the circ$!stances of her life grante% her so!e training in the locally rele&ant r$les for !oral con%$ct" a f$ll appreciation of the !oral senti!ents on which those r$les are base% is $nnecessary. .he non-!oral agent who !eets these con%itions is s$fficiently e2$ippe% to f$nction in society" an% so she %oes not 2$alify as e0e!pt fro! sanction if she &iolates !oral nor!s. 3he is free to be %eter!ine% by the Hoo%: tho$gh she cannot %irectly access it" she learns to act li(e those who can.
11 3!ith" Angela. +Attrib$tability" Answerability" an% Acco$ntability: 'n efense of a Jnifie% Acco$nt.- thics 4ol. 122 7Apr 2#12:. )eb. ;58. 12 )olf" 1;4.