9 30 13 NVD 539 Attachment Motion For Tro Stamped 204 Pages PDF

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
PETITIONER
CASE NO
VS.
RENO JUSTICE COURT (JUDGES
DAVID CLIFTON, PETER SFERRAZZA
SCOTT PEARSON), RENO
MUNICIPAL COURT (JUDGES WILLIAM
L. GARDNER, KENNETH RAY HOWARD
DOROTHY NASH HOLMES, JAY DILWORTH
;SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT;
STATE BAR OF NEVADA; RENO CITY
ATTORNEYS OFFICE; WASHOE COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE; NORTHERN
NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD
________________________________________/
MOTION FOR TRO OR INJUNCTION WHERE YOUNG ABSTENTION UNCALLED FOR IN
LIGHT OF ENORMITY OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, IMPROPRIETY, MISCONDUCT, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES INVOLVED
Coughlin apologizes for this not being in better form but he is overwhelmed, and seeks an op-
portunity to amend this proposed filing and to obtain counsel, hopefully at public expense or some
sort of assistance. The court also may not promulgate rules in order to diminish constitutional rights,
defeat
the right of litigants to access to the court, Knox v. Eighth Judicial Dist Court of State, In and For
County of Clark, 108
Nev. 354, 830 P.2d 1342 (1992).
http://www.leagle.com/decision/19922172830P2d1342_12164 It is unimaginable for the district
court to refuse to order released the sealed portions of Coughlins own criminal trials in rcr2011-
Case 3:13-cv-00446-RCJ-WGC Document 9-1 Filed 09/30/13 Page 1 of 204 Case 3:13-cv-00539 Document 1-1 Filed 09/30/13 Page 1 of 204
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063341, rcr2012-065630, etc., etc., especially where such is absolutely relevant,material and
necessary to his Marsden and Stankewitz claims, amongst other appealable issues. Additionally, the
RJC needs to face the music and release the three different hearing portions of 2/5/13 that in 065630
and 063341 that it is steadfastly refusing to release, same with the 12/18/12 hearing in rcr2012-
067980 involving wcpd jim leslie. Its not a brady analysis, its what occurred in open court.
Sunshine. Transparency. Access.
Couglin declares everything he asserts herein is true and correct made under penalty of perjury with
the the caveat that some of the dollar figures and dates as to his finances during oct 2011 through
april 2012 are from memory and likely not exact and that such assertions are based upon his own
personal knowledge except those matters stated upon information and belief and as to those matters
Coughlin believes them to be true: This filing should also be consider a Petittion for Extraordinary
writ (such as Mandamus, Prohibition, Certiorari, etc., etc. or evne Habeas Corpus) or a supplement to
those file previously in these case. Actually, the 3/26/12 Motion for New Trial, or, in the alterantive,
Motion to Alter or Amend Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC has never been
adjudicated by the 2JDC, as such, the entire appeal in 60630 was arguably premature, and any orders
therefrom, necessarily, void (as to cr11-2064). Coughlin asks for appointment of counsel at public
expense and the transcript of the 2/27/12 and 3/12/12 trial dates in 11 tr 26800 to be prepared at
public expense (much more important that the 2/12/12 and 2/13/12 dates ordered prepared in cr12-
0376 (the SBN is attempting to disbar Coughlin largely based upon the horrid jurisprudence dished
out in 11 tr 26800which Coughlin appealed, and which he had a right to appeal (at least in his
status as a party, as pengilly seems to make clear an attorney must file a writ to challenge either
contempt or sanctiosn orders). Coughlin would also like the entire record (certified docket, etc)
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from 11 tr 26800 ordered transmitted to the 2JDC. That case has caused everybody else plenty of
headaches and problems, and the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes ought be made share the burden
As to all the Administrative Orders and pre-trial orders that alter all the deadlines applicable
to every other defendant (equal protection violation): Lower courts may also have rulemaking
authority[FN5] but may not encroach upon the authority granted to the state's highest court.[FN6]
Thus, the state's highest court's exclusive constitutional authority to enact rules that govern
procedural matters in all state courts cannot be supplemented, annulled, or superseded by an inferior
court. [FN5] In re Nuotila's Estate, 360 Mich. 256, 103 N.W.2D 638, 82 A.L.R.2D 923 (1960). [FN6]
United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Goodman, 826 So. 2D 914 (Fla. 2002).
Coughlin has a substantive right to defend himself against all these convenient 1983 collateral
bar desiring prosecutions. Its ridiculous to be attempting to characterize Coughlin as a vexatious
litigantvexatious litigants sue people for money (fine there is some habeas reform, etc., etc., but
the Rule 2.15 letters to the SBN (Judge Nash Holmes) and her 3/12/12 Order purporting Coughlin to
have violated RPC 3.1 meritorious claims for asserting basic witness bias arguments and or cross-
examination (and the same question can be asked for many, many different purposes, so Coughlin
repeating one, despite Howard and Nashs views, does not mean he is disobeying their directives),
not defend themselves against ridiculous prosecutions and brain dead arrests:
The court also may not promulgate rules in order to diminish constitutional rights,[FN10] de-
feat the right of litigants to access to the court,[FN11] or hinder parties from exercising their rights in
court.[FN12]A trial court is without authority to adopt local rules or procedures that conflict with
statutes or with rules of court adopted by the Judicial Council, or that are inconsistent with the Con-
stitution or case law. Elkins v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 4th 1337, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483, 163. [FN9]
Sackett v. Santilli, 146 Wash. 2D 498, 47 P.3D 948 (2002). [FN10] City of Auburn v. Brooke, 119
Wash. 2D 623, 836 P.2D 212 (1992). [FN11] Knox v. Eighth Judicial Dist Court of State, In and
For County of Clark, 108 Nev. 354, 830 P.2D 1342 (1992). [FN12] Hochberg v. Davis, 171 A.D.2D
192, 575 N.Y.S.2D 311 (1st Dep't 1991).
http://www.leagle.com/decision/1992742119Wn2d623_1701
http://www.leagle.com/decision/1991363171AD2d192_1326
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The appellate courts have already had occasion to spank Supreme Court judges for implementing
procedures that conflict with the CPLR. See Richard's Home Center & Lumber, Inc. v. Kownacki,
247 A.D.2d 371, 668 N.Y.S.2d 906, 372, 907 (2d Dep't 1998) (Supreme Court improperly limited
defendants to filing summary judgment motion only after court certified discovery was complete);
Hochberg v. Davis, 171 A.D.2d 192, 575 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1st Dep't 1992) (directing Supreme Court
justice to rescind his part rule requiring judicial consent before the filing of a written motion);
Goldheart Intl, Inc. v. Vulcan Constr. Corp., 124 A.D.2d 507, 509, 508 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (1st Dept
1986) (mem.) (Supreme Court has no authority to refuse to entertain a motion) Grisi v. Shainswit,
119 A.D.2d 418, 422, 507 N.Y.S.2d 155, 158-9 (1st Dep't 1986) (per curiam) (A party cannot be
deprived of his right to make a written motion or a record.) (NOTE: sound a lot like RMC Judge
Howards 12/15/11 Order in 22176 refusing to rule on Coughlins Motion for New Trial and Motion
to Disqualify Judge Howardand Judge Nash Holmes various Orders from 3/13/12 in RMC 11 TR
26800 and Judge Cliftons 11/27/12 no faxing no sthis and that were taking it back to the 80s
order is similarly ridiculous and illegal.
50. Permissible subjects of rulemaking authority, generally West's Key Number Digest West's
Key Number Digest, Courts k 80 to 80(5) The substantive law prescribes the norms for societal
conduct and the punishments for violations thereof, and thus creates, defines, and regulates
primary rights; in contrast, practice and procedure, as may be properly governed by state
court rules, pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive
law, rights, and remedies are effectuated.[ FN1] A court generally may only promulgate rules
regarding procedural matters[FN2] and may not abridge any substantive right.[FN3] Courts
have broad powers and wide discretion[FN4] to adopt rules of criminal procedure,[ FN5] civil
procedure,[FN6] and evidence,[FN7] to promulgate the procedure by which rights are
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judicially enforced,[FN8] and to promulgate rules for the administration of lower courts.[FN9]
[FN1] State v. Templeton, 148 Wash. 2D 193, 59 P.3D 632 (2002). [FN2] State ex rel. Uzelac v.
Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2D 21 (1965). [FN3] In Re Samantha C., 268 Conn.
614, 847 A.2D 883 (2004); Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 834 A.2D 875 (D.C. 2003); State v. Bicknell,
140 Idaho 201, 91 P.3D 1105 (2004); Consolidated Const. Services, Inc. V. Simpson, 372 Md.
434, 813 A.2D 260 (2002). [FN4] Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 781 N.E.2D 780 (2002). [FN5]
Hooper v. State, 585 So. 2D 137 (Ala. 1990); In re Application of Olson for Payment of Services,
648 N.W.2D 226 (Minn. 2002). [FN6] Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138, 835 S.W.2D 843 (1992);
USF & G Ins. Co. 20 Am. Jur. 2D Courts 50 of Mississippi v. Walls, 2004 WL 1276971 (Miss.
2004). [FN7] State v. Gianakos, 644 N.W.2D 409 (Minn. 2002); USF & G Ins. Co. Of Mississippi
v. Walls, 2004 WL 1276971 (Miss. 2004); State v. Templeton, 148 Wash. 2D 193, 59 P.3D 632
(2002). [FN8] Boston v. Buchanan, 2003 OK 114, 89 P.3D 1034 (Okla. 2003). [FN9] Ziebarth v.
Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul, 494 N.W.2D 145 (N.D. 1992); Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2D 337
(Tenn. 1976). 51. Limitations on authority West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest,
Courts k 78 The state constitution may grant the legislature limited authority to make procedural rules
where necessary.[FN1] To be valid, a rule of court must be reasonable.[FN2] In exercising its
rulemaking authority, a court has the duty to ensure the orderly and expeditious conduct of court
business as well as to secure the rights of parties.[FN3] A court generally may only promulgate rules
regarding procedural matters.[FN4] Accordingly, neither a court may prescribe a rule that creates a
remedy in addition to that prescribed by the legislature,[FN5] nor may it enlarge or restrict the court's
jurisdiction.[FN6] Thus, the delegation of rulemaking authority to impose costs must be explicit; the
courts cannot make such rules or orders and impose costs thereunder unless the power so to do is
expressly given them by statute or ratified by legislative enactment.[ FN7]
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The state's supreme court cannot contradict the state constitution by court rule.[FN9] The
court also may not promulgate rules in order to diminish constitutional rights,[FN10] defeat the right
of litigants to access to the court,[FN11] or hinder parties from exercising their rights in court.[FN12]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: A trial court is without authority to adopt local rules or
procedures that conflict with statutes or with rules of court adopted by the Judicial Council, or that
are inconsistent with the Constitution or case law. Elkins v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 4Th 1337, 63
Cal. Rptr. 3D 483, 163 P.3D 160 (2007). 20 Am. Jur. 2D Courts 51 [END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] R. E. W. Const. Co. V. District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 88 Idaho 426, 400 P.2D 390
(1965). [FN2] Slagle v. Valenziano, 134 Ind. App. 360, 188 N.E.2D 286 (Div. 2 1963); State ex rel.
Abel v. District Court of First Judicial Dist. In and For Lewis and Clark County, 140 Mont. 117, 368
P.2D 572 (1962); City of McAlester v. Nave, 1969 OK 39, 451 P.2D 681 (Okla. 1969). [FN3]
Campbell v. Criterion Group, 605 N.E.2D 150 (Ind. 1992). [FN4] 48. [FN5] Boudreaux v. Yancey,
256 So. 2D 340 (La. Ct. App. 1St Cir. 1971). [FN6] U.S. V. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S. Ct. 767,
85 L. Ed. 1058 (1941); People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551, 357 P.2D 352, 82 A.L.R.2D
1163 (1960); Slagle v. Valenziano, 134 Ind. App. 360, 188 N.E.2D 286 (Div. 2 1963); Guimont v.
Naquin, 152 So. 2D 281 (La. Ct. App. 1St Cir. 1963). [FN7] Vicencio v. Lincoln-Way Builders, Inc.,
204 Ill. 2D 295, 273 Ill. Dec. 390, 789 N.E.2D 290 (2003). [FN9] Sackett v. Santilli, 146 Wash. 2D
498, 47 P.3D 948 (2002). [FN10] City of Auburn v. Brooke, 119 Wash. 2D 623, 836 P.2D 212
(1992). [FN11] Knox v. Eighth Judicial Dist Court of State, In and For County of Clark, 108 Nev.
354, 830 P.2D 1342 (1992). [FN12] Hochberg v. Davis, 171 A.D.2D 192, 575 N.Y.S.2D 311 (1st
Dep't 1991).
Rules of statutory construction apply to court rules. Weddell v. Stewart, 261 P.3d 1080,
127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 58 (Nev. 2011).
The court also may not promulgate rules in order to diminish constitutional rights, defeat
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the right of litigants to access to the court, Knox v. Eighth Judicial Dist Court of State, In and For
County of Clark, 108
Nev. 354, 830 P.2d 1342 (1992). On April 20, 1992, the state filed in this court an answer to the pe-
tition for a writ of mandamus. In that answer the state first explains that petitioner's petition to seal
his records was not set for a hearing because it did not comply with Eighth District Court Rule
(EDCR) 2.20(a), which requires that motions "contain a notice of motion setting the same for hear-
ing." Because petitioner never requested that his petition be set for a hearing, the state explains that
no action was taken.
The state's explanation demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of civil procedure. Petitioner did not
file a motion in the district court; therefore EDCR 2.20 is inapplicable. Petitioner commenced an in-
dependent civil action by filing a petition. The district court had a mandatory duty to take official ac-
tion on that petition, whether or not petitioner filed any further documents in the district court. Fur-
ther, even if EDCR 2.20 were applicable, we hold that a district court may not use its local rules to
defeat the right of litigants to access to the court.
The rest of the state's answer is even more disturbing. The state explains that it is the regular practice
in the Eighth Judicial District to refer petitions under NRS 179.255 to a deputy district attorney for
review, and for the deputy district attorney to return the petition to the petitioner if, in the sole view
of the deputy district attorney, the petitioner's records should not be sealed. This procedure is fol-
lowed whether or not the petition has been filed in the district court. The state explains that the peti-
tioner may thereafter move to have the petition set for a hearing.
1
The state's explanation of the local
procedure for handling petitions under NRS 179.255, is confirmed by an affidavit from the Judge Jo-
seph T. Bonaventure.
We hold that the above procedure is illegal. NRS 179.255 has no provision for referring petitions to
seal records to the office of the district attorney. Instead, the district attorney is entitled to be notified
of the petition and to "testify and present evidence at the hearing on the petition." NRS 179.255(2).
There is absolutely no authority for referring a petition to the district attorney or for the district attor-
ney to return a petition to the petitioner. Likewise, there is no authority for the district court to avoid
its mandatory obligation to act on the petition by deferring its judicial role to a deputy district attor-
ney.
Accordingly, we grant this petition. The clerk of this court shall forthwith issue a writ of mandamus,
directing the district court to schedule a hearing on petitioner's petition to seal his records, and make
an official disposition of that petition
53. ConstructionConflicts between rules and statutory or constitutional provisions
West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Courts k 85(2), 85(3) An apparent conflict
between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized and both given effect if
possible.[FN1] However, where the conflict is irresolvable, a procedural rule generally prevails over
a statute on procedure,[FN2] absent a constitutional provision subordinating the court's rulemaking
authority to the legislature in regard to practice and procedure.[ FN3] A statute may also control over
a rule where to permit the rule to control would confer new jurisdiction on the court.[FN4] A court-
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created rule of procedure also cannot be applied in derogation of a substantive, legislatively protected
right.[FN5] Observation: Whatever the scope of the inherent power of federal courts to formulate
procedural rules not specifically required by the Federal Constitution or by Congress, such power
does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure; the United States Supreme Court's case law does not establish any inherent
power of the federal courts to act in contravention of applicable federal court rules.[FN6] State rules
of civil procedure supersede all previous court decisions.[FN7] Observation: The promulgation of a
rule by the state's highest court, acting in its administrative capacity, is not a prior determination that
the rule is valid and constitutional; rather, that determination must await adjudication in a future
case.[FN8] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Where a rule of the Supreme Court on a matter
within the court's authority and a statute on 20 Am. Jur. 2D Courts 53 the same subject conflict, the
rule will prevail. Stein v. Krislov, 345 Ill. Dec. 675, 939 N.E.2D 518 (App. Ct. 1St Dist. 2010).
Where there is an irreconcilable conflict between a court rule and a statute, the statute supersedes the
rule. Hermanson v. Szafarowicz, 457 Mass. 39, 927 N.E.2D 982 (2010). It is only where there is an
inherent conflict between a statute and a court rule that a court is required to decide if a statute is a
legislative attempt to supplant Supreme Court's authority to control practice and procedure in the
courts. Muci v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 267 Mich. App. 431, 705 N.W.2D 151 (2005). If no
distinct conflict exists between a statute and a rule, the court will apply the ruleunless the purpose
of the statute would be so frustrated by an application of the rule that the rule and the statute must be
deemed inconsistent. 48 M.S.A., Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 81.01(A). In re Civil Commitment of
Lonergan, 2012 WL 1192168 (Minn. 2012). Because the rules of appellate procedure are dependent
on statutory authority, they necessarily are subordinate to that authority; it follows that, where there is
an inconsistency between a statute and a rule, the statute must govern. West's Or.Rev. Stat. Ann
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1.002(1), 2.120; Rules App.Proc., Rule 1.05 Et seq. State v. Harding, 347 Or. 368, 223 P.3D 1029
(2009). A court rule will not be construed to circumvent or supersede a constitutional mandate. State
v. Waldon, 148 Wash. App. 952, 202 P.3D 325 (Div. 1 2009). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1]
Bowyer v. Taack, 107 Nev. 625, 817 P.2D 1176 (1991); State v. Thomas, 121 Wash. 2D 504, 851
P.2D 673 (1993). [FN2] In re Opinion of Clerk, 606 So. 2D 138 (Ala. 1992); Hickson v. State, 316
Ark. 783, 875 S.W.2D 492 (1994); Haven Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2D 730 (Fla.
1991) (Declaring conflicting statute unconstitutional); Shaw v. Shaw, 603 So. 2D 287 (Miss. 1992);
Williams v. Cummings, 191 W. Va. 370, 445 S.E.2D 757 (1994). [FN3] Stokes v. Denmark
Emergency Medical Services, 315 S.C. 263, 433 S.E.2D 850 (1993). [FN4] Simms v. Warden, 229
Conn. 178, 640 A.2D 601 (1994). As to the prohibition of a court rule enlarging or restricting the
court's jurisdiction, see 49. [FN5] Shewan v. State, 396 So. 2D 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5Th Dist.
1980); Weber v. Weber, 176 Wis. 2D 1085, 501 N.W.2D 413 (1993). [FN6] Carlisle v. U.S., 517 U.S.
416, 116 S. Ct. 1460, 134 L. Ed. 2D 613 (1996). [FN7] Thomas v. Cornell, 316 Ark. 366, 872 S.W.2D
370 (1994); Shaw v. Shaw, 603 So. 2D 287 (Miss. 1992). [FN8] New York State Ass'n of Criminal
Defense Lawyers v. Kaye, 95 N.Y.2D 556, 721 N.Y.S.2D 588, 744 N.E.2D 123 (2000).
448. Right of criminal defendant to complete record West's Key Number Digest West's Key
Number Digest, Criminal Law k1110 An indigent criminal defendant who appeals his conviction is
entitled under the federal Constitution's 14th Amendment to the use of a transcript or other record of
his trial which is sufficiently complete to allow consideration of the errors assigned.[FN1] The
requirement of sufficient completeness does not translate automatically into a requirement of a
complete verbatim transcript.[FN2] A state is not required to furnish to the defendant a verbatim
transcript,[ FN3] except where it is necessary to assure him or her as effective an appeal as would be
available to a defendant with financial resources.[FN4] Thus, there is no federal constitutional right
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to a perfect transcript.[FN5] Possible substitutes for a complete verbatim transcript include a
statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a full narrative statement based perhaps on the trial judge's
minutes taken during the trial, or a full narrative statement based on the court reporter's untranscribed
notes.[FN6] Caution: A capital murder defendant waives on appeal the issue of whether the trial court
erred in failing to record sidebar discussions which took place during voir dire and both phases of
trial, where the defendant fails to object at trial or ask that the sidebar discussions be recorded.[ FN7]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Record in a criminal case must be of sufficient completeness
for appellate review of potential errors, but a complete verbatim transcript is not required. State v.
Johnson, 147 Wash. App. 276, 194 P.3D 1009 (Div. 2 2008). To satisfy due process, a criminal
defendant is entitled to a record of sufficient completeness for purposes of an appeal; a "record of
sufficient completeness" does not necessarily mean a complete verbatim report of proceedings and, as
long as another method allows effective review, such method is constitutionally permissible. In re
Detention of Strand v. State, 139 Wash. App. 904, 162 P.3D 1195 (Div. 2 2007). [END OF
SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Draper v. State of Wash., 372 U.S. 487, 83 S. Ct. 774, 9 L. Ed. 2D 899
(1963). [FN2] Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2D 594 (Wyo. 1993). As to the right of a criminal defendant
in federal court to a new trial due to the failure of a court reporter to record the entire proceeding as
required by federal law, see Am. Jur. 2D, New Trial 98 [FN3] State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552,
638 A.2D 578 (1994). [FN4] Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2D 594 (Wyo. 1993). [FN5] State v. Menzies,
845 P.2D 220 (Utah 1992) (transcript errors did not prevent proper consideration of the defendant's
claims and, therefore, use of them did not violate the defendant's right to equal protection of the
laws). [FN6] State v. Williams, 227 Conn. 101, 629 A.2D 402 (1993). As to the failure of the court
reporter in a criminal trial to transcribe his or her notes due to death or disability as entitling the
accused to a new trial, see 460, 461. [FN7] State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St. 3D 14, 2006-Ohio-
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5084, 854 N.E.2D 1038 (2006). 1109. Generally West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number
Digest, Constitutional Law k4809 West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 641.11 A.L.R. Library
Reimbursement to Pro Se Criminal Defendants Under Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.A. Sec
3006A(d), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 2D 223 Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to effective assistance of counsel, the right does not extend to providing an indigent defendant
with the representation of his or her choice.[FN1] Moreover, an indigent defendant is entitled to
representation by counsel only for trial and for the direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and
sentence.[FN2] The court, however, does not have discretion to deny counsel to an indigent
defendant.[FN3] Observation: A statute governing the designation of a public defender for an
indigent defendant in any criminal action entitles an indigent defendant to the assistance of counsel
for the purpose of determining whether a legitimate basis exists for the filing of a motion to correct
an illegal sentence and, if so, for the purpose of representing the defendant in the preparation and
filing of the motion and, thereafter, in connection with any direct appeal from the denial of the
motion.[FN4] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Indigent defendant did not have Sixth
Amendment right to continuity of representation by military defense counsel following suspension of
military commission and transfer of his criminal case to district court. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
U.S. V. Ghailani, 686 F. Supp. 2D 279 (S.D. N.Y. 2009). Once an indigent litigant has been appointed
counsel, the Supreme Court refers to its constitutional jurisprudence to determine the scope of the
obligation borne by the appointed attorney. A.L.L. V. People, 226 P.3D 1054 (Colo. 2010). When an
indigent defendant's choice of counsel is supported by objective considerations favoring the
appointment of the preferred counsel and there are no countervailing considerations of comparable
weight, it is an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant the counsel of his preference. Phan v. State,
290 Ga. 588, 723 S.E.2D 876 (2012). Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
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effective assistance of counsel, but that right does not extend to entitle an indigent defendant to
counsel of his or her choice. State v. Smith, 42 Kan. App. 2D 344, 212 P.3D 232 (2009). Defendant's
right to continue with assigned counsel as counsel of his own choosing once an attorneyclient
relationship has been formed is qualified in the sense that a defendant may not employ it as a means
to delay judicial proceedings. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. People v. Griffin, 934 N.Y.S.2D 393 (App.
Div. 1St Dep't 2011). While an indigent defendant is entitled to free counsel, he is not entitled to free
counsel of his own choosing. Com. V. Cook, 952 A.2D 594 (Pa. 2008). A trial judge is under no duty,
under federal and state protections of the right to effective assistance, to search until he finds an
attorney agreeable to the defendant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P. Art. 26.04.
Barnett v. State, 344 S.W.3D 6 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2011), petition for discretionary review refused,
(Sept. 14, 2011). An appointed attorney's legal responsibilities do not magically and automatically
terminate at the conclusion of the trial; the continuity of representation from trial to appeal is
necessary to correct the ambiguity of representation which all too often follows a conviction. Rogers
v. State, 305 S.W.3D 164 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2009). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] State
v. McCormick, 37 Kan. App. 2D 828, 159 P.3D 194 (2007), review denied, (Sept. 27, 2007). [FN2]
Orr v. State, 276 Ga. 91, 575 S.E.2D 444 (2003). [FN3] Lamonte v. State, 839 N.E.2D 172 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005). [FN4] State v. Casiano, 282 Conn. 614, 922 A.2D 1065 (2007).
1111. Who is indigent or otherwise sufficiently impecunious for purposes of entitlement
to appointed counsel West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 641.11
A.L.R. Library Determination of indigency of accused entitling him to appointment of counsel, 51
A.L.R.3D 1108 Forms Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Criminal Procedure 66 (Notice
Motion for leave to withdraw as attorneyDefendant not indigent) Implementation of the right of an
indigent accused to the assistance of appointed counsel for his or her defense necessitates a
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determination whether he or she is in fact indigent. This determination rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court,[FN1] at least where the accused is possessed of some assets or
funds.[FN2] While a person who is able to afford retained counsel is not indigent,[FN3] there are few
hard and fast rules otherwise available for the resolution of this issue. The determination of indigency
must be determined according to the facts of the particular case.[FN4] An accused need not be totally
devoid of means to be considered indigent.[FN5] A defendant may be found indigent for the purpose
of receiving public assistance of counsel and yet solvent to pay other costs and fees, and the record
must justify the order of partial indigency.[FN6] The fact that a defendant is employable,[FN7] has
previously retained counsel,[FN8] owns valuable property,[FN9] or has succeeded in obtaining his or
her release on bail[FN10] does not compel a conclusion that he or she is not indigent. Conversely, an
accused may be denied appointed counsel even though he or she is unemployed,[FN11] is unable to
post bail,[FN12] has expenses that exceed his or her income,[FN13] or will suffer great but not
insurmountable burdens in retaining counsel.[FN14] When determining whether a defendant is
indigent and entitled to the appointment of counsel, the record must show that the determination of
the ability to pay includes a balancing of assets against liabilities and a consideration of the amount of
the defendant's disposable income or other resources reasonably available to the defendant after the
payment of fixed or certain obligations.[FN15] The determination of indigency for purposes of
appointment of counsel must be based on a thorough examination of the defendant's total financial
picture as is practical, and not on a superficial examination of income and ownership of
property.[FN16] Moreover, when determining a defendant's eligibility for court-appointed counsel, a
defendant's spouse's income and assets may be considered insofar as they may reduce a defendant's
other expenses and free more of his or her income to pay for counsel.[FN17] The court may also
consider the income of a cohabitant,[FN18] or the possibility of financial assistance from his or her
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family or friends.[FN19] A defendant's claim of indigency, warranting court-appointed counsel,
certainly should be rejected when the defendant puts his or her own assets into relatives' names, while
those assets, in fact, remain at the defendant's disposal.[FN20] Observation: A court may find a
defendant partly indigent and require him or her to pay part of the cost of appointed counsel.[FN21]
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he or she is sufficiently impecunious to be
entitled to appointed counsel.[FN22] Moreover, a defendant who refuses to disclose his or her
financial condition is not entitled to appointed counsel.[FN23] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases: Trial judge only possesses restricted discretion to limit an indigent defendant's state
constitutional right to counsel by certifying, in writing, before trial that the defendant will not be
imprisoned. State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2D 1029 (Fla. 2008). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Warren v.
City of Enterprise, 641 So. 2D 1312 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); Alexander v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
App. 4Th 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2D 732 (2d Dist. 1994), As modified on denial of reh'g, (Mar. 10, 1994);
People v. Nord, 767 P.2D 750 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), Judgment rev'd on other grounds, 790 P.2D 311
(Colo. 1990). [FN2] People v. Walker, 255 Ill. App. 3D 10, 194 Ill. Dec. 77, 627 N.E.2D 193 (1st
Dist. 1993). [FN3] State v. Buelow, 122 Wis. 2D 465, 363 N.W.2D 255 (Ct. App. 1984). [FN4] State
v. Haag, 49 Ohio App. 2D 268, 3 Ohio Op. 3D 301, 360 N.E.2D 756 (9th Dist. Summit County
1976); Williams v. State, 691 S.W.2D 81 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1985). [FN5] Graves v. State,
503 N.E.2D 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). [FN6] Willis v. State, 708 So. 2D 939 (Fla. 1998). [FN7]
Baldwin v. State, 51 Md. App. 538, 444 A.2D 1058 (1982). [FN8] State v. Dubrock, 649 S.W.2D 602
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). [FN9] State v. Masilko, 226 Neb. 45, 409 N.W.2D 322 (1987); State v.
Lathe, 132 Vt. 631, 326 A.2D 147 (1974). [FN10] Hancock v. State, 26 Ark. App. 107, 760 S.W.2D
391 (1988); Vera v. State, 689 So. 2D 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2D Dist. 1997); State v. Hesse, 110
Idaho 949, 719 P.2D 1209 (1986). [FN11] Boles v. State, 178 Ga. App. 508, 343 S.E.2D 729 (1986).
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[FN12] State v. Fontaine, 382 N.W.2D 374 (N.D. 1986). [FN13] State v. Vincent, 883 P.2D 278 (Utah
1994). [FN14] Texas Dept. Of Human Resources v. Texas State Employees Union CWA/ AFL-CIO,
696 S.W.2D 164 (Tex. App. Austin 1985). [FN15] Lamonte v. State, 839 N.E.2D 172 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). [FN16] Lamonte v. State, 839 N.E.2D 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). [FN17] State v. Atkins, 143
N.H. 242, 723 A.2D 939 (1998). [FN18] State v. Vincent, 883 P.2D 278 (Utah 1994). [FN19] State v.
Vincent, 883 P.2D 278 (Utah 1994). [FN20] State v. Atkins, 143 N.H. 242, 723 A.2D 939 (1998).
[FN21] State v. Ferris, 540 N.W.2D 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). [FN22] Adams v. City of Pelham,
651 So. 2D 55 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); People v. Adams, 836 P.2D 1045 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); State
v. Smith, 677 A.2D 1058 (Me. 1996); State v. Smith, 677 A.2D 1058 (Me. 1996); State v. DuPaul,
527 N.W.2D 238 (N.D. 1995). [FN23] State v. Eichelberger, 227 Neb. 545, 418 N.W.2D 580 (1988).
As to the practice of requiring an indigent defendant seeking appointment of counsel to execute an
affidavit as to his or her financial condition, see 1114./// 1112. Who is indigent or otherwise
sufficiently impecunious for purposes of entitlement to appointed counselEffect of official
guidelines, or conclusion of public defender as to accused's indigency West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 641.11 Some jurisdictions have adopted guidelines
regarding the income or assets of accused persons for use in evaluating their entitlement to appointed
counsel.[FN1] It has been held that the failure of a particular defendant to meet income eligibility
standards stated in such guidelines justifies denial of appointed counsel.[FN2] However, some such
guidelines serve only to establish a presumption of indigency where the defendant's income or assets
fall below the prescribed levels.[FN3] Observation: The trial court abused its discretion in accepting a
public defender's determination that a defendant was not indigent, where a discrepancy existed
between information regarding the defendant's income and an investigator's determination that the
defendant was above the guidelines for indigency, no evidence in the record explained the
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discrepancy, and the trial court made no findings or further inquiry.[FN4] [FN1] See, e.G., People v.
Tellez, 890 P.2D 197 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). [FN2] Horton v. State, 161 Ga. App. 664, 289 S.E.2D
788 (1982). [FN3] State v. Ferris, 540 N.W.2D 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). [FN4] Peoplel v.
Steinbeck, 2007 WL 2728609 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007)...... 1114. Who is indigent or otherwise
sufficiently impecunious for purposes of entitlement to appointed counselRequirement of affidavit
as to financial condition of accused West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Criminal
Law 641.11 Forms Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Federal Criminal Procedure 14 (Affidavit
of financial status) It is a common practice to require a defendant seeking appointment of counsel to
make and execute an affidavit as to his or her financial condition. He or she may also be required to
execute a release authorizing a court investigator to verify the statements made therein. Such a
requirement has been upheld as against the contentions that it violates the defendant's right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure, his or her privilege against self-incrimination, and his or her
right to counsel.[FN1] A motion to file a financial affidavit under seal has been denied,
notwithstanding the claim that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination would be violated
if the government were to use the information in the affidavit against him at trial, where the claim
was made without any specificity, the contents of the affidavit were unknown, and the government
had not indicated any intent to use the affidavit to incriminate the defendant.[FN2] Observation: A
district court's inquiry into a defendant's financial status to determine if he qualified for court-
appointed counsel was a judicial proceeding, and thus the defendant was exempt from prosecution
for making false statements to a judicial branch on the basis of statements or omissions in a financial
affidavit submitted to the district court in support of a request for appointment of counsel.[FN3]
[FN1] State v. Smith, 677 A.2D 1058 (Me. 1996). [FN2] U.S. V. Madrzyk, 990 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D.
Ill. 1998). [FN3] U.S. V. McNeil, 362 F.3D 570 (9th Cir. 2004).
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62. Duty to exercise jurisdiction West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest,
Courts k 26, 28 Generally, a court with jurisdiction over a case has not only the right but also the duty
to exercise that jurisdiction,[FN1] and to render a decision in a case before it.[FN2] State courts are
not free to decline the jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress in cases based on federal statutes if
such cases are within the scope of the ordinary jurisdiction of the state courts as prescribed by local
laws.[FN3] A court's duty to exercise its jurisdiction can be enforced by way of a mandamus
proceeding.[FN4] In certain situations, a court having jurisdiction over a case may in its discretion
decline to exercise it,[FN5] as when the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable.[FN6]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: As a general matter, the pleader must allege facts that
affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the case. In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3D 373
(Tex. 2004). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 80
Wyo. 199, 339 P.2D 398 (1959). [FN2] Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 80 Wyo. 199,
339 P.2D 398 (1959). 20 Am. Jur. 2D Courts 62 [FN3] Bowles v. Barde Steel Co., 177 Or. 421, 164
P.2D 692, 162 A.L.R. 328 (1945). As to state court jurisdiction over federal causes of action, see 92.
[FN4] Am. Jur. 2D, Mandamus. [FN5] Lyon v. Lyon, 618 So. 2D 127 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992); Sparrow
v. Nerzig, 228 S.C. 277, 89 S.E.2D 718, 56 A.L.R.2D 328 (1955). [FN6] 130 to 143. (NOTE:
Judge Stiglich, Coughlin respectfully submits, is mistaken to whatever extent she is of the opnion that
anything order by the NSCT in 60360 or 60630,, or 61383 somehow absolves the district court of its
duty to rule on 60b motions, etc., etc., and nothing about Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order in cr11-2064
takes away the requirements of NRS 177 and 178 that Judge Stiglich adjudicated Coughlins filing
herein and therein.
Amjur appellate review 445. Duty to present adequate record West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k557, 580, 596, 619 West's Key Number Digest,
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Criminal Law k1092.3, 1099.2 West's Key Number Digest, Federal Courts k691 Especially where
NRS 189.030(1) Required the RMC to transmit the very record that Judge Elliott purported to be
Coughlin's duty to transmit, the affirming of Judge Howard's "Ruling" is completely inappropriate,
especially where all of Howard's Orders and the judgment is fundamentally erroneous on its
face.McNair v. Pavlakos/McNair Development Co., 576 So. 2D 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5Th Dist.
1991).
AMJUR Courts 49. Courts possessing rulemaking power; manner of exercise West's Key
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Courts k 81 to 84 The power to make rules is generally
vested in a jurisdiction's highest court,[FN1] which has broad powers to adopt procedural
rules.[FN2] Observation: A state supreme court's constitutional authority to engage in rulemaking
includes the exclusive power to establish or modify court rules through judicial decisions.[FN3] The
court's constitutional authority to promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in the courts
may also be exercised in the form of general directives or specific orders.[FN4] Lower courts may
also have rulemaking authority[FN5] but may not encroach upon the authority granted to the state's
highest court.[FN6] Thus, the state's highest court's exclusive constitutional authority to enact rules
that govern procedural matters in all state courts cannot be supplemented, annulled, or superseded by
an inferior court.[FN7] Unlike local court rules, administrative orders of a chief judge of a judicial
circuit generally do not have to be approved by the state's highest court.[FN8] In this regard, a lower
court's administrative order which establishes a procedure for every defendant to comply with consti-
tutes a "rule" within the purview of the state's highest court, and must be approved by the higher
court.[FN9] A state supreme court may hold its rulemaking conferences in private so as to be free of
whatever influence the presence of others might occasion.[FN10] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases: Under the state constitution, the court possesses plenary authority to create procedural rules in
both civil and criminal cases. West's C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 6, 21. City and County of Broomfield v.
Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co., 239 P.3D 1270 (Colo. 2010). 20 Am. Jur. 2D Courts 49
[END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Schoenvogel ex rel. Schoenvogel v. Venator Group Retail, Inc.,
895 So. 2D 225 (Ala. 2004); Borer v. Lewis, 91 P.3D 375 (Colo. 2004); United Services Auto. Ass'n
v. Goodman, 826 So. 2D 914 (Fla. 2002); Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 781 N.E.2D 780 (2002);
USF & G Ins. Co. Of Mississippi v. Walls, 2004 WL 1276971 (Miss. 2004); Berdella v. Pender, 821
S.W.2D 846 (Mo. 1991); State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3D 600 (Tenn. 2004), Cert. Denied, 125 S. Ct.
1306 (U.S. 2005); State v. Arbaugh, 215 W. Va. 132, 595 S.E.2D 289 (2004); Terex Corp. V. Hough,
2002 WY 112, 50 P.3D 317 (Wyo. 2002). Only the state supreme court, not the judicial council, has
authority to adopt rules governing the use of memorandum decisions in the appellate process. Grand
County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 44 P.3D 734 (Utah 2002). [FN2] 48. [FN3] State v. J.M., 182 N.J.
402, 866 A.2D 178 (2005). [FN4] State v. J.M., 182 N.J. 402, 866 A.2D 178 (2005). [FN5] In re
Nuotila's Estate, 360 Mich. 256, 103 N.W.2D 638, 82 A.L.R.2D 923 (1960). [FN6] United Services
Auto. Ass'n v. Goodman, 826 So. 2D 914 (Fla. 2002). [FN7] State, ex rel. Romley v. Ballinger, 209
Ariz. 1, 97 P.3D 101 (2004). [FN8] Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc. V. Pfeifler, 846 So. 2D 1129
(Fla. 2003). [FN9] State, ex rel. Romley v. Ballinger, 209 Ariz. 1, 97 P.3D 101 (2004). [FN10]
Amendment of The State Bar of Wisconsin, Matter of, 480 N.W.2D 442 (Wis. 1992).
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District Court has the final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in municipal courts, Appellate ap-
propriately sought post conviction relief therefrom. The above-mentioned denial of the Appellate's
Motion can either be interpreted as the District Court refusing a new trial or refusing to exercise its
jurisdiction,and in both cases, this Court has jurisdiction to review such a determination.
A. REFUSING A NEW TRIAL
Appellate believes that there were at least two substantial reasons to move the District
Court to rehear the appeal and/or seek a new trial, both of which were reflected in his Motion:
1) As stated above, Appellate acted in proper person; and, 2) The Respondents did not meet their
burden of proof that Appellant was the perpetrator of that crime. There is therefore a claim that the
factual underpinnings of the District Courts' initial decisions were incorrect, as well as, for all intents
and purposes, insufficiency of counsel for both the Bench Trial at Boulder City Municipal Court as
well as for the Appeal at District Court. Appellant was not sufficiently versed in court procedure or
practice to articulate the details of his defense.
NRS 177.015(1)(b) states: "...The party aggrieved in a criminal action may appeal only... [t]o the Su-
preme Court from an order of the district court granting a motion to dismiss, a motion for acquittal or
a motion in arrest of judgment, or granting or refusing a new trial." (Emphasis added) This
Court has repeated and reiterated NRS 177.015(1)(b) in determining its authority to
review in similar matters. "In interpreting a similar provision (determining whether a pre-sentence
motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is the functional equivalent of an appealable order granting a motion for
a new trial) with respect to civil appeals under NRAP 3A, which authorizes appellate review of a
district court order "granting or refusing a new trial," this court has concluded that only orders re-
solving post-judgment motions for a new trial are appealable. We see no reason why the identical
language in NRS 177.015 "granting or refusing a new trial" should be construed in a man-
ner inconsistent with NRAP 3A. And to the contrary, there are compelling policy justifications...
underlying the general rule that a judgment be final before this court is 4
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vested with jurisdiction. We therefore hold that, pursuant to NRS 177.015(1)(b), this court has au-
thority to review determinations of the district court resolving post-conviction motions for a new trial,
as well as post-conviction motions that are the "functional equivalent" of a motion for a new trial."
State v. Lewis, 178 P.3d 146 (Nev. 2008).
Appellant's Motion specified the flaws in the prosecution of the case and counsel attempted
to argue the merits therein. Appellant was denied a hearing, not based on the merits, but on an ar-
gument of improper jurisdiction. Had the matter been heard and denied on the 5
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merits, Appellant agrees that this Court would not have jurisdiction, but that was not the
outcome. Pursuant to NRS 177.015(1)(b), this Court has authority to review this matter.
B. REFUSING TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION
The District Court did not deny Appellant's Motion on the merits and did not entertain even
an opportunity for the matter to be reheard. The Appellant's Motion was denied for improper juris-
diction, with the District Court deferring to this, the Nevada Supreme Court, according to the hear-
ing minutes, and Respondents reflecting in the Order that the case had been remanded to Boulder
City Municipal Court and was therefore not within the District Court's jurisdiction. The Nevada
Constitution, Article 6, 6 (1) states, in pertinent part:
"The District Courts in the several Judicial Districts of this State have original
jurisdiction in all cases excluded by law from the original jurisdiction of justices' courts.
They also have final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in Justices Courts and such
other inferior tribunals as may be established by law."
(Emphasis added)
This Court stated, in Floyd v. District Court, 36 Nev. 349, 354, 135 P. 922, 924 (1913) that
the constitutional grant of final appellate jurisdiction to the district court is "also a prescription that
the district court must assume final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in a justice court, and hence
it is the duty which the district court cannot either refuse or divest itself of'; see also Mazade v. Jus-
tice's Court of Goldfield Tp., 41 Nev. 481, 482-83, 172 P. 378, 379 (1918); Bancroft v. Pike, 33 Nev.
53, 80, 110 P. 1,2 (1910).
Further, while in discussion over authority to review a writ of mandamus in State of Ne-
vada v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 127, 994 P.2d 692 (Nev., 2000), this Court stated "...we have declined
to entertain writs that request review of a decision of the district court acting in its appellate ca-
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pacity unless the district court has improperly refused to exercise its jurisdiction, has exceeded its
jurisdiction, or has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner."
The matter of State, obviously different in the nature of the aggrieved's petition, still bears
consideration based on this Court's authority for intervention on grounds of the district 6
court refusing to exercise its jurisdiction. It has been this Court's practice to provide for the review,
where appropriate, of appeals decided by the court of appeals. That includes the District Court, in it's
appellate capacity.
In Passanisi v. State 108 Nev. 318, 321-22, 831 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1992) this Court concluded, "...
that [it] had jurisdiction over a post-conviction motion to modify sentence as the functional equiva-
lent of a motion for a new trial because both motions were "based on the claim that the factual under-
pinnings of the District Court's decision [were] incorrect".
"Where factual allegations are made which, if true, could establish a right to relief, a convicted
person must be allowed an evidentiary hearing on such issue, unless the available record repels such
allegations." Fine v. Warden, 90 Nev. 166, 521 P.2d 374 (1974).
Coughlin can report that WCDA Assistant District Attorney Bruce Hahn sat both on the Board
of Directors of Washoe Legal Services and Coughlins NNDB Screen Panel in April 2012, an
unimaginable conflict that Hahn failed to recuse himself from, especially in light of Coughlins
lawsuits against WLS, and Washoe Countys culpability (and the WCDAs accessory stance thereto)
vis a vis the systematic burglaries of tenants dressed up as summary eviction lockouts, of which
Coughlin has been subjected to at least three such burglaries by the WCSO (11/1/11 in Rev2011-
001708 (resulting in Coughlins arrest in RMC 11 CR 26405), 3/15/12 in rev2012-00374, and
rev2012-001048 on 6/28/12, resulting in Coughlins arrest in rcr2012-067980).
This Courts 8/22/13 Order granted Coughlins Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperisas such,
the state or city (or county) is required to prepare at public expense the transcript of the 11/30/11 trial
(and, arguably the less than five minute 10/11/11 arraignment in RMC 11 CR 22176, now on appeal
(and arguably the subject of a Petition for Extraordinary writ (possibly one of the Habeas Corpus
variety), Motion for New Trial, appeal of any order deny such Motion for New Trial), whether the
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2JDC ever had jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal in cr11-2064 or not (compliance with NRS
189.030(1) arguably being a jurisdictional prerequisite and or NRS 189.035 made void for lack of
jurisdiction any orders from the 2JDC beyond remanding for new trial based upon the materially
defective transcript forwarded to the 2JDC by the RMC (not forwarding one at all still qualifies as
being materially defective).
Coughlin does not even need an order granting publication of transcript at public expense
given he has an order granting his motion to proceed informa pauperis, which makes law of the case
the issue of whether or not Coughlin is indigent. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100
L. Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1956) (why can collateral estoppels constantly be applied against
Coughlin, yet none of the IFPs granted in other cases ever provided a basis for applying collateral
estoppels in Coughlins favor2JDC Judge Steinheimmer granted Coughlins 6/27/11 Motion to
Proceed IFP in CV11-01896, yet Judge Howard is permitted to sidestep the issue in his 10/27/11 and
12/15/11 orders now on appeal in cr11-2064? 01896 was a civil case and the case Howard presided
over was a criminal case. IFPs are universally more readily granted in criminal cases.
Also, Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming misstates NRS 4.410(2), as such was amended in 2011
to direct the depositing of the down payment in a civil case with the court reporter rather than
the clerk of court that Elliott references. As such, Pam Longonis angrily hanging up the phone on
Coughlin on multiple occasions and refusal to indicate to Coughlin as to where he may make such
deposit (refusing to provide any mailing or contact information) becomes much, much more relevant.
Also the TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL/OTHERS handout provide to Coughlin and others by the
RMC is arguably further not in compliance with Nevada law in that it purports to required criminal
defendants to pay for not just their copy of the transcript, but a copy for the court and one for the
Respondent as well: 2.'Cost. Appeal transcripts are billed at $4.10 per page, which includes an
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original (to be filed with District Court), one copy for the appeilant, and one copy for the opposing
counsel.. Remuneration for transcripts is statutorily set and heavily dependent on the numbers of
days it takes the CCR to prepare such under NRS 3 compared to when it was ordered, and the number
of hours involved in the proceeding to be recording (in Coughlins case the 11/30/11 trial consists of
6 hours of audio, and the 10/11/11 arraignment consists of four minutes of audio). And, actually, that
RMC/Longoni handout needs to be looked over with a fine tooth comb, its on RMC letterhead
(listing CASSANDRA JACKSON Interim Court Administrator) and provided to the public (and
provided to Coughlin at all relevant times herein) by the RMCs filing office, and such reads:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/169461777/Rmc-Transcript-Rules-in-Violation-of-Nrs-Longioni
TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL/OTHERS:
If you wish to order a transcript of your proceedings in the Reno Municipal Court, you may
do so by contacting Pam Longoni at (775) 530-5251.
The following information is provided to assist you in placing an order for a transcript:
1. Orders will require the date of the court appearance, type of proceeding, (trial, arraignment,
etc.), department number in which the proceeding was held, and also include the appropriate deposit
as indicated below. Payment may be made by check or money order. No transcript will be prepared
until the required deposit is received.
2. Cost. Appeal transcripts are billed at $4.10 per page, which includes an original (to be filed
with District Court), one copy for the appellant, and one copy for the opposing counsel. Transcripts
ordered for purposes other than appeal, where only one copy and original transcript is required, are
billed at $3.00 per page.
3. Deposits. Deposits required are as follows: $75.00 for arraignment/sentencing; a minimum
deposit of $200.00 for any trial transcript; and a minimum deposit of $500.00 for very lengthy trials
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(those lasting more than three hours). NO TRANSCRIPT IS CONSIDERED TO BE
OFFICIALLY ORDERED, AND COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSCRIPTION WILL NOT
BEGIN, UNTIL RECEIPT OF THE REQUIRED DEPOSIT.
4. Follow-up on Transcript Preparation. You will be notified when your transcript has been
prepared. If the actual cost of the transcript is less than the amount of the deposit paid, a refund will
he issued with the transcript. And, likewise, any outstanding balance due after completion of the
transcript must be paid before the Original is filed with District Court or any copies released. No
refunds of deposits will be given for transcripts once they have been prepared and no responsibility
will be taken for the dismissal of any appeal by District Court because no Original was filed due to
non payment of an outstanding balance due.
5. Pam Longoni will be happy to answer any questions you may have regarding the above
information.
With regard to the problem of determining whether any given defendant is indigent, so
as to entitle him to a free transcript or other record for use in appealing his conviction, which is the
subject of this annotation, the statement has frequently been made that the determination of indigency
is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court, and therefore (impliedly or expressly) is
reviewable only for abuse of such discretion.
8
However, it has also been said that a lower courts
determination in this regard, though entitled to great weight, will nonetheless be subject to review
upon appeal, for the reason that it involves a basic constitutional right relating to the administration of
criminal justice.
9
3
, infra.
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State v Rutherford (1964) 63 Wash 2d 949, 389 P2d 895.
Law Reviews and Other Periodicals
Note, Criminal ProcedureFree Transcripts for Indigents. 51 NC L Rev 621 (1973)
Also relevant to this Courts 8/25/13 Order (Coughlin respectfully seeks leave of court to
exceed the 15 page limit referenced therein and in addition, respectfully submits that there is no valid
oblivation to so limit his advocacy, and, as such, submits this open refusal respectfully made,
pursuant to RPC 3.5(d), especially in light of the statutory provisions in NRS 178.600, and .610, and
the ambiguity over what rules apply to these criminal appeals to the district court (it does not seam
that NRAP applies were NRAP Rule 3B Criminal Actions: Rules Governing specifically identifies
only appeals from district court deteriminations in criminal actions shall be governed by these
rules..(NOTE: NRAP RULE 3B. CRIMINAL ACTIONS: RULES GOVERNING Appeals from
district court determinations in criminal actions shall be governed by these Rules and by NRS
177.015 to 177.305 and NRS 34.575. All appeals in capital cases are also subject to the provisions of
SCR 250. Rule 3C applies to all other direct and post-conviction criminal appeals, except those
matters specifically excluded from the fast track by Rule 3C(a). [As amended; effective July 1,
2009.] its not exactly clear what is meant by Rule 3c applies to all other direct and post-conviction
criminal appeals
i
though the all other phrase would tend to reference all criminal appeals that are
not appeals from district court determinations and thus make NRAP 3C applicable to these NRS
189 appeals from the justice and municipal courts to the district courts.? A problem arises,
however, where NRAP Rule 3C contradicts NRS 189.030(1), seemingly, and other rules.. and the
WDCR do not limit criminal appeal briefs while they do limit civil appeal briefs. )allowing Coughlin
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to file a Supplemental Brief speaking to the issue of whether this Court still has jurisdiction in cr11-
2064: STATE v. EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 396 P.2D 680 (1964) Were Harris
financially responsible, he could purchase a copy of the transcript; unfortunately he is without money.
The district court granted his motion. The transcript was ordered to be prepared at county expense
and a copy thereof delivered to counsel for Harris. By this proceeding in certiorari the district
attorney challenges the validity of that order, contending that the court lacked power to make it. His
argument is based upon the absence of any statute authorizing such a charge against the county. The
argument has no merit.
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/NRAP.html NRS 177.165 Preparation of
record and papers on appeal. All appeals from a district court to the Supreme Court shall be heard
on the original papers and the reporters transcript of evidence or proceedings. The form and manner
of preparation of the record and of other papers filed may be prescribed by the Supreme Court, and to
the extent not otherwise so prescribed shall conform to the practice in civil cases.
(Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
NRS 177.155 seems to make quite clear that Judge Stiglichs jurisdiction in these criminal appeals to
the district court is vast, and not affected by anything in 60630 (the appeal of 2064 to the Nevada
Supreme Court) nor by Judge Elliotts purported remittitur in his 3/15/12 OARRMC (which purports
to adjudicate on appeal a ruling which would necessarily be interlocutory in natureas such,
maybe that is why Judge Elliotts Order Affirming indicates such remand is made back to the RMC
for all future proceedings, which implies there is some proceeding in the RMC that are to take
place or were at the time of that 3/15/12 Order (perhaps a reference to the fact that RMC Judge
Howard was precluded from presiding over a contempt trial of Coughlin (which is what Howard
made the petty larceny trial less than ten minutes into such when he found Coughlin in contempt the
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indicated he was, rather than perform the immediate action necessary to protect the dignity of the
court that such a summary contempt ruling would requireJudge Howard instead proceeded to hold
nearly six hours of trial, indicating that he would determine Coughlins punishment on such purported
summary contempt finding after the petty larceny trial was concluded (therefore impermissibly, to
much prejudice to Coughlin, mixing the two). Pengilly and McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court
in and for Humboldt County, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318, make quite clear that pursuant to NRS
22.030(3), Judge Howard was not permitted to preside over any portion of such contempt
proceedings upon the motion to disqualify/objection to Howards so presiding that Coughlin
immediately made upon Howards contempt ruling less than ten minutes into the trial (ie, Judge
Elliotts 3/15/12 Order tip toed around the fact that Judge Howard violated Nevada law yet again in
such respect, and that future proceedings necessarily were required in the RMC and that Elliotts
3/15/ Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC purports to do just that, affirm a ruling, not affirm
a Judgment of ConvictionNRS 177.155 Supervision of appeal. The supervision and control
of the proceedings on appeal shall be in the appellate court from the time the notice of appeal is filed
with its clerk, except as otherwise provided in this title. The appellate court may at any time entertain
a motion to dismiss the appeal, or for directions to the trial court, or to modify or vacate any order
made by the trial court or by any judge or justice of the peace in relation to the prosecution of the
appeal, including any order fixing or denying bail.
NRS 22.030(3) provides: 22. 030. Summary punishment of contempt committed
in immediate view and presence of court; affidavit or statement to be filed when contempt
committed outside immediate view and presence of court; disqualification of judge3. Except
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as otherwise provided in this subsection, if a contempt is not committed in the immediate view
and presence of the court, the judge of the court in whose contempt the person is alleged to be
shall not preside at the trial of the contempt over the objection of the person. The provisions of
this subsection do not apply in: see , Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Assoc., 116
Nev. 646, at 650, 5 P.3d 569 (2000); it was a mandatory duty of the judge not to preside at the
trial of the contempt charges after the objection under NCL 8943 (cf. NRS 22.030), a writ
issued to prevent the judge from presiding. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev.
318, 218 P.2d 939 (1950)
Judge Howard violated NRS 22.030(3) where he continued to preside over the
trial of the contempt over Coughlins objection where such portion of such alleged contempt
occurring after the point ten minutes into the 11/30/11 trial in 11 CR 22716 (see cr11-2064)
necessarily did not occure in the immediate view and presence of court given such alleged
contemptuous behavior (specifically referenced, somewhat, in Howards 11/30/11 Order
Punishing Summary Contempt) patently, manifestly from the record, did not occur until after
such point ten minutes into the 11/30/11 trial when Judge Howard found Coughlin in contempt (at
which point Coughlin requested the appoitnement of defense counsel, which howard denied,..).
Howard presided over the trial over contempt that had not even occurred yet (to the extent his
11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt patently references alleged behavior occurring beyond
the first 10 minutes of the trial.obviously that which will allegedly only occur in the future is not
immediate.
NRS 5.073 Conformity of practice and proceedings to those of justice courts;
exception; imposition and collection of fees.
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1. The practice and proceedings in the municipal court must conform, as nearly as
practicable, to the practice and proceedings of justice courts in similar cases. An appeal perfected
transfers the action to the district court for trial anew, unless the municipal court is designated as a
court of record as provided in NRS 5.010. The municipal court must be treated and considered as a
justice court whenever the proceedings thereof are called into question.
2. Each municipal judge shall charge and collect such fees prescribed in NRS 4.060 that
are within the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 903; A1991, 455; 1997, 115)
NRS 5.075 Form of docket and records. The Court Administrator shall prescribe the
form of the docket and of any other appropriate records to be kept by the municipal court, which form
may vary from court to court according to the number and kind of cases customarily heard and
whether the court is designated as a court of record pursuant to NRS 5.010.
NRS 3.320(3) relating to the duties of court reporters in criminal cases provides, in part, that
the reporter "if directed by the court * * * must, within such reasonable time after the trial of such
case as may be designated by law or, in the absence of any law relating thereto, by the court, write
out the same, or such specific portions thereof as may be requested, in plain and legible longhand, or
by typewriter or other printing machine, and certify to the same as being correctly reported and
transcribed, and, when directed by the law or court, file the same with the clerk of the court." NRS
3.370(2) reads, in part, that "in criminal cases the fees for reporting and for transcripts ordered by the
court to be made must be paid out of the county treasury upon the order of the court." These
provisions embrace the order of which the district attorney complains.
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However, we wish to mention that in this case the judicial power to make the order in
question does not rest primarily upon the statutory provisions which we have related. The demands of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution
compel that a copy of the transcript of the first trial be furnished Harris. The mentioned statutes
merely implement the constitutional mandate. Griffin v.Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed.
891, involved an indigent's right to a transcript for the purpose of appellate review. Illinois had not,
by statute, authorized an indigent appellant to obtain the transcript at state expense. The United States
Supreme Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
prevent a state from denying appellate review to an indigent because of his poverty. Justice Black
wrote: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of a trial a man gets depends upon the amount
of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants
who have money enough to buy transcripts. * * * Plainly, the ability to pay costs in advance bears no
rational relationship to the defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to
deprive a defendant of a fair trial." The Griffin principle has been subsequently applied by the high
court to closely related situations. In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209, it
was held that Griffin applied to state collateral proceedings even where a criminal appeal was
discretionary and not a matter of right. In Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39,
the court held that a state may not require a payment of statutory filing fees by an indigent before his
appeal would be docketed. In Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357
U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.E.2d 1269, the Griffin principle was given retrospective application. See
also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899; Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9
L.Ed.2d 892.
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As already stated the Griffin doctrine involved fundamental fairness to one seeking appellate
review of his conviction. He was no longer clothed with the presumption of innocence. In the case
before us we are concerned with fundamental fairness to one who is about to stand trial for a capital
offense. He presently enjoys the presumption of innocence. We believe that the Griffin principle has
greater need for application here than it did in Griffin itself, for we know that everyone accused of
crime has a constitutional right to a fair trial. On the other hand, we are not at all certain that a
convicted defendant has a constitutional right to appeal; the United States Supreme Court has never
said so. Indeed, that court stated in McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867,
that "a review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the
offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law and is not now a necessary
element of due process of law." In the light of Griffin v. Illinois, the order made below was
compelled.
We would reach the same result quite apart from any consideration of the particular statutory
and constitutional demands which we have discussed. The inherent power of a court to exercise
reasonable control over a criminal proceeding cannot seriously be questioned. In Marshall v. District
Court, 79 Nev. 280, 382 P.2d 214, we held that the district court in a murder case had the power to
order the district attorney to produce for the inspection of the defendant the autopsy report of the
victim any and all photographs relevant to the case, all statements of all persons who testified at the
preliminary hearing or who will be witnesses at the trial, and a certain tape recording given by the
defendant. In Pinana v. District Court, 75 Nev. 74, 334 P.2d 843, we held that the district court had
the power to deny the defendant's request for pre-trial inspection of statements made by her to the
district attorney. In neither case was certiorari available to control judicial discretion or to review the
propriety of judicial action. In each case the state had incurred an expense in obtaining the
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information sought by the defendant's pre-trial discovery motions, and in each instance the court
possessed power to enter the order in question.
It is important to note that Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC
(OARMC) misapplies NRS 4.410(2) to NRS 189.030(1) in characterizing Coughlin as the one
ordering the transcript. That is a three card monty approach. Coughlin merely filed a Notice of
Appeal in the RMC, which triggered the statutory requirement that the RMC necessarily, order the
transcript as the RMC, under NRS 189.030(1) shall transmit such to the district court within 10
days of Coughlins 12/11/11 filing of a Notice of Appeal (unless the 2004 ADKT makes a post-Rust
application required whereby the filing by Coughlin at the same time of a Motion for New Trial made
such Notice of Appeal premature and tolling the requirements of NRS 189.030(1)but regardless,
what actually occurred in Elliotts 3/15/12 OARRMC is completely inappropriate and voidSo,
actually, under Elliotts analaysis (especially if the RMC wants to keep its NRS 5.010 court of
record designation or be made to answer for the fraud attendant to enforcing the local ordinance
But, really, the RMC and Longoni makes this quite easy were their own handout admits that
the preparation of the transcript will not begin (whether a civil or criminal case (and the RMC
handles barely any civil cases at all anyways) until the money deposit outlined is made:
Reno MUNICIPAL COURT
GENERAL PROVISIONS
NRS 5.010 General requirements for court; designation as court of record. There must
be in each city a municipal court presided over by a municipal judge. The municipal court:
1. Must be held at such place in the city within which it is established as the governing body of
that city may by ordinance direct.
2. May by ordinance be designated as a court of record.
[35:19:1865; B 940; BH 2454; C 2535; RL 4855; NCL 8397](NRS A 1983, 899;
1985, 671; 1991, 161)
Sec. 2.16.040. Court of record; recording.
The Reno Municipal Court is hereby designated as a court of record in accordance with NRS
5.010. Proceedings in the municipal court may be recorded by any method recognized by the
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Nevada Supreme Court.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Editors noteOrd. No. 3099, 1, adopted June 27, 1983, repealed former 2.16.040
2.16.060, concerning the office of the marshal, which sections derived from Code 1966,
2.32.0102.32.030.
Sec. 2.16.050. Recording; operation of equipment; transcription of
recordings; use of transcript.
(a) Each judge shall appoint a suitable person, who need not be a certified shorthand reporter
and may have other responsibilities in the court to operate the recording equipment. The
person so appointed shall subscribe to an oath that he or she will so operate it as to record
all of the proceedings.
(b) The municipal court may designate any certified person to transcribe the recording into a
written transcript. The person so designated shall subscribe to an oath that he or she has
correctly transcribed it. The transcript may be used for all purposes for which transcripts
are used and is subject to correction in the same manner as other transcripts.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Sec. 2.16.060. Recording; preservation; destruction.
The recording of each proceeding in municipal court must be preserved until at least 30 days
after the time for filing an appeal expires. If no appeal is taken, the judge may order the
destruction of the recording at any time after that date. If there is an appeal to the district court,
the recording must be preserved until at least 30 days after final disposition of the case on
appeal. The municipal court may order the destruction of the recording at any time after that
date.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Sec. 2.16.070. Filing of appeals.
An appeal in a civil or criminal case must be taken and perfected in the same manner as the
same type of appeal from the justice's courts, as provided in the Nevada Revised Statutes.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Sec. 2.16.080. Recording; payment of fees.
(a) The fees for transcripts, processing an appeal, and copies must be paid by the party
ordering them in accordance with the municipal court procedures.
(b) In a civil case the preparation of the transcript need not commence until the fees have been
deposited.
(c) In a civil case, upon a finding of a party's indigency by the court, such fees shall be waived
or paid by the court.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
Sec. 2.16.090. Transmission of transcript, other papers, recording
and copy of docket to district court.
(a) The court shall transmit to the clerk of the district court the recording and/or transcript of
the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified copy of his or her docket in
accordance with the Nevada Revised Statutes, District Court Rules, and the Washoe
County District Court Rules.
(b) The judge shall give notice to the appellant or his or her attorney and to the other party that the
recording and/or transcript, all other papers relating to the case, and a certified copy of
the docket have been filed with the clerk of the district court.
(Ord. No. 4199, 1, 3-24-92)
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So, Reno Municipal Code Sec 2.16.080 becomes pretty important, huh? Sec. 2.16.080. Recording;
payment of fees.
(a) The fees for transcripts, processing an appeal, and copies must be paid by the party
ordering them in accordance with the municipal court procedures.
This is true, especially considering that the RMC provided Coughlin in obstructing his attempts to get
the transcript made and even to obtain a copy of the audio from this alleged court of record a
handout on RMC letterhead that reads: RENO MUNICIPAL COURT
TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL/OTHERS
If you wish to order a transcript of your proceedings in the Reno Municipal Court, you
may do so by contacting Pam Longoni at (775) 530-5251.
The following information is provided to assist you in placing an order for a transcript:
I. Orders will require the date of the court appearance, type of proceeding, (trial,
arraignment, etc.), department number in which the proceeding was held, and also
include the appropriate deposit as indicated below. Payment may be made by check or
money order. No transcript will be prepared until the required deposit is received.
3. Deposits. Deposits required are as follows: $75.00 for arraignment/sentencing; a

minimum deposit of$200.00 for any trial transcript; and a minimum deposit of$500.00
for very lengthy trials (those lasting more than three hours). NO TRANSCRIPT IS
CONSIDERED TO BE OFFICIALLY ORDERED, AND COMMENCEMENT OF
TRANSCRIPTION WILL NOT BEGIN, UNTIL RECEIPT OF THE REQUIRED
DEPOSIT.
5. Questions. Pan Longoni will be happy to answer any questions you may have
regarding the above information.
P.O. BOX~cn,l, Nevada 89505 (715) 3342290, Fax (775) 3343824
Additionally, the 8/22/13 Order of this court uses the same term, ruling that Judge Elliott
used in his 3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMCwhere such 8/22/13 order refers to its
tentative rulingthe term ruling necessarily connotes lack of a final order or judgmentas
such, where such 3/15/12 Order Affirming purports to remand jurisdiction back to the RMC, such is
void, as a remand is not appropriate until a final judgment has been entered as to Coughlins appeal
(where such appeal should encompass, for judicial economies sake, Coughlins appeal of all of the
Orders and Judgments by Judge Howard (including, but not limited to Howards 10/27/11 denial of a
continuance and denial of court appointed defender, obviously the 11/30/11 judgment of conviction
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and court order, as well as the 11/30/11 Order Punishinng Summary Contempt, in addition to the
12/15/11 Order (which purports to refuse to adjudicate Coughlins Motion for New Trial (or Motion
to Vacate/Set Aside, which is obviously the functional equivalent of such and where the file name of
the motion filed via email (with written permission to by RMC Ballard) list a Motion for New
Trial, etc., etc) which arguably made premature Coughlins 12/12/11 and or 12/13/11 Notice of
Appeal, meaning the 2JDC never really had jurisdiction for the appeal in the first place, not until
Howard rules on Coughlins tolling motion NRS 176.515 Motion for New Trialand really it
would be appropriate to combine into this matter coughlins Petition for extraordinary writs.
Please consider this a supplement to Coughlins 9/18/13 Motion (or motion for leave to
submit such) and or motion for extension of time to file the Supplemental Brief not to exceed fifteen
(15 pages) solely on the issue of whether this court has jurisdiction over this case referenced in
the 8/22/13 Order in Cr11-2064. Coughlin believes the transcript in the matter on appeal in cr11-
2064 (at least of the 11/30/11 trial date, though the misconduct by Judge W. Gardner at the 10/11/11
arraignment is of salient importance to the denial of Coughlins Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
issues)Indeed, Judge Elliotts own invocation of NRS 4.410(2) in his fn1 in his 3/15/12 Order
Affirming in cr11-2064 brings into place Braham and the mandatory authority establishing that an
criminal defendant/petitioner/appellant whom has been declared indigent may not be charged for the
transcript of the trial. See NRS 189.030(1).
The 8/27/12 Order granting the Citys Motion to Dismiss should be vacated. Coughlin is
entitled to rely upon Judge Elliotts written pronouncement that the deadline in NRS 189.010 (and
therefore in all of TITLE 14PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES (NRS 169 to 189, which
necessarily includes NRS 189.010, NRS 176.515, NRS 178.482 computation of time standard
specifying that NRCP 6(a) and 6(e) apply.
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Given Nevada law pursuant to NRS 189.030(1), Coughlin was absolutely entitled to the
transcript of the trial of 11/30/11, making Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the
RMC in excess of his jurisdiction, so much so that he arguably should be prevented from
availing himself of any judicial immunity. U. S. v. MacCollomSupreme Court of the United
States June 10, 1976 426 U.S. 317 96 S.Ct. 2086 .
Although under some authority, the mere oral pronouncement of judgment without an
entry on the trial docket is not a rendition of judgment. Nev.-Division of Child and Family
Services, Dept. Of Human Resources, State of Nevada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 120 Nev. 445, 92 P.3D 1239 (2004).
RULES OF COURT
NRS 178.608 Rules of justice courts and district courts not to be inconsistent with this
title. Rules made by justice courts and district courts for the conduct of criminal proceedings shall
not be inconsistent with this title. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1458)
NRS 178.610 Where no procedure specifically prescribed court may proceed in lawful
manner. If no procedure is specifically prescribed by this title, the court may proceed in any lawful
manner not inconsistent with this title or with any other applicable statute. (Added to NRS by 1967,
1458).
BOYLE et al.,V. CertainTEED CORPORATION, 40 Cal.Rptr.3D 501 (2006): "[1] Courts 78
106k78 Sources of authority for local judicial rulemaking include express legislative grants of power
to adopt local rules for the judicial management of cases, standards of judicial administration
recommended by the Judicial Council, and the inherent power of courts to control litigation before
them.
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[2] Judgment 183 228k183 [2] Judgment 184 228k184 Local court rule providing for
expedited summary judgment on 60 days notice and no supporting papers in asbestos cases
impermissibly conflicted with statewide statute requiring 75 days notice and supporting evidence for
summary judgment motions; thus, local court rule was invalid. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. 437C. See 6
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Proceedings Without Trial, 192; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice
Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2005) 10:54 et seq (CACIVP Ch. 10-B).
[3] Courts 78 106k78 Trial judges have no authority to issue courtroom local rules that
conflict with any statute or are inconsistent with law.
[4] Appeal and Error 232(.5) 30K232(.5) Plaintiffs in wrongful death asbestos case did not
waive their claim that local court rule providing for expedited summary judgment on 60 days notice
and no supporting papers in asbestos cases conflicted with statewide statute requiring 75 days notice
and supporting evidence for summary judgment motions; plaintiffs's summary judgment brief stated
at the outset that the expedited summary judgment procedure provided by the local court rule violated
the summary judgment statute, and therefore they fully stated the nature and specific grounds for the
challenge." BOYLE et al.,V. CertainTEED CORPORATION, 40 Cal.Rptr.3D 501 (2006).
("A. Introduction [1] There are several sources of authority for local judicial rulemaking.
(Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4Th 953, 966-967, 67 Cal.Rptr.2D 16, 941 P.2D
1203.) Those sources of authority include express legislative grants of power to adopt local rules for
the judicial management of cases, standards of judicial administration recommended by the Judicial
Council, and the inherent power of courts to control litigation before them. (Ibid.) The Judicial
Council has recognized that complex civil litigation requires " 'specialized management to avoid
placing unnecessary burdens on the trial courts or litigants.' " (Id., Citing Cal. Standards Jud. Admin.,
19 (Deering's Cal. Ann.Codes, Rules (Appen.) (1988 Ed.) Pp. 620-621.)) The San Francisco
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Superior Court has designated cases involving death and injury from asbestos exposure as complex
litigation under Judicial Council standards, and has established a procedure for the issuance of
general orders applicable to asbestos cases filed in that court. (Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4Th at pp.
966-967, 67 Cal.Rptr.2D 16, 941 P.2D 1203.) The San Francisco Superior Court's authority to issue
those general orders in asbestos cases is not questioned on this appeal. It is the validity of one of
those general orders that is challenged by plaintiffs. *504 [2][3] Plaintiffs argue that General Order
No. 157, Allowing expedited summary judgment, conflicts with Code of Civil Procedure section
437c. It is well established that, whatever the source of authority for a local judicial rule, " 'trial
judges have no authority to issue courtroom local rules which conflict with any statute' or are
'inconsistent with law.' " (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., Supra, 16 Cal.4Th at p. 967, 67
Cal.Rptr.2D 16, 941 P.2D 1203.) If General Order No. 157 Conflicts with a statewide statute, then it
is an inappropriate exercise of that court's rulemaking powers. (Id.)"
Woerner v. Justice Court of Reno Tp. Ex rel. County of Washoe, 1 P.3D 377, 381 , Nev.;
Courts 106k78. Westlaw Key Number Search: 106K78. C.J.S. Courts 7, 124 to 127.
Trial court exceeds its inherent authority to enforce the court's rules of practice by prohibiting
the state from seeking the death penalty in a first-degree murder prosecution, as a sanction for the
state's failure to timely file a petition for a special pretrial conference, where such an order
impermissibly conflicts with the legislative mandate and with the district attorney's constitutional
obligations. State v. Rorie, 348 N.C. 266, 500 S.E.2D 77 (1998).
A state supreme court has the inherent power to adopt measures essential to due
administration of justice and to exercise general superintending control over inferior courts.
Goldman v. Bryan, 104 Nev. 644, 764 P.2D 1296 (1988). Courts may have some inherent authority
to discipline attorneys. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 115 L. Ed. 2D 27,
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19 Fed. R. Serv. 3D 817 (1991); Morrison v. International Programs Consortium, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
2D 53 (D.D.C. 2003) (Imposing monetary sanctions); Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2D 243 (Utah
1993); Chevron Chemical Co. V. Deloitte & Touche, 176 Wis. 2D 935, 501 N.W.2D 15 (1993).
Correct errors in a record. State v. Old, 271 N.C. 341, 156 S.E.2D 756 (1967). As to correcting or
amending the court's record, generally, see 27. 28. Right to inspect record, generally West's Key
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Courts k 117 Court records are generally open to
inspection by the public.[FN1] Members of the press have no greater right than members of the
general public to inspect public court records.[FN2] The right of access to a judicial document begins
when the document is filed.[FN3] The right to inspect includes the right to make copies from the
record.[FN4] Where the record consists of an audiotape,[FN5] it is open to inspection by the
public.[ FN6] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: In assessing claim for public access to judicial
documents, weight to be given presumption of access must be governed by role of material at issue in
exercise of Article III judicial power and resultant value of such information to those monitoring
federal courts. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. Of Onondaga, 435 F.3D 110 (2d Cir. 2006). [END OF
SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Pantos v. City and County of San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 3D 258, 198 Cal. Rptr. 489
(1St Dist. 1984); Green v. Drinnon, Inc., 262 Ga. 264, 417 S.E.2D 11 (1992); In re John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 Misc. 2D 269, 366 N.Y.S.2D 93 (Sup 1975); In re Robertson, 7 N.C. App.
186, 171 S.E.2D 801 (1970); Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85 Wash. 2D 385, 535 P.2D 801 (1975).
As to public records, generally, see Am. Jur. 2D, Records and Recording Laws. 20 Am. Jur. 2D
Courts 28 [FN2] Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3D 777, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (2D Dist. 1977); C. V.
C., 320 A.2D 717, 84 A.L.R.3D 581 (Del. 1974); Sentinel Communications Co. V. Smith, 493 So. 2D
1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5Th Dist. 1986) (Disapproved of on other grounds by, Barron v. Florida
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Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2D 113 (Fla. 1988)) (Holding, however, that the news media
should be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court orders the sealing of the
record); State ex rel. Bingaman v. Brennan, 98 N.M. 109, 645 P.2D 982 (1982). [FN3] Atlanta
Journal v. Long, 258 Ga. 410, 369 S.E.2D 755 (1988), opinion corrected, 377 S.E.2D 150 (Ga. 1989).
[FN4] Keko v. Lobrano, 497 So. 2D 353 (La. Ct. App. 4Th Cir. 1986), Writ denied, 497 So. 2D 1003
(La. 1986). [FN5] 25. [FN6] Smith v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 261 Va. 113, 540 S.E.2D 878
(2001).
Judge Stiglich absolutely has jurisdiction to correct the errors of Judge Elliott in taking
over these cases from him (such address the provision in the 8/25/13 Order allowing Coughlin to
provide authority in to Department 8 in support of his contention that CR11-2064 is not a closed
cases or presenting of a situation where Judge Stiglich has no jurisdiction any longer): 27.
Correction or amendment; generally West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Courts k
116 to 116(6) A court may, upon its own motion[FN1] or that of an interested party,[FN2]
correct[FN3] or amend[FN4] its record in a civil[FN5] or criminal[FN6] case, where the record
contains an incorrect entry or fails to record a substantial occurrence in the proceeding.[FN7] Factual
determinations made by a court are correctable if the judge who heard the evidence believes that they
are necessary and capable of being made without the grant of a new trial.[FN8] The incorrect rate of
prejudgment or post-judgment interest is a "clerical error" that a court may correct at any time on its
own initiative.[FN9] However, the court may not, under the guise of correcting or amending the
record, change the substance of what is correctly recorded.[FN10] Thus, while the record may be
amended nunc pro tunc,[FN11] the order can only be used to place in the record evidence of judicial
action that had actually been taken and cannot correct an error or supply the record with action that
the court failed to make.[FN12] A court may correct or amend its records at any time after it has
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created the record.[FN13] The court may also amend or correct the record where the case is already
in the appeal or review stage.[FN14] On a motion to correct or amend a court record, the court may
consider any relevant, competent evidence but must exercise great caution where the only evidence
offered on which to base the order is parol evidence or the judge's memory.[FN15] CUMULATIVE
SUPPLEMENT Cases: When there is a conflict between the docket entries and the transcript, the
transcript, unless shown to be in error, takes precedence over the docket entries, and additionally, if
necessary, the docket will be corrected. Caldwell v. State, 164 Md. App. 612, 884 A.2D 199 (2005).
20 Am. Jur. 2D Courts 27 [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Ankner v. Napolitano, 764 A.2D 712
(R.I. 2001); Jefferson v. Com., 269 Va. 136, 607 S.E.2D 107 (2005). [FN2] State v. Cannon, 244 N.C.
399, 94 S.E.2D 339 (1956). [FN3] Ankner v. Napolitano, 764 A.2D 712 (R.I. 2001); Jefferson v.
Com., 269 Va. 136, 607 S.E.2D 107 (2005). [FN4] State v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399, 94 S.E.2D 339
(1956). [FN5] Ankner v. Napolitano, 764 A.2D 712 (R.I. 2001); Bales v. Brome, 56 Wyo. 111, 105
P.2D 568 (1940). [FN6] Teasley v. Com., 188 Va. 376, 49 S.E.2D 604 (1948) (overruled in part on
other grounds by, Council v. Com., 198 Va. 288, 94 S.E.2D 245 (1956)). [FN7] State v. Cannon, 244
N.C. 399, 94 S.E.2D 339 (1956). [FN8] Padilla v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 2D 479 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
[FN9] Ankner v. Napolitano, 764 A.2D 712 (R.I. 2001). [FN10] Interstate Printing Co. V. Department
of Revenue, 236 Neb. 110, 459 N.W.2D 519 (1990); Council v. Com., 198 Va. 288, 94 S.E.2D 245
(1956). [FN11] Interstate Printing Co. V. Department of Revenue, 236 Neb. 110, 459 N.W.2D 519
(1990). [FN12] First Midwest Bank/Danville v. Hoagland, 244 Ill. App. 3D 596, 184 Ill. Dec. 250,
613 N.E.2D 277 (4th Dist. 1993); Harden v. Com., 885 S.W.2D 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994). [FN13]
State v. Old, 271 N.C. 341, 156 S.E.2D 756 (1967). [FN14] 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land
Conservation and Development Com'n, 301 Or. 622, 724 P.2D 805 (1986). [FN15] State v. Cannon,
244 N.C. 399, 94 S.E.2D 339 (1956).
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Also, integral to the analysis of the 4/13/09 Order After Trial in DV08-01168 at issue in
Coughlins wrongful termination lawsuits against WLS in CV11-01896 and CV11-01955, as well as
supportive of the arguments Coughlin made during the 8/19/13 and 8/22/13 status conferences in
cr11-2064 relative to the peculiar use of the term Ruling in Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming
the Ruling of the RMC is the following from CJS (and such is awfully relevant to the analysis of
whether NRS 69.050s prevailing party attorneys fee award in the appeal of a judgment applies to
summary eviction orders):
S 4. Distinguished from rules and orders West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number
Digest, Judgment k 22 Judgments generally are distinguished from rules or orders in that a judgment
is the final determination of the rights of the parties ending the suit whereas a rule or order is an
interlocutory determination of some subsidiary or collateral matter, not disposing of the merits. A
judgment in the most general sense is a judicial act that establishes rights and liabilities to the extent
possible in a particular suit, while orders, opinions, verdicts, and other declarations in a trial court are
the building blocks for a judgment.[1] A judgment is an order, but an order is not necessarily a
judgment.[2] However, certain orders have sometimes been termed judgments,[3] and it has been
held that the character of an instrument, whether a judgment or an order, is to be determined by its
contents and substance, and not by its title.[4] As distinguished from a judgment, an order is the
mandate or determination of the court on some subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action, not
disposing of the merits, but adjudicating a preliminary point or directing some step in the
proceedings;[5] and the term is commonly defined in codes of procedure as every direction of a court
or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment.[6] A judgment, on the other
hand, is the determination of the court on the issue presented by the pleadings which ascertains and
fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in the particular suit with relation to the subject
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matter in litigation, and puts an end to the suit.[7] The distinguishing characteristic of a judgment is
that it is final,[8] while that of an order, when it relates to proceeding in an action, is that it is
interlocutory.[9] A decision sustaining or overruling a demurrer ordinarily is an order, not a
judgment,[10] although there is also some authority to the contrary.[11] An order or rule ordinarily is
not founded on the whole record in the case, but is granted on a special application to the court called
a "motion;" the determination of such motion is an order, not a judgment.[12] A special proceeding
regularly terminates in a final order, not a judgment,[13] although the final order in a special
proceeding is in effect a judgment and is sometimes referred to as such.[14] An order on a motion for
sanctions is not a judgment.[15] It has been held that an order for restitution does not authorize the
entry of civil judgment.[16] It has been held that to equate a judgment in a criminal case with an
order that does not adjudicate guilt is not technically correct.[17] Order for judgment. An order
merely directing or authorizing the entry of judgment in the case does not constitute a judgment; to
have this effect it must be so worded as to express the final sentence of the court on the matters
contained in the record and to end the case at once, without contemplating any further judicial
action.[18] Order for an execution. An order of a judge to the clerk to issue execution for a specific
sum with costs has been held equivalent to a judgment,[19] although there is also authority to the
contrary.[20] "Judgment order." It has been said that the phrase "judgment order" is inherently
contradictory[ 21] and courts should not use the phrase to dispose of a case requiring a
"judgment."[22] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [FN1] Miss.-
Gordon v. Gordon, 929 So. 2D 981 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). [FN2] Fla.-Centennial Ins. Co. V. Life
Bank, 953 So. 2D 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2D Dist. 2006). [FN3] Mont.-State ex rel. Meyer v. District
Court of Fourth Judicial Dist. In and for Missoula County, 102 Mont. 222, 57 P.2D 778 (1936). Ohio-
Continental Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. V. Jacksick, 46 Ohio App. 344, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 203, 188 N.E. 662
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(5Th Dist. Stark County 1933). [FN4] Ark.-White v. Mattingly, 89 Ark. App. 55, 199 S.W.3D 724
(2004). Idaho-State v. McNichols, 62 Idaho 616, 115 P.2D 104 (1941). Or.-In re McLeod's Estate,
143 Or. 233, 21 P.2D 1084 (1933). [FN5] Iowa-Whittier v. Whittier, 237 Iowa 655, 23 N.W.2D 435
(1946). Nev.-Elsman v. Elsman, 54 Nev. 20, 2 P.2D 139 (1931). Tex.-Lindley v. Flores, 672 S.W.2D
612 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1984). [FN6] N.C.-Curry v. First Federal Sav. And Loan Ass'n of
Charlotte, 125 N.C. App. 108, 479 S.E.2D 286 (1997). Okla.-Foreman v. Riley, 1923 OK 2, 88 Okla.
75, 211 P. 495 (1923). S.D.-Western Bldg. Co. V. J.C. Penney Co., 60 S.D. 630, 245 N.W. 909
(1932). Wis.-Newlander v. Riverview Realty Co., 238 Wis. 211, 298 N.W. 603, 135 A.L.R. 383
(1941). [FN7] Mo.-Koch v. Meacham, 233 Mo. App. 453, 121 S.W.2D 279 (1938). Tex.-Lindley v.
Flores, 672 S.W.2D 612 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1984). [FN8] Nev.-Elsman v. Elsman, 54 Nev. 20,
2 P.2D 139 (1931). N.Y.-In re Kennedy's Estate, 156 Misc. 166, 281 N.Y.S. 278 (Sur. Ct. 1935). Final
determination (1) An order which is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action is
the "judgment." Cal.-Passavanti v. Williams, 225 Cal. App. 3D 1602, 275 Cal. Rptr. 887 (4Th Dist.
1990). (2) An order which has effect of finally determining rights of parties, and finally disposing of
case is "judgment." Mont.-State ex rel. Meyer v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist. In and for
Missoula County, 102 Mont. 222, 57 P.2D 778 (1936). As to the distinction between final and
interlocutory judgments, see s 10. [FN9] N.Y.-In re Kennedy's Estate, 156 Misc. 166, 281 N.Y.S. 278
(Sur. Ct. 1935). As to distinction between final judgment and final order, see C.J.S., Motions and
Orders s 2. [FN10] Wyo.-Greenawalt v. Natrona Imp. Co., 16 Wyo. 226, 92 P. 1008 (1907).
Interlocutory judgments on demurrer, see, infra s 10. [FN11] N.Y.-Bentley v. Jones, 4 How. Pr. 335,
1850 WL 5291 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1850). [FN12] Mo.-Pence v. Kansas City Laundry Service Co., 332
Mo. 930, 59 S.W.2D 633 (1933). Okla.-French v. Boles, 1927 OK 429, 128 Okla. 90, 261 P. 196
(1927). [FN13] N.Y.-People ex rel. Rochester, S. & E.R. Co. V. Moroney, 224 N.Y. 114, 120 N.E. 149
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(1918). Wis.-In re Wisconsin Mut. Ins. Co., 241 Wis. 394, 6 N.W.2D 330 (1942). [FN14] N.Y.-In re
Kennedy's Estate, 156 Misc. 166, 281 N.Y.S. 278 (Sur. Ct. 1935). [FN15] Tex.-Jobe v. Lapidus, 874
S.W.2D 764 (Tex. App. Dallas 1994), writ denied, (Sept. 15, 1994). [FN16] Federal court order
Federal court order requiring defendant to make restitution to mail fraud victim pursuant to Victim
and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) could not be sole basis for derivative civil fraud
judgment in favor of victim and against defendant in state court. Minn.-CNA Ins. Companies v.
Caswell-Ross Agency, 497 N.W.2D 633 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). [FN17] Mont.-State ex rel. Torres v.
Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, Cascade County, 265 Mont. 445, 877 P.2D 1008 (1994). [FN18]
Cal.-Bastajian v. Brown, 19 Cal. 2D 209, 120 P.2D 9 (1941). Okla.-Lee v. Epperson, 1934 OK 229,
168 Okla. 220, 32 P.2D 309 (1934). Or.-Grant County Federal Credit Union v. Hatch, 98 Or. App. 1,
777 P.2D 1388 (1989). Purport An order for a judgment is not a judgment, because it does not purport
of itself to determine the rights of the parties. Cal.-Ericson v. Steiner, 119 Cal. App. 305, 6 P.2D 298
(3d Dist. 1931). [FN19] Ga.-Klink v. Steamer Cusseta and Owners, 30 Ga. 504, 1860 WL 2182
(1860). Ill.-Sears v. Sears, 8 Ill. 47, 3 Gilman 47, 1846 WL 3815 (1846). Including A judgment is the
act of the trial court finally adjudicating the rights of the parties including a decision by the court that
a party shall recover a sum certain. Mass.-Karellas v. Karellas, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 766 N.E.2D
102 (2002). [FN20] Colo.-Hoehne v. Trugillo, 1 Colo. 161, 1869 WL 125 (1869). [FN21] Or.-State v.
McDonnell, 306 Or. 579, 761 P.2D 921 (1988). [FN22] Or.-State v. McDonnell, 306 Or. 579, 761
P.2D 921 (1988).
As to rendition in open court see s 19. (There is some issues with Judge Howard's holdign the
11/30/11 trial through the night, concluding at 8:30 pm (overtime pay, so much for budget crisis
"soundbyte"): III. Essentials of Existence, Validity, and Regularity of Judgment A. Introduction 2.
Duly Constituted Court Topic Summary References Correlation Table s 19. Court sitting in
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authorized place at authorized time West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Judgment
k 10 West's Key Number Digest, Judgment k 11 It has been held to be essential to the validity of a
judgment that it be rendered by a court sitting at the time and also in the place authorized by law;
however, there is some authority to the contrary. According to some authorities, it is essential to the
validity of a judgment that it be rendered by a court sitting in the place[1] and also at the time[2]
authorized by law, the tribunal not being otherwise a court in any legal sense,[3] and the proceedings
being, therefore, coram non judice.[4] However, this is not the universal view. Thus, it has been held
that the mere fact that the court was held at a place other than that directed by law will not of itself
render the judgment void,[5] as where the court errs with respect to the location of the county seat.[6]
It has also been held that the fact that a term of court at which a judgment was rendered was held at a
time other than that prescribed or authorized by law, while rendering the judgment erroneous and
constituting ground for its reversal, does not render the judgment void;[7] however, there is contrary
authority on this specific point, holding a judgment rendered under such circumstances to be void.[8]
Signature and entry. In cases in which the trial judge signs a judgment but fails to authorize its entry
before vacating his or her office, it would not be within the authority of the clerk to authorize the
entry of the judgment, and the judgment would be void.[ 9] A revised judgment is void where it is
signed after the trial court loses its plenary power following the filing of a notice of appeal.[10]
Judgments rendered in chambers. Judgments should be rendered in open court and not in
chambers,[11] and it has been held that judgments rendered in chambers are void,[12] in the absence
of statutory or constitutional provisions authorizing such action at chambers.[13] However, whether a
judgment was signed at chambers or in open court is immaterial, since the signing of a judgment
involves no judicial consideration.[14] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----- [FN1] Ala.-Polytinsky v. Johnston, 211 Ala. 99, 99 So. 839 (1924). Okla.-City of Clinton ex rel.
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Richardson v. Keen, 1943 OK 165, 192 Okla. 382, 138 P.2D 104 (1943). Tex.-British General Ins.
Co. V. Ripy, 130 Tex. 101, 106 S.W.2D 1047 (Comm'n App. 1937). [FN2] Ala.-Polytinsky v.
Johnston, 211 Ala. 99, 99 So. 839 (1924). Ark.-Magnolia Petroleum Co. V. Saunders, 192 Ark. 783,
94 S.W.2D 703 (1936). Ga.-Hicks v. Hicks, 69 Ga. App. 870, 27 S.E.2D 10 (1943). Tex.-British
General Ins. Co. V. Ripy, 130 Tex. 101, 106 S.W.2D 1047 (Comm'n App. 1937). Validity of judgment
on holiday, see C.J.S., Holidays s 10. Validity of judgment on Sunday, see C.J.S., Sunday s 79. [FN3]
Ariz.-Meade v. Scribner, 10 Ariz. 33, 85 P. 729 (1906). [FN4] Ga.-Hicks v. Hicks, 69 Ga. App. 870,
27 S.E.2D 10 (1943). [FN5] Minn.-Ellis v. Ellis, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N.W. 1056 (1893). Improper
county A judgment is not invalidated if tried in an improper county unless there is something in
statute to indicate its requirements are jurisdictional. Ark.-Mark Twain Life Ins. Corp. V. Cory, 283
Ark. 55, 670 S.W.2D 809 (1984). [FN6] Ill.-Robinson v. Moore, 25 Ill. 135, 1860 WL 6520 (1860).
[FN7] S.D.-Lockard v. Lockard, 21 S.D. 134, 110 N.W. 104 (1907). [FN8] Ala.-State v. Thurman, 17
Ala. App. 656, 88 So. 61 (1921). [FN9] Ala.-Rollins v. Rollins, 903 So. 2D 828 (Ala. Civ. App.
2004). [FN10] Tex.-United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Croft, 175 S.W.3D 457 (Tex. App. Dallas 2005).
[FN11] Tex.-Bridgman v. Moore, 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W.2D 705 (1944). [FN12] Colo.-Scott v.
Stutheit, 21 Colo. App. 28, 121 P. 151 (1912). Neb.-Shold v. Van Treeck, 82 Neb. 99, 117 N.W. 113
(1908). [FN13] Wash.-Williams v. Briley, 137 Wash. 262, 242 P. 370 (1926). [FN14] Idaho-Baldwin
v. Anderson, 52 Idaho 243, 13 P.2D 650 (1932).
As such, the ROA in both 1262 and 2064 failed to demonstrate that Coughlin was personally
served such 11/30/11 and 6/18/12 Judgment of Conviction and Court Order in 2064 and 1262
respectively, so NRCP 6(e)s three days for mailing for constructive service must be added on to all
deadlines, including those under NRS 176.515 and NRS 189.010. The trial court's oral
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pronouncement must clearly indicate the intent to render judgment at the time the words are
expressed. In re A.B., 125 S.W.3D 769 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2003), review denied, (Mar. 19, 2004).
As to rendition and entry of judgment generally, see ss 136 to 154. Also, it has been stated that
a written judgment must agree with the written record of the rendition.Tex.-Burgess v. Burgess, 834
S.W.2D 538 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1992). Order or memoranda for judgment. It must appear
that that which is offered as the record of a judgment is really such, and not an order for a judgment
or mere memoranda from which the judgment is to be drawn. Utah-Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73 Utah
563, 276 P. 159 (1929). Order in memorandum as judgment Although there was no formal judgment
in sense of docketed separate piece of paper, order for judgment in judge's memorandum met test for
judgment and disposed of all claims in case. Mass.-Computer Systems of America, Inc. V. Western
Reserve Life Assur. Co. Of Ohio, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 475 N.E.2D 745 (1985).
Coughlin touches on the import of the term rendition in NRS 189.010 at page 253 of the
12/23/11 ROA in 2064. However, Judge Elliots 3/15/12 Order in 2064 8/27/12 Order in 1262
remixes NRS 189.010 to involved entry of order rather than rendition and Coughlin is entitled to
rely upon such. It does not appear there is any law in Nevada as to just what the term rendition
meanshowever, both Judge Howard on 11/30/11 and Judge Sferrazza (even though rendition is
not used at all in any of the statute relevant to a summary evictionJudge Sferrazza, in dictum at the
12/20/11 hearing purported his order evicting Coughlin to be entered in open court verbally on
10/25/11) on 10/25/11 both indicated their judgments were not being rendered at such time, but
Judge Howard referenced such would take effect upon Coughlins release from the three days
summary incarceration (ie, the NRS 189.010 and NRS 176.515 deadlines would run therefromand
Sferrazza indicated the eviction would be effective on 10/31/11 at 5 pmthe fact that neither were
entered as such time as the were orally pronounced means they had to be served in the mail, and
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that entails and NRCP 6(e) analysis relative to the the various deadlines attendant thereto. II.
Rendition 59. Manner of pronouncement Federal Civil Procedure 2621
A. Rendition Topic Summary References Correlation Table s 136. Generally West's Key
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Judgment k 191 West's Key Number Digest, Judgment k
192 The rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law
on the facts in controversy as ascertained by the pleadings and verdict or findings, as distinguished
from the ministerial act of entering the judgment. The rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the
court[1] in pronouncing the sentence of the law on the facts in controversy as ascertained by the
pleadings and verdict or findings,[2] as distinguished from the official entry of the judgment.[3]
"Rendition" of judgment is the act by which the court declares the decision of the law upon the
matters at issue[4] and it is the substance and effect of an adjudication that is determinative of
whether it is a judgment, not the form of the decree.[5] On its rendition, and without entry, a
judgment is final, valid, and enforceable as between the parties[6] in the absence of a statute to the
contrary.[7] Under some authority, the court's practice does not favor the termination of proceedings
without a determination of the merits of the controversy where that can be brought about with due
regard to necessary rules of procedure.[8] Accordingly, the law does not favor the termination of
proceedings without a determination of the merits of the controversy when that can be brought about
with due regard to necessary rules of procedure, and for that reason, the trial court should make every
effort to adjudicate the substantive controversy before it and, when practicable, should decide a
procedural issue so as not to preclude hearing the merits of an appeal.[9] ----------------------------------
---------------------------------------------- [FN1] Ala.-Smith v. Jackson, 770 So. 2D 1068 (Ala. 2000).
Cal.-People v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co., 83 Cal. App. 4Th 1289, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2D 433 (3d Dist.
2000). Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994). Mo.-Cozart v. Mazda Distributors
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(Gulf), Inc., 861 S.W.2D 347 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1993). Neb.-National Account Systems of Omaha,
Inc. V. McIntyre, 2 Neb. App. 884, 518 N.W.2D 158 (1994). Okla.-Peoples Elec. Co-op. V.
Broughton, 1942 OK 233, 191 Okla. 229, 127 P.2D 850 (1942). [FN2] Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md.
699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994). Neb.-National Account Systems of Omaha, Inc. V. McIntyre, 2 Neb. App.
884, 518 N.W.2D 158 (1994). Okla.-Presbyterian Hosp., Inc. V. Board of Tax-Roll Corrections of
Oklahoma County, 1984 OK 93, 693 P.2D 611 (Okla. 1984). Tenn.-Christopher v. Spooner, 640
S.W.2D 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). Tex.-Arriaga v. Cavazos, 880 S.W.2D 830 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 1994). W.Va.-Echard v. City of Parkersburg, 187 W. Va. 350, 419 S.E.2D 14 (1992).
Decision or findings by court, generally, see C.J.S., Trial ss 602 to 606, 609 to 612. Verdict or
findings by jury, generally, see C.J.S., Trial s 485. [FN3] Ariz.-American Sur. Co. Of N.Y. V. Mosher,
48 Ariz. 552, 64 P.2D 1025 (1936). Mo.-In re Marriage of Huey, 716 S.W.2D 479 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D.
1986). Tenn.-Christopher v. Spooner, 640 S.W.2D 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). Tex.-Bakali v. Bakali,
830 S.W.2D 251 (Tex. App. Dallas 1992). W.Va.-Echard v. City of Parkersburg, 187 W. Va. 350, 419
S.E.2D 14 (1992). As to entry, generally, see s 143. [FN4] Tex.-Stallworth v. Stallworth, 201 S.W.3D
338 (Tex. App. Dallas 2006). Va.-Jefferson v. Com., 269 Va. 136, 607 S.E.2D 107 (2005). [FN5] Cal.-
Otay River Constructors v. San Diego Expressway, 158 Cal. App. 4Th 796, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3D 434 (4th
Dist. 2008). [FN6] Ala.-Du Pree v. Hart, 242 Ala. 690, 8 So. 2D 183 (1942). Cal.-Bank One Texas v.
Pollack, 24 Cal. App. 4Th 973, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2D 510 (2d Dist. 1994). Ill.-Wickiser v. Powers, 324 Ill.
App. 130, 57 N.E.2D 522 (3d Dist. 1944). Neb.-Pontiac Imp. Co. V. Leisy, 144 Neb. 705, 14 N.W.2D
384 (1944). As to execution before entry see C.J.S., Executions s 13. As to necessity of entry, see s
144. [FN7] Ark.-McConnell v. Bourland, 175 Ark. 253, 299 S.W. 44 (1927). Del.-Hazzard v.
Alexander, 36 Del. 512, 178 A. 873 (Super. Ct. 1935). Or.-Haberly v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Relief Ass'n,
135 Or. 32, 287 P. 222 (1930). [FN8] Conn.-Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 848 A.2D 352 (2004);
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Pietraroia v. Northeast Utilities, 254 Conn. 60, 756 A.2D 845 (2000). [FN9] Conn.-Fedus v. Planning
and Zoning Com'n, 278 Conn. 751, 900 A.2D 1 (2006); Olympia Mortg. Corp. V. Klein, 61 Conn.
App. 305, 763 A.2D 1055 (2001).
VII. Rendition, Entry, Record, and Docketing A. Rendition Topic Summary References
Correlation Table s 138. Mode and sufficiency; necessity of notice West's Key Number Digest West's
Key Number Digest, Judgment k 215 Whether a judgment has been rendered in a particular case is
an inquiry that must be made on a case-by-case basis and which focuses upon the actions and
statements of the court and judgments should be tailored to meet the needs of each case. Statutory
provisions with respect to the mode and sufficiency of rendering judgment are controlling.[1] Where
there are no formal requirements regarding the rendition of a judgment,[2] the question of whether a
judgment has been rendered in a particular case is an inquiry that must be made on a case-by-case
basis.[3] In general, the rendition of judgment occurs when the court pronounces judgment in
intelligible language[4] which fully determines the rights of the parties.[5] An announcement, merely
intended to acquaint the parties with the judgment which may be entered in case particular evidence
appears, does not amount to the rendition of a judgment.[6] Although under some authority, the mere
oral pronouncement of judgment without an entry on the trial docket is not a rendition of
judgment.[7] Generally, a judgment is rendered and exists as such when it is orally announced from
the bench, and before it has been reduced to writing and entered by the clerk.[8] Such an
announcement must declare a present intent to render rather than an intent to render in the future.[9]
Under other authority, what a judge orally declares is not a judgment until it has been put in writing
and entered as such.[10] The custom of drawing a formal judgment and having the judge sign it is
usually observed,[11] particularly where it contains special provisions requiring settlement by the
court unless agreed on by the parties.[12] The subsequent issuance of a formal written order does not
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preclude a finding that judgment was actually orally rendered on an earlier date.[ 13] However, the
mere act of signing a judgment does not constitute a rendition of judgment.[14] In the absence of a
rule requiring a judgment to be embodied in a separate document, when it is clear that a competent
tribunal intended a minute entry or a docket sheet entry to be a determination of the rights of the
parties to an action and shows in intelligible language the relief granted, the minute or docket entry
may be considered the judgment.[15] Accordingly, while judgment may be rendered by a docket
entry,[16] the docket entry of summary judgment does not constitute rendition of judgment.[17]
However, a trial docket entry alone, unaccompanied by an oral pronouncement in open court, does
not amount to a rendition of judgment.[ 18] Thus, "announcement" of a decision or final order of the
trial court can come, inter alia, orally from the bench, from trial docket notes, from file-stamped but
unsigned journal entries, or from signed but not file-stamped journal entries.[19] Settlement on notice
is not required unless specially directed.[20] The return and recording of a general verdict under the
direction of the court are generally a sufficient rendition of judgment; no further action on the part of
the court is necessary,[21] and it is the ministerial duty of the clerk to enter the proper judgment on
the verdict.[22] Where a special verdict or special findings are returned, the announcement of the
decision in open court and its entry in the minutes constitute the rendition of the judgment.[23] Letter
to counsel. While a letter to counsel may be considered rendition of judgment[24] if it is in sufficient
detail to state the court's decision on all matters at issue and is filed with the clerk,[25] a letter is not a
rendition of judgment if it only indicates the court's intention to render judgment in a certain way and
sets out guidelines by which counsel are to draw a judgment.[26] Notice of rendition. Notice of
rendition of judgment is unnecessary[27] except where required by statute.[28] The purpose of notice
required by a statute before rendition of judgment, in a case wherein judgment is not rendered at the
hearing, but taken under advisement, is to give an opportunity to attorneys to make objections and
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exceptions to the decision.[29] The notice must be given by the court[30] which has authority to
direct the manner of service consistent with existing rules.[31] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases: Notices of judgment required by rule of civil procedure to be served by court clerk are
mandatory, and are indispensable to the right of parties to receive timely information from state trial
courts concerning significant judicial actions in civil matters in litigation. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
77(d). In re Dunn, 84 So. 3D 4 (Miss. 2010). Judgment is "rendered" as of the date on which the trial
judge declares in open court his decision on matters submitted to him for adjudication; an oral
pronouncement by the court of its decision is sufficient for rendition of judgment. Westwood Shores
Country Club v. Hendrickson, 395 S.W.3D 298 (Tex. App. Tyler 2013), reh'g overruled, (Feb. 21,
2013). The rendition of judgment and the signing of a written judgment are not synonymous. Greene
v. State, 324 S.W.3D 276 (Tex. App. Austin 2010), reh'g overruled, (Oct. 15, 2010). [END OF
SUPPLEMENT] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [FN1] N.C.-
Draughon v. Harnett County Bd. Of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 580 S.E.2D 732, 177 Ed. Law Rep.
608 (2003), Aff'd, 358 N.C. 131, 358 N.C. 381, 591 S.E.2D 521 (2004). Okla.-Miller v. Miller, 1983
OK 64, 664 P.2D 1032 (Okla. 1983). Effect of rule Aside from its definition in rules, rendition of
judgment generally refers to judicial act of court in giving, returning, pronouncing, or announcing,
orally or in writing, its conclusions and decision on matter submitted to it for adjudication, and is
distinct from signing of subsequent formal judgment and from later recording or filing of writing or
entry of judgment in minutes of court. Fla.-Gaines v. Sayne, 764 So. 2D 578 (Fla. 2000). [FN2] Md.-
Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994). [FN3] Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646
A.2D 365 (1994). [FN4] Mo.-Grantham v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 721 S.W.2D 242 (Mo. Ct. App.
W.D. 1986). [FN5] Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994). Mo.-In re Marriage of
Huey, 716 S.W.2D 479 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1986). [FN6] Mo.-Serfass v. Warner, 707 S.W.2D 448
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(Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1986). [FN7] Neb.-State v. McPherson, 1 Neb. App. 1022, 510 N.W.2D 487
(1993). Nev.-Division of Child and Family Services, Dept. Of Human Resources, State of Nevada v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 120 Nev. 445, 92 P.3D 1239 (2004). [FN8] Ariz.-
Griffith v. State Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 46 Ariz. 359, 51 P.2D 246 (1935). Ill.-In re Marriage of
Gurin, 212 Ill. App. 3D 806, 156 Ill. Dec. 877, 571 N.E.2D 857 (1st Dist. 1991). Ind.-Bailer v. Dowd,
219 Ind. 624, 40 N.E.2D 325 (1942). Iowa-Street v. Stewart, 226 Iowa 960, 285 N.W. 204 (1939).
Kan.-Gates v. Gates, 160 Kan. 428, 163 P.2D 395 (1945). Md.-Jones v. Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 740
A.2D 1004 (1999). Neb.-Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, Inc., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2D 764 (2000).
Okla.-Miller v. Miller, 1983 OK 64, 664 P.2D 1032 (Okla. 1983). Tex.-Garza v. Texas Alcoholic
Beverage Com'n, 89 S.W.3D 1 (Tex. 2002). Wis.-Zbikowski v. Straz, 236 Wis. 161, 294 N.W. 541
(1940). As to necessity of writing, generally, see s 106. [FN9] Tex.-Garza v. Texas Alcoholic
Beverage Com'n, 83 S.W.3D 161 (Tex. App. El Paso 2000), judgment aff'd, 89 S.W.3D 1 (Tex. 2002);
Brim Laundry Machinery Co., Inc. V. Washex Machinery Corp., 854 S.W.2D 297 (Tex. App. Fort
Worth 1993), writ denied, (Nov. 17, 1993). Special care where rendered orally Md.-Davis v. Davis,
335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994). [FN10] Ga.-Huffman v. Armenia, 284 Ga. App. 822, 645 S.E.2D
23 (2007), cert. Denied, (July 12, 2007). Ga.-In the Interest of L.H., 242 Ga.App. 659, 660, 530
S.E.2D 753 (2000). As to necessity that judgment be in writing, see s 106. [FN11] Ark.-McConnell v.
Bourland, 175 Ark. 253, 299 S.W. 44 (1927). As to signature by judge, see s 129. [FN12] Ark.-
McConnell v. Bourland, 175 Ark. 253, 299 S.W. 44 (1927). As to settlement of orders, generally, see
C.J.S., Motions and Orders s 56. [FN13] Md.-Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2D 365 (1994).
[FN14] Tex.-Stephens v. Henry S. Miller Co., 667 S.W.2D 250 (Tex. App. Dallas 1984), writ
dismissed by agreement, (July 11, 1984). As to signing of judgments, see s 129. [FN15] Mo.-Cozart
v. Mazda Distributors (Gulf), Inc., 861 S.W.2D 347 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1993). [FN16] Mo.-
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Weinbaum v. Weinbaum, 679 S.W.2D 384 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1984). [FN17] Tex.-Harper v.
Welchem, Inc., 799 S.W.2D 492 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1990). [FN18] Neb.-Hornig v. Martel
Lift Systems, Inc., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2D 764 (2000). Tex.-Bailey-Mason v. Mason, 122 S.W.3D
894 (Tex. App. Dallas 2003). [FN19] Neb.-Rosen Auto Leasing, Inc. V. Jordan, 15 Neb. App. 1, 720
N.W.2D 911 (2006). [FN20] Colo.-Graybill v. Cornelius, 79 Colo. 498, 246 P. 1029 (1926). As to
notice of entry see s 148. [FN21] Or.-Haberly v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Relief Ass'n, 135 Or. 32, 287 P.
222 (1930). Tex.-Bridgman v. Moore, 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W.2D 705 (1944). Wyo.-State v. Scott, 35
Wyo. 108, 247 P. 699 (1926). [FN22] As to ministerial duty of the clerk to enter judgment see s 145.
[FN23] Cal.-Benway v. Benway, 69 Cal. App. 2D 574, 159 P.2D 682 (3d Dist. 1945). [FN24] Tex.-
Estes v. Carlton, 708 S.W.2D 594 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1986), writ refused n.R.E., (Oct. 1, 1986).
[FN25] Tex.-Mixon v. Moye, 860 S.W.2D 209 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1993). [FN26] Tex.-Mixon v.
Moye, 860 S.W.2D 209 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1993). [FN27] Mo.-McCormick v. Stephens, 141 Mo.
App. 236, 124 S.W. 1076 (1910). [FN28] N.M.-R. V. Smith Supply Co. V. Black, 43 N.M. 177, 88
P.2D 269 (1939) . [FN29] N.M.-R. V. Smith Supply Co. V. Black, 43 N.M. 177, 88 P.2D 269 (1939) .
[FN30] N.M.-R. V. Smith Supply Co. V. Black, 43 N.M. 177, 88 P.2D 269 (1939) . [FN31] N.M.-R.
V. Smith Supply Co. V. Black, 43 N.M. 177, 88 P.2D 269 (1939)
Judgment 191, 215 A rendition of judgment can occur in more than one manner.[1] In some
jurisdictions, rendition of judgment is the court's pronouncement by spoken word in open court or by
written order filed with the clerk of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication.[2 ] It
is also said that rendition of judgment occurs when the court makes an oral pronouncement in open
court and accompanies that pronouncement with a notation on the trial docket or, in the alternative,
when some written notation of the judgment is filed in the records of the court.[3] Accordingly, in
some jurisdictions an oral manifestation of the decision is regarded as sufficient for a judgment at law
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to become operative.[4] For the trial court to effectively render judgment in open court, it must do so
in spoken word, not in mere cognition,[5] and the trial court's oral pronouncement must clearly
indicate the intent to render judgment at the time the words are expressed. [6] Where oral rendition of
a judgment is proper, if the trial court signs a judgment on an issue without first making an oral
pronouncement in open court, the act of signing the judgment is the official act of rendering
judgment.[7] When a trial court orally renders a judgment that disposes of some of the issues in a
party's pleading, but is silent on others, a later signed judgment that disposes of an additional issue,
while only a "written memorandum" of the oral judgment, is a rendition of judgment on the issue
addressed for the first time in the written judgment.[8] Caution: An announcement of judgment in
open court merely constitutes a rendering of the judgment, not an entry of judgment.[9] 46 Am. Jur.
2D Judgments 59 In other jurisdictions, however, mere oral pronouncement by the court of its
decision is not the rendition of a judgment,[10] and it has been said that a trial court's oral
pronouncement is not a judgment until it is put in writing and entered as the judgment,[11] that a
judge does not render the judgment until he or she signs a written notation of the relief granted or
denied,[12] and that a judgment is not rendered until it is signed.[13] Among the reasons stated for
not recognizing an oral pronouncement by the court as the rendition of judgment are that: (1) there is
no practical manner in which to execute an oral judgment; (2) an oral judgment cannot be filed in the
court of another county or state; and (3) there is no mechanism by which an oral judgment can
become a lien on the property of the judgment debtor.[14] Observation: Prior to the entry of a final
judgment, a court remains free to reconsider and issue a written judgment different from its oral
pronouncement.[15] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: The mere oral announcement of a
judgment without an entry on the trial docket is not the rendition of a judgment, for the purposes of
appeal; for a final judgment to exist, there must be an order that is both signed by the court and filed
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stamped and dated by the clerk of the court. Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. Of Health and Human
Services, 277 Neb. 456, 763 N.W.2D 77 (2009). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Hornig v. Martel
Lift Systems, Inc., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2D 764 (2000). [FN2] Jones v. Hubbard, 356 Md. 513,
740 A.2D 1004 (1999); Barton v. Gillespie, 2005 WL 1540156 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2005).
[FN3] Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, Inc., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2D 764 (2000). Although a
judgment is rendered and exists as such when it is orally announced from the bench, and before it has
been reduced to writing and entered by the clerk, as a general rule a judgment must be reduced to
writing. Bauman v. Maple Valley Community School Dist., 649 N.W.2D 9 (Iowa 2002). [FN4] U.S.
V. Hunt, 513 F.2D 129 (10th Cir. 1975); Gordon v. Gordon, 390 S.W.2D 583 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965);
Wittau v. Storie, 145 S.W.3D 732 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004). [FN5] James v. Hubbard, 21 S.W.3D
558 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2000). [FN6] In re A.B., 125 S.W.3D 769 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2003),
review denied, (Mar. 19, 2004). [FN7] Wittau v. Storie, 145 S.W.3D 732 (Tex. App. Fort Worth
2004). [FN8] Wittau v. Storie, 145 S.W.3D 732 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004). [FN9] Santana v.
Santana, 614 S.E.2D 438 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). As to entry of judgment distinguished, see 60.
[FN10] Rust v. Clark County School Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 747 P.2D 1380, 44 Ed. Law Rep. 736
(1987); Montano v. Encinias, 103 N.M. 515, 709 P.2D 1024 (1985); Sparkle Laundry & Cleaners,
Inc. V. Kelton, 595 S.W.2D 88, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). [FN11] Stoker v.
Bellemeade, LLC, 272 Ga. App. 817, 615 S.E.2D 1 (2005), cert. Denied, (Sept. 19, 2005). [FN12]
Mumin v. Hart, 9 Neb. App. 404, 612 N.W.2D 261 (2000). [FN13] State ex rel. A.S.K., 775 So. 2D
1101 (La. Ct. App. 4Th Cir. 2000). [FN14] McAteer v. Stewart, 696 P.2D 72 (Wyo. 1985). As to
judgment liens, see 342 to 384. [FN15] Rust v. Clark County School Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 747
P.2D 1380, 44 Ed. Law Rep. 736 (1987). AMJUR JUDGMENTS 59
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A court's inherent power extends to all matters reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, subject to or not in conflict with valid existing laws and
constitutional provisions. Veilleux v. State, 635 So. 2D 977 (Fla. 1994). A court's inherent powers do
not increase its jurisdiction; rather, they include only those powers that are necessary to the court's
existence and to the effective and orderly exercise of its jurisdiction. State v. Rorie, 348 N.C. 266,
500 S.E.2D 77 (1998). Courts invested with the judicial power of the United States have certain
inherent authority to protect the courts' proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging the
courts' traditional responsibilities, although: (1) in many instances the inherent powers of the courts
may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule, (2) principles of deference counsel restraint in
resorting to inherent power and require its use to be a reasonable response to the problems and needs
that provoke it, and (3) a court's inherent power is limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise.
Degen v. U.S., 517 U.S. 820, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 135 L. Ed. 2D 102 (1996).
Additionally, the 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC is void and or should be
vacated in cr11-2064: Late filing: Late filing of transcript of record of original proceedings against
defendant by justice's court on defendant's appeal of conviction to the district court did not
warrant dismissal of underlying criminal charges against defendant. State v. O'Donnell, 1982, 646
P.2D 1217, 98 Nev. 305. Criminal Law 260.7
Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064 purporting to deny Coughlins appeal based upon the
alleged failure of Coughlin to provide a transcript is violative of ODonnell.
Additionally, at page 16 of the 12/23/11 roa in cr11-2064 is proof that the RMC and RCA
serve upon each other documents via email, making further impermissible the RMCs failure to
comply with NRS 189.030(1), even should one not view the written permission to file by email
provided to Coughlin by RMC Ballard as not effective (or effective only until the RMC served an
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order upon Coughlin revoking such permission to file via email, and there exists no such revocation
until, perhaps, the Administrative Order 2013-01 made in his Administrative Judge capacity by RMC
Judge Gardner on 1/16/13and Judge Howards 12/16/11 Order fails to operate as any such
revocation, and even if it did, the signature thereon fails to indicate such is done in any
Administrative Judge capacity sufficient to make it applicable to all of Coughlins cases in the RMC.
Additionally, Judge Howards 12/22/11 Appeal Bond Order, in seeking to recharacterize the
$360.00 cash bail by Coughlin that Howard had already converted to a fine on 11/30/11, effectively
granted Coughlin IFP statuts (even further requiring transmission of the transcript within 10 days of
the 12/12/11 Notice of Appeal under NRS 189.030(1)) where the bond set at $360 was never required
of Coughlin: http://www.scribd.com/doc/171738850/12-22-11-Appeal-Bond-Order-by-RMC-Judge-
Howard-Declaring-Coughlin-Indigent-Further-Requiring-Transmission-of-Transcript-Per-NRS-189-
030-1-22176-2064
Such 12/22/11 order at page 7 of the 12/23/11 ROA in cr11-2064 reads: "APPEAL BOND
ORDER Pursuant to NRS 177.105, 177.115,178.488, And 178.498, This Court orders at Bail or Bond
on Appeal is: (X) GRANTED and set in the amount of $ 360.00 , With the condition that II I e
Defendant: DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011 /s/ Kenneth R. Howard, Judge Department
Four"
Judge Howard denied all stays requested by Coughlin, including those Coughlin made
verbally during the portion of the proceeding held in absentia of the City Atttorney at 8:30 pm on
11/30/11 in the matter at issue in cr11-2064. He is not able to recharacterize such rulings on 11/30/11
in his 12/22/11 Appeal Bond Order, and the transmission of Coughlins appeal where Coughlin paid
no such further $360.00 bond on appeal operates as an order finding Coughlin indigent.
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NRS 177.105 Stay of execution upon sentence of imprisonment. NRS
177.115 Stay of execution upon fine.
NRS 177.105 Stay of execution upon sentence of imprisonment. A sentence of
imprisonment shall be stayed if an appeal is taken and the defendant is admitted to
bail. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
NRS 177.115 Stay of execution upon fine. A sentence to pay a fine or a fine and costs,
if an appeal is taken, may be stayed by a Justice Court, district court, or by the Supreme Court
upon such terms as the court deems proper. The court may require the defendant pending
appeal to deposit the whole or any part of the fine and costs in the registry of the court
appealed from, or to give bond for the payment thereof, or to submit to an examination of
assets, and it may make any appropriate order to restrain the defendant from dissipating the
defendants assets. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
There certainly seems to be widespread confusion over just what rules and statutes
apply to criminal appeals to the district courtand Judge Elliott certainly exhibited a great
deal of jurisdictional largesse in his various ordersespecially that of 3/15/12 affiriming in
2064especially where NRS 189.030(1) directly conflicts with the application of NRAP 28 and
32 to an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court that Judge Elliott relied on in citing to Thomas v.
States footnote 4 as a basis for denying Coughlins appeal.
Further, this court still has jurisdiction where there is not corollary applicable to the
district courts to NRS 177.305 Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to cease after certificate of
judgment remitted. See Palmer v. Del Webbs High Sierra, 108 Nev. 673, 680 (1992) (Young, J.,
Concurring) (explaining that [t]he legislature could have easily provided that an occupational
disease means, is or is defined as any disease which arises out of and in the course of the
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employment, but that the legislature did not, in fact, do so). Likewise, the legislature could have
easily included district courts jurisdiction within that NRS 177.305 requires to cease upon remand to
a justice or municipal court, but failed to do so, arguably, in light of the higher degree of many of the
very peculiarities Coughlin has reference herein occurring in such courts.
See, e.G., County of Clark ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. V. Upchurch, 114 Nev. 749, 753 (1998)
(Citing Cleghorn v. Hess, 109 Nev. 544, 548 (1993)). See also Willis v. State, 488 A.2D 171, 177
(Md. 1985) ([T]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine the legislative
intent.). See, e.G., State v. Allen, 118 Nev. 842, 847 (2002) (Citing Washington v. State, 117 Nev.
735, 738-39 (2001)) (Explaining that the plain meaning of a statute is intended to reflect
legislative intent). See also Monterey Coal Co. V. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Commn,
743 F.2D 589, 595 (7th Cir. 1984) ([T]he language of the statute is the most reliable indicator of
congressional intent.).
N.R.S. 178.602 Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the court. Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order
Affirming in CR11-2064 and 8/27/12 Order Dismissing Appeal in cr12-1262 are reveal plain
error where the requirement that a transcript be transmitted, regardless of any down payment
for such being paid (particularly for an indigent criminal defendant like Coughlin) is
mandatory under NRS 189.030(1), as was the appointment of counsel, which was denied, and
where the 6/26/12 tolling Motion for New Trial was clearly not considered by Judge Elliott in
his Order, especially where the timeliness of Coughlins Motion for New Trial was law of the
case considering RMC Judge W. Gardners 7/11/12 Order deny Coughlins motion failing to
find such untimely, in addition to where Coughlin absolutely entitle to rely upon Judge Elliotts
characterization of NRCP 6 as applying to post-conviction filings in the computation of time,
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meaning Coughlins Motion for New Trial would have been due on 6/28/12, which, incidentally,
is the day Coughlin filed by facsimile that which the RMC only file stamped as filed on 7/25/12
(which is arguably a supplemental to his 6/26/12 Motion for New Trial at page 229 (Notice of
Appeal; Motion to vacate and or Set Aside. JCRCP 59. JCRCP 60; Motion for Reconsideration:
Motion for Recusal: Motion For Publication Of Transcript at Public Expense Petition (or In
Forma Pauperis Status) of the 7/26/12 ROA in CR12-1262 (Coughlins 8/15/12 and 8/27/12
filings in CR12-1262 produced the fax confirmation proof that the RMC received such on
6/28/12, and regardless of whether the RMC chose to place a file stamp on such, NRS
189.030(1) requires all related papers be transmitted in the ROA, where Whitman, Donoho,
Gray, Barnes, and Sullivan clearly place a duty on RMC Clerks to, at the very least, maintain
a record of such submission (shades of the 7/22/13 WDCR 18 violation by 2JDC Asst. Clerk of
Court Wise and Unit Manager Michelle Purdy at to the extraordinary writ Coughlin
submitted, which he still has not received the copy of that Judge Stiglich agreed to provide him
upon Coughlin indicating that he would prefer not to take back possession of such submission
in response to Judge Stiglichs attempting to return such to him unfiled, and, apparently,
undocumented, as well as the cd/dvd disc attached thereto and all the materials thereon.
Coughlin hereby requests the district court order the RMC to transmit all related
papers to it, filing such so they will be available to Coughlin, including those materials
Coughlin filed via email per Ballards written permission to, and ESPECIALLY important, to
please require the RMC to transmit the COMPLETE 10/27/11 Application for Appointment Defender
(IFP) that Coughlin filed with the RMC, as at page 20 of the 12/23/11 ROA, only a partial (pages
missing) reproduction thereof is included (which is telling considering the 2008 Indigent Defense
Order made mandatory appointing Coughlin counsel, and the 2008 Court of Limited Jurisdiction
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Bench Book references Aigersinger specifically as to the mandatory appointment where the mere
possibility of jail time is involved, and Howards own 10/27/11 Order denying Appointment of Legal
Defender fails to rule there was no possibility of incarceration.
Determination of indigency of accused entitling him to transcript or similar record for
purposes of appeal. 66 A.L.R.3d 954 (Originally published in 1975)
3 Determination of "indigence" as a discretionary matter
4 "Indigence" as a relative term
5 Rule that "indigence" does not require complete destitution
6 Rule that burden is on defendant to show his indigence
III Relevance of particular factors
7[a] Possibility of aid from others; friends or relatives-View that possibility of such
aid is not determinative of "indigence"
7[b] Possibility of aid from others; friends or relatives-View that possibility of such
aid precludes finding of "indigence"
8 Private charitable agencies or groups
9[a] Accused's status as regularly employed-As insufficient to negate indigence
9[b] Accused's status as regularly employed-As suggesting nonindigence
10[a] Earning power of accused-Potential
10[b] Earning power of accused-Present earnings
11[a] Unencumbered assets of accused-Generally
11[b] Unencumbered assets of accused-Effect of transfer of such assets prior to trial
or appeal
12[a] Retention of counsel for trial or appeal-As suggesting nonindigence
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12[b] Retention of counsel for trial or appeal-As not precluding finding of indigence
13[a] Filing of bail or appeal bond-As suggesting nonindigence (NOTE:
Howards 12/15/11 Order indicates: B. MOTION FOR PUBLICATION OF TRANSCRIPT AT
PUBLIC EXPENSE and MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Defendant Coughlin cites to NRS 12.015 as authority for allowing him to issue "any,
necessary writ, process, pleading or paper without charge, with the exception of jury fees because I
lack sufficient financial ability to proceed without this waiver".
Appellant Coughlin's reference to NRS 12.015 is misplaced as that provision refers to civil
procedure. He cites no other authority for his request.
This case has gone to verdict and the defendant was found guilty. It is difficult to see what
additional costs will be incurred by Appellant Coughlin other than the trial transcript. This is not a
complex case with numerous factual or legal issues.
Mr. Coughlin is a licensed attorney-at-law who implied during trial that his incarceration for
contempt would adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in his "affidavit of poverty" does not
indicate any income from his practice of law. Of note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the
litigation of the instant matter.
Coughlins employement as a solo practitioner with exactly one employee, himself,
throughout October 2011 through June 2012 in no way establishes his non-indigence. Such is,
particulary for Coughlin whose first paying client came in late July 2011, a highly tenuous operation
and position to be in, particularly in washoe county during the through of 3 straight years of 15%
unemploymentWhat little income Coughlin had from the practice of law the justice court was busy
requiring Coughlin to deposit such under an unlawful application of NRS 118a.355(5) to a no cause
summary eviction against a commercial tenant (which is forbidden under NRS 40.254) Coughlin was
forced to deposit some $2,275 in rent escrow on 10/17/11, which the RJC only finally returned to
Coughlin upon Coughlin bailing out of jail on 11/15/11, Coughlin only able to post the cash only
$1,315 bond required for the 8/20/11, 9/9/11, and 11/13/11 arrests where his client Peter Eastman
(out of total necessity to avoid prejudice to Coughlins client, including Eastmans affairs and
Coughlins family and friends either refusing to or being unreachable due to the jails obstructionist
telephone system and tier time rules) put up such $1,315 to bail Coughlin out on 11/15/12, at which
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point Coughlin retrieved the rent escrow $2,275 the RJC returned to him via certified mailing from
the Washington st. USPS postal station and went directly to the bank with Eastman to cash such, and
gave Eastman $1,315 in cash that day. AT such point Coughlin was forced to buy a temporary
computer, scanner, printer, and clothes due to the burglary by Hill and the WCSO and the wrongfull
arrest of Coughlin for trespassing by the RPD on 11/13/11, and Coughlin secured a monthly rental
from the Silver Dollar Motor Lodge for $600 per month studio that included internet, phone,
etcCoughlin received a check from Eastman on or about 9/9/11 for $1,000 pursuant to a flat fee of
$3,500 agreed to handle Eastmans case. Case was never paid anything further by Eastman (though
Eastman watched Coughlins dog, and was very helpful throughout nearly all of the wrongful
summary incarcerations of his attorney, Coughlin by local judges, that prejudiced the defense of
Eastman and kellers cases. Coughlin received a $900 check from Keller on 11/10/11 pursuant to a
flat fee arrangement for $4,500 to be payable thereafter in monthly installments of $1,000 until paid
in full. Keller fulfilled that obligation in a timely manner. Coughlin received approximately a $500
check from the Carpentiers on or about 10/20/11 pursuant to a a flat fee agreement of of around
$1,000 that was contingent upon if the Carpentiers wished to pursue their matter through various
stages. Coughlin ultimately received around another $500 from the carpentiers (Coughlin is forced
to do most of this from memory at this point, but might have more documentation to support such
later)Coughlin had no money in his bank account in July 2013 until getting his first client, Robert
Bell, whom paid him $250. Coughlin received $1,000 in August 2011 from client Parmenter, and
approximately $500 from client Gessin in August 2011, another $250 from client Charles Thomas in
a divorce/custody matter.the point is, Coughlin had practically no money whatsoever at all relevant
times considering the confluence of the justice courts illegal rent escrow demands, required monies
for bail, money required to buy new items to run his law practice due and cloth himself due to Hill
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applying an unlawful rent distraint under NRS 118A.520 incident to Hills and the RPD, WCSO
burglary of Coughlins former home law office in November 2011. Coughlin did not receive one red
cent from any friends or family throughout June 2007 (other than maybe a birthday check for $100.00
or something like that from his mother or father) through late April 2012to the best of his memory
Coughlin also received around $1,000 sometime prior to his 11/1/11 eviction from a client
name Gary Dawson http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=25379 (of
Fairfield, California) (in Coughlins opinion Hill and Baker owe Mr. Dawson a lot of money) and
there is some issues relative to whether client timely paid an installment in November 2011 incident
to a contingent representation agreement and Hills obstruction of Coughlins mail an burglary of his
office.
Coughlns business at the time he applied for court appointed counsel on 10/26/11 and at the
time of his filing an IFP motion on 12/14/11 in the RMC in 22716 was highly, highly unstable,
unpredictable, fraught with unforeseen expenses, impossible to gauge income wise, and rife with a
multitude of professional responsibilities and rules of conduct that greatly limited his earning
capacity or ability to do anything else for a living. Coughlin was working 80 hour weeks for less
than minimum wage, getting fleeced by the government, courts, and opposing counsel in the process.
Clearly, a transcript at public expense in RMC 11 CR 22716 was warranted, and Judge Hardys
3/8/12 Order requiring Coughlin to submit two years worth of tax returns was entirely too invasive
and burdensome given the circumstances (and Jduge Stiglich arguably does not have jurisdiction to
enter the 9/19/13 order denying coughlins ifp motion therein in light of NRS 12.015 and local rules
making such a chief judge issue. Such is further evidence of the extent to which the federal court
here should not apply younger abstention. Judge Stiglich is being placed in an entirely unfair
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situation here, and on top of that, the 2JDC throws the Mirch v. Clifton case her way. Federal
intervention is entirely warranted.
13[b] Filing of bail or appeal bond-As not precluding finding of indigence
14 Ability of accused to pay filing fees not paid
15[a] Cost of transcript or other record in relation to defendant's resources-
Relatively high cost of document as suggesting indigence
15[b] Cost of transcript or other record in relation to defendant's resources-
Relatively low cost of document as suggesting nonindigence
IV Particular determinations
16 Indigence held established or supportable
17 Nonindigence held established or supportable
Supreme Court may consider sua sponte plain error which affects the defendant's
substantial rights, if the error either: (1) had a prejudicial impact on the verdict when viewed in
context of the trial as a whole, or (2) seriously affects the integrity or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings. Rowland v. State, 2002, 39 P.3d 114, 118 Nev. 31, habeas corpus
denied 2009 WL 2152325, affirmed 467 Fed.Appx. 703, 2012 WL 289241, certiorari denied 2012
WL 1599318. Criminal Law1030(1)
NRS 177.305 Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to cease after certificate of judgment
remitted. After the certificate of judgment has been remitted, the Supreme Court shall have
no further jurisdiction of the appeal or of the proceedings thereon, and all orders which may be
necessary to carry the judgment into effect shall be made by the Court to which the certificate
is remitted. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1447)
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NRS 177.145 Application for relief pending review. If application is made to a district
court or to a justice of the Supreme Court for bail pending appeal or for an extension of time for
filing the record on appeal or for any other relief which might have been granted by the trial court,
the application shall be upon notice and shall show that:
1. Application to the court below or a judge thereof is not practicable;
2. Application has been made and denied, with the reasons given for the denial; or
3. The action on the application did not afford the relief to which the applicant considers
himself or herself to be entitled. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
NRS 177.155 Supervision of appeal. The supervision and control of the proceedings on
appeal shall be in the appellate court from the time the notice of appeal is filed with its clerk, except
as otherwise provided in this title. The appellate court may at any time entertain a motion to dismiss
the appeal, or for directions to the trial court, or to modify or vacate any order made by the trial court
or by any judge or justice of the peace in relation to the prosecution of the appeal, including any order
fixing or denying bail. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
Pursuant to NRS 177.155, Coughlin request the district court to enter an Order requiring the
preparation of the transcript from the 11/30/11 trial at issue in cr11-2064 at public expense. The
district courts merely allowing for citation to the audio is not sufficient. There is a benefit to a
written transcript and the lack thereof plus the concomitant alleged requirement to cite to specific
portions of the audio is entirely prejudicial and unconstitutional. It takes much long to listen to a
transcript (especially the numerous amounts of times an effective brief requires) than it does to read
one. The District Court still has jurisdiction (if it ever did) despite the 3/15/12 Order Affirming
purported to remand such to the municipal court where such 3/15/12 Order was void, fails to indicate
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which ruling it is affirming (ie, if Coughlins Motion for New Trial (and arguably there was one
based on the clear error standard required filed within 7 days under NRS 176.515 and another
based on newly discovered evidence filed within the two years required thereunder as well) was
denied by the RMC (its hard to tell, actually, see Howards 12/15/11 Order and his concomitant
failure to enter any order as to Coughlins 2/27/12 Motion for New Trial, and see Judge Holmes
summary incarceration of Coughlin for five days in 11 TR 26800 (this court may order the record
therefrom transmitted as well, both under superintending control and NRS 177.155 aspect in either
2064 or 1262, but pursuant to Coughlins Petition for Writ in Coughlin v Nash Holmes, or incident to
CR13-1332, etc, etc) Also, NRS 177.045 Intermediate order or proceeding may be
reviewed on appeal provides this court with authority to review the 2/28/12, 3/12/12, 3/13/12
Orders in 11 TR 26800 by Judge Nash Holmes and the 9/18/12 Order in RMC 13 cr 3913 by
RMC Judge W. Gardner and the 6/18/13 and 9/24/13 Orders by RJC Judges Pearson and
Clifton, especially where such are so patently violative (along with all three of the Admin
Orders referenced herein) of NRS 178.600 and NRS 178.610, not to mention NV Const. Art. 4
Sec. 21.
Right of indigent defendant in criminal case to aid of state as regards new trial or appeal, 55
A.L.R.2d 1072. Arguments of attorney to jury, free transcript of, . 10 Insufficient means to
procure transcript, showing of, . 12[b] Materiality of transcript to decision on appeal, showing
of, . 12[b]
Past conviction as affected by failure to furnish the transcript, . 3[b] Preliminary hearing,
right to transcript of testimony at, . 19[a] Refusal to furnish transcript as ground for new
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trial, . 12[c] Stenographic transcript of trial proceedings, furnishing without cost, . 3[a]
Transcript of proceedings, furnishing without cost, . 3[a] Nevada
McRoy v. Warden, Nev. State Prison, 88 Nev. 267, 496 P.2d 162 (1972) 4
Teeter, State ex rel. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court in and for Clark County, 64 Nev. 256, 180
P.2d 590 (1947) 18 Ninth Circuit
Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1958) 4, 6[a]
Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) 4
Boyden, In re, 230 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1955) 6[f]
Brown v. U S, 270 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1959) 6[c]
Burdix v. U S, 15 Alaska 493, 220 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1955) 1
Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1958) 5
Davis v. Wilson, 278 F. Supp. 852 (C.D. Cal. 1968) 4
De Groot v. U S, 88 F.2d 624, 5 Alaska Fed. 881 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1937) 6[g]
Dinerstein, Application of, 258 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1958) 6[f]
Doyle v. U.S., 366 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1966) 3[b], 4
Forgona, In re, 221 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1955) 1
Gargano v. U.S., 137 F.2d 944 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1943) 4
Garrison v. Johnston, 104 F.2d 128 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1939) 4, 6[c]
Gilbert v. U.S., 278 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1960) 6[f]
Harders v. State of Cal., 373 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1967) 4
Jefferson v. U.S., 277 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1960) 6[a]
Kyle v. U.S., 199 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1952) 1
Mason v. Cranor, 227 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1955) 3[c]
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Mitchell, In re, 230 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955) 6[f]
Osborne v. Johnston, 120 F.2d 947 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1941) 4
Richards v. Townsend, 444 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1971) 3[b]
Richards v. Townsend, 300 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Cal. 1969) 3[b]
Richardson v. U.S., 267 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959) 6[g]
Schlette v. King, 258 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1958) 6[g]
Territory of Guam, People of v. Olsen, 462 F. Supp. 608 (D. Guam 1978) 6[c]
Tucker v. U.S., 308 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1962) 4
Tweedy v. United States, 276 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1960) 6[g]
U.S. v. Garcia, 412 F. Supp. 281 (D. Ariz. 1976) 3[b], 4
U.S. v. Geise, 167 F. Supp. 775 (Terr. Alaska 1958) 6[f]
U.S. v. Schmitz, 525 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1975) 5
U.S. v. Taylor, 223 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1963) 6[g]
U.S. v. Tucker, 213 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1954) 1
Winhoven v. U.S., 209 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1953) 1
Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules
United States
U.S. Const. Amend. 14. See 9.1
U.S. Const. Amend. 6. See 4
U.S. Const. Amend. VI. See 4, 11, 15, 25[e]
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. See 4, 5
U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV. See 14.07
18 U.S.C.A. 924(c). See 6[a]
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18 U.S.C.A. 3006A. See 6[c]
18 U.S.C.A. 3006A(c). See 6[b]
28 U.S.C.A. 753(f). See 6[a]
28 U.S.C.A. 832. See 6[a], 6[c]
28 U.S.C.A. 1915. See 6[a], 6[f], 6[g]
28 U.S.C.A. 2255. See 6[a]
Supreme Court
Anders v. State of Cal., 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967) 4
Arsenault v. Com. of Mass., 393 U.S. 5, 89 S. Ct. 35, 21 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1968) 4
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977) 3[b], 4
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 92 S. Ct. 431, 30 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1971) 3[b]
Burns v. State of Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S. Ct. 1164, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1209, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 570 (1959)
3[b]
Coppedge v. U.S., 369 U.S. 438, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962) 6[f], 6[g]
Dennett v. Hogan, 414 U.S. 12, 94 S. Ct. 18, 38 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1973) 6[b]
Doherty v. U.S., 404 U.S. 28, 92 S. Ct. 175, 30 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1971) 6[a]
Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192, 80 S. Ct. 1048, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1142, 85 Ohio L. Abs. 31 (1960) 5
Douglas v. People of State of Cal., 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963) 4, 13.05,
14.07
Draper v. State of Wash., 372 U.S. 487, 83 S. Ct. 774, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899 (1963) 26
Ellis v. U. S., 356 U.S. 674, 78 S. Ct. 974, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (1958) 6[g]
Entsminger v. State of Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 87 S. Ct. 1402, 18 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1967) 3[b], 4
Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521, 77 S. Ct. 1371, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1529 (1957) 6[g]
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Farley v United States (1957) 354 US , 1 L ed 2d 1529, 77 S Ct 6[c], 6[d], 6[g]
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1956) 3[b],
3[c], 4, 9
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S. Ct. 2582, 162 L. Ed. 2d 552 (2005) 5, 14.07
Hardy v. U.S., 375 U.S. 277, 84 S. Ct. 424, 11 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1964) 6[c], 6[g]
Hill v. U.S., 356 U.S. 704, 78 S. Ct. 1139, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1145 (1958) 6[g]
Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 77 S. Ct. 550, 1 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1957) 6[f], 6[g]
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 83 S. Ct. 768, 9 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1963) 12[a]
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996) 3[b], 4
ARTICLE OUTLINE
I Introduction
1 Scope
2 Summary
II Rules applicable in absence of statutes providing for aid to indigent appellants
3[a] Indigent's rights other than to aid of counsel; rule of Griffin v IllinoisThe holding in
Griffin v Illinois
3[b] Indigent's rights other than to aid of counsel; rule of Griffin v IllinoisCases decided
after Griffin v Illinois
3[c] Indigent's rights other than to aid of counsel; rule of Griffin v IllinoisCases decided
prior to Griffin v Illinois
4 Indigent's right to aid of counsel
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III Rules applicable under statutes providing for aid to indigent appellants
5 Generally
6[a] Federal statuteGenerally
6[b] Federal statutePersons entitled to statutory benefits; sufficiency of application for
relief
6[c] Federal statuteNature of benefits accorded by statute
6[d] Federal statuteCourt to which application for statutory benefits must be made
6[e] Federal statuteTime for application for relief
6[f] Federal statuteNecessity that appeal be taken in good faith
6[g] Federal statuteGood faith as requiring that appeal have merit
6.5 Alabama statute
18 Nevada statute
NRS 177.045 Intermediate order or proceeding may be reviewed on appeal. Upon
the appeal, any decision of the court in an intermediate order or proceeding, forming a part of
the record, may be reviewed. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1444)
NRAP RULE 3B. CRIMINAL ACTIONS: RULES GOVERNING
Appeals from district court determinations in criminal actions shall be governed by these Rules
and by NRS 177.015 to 177.305 and NRS 34.575. All appeals in capital cases are also subject to the
provisions of SCR 250. Rule 3C applies to all other direct and post-conviction criminal appeals,
except those matters specifically excluded from the fast track by Rule 3C(a).
[As amended; effective July 1, 2009.]
RULE 3C. FAST TRACK CRIMINAL APPEALS
(a) Applicability.
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(1) This Rule applies to an appeal from a district court judgment or order entered in a criminal or
post-conviction proceeding commenced after September 1, 1996, whether the appellant is the State or
the defendant. A proceeding is commenced for the purposes of this Rule upon the filing of an
indictment, information, or post-conviction application in the district court.
(2) The Supreme Court may exercise its discretion and apply this Rule to appeals arising from
criminal and post-conviction proceedings that are not subject to this Rule
It is far from clear that NRAP applies to appeals from the municipal or justice courts to the
district courts. Indeed, the Court in Brahams refrained from commenting on the applicability of
NRAP 38 thereto vis a vis the transcript cost analysis. (NOTE: further muddling the applicability of
Braham is the fact that it involved a petition for writ of certiorariBraham v. Fourth Judicial Dist.
Court, 103 Nev. 644 (1987), 747 P.2d 1390: Fn1 We express no opinion as to whether petitioner, as
a prevailing party in this court, may recover the cost of the transcript in the
district court. Cf. NRAP 39(e) (costs on appeal taxable in the district courts).
RS 177.165 Preparation of record and papers on appeal. All appeals from a district
court to the Supreme Court shall be heard on the original papers and the reporters transcript of
evidence or proceedings. The form and manner of preparation of the record and of other papers
filed may be prescribed by the Supreme Court, and to the extent not otherwise so prescribed shall
conform to the practice in civil cases. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1445)
DISMISSAL OR ARGUMENT OF APPEAL
NRS 177.205 Dismissal by Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may, on its own
motion or on motion of the respondent, dismiss an appeal:
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1. If the appeal is irregular in any substantial particular.
2. If the appellant has failed to comply with the requirements for docketing of the record
on appeal or filing briefs, unless for good cause shown an extension is granted. (Added to NRS by
1967, 1446; A 1985, 63)
The above two statutes do not apply to appeals to the district court.
in conjunction with NRS 178.482
The RMC accepted Coughlins filing via email, as show in the following:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/171731158/11-29-11-Subpoena-and-Duces-Tecum-on-WalMart-Filed-
Email-Only-After-Written-Permission-File-by-Email-RMC-Ballard-Fraudulent-Excision-Per-NRS-
189-030-1
Further, the RJCs has filed purported transcripts in CR12-2025, apparently pursuant
to NRS 4.400(2), however, the oaths such persons purported subscribe to fail to include a last
name for such individuals, and as such, are completely invalid. Take, for instance the 11/20/12
purported transcript from RCR2011-063341 now on appeal in CR12-2025, which, at page 1
provides: (JAVS ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED) Transcribed By: Cathy W..
For instance, the oath by Cathy W. goes: I, CATHY W, do hereby state: That I am
not a relative, employee or independent contractor of counsel to any of the parties, or a relative,
employee or independent contractor of the parties involved in the proceeding, or a person
financially interested in the proceedings: That I was NOT present in Department No. 2 Of the
above-entitled Court on November 20, 2012, but transcribed the proceedings had and the
testimony given upon the matter captioned within from the JAVS electronically recorded audio
media; That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1 through 125, is a full, true and
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correct transcription of said JAVS electronically recorded audio media. DATED: at Reno,
Nevada, this 24th day of April, 2013./S/ Cathy W." (At page 126).
If Cathy W. is the RJCs Cathy Wood, whom Coughlin had made allegations of gross
misconduct against on numerous occasions, including as relates to the coverup of the
disappearance of the discs Coughlin attached to his 11/15/12 filings with Judges Sferrazza and
Clifton in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630, and her making Robbin Baker cry in the
filing office incident to Baker being forced to recant the indication she had made to Coughlin
moments before when Baker admitted that she clearly remember Coughlins filings in those
cases on that 11/15/12 date having discs attached to them as exhibitsthen, clearly, Cathy W.
is amongst those who qualify as a relative, employee or independent contractor of the parties
involved in the proceeding, or a person financially interested in the proceedings and such
transcripts should be stricken from the record in CR12-2025.
NRS 4.400 Operation of equipment; transcription of recordings; use of
transcript. 2. The justice of the peace may designate the same or another person to
transcribe the recording into a written transcript. The person so designated shall subscribe to
an oath that the person has correctly transcribed it. The transcript may be used for all
purposes for which transcripts are used and is subject to correction in the same manner as
other transcripts. (Added to NRS by 1979, 1511; A1993, 1410)
Further, the RMC simply failed to order the preparation of the transcript in CR11-2064.
It is manifestly violative of Nevada law, and RMC Judge Kenneth Ray Howards knows that
very well, for Judge Howard to have failed to have ordered the preparation of the transcript to
begin within 10 days of Coughlins 12/13/11 Notice of Appeal in RMC 11 Cr 221176.
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Further as to all the shenanigans by the well compensated Bailiffs Reyes, Medina,
Ramsey, and Heibert and Chief Bailiff Sexton and RMC Marshals Coppa, Harley, Thompson,
etc, and all their purporting to serve documents on Coughlin, in ever more increasingly coercive
and hostile fashions, often in conjunction with the terms of the unlawful Administrative Orders
2012-01 and 2013-06 in the RJC and 2013-01 in the RMC and the refusals by both sets to file in
documents Coughlin submits for filing or to allow Coughlin simple access to the courts,
including refusing to allow Coughlin to view files for any length of time, refusing to answer
basic questions over the phone, telling Coughlin he must present in person to ask such question,
then upon Coughlin so presenting, telling Coughlin he must mail in a written request and
refusing to take a written request Coughlin then attempts to hand deliver:
NRS 3.310 Bailiffs and deputy marshals: Appointment; duties; qualifications;
compensation.
3. Each bailiff or deputy marshal shall:
(a) Preserve order in the court.
(b) Attend upon the jury.
(c) Open and close court.
(d) Perform such other duties as may be required of him or her by the judge of the
court.
4. The bailiff or deputy marshal must be a qualified elector of the county and shall
give a bond, to be approved by the district judge, in the sum of $2,000, conditioned for the
faithful performance of his or her duty.
7. The provisions of this section do not:
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(a) Authorize the bailiff or deputy marshal to serve any civil or criminal process, except
such orders of the court which are specially directed by the court or the presiding judge thereof to
him or her for service.
And, along with NRS 3.310(7) goes RCA Wongs entire case in both 13 CR 3913 and 3914 as
the TPO in 3913 that the EPO in 3914 necessarily relies upon for notice of such 1/4/13 hearing to
extend the 12/20/12 Workplace Harassment TPO granted the State Bar of Nevada against Coughlin in
RCP2012-000607 was purportedly served by RJC Bailiff Anthony Englishand such 12/20/12 Order
specifically provides, in writing, that it is to be served by certain law enforcement agencies, the RJC
Bailiff not listed amongst those specified therein.
Of course, RCA Chief Wong will not drop his prosecutions in 3913 and 3914, set for trial on
10/29/13, where RMC Judge W. Gardner has continued his rampage upon NRS 178.600 and 178.610
(with fellow RMC Judges Nash Holmes, Howard, and Dilworth and RJC Judges Pearson, Clifton,
and Sferrazza providing a stunning greek chorus thereto) in entering orders that expressly contradict
many sections of Title 14 of NRS (including, but not limited to: countenancing WCPD Dogans
failure to appear at a gross misdemeanor arraignment (NRS 178.397) on 2/14/12 and then retaliating
against Coughlins 2/21/12 filing in RCR2012-065630s pointing that out (only after Dogan smugly
refused to seek to avoid a fta warrant going out for Coughlins arrest) via a 4/11/12 email from RJC
Judicial Secretary Lori Townsend attaching such in an email to the SBNs Patrick King,, the
multitude of violations of the mandatory stay required by NRS 178.405 vis a vis Orders for
Competency Evaluations, NRS 178.484 (see 4/19/12 summary eight day incarceration incident to
DDA Young, WCPD Dogans and 2JDC Judge Elliotts violations of NRS 178.405), RMC Judge W.
Gardners 7/5/12 violations of NRS 178.498 Amount. NRS 178.499 Increase in
amount. NRS 178.502 Form of bail; extension of bond or undertaking to proceedings in
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other courts; exoneration; place of deposit, in 12 CR 12420, taking Coughlins bondable $1,415
bail (which was entirely dubious in the first place given Coughlin provide RPD Officer Alan
Weaver the required proof of his car insurance upon being pulled over on a 4.7 inch high
definition pdf of his USAA insurance card, where such represented some $850 of the $1,415 bail
that was initially bondable, only for Judge W. Gardner to then, without any notice to Coughlin
whatsoever and without providing Coughlin an opportunity to be heard or cross examine RPD
Officers Dye and Weaver during the 7/5/12 bail increase hearing, summarily increased
Coughlins bail to a cash only $3,000, purporting to base such misconduct on a public health
and safety rationale that is not amongst the basis for imposing bail under Nevada law.
Additionally violative of NRS 178.600, .610 is Judge Sferrazzas 11/19/12 failure to grant
a continuance an or institute contempt proceedings against the witnesses Coughlin properly
subpoenaed under NRS 174.375 based upon Sferrazza contention that Coughlin (whom
Sferrazza had ruled was indigent and where at the 10/22/12 hearing Sferrazza ruled that
Coughlin did not have to pay such witnesses fees in advance of trial, and, perhaps, not at
alland where the 11/13/11 hearing wherein Judge Sferrazza purports to have ordered that
Coughlin need have done so was improperly and insufficiently noticed to Coughlin, and
fraudulently so, where RCA Skau purports that Judge Sferrazza authorized him to serve
Coughlin notice of such 11/13/12 hearing on the various Emergency Ex Parte Motions to Quash
Coughlins subpoenas via email (and where Judge Sferrazza accepted the purportedly served
only via fax (Coughlin swears he did not even receive any such 11/8/12 fax by WCPD Dogan of
his purported Motion to Quash Coughlins 11/6/12 subpoena on Dogan) Motion to Quash by
WCPD Dogan that was not properly served where, if the RJC and RMC want to take the
position that Coughlin is not an attorney and therefore, quash any subpoenas attorney whose
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Nevada law license is suspended Coughlin issue himself (whether issued prior to or after the
6/7/12 order in 60838 suspending Coughlins law license in Nevadathen Dogans attempts to
serve Coughlin via facsimile on 11/8/12 with his Motion to Quash are not permissible under
SERVICE AND FILING OF PAPERS NRS 178.589 Use of facsimile machine.
Additionally, these garbage Administrative Orders and those of 11/28/12 by Judge
Sferrazza in ALL CASES ALL DEPARTMENTS and of 5/8/12 and 9/18/12 by RMC Judge
W. Gardner, and of 11/27/12 by Judge Clifton in RCR2012-065630 (which even prohibited
Coughlin from fax anything to the WCDAs Office in RCR2012-065630, even if such was a filing
in a different case wherein matters in RCR2012-065630 were of relevance.) are further violative
of NRS 178.588 Filing of papers.
NRS 178.588 Filing of papers. Papers required to be served must be filed with the
court. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 178.589, papers must be filed in the manner
provided in civil actions. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1457; A1999, 52)
NRS 178.588 provides that NRCP applies (according to Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order in
CR11-2064)especially where JCRRT 2 specifically provides that the JCRRT do not apply to
criminal mattersbut even if they did, JCRRT 2 still prohibits the Administrative Order 2013-
06 in the RJC and Judge Sferrazzas 11/28/12 Order in the RJC from threatening Coughlin
with 25 days incarceration for contempt for each instance of Coughlin submitting a filing via
facsimile (or submitting even a letter to the court, arguably) in one of Coughlins many (due to
RJC misconduct) landlord tenant cases (where such misconduct resulted in more and more
summary evictions of Coughlin through no fault of Coughlins).
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/160451812/8-14-13-0204-62337-71437-72675-Complete-
With-Attachments-RJC-Judge-Pearson-Administrative-Order-2013-06-1048-374-1708-67980-
63341-65630-Ocr-A9
http://www.scribd.com/doc/168477431/7-31-13-0204-RJC-Pears-Notice-of-Receipt-of-
Document-Not-Considered-by-Court-65630-63341-67980-Requests-for-Audio-71437-72675
NRS 178.600 and 178.610 are under assault by the judges of inferior tribunals.
ii
:
Further the RMC and its official CCR, Pam Longoni carry on the tradition of
applying Nevada law applicable only to district courts to inferior tribunals such as the RMC
and RJC where the RMCs written policies relative to transcripts seek to enforce a statute
applicable only to district courts: (CHAPTER 3 - DISTRICT COURTS)NRS 3.370
Official reporter: Compensation. 6. Where a transcript is ordered by the court or by any
party, the compensation for the transcript must be paid to the reporter before the furnishing of
the transcript.
The RMC and RJCs Administrative Orders =
Coughlin actually filed his Motion for New Trial in RCM 11 CR 22176 (permission to
file via email, etc.) on 12/12/11, but, regardless, the 7 day deadline under NRS 176.515 began to
run from the point at which Judge Howard indicated his judgment was to be rendered (ie,
following the conclusion of Coughlins serving the three days incarceration incident to
Howards 8:30 pm 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt (and where such rendition
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did not take effect in Coughlins presence, but in the future, such arguably requires entry of
such orderand Coughlin is entitled to rely upon, in all of these criminal cases, the initial
written expression by Judge Elliott as to the applicability of NRCP 6 to these
mattersmeaning, 7 days from the rendition (at the earliestand there still has arguably yet
to be any entry of such, much less notice of entry) of the 11/30/11 Judgment of Conviction
and Court Order taking effect, on 12/3/11 at 8 pm (a Saturday), means 7 judicial days (in light
of Elliotts pronouncement of the applicability of NRCP to all of Title 14, would have run on, at
the earliest, the very 12/13/11 date that Coughlins Motion for New Trial is file stamped by the
RJC. Further, Judge Howards too early (ie, prior to the RCA even responding to such)
12/15/12 Order purporting dispose of such Motion for New Trial of 12/13/11, arguably makes
voids such 12/15/11 Order, and, therefore, Judge Elliott lacked jurisdiction to even enter his
3/15/11 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in cr11-2064.
"FW: RMC said I could file this by email? From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.Com) Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:34 PM To: fiskm@reno.Gov 1
attachment 12 11 11 final motion for new trial city of reno v coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176.Pdf (12.9
MB) Zach Coughlin, Esq. 817 N. Virginia St. #2 Reno, NV 89501 tel: 775 338 8118 fax: 949 667
7402 Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
http://www.scribd.com/doc/171624940/12-11-11-Final-Motion-for-New-Trial-City-of-
Reno-v-Coughlin-RMC-11-CR-22176-12-11-11-Final-Motion-for-New-Trial-City-of-Reno-v-
Coughlin-RMC-11-CR-221
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.Com To: renomunirecords@reno.Gov Subject: RMC
said I could file this by email Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 19:27:57 -0800 Dear RMC, I called an
wrote earlier and received approval to file the attached pdf and media files by email rather than
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fax or other submission. This filing is large, as such, it must be broken down into segments. This
is part one, part two will be in the next email. I will pay whatever filing fee or bond or whatever
I have to pay to access justice in this here case. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq. 817 N. Virginia
St. #2 Reno, NV 8950 fax: 949 667 7402 Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
Further, the RMCs Ballard represented to Coughlin that his filings submitted via email
would be file stamped the day such emailed filings were sent such that a filing emailed by
Coughlin to the RMC at 11:59 p.m. would be assigned a file stamping date of the same date.
Additionally, Judge Howards 11/30/11 Judgment of Conviction and Court Order bares a file
stampe of 11/30/11 such only being rendered at 8:20 p.m.
As such, Coughlins filing of 12/12/11 a Motion for New Trial was timely under NRS
176.515 (and regardless, Coughlins filing of a Motion for New Trial during his three day
summary incarceration between 11/30/11 and 12/3/11, under the prisoners mailbox rule, is
timely as well). Judge Howards 12/15/11 Order refused to adjudicate such Motion for New
Trial (the RMC does a lot of refusing to adjudicate, refusing to file things in, refusing to
transmit that required by NRS 189.030(1), refusing to respond to an NRS 1.235 Motion to
Disqualify at all, much less within 5 days by affidavit, refusing to appoint counsel to per se
indigents where incarceration was a possibility, etc., etc.), as such, either or both the 12/1/11
Motion for New Trial Coughlin submitted in jail or the 12/12/11 Motion for New Trial Coughlin
filed via email after receiving RMC Ballards permission to, continue to be tolling motions, an d
the deadline for Coughlin to file an appeal in 22176 has yet to even begin running.
The RMCs violation of NRS 189.030(1) in failing to transmit Coughlins 901 page
12/11/11 Motion for New Trial (http://www.scribd.com/doc/171630269/12-13-11-0204-2064-
22176-Motion-for-New-Trial-Notice-of-Appeal-NRS-189-030-1-Requires-RMC-Add-to-ROA-
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in-CR11-2064-RMC-Deficiencies-Opt-a9 )dcfwas highly prejudicial especially where such
Motion contained voluminous support for Coughlins contention that the RMCs refusal to
grant Coughlin even one continuance was clear error, particularly where the materials within
such 901 page Motion for New Trial detail the circumstances of Coughlins wrongful summary
eviction in Rev2011-001708, Coughlins wrongful criminal trespass arrest and three day
incarceration in RMC 11 CR 26405, and thet attendant difficulties connected thereto, in
addition to Hills applying an unlawful rent distraint to exculpatory material necessary to
Coughlins defense where it was Hill, actually, whom had burglarized Coughlins law office and
arguably intended to and did deprive Coughlin and his clients of the contents of such a whole
lot longer than Coughlin could be said to have and or have intended to deprived Cory Goble of
the iPhone Goble falsely purported to be his.
Also, especially with respect to cr11-2064 and the 3/15/12 order purporting affirm the rmc
ruling based on Coughlin allegedly failing to cite to the the transcript that the RMC fraudulently
failed to have prepared in the City of Renos con game where they pass an ordinance calling
themselves and NRS 5.010 court of record then fail to repeal those ordinances that conflict with the
requirements under Nevada law for so being a court of record, specifically with respect to NRS
189.030 and 189.035, where even Elliott had to admit NRS 4.14(a) and Brahams application thereof
are just worth mentioning, but not applicable in a criminal setting in his 3/15/12 order affiriming rmc
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ruling in cr11-2064. http://www.scribd.com/doc/170863766/3-15-12-2JDC-Judge-Elliott-Order-
Affirming-Ruling-of-the-Reno-Municipal-Court-RMC-Violating-NRS-189-035-Judicial-Misconduct
Also, all this non-sense where RMC Judge W. Gardner, Holmes and Howard, and RJC Judges
Clifton, Pearson, and Sferrazza openly violate NRS 178.610 (not to mention NV Const Art. 4 Sec
21which is also violated where the WCSO insists on dressing up burglaries on tenants as
lockouts where, to avoid the extreme inconvenience of making two trips (one to post the summary
removal order, and another to conduct the lockout 24 hours later) the Sheriff violates NRS
40.253(5)(a)s requirement that tenants be given 24 hours from receipt (see Brahamswhich is
also a good case for showing the fraud by the RMC and Reno City Attorney that 2JDC Judge Elliott
co-signed in his 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC (see 60838 and 62337) in allowing the
RMC to masquerade as a court of record (fun! No trial de novo in District Court!) per NRS 5.010,
yet avoid all the inconvenience of actually complying with NRS 189.030 and NRS 189.035 (and
Elliotts rationale in his 3/15/12 Order in cr11-2064 is beyond questionable (one, Thomas v. State in
no way allows Elliott to simply deny Coughlins appeal, especially where Elliott claims the lack of
the very transcript that the RMC was required by law to order prepared even without Coughlin
putting up the deposit that the RMC and the CCR it demands appellants use (Pam Longoni) and, two,
the Court in Thomas still decided that appeal on the merits, three NRAP 28 and 32 dont apply in
criminal appeals from the justice and municipal courts (otherwise, Coughlins briefs would not be
limited to 5 pages, rightoh wait, thats a local rule, right? Yeah, only its a local rule that applies to
civil cases only, though some judges in the 2JDC (hopefully not those whom are purported to have
a background in indigent defenseas, one would expect all the lifelong prosecutors turned judges to
fudge the rules in applying such civil rules to indigent criminal appellantslike, well, like Judge
Elliott did in applying NRS 4.414 in enacting all these house rules that apply only to Coughlin,
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especially to indigent Coughlin, and especially where such purports to subject Coughlin to contempt
charges threatening to incarcerate Coughlin for 25 days for each fax he sends to, say, the RJCand
Judge Cliftons 11/27/12 Emergency Ex Parte Order in RCR2012-065630 (now on appeal in CR13-
0614a case so troubled that Coughlin has yet to even been afforded Eflex privileges to it despite
collateral estoppel from cr12-2025s 1/9/13 and 8/25/13 Order seemingly supporting suchwhere the
RJC now refuses to give Coughlin dockets in his cases, even his criminal cases (Judge Cliftons
approach at the 9/24/13 hearing in RCR2013-072675 (the Bailiff Reyes throwing Coughlin over a
bench casefunny, if one is resisting the public officers order to go to the lobbywhy not just
arrest one at the bench in front of coffee shop in the Mills Lane Justice Center? Why attack
Coughlin, gang up on him, twist both his arms behind his back and hurriedly run over the metal
detector, knocking it over, before throwing Coughlin over the bench in the lobby? Hows that an
SCR 111(6) serious crime (aka NRS 199.280 resisting a public officer (see one of the In Re Beckett
cases) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yllvEBtk6C4 5 23 13 0204 long behind magnetom
heibert and reyes 72675 71437
NRS 189.070 Grounds for dismissal of complaint on appeal. Any complaint, upon motion of the
defendant, may be dismissed upon any of the following grounds:
1. That the justice of the peace did not have jurisdiction of the offense.
2. That more than one offense is charged in any one count of the complaint.
3. That the facts stated do not constitute a public offense. (this is especially true in the case of the
11/13/11 Complaint in the criminal trespass case in 26405 where such simply reads: I, Richard G.
Hill, on behalf of Matthew Merliss hereby complain and say that Zachary B. Coughlin has
committed the crime of trespass to wit: That said defendant on or about Nov 13, 2011, in the
City of Reno, State of Nevada, @ 121 River Rock St., the Def was found on the property after
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being evicted on 11/1/11. All of which in in violation of 8.10.010 of the Reno Municipal Code. I
therefore request that said Defendant be dealt with according to law. I hereby declare upon
information and belief under penalty of perjury pursuant to NRS 171.102, that the foregoing is true
and correcdt to the best of my knowledge. /s/ Richard G. Hill 11/13/11 (Complainant) (Dated)
11/13/11.
In general Where complaint against structural engineer did not state any specific facts but
merely alleged that he had violated a statute which required persons practicing architecture to have a
certificate issued to them under the Architect's Act, the complaint was insufficient and, therefore, the
engineer was entitled to have the action against him dismissed. N.R.S. 185.030, 189.070, 623.040,
623.180, 623.330, 623.360, 625.050. Sardis v. Second Judicial Dist. Court In and For Washoe
County, Dept. No. 1, 1969, 460 P.2D 163, 85 Nev. 585. Licenses 42(3) Defect that complaint,
charging relator in a justice court with a misdemeanor, was insufficient because purporting to be
made upon information and belief, instead of positive knowledge, was not jurisdictional, and was
waived by relator by pleading to the complaint without making objection upon ground assigned. Ex
parte Murray, 1916, 157 P. 647, 39 Nev. 351. Indictment And Information 196(5) Presumptions On
habeas corpus to secure release of one convicted of a misdemeanor in district court on appeal from
justice's court, it will be presumed that proceedings in district court were in every way regular until
contrary is made affirmatively to appear. Ex parte Murray, 1916, 157 P. 647, 39 Nev. 351. Habeas
Corpus 702 Criminal Law 260.8, 260.12. Westlaw Key Number
Searches: ?110K260.8; ?110K260.12.
Simply put, ones being found on the property after being evicted does not constitute a
public offense, as such, the Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to NRS 189.070(3).
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NOTE CITED TO AS PRECEDENT (unlike Hazlett-Stevens citing to an unpublished TN
case in Lovins v. State: Sufficiency of grounds
Cumulative effect of alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct did result in unfair trial so
as to amount to reversible plain error; defendant alleged that prosecutor alluded to facts not in
evidence, injected opinion, misrepresented the evidence, disparaged defendant and defense counsel,
and misstated the law on robbery and reasonable doubt. Reed v. State, 2012, 2012 WL
1302785 Criminal Law 1037.1(2)
Regardless, such Complaint was completely insufficient from a due process standpoint to put
Coughlin on notice as to what he needed to defend against. Any change in the charging document
that effectively alters the act or acts alleged, particularly when made after jeopardy has attached,
violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the accusation in time to prepare his or her
defense. Thanos v. State, 282 Md. 709, 387 A.2D 286 (1978). Where such complaint can only be
interpreted to alleged the failure to leave after being warned type of trespass under RMC 8.10.010,
and not the going on property with the intent to vex and annoy type that RMC Judge W. Gardners
judgment as rendered ultimately relied upon, Coughlins due process rights were violated. Coughlin
filed his Motion to Dismiss with the
Furthermore, both 2064 and 1262s complaints should be dismissed as the 11/14/11 complaint in
1262 fails to alleged facts constituting a public offense as there is no warning referenced anywhere
therein sufficient to notice-plead a criminal trespass under rmc 8.10.010, and where in 2064, there
was no jurisdiction established (the City and RMC completely failed to address Coughlins race and
whether he has any tribal blood for that arrest on tribal land by tribal police officers violative of NRS
171.1255 http://law.justia.com/codes/nevada/2010/title14/chapter171/nrs171-1255.html
ERROR
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NRS 178.598 Harmless error.
NRS 178.602 Plain error.
RECORDS
NRS 178.606 Docket kept by deputy clerk of justice court; contents.
RULES OF COURT
NRS 178.608 Rules of justice courts and district courts not to be inconsistent with this
title.
NRS 178.610 Where no procedure specifically prescribed court may proceed in lawful
manner.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537783/Rmc-Transcript-Rules-in-Violation-of-Nrs-Longioni-Ocrd-
and-Tagged-Jbig2-Lossy
Determination of indigency of accused entitling him to transcript or similar record for purposes of
appeal, 66 A.L.R.3d 954 (Originally published in 1975):
Supreme Court
Draper v. State of Wash., 372 U.S. 487, 83 S. Ct. 774, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899 (1963)
2[a]
Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S. Ct.
1061, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1269 (1958)
2[a]
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1956)
1[a]
,
2[a]
,
2[b]
,
7[a]
Hardy v. U.S., 375 U.S. 277, 84 S. Ct. 424, 11 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1964)
4
,
5
,
13[b]
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S. Ct. 410, 30 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1971)
2[a]
Seals v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 254, 85 S. Ct. 943, 13 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1965)
8
,
16
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Ninth Circuit U.S. v. Schmitz, 525 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1975)
11[b]
,
17
Nothing in Nevada
California March v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. 3d 422, 102 Cal. Rptr. 597, 498 P.2d 437, 66
A.L.R.3d 945 (1972)
2[a]
,
5
,
7[a]
,
10[a]
,
15[a]
,
16
Alabama Wilson v. State, 280 Ala. 167, 190 So. 2d 720 (1966)
6
,
11[a]
,
11[b]
,
12[a]
,
15[b]
,
17
Nevada being so very comparable to Alabama, though Nevada is a model of diversity in
the judiciary compared to Alabama. Also, perhaps of some utility: Nikander v. District Court In
and For First Judicial Dist., 711 P.2d 1260 (Colo. 1986)
5
,
6
,
10[a]
Humberto-Mauricio v. State leslies' failure to argue nrs 171.136 Exclusionary at supression hearing.
Humberto-Mauricio v. State Citation: 124 Nev. 1476 178.608. Rules of justice courts and district
courts not to be inconsistent with this title Currentness Rules made by justice courts and district
courts for the conduct of criminal proceedings shall not be inconsistent with this title.Courts 78 to 86.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k78 to 106k86. C.J.S. Courts 7, 124 to 134. Right of indigent
defendant in criminal case to aid of state as regards new trial or appeal Citation: 55 A.L.R.2D 1072
(Originally published in 1957). Determination of indigency of accused entitling him to transcript or
similar record for purposes of appeal Citation: 66 A.L.R.3D 954 N.R.S. 189.035 189.035.
Procedure where transcript defective Currentness 1. Except as provided in subsection 2, if the district
court finds that the transcript of a case which was recorded by sound recording equipment is
materially or extensively defective, the case must be returned for retrial in the justice court from
which it came. Criminal Law 260.7. Westlaw Key Number Search: ?110K260.7. N.R.S. 189.030
189.030. Transmission of transcript, other papers, sound recording and copy of docket to district
court Currentness 1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the
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clerk of the district court the transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified
copy of the docket. 2. The justice shall give notice to the appellant or the appellants attorney that the
transcript and all other papers relating to the case have been filed with the clerk of the district court.
3. If the district judge so requests, before or after receiving the record, the justice of the peace shall
transmit to the district judge the sound recording of the case. The use of the term "shall" in NRS
189.030(2) Makes the RMC's failure to transmit (or eve order it prepared) the transcript in 11 CR
22176 most definitely not something 2JDC Judge Elliott was entitled to mischaracterize Thomas v.
State to in his 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling (what ruling? Which one? The contempt order? The
judgment of conviction? RMC Judge Howards Order or ruling of 12/15/11 refusing to adjudicate
Coughlins 12/12/11 and or 12/13/11 Motion for New Trial, or Motion to Set Aside? The order of
12/16/11 ordering coughlin not to email the RMC? The 12/22/11 Appeal Bond Order wherein RMC
Judge Howard finds Coughlin indigent, and thus provides even further authority requiring the RMC
to transmit the transcript of the 11/30/11 trial in 22176, the doing of which being a jurisdictional
prerequisite lacking in 2064 making void Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the
RMC? Where's the order denying Coughlin's Motion for New Trial? Does the 2JDC even have
jurisdiction until such Motion(s) for New Trial filed by Coughlin are adjudicated? Does not the
prisoner's mailbox rule and the Washoe County Jail's refusals of Coughlin's filings (and they are
filings, whether the court puts a stamp on them or not) mean Coughlin's 12/13/11 notice of appeal
was premature?
Http://www.Lawlessamerica.Com/index.Php?Option=com_content&view=article&id=510:judges-
and-court-clerks-violate-the-law-when-your-court-filings-are-denied-or-
disappear&catid=98:litigation-help&Itemid=225 Mailed documents To be filed, a document must be
received. Merely mailing a notice of appeal within the 10-day period is not sufficient to meet the
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filing requirement, since filing requires the actual receipt of the notice by the court within the time
allowed by law. Even though the filing may not be timely, the magistrate has the duty to forward the
case to the district court under NRS 189.030. Op.Atty.Gen. Opinion No. 79-4 (Feb. 16, 1979), 1979
WL 34680.
Likewise, RMC Court Administrator Jacksons merely including some of the related papers
in 22176, and fraudulently tip toeing around the requirement to order and forward the transcript to the
2JDC under NRS 189.030 is required, and whether or not the RMC feels Coughlin was required to
pay it or the RMCs official CCR Longoni some down payment, the RMC was required to transmit
that transcript to the 2JDC within 10 days of Coughlins 12/13/11 filing of a Notice of Appeal (to
whatever extent the filing by Coughlin of a tolling motion obviates such need until such time as
Judge Howard can be bothered to adjudicate such).
Braham v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 644 (1987) 747 P.2D 1390: "[5] Braham
claims that the district court erroneously required him to pay for a transcript of the justices court
proceeding. Concerning appeals from justice to district court, NRS 189.030(1) Provides: The justice
shall, within 10 days after the notice Of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court the
transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified copy of his docket.
However, NRS 4.410(2) Provides: The fees for transcripts and copies [of justices court
proceedings] must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case the preparation of the transcript
need not commence until the fees have been deposited with the deputy clerk of the court. The lower
court did not err by requiring Braham to pay for the justices court trial transcript. NRS 189.030(1)
Establishes the time frame for transmitting transcripts of appealed cases. It says nothing about
costs. NRS 4.410(2) Establishes who pays for the transcript. Therefore, when a justices court
decision is appealed, the justice of the peace sends the case to the district court within ten days
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and costs of transmission can properly be assessed to the non-indigent appellant.1 We hold that
NRS 484.385(3), In conjunction with NRS 178.482, Provides that an order of revocation becomes
effective eight days after mailing. Braham was arrested while driving prior to the effective date of
revocation. His conviction, therefore, must be vacated. Accordingly, we grant the petition for a writ
of certiorari. The clerk of this court shall issue a writ of certiorari, forthwith, directing the respondent
district court to vacate the conviction and issue a new judgment consistent with this opinion." Braham
v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 644 (1987) 747 P.2D 1390.
So, Braham in no way whatsoever makes contingent the requirement in NRS 178.030(1) that
the RMC transmit the transcript within 10 days of the filing of Coughlins 12/12/11 Notice of Appeal
upon anything whatsoever. Braham may have provided support for the contention that Coughlin
would have ultimately been responsible for paying for the transcript, had Judge Howards 12/22/11
Appeal Bond Order not operated to declare Coughlin indigent, where Braham merely provides that:
NRS 189.030(1) Establishes the time frame for transmitting transcripts of appealed cases. It
says nothing about costs. NRS 4.410(2) Establishes who pays for the transcript. Therefore,
when a justices court decision is appealed, the justice of the peace sends the case to the district
court within ten days and costs of transmission can properly be assessed to the non-indigent
appellant.1
Cost of transcripts: Petitioner for writ of certiorari was required to pay for justice's court trial
transcript. N.R.S. 189.030, Subd. 1. Braham v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 1987, 747 P.2D 1390, 103
Nev. 644. Certiorari 71
Late filing: Late filing of transcript of record of original proceedings against defendant by
justice's court on defendant's appeal of conviction to the district court did not warrant dismissal of
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underlying criminal charges against defendant. State v. O'Donnell, 1982, 646 P.2D 1217, 98 Nev.
305. Criminal Law 260.7
Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064 purporting to deny Coughlins appeal based upon
the alleged failure of Coughlin to provide a transcript is violative of ODonnell.
To be filed, a document must be received. Merely mailing a notice of appeal within the 10-
day period is not sufficient to meet the filing requirement, since filing requires the actual receipt of
the notice by the court within the time allowed by law. Even though the filing may not be timely, the
magistrate has the duty to forward the case to the district court under NRS 189.030. Op.Atty.Gen.
Opinion No. 79-4 (Feb. 16, 1979), 1979 WL 34680. 1. Braham v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court 747
P.2D 1390, 1390+ , Nev. Motorist filed petition for writ of certiorari contending that revocation of his
license did not become effective prior to his arrest for driving with revoked license. The... Dec. 31,
1987 2. Cost of transcripts Case 2. State v. O'Donnell 646 P.2D 1217, 1218+ , Nev. State petitioned
for writ of mandamus, challenging district court's order dismissing criminal complaint against
defendant on ground of late filing of transcript of record of... Jun. 25, 1982 3. Late filing Case 3. The
Honorable Paul Freitag Attention: Tom Perkins, Esq. 1979 Nev. Op. Atty. Gen. 20 + Criminal
Appeals From Municipal CourtNRS 189.010 And 189.020 Must be read in pari materia so that an
appeal from a municipal court in a criminal matter must be filed with the... 1979 1. Mailed documents
Administrative Decision Context and Analysis (2) Library References (2) Criminal Law 260.7.
Westlaw Key Number Search: ?110K260.7.
2JDC Judge Elliott's 3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064 mangles Thomas v. State, co-signs the
Canon 1 Rule 1 violations of the RMC and Judge Howard per the violations of NRS 189.030 (And
Elliott's invocation Thomas is further misplaced given the very footnote 4 thereof Elliott cites to
references the fact that per NRAP 28, the very "record" that the RMC was required to transmit to the
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2JDC under NRS 189.030 Is not transmitted in appeals from the district courts to the Nevada
Supreme Court...Further, Elliott's chicanerous order keeps referencing some "record" it is Coughlin's
responsibility to "cite" to (where the RMC fails to bates stamp the very "record" that it transmits (ie,
all the papers the RMC cares to characterize as a "filing" in 22176, but not the transcript it is required
to transmit, whether Coughlin puts up a down payment or not (and Coughlin was told to pay
Longoni, and Longoni refused to accept such from Coughlin, and hung up the phone on Coughlin
twice...Real screen and roll combo they got goin', Longoni and the RMC)...To say nothing of the
RMC's Ballard and Cassandra Jackson's fraud in failing to include in the 12/23/11 ROA the very
filings Coughlin submitted via email upon receiving written permission from Ballard herself allowing
Coughlin to submit filings via email (http://www.scribd.com/doc/158810840/10-4-11-to-1-10-12-
0204-2064-22176-Relevant-Emails-With-Missing-Filings-Interlineated-Between-Coughlin-RCA-
and-Renomunirecords-Reno-gov-ROA ), which, even if the RMCs position is that such are not
filings, regardless, the RMC is required to transmit such given they would still fall within the
purview of N.R.S. 189.030(1), which provides: The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of
appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court the transcript of the case, all other papers
relating to the case, and a certified copy of the docket. Amongst the other papers relating to the
case is a voluminous exhibit to Coughlins ).. Elliott's wrote:
"Although Appellant's arguments on appeal are unclear, Appellant raises a wide variety of
issues, including, inter alia: that he was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, that the
Municipal Court erred in failing to grant him a continuance, that the prosecution engaged in
misconduct, that he was refused an opportunity to testify on his own behalf, that certain evidence
should have been suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
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that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, and that "[f]urther improprieties and due
process deficiencies" occurred.
Unfortunately, Appellant neither supports his arguments with relevant authority nor citations
to relevant portions of the record. Most importantly, Appellant has failed to provide this Court with
a copy of the transcript of relevant proceedings in the Reno Municipal Court. The Nevada Supreme
Court has held that an "[a]ppellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide this court with
'portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal'" Thomas
v. State, 120 Nev. 37 N. 4, 83 P.3D 818 (2004) (citing NRAP 30(b)(3). Further, NRAP 28(e) provides
that "[e]very assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be supported by a reference to
the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found." While Appellant
did provide this Court with a Compact Disc containing a recording of the Municipal Court
proceedings, Appellant did not cite to the portions of the Compact Disc that he felt supported his
arguments, and it is not the responsibility of this Court to guess which portions of the Compact Disc
might support Appellant's arguments.
In short, Appellant did not satisfy his responsibility to supply and cite to relevant portions of
the record merely by producing a Compact Disc recording of the entire Municipal Court proceeding.
In light of Appellant's failure to provide this Court with an adequate appellate record, and
Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record, this Court is unable to conduct a
meaningful review of Appellant's appeal. Thus, Appellant has failed to meet his burden in providing
an adequate appellate record, and this Court must affirm the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court.1
(Fn 1: 1 It is worth noting that, pursuant to NRS 4.410(2), "[T]he fees for transcripts and copies [of
municipal court proceedings] must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case the preparation
of the transcript need not commence until the fees have been deposited with the deputy clerk of the
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court." Accordingly, NRS 189.030, Which requires the municipal court to transmit various
papers to the district court upon appeal, does not require action until such fees have been paid.
Here, it appears that Appellant never paid the requisite fees to secure the transcription of the
proceedings. For this reason, the appellate record is incomplete. ) NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that this matter is remanded back to the Reno Municipal Court for all further
proceedings. Dated this 15th day of March, 2012 /s/ Steven P. Elliott District Judge
It is simply breathtaking to witness a district court judge like Judge Steven P. Elliot of the
2JDC go from one sentence to the next essentially lying about what a statute entails (his
characterization of what NRS 189030 requires is limited to noting such requires the municipal
court to transmit various papers to the district court and so brazenly edits out the fact that such
statutory section specifically (shall) requires the municipal court to transmit the very transcript that
Elliott in the preceding sentence alleges the lack thereof justifies his asserting Coughlins allegedly
failing to meet Coughlins burden to provide the transcript as a rationale supporting Elliotts 3/15/12
Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC. Further, Elliott is therein remixing the plain language of
such statutory section he cites to, NRS 189.030 where such makes expressly clear it is the courts
burden to provide such
Only in appeals from the district court to the Nevada Supreme Court, the burden is on the
appellant to provide an adequate record enabling this court to review assignments of error. Thomas v.
State, 120 Nev.37, 43 N.4, 83 P.3D 818, 822 n.4 (2004); See also Greene V. State, 96 Nev. 555,
558,612 P.2D 686, 688 (1980); Jacobs v. State, 91 Nev. 155, 158, 532 P.2D 1034, 1036(1975).
http://www.leagle.com/decision/19801298612P2d686_11293.xml/GREENE%20v.%20STATE
Greene is actually a ridiculous Catch-22 opinion: The appellant served subpoenas duces tecum seek-
ing all personnel records pertaining to Officer Thomas. The trial court quashed the subpoenas when
appellant's counsel acknowledged that he was on a fishing expedition, merely hoping to find infor-
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mation to impeach the officer. The court also denied appellant's request for the officer's home ad-
dress.
Appellant contends it was reversible error for the court to deny him the residence address of the po-
lice officer and personnel files, which might have led to impeachment material.
///Because the personnel file is absent from the record on appeal, we cannot determine
whether the trial judge abused his discretion in precluding disclosure of its contents. See e.g., Lee v.
Sheriff, 85 Nev. 379, 455 P.2d 623 (1969). The burden to make a proper appellate record rests on
appellant.
http://www.leagle.com/decision/19751566532P2d1034_11548.xml/JACOBS%20v.%20STAT
E Jacobs, also, failed to include in the record on appeal the affidavit that supported the search
warrant without which we cannot make this determination. It is the appellant's responsibility to
provide the materials necessary for this court's review.
West keynumbers/headnotes index: 3. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL OR IN ARREST. 1063.
Necessity of motion for new trial or in arrest. (1). In general. (2). Indictment and information. (3).
Defects in preliminary proceedings. (4). Sufficiency of evidence. 492 XXIV. REVIEW.(Cont'd) (5).
Proceedings at trial in general. (6). Instructions. (7). Review on direct bill of exceptions. 1064.
Statement of grounds for new trial or in arrest. (1). In general. (2). Indictment. (3). Preliminary
proceedings. (4). Admission or exclusion of evidence. (5). Sufficiency of evidence. (6). Proceedings
at trial in general. (7). Instructions. (8). Misconduct of jury. 1064.5. Authentication of statement of
grounds for new trial. 1065. Necessity of ruling or order on motion for new trial. 1066. Exceptions to
decision on motion for new trial or in arrest. 4. RESERVED OR CERTIFIED QUESTIONS. 1068.
Cases and questions reserved or certified. (F) PROCEEDINGS, GENERALLY. 1068.5. Proceedings
in general. 1069. Time of taking proceedings. (1). In general. (2). Statutory provisions. (3). Term at
which appeal must be taken. (4). Term to which appeal must be taken. (5). Commencement of period
of limitations. (6). Effect of delay. 1070. Parties. 1070.5. Announcement or allowance in open court.
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1071. Petition or prayer. 1072. Allowance or leave from appellate court. 1073. Certificate of probable
cause or reasonable doubt. 1074. Affidavits. 1075. Payment of fees or costs. 110. CRIMINAL LAW
XXIV. REVIEW.(Cont'd) 1076. Bonds or other securities to perfect proceedings. (1). In general.. (2).
Necessity of bond or undertaking. (3). Power to require appeal bond. (4). Requisites of bonds and
undertakings. (5). Amendment, and giving new bond or undertaking. (6). Amount of security. 1077.
Proceeding in forma pauperis. 1077. 1. -- Proceeding in general. (1). In general; right to allowance.
(2). Frivolous or futile appeals; good faith. (3). Application or affidavit. (4). Hearing, determination,
certificate, and review. 1077.2. -- Free record or transcript. (1). In general. (2). Extent of transcript
allowable. (3). Application and proceedings for allowance; review. 1078. Certification of appeal.
1079. Appellate process or notice in general. 1080. Writ of error. 1081. Notice ofappeal. (1). In
general. (2). Form and requisites. (3). Service. (4). Time of giving. (4.1). -- In gen'eral. (5). -- Effect
of delay. (6). -- Excuse for deiay; extension of time and relief from default. 1081.5. Writ of certiorari
and answer or return thereto. 1082. Entry or docketing. 1083. Effect of transfer or proceedings
therefor. 1084. Supersedeas or stay of proceedings. (G) RECORD AND PROCEEDINGS NOT IN
RECORD. 1. MATTERS TO BE SHOWN BY RECORD. 1086. 1. Proceedings sustaining judgment
or order in general. 1086.2. Jurisdiction of lower court. 493 110. CRIMINAL LAW XXIV.
REVIEW.(Cont'd) 1086.3. Appointment of special judge. 1086.4. Grounds of review in general.
1086.5. Change of venue or transfer of cause. 1086.6. Proof of venue. ' 1086.7. Matters relating to
grand jury. 1086.8. Indictment, information, or complaint. 1086.9. Arraignment and plea. 1086.10.
Matters relating to petit jury. 1086.1 1 . Proceedings at trili l in general. 1086.12. Presence of
accused. 1086.13. Verdict, judgment, and sentence. 1086.14. Presentation and reservation of grounds
of review. 1087.1 . Taking and perfecting appeal or other proceeding for review. (1). In general. (2).
Process or notice. 1087.2. Making and filing bill of exceptions, case, or statement of facts. 1087.3.
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Incorporating evidence. 2. SCOPE AND CONTENTS OF RECORD. 1088.1. In general. 1088.2.
Proof of venue. 1088.3. Matters relating to grand jury. 1088.4. Indictment, information, or complaint.
1088.5. Affidavits. 1088.6. Motions. 1088.7. Arraignment and plea. 1088.8. Matters relating to petit
jury. 1088.9. Presence of accused and counsel. 1088.10. Evidence. 1088.1 1 . Instructions. 1088.12.
Verdict, judgment, or sentence. 1088.13. Opinions. 1088.14. Bill of exceptions. 1088. 15. Papers
referred to in record. 1088.16. Official certificates or statements accompanying transcript. 1088.17.
Affidavits accompa..Ying or supplementing transcript. 1088.18. Effect of incorporating matters of
record in bill of exceptions. 1088.19. Matters improperly included. 1088.20. Loss or destruction of
record. 3. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 1090. Necessity. 1090.1 . -- In general. (1). In general. (2).
Review on record, and errors on face thereof. (3). Particular matters, review of. 1090.2. -- Statutory
provisions. 1090.3. -- Venue. 1090.4. -- Preliminary proceedings. 1090.5. -- Indictment, information,
or complaint. 1090.6. -- Arraignment and plea. 1090.7. -- Continuance. 1090.8. -- Evidence. 1090.9. -
- Competency of witnesses. 1090.10. -- Affidavits. 1090.1 1 . -- Proceedings at trial in general.
1090.12. -- Matters relating to petit jury. 1090.13. -- Arguments and conduct of counsel. 1090.14. --
Instructions. 1090.15. -- Verdict, judgment, or sentence. 1090.16. -- New trial. 1090.17. -- Motions in
arrest. 1090. 18. -- Presentation of exceptions taken. 1090. 19. -- Substitutes. 1091. Form and
contents. (1). In general. (2). Setting forth errors or irregularities in general. (3). Showing as to
examination and impeachment of witnesses. (4). Setting forth errors or irregularities in admission of
evidence. (5). Setting forth errors and irregularities in exclusion of evidence. (6). Showing that
testimony was used at trial. ' (7). -Showing errors and irregularities as to petit j ury. (8). Showing as
to improper argument or conduct of counsel. (9). Setting forth errors and irregularities as to
instructions. (10). Setting forth objections, rulings, and exceptions. (11). Incorporation of evidence.
494 XXIV. REVIEW.(Cont'd) (12). Incorporating instructions. (13). Insertion of documents or
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proceedings. (14). Number of bills. (15). Construction of bilL 1092. Settlement, signing, and filing.
1092.1. -- In general. 1092.2. -- Notice of presentation for settlement. 1092.3. -- Duty to prepare bill.
1092.4. -- Time for presentation, allowance, or filing in general. 1092.5. -- Settlement, allowance, or
filing during term. 1092.6. -- Settlement, allowance, or filing after term. 1092.7. -- Time prescribed or
allowed. 1092.8. -- Compliance with requirements as to time. 1092.9. -- Extension of time. 1092.10.
_.- Compelling allowance or settlement. 1092.1 1 . -- Allowance or settlement. (1). In general. (2).
Necessity of approval, and effect of refusal or disallowance. (3). Qualification or explanation by
court. 1092.12. -- Procuring signatures of bystanders. 1092.13. -- Signature and seal. 1092.14. --
Certificate. 1092.15. -- Service. 1092.16. -- Filing. 1092.17. -- Amended or supplemental bills.
1092.18. -- Exceptions pendente lite. 1093. Scope and sufficiency. 1094. Effect of failure to make.
(1). In general. (2). Affirmance. (2. 1). -- In generaL (3). -- Affirmance where proceedings appear
regular. 1095. Striking out. 4. CASE OR. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 1097. Necessity. (1). In general.
110. CRIMINAL LAW XXIV. REVI EW. (Cont'd) (2). Arraignment and plea. (3). Continuance. (4).
Evidence. (5). Instructions. (6). New trial. 1098. Form and contents. 1099. Settlement, signing, and
filing. 1099.1. -- In general. 1099.2. -- Duty to prepare statement. 1099.3. -- Service of proposed case
or statement. 1099.4. -- Service of counter case. 1099.5. -- Settlement, allowance, or filing after term.
1099.6. -- Time prescribed or allowed. (1). In general. (2). Extension of time. (2.1). -- In general. (3).
-- Time for extension; further extensions. 1099.7. -- Due diligence and compliance with time
requirements. (1). In general. (2). Computation of time. (3). Effect of noncompliance. (4). Excuse for
delay. 1099.8. -- Laches of judge, prosecuting attorney, or clerk. 1099.9. -- Filing nunc pro tunc.
1099.10. -- Signature and seal. 1099.1 1 . -- Certificate. 1099.12. -- Service. 1099.13. -- Filing.
1099.14. -- Amended or supplemental statements. 1 100. Scope and sufficiency. 1 101. Effect of
failure to make. 1 102. Striking out. 5. ABSTRACTS OF RECORD. 1103. In general. 6.
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TRANSCRIPT OR RETURN. 1104. In general. 495 (.5). In general. (1). Necessity. (2). Caption. (3).
Form and contents in general. 110. CRIMINAL LAW XXIV. REVIEW.(Cont'd) (4). Original papers.
(5). Index and marginal notes. (6). Proceedings for preparation. (7). Supplemental transcript or return.
(8). Paper books. 7. AUTHENTICATION AND CERTIFICATION. 1 105. In general. (.5). In general.
(1). Necessity. (2). Sufficiency. A. TRANSMISSION AND FILING. 1106. In general. (1). In general.
(2). Time for transQ1ission or filing. (3). Failure to file in time. (4). Loss, destruction, or withdrawal
from files. 9. PRINTING. 1107. In general. 1 0. SERVICE OF COPIES. 1 108. In general. 1 1 .
DEFECTS AND OBJECTIONS. 1 109. In general. ( 1). In general. (2). Estoppel or waiver. (3).
Operation and effect. ' 12. AMENDMENT AND CORRECTION. 1 1 10. In general. (1). In general.
(2). Power to amend and correct errors. (3). Defects amendable. (4). By stipulation. (5). Time. (6).
Proceedings for amendment or correction. (7). Supplying omissions. (8). Certiorari to bring up
record. (9). Remission to lower court for correction of defects. 1 3. CONCLUSIVENESS AND
EFFECT. 1 1 1 1. In general. (1). In general. (2). Conclusiveness of recitals. (3). Conclusiveness of
bill of exceptions, case, or, statement of facts. (4). Conclusiveness of certificate. (5). Conflict in
record. 1 4. IMPEACHING OR CONTRADICTING. 1 1 12. In general.
Amjur appellate review 445. Duty to present adequate record West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k557, 580, 596, 619 West's Key Number Digest,
Criminal Law k1092.3, 1099.2 West's Key Number Digest, Federal Courts k691 Especially where
NRS 189.030(1) Required the RMC to transmit the very record that Judge Elliott purported to be
Coughlin's duty to transmit, the affirming of Judge Howard's "Ruling" is completely inappropriate,
especially where all of Howard's Orders and the judgment is fundamentally erroneous on its
face.McNair v. Pavlakos/McNair Development Co., 576 So. 2D 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5Th Dist.
1991).
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However, appeals to district court from inferior tribunals such as municipal and justice courts
have entirely different sets of rules attaching therein. Chief amongst these differences is the manner
in which the transcript is kept, where district courts have CCRs and in the overwhelming majority
of instances, those inferior tribunals take advantage of the statutory sections allowing for audio
recording of such matters (NRS 5.010, etc., etc..).
To get an idea of how wrongheaded (fraudulent, even) and misplaced 2JDC Judge Elliotts
citation to Thomas v. State is compare the exact characterization of such in Elliotts 3/15/12 Order
Affirming alongside the portion he refers to and cites to from Thomas v. State, alongside NRS
189.030 (which, unbelievably, Elliott manages to cite to in the sentence immediately after his
specious citation to Thomas v. State, though Elliott is careful to misrepresent the text of NRS
189.030, in, arguably, a Sierra Glass violation that Elliotts leaving his judicial position in sua sponte
(in violation of the limits to his adjudicatory boundaries that Breliant defines (Due to the adversarial
nature of the judicial system, a court's function is generally limited to adjudicating the issues raised
by the parties on the proof they have presented and applying appropriate procedural sanctions on
motion of a party. Somers v. Chan, 110 Conn. App. 511, 955 A.2d 667 (2008).
VERTEX, INC. v. CITY OF WATERBURY, 898 A.2d 178 (2006), 278 Conn. 557. We note
that due to the adversarial nature of our judicial system, "[t]he court's function is generally limited to
adjudicating the issues raised by the parties on the proof they have presented and applying
appropriate procedural sanctions on motion of a party." (Emphasis added.) F. James, G. Hazard & J.
Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure (5th Ed. 2001) 1.2, p. 4. The parties may, under our rules of practice,
challenge the legal sufficiency of a claim at two points prior to the commencement of trial. First, a
party may challenge the legal sufficiency of an adverse party's claim by filing a motion to strike.
Practice Book 10-39. Second, a party may move for summary judgment and request the trial court
to render judgment in its favor if there is no genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book 17-44, 17-49. In both instances, the rules of practice
require a party to file a written motion to trigger the trial court's determination of a dispositive
question of law. The rules of practice do not provide the trial court with authority to determine
dispositive questions of law in the absence of such a motion.
In two recent decisions, we considered the boundaries of a trial court's discretion to determine
dispositive questions of law on the eve of trial and in a manner inconsistent with the procedures
established in the rules of practice. First, in Krevis v. Bridgeport, supra, 262 Conn. at 815, 817 A.2d
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628, the trial court, on the day jury selection was to commence, heard oral arguments on the
defendant's motion in limine to prohibit references to punitive damages and attorney's fees because of
the defendant's governmental immunity as a municipality. During the course of the oral argument, the
defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the governmental immunity statute. Id., at
820, 817 A.2d 628. The trial court granted the defendant's motion in limine because it determined that
the governmental immunity statute applied. Id. The court emphasized that it was not ruling on the
legal validity of the plaintiff's claim, but notedthat it would be willing to expand its ruling to consider
this issue. Id. After a recess, the plaintiff asked the court to rule on the legal sufficiency of its claim.
Id., at 821, 817 A.2d 628. The parties, at defense counsel's suggestion, agreed that the plaintiff's
request should be treated as an oral motion for summary judgment. Id. Thereafter, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. Id., at 821-22, 817 A.2d 628. On appeal, we concluded
that, by deciding "a dispositive question of law that the parties ... [submitted] to the court orally,
without a written motion or compliance with certain applicable provisions of the Practice Book"; id.,
at 818, 817 A.2d 628; the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id., at 824, 817 A.2d 628. We
determined that, although the plaintiff's oral motion for summary judgment violated the rules of
practice, the plaintiff's counsel knowingly had waived the procedural requirements for a motion for
summary judgment. Id.; cf. Mamudovski v. BIC Corp., 78 Conn.App. 715, 721-25, 829 A.2d 47
(2003) (trial court abused its discretion when it ruled on defendant's oral motion for summary
judgment in violation of procedural requirements of rules of practice because plaintiff objected to this
procedure), appeal dismissed, 271 Conn. 297, 857 A.2d 328 (2004).
We also considered the scope of a trial court's discretion to consider dispositive questions of
law outside the boundaries of the rules of practice in McNamara v. Tournament Players Club of
Connecticut, Inc.,270 Conn. 179, 851 A.2d 1154 (2004). In that case, the trial court at first denied the
defendant's request for permission to file a motion for summary judgment after the case had been
assigned for trial, but it reconsidered its decision during jury selection. Id., at 186-87, 851 A.2d 1154.
After a recess to give the parties time to review the briefs previously filed, the parties argued the
defendant's motion for summary judgment and the trial court made a preliminary ruling granting the
defendant's motion on all but one of the counts of the plaintiff's complaint. Id., at 188-91, 851 A.2d
1154. During argument on the motion, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' request to present to the
court written opposition to the defendant's motion by the next morning. Id., at 190, 851 A.2d 1154.
The court reconvened the hearing the next morning, and the plaintiffs offered additional argument on
the lone count on which the trial court had not issued a preliminary ruling. Id., at 191, 851 A.2d 1154.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendant on all counts. Id. On appeal, we
rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court could not sua sponte raise and decide a motion for
summary judgment in violation of the rules of practice. Id., at 192-93, 851 A.2d 1154. We concluded
in McNamara that, under our decision in Krevis, the trial court has discretion to decide a dispositive
question of law that previously had been presented to it, without complying with the procedural
provisions in the rules of practice. Id., at 193, 851 A.2d 1154. We also concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion on the grounds that it did not give the plaintiffs a fair opportunity to
respond to the defendant's motion. Id. First, we observed that the plaintiffs did not voice any
objection to the trial court's procedure either during or after the proceedings on the motion for
summary judgment. Id., at 194, 851 A.2d 1154. Second, we noted that the plaintiffs agreed to decide
the legal questions in this manner. The plaintiffs' counsel stated that "if the case were destined to be
subject to a directed verdict for the defendant, `then we might as well save it and litigate the issue' on
appeal." Id. Finally, we reasoned that the plaintiffs had a fair opportunity to respond to the motion
because the plaintiffs'counsel stated that he was ready to argue the defendant's motion, the trial court
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gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to submit a written opposition to the defendant's motion, and the
plaintiffs had an opportunity to challenge the trial court's preliminary rulings when the hearing
reconvened the next morning. Id., at 194-96, 851 A.2d 1154.
Our decisions in Krevis and McNamara affirming the exercise of the trial court's discretion
under its case management authority to determine dispositive questions of law on the eve of trial
outside the procedural provisions of the rules of practice readily are distinguishable from the facts of
the present case in several critical respects. First, in both of these cases, the dispositive question of
law was raised in a written motion filed by one of the parties. In McNamara, the defendant's motion
for summary judgment had been filed previously. In Krevis, the issue of governmental immunity was
raised by the defendant's motion in limine. Second, the parties in both cases agreed that the trial court
could decide the question of law despite noncompliance with the rules of practice. Finally, the trial
court provided the nonmoving party, the plaintiffs in both cases, with a reasonable opportunity to
respond to the dispositive motion.
In the present case, none of these important facts was present. First, as noted previously
herein, the trial court in its memorandum of decision acknowledged that no motion to strike or
motion for summary judgment had been filed. The pretrial briefs that led to the dismissal of two
counts of the complaint were filed on the trial judge's order and not at the initiative of either party.
Second, the record does not demonstrate that the plaintiff knowingly waived the applicable
procedures under the rules of practice for dispositive motions.
8
Rather, the record shows that the
plaintiff expressed its objection to the trial court's procedure in dismissing its first two counts by
filing a notice of intent to appeal the day after the trial court issued its memorandum of decision and
by filing a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial asserting that the trial court should not
have dismissed the first two counts in the manner that it did. Finally, the record does not reveal that
the plaintiff had a fair opportunity to respond to the potential dismissal of claims because it lacked
notice that the trial court intended to use the parties' pretrial briefs to rule on the legal sufficiency of
its claims. See Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir.1996) (even where court
may render summary judgment sua sponte, it must "first [give] the targeted party appropriate notice
and a chance to present its evidence on the essential elements of the claim or defense"). While neither
party could recall definitively during oral argument in this court whether the trial court explained its
objective in having the parties submit pretrial briefs, the trial court's memorandum of decision states
that it "requested the parties to brief in advance of the imminent trial the legal theories on which this
case has been brought." Accordingly, it does not appear that the plaintiff had notice that the trial court
might dismiss its claims based on the pretrial briefs.
We conclude that, on these facts, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the first two
counts of the plaintiff's complaint. The trial court's broad case management authority simply does not
extend so far as to permit the court to: (1) initiate the pretrial disposition of a claim based on the
court's perception of its legal insufficiency; and (2) proceed to consider such disposition (a) in
disregard of the procedural protections provided in our rules of practice without the agreement of
counsel and (b) without notice to the parties and a reasonable opportunity for the plaintiff to oppose
the disposition of its claims.
The defendant argues that the trial court had ample authority to dismiss sua sponte the
plaintiff's first two counts under Practice Book 15-1
9
and 16-9,
10
and under General Statutes 52-
216.
11
We disagree. Both the cited rules of practice and 52-216 stand solely for the general
proposition that, at trial, issues of law should be tried before factual issues and that the trial court
must decide all issues of law. None of these sections authorizes the trial court to act as it did in the
present case, determining, sua sponte, dispositive legal questions without a motion pending, without
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the plaintiff's waiver of applicable procedural rules of practice, and without giving the plaintiff a fair
opportunity to respond.
12
FN: 8. If the defendant had moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff would have
had the opportunity to file an opposing memorandum of law to the motion. See Practice Book
17-45 (summary judgment motion must be placed on short calendar no less than fifteen days
after it was filed and adverse party may, within ten days of filing motion, request that motion
be placed on short calendar no less than thirty days after filing of request for extension);
Practice Book 11-10 (adverse party may file memorandum of law "on or before the time the
matter appears on short calendar"). In addition, if the defendant had moved for summary
judgment, the plaintiff would have had a right to argue the motion orally. Practice Book 11-
18. In the present case, the trial court required the plaintiff to submit its brief simultaneously
with the defendant's, the plaintiff was given approximately four days to submit its brief to the
trial court, and the plaintiff was not provided an opportunity to argue orally before the trial
court dismissed the counts.
9. Practice Book 15-1 provides in relevant part: "Where the pleadings in an action
present issues both of law and of fact, the issues of law must be tried first, unless the judicial
authority otherwise directs...."
10. Practice Book 16-9 provides in relevant part: "The judicial authority shall decide
all issues of law and all questions of law arising in the trial of any issue of fact...."
11. General Statutes 52-216 provides in relevant part: "The court shall decide all
issues of law and all questions of law arising in the trial of any issue of fact...."
12. The defendant also argues that, even if the trial court improperly dismissed the first
two counts, it was harmless because the factual underpinnings of the plaintiff's three counts
were the same and the trial court renewed its inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the first two
counts during oral argument on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. We disagree.
Although the core of the factual allegations underlying the dismissed counts and the
remaining unjust enrichment count were essentially the same, there are obvious differences in
what the plaintiff needed to prove to prevail on each count. Specifically, to prevail on its
estoppel claim, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant did or said "something which
[was] intended or calculated to induce [the plaintiff] to believe in the existence of certain facts
and to act on that belief; and the [plaintiff], influenced thereby, must [have changed] his
position or [did] some act to [its] injury which [it] otherwise would not have done." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) John J. Brennan Construction Corp., Inc. v. Shelton, 187 Conn.
695, 711, 448 A.2d 180 (1982). In addition, the plaintiff had to "show that he exercised due
diligence to ascertain the truth and that he not only lacked knowledge of the true state of
things but had no convenient means of acquiring that knowledge." (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. By contrast, to prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment the plaintiff had to prove:
"(1) that the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the
plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Whalers Hockey Club v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire
Co., 231 Conn. 276, 283, 649 A.2d 518 (1994). Further, the facts that the plaintiff would have
needed to prove to prevail on its dismissed breach of contract count stand in even starker
contrast to the facts necessary to prove unjust enrichment because proof of an operative
contract would have been incompatible with recovery on an unjust enrichment
theory. Meaney v. Connecticut Hospital Assn., Inc., 250 Conn. 500, 517, 735 A.2d 813 (1999)
("express contract between the parties precludes recognition of an implied-in-law contract
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governing the same subject matter" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Although the trial
court gave the plaintiff an opportunity to present oral argument on the dismissed counts
during the defendant's directed verdict motion, nothing in the record shows that the plaintiff
had notice prior to trial that the trial court would renew its inquiry on the legal sufficiency of
these counts during the trial. Moreover, once the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's first two
counts prior to the trial, the plaintiff had no reason to put on its case on these counts. We reject
the defendant's claim that the plaintiff was not harmed by the trial court's dismissal of the first
two counts of its complaint. VERTEX, INC. v. CITY OF WATERBURY, 898 A.2d 178
(2006), 278 Conn. 557.
A court speaks only through its written orders. Hernandez v. Com., 281 Va. 222, 707
S.E.2d 273 (2011).) coming up with all these wonderfully fraudulent legal arguments and citations to
inapplicable authority that RCA Roberts in no way came up with on her own in her pathetic
Answering Brief (really, a thorough review of all of Coughlins cases reveal that the judiciary has by
and large given the RCA and WCDAs Office a complete and utter pass, allowing the most tepid of
arrangements (and, many, many times, total Polk v. State, DCR 13(3) failures to file any opposition at
all or otherwise address Coughlins arguments, to carry the day.
Judge Nash Holmes' reverting to her lifelong prosecutor role (an executive function) in
illegally confiscating out of where it was already booked into Coughlin's personal property at the
Washoe County jail, several items) is arguably not deserving of judicial immunity. (enforcing and
arbitrating a state's rules of ethics; Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 74 Ed. Law Rep. 55, 22 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d 580 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, (July 2, 1992).
Judge Howard's researching case law as to whether there was some way he could deny
indigent Coughlin his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (and fraudulently applying such where his
10/27/11 Order failed to exclude the possibility of incarceration) arguably does not deserve judicial
immunity, nor does Judge Elliott's doing RCA Roberts job in his 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of
the RMC in cr11-2064 (both prosecutorial/executive functions taken from the bench...which Judge
Clifton does constantly). (researching the law applicable to a plaintiff's tax situation; Christensen v.
Ward, 916 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990).
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Such an environment has atrophied the ethics, not to mention legal skills of these prosecutors.
When they are put upon to make some legal argument, it is striking how completely pathetic their
grasp of not only the factual materials is, but, even more alarming, is the extent to which they simply
do not know the law very well (though, for RCA Wong, whom served as an RJC Justice of the Peace
for seven and a half years from 1991 to 1998, such is a rather dubious pose he takes, particularly in
the context of the criminal trespass case incident to the very summary eviction law centric 1708 in
26405, especially where Wong was a Justice of the Peace in such court of limited jurisdiction where
one of those few areas included within that limited jurisdiction is landlord tenant law, and therefore,
summary evictions. Also, Coughlin suspects that these prosecutors know full well some of the very
law they feign to be unaware of (such as Coughlins right to serve them via facsimile, the prohibition
against the motions and settings they make in violations of the stay during the pendency of
competency evaluation orders under NRS 178.405, etc., etc., the improper remarks during closing
arguments, DDA Youngs coercive attempts (in chorus with RJC Judge Sferrazza) to force Coughlin
to waive his Fifth Amendment rights, etc., etc.)
Elliots 3/15/12 Order cites to and refers to the following from Thomas v. State:
[1]
As a
preliminary matter, we note that Thomas's counsel did not adequately cite to the record in his briefs
or provide this court with an adequate record. In support of factual assertions, counsel simply cites
the supplemental habeas petition filed below. This is improper.
3
Additionally, counsel failed to
include many necessary parts of the record in the Appellant's Appendix. We are able to address the
merits of a number of claims only because the State provided a seven-volume appendix that includes
necessary parts of the record.
4
3
NRAP 28(e) provides: Every assertion in briefs regarding matters in the
record shall be supported by a reference to the page of the transcript or
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appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. The rule also prohibits a
brief to this court from incorporating by reference briefs or memoranda filed
in district court.
4
In the reply brief, Thomas's counsel states his belief that this court has the
direct appeal record and chastises the State for wasting paper in its appendix.
Counsel is mistaken. The clerk of this court does not retain the direct appeal
record. Rather, SCR 250(7)(b) provides that the clerk of the district court
shall retain the original record ... and shall not transmit a record on appeal to
the supreme court. Appellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide this
court with portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised
in appellant's appeal. NRAP 30(b)(3); see also Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555,
558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980); Jacobs v. State, 91 Nev. 155, 158, 532 P.2d
1034, 1036 (1975).
Somehow, Elliott then has the hutzpah to refer to the very NRS 189.030 the
makes completely inapplicable his immediately prior thereto citation to
Thomas v. State.
Somehow, Elliot then has the hutpah (or just plain lack of respect for the dignity of the
judiciary much less the intelligence of the people of Nevada) to reference the very NRS 189.030 the
makes completely inapplicable his immediately prior thereto citation to Thomas v. State. (though,
Elliott hedged his bets some by mischaracterizing the ruling in Thomas v. State as well as
misrepresenting the text of NRS 189.030)
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NRS 189.030 Transmission of transcript, other papers, sound recording and copy of
docket to district court.
1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk
of the district court the transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified
copy of the docket.
2. The justice shall give notice to the appellant or the appellants attorney that the
transcript and all other papers relating to the case have been filed with the clerk of the district court.
Now, consider that Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC distorts all of the
above where it reads: Unfortunately, Appellant neither supports his arguments with relevant
authority nor citations to relevant portions of the record. Most importantly, Appellant has failed to
provide this Court with a copy of the transcript of relevant proceedings in the Reno Municipal Court.
The Nevada Supreme Court has held that an "[a]ppellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide
this court with 'portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in appellant's
appeal'" Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37 N. 4, 83 P.3D 818 (2004) (citing NRAP 30(b)(3). Further,
NRAP 28(e) provides that "[e]very assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be
supported by a reference to the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is
to be found." While Appellant did provide this Court with a Compact Disc containing a recording of
the Municipal Court proceedings, Appellant did not cite to the portions of the Compact Disc that
he felt supported his arguments, and it is not the responsibility of this Court to guess which
portions of the Compact Disc might support Appellant's arguments.
In short, Appellant did not satisfy his responsibility to supply and cite to relevant portions of
the record merely by producing a Compact Disc recording of the entire Municipal Court proceeding.
In light of Appellant's failure to provide this Court with an adequate appellate record, and
Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record, this Court is unable to conduct a
meaningful review of Appellant's appeal. Thus, Appellant has failed to meet his burden in providing
an adequate appellate record, and this Court must affirm the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court.1
(Fn 1: 1 It is worth noting that, pursuant to NRS 4.410(2), "[T]he fees for transcripts and copies [of
municipal court proceedings] must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case the preparation
of the transcript need not commence until the fees have been deposited with the deputy clerk of the
court." Accordingly, NRS 189.030, Which requires the municipal court to transmit various
papers to the district court upon appeal, does not require action until such fees have been paid.
Here, it appears that Appellant never paid the requisite fees to secure the transcription of the
proceedings. For this reason, the appellate record is incomplete. ) NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that this matter is remanded back to the Reno Municipal Court for all further
proceedings. Dated this 15th day of March, 2012 /s/ Steven P. Elliott District Judge
Coughlin appealed. He did not order the transcript in the sense Judge Elliott references in
invoking NRS 4.410(2). Rather, Nevada law required the municipal court Judge Howard to order the
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transcript prepared and transmit it. Judge Elliott fraudulently focuses on his contention that
Appellant did not cite to the portions of the Compact Disc that he felt supported his arguments
(Coughlin disputes this, anyways) while Elliott completely fails to address the fact that Coughlins
extensive, dense, highly researched and crafter Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Opening Brief, and
the Supplements to Coughlins brief cite to the 452 page ROA filed by the RMC on 12/23/11
extensively (and, if NRAP is going to be invoked, then Judge Elliott might as well sua sponte
mention the RMCs failure to bates stamp the ROA or arrange it into volumes of now more than 250
pages per volume, etc per NRAP 10, 11, etc.) Further, Coughlin went a step beyond that in
attempting to provide to the district court those related papers that the RMCs Howard, Ballard, and
Jackson fraudulently failed to include amongst that transmitted under NRS 189.030(1) (ie, the
emailed filings that the RMC selectively chose not to include, where some were, some were not,
included by the RMC (ie, 11/29/11 Subpoena, and the 12/8/11 Records Request submitted via email
only, where included in the 12/23/11 ROA, whereas Coughlins 901 page 12/12/11 Motion for New
Trial was not, etc., etc).
Regardless, Judge Elliott knew full well he was required to judge the appeal on the record:
NRS 189.050 Action to be judged on record. An appeal duly perfected transfers the action to the
district court to be judged on the record.
The transcript of the trial always going to be relevant, and where, in 22176, the only other
proceeding was the 10/10/11 arraignment in violation of NRS 178.405 (well, actually, Coughlin
hereby requests the district court order the RMC to provide to Coughlin or to Coughlin through the
district court any audio of the 11/14/11 original trial date wherein Coughlin was brought to the court
in jail reds, as he was incarcerated incident to the 11/13/11 wrongful trespass arrest, and RMC Judge
Howard wound up revoking Coughlins bail, and raising it to $1,000 despite the fine schedule for a
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conviction of petty larceny in the RMC at such time being on $360 (meaning, the RMC converted the
$360 cash bail Coughlin posted on 9/9/11, and then foisted another $1,000 bail on top of that for a
misdemeanor, to which the jurisdiction for fines extends only to $1,000... especially where Judge
Howards original 11/30/11 Judgment of Conviction and Court Order included a community service
requirement that he excised, on the record, in absentia of the city attorney, at 8:30 pm at night on
11/30/11 in admitting to Coughlin he was mistaken in his earlier belief (which he referenced on the
record as justifying his denial of Coughlins motion for a continuance) that Coughlin had caused the
continuance of the original 11/14/11 trial date in 22176 (2064). Howards remedy for his mistake
(he was well aware such continuance of the 11/14/11 date was not Coughlins fault, as Howard had
vacated his original response to such continuance on 11/14/11 where the $1,000 bail requirement was
rescinded.
How funny is this? Coughlins trial before RMC Judge Howard on 11/30/11 occurred on the
very same day as this filing in ADKT410: 11-36708 - Case Search where such filing includes the
following:
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=24755
And, actuallyRMC Judge Howard did declare Coughlin indigent, after all, where,
having already converted the $360.00 cash bail Coughlin posted on 9/10/11 for the 9/9/11 arrest
to a fine (meaning, given the RMCs standard practice of crediting an individual with $100 per day
(with a day including any part of a calendar day spent in custody) credit for time served, with
absolutely no aggravating circumstances whatsoever, other than Coughlin attempting to defend
himself in accord with his rights as a criminal defendant, Judge Howard fined Coughlin some $560
where the normal fine would be $360).
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Judge Howard so converted Coughlins $360 cash bail to a fine on 11/30/11. As such, Judge
Howards 12/22/11 Appeal Bond Order declared Coughlin indigent such that the even the
misapplication of NRS 4.410(2) that 2JDC Judge Elliott attempted to pass of as an excuse for the
RMC failing to abide by NRS 189.030(1) fails to operate as an excuse, particularly in a criminal case
and particularly in light of Braham.
Further, RMC Court Administrator Cassandra Jacksons Certficate of 12/22/11 is fraudulent
in both failing to include all papers relating to 11CR22176 (especially in light to the written
permission to file via email RMC Donna Ballard provided to Coughlin and the concomitant failure of
Ballard and Jackson to include many such items in the ROA (whilst including some, such as
Coughlins 12/14/11 Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis, indicating the RMC was selective in
deciding what emailed filings by Coughlin it wished to see transmitted in the 12/23/11 ROA filed in
CR11-2064). Jacksons 12/22/11 Certificate excises the language in NRS 189.030(1) requiring the
RMC to transmit the transcript where such reads: CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMITTAL OF
COMPLETE RECORD ON APPEAL I, CASSANDRA JACKSON, Interim Court Administrator
of the Reno Municipal Court, do hereby certify that the attached documents include full, true and
correct copies of all papers relating to Case Number llCR22176, including a Certified Copy of
Docket. Further, said documents have been transmitted to and filed with the clerk of the Washoe
County District Court. D Dated this,;i.DJl day of December, 2011. /s/ Cassandra Jackson, Interim
Court Administrator SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME This 22
nd
day of December, 2011
/s/ Evangelina Cabral, NOTARY PUBLIC
http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537530/12-15-11-22176-2064-Order-by-Howard-on-
Transcript-Costs
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RMC Judge Howards 12/15/11 Order reads: On November 30, 2011, Defendant Coughlin
was found guilty of the offense of Petit Larceny, a violation of RMC 8.10.040. Thereafter, Appellant
filed his Notice of Appeal on December 13, 2011. Additionally, Defendant Coughlin filed a Motion to
Vacate and/or Set Aside, Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Recusal and Motion for Publication
of Transcript at Public Expense. Appellant Coughlin requested that he be provided the trial transcript
at public expense on the basis that he was indigent. On November 14, 2011, Defendant Coughlin
filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis wherein he seeks a waiver of certain fees due to his
asserted indigence.
A. FAILURE TO PROPERLY SERVE CITY ATTORNEY
Written motions are to be served upon each of the parties. NRS
178.582. Service upon the attorney or upon a party must be made in the manner provided in
civil actions. NRS 178.584. 2
Appellant has chosen to serve the City Attorney with these various pleadings via electronic
mail. There is no provision in the Nevada Revised Statutes or the Rules of Court which denotes
electronic mail as an appropriate means of service of process. This alone is a basis for non-
consideration/denial of Appellant's various
requests.
B. MOTION FOR PUBLICATION OF TRANSCRIPT AT PUBLIC EXPENSE and
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Defendant Coughlin cites to NRS 12.015 as authority for allowing him to issue "any,
necessary writ, process, pleading or paper without charge, with the exception of jury fees because I
lack sufficient financial ability to proceed without this waiver".
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Appellant Coughlin's reference to NRS 12.015 is misplaced as that provision refers to civil
procedure. He cites no other authority for his request.
This case has gone to verdict and the defendant was found guilty. It is difficult to see what
additional costs will be incurred by Appellant Coughlin other than the trial transcript. This is not a
complex case with numerous factual or legal issues.
Mr. Coughlin is a licensed attorney-at-law who implied during trial that his incarceration for
contempt would adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in his "affidavit of poverty" does not
indicate any income from his practice of law. Of note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the
litigation of the instant matter.
This Court has not been provided sufficient information to determine Mr. Coughlin's
indigency status and will not grant him carte blanche authority to continue the fishing expedition he
conducted during the trial of this matter. Appellant's motion to further pursue this matter at public
expense is denied.
C. MOTION TO VACATE AND/OR SET ASIDE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND MOTION FOR RECUSAL
These motions will not be addressed as Defendant Coughlin has not submitted a basis for
their consideration.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Coughlin's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
and Motion for Publication of Transcript at Public Expense is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside, Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Recusal are presently DENIED.
DATED this 15
th
day of December, 2011 /s/ Kenneth R. Howard, (Municipal Court) Judge
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RMC Judge Howards 12/15/11 Order fails to adjudicate Coughlins timely filed tolling, NRS
176.515 Motion (timely where the time period allowed for such, just like the deadline for the notice
of appeal, Judge Howard ruled, would begin upon running upon the the conclusion of Coughlins
three day incarceration for summary contempt, and where Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order in CR11-
2064 arguably makes NRCP 6(a) applicable, or at least entitles Coughlin to rely upon such indication.
Regardless, even if NRS 178.476 is applied to Coughlins 12/12/11 filed (though file stamped
12/13/11 by the RMC, Coughlin email such to the RMC on 12/12/11, and the RMC has failed, again,
to abide by NRS 189.030(1) where such requires the RMC to transmit all related papers not just
those which the RMC later decides to characterize as filings, to the district court):
8.10.040 M Petit Larceny, Value Less than $250 First Offense $ 355 in 22176
8.10.010 Trespassing $305 in 26405 (where Coughlin was in jail from 11/13/11 to 11/15/11, three
days credit for time served at $100 per day, plus a fine of $305, meaning RMC Judge W. Gardner
doubled the standard sentence where the RCA requested absolutely nothing more than the standard
sentence and offered no aggravating evidence whatsoever).
Further, where the Duract Cough Melts allegedly recovered from Coughlins pocket upon the
search incident to the arrest by the RSIC Officers (they and Wal-Marts Frontino, and RCA Roberts
admit that neither Walmart nor its associates made a citizens arrest of Coughlin and that the alleged
crime did not occur within the presence of the tribal police officers (where tribal police officers are
prohibited from making misdemeanor arrests pursuant to NRS 171.1255) and that such alleged crime
occurred between 7 pm and 7 am) are obviously explained by the entry on the $83.82 receipt
Coughlin produced for the items he purchased minutes prior to the arrest (where Walmarts Frontino
admits Coughlin made such purchasesave the one listed on such receipt for the Duract Cough
Melts, as Frontino took his cues from the forty five minute coaching session she had with him prior to
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the trial resulting in Frontino testifying that he personally witnessed every item wrung up at the time
made the purchases resulting in the $83.82 receipt, and was absolutely sure an entry with the UPC of
the very Duract Cough Melts Frontino alleged Coughlin to have consumed while shopping was not
listed therein (which is incorrect, as such UPC is, in fact, listed therein). The 9/14/11 file stamped and
9/9/11 signed Criminal Complaint (Petit Larceny) by Walmarts Frontino alleges that Coughlin did
take or carry away Walmart property where the record contains absolutely no evidence that
Coughlin did any such taking or carrying away where Frontino alleges Coughlin consumed such
items while shopping, and, therefore, metabolized such items into something other prior to any taking
or carrying away of such items. Rather, such consuming while shopping would be more supportive
of a destruction of property charge. The petty larceny conviction is not supported by the evidence.
RMC 8.10.040. Petit larceny. It is unlawful for any person to take or carry away the property
of another with the intent to deprive the owner of his property therein, in any value less than $250.00,
And for his conviction therefor, he shall be fined in an amount not more than $1,000.00 And/or be
incarcerated not more than six months. In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the
person to pay restitution.
NRS 205.445 Defrauding proprietor of hotel, inn, restaurant, motel or similar
establishment.
1. It is unlawful for a person:
(a) To obtain food, foodstuffs, lodging, merchandise or other accommodations at any
hotel, inn, trailer park, motor court, boardinghouse, rooming house, lodging house, furnished
apartment house, furnished bungalow court, furnished automobile camp, eating house, restaurant,
grocery store, market or dairy, without paying therefor, with the intent to defraud the proprietor or
manager thereof;
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(c) After obtaining credit, food, lodging, merchandise or other accommodations at a hotel,
inn, trailer park, motor court, boardinghouse, rooming house, lodging house, furnished apartment
house, furnished bungalow court, furnished automobile camp, eating house, restaurant, grocery store,
market or dairy, to abscond or surreptitiously, or by force, menace or threats, to remove any part of
his or her baggage therefrom, without paying for the food or accommodations.
2. A person who violates any of the provisions of subsection 1 shall be punished:
(a) Where the total value of the credit, food, foodstuffs, lodging, merchandise or other
accommodations received from any one establishment is $650 or more, for a category D felony as
provided in NRS 193.130. In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay
restitution.
(b) Otherwise, for a misdemeanor.
3. Proof that lodging, food, foodstuffs, merchandise or other accommodations were
obtained by false pretense, or by false or fictitious show or pretense of any baggage or other property,
or that the person refused or willfully neglected to pay for the food, foodstuffs, lodging, merchandise
or other accommodations, or that the person gave in payment for the food, foodstuffs, lodging,
merchandise or other accommodations negotiable paper on which payment was refused, or that the
person absconded without paying or offering to pay for the food, foodstuffs, lodging, merchandise or
other accommodations, or that the person surreptitiously removed or attempted to remove his or her
baggage, is prima facie evidence of the fraudulent intent mentioned in this section.
4. This section does not apply where there has been an agreement in writing for delay in
payment for a period to exceed 10 days.
[1:132:1939; 1931 NCL 3333.01] + [1911 C&P 461; A 1917, 35; 1931, 391; 1949,
109; 1943 NCL 10414](NRS A 1967, 505; 1979, 1448; 1989, 1437; 1995, 1226; 2011, 169)
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Obviously, the City of Reno had a much tougher case having to prove the specific intent
requirement found in NRS 205.445. Further, as to 60838, the conviction of petty larceny under its
incarnation in RMC 8.10.040 lacks a finding of the specific intent necessary to characterize such a
serious crime.
Additionally, where the RCA offered no evidence whatsoever that Coughlin does not have any
tribal blood, the NRS 189.070(1) requires dismissal of the complaint in light of the RCAs admission
that the alleged petty larceny in 22176 occurred on tribal land and the misdemeanor arrest was made
by tribal police officers. Further, Pursuant to NRS 189.070(3), the facts stated in the 11/13/11
Criminal Complaint (trespass) in 26405 fail to constitute a public offense where there was never a
lockout performed incident to the 10/27/11 summary removal order in light of the fact that the
purported lockout of 11/1/11 was in complete and utter violation of the requirements to accord the
tenant 24 hours from receipt of the summary removal order prior to the sheriff (and only the
sheriff or constable, ie, Hill and landlord Merliss are precluded from subsequently performing
another quasi lockout of their own) performing such a lockout. The City of Reno, v. Zachary B.
Coughlin, Esq. (so much for the State Bar of Nevada and RMCs lame attempts to characterize
Coughlins 12/14/11 filing of a IFP Motion and Declaration in Support thereof to be somehow
fraudulent in light of the failure of page 1 of such to identify Coughlin as an attorney (never mind the
fact that that filing was also filed via facsimile that did include a cover sheet containing all the
information purportedly required by RMC Rule 5 (including Coughlins NV Bar #, etcwhere the
RMC chose to include in the 7/26/12 ROA in CR12-1262 from such 11 cr 26405 trespass case only
the faxed version of the 12/14/11 IFP Motion by Coughlin where Coughlin also filed via email
(where such email quite clearly identifies Coughlin as an attorney as had numerous previous filings
and emails by Coughlin in and to the RMC) (and certainly no fax cover sheet) on such filing so so
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much for RMC Court Administrator Jackson and Filing Officer Supervisor Ballards fraudulent
failure to include Coughlins other email filings (such as the 901 page 12/12/11 Motion for New
Trial/Notice of Appeal in 22716 in the 12/23/11 ROA in CR11-2064.at page 25 of the 12/23/11
ROA in CR11-2064, is the 11/29/11 Subpoena and Subpoena Duces Tecum that the RMCs Donna
Ballard printed off from the filing Coughlin submitted via email only to the RMC upon Ballard
providing Coughlin with written permission to submit filings via email. The RMC is stuck with
that and now must explain why it failed to obey NRS 189.030(1)s requirement to transmit all
related papers in the ROAs in CR11-2064 and CR12-1262 where some such filings by email by
Coughlin have been selectively excised therefrom, in a fraudulent manner
http://www.scribd.com/doc/171731158/11-29-11-Subpoena-and-Duces-Tecum-on-WalMart-Filed-
Email-Only-After-Written-Permission-File-by-Email-RMC-Ballard-Fraudulent-Excision-Per-NRS-
189-030-1 ) Criminal Complaint) filled out in Richard G. Hill, Esq.s handwriting and signed by
Hill in 11/13/11 merely reads: Criminal Complaint (GENERAL) I
NRS 189.070 Grounds for dismissal of complaint on appeal. Any complaint,
upon motion of the defendant, may be dismissed upon any of the following grounds:
1. That the justice of the peace did not have jurisdiction of the offense.
2. That more than one offense is charged in any one count of the complaint.
3. That the facts stated do not constitute a public offense.
Further, the RMCs Ballard fraudulently refused to allow Coughlin to obtain a copy of the
9/14/11 file stamped Criminal Complaint in 22176 and the Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable
Cause attached thereto until after the 10/10/11 arraignment, which was void in light of its being held
during the pending of an Order for Competency Evaluation per NRS 178.405). The RMC and RCA
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routinely conspire to prejudice defendants cases by refusing to afford defendants access to filings
and police reports they are absolutely entitled to until an artificially short period of time prior to the
trial, obstructing the defendants ability to prepare their defense and conduct discovery, subpoena
witnesses, etc.
records request for incident report urgent please

From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent:Tue 10/04/11 3:10 PM
To:renomunirecords@reno.gov
1 attachment
records request to reno city attorneys office oct 4.pdf (66.5 KB)
RenoMuniRecords@reno.gov
Dear Reno City Attorney Records Department.
My name is Zach Coughlin. I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to an arrest
at the E. 2nd St. Walmart by the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police on or about Saturday October
10th, 2011 at between approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and all records, video, audio,
paper documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am representing myself. I have sought these
records from the Reno Municipal Court's Records Office and they kept telling me they didn't have
them yet and that I should return sometime soon. Finally, they admitted the do not keep these records
and they must be obtained from your office. The RSIC Police refused to give me a copy of these
records. This delay has unduly prejudiced my case and I request that you provide these records to me
at once, with no delay, please. I believe this case should be dismissed.
Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin signed electronically and signed in attached PDF. I can come pick the records
up with identification if that is required or I hereby give you permission to email them to me or mail
them to the address below:
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
records request
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent:Tue 10/04/11 4:41 PM
To:renomunirecords@reno.gov
2 attachments
RMC subpoena.pdf (67.8 KB) , RECORD_REQUEST_Zach Coughlin to RMC.pdf (20.2
KB)
October 4, 2011
Dear Reno Municipal Court Records Division,
My name is Zach Coughlin. I have now been informed by both the Reno Municipal Court and
the Reno City Attorney's officer, and the Reno Sparks Indian Colony none of these entities can
provide my requested records. You have them, I believe I have a constitutional right to them. If you
feel differently, please explain in writing why that is the case.
1
I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to IC110627 at the E. 2nd St. Walmart
by the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police on or about Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between
approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and all records, video, audio, paper documentation or
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otherwise that I have a right to. I am representing myself. I have sought these records from the Reno
Municipal Court's Records Office and they kept telling me they didn't have them yet and that I should
return sometime soon. Finally, they admitted they do not keep these records and they must be
obtained from your the Reno City Attorney's Office. At the RMC records window I spoke with a
supervisor named Karen. She denied my request for these records today. This delay has unduly
prejudiced my case and I request that you provide these records to me at once, with no delay, please.
The RS Indian Colony Police refused to give me a copy of these records today when I spoke with
Sargent Avansino, who was polite and helpful otherwise. I believe this case should be dismissed.
Signed electronically and signed in a signed attached PDF. I can come pick the records up
with identification if that is required or I hereby give you permission to email them to me or mail
them to the address below:
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Compare the Certificate of Transmittal of Complete Record on Appeal by RMC Court
Administrator Cassandra Jackson of 7/26/12 in cr12-1262 with that she made in cr11-2064 on
12/23/11, where that of 7/26/12 actually does include the transcript (or at least promise of) required
by NRS 189.030(1): CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMITTAL OF COMPLETE RECORD ON APPEAL
I, Cassandra Jackson, Court Administrator of the Reno Municipal Court, do hereby certity that the
attached documents include full, true and correct copies of all papers relating to Case Number 11 CR
2640521, including a Certified Copy of Docket, Plaintiff's exhibits 1- 3. Further, said documents have
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been transmitted to and filed with the clerk of the Washoe County District Court. Transcript to follow.
/s/ Cassandra Jackson, Court Administrator (thereafter notarized by the RMCs Lisa Wagner).
Further, RCA Wongs apparent contention that Coughlins 6/26/12 filing in the trespass case
in 26405 was not a NRS 176.515 Motion is undone by the entry at page 6 of the 7/25/12 ROA in
cr12-1262: 26 June 2012: Motion for New Trial filed by defendant..
What Richard G. Hill, Esq. and his landlord client Merliss did in the trespass matter in 11 CR
26405 is tantamount to a violation of the following:
BURGLARY; INVASION OF THE HOME
NRS 205.060 Burglary: Definition; penalties; venue.
NRS 205.065 Inference of burglarious intent.
NRS 205.067 Invasion of the home: Definition; penalties; venue.
NRS 205.070 Commission of another crime while committing burglary or invasion of
the home.
NRS 205.075 Burglary with explosives; penalty.
NRS 205.080 Possession of instrument with burglarious intent; making, alteration or
repair of instrument for committing offense; penalty.
Along with the RCAs choice to charge Coughlin under the easier to get a conviction for RMC
8.10.040 than a corollary in NRS, comes the pricethere is nothing in RMC 8.10.040 that supports
destroying property as being tantamount to petty larceny.
NRS 205.0832 Actions which constitute theft.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, a person commits theft if, without
lawful authority, the person knowingly:
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(a) Controls any property of another person with the intent to deprive that person of the
property.
(b) Converts, makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, or without authorization
controls any property of another person, or uses the services or property of another person entrusted
to him or her or placed in his or her possession for a limited, authorized period of determined or
prescribed duration or for a limited use.
(c) Obtains real, personal or intangible property or the services of another person by a
material misrepresentation with intent to deprive that person of the property or services. As used in
this paragraph, material misrepresentation means the use of any pretense, or the making of any
promise, representation or statement of present, past or future fact which is fraudulent and which,
when used or made, is instrumental in causing the wrongful control or transfer of property or
services. The pretense may be verbal or it may be a physical act.
(d) Comes into control of lost, mislaid or misdelivered property of another person under
circumstances providing means of inquiry as to the true owner and appropriates that property to his or
her own use or that of another person without reasonable efforts to notify the true owner.
(e) Controls property of another person knowing or having reason to know that the property
was stolen.
(f) Obtains services or parts, products or other items related to such services which the
person knows are available only for compensation without paying or agreeing to pay compensation or
diverts the services of another person to his or her own benefit or that of another person without
lawful authority to do so.
(g) Takes, destroys, conceals or disposes of property in which another person has a
security interest, with intent to defraud that person.
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Similarly, in CR12-2025, lost, mislaid or misdelivered property of another person under
Further, there is no uncontradicted evidence in 2025 that Coughlin did anything to take or
carry away the iPhone, especially where Coughlin produced video and audio of himself pleading
with the skateboards to be peaceful and wait for the police (whom Coughlin had made a 911 call to)
to arrive.
Where DDA Young made the tactical decision to charge Coughlin with petty larceny under
the WCCs easier to convict on WCC 53.160 (steal, take, and carry away the personal property of
another where there is not intent language in such code section, just like there is not any intent
language in RMC 8.10.040), Young and the State must accept the downside in that such WCC
contains not the NRS 205.0832(d)s lost, mislaid or misdelivered property of another person under
All of these prosecutors are paid well over $100,000 a year to do their job. Judges do not
justice when they let such prosecutors steal money from the taxpayers via such rather tepid
arrangements disguised as complaints and charging decisions and or tactical decisions in
deciding whether to charge under local ordinances and codes or state statutes.
Additionally, the Model Penal Code eliminates the asportation requirement and instead
requires that the defendant "exercise unlawful control."
[22]
The drafters noted that historically the
asportation requirement distinguished larceny (a felony) and attempted larceny (a
misdemeanor).
[23]
They reasoned, therefore, that asportation was an irrelevant requirement because in
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modern criminal law, like the Model Penal Code,
[24]
the sentencing consequences between an
attempted and completed crime are negligible.
1. ^ Section 223.2(1).
2. ^ Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Comment to 223.2(1), at 164 (1980).
3. ^ 5.01
Further, in 2025, where DDA Young knew full well his entire case (consisting of a petty
larceny charge and a possession of stolen property charge premised upon the exact same facts)
was meritless and fraudulent in violation of RPC 3.8 and Brady where the very another required for
the NRS 205.275 (Staab/Shepp) possession of stolen property charge was not identified in Youngs
complaint for the very reasons that RPD Duraldes arrest of Coughlin was wrongful, just as where
witness Duraldes testimony, written witness statement at the time of arrest, and the testimony of
Duralde as to what Zarate told him (which, of course, Duralde purports to have supported both his
reasonable suspicion and probable cause analysis sufficient to support the arrest and search incident
to (where the exclusionary rule obviously should have been applied to the iPhone) that was unlawful
regardless, in light of the $80 value of the iPhone as testified to by Goble (less than one third of the
then $250 jurisdictional limit for the grand larceny charge Duralde fraudulently made in a
calculated, fraudulent attempt to get around the prohibition against such arrest for an alleged
misdemeanor that Duralde admits occurred outside his presence and between the hours of 7 pm and 7
am (NRS 171.136 prohibits such), where Duralde smugly referenced his fraud to Coughlin in
mentioning the certain benefits to charging it this way upon Duralde announcing Oooooooh!
Thats a felony! to Coughlin, whom identified himself by name and as an attorney, to which Duralde
immediately informed Coughlin I dont respect you at all in a patent display of his juvenile and
vindictive attitude towards attorneys.
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The problem for RPD Duralde and DDA Young and witness Zarate is that Duraldes
testimony as to what witness Zarate told him during his investigation directly contradicted both
Zarates testimony (who testified that he said nothing more to any police officer that night than the
sentence I was there, I saw everything) and the written witness statement by Duralde, which, in fact,
references the very another that NRS 205.275 requires (though contains nothing to support the
element such requires as to whether Coughlin knew such iPhone to have been stolen by such
another (ie, the still unidentified man whom Coughlin capture Nicole Watson on tape admitting
loudly announced he was going to throw the iPhone in the nearby Truckee river).
DDA Youngs 12/5/12 Amended Complaints fraudulent attempt to get around all that bleeds
through the page, but that is how bad DDA Young wanted to vindictively add another SCR 111(6)
serious offense to the Complaint in 2025. Too bad for Young and, some might say, Judge Sferrazza
(whom continued the same outrageously legal error prone jurisprudence he display in the wrongful
summary eviction handled by Hills firm in Rev2011-001708), as in flying to close to the sun, Shepp
and Staab made the bookend convictions of Coughlin for both petty larceny and possessing stolen
property equally void.
DDA Youngs Complaint in 2025 read: COUNT II. POSSESSION OF STOLEN
PROPERTY, a violation of NRS 205.275, a misdemeanor1 in the manner following, to wit:
That the said defendant on or about the 20th day of August, 20111 at Reno Township, within
the County of Washoe1 State of Nevada, did willfully and unlawfully possess or withhold stolen
goods having a value less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00), to wit: an iPhone, at or near 1
North Center Street, Reno, Washoe CountYI Nevada, such property being owned by CORY GOBLE,
for his own gain or to prevent the true owner from again possessing said property, knowing that the
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property was obtained by means of larceny or under such circumstances as should have caused a
reasonable man to know that such goods were so obtained.
Ironically, in his attempt to burden Coughlins defense by stacking on another charge, Young
destroyed his case (and reputation and, arguably, career) as to not only the original petty larceny
charge, but the inclusion of a possession of stolen property charge in the Amended Complaint as well.
So, Richard G. Hill, Esq., landlord Merliss, Thomas Frontino, RPD Chris Carter, Jr (lying in
his police report in alleging that Coughlin refused to leave when the very videos Hill and Merliss
filmed show Coughlin asking why he was afforded no opportunity to simply leave upon being issued
any such warning to leave (much less simply be issued a citation) where Coughlin pointed out no one
told him to leave prior to his being placed under arrest, and the RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez admitted
both at the time of arrest on 11/13/11 and in a video taped interview by Coughlin on 1/13/12 that
neither she nor RPC Officer Chris Carter, Jr. issued Coughlin any warning to leave on 11/13/11. In
response to Coughlins asking if you feel I am trespassing, couldnt you just tell me to leave,
Sargent Lopez responded: You were told not to come back, return to which Coughlin asked who
told me to leave to which Sargent Lopez responded The court (which, combined with the fact that
neither Lopez nor Carter made any indication on the videos that they themselves ever warned
Coughlin to leave (Carter initially responded to Coughlins question by indicating we tried rather
than we did and follows such up with We actually feel that you are playing games which
indicates that Carter, Lopez, Hill, and Merliss were playing a game of their own that they must now
answer for in light of Russell, Iorio, Mayes, etc.. Seconds later, upon his Sargent Lopez correcting
and aborting Carters attempt to lie about whether the officers issued Coughlin any warning to leave,
where Lopez admits it was the court whom she understands as having been the one to provide
Coughlin the warning to leave that Coughlins alleged disobeyance of would be a necessary
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element of a trespass conviction. At such point (2:13) Carter aborts the lies he had not quite told yet
(we tried versus we did) and falls in line with Sargent Lopezs story in chiming in immediately
after Lopez indicated it was the court that told Coughlin to leave, Carter indicates the court. The
served you court papers if you feel I am trespassing, couldnt you just tell me to leave ). to which
Coughlin asked When?
At the 1:58 mark:
Coughlin: if you feel I am trespassing, couldnt you just tell me to leave?
Officer Carter: We tried, we actually feel you are playing games.
Coughlin: When?
Sargent Lopez: You were told not to come back (2:04) (NOTE: Sargent Lopez does not say
We told you not to come back, but rather, You were told not to come back which she quickly
clarifies as having been something the court told Coughlin (which Carter then clarifies as having
been told to Coughlin via the medium of court papers rather than any rendition standard which Hill
will will argue excuses his and the WCSOs offices failure to abide by Nevada law per NRS
40.253(5)(a)s requirement that tenants have receipt of the written summary (just days after
Coughlins cross examination of that very Sargent Lopez in 065630 (where Coughlin asserted a
vindictive arrest and prosecution motive for the 1/14/12 misuse of emergency telephone services
(911) charge now on appeal in CR12-0614) on 3/19/12 where Coughlin queried Sargent Lopez as to
her video taped admission on 1/13/12 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcVDVjFK64g) that
neither she nor Officer Carter warned Coughlin to leave the former home law office prior to their
arresting him for trespass. Such resulted in the RJC issuing the following:
www.wcbar.org/documents/AdminOrder2013-01.pdf Admin Order 2013-01/Proper Eviction
Notice - Washoe County Bar ...
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www.wcbar.org/documents/AdminOrder2013-01.pdf
40.253 required landlords seeking the summary eviction Of a tenant provide notice to the
tenant ... Governor, added the following language to the notice required by NRS ... county to remove
the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order; ..
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CDk
QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wcbar.org%2Fdocuments%2FAdminOrder2013-
01.pdf&ei=0U9GUvqhN4njrAHN04HADg&usg=AFQjCNE4tkVMABRDiOHXLqocldbyh6U7
WA&sig2=Ge2J_y6_jfGKWXE6VUCiOA&bvm=bv.53217764,d.aWM
But, really, such 3/22/13 Administrative Order 2013-01 by RJC Chief Judge Pearson only
speaks to the NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) wrinkle added by the legislature as to eviction notices (rather
than the longstanding requirement under NRS 40.253(5)(a) that every county in Nevada other than
Washoe County has been in compliance with: The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order.
(where there is no jurisdiction (see Volpert, Aikins, Davidsohn, JCRCP 81, etc.) for the fraudulent
(Mayes v. UVI invoking fraud, therefore making Coughlins suing the landlords attorneys
absolutely based in law and fact and not meritless) language in the 10/27/11 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order of Summary Eviction submitted by Hills associate Baker and signed
by Judge Sferrazza attempting to completely excise the burdensome requirement that such order
direct the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order.
Former RJC Chief Civil Clerk Stancil admitted to Coughlin (newly discovered evidence!)
on 8/1/13 that RJC Judge Clifton ordered her not to comply with Coughlins 10/30/11 SCR 110
subpoena on Stancil both personally and in her stead as RJC Custodian of Records for Coughlins
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11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearingwhere NNDB Chair Susich is required under SCR 110(3)-(4)
to refer such violation of Coughlins SCR 110 subpoena to a district court judge in the 2JDC for the
institution of contempt proceedings (same goes with WCDA Watts-Vials obstruction of the
subpoenas Coughlin had served on the 2JDCs Custodian of Records and Clerks of Court Hastings
and Wise and Judges Flanagan and Elliott, and, maybe, L. Gardner). RJC Judge Clifton was not then
Chief Judge, either) Judge Clifton (husband to the very AG Ronda Clifton whom Kevin Mirch is now
suing CV13-00902 - KEVIN J. MIRCH VS. RHONDA CLIFTON ETAL (D15) DF - TORTS-
DEFAMATION (LIBEL/SLAND) (randomly reassigned to Judge Stiglich for a minute (no fair,
why does Judge Stiglich have to take on all these dumpster fire cases involving such a legion of
instances of misconduct by law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary?
Sure, Chief Judge Hardy has to move these case to someone he can trust to do a professional
job rendering fair and impartial jurisprudence and there is only so many options that are not
completely drenched in RCA/WCDA juice, but, oh, wait, these assignments are random, never
mindthing is, pacifying prosecutors and law enforcement (police, sheriffs, tribal police, bailiffs,
etc) is like a bad heroin or meth addictionyou feed it a little and it just grows and grows until it is
this ultra demanding, manipulative, disgusting monster that is never, ever satisfied no matter how
much one throws Thomas v. States footnote 4 at, say, the RMCs patent violation of NRS 189.030,
instead of applying NRS 189.035, or, maybe, actually reading the 50-100 pages of specific citations
to specific filings in the 452 page record the RMC is required to transmit under NRS 189.030
(where no such transmittal of the entire record from the district court is provided for in the very
NRAP that Judge Elliott then proceeds to claim supports his position that NRAP 28 and 32 provide
authority for the miscarriage of justice that is his 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in
CR11-2064..
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(http://www.ccwashoe.com/public/ck_public_qry_doct.cp_dktrpt_docket_report?backto=P&case_id=
CV13-00902&begin_date=&end_date= ) incident to his allegations she cooked up some bogus
theft charge (sound familiar?) to do the bidding of NVB Judge Beesley, the Reno City Attorneys
Don Christensen, members of Beesley Peck (Coughlin suit against Washoe Legal Services name
former Beesley Peck partner Karen Sabo, Esq. amongst the defendants, and (newly discovered
evidence) Coughlin can now report that WCDAs Bruce Hahn (to go along with WLS Exec
Directors daughter Tyler Elcano, Esq. getting hired by the WCDAs Office) was on the 4/10/12
and 4/16/12 NNDB Screening Panels that either fraudulently, or negligently (or, probably, both)
green lit SBN Asst Bar Counsel charlatan Patrick O. Kings filing of an SCR 105 Complaint against
Coughlin (resulting in a NNDB Panel recommendation by Judge Elliotts former employer at
Osborne & Echevveria, law firms son, John Echeverria crafting one of the most fraudulent Findings
of Fact; Conclusions of Law ever written recommending that Coughlin be permanently disbarred,
now on appeal in 62337) based upon a presentation by
CV13-00902 - KEVIN J. MIRCH VS. RHONDA CLIFTON ETAL: 06-SEP-2013 12:44 PM
Case Assignment Notification Entry: RECUSING - RANDOMLY REASSIGNED TO
DEPARTMENT 10 FROM DEPARTMENT 9 ...10-SEP-2013 10:16 AM $Peremptory Challenge
MIRCH, KEVIN (guess Mirch didn't feel like smelling any of what any former WCDA prosecutor
turned Judge was cooking either) (http://www.Scribd.Com/doc/155826069/4-3-13-0204-065630-
063341-CR13-0552-Order-by-Former-WCDA-Now-Judge-Sattler-Striking-Coughlin-s-Mandamus-
Petition-Re-Violations-of-Stay-Under-NRS-178-4 )...24-SEP-2013 01:59 PM Case Assignment
Notification Entry: RECUSAL - RANDOMLY REASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT 8 (Judge
Stiglich), FROM DEPARTMENT 1 ...No way, Jose! ....27-SEP-2013 03:05 PM Case Assignment
Notification Entry: RECUSUAL - RANDOMLY REASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT 15,
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FROM DEPARTMENT 8 (because Judge Peck in Department 13 might have had a conflict as to
Mirch).
Further, Hills statements on the videos of the arrest, when view in combination with his
sworn testimony at the 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial and 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing,
clearly establish that Hill lied not only in testifying that the RPD Officers warned Coughlin to leave
(at any point, much less prior to landlord Merliss further burglarizing Coughlins former home law
office in kicking the door down) (which, again, the RPD Officers that the RMC would not allow
Coughlin to cross examine are caught on tape admitting they did not do), as well as establishing that
Hill lied to the RPD the 11/13/11 date of the arrest where Hill is heard on the video telling the officers
in response to Coughlins asking just who it was whom allegedly warned Coughlin to leave (and
when), to which Hill is heard (while filming, like a complete and utter idiot where Hill then
propounded such to the Reno City Attorney, whose prosecutor Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. then
suborned the perjury of Hill amidst his own RPC 3.8 and Brady violations:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537747/6-18-12-0204-26405-Ocr-CR12-1262-3059269-Transcript-
Criminal-Trespass-Testimony-RG-Hill-CD-Baker-RMC-Judge-W-Gardner-a9-Cropped-Hole-
Punches-and-Line official audio from 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in RMC 11 CR 26405 morning
then afternoon sessions: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3uG_-2J129A
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3W9j0tJLRvI
Some Google Search Results 13-12021 - Case Search despite Hill's 6/18/12 sworn
testimony at the criminal trespass Trial of ... Judge W. Gardner in 11 CR 26405 and 11 TR 26800 in
the Reno Municipal .... Also available at that link is the transcript from the criminal trespass Trial on
6/18/12 where.
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12-36656 - Case Search Nov 19, 2012 - TRANSCRIPT MATERIALS CURRENTLY EXISTS
TO BE RELEASED TO .... the follow sworn testimony by Hill from the 6/18/12 Trial, viewed in ....
11 CR 26405, where Hill indicates the WCSO attempted to "personally
12-37363 Nov 27, 2012 - ... under oath twice (at the criminal trespass trial in 26405 on
6/18/12 and at ..... (page 10 of unofficial "Transcript" and at 8:52 am on the certified ...It is far from
clear denying anything and everything Coughlin asks for is the wise career move, despite, some
might say, the conventional wisdom formerly holding that, in Washoe County, ya gotta have the
WCDA, cops and sheriff endorsing you.
Judge Stiglich could be forgiven if wondering whether she was appointed to the bench or
to preside over a toxic waste dump replete with industrial levels of prosecutorial, police, and
judicial misconduct to wade through.
Sargent Lopez subjected Coughlin to a custodial arrest for criminal trespass in Reno
Municipal Court case 11 CR 26405, on November 13th, 2011 (which resulted in Coughlin being
convicted for criminal trespass following the June 18th, 2012 Trial (and a SCR 111(4) Petition filed
with the Nevada Supreme Court in 61901) wherein Richard Hill testified as follows: "Anyway, the
client gets down to the bottom ofthe stairs. I was 3 or 4 feet behind him, and he pushed on the door,
and I could see that the door was moving, but it was barricaded. And he turned to me and said, "It's
barricaded from the inside." I said, "Okay, that's it. Let's go upstairs." We went upstairs. We called the
police. They arrived about 10 minutes later. Told them what the problem was. They went down. It
was a lady sergeant. I believe her name was Lopez, and an officer. I don't recall his rank. I believe it
was Carter. They went down, and banged on the door with their nightsticks. We were pretty sure who
was inside. Didn't know for sure. And I said, "Come on out, Zach." Nothing. "Come on out, Zach."
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Nothing. And that went on for 2 or 3 minutes. And they specifically identified themselves as the
police. They said, "Well, that's it, we're going to leave." And both Dr. Merliss and I said, "What do
you mean? This guy is in here. Somebody is in here criminally trespassing. We need to know who it
is and get him out of here." And they said, "Well, we're not going to break down the door." So, Dr.
Merliss went down the stairs, and he's the one that kicked the door open. Broke the door in the
process. He then came up. One of the police officers went down with his gun drawn, flashlight turned
down, and the first thing I heard was, "Show me your hands! Show me your hands! Come towards
me." (Page -93) And I don't recall at that time whether Mr. Coughlin identified himself or not. We
then proceeded upstairs, and Mr. Coughlin then came upstairs on his own.... Page -1 12BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Hill, you say the police -you're testifying under oath that you're sure the police
specifically identified themselves as police prior to the door being kicked down? A l am.... BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Can you tell me exactly what the police said when they identified themselves as
police prior to the door being kicked down? Page -1 13- A We told them that we were pretty sure you
were there, so my best recollection is that they shouted, "Come on out, Zach. Come on out, Zach."
Words to that effect. I recall hearing that, as well as, "Come on out, this is the police." Basement. Q A
When did you hear, "Come on out, this is the police." When they were down banging on the door of
the Q A Prior to the door being kicked down? Yes. Q A You're sure? Positive. Q A Were you
videotaping during this period oftime? I wasn't. Q A Q You were not videotaping? Nope...." (Take a
look at the video "Zach's arrest 010" and consider whether Hill was flat out lying in that respect, in
addition to many others)
http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537747/6-18-12-0204-26405-Ocr-CR12-1262-
3059269-Transcript-Criminal-Trespass-Testimony-RG-Hill-CD-Baker-RMC-Judge-W-Gardner-a9-
Cropped-Hole-Punches-and-Line
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As to RCA prosecutor Hazlett-Stevens(for whom Dan Wong, Esq. and John Kadlic have a
supervisory duty) then suborned the perjury of Hill as to the following testimony by Hill at the
6/18/12 criminal trespass trial (Hazlett is another of the McGeorge Mafia, which includes RCA Chief
Dan Wong, John Springgate (see dv08-01168, Joshi case from which 2JDC L. Gardners FHE3
springs), Bruce Hahn, NNDB Panel Member in 62337 Stephen R. Kent, Esq., Z. Young, WLSs Paul
Elcano, RMCs Judge Nash Holmes, RMC Judge Howard, RMC Judge Dilworth, WCDA Gammick
presided over by the very brother of 2JDC Judge Linda Gardner (RMCs W. Gardner) where Linda
Gardners vacated 4/13/09 Order After Trial (vacated by her 6/19/09 Final Decree of Divorce (again,
see DV08-01168), which took out the part hitting Coughlin with $934 worth of attorneys fees via
NRS 7.085 while adding an award of the very alimony such then vacated fee award relied upon (ie,
Coughlin allegedly made a vexatious claim for alimony)Somehow, WCDAs Offices Bruce
Hahn, Esq., as a member of the 3 member NNDB Screening Panel in April 2012 deciding whether or
not to subject Coughlin to the awful, awful experience 62337 has put he and his family and clients
and clients families through, was not able to glean that his even sitting on such Screening Panel
might lend an appearance of impropriety to the whole thing (funny, SBN King, whom reneged on his
promise to reveal the names of those on such Screening Panel, did, in initially promising to track
down the names he couldnt remember, indicate on 10/12/12, that one of the members was a
femalewhich is bad considering it was three males on the Panel, one of which was Bruce Hahn,
tending to indicate Kings subsequent refusal to divulge the identifies thereof and conspiracy with
NNDB Chairman Susich to prevent Coughlin from obtaining was borne of an admission that Hahn
had no business remaining on such panel, especially where the WCDAs Office will be defending the
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WCSO and possibly the RJC in the lawsuits filed against them based upon the burglaries
masquerading as summary removal order lockouts incident to summary evictions in Rev2011-
001708, Rev2012-000374, and Rev2012-001048 (and probably others, too, including the RPDs
Soldal style misconduct towards Coughlin on 9/21/12 at Superior Mini Storage in Rev2012-
078432)apparently dealing with tenants it akin to an afternoon playing paintball to the WCSO and
RPD. Or kick the can. Interestingly, neither RPD Duralde nor the WCDAs Office DDA Young
found very relevant or mitigating witnesses Zarate and Lichty calling Coughlin a faggot in a hostile
and threatening tone (with some of such threats capture on video and 911 audio recordings) shortly
before the arrest of 8/20/11 at issue in cr12-2025. Apparently such hate speech is not that big a
concern to the RPD and DDA Young.
At the 1:58 minute mark: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V6I3t7tTlPI
PERJURY AND SUBORNATION OF PERJURY
NRS 199.120 Definition; penalties.
NRS 199.125 Oath and swear defined.
NRS 199.130 False affidavit or complaint to effect arrest or search.
NRS 199.140 Use of fictitious name on affidavit or complaint to effect arrest or search.
NRS 199.145 Statement made in declaration under penalty of perjury.
NRS 199.150 Attempt to suborn perjury.
NRS 199.160 Procuring execution of innocent person by perjury or subornation of
perjury.
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NRS 199.180 Irregularity in administering oath or incompetency of witness no
defense.
NRS 199.190 Deposition: When deemed to be complete.
NRS 199.200 Statement of what one does not know to be true.
Also, DDA Young countenanced witness Zarates capture on video and audio tape violations
of the following in his attempts to dissuade witness Nicole Watson from testifying:
NRS 199.230 Preventing or dissuading person from testifying or producing
evidence.
NRS 199.240 Bribing or intimidating witness to influence testimony.
NRS 199.305 Preventing or dissuading victim, person acting on behalf of victim, or
witness from reporting crime, commencing prosecution or causing arrest.
NRS 199.310 Malicious prosecution. A person who maliciously and without probable
cause therefor, causes or attempts to cause another person to be arrested or proceeded against for any
crime of which that person is innocent:
1. If the crime is a felony, is guilty of a category D felony and shall be punished as
provided in NRS 193.130; and
2. If the crime is a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
RPD Officer Carters statements in his 11/13/11 police report in 11 CR 26405 are criminal
misconduct: NRS 197.130 False report by public officer. Every public officer who shall knowingly
make any false or misleading statement in any official report or statement, under circumstances not
otherwise prohibited by law, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor. [1911 C&P 84; RL 6349;
NCL 10033]
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In Braham, the defendant was convicted in a Justice Court of driving with a revoked driver's
license. The defendant appealed his conviction to the District Court, which required him to pay for a
transcript of the Justice Court's proceedings. The Nevada Supreme Court found that although N.R.S.
189.030(1) Establishes a timeframe for transmitting transcripts, it is silent regarding the costs for
transmitting transcripts. Id. At 1392. The Nevada Supreme Court found that, in the absence of explicit
legislative direction otherwise, N.R.S. 4.41 0(2) Controls who pays for the transcript. Id. 'Since
N.R.S. 4.410(2) Places the burden of paying for transcripts "on the party ordering them",
23. Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, e . G., NRAP 4(b),
NRS 34.710, NRS 34.815 , NRS 177.015(2), Or other........MR.AP..... 4.....(H) ..............
SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY 24. Specify statute, rule or other authority which grants this
court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order appealed from: NRS 177.015(1)(B) ................ NRS
34.710(3)................ NRS 177.015(2)---------------- NRS 34.710(4)................ NRS 177.055 ................
NRS 34.815 NRS 177.385 ................ Other (specify). VERIFICATION I certify that the information
provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information
and belief.{
Really, Judge Howards 12/15/11 Order is void given he entered it prior to the City Attorneys
Office (in cr11-2064 and RMC 11 CR 22176) even filing an opposition to the 12/13/11 Motion for
New Trial (newly discovered evidence receipt for $83.82 worth of groceries Coughlin purchase
minutes prior to the arrest at Wal-Mart containing UPC for the very Duract Coughlin Melts Coughlin
is alleged to have stolenwhich is especially important considering the perjury by Wal-Marts
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Frontino (and perhaps the RSICs Crawford) incident to Frontinos testimony that he personally eye
witnessed all of the items Coughlin was wrung up for by the Wal-Mart associate and that such Duract
Cough Melts item was not amongst those wrung up, nor amongst those to be listed on the receipt of
such purchaseso much for beyond a reasonable doubt, especially where the entirety of the Citys
case rest upon the credibility of Wal-Marts Frontino, whom was caught lying where he alleged he
personally eye witnessed Coughlin select and consume the very chocolate candy bar that
Frontino alleges Coughlin consumed while shopping and did not pay for turned out to belong to a
regrigerated item which, obviously, is not amongst those found in the candy isle that Frontino
admitted did not contain any refrigerated items.
Really, 2JDC Judge Elliott's 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC must be read as a
remand back to the RMC for a new trial, if not a complete reversal, consistent with NRS 189.035
given the inapplicability of Thomas v. State to appeals to the district court. Indeed, if Thomas v. State
applies to appeals to the district court, then NRS 177.255 precludes the very rationale Judge Elliott
enunciates for his willful failure to embrace his jurisdiction in refusing to adjudicate Coughlin's
appeal (which is a fraudulent form of adjudicating it in effect).
NRS 177.255 Court to give judgment without regard to technical errors. After hearing the
appeal, the Court shall give judgment without regard to technical error or defect which does not affect
the substantial rights of the parties. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1446).
If Elliott and the RMC are doing this to Coughlin, a trained attorney (suspended or not), can
you imagine what they are doing to Joe Citizen on a daily basis? To indigent Joe Citizen whom is not
a National Merit Finalist who passed the bar examination after his second of three years of law school
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where he was ranked tenth in his class? Its not as if Elliott and Howard can claim to be new to the
bench.
The portion of Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in cr11-2064 (which
Elliott knew full well would be included in an SCR 111(6) Petitionwell, maybe he didnt because
the RMC failed to comply with SCR 111(2) in failing to transmit a copy of the conviction to the
NSCT and SBNso, had Coughlin followed Coe Swobes advice (you probably dont need to
report that and had Coughlins initial report of his conviction to the SBNs Asst Bar Counsel Glenn
Machado been treated as Machado indicated it would (this doesnt sound like a big deal..a candy
bar?), and had Richard G. Hill, Esq. not discharged mine and my associates RPC 8.3 duties in his
purported 1/14/12 unsigned, unsworn, emailed grievance (NG12-0204, 62337) to the same Asst.
Bar Counsel Patrick O. King whom was then listed as attorney of record in Milsner v. Carstarphen
opposite the same Richard G. Hill, Esq., then.maybe Elliott really did not think, or even know that
his laughable 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC would be put on this sort of stage.but
here we are. And, so too, is Elliotts (and WCDA DDA Zachary Norman Young and Patricia
Halsteads) misconduct on 4/19/12 in summarily incarcerating Coughlin for eight days whilst
managing to violate both NRS 178.405 and NRS 178.484 (and perhaps NRS 22.030(2) given the
4/18/12 letter by Lakes Crossings Bill Davis, Ph.D. and Sally Farmer, Ph.D. was not in the form of
an affidavit, or even a declaration in lieu of). Elliotts 3/15/12 order cited to and relied upon:
[1]
As a
preliminary matter, we note that Thomas's counsel did not adequately cite to the record in his briefs
or provide this court with an adequate record. In support of factual assertions, counsel simply cites
the supplemental habeas petition filed below. This is improper.
3
Additionally, counsel failed to
include many necessary parts of the record in the Appellant's Appendix. We are able to address the
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merits of a number of claims only because the State provided a seven-volume appendix that includes
necessary parts of the record.
4
3
NRAP 28(e) provides: Every assertion in briefs regarding matters in the
record shall be supported by a reference to the page of the transcript or
appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. The rule also prohibits a
brief to this court from incorporating by reference briefs or memoranda filed
in district court.
4
In the reply brief, Thomas's counsel states his belief that this court has the
direct appeal record and chastises the State for wasting paper in its appendix.
Counsel is mistaken. The clerk of this court does not retain the direct appeal
record. Rather, SCR 250(7)(b) provides that the clerk of the district court
shall retain the original record ... and shall not transmit a record on appeal to
the supreme court. Appellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide this
court with portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in
appellant's appeal. NRAP 30(b)(3); see also Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555,
558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980); Jacobs v. State, 91 Nev. 155, 158, 532 P.2d
1034, 1036 (1975).
As to the prisoners mailbox rule and Coughlins submissions to washoe county jail
employees during the three day summary incarceration following the 11/30/11 trial in 22176: t all
that is required on the part of a person filing a paper with an official is 'merely the depositing of
the instrument with the custodian for the purpose of being filed'. (See Palcar Real Estate Co. v.
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8 Cir., 1942, 131 F.2d 210; Schultz v. United States, Ct.Cl.1955,
132 F.Supp. 953, 955; McCord v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1941, 74 App.D.C. 369, 123
F.2d 164, 165;Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 1952, 199 F.2d 902,
904. (Johansson v. Towson, 177 F. Supp. 729 (M.D.Ga. 02/17/1959).) [emphasis added.]
The filing of a paper takes place upon the delivery of it to the officer at his office. Milton
v. United States, 5th Cir. 1939, 105 F.2d 253; Poynor v. Commissioner, 5th Cir. 1936, 81 F.2d 521.
When the mails are utilized for the purpose of filing an instrument, the filing takes place upon
delivery at the office of the official required to receive it. Wampler v. Snyder, 1933, 62 App. D.C.
215, 66 F.2d 195. (Phinney v. Bank of Southwest National Association, 335 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.
08/05/1964).) (See also United States v. Missco Homestead Ass'n Inc., 185 F.2d 283 (8th Cir.
11/01/1950).) (Dienstag v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 164 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y.
11/18/1957); Thorndal v. Smith, Wild, Beebe & Cades, 339 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 01/04/1965); Lone
Star Producing Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 208 F. Supp. 85 (E.D.Tex. 07/17/1962).) [emphasis added.]
Although Lombardo was decided before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated, courts have relied on it and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 5(e), and 77 for the
same proposition. See, e.g., Milton v. United States, 105 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1939)("The word
'filed' . . . requires of one filing a suit, merely the depositing of the instrument with the
custodian for the purpose of being filed. Except where specific statute otherwise provides, and
none such is present here, it charges him with no further duty, [and] subjects him to no
untoward consequences."); Greeson v. Sherman, 265 F.Supp. 340, 342 (W.D. Va. 1967)("[I]f rule 3
is read in conjunction with Rule 5(e) . . . [a complaint is filed when] the complaint is delivered to an
officer of the court who is authorized bo receive it."); Freeman v. Giacomo Costa Fu Andrea, 282
F.Supp. 525, 527 (E.D.Pa. 1968)("[I]t is settled law that delivery of a pleading to a proper official is
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sufficient to constitute filing thereof.") In Cintron v. Union Pacific R. Co., 813 F.2d 917, 920 (9th
Cir. 1987), the court said: The consensus is that "[p]apers and pleadings including the original
complaint are considered filed when they are placed in the possession of the clerk of the court." C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1153 (1969). See United States v. Dae Rim
Fishery Co., 794 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1986). The court then discussed earlier cases,
including Loya v. Desert Sands Unified School Dist., 721 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1983). (Stone Street
Capital, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 300 F.Supp.2d 345 (D.Md. 11/06/2003).) [emphasis added.]
Filing is complete once the document is delivered to and received by the proper
official. United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76, 36 S.Ct. 508, 60 L.Ed. 897 (1916).
Although Lombardo was decided before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated,
courts have relied on it and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 5(e), and 77 for the same proposition.
See, e.g., Milton v. United States, 105 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1939);Greeson v. Sherman, 265 F.
Supp. 340, 342 (W.D.Va. 1967) ("If Rule 3 is read in conjunction with Rule 5 (e) . . . [a complaint is
filed when] the complaint is delivered to an officer of the court who is authorized to receive
it.");Freeman v. Giacomo Costa Fu Andrea, 282 F. Supp. 525, 527 (E.D.Pa. 1968) ("[I]t is settled
law that delivery of a pleading to a proper official is sufficient to constitute filing thereof."). (Central
States, SE & SW Pension v. Paramount Liquor, 34 F.Supp.2d 1092 (N.D.Ill. 02/09/1999).)
[emphasis added.]
The docketing of filed documents is a ministerial act that the Office of the Clerk is
obligated to perform. (See Ray v. United States, 57 S. Ct. 700, 301 U.S. 158 (U.S. 04/26/1937).)
[emphasis added.]
State Case Law
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"The duties of the clerk relating to the filing of complaints are ministerial in
nature . . ." Orr v. Culpepper, 161 Ga. App. 801, 804 (288 S.E.2d 898) (1982). "It is the official duty
of the clerk of a court to file all papers in a cause presented by the parties, and to mark them filed,
with the date of filing. [Cits.]" (Brinson v. Georgia RR Bank &c. Co., 45 Ga. App. 459 at 460 (165
SE 321) (1932).) [emphasis added.]
The habeas court clerk's duty to file a notice of appeal is ministerial in nature, and it was
beyond her duty or power to concern herself with the legal viability of a notice presented to her
for filing. See Orr v. Culpepper, 161 Ga. App. 801, 804 (288 SE2d 898) (1982). By rejecting
Hughes' timely notice of appeal, the clerk of the habeas court, in effect, determined its legal
insufficiency and then undertook to dismiss the appeal. In so doing, she usurped this Court's authority
to determine its own jurisdiction. (Hughes v. Sikes, 273 Ga. 804, 546 S.E.2d 518 (Ga.
05/07/2001).) [emphasis added.]
Consider: Sullivan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For County of Clark, 904 P.2D 1039,
111 Nev.1367 (Nev., 1995): See Bowman v. District Court, 102 Nev. 474, 728 P.2D 433 (1986) (clerk
has a ministerial uty to accept and file documents if those documents are in proper form; clerk must
not exercise anyjudicial discretion); Barnes v. District Court, 103 Nev. 679, 748 P.2D 483 (1987)
(prisoner's right ofaccess to court cannot be denied on basis of indigency); Huebner v. State, 107 Nev.
328, 810 P.2D1209 (1991) (clerk must create an accurate record of all pleadings submitted for filing,
whether or notthe documents are actually filed); Whitman v. Whitman, 108 Nev. 949, 840 P.2D 1232
(1992) (clerkhas no authority to return documents submitted for filing; instead, clerk must stamp
documents thatcannot be immediately filed "received," and must maintain such documents in the
record of the case);Donoho v. District Court, 108 Nev. 1027, 842 P.2D 731 (1992) (the clerk of the
district court has aduty to file documents and to keep an accurate record of the proceedings before the
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court); Grey v.Grey, 111 Nev. 388, 892 P.2D 595 (1995) (clerk of district court admonished for failure
to keepaccurate record of documents submitted for filing)18 U.S.C. 2071 Case Law:
United States v. Conlin, 551 F.2d 534 (2nd Cir. 03/17/1977); United States v. Claypoole, 227
F.2d 752 (3rd Cir. 12/07/1955); United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 05/03/1974); United
States v. May, 625 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 05/30/1980); United States v. Salazar, 455 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.
07/24/2006); United States v. Lang, No. 02-4075 (10th Cir. 04/21/2004). This case has some very
good information -- United States v. Rosner, 352 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 12/14/1972). 18 U.S.C.
2071 case Law Search Results from versuslaw.com.
This Court need not bother with that analysis. Brahams, NRS 178.482, Judge Elliotts own 3/15/12
Order in Cr11-2064 (and where WDCR 3(1) formed the dubious basis for assigning all of Coughlins
criminal cases to Judge Elliott (made all the more dubious by Judge Elliotts patent misconduct in
failing to divulge (never mind disqualify himself) the fact that he is on CAAWs Executive Board
while presiding over Coughlins wrongful termination suit in CV11-01955, where CAAW is a named
co-defendantsuch is tantamount to an NRCP 60(b)(4) void for lack of jurisdiction basis for setting
aside all orders by Elliott therein (and there is some horrid oneslike granting attorneys fees
premised upon Elliotts view of the merits of Coughlins Complaint when his dismissal order
admits it did not get to the merits but rather dismissed on the specious insufficiency of service of
process and or process). WDCR 3(1) does not justify Elliott sinking his claws in every last criminal
matter involving Coughlin (look at the shameful summary incarceration of then practicing attorney
Coughlin on 4/19/12 for 8 days in plain violation of the statutory notice requirements for such a bail
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revocation (which is a form of summary contemptthe Lakes Crossing letter was not an affidavit
per NRS 22.030(2), etc, etc.).
Anyways, NRS 189 applies to municipal courts, well, at least to ones that are courts of
record (a de novo trial is required if the RMC is not a court of recordCoughlin can get a straight
answer one way or the other in that regard, ie, whether the RMC is a court of record), NRS
5.071and NRS 189 presents a minefield of problems for the City and the RMC (and coming
attraction, NRS 189.035 procedure when transcript defective makes Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order
Affirming Ruling of the RMC in CR11-2064 such clear error to be arguably a manifestation of
judicial misconduct
The RMCs failure to abide by NRS 189.030 (Brahams speaks to a petition for certiorari,
which is different than a criminal case and the appeal thereofregardless, NRS 4.410(2) and
Brahams merely speak to whom has to pay for the transcript.
Where NRS 4.410(2) provides that 2. The compensation for transcripts and copies must be
paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case, the preparation of the transcript need not commence
until the compensation has been deposited with the court reporter. and where NRS 189.030,
In Braham, the defendant was convicted in a Justice Court of driving with a revoked driver's
license. The defendant appealed his conviction to the District Court, which required him to pay for a
transcript of the Justice Court's proceedings. The Nevada Supreme Court found that although N.R.S.
189.030(1) Establishes a timeframe for transmitting transcripts, it is silent regarding the costs for
transmitting transcripts. Id. At 1392. The Nevada Supreme Court found that, in the absence of explicit
legislative direction otherwise, N.R.S. 4.41 0(2) Controls who pays for the transcript. Id. 'Since
N.R.S. 4.410(2) Places the burden of paying for transcripts "on the party ordering them", (and does
not apply to an indigent (which 2JDC Judge Steinheimmers 8/9/13 Order in CV11-01896 found
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Coughlin to bewhere RMC Judge Howard failed to find Coughlin was not indigent, rather, he
attempted to satisfy Aigersinger by indicating it was not typical for jail time to result from the
charges brought in 11 CR 22176 (2064, 60838)which isnt good enough (ie, the threat it still
therewhich Howard found useful when abusing the contempt power and threatening to failed to
completely prevent Coughlin from defending himself against the lies of Wal-Marts Frontino and
RSIC Officers Braunworth and Crawford, a threesome that goes together like bread and meat), and
the RMC never ruled that Coughlin was not indigent, rather, it tried an end run around Aigersinger by
indicating incarceration is not usually seen in similar cases (yet failed to specifically rule such was
not a possibility, and the Sixth Amendment and Aigersinger provide the mere possibility of
incarceration triggers the appointment of counsel) the specifically delineates between criminal and
civil matters in indicating that the preparation in a civil case shall not be ordered until a down
payment is madeie, such preparation must begin in a criminal case regardless, and the RMC grafts
such civil rule onto criminal matters, which is judicial misconduct.they do not absolve the RMCs
willful Canon 1 Rule 1.1 violation in failing to abide by the requirements of NRS 189.030 in failing
to order the transcript prepared (especially with the exclusive CCR Longoni
(http://www.scribd.com/doc/153537783/Rmc-Transcript-Rules-in-Violation-of-Nrs-Longioni-Ocrd-
and-Tagged-Jbig2-Lossy ) hustle being perpetuated by the RMC), and Elliotts 3/15/12 Order
Affirming Ruling in CR11-2064 only compounds the RMCs misconduct in that regard. Coughlin
did not stipulate to anything relative to NRS 189.035, he was denied counsel in the appeal as well,
Judge Hardys 3/8/12 Order Denying indigent Coughlin his IFP veers into 2008 Indigent Defense
Order violative territory as wellThe transcript was defective in that the RMC flat out refused to
order it prepared as it is required to due under NRS 189.030, as such the case must be returned for
retrial in the justice court from which it came. Elliotts citation to authority indicating it is
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Coughlins responsibility to cite to the transcript in his brief is non-sense where the RMC willfully
refused to follow the law as to the preparation of transcript (soda and nuggets on a date with the RMC
apparently, as one doesnt get counsel, doesnt get a transcript, no continuance, doesnt get to even
save their trial notes on their laptop before the handcuffs come out).
And, actually, the pros at the City Attorneys office ran this same motion to dismiss hustle in
cr11-2064. Wheres the Canon 2. Rule 2.15 RMC D Nash Holmes 3/14/12 grievance against
Coughlin alleging violations of (amongst others) RPC 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 4.4, 8.4, etc., etc.
especially RPC 3.1 meritorious contentions. In cr11-2064 roberts alleged Coughlins appeal not
timelyyet Howards own 12/15/11 order therein establishes that Coughlins 12/13/11 Motion for
New Trial therein was timely, such is a tolling motion, and regardless, such was double titled as a
notice of appeal anyways. Fine, RCA Roberts alleges she was not present for the additional three
minutes of rendition Judge Howard issue upon having Coughlin brought back into court in cuffs at
8:20 pm on 11/30/11 (at which point Judge Howard announce an NRS 178.476 enlargement (or he
delayed the rendition of his order until after Coughlins 3 day incarceration, either way, and Root
does not preclude that, especially the latter, but, regardless, Root presents no issue at all as to
Coughlins 12/13/11 NRS 176.515 motion for new trialproblem is, that means such order was
made in absentia, and to whatever extent rendition does not require entry the order, notice of
entry of order then becomes required, and the RMC never filed such a notice of entry of
ordermeaning, the 2JDC never rightfully had jurisdiction of cr11-2064, beyond the rubber
stamping of the signature on the 11/30/11 Judgment of Conviction and Court Order issue in cr11-
2064.
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November 15, 2011: Notice of Setting Bench Trial date of November 30, 2011, in cr11-2064 was
mailed to an outdate address for Coughlin, trial of 11/30/11 void for lack of notice.
December 13, 2011: Coughlins Notice of Appeal, Motion to Vacate and or Set Aside, JCRCP
59, JCRCP 60, Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Recusal. (NOTE: this is a NRS 176.515
Motion for New Trial regardless of Coughlin invoking NRCP 59, 60, etcsee page 110 of 12/23/11
ROA from RMC in CR11-2064.)
December 15, 2011: Order denying Defendant's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Motion for
Publication of Transcript at Public Expense, Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside, Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Recusal.
December 15, 2011: Notice of Denial of Service filed by Reno City Attorney.
December 16, 2011: Defendant Coughlin's Supplemental to Notice of Appeal, Motion to Vacate and
or Set Aside, JCRCP 59, JCRCP 60, Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Recusal; Motion to
Strike.
December 16, 2011: Defendant Coughlin's Notice of Denial of Service; Opposition City of Reno's
Notice of Denial of Service; Request for Clarification Regarding Deadline for Filing Motion for new
Trial, Other tolling Motions, etc., Application for Deferral or Waiver of court Fees and Cost.
Coughlins 12/16/11 Supplemental Notice of Appeal appealed the 12/15/11 Order Denying
Defenants .Motion to vacate and/or Set Aside (an NRS 176.515 Motion for New Trial, and an
order denying itself is an appealable orderyet the 2JDCs Elliott failed to adjudicate such appeal of
the 12/15/11 Order Denying Coughlins NRS 176.515 Motion for New Trial.
And RCA Wongs attempt to argue that RMC Rule 5 rule related to faxing of, allegedly, just
motions somehow overrides NRS 178.589
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How reckless was Wal-Mart in its allegations, especially considering the availability of NRS
178.564. Surely Wal-Mart ought be made to have some skin in the game now that its lies have been
exposed. Same with Hill and Merliss, and the Reno City Attorneys Office. Play with someones law
license and reputation, chickens come home to roost when your lies and misconduct bawk that bawk.
There is no way Jordan v State allows for the RJC and RMC judges to violated NRS
178.608, .610, .589, WDCR 10, JCRRT 10, JCRRT 2 (RJC keeps asserting rules applicable only to
civil actions to justify its criminal conduct in refusing indigent criminal defendant Coughlins
filingsJustice Clifton abusing contempt power in order Coughlin not to fax the WCDAs Officer
filings, etc.
Note: Cf. Hill v. Sheriff, supra, and Stockton v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 94, 482 P.2d 285 (1971). Neither is it
a case
where the prosecutor willfully disregarded important procedural rules. Cr. Maes v. Sheriff, 86 Nev.
317, 468 P.2d
332 (1970). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor exhibited a conscious indifference to rules of
procedure
affecting the accused's rights. Cf. State v. Austin, 87 Nev. 81, 482 P.2d 284 (1971).
Downey v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 88 Nev. 14, 15, 492 P.2d 989, 990 (1972) hicks 5 30 12 72 hours
Note: all the changing the rules vis a vis service faxing, deadline for pre-trial motions etc by rmc rjc
skau, Clifton no faxing on 11/27/12, gardner's altering pretrial 15 days and art 4 sec 21 fourteenth
amendment,
WestlawNext - 3 full text Citing References for Stockton v. Sheriff, Clark County
WestlawNext - Stockton v. Sheriff, Clark County no juris criminal
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Jordan no faxing for coughlin rmc rule 534.020. Writ may be granted by Supreme Court and district
courts; when writ may issue
Citation: NV ST 34.020
Sent On: September 24, 2013
Sent By: A WestlawNext Researcher
Client ID: PATRON ACCESS
Note: Elliott exceeded jurisdiction in his 3/15/12 order in 2064 where NRS 189.030 required him to
not opine
upon the RMC's failure to transmit transcript, not to deny based upon Coughlin's alleged failure to
cite to such Braham v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court
Citation: 103 Nev. 644
Item: 239.Importance and purpose of principle of separation of powers, 16A Am. Jur. 2d
Constitutional Law 239. Courts are prohibited from encroaching upon a domain of another branch
of the government. (The executive branch has the authority to prosecute criminal cases in the courts,
however, the RJC has chosen to rebrand its Administrative Order 2012-01 with a criminal case
number in RCR2013-071437)/ Southworth v. State, 62 A.D.2D 731, 405 N.Y.S.2D 548 (4th Dep't
1978), judgment aff'd, 47 N.Y.2D 874, 419 N.Y.S.2D 71, 392 N.E.2D 1254 (1979).
From: WestlawNext@westlawnext.Com Sent: Tue 9/24/13 12:57 PM To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.Com; astege@da.Washoecounty.Us; zyoung@da.Washoecounty.Us;
wongd@reno.Gov 1 attachment Willmes v Reno Mun Court.Rtf (263.2 KB) A WestlawNext
Researcher sent you content from WestlawNext. Please see the attached file. Item: Willmes v. Reno
Mun. Court Citation: 118 Nev. 831 Sent On: September 24, 2013 Sent By: A WestlawNext
Researcher Client ID: PATRON ACCESS Note: please consider dropping the various prosecutions
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(and join in seeking to set aside the convictions) in light of the illegality of the various Administrative
Orders and the, at least appearance of impropriety, attendant to your office's garnering a competitive
advantage incident thereto. While the courts generally have not applied judicial immunity to
administrative, legislative, or executive functions. Neither judicial immunity nor Eleventh
Amendment immunity, both of which shielded judges from being sued for damages, applied to bar
action against two state-court judges in which former state-court litigants requested only declaratory
relief. Cichowski v. Hollenbeck, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (W.D. Wis. 2005). ...... The courts generally
have distinguished between judicial acts and administrative, legislative, or executive functions that
judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. judicial immunity is not designed to insulate
the judiciary from all aspects of accountability,[FN5] and the mere fact that a defendant in a civil
action is a judge does not mean that he or she is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.[FN6] In this
regard, judges generally have no judicial immunity for their administrative, legislative, or executive
functions.[FN7] [FN5] Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct. 183, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980). -
[FN6] Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990). -
[FN7] 67.
a judge will loose the cloak of immunity only when he conducts proceedings over which he lacks any
semblance of subject matter jurisdiction. Stiggle v. Tamburini, 467 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D.R.I. 2006).
The doctrine of judicial immunity is so expansive that it is overcome only when: (1) the action is
nonjudicial, that is, not taken in the judge's judicial capacity, or (2) the action, although judicial in
nature, is performed in the complete absence of any jurisdiction. Miller v. County of Nassau, 467 F.
Supp. 2d 308 (E.D. N.Y. 2006). 70. Nonjudicial acts West's Key Number Digest West's Key
Number Digest, Judges 35, 36
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Judges may be exposed to liability for nonjudicial acts[FN1] since they generally have no
judicial immunity for their administrative, legislative, or executive functions.[FN2] Judges acting in
an administrative capacity do not have absolute immunity from suits for damages;[FN3]
administrative decisions, even though essential to the functioning of the court, have not been
regarded as judicial acts.[FN4]
Observation: The exception from judicial immunity for legislative and executive acts has
sometimes been referred to as the "discretionary function exception."[FN5]
[FN1] Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Malina v. Gonzales, 994
F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1993); Archie v. Lanier, 95 F.3d 438, 1996 FED App. 0297P (6th Cir. 1996); John
v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 135 (7th Cir. 1990); Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1990); JNC Companies v. Ollason, 137 B.R. 46 (D. Ariz. 1991), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1225 (9th
Cir. 1993); Meyer v. Foti, 720 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. La. 1989); Hammond v. Creative Financial
Planning Organization, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Rumfola v. Murovich, 812 F. Supp.
569 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Cintron Rodriguez v. Pagan Nieves, 736 F. Supp. 411 (D.P.R. 1990);
Kalmanson v. Lockett, 848 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2003). - [FN2] Crooks v.
Maynard, 913 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990). - [FN3] Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98
L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988); Mumford v. Zieba, 788 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Ohio 1992), judgment rev'd on
other grounds, 4 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1993). - [FN4] Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,
113 S. Ct. 2167, 124 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1993); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L.
Ed. 2d 555 (1988). - As to the general rule of nonliability for damages, see 61. - As to judicial acts
protected by the rule of nonliability for damages, see 67. - [FN5] Koelln v. Nexus Residential
Treatment Facility, 494 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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From: WestlawNext@westlawnext.Com Sent: Tue 9/24/13 12:47 PM To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.Com; astege@da.Washoecounty.Us; zyoung@da.Washoecounty.Us 1
attachment 178608 Rules of justice courts and district courts not to be inconsistent with t.Rtf (36.6
KB) A WestlawNext Researcher sent you content from WestlawNext. Please see the attached file.
Item: 178.608. Rules of justice courts and district courts not to be inconsistent with this title Citation:
NV ST 178.608 Sent On: September 24, 2013 Sent By: A WestlawNext Researcher Client ID:
PATRON ACCESS Note: Dear Mr. Young and Mr. Stege, I am writing to inquire with you as to
whether you believe your office's countenancing (and prosecuting based upon) the 12/20/12
Administrative Order 2012-01 in RCR2013-071437, and the 8/14/13 Administrative Order 2013-06
Mr. Stege referenced in court today in RCR2013-072675
Item: 239.Importance and purpose of principle of separation of powers, 16A Am. Jur. 2d
Constitutional Law 239. Courts are prohibited from encroaching upon a domain of another branch
of the government. (The executive branch has the authority to prosecute criminal cases in the courts,
however, the RJC has chosen to rebrand its Administrative Order 2012-01 with a criminal case
number in RCR2013-071437)/ Southworth v. State, 62 A.D.2D 731, 405 N.Y.S.2D 548 (4th Dep't
1978), judgment aff'd, 47 N.Y.2D 874, 419 N.Y.S.2D 71, 392 N.E.2D 1254 (1979).
N.R.S. Const. Art. 3, 1: 1. Three separate departments; separation of powers; legislative
review of administrative regulations
sions (1) 178.610.?Where no procedure specifically prescribed court may proceed in lawful manner
NV ST 178.610 Effective [See Text Amendments] Enacted Legislation Added by Laws 1967, p. 1458
Citing References (1) Title Date NOD Topics Type 1. Woerner v. Justice Court of Reno Tp. Ex
rel. County of Washoe 1 P.3D 377, 381 , Nev. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Competency to Stand Trial.
Refiling of murder charge against petitioner previously found incompetent to stand trial was not
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barred. Jun. 05, 2000 - Case Context and Analysis (3) Library References (3) Courts 78.
Westlaw Key Number Search: ?106K78. C.J.S. Courts ?7, 124 To 127.
2JDC Judge Elliots 3/15/12 CR11-2064 (conviction at issue in 60838 and 62337) reads:
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL Pursuant to NRS 189.010, An appellant
has ten days following the entry of a judgment of conviction to file a notice of appeal.... That
Judge Elliott referenced the entry of judgment of such judgment of conviction is important, as it
alters any apparent import of the use of the term rendition anywhere in NRS 189 and NRS 178.
Coughlin is entitled to Reply on Judge Stiglichs predecessor the consolidation of of
Coughlins criminal matter in one department, Judge Elliotts statement of how such will apply
NRCP to criminal law: http://www.scribd.com/doc/169383303/3-15-12-0204-22176-2064-Order-
Denying-Motion-to-Dismiss-Appeal-Applying-NRCP-6-e-Ocr-No-Numbers (see page 2 of such
3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064: Pursuant to NRS 189.010, An appellant has ten days following the
entry of a judgment of conviction to file a notice of appealAs applied to the instant case,
Respondent reasons that because Appellant filed his appeal more than ten calendar days after the
entry of judgment, Appellant's appeal is untimely. Respondent's approach ignores Nevada Rule of
Civil Procedure 6(a), which governs the computation of time. That rule provides that "[w]hen the
period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
nonjudicial days shall be excluded in the computation." NRCP 6(a). In other words, NRS
189.010'S ten day rule does not refer to calendar days, but is calculated based on the passage of
judicial days. Thus, Appellant had until December 14, 2011 to file his Notice of Appeal. Because
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on December 13, 2011, his appeal was timely and this Court will
deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.)
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Such pronouncement by Judge Elliott operates to make the 6/26/12 filing by Coughlin timely:
Courts of appeal have occasionally excused untimely filings in "unique circumstances."52 Under the
"unique circumstances" doctrine, a late appeal may be deemed timely by the court of appeals "only
where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing
his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly
done."53 Such a situation is most likely to arise when a party was late in filing a motion which will
toll the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(A)(4)(A), but the trial court has assured the party that
the motion was accepted as timely. Under such circumstances, the court of appeals may permit the
filing of a notice of appeal at a time that would have been proper when treating the tardy trial
court motion as if it had been timely filed.54...
50. Fed. R. App. P. 4 And 26(b). See also Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315
(1988). 51. Hernandez-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 630 F.2D 1352, 1354 (9th Cir.
1980), Citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960).
Footnotes: 52. The "unique circumstances" doctrine has been criticized in the Seventh Circuit.
See Fogel v. Gordon & Glickson, P.C., 393 F.3D 727, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2004). 53. Osterneck v. Ernst
& Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989). 54. The Seventh Circuit seems to have further narrowed the
availability of relief, stating that "[i]n our view, the unique circumstances exception is available
only when there is a genuine ambiguity in the rules to begin with, and the court resolves that
ambiguity in the direction of permitting additional time to appeal." Prop. Unltd., Inc. V. Cendant
Mobility Serv., 384 F.3D 917, 922 (7th Cir. 2004)...
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number of any person.
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DATED this 9/27/13
_/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant/Petitioner
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Zach Coughlin, declare:
I, Mr. Zach Coughlin served the foregoing electronically by efiling on efiler dan wong of the
rca and or wcda z young and or wlss jospeh garin, esq.
DATED THIS 9/28/13
BY
/s/ zach coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant/petitioner
i
the immediate presence of the court, an affidavit must be presented to the court of the
facts constituting contempt, the affidavit, was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the
contempt proceeding and the person of the contemner. Phillips v. Welch, 12 Nev. 158 (1877),
cited, Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Ellison Ranching Co., 46 Nev. 351, at 354, 213 Pac. 700 (1923),
State ex rel. Mongolo v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 46 Nev. 410, at 416, 211 Pac. 105 (1923)
Affidavit must state substantive facts constituting alleged contempt. Under sec. 461, ch.
112, Stats. 1869 (cf. NRS 22.030), which provides that where contempt is committed outside
the immediate presence of the court, an affidavit must be presented to the court of the facts
constituting the contempt, a statement of such facts is necessary in order to give the court
jurisdiction. With no affidavits s actions are illegal null and void as a matter of law.
Term "immediate view and presence" defined. Unless contempt is committed in the
immediate view and presence of the court, meaning ocular view of the court or where the court
has direct knowledge of the contempt, the charge must be made by affidavit and the
contemnor given the right to show cause why he should not be punished before judgment is
passed on him, in accord with secs. 461 and 462, ch. 112, Stats. 1869 (cf. NRS 22.030 and
22.040). Ex parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 352, 90 Pac. 737 (1907), cited, Ex parte Tani, 29 Nev. 385,
at 399, 91 Pac. 137 (1907) The alleged offense MUST be committed in the immediate
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presence of the court. Ex parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 352, 90 Pac. 737 (1907), cited, Ex parte
Tani, 29 Nev. 385, at 399, 91 Pac. 137 (1907)
Constitutional or inherent powers of court not abridged by provision of statute. NCL 8943
(cf. NRS 22.030), which provides that in all cases of contempt arising outside of the immediate
view and presence of the court, the judge in whose contempt the defendant is alleged to
be shall not preside at the trial over the objection of the defendant, does not abridge any of
the constitutional or inherent powers of the court, because the legislature has the right to
regulate the exercise of power to punish for contempt. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court,
67 Nev. 318, 218 P.2d 939 (1950), cited, Lamb v. Lamb, 83 Nev. 425, at 428, 433 P.2d 265
(1967), Awad v. Wright, 106 Nev. 407, at 410, 794 P.2d 713 (1990) Judge ignored
this precedent before and appears to be bought and paid for..
Writ of prohibition issued to prevent judge from presiding after objection. On a petition
for a writ of prohibition to prevent a contempt proceeding, where the contempt petition was
sufficient, ... it was a mandatory duty of the judge not to preside at the trial of the
contempt charges after the objection under NCL 8943 (cf. NRS 22.030), a writ issued to
prevent the judge from presiding. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 318, 218
P.2d 939 (1950)
Where respondent did not file an affidavit with an order to show cause, district court
did not have jurisdiction to hold appellant in contempt of court. The law is clear Judge
had no jurisdiction to hold the Plaintiff in contempt. See. Awed v. Wright, 106 Nev.
407, 794 P.2d 713 (1990), cited, Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Assoc., 116 Nev.
646, at 650, 5 P.3d 569 (2000)
Pg. 19
Page 20
Courts are bound by statute in exercise of their inherent powers of contempt. Where
an alleged contempt of court by the appellant took place outside of the presence of the court
and the respondent failed to file an affidavit with an order to show cause, an order of contempt
issued by the court was in violation of NRS 22.030 and was reversed on appeal.
Failure by a judge to recuse herself was reversible error. Where an alleged contempt
arose outside of the presence of the judge, and the appellant timely filed a peremptory
challenge objecting to the judge presiding over the contempt proceedings, the judge
committed a reversible error when she did not recuse herself (see NRS 22.030). Awad V.
Wright, 106 Nev. 407, 794 P.2d 713 (1990)
Judges
In case of contempt arising outside view of court, judge should have recused herself in response
to peremptory challenge. N.R.S. 22. 030, subd. 3. Awad v. Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d
713, 106 Nev. 407. Judges 51(4)
Where contempt petition was sufficient under circumstances and record to give district court
jurisdiction, and question of inability to comply with court order by reason of interest of
United States was a matter of defense, writ of prohibition would issue prohibiting judge who
issued order from presiding at trial of contempt proceedings. N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick
v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318.
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Prohibition 5(3)
Where judge voluntarily disqualified himself and called another judge upon request of parties
without requiring payment of fee, change held not change of judge so as to preclude right to
have different judge hear order to show cause upon filing affidavit of prejudice and paying
fee. Comp.Laws, 8943; 8407, as amended by St.1931, c. 153, 1; 8407.02, as added by
St.1931, c. 153, 3. State ex rel. Warren v. Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Humboldt
County, 1936, 61 P.2d 6, 57 Nev. 214. Judges 51(1)
Contempt 51 to 54.
Judges 39 to 56.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 93k51 to 93k54; 227k39 to 227k56.
C.J.S. Contempt 62, 70 to 71.
C.J.S. Judges 62, 98 to 160. 154 ALR 1227, Necessity and Sufficiency of Making and Recording
Subsidiary or Detailed
Findings Supporting Adjudication of Direct Contempt.
Statute providing that in all cases of contempt arising without immediate view and presence
of
court, judge of court in whose contempt defendant is alleged to be, shall not preside at such
trial over objection of defendant, is constitutional. N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318. Contempt
31
State ex rel. Warren v. Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Humboldt County,
61 P.2d 6, 57 Nev. 214 (Nev. Oct 02, 1936) (NO. 3157)
Presence of court
2 Ex parte Hedden, 90 P. 737, 29 Nev. 352, 13 Am.Ann.Cas. 1173 (Nev. Jun 27,
1907) (NO. 1,718)
Appellate Briefs
21 Ann CHRZANOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. Judge George ASSAD, City of Las Vegas, a
Political Subdivision of the State of Nevada; Marshall R. Saavedra, John Does, IX,
each individually and in their official capacities, Defendants., 2006 WL
2981572, *2981572+ (Appellate Brief) (9th Cir. Jul 31, 2006) Answering
27 Yaakov M. VANN, Plaintiff, v. State of Nevada, Honorable Douglas Smith,
Clark County, Nevada Sargent Kosmides Peter Dubowsky Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department Mister Lorne Wyne Aka ""Rabbi Yitz Wyne"" Miss.
Michelle Halabe, Defendant., 2004 WL 3703284, *3703284+ (Trial Motion,
Memorandum and Affidavit) (D.Nev. May 20, 2004) Plaintiff's Reply Brief to
Clark County Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Compel Discovery (NO. CVS-
03-0507-PMP(PAL)
28 Yaakov M. VANN, Plaintiff, v. State of Nevada, Honorable Douglas Smith,
Clark County Nevada, Sargent Kosmides, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,
Mister Lorne Wynh aka ""Rabbi Yitz Wyne,"" Miss. Michelle Halabe,
Peter Dubowsky, Defendant., 2004 WL 3703277, *3703277 (Trial Motion,
Memorandum and Affidavit) (D.Nev. Apr 09, 2004) Defendants Justice of the
Peace Douglas Smith, Clark County, Nevada, Sargent Kosmides and Las Vegas
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Metropolitan Police Department's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss/
Opposition to Plaintiff's ... (NO. CV-S-03-0507-PMP(PAL)
At to the rubber stamped signature by RMC Judge Howard on the 11/30/11 Judgment of
conviction at issue in cr11-2064. There is no proof offered that Howard has received approval from
the Supreme Court for use of such, nor that any necessity for so using such arose, and such was
combined impermissibly with the signature of another officer (an RMC marshal, and possibly
another, especially if the interlineations of a date next to Howards stampe signature, in a handwriting
other than Howards, is tantamount to a signature: NRS 5.065 Use of facsimile signature:
Conditions and restrictions.
1. Each municipal judge may use a facsimile signature produced through a mechanical device in
place of his or her handwritten signature whenever the necessity arises and upon approval of the
Supreme Court, subject to the following conditions:
(a) That the mechanical device must be of such a nature that the facsimile signature may be
removed from the mechanical device and kept in a separate secure place.
(b) That the use of the facsimile signature may be made only under the direction and supervision
of the municipal judge whose signature it represents.
(c) That the entire mechanical device must at all times be kept in a vault, securely locked, when
not in use, to prevent any misuse of the device.
2. No facsimile signature produced through a mechanical device authorized by the provisions of
this section may be combined with the signature of another officer.
Griffin v Illinois (1956) 351 US 12, 100 L Ed 891, 76 S Ct 585, 55 ALR2d 1055, reh den 351
US 958, 100 L Ed 1480, 76 S Ct 844. In that case the Supreme Court, while noting that a state is not
required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate review at all, also indicated that a state that
does grant appellate review must do so in a way that does not discriminate against some convicted
defendants by reason of their poverty.
So, if NRAP 3C applies to these criminal appeals to the district court, here is the text thereof:
RULE 3C. FAST TRACK CRIMINAL APPEALS
(a) Applicability.
(1) This Rule applies to an appeal from a district court judgment or order entered in a criminal or
post-conviction proceeding commenced after September 1, 1996, whether the appellant is the State or
the defendant. A proceeding is commenced for the purposes of this Rule upon the filing of an
indictment, information, or post-conviction application in the district court.
(2) The Supreme Court may exercise its discretion and apply this Rule to appeals arising from
criminal and post-conviction proceedings that are not subject to this Rule.
(3) Unless the court otherwise orders, an appeal is not subject to this Rule if:
(A) the appeal challenges an order or judgment in a case involving a category A felony, as
described in NRS 193.130(2)(a), in which a sentence of death or imprisonment in the state prison for
life with or without the possibility of parole is actually imposed;
(B) the appeal is brought by a defendant or petitioner who was not represented by counsel in
the district court; or
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(C) the appeal is filed in accordance with Rule 4(c).
(b) Responsibilities of Trial Counsel.
(1) Definition. For purposes of this Rule, trial counsel means the attorney who represented
the defendant or post-conviction petitioner in district court in the underlying proceedings that are the
subject of the appeal.
(2) Responsibilities. Trial counsel shall file the notice of appeal, rough draft transcript request
form, and fast track statement and consult with appellate counsel for the case regarding the appellate
issues that are raised. Trial counsel shall arrange their calendars and adjust their public or private
contracts for compensation to accommodate the additional duties imposed by this Rule.
(3) Withdrawal. To withdraw from representation during the appeal, trial counsel shall file
with the Supreme Court a motion to withdraw from representation. The motion shall be considered
only after trial counsel has filed the notice of appeal, rough draft transcript request and fast track
statement. The granting of such motions shall be conditioned upon trial counsels full cooperation
with appellate counsel during the appeal.
(c) Notice of Appeal. When an appellant elects to appeal from a district court order or
judgment governed by this Rule, appellants trial counsel shall serve and file a notice of appeal
pursuant to applicable rules and statutes.
(d) Rough Draft Transcript. A rough draft transcript is a computer-generated transcript that
can be expeditiously prepared in a condensed fashion, but is not proofread, corrected or certified to
be an accurate transcript.
(1) Format. For the purposes of this Rule, a rough draft transcript shall:
(A) Be printed on paper 8 1/2 by 11 inches in size, double-sided, with the words Rough
Draft Transcript printed on the bottom of each page;
(B) Be produced with a yellow cover sheet;
(C) Include a concordance indexing key words in the transcript; and
(D) Include an acknowledgment by the court reporter or recorder that the document
submitted under this Rule is a true original or copy of the rough draft transcript.
(2) Notification of Court Reporter or Recorder. When a case may be subject to this Rule, the
presiding district court judge shall notify the court reporter or recorder for the case before trial that a
rough draft transcript may be required.
(3) Request for Rough Draft Transcript.
(A) Filing and Service.
(i) When a rough draft transcript is necessary for an appeal, trial counsel shall file a
rough draft transcript request form with the district court and shall serve a copy of the request
form upon the court reporter or recorder and opposing counsel.
(ii) Trial counsel shall serve and file the rough draft transcript request form on the same date
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the notice of appeal is served and filed.
(iii) Trial counsel shall file with the Supreme Court 2 file-stamped copies of the rough draft
transcript request form and proof of service of the form upon the court reporter or recorder and
opposing counsel.
(B) Form. The rough draft transcript request shall substantially comply with Form 5 in the
Appendix of Forms.
(C) Necessary Transcripts. Counsel shall order transcripts of only those portions of the
proceedings that counsel reasonably and in good faith believes are necessary to determine whether
appellate issues are present. In particular, transcripts of jury voir dire, opening statements, closing
arguments, and the reading of jury instructions shall not be requested unless pertinent to the appeal.
(D) No Transcripts. If no transcript is to be requested, trial counsel shall serve and file
with the Supreme Court a certificate to that effect within the same period that a rough draft
transcript request form must be served and filed under subparagraph (A). Such a certificate shall
substantially comply with Form 14 in the Appendix of Forms.
(E) Court Reporter or Recorders Duty.
(i) The court reporter or recorder shall submit an original rough draft transcript, as requested
by appellants or respondents counsel, to the district court no more than 20 days after the date that
the request is served.
(ii) The court reporter or recorder shall also deliver certified copies of the rough draft
transcript to the requesting attorney and counsel for each party appearing separately no more than 20
days after the date of service of the request. The court reporter or recorder shall deliver an additional
certified copy of the rough draft transcript to the requesting attorney for inclusion in the appendix.
Within 5 days after delivering the certified copies of the rough draft transcript, the court reporter or
recorder shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court a certificate acknowledging delivery of the
completed transcript and specifying the transcripts that have been delivered and the date that they
were delivered to the requesting party. Form 15 in the Appendix of Forms is a suggested form of
certificate of delivery.
(iii) Relevant portions of the trial or hearing that were audio recorded or video recorded shall
be submitted in typewritten form. The Supreme Court will not accept audio- or videotapes in lieu of a
rough draft transcript.
(4) Supplemental Request for Rough Draft Transcript.
(A) Opposing counsel may make a supplemental request for portions of the rough draft
transcript that were not previously requested. The request shall be made no more than 3 days after
opposing counsel is served with the transcript request made under Rule 3C(d)(3)(A).
(B) In all other respects, opposing counsel shall comply with the provisions of this Rule
governing a rough draft transcript request when making a supplemental rough draft transcript request.
(5) Sufficiency of the Rough Draft Transcript. Trial counsel shall review the sufficiency of
the rough draft transcript. If a substantial question arises regarding an inaccuracy in a rough draft
transcript, the Supreme Court may order that a certified transcript be produced.
(6) Exceptions. The provisions of Rule 3C(d)(1) shall not apply to preparation of transcripts
produced by means other than computer-generated technology. But time limits and other procedures
governing requests for and preparation of transcripts produced by means other than computer-
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generated technology shall conform with the provisions of this Rule respecting rough draft transcripts.
(e) Filing of Fast Track Statement, Appendix, and Fast Track Reply.
(1) Fast Track Statement.
(A) Time for Serving and Filing. Within 40 days from the date that the appeal is docketed
in the Supreme Court under Rule 12, appellants trial counsel shall serve and file a fast track
statement that substantially complies with Form 6 in the Appendix of Forms.
(B) Length and Contents. Except by court order granting a motion filed in accordance
with Rule 32(a)(7)(D), the fast track statement shall not exceed 15 pages in length or shall comply
with the type-volume limitations stated in Rule 3C(h)(2). The fast track statement shall include the
following:
(i) A statement of jurisdiction for the appeal;
(ii) Astatement of the case and procedural history of the case;
(iii) A concise statement summarizing all facts material to a consideration of the issues on
appeal;
(iv) An outline of the alleged error(s) of the district court;
(v) A statement describing how the alleged issues on appeal were preserved during trial;
(vi) Legal argument, including authorities, pertaining to the alleged error(s) of the district
court;
(vii) Where applicable, a statement regarding the sufficiency of the rough draft transcript;
and
(viii) Where applicable, a reference to all related or prior appeals, including the appropriate
citations for those appeals.
(C) References to the Appendix. Every assertion in the fast track statement regarding
matters in a rough draft transcript or other document shall cite to the page and volume number, if any,
of the appendix that supports the assertion.
(D) Number of Copies to Be Filed and Served. An original and 1 copy of the fast track
statement shall be filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court, and 1 copy shall be served on counsel
for each party separately represented.
(2) Appendix.
(A) Joint Appendix. Counsel have a duty to confer and attempt to reach an agreement
concerning a possible joint appendix to be filed with the fast track statement.
(B) Appellants Appendix. In the absence of an agreement respecting a joint appendix,
appellant shall prepare and file an original and 1 copy of a separate appendix with the fast track
statement. Appellant shall serve a copy of the appendix on counsel for each party separately
represented.
(C) Form and Content. The preparation and contents of appendices shall comply with
Rules 30 and 32 and shall be paginated sequentially.
(3) Fast Track Reply. The appellant may file a reply to the Fast Track Response that shall be
entitled Reply to Fast Track Response. The reply shall be no longer than 5 pages or shall comply
with the type-volume limitations stated in Rule 3C(h)(2). The reply must be limited to answering
matters set forth in the Fast Track Response. The reply must be filed within 14 days of service of the
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Fast Track Response.
(f) Filing of Fast Track Response and Appendix.
(1) Fast Track Response.
(A) Time for Service and Filing. Within 20 days from the date a fast track statement is
served, the respondent shall serve and file a fast track response that substantially complies with Form
7 in the Appendix of Forms.
(B) Length and Contents. Except by court order granting a motion filed in accordance
with Rule 32(a)(7)(D), the fast track response shall not exceed 10 pages in length or shall comply
with the type-volume limitations stated in Rule 3C(h)(2). The fast track response shall include
additional authority and factual information necessary to rebut the contentions in the fast track
statement.
(C) References to the Appendix. Every assertion in the fast track response regarding
matters in a rough draft transcript or other document shall cite to the page and volume number, if any,
of the appendix that supports the assertion.
(D) Number of Copies to Be Filed and Served. An original and 1 copy of the fast track
response shall be filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court, and 1 copy shall be served on counsel for
each party separately represented.
(2) Appendix.
(A) Joint Appendix. Counsel have a duty to confer and attempt to reach an agreement
concerning a possible joint appendix. (NOTE: the WCDAs Office has willfully obstructed
Coughlins ability to communicate with opposing counsel Z. Young, at times refusing to even allow
Coughlin to leave Young a voice mail, and WCDA ADA Helzer has admitted to engineering a
process whereby he intercerpts Coughlins written communications to Young and RJC Bailiffs,
including Bailiff Reyes have, in a hostile and threatening manner, prevented Coughlin from
communicating at all with Young at any time (other than, say, indirectly during the record portion
of a proceeding).
(B) Respondents Appendix. In the absence of an agreement respecting a joint appendix,
respondent shall prepare and file an original and 1 copy of a separate appendix with the fast track
response. Respondent shall serve a copy of the appendix on counsel for each party separately
represented.
(C) Form and Contents. The preparation and contents of appendices shall comply with
Rules 30 and 32 and shall be paginated sequentially.
(g) Filing of Supplemental Fast Track Statement and Response.
(1) Supplemental Fast Track Statement.
(A) When Permitted; Length. A supplemental fast track statement of not more than 5
pages or its equivalent calculated under the type-volume limitation provisions of Rule 3C(h)(2) may
be filed when appellate counsel differs from trial counsel and can assert material issues that should be
considered but were not raised in the fast track statement.
(B) Time for Service and Filing; Number of Copies. When permitted under
subparagraph (A), an original and 1 copy of a supplemental fast track statement shall be filed with the
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Supreme Court, and 1 copy shall be served upon opposing counsel, no more than 20 days after the
fast track statement is filed or appellate counsel is appointed, whichever is later.
(2) Supplemental Fast Track Response. No later than 10 days after a supplemental fast track
statement is served, the respondent may file and serve a response of not more than 5 pages or its
equivalent calculated under the type-volume limitation provisions of Rule 3C(h)(2).
(h) Format; Type-Volume Limitation; Certificate of Compliance.
(1) Format. Fast track filings shall comply with the formatting requirements of Rule 32(a)(4)-
(6), and Rule 32(a)(7)(D) shall apply in computing permissible length.
(2) Type-Volume Limitation. The size of a fast track filing may be calculated by type-volume
in lieu of page limitation. Using a type-volume limitation, a fast track statement is acceptable if it
contains no more than 7,000 words or 650 lines of text. A fast track response is acceptable if it
contains no more than two-thirds the type-volume specified for a fast track statement (4,667 words or
433 lines of text); and a fast track reply or supplement is acceptable if it contains no more than one-
third of the type-volume specified for a fast track statement (2,333 words or 216 lines of text).
(3) Certificate of Compliance. Fast track filings must include a certificate of compliance in
substantially the form required by Rule 32(a)(8). A certificate that includes the first two paragraphs
under Verification in Forms 6 and 7 of the Appendix of Forms will be regarded as sufficient to
meet the requirements of this Rule.
(i) Extensions of Time.
(1) Preparation of Rough Draft Transcript.
(A) Five-Day Telephonic Extension. A court reporter or recorder may request by
telephone a 5-day extension of time to prepare a rough draft transcript if the preparation requires
more time than is allowed under this Rule. If good cause is shown, the clerk of the Supreme Court or
a designated deputy may grant the request by telephone or by written order of the clerk.
(B) Additional Extensions by Motion. Subsequent extensions of time for filing rough
draft transcripts shall be granted only upon motion to the Supreme Court. The motion shall justify the
requested extension in light of the time limits provided in this Rule, and shall specify the exact length
of the extension requested. Extensions of time for the filing of rough draft transcripts shall be granted
only upon demonstration of good cause. Sanctions may be imposed if a motion is brought without
reasonable grounds.
(2) Fast Track Statement and Response; Supplemental Statement and Response.
(A) Five-Day Telephonic Extension. Counsel may request by telephone a 5-day extension
of time for filing fast track statements and responses, and supplemental fast track statements and
responses. If good cause is shown, the clerk of the Supreme Court may grant the request by telephone
or by written order of the clerk.
(B) Additional Extensions by Motion. Subsequent extensions of time for filing fast track
statements and responses, and supplemental fast track statements and responses shall be granted only
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upon motion to the Supreme Court. The motion shall justify the requested extension in light of the
time limits provided in this Rule, and shall specify the exact length of the extension requested.
Extensions of time for the filing of fast track statements and responses, and supplemental fast track
statements and responses shall be granted only upon demonstration of extreme need or merit.
Sanctions may be imposed if a motion is brought without reasonable grounds.
(j) Amendments to Statements and Responses. Leave to amend fast track statements and
responses, or supplemental fast track statements and responses shall be granted only upon motion to
the Supreme Court. A motion to amend shall justify the absence of the offered arguments in the initial
or supplemental fast track statement or response. The motion shall be granted only upon
demonstration of extreme need or merit.
(k) Full Briefing, Calendaring or Summary Disposition.
(1) Based solely upon review of the rough draft transcript, fast track statement, fast track
response, and any supplemental documents, the Supreme Court may summarily dismiss the appeal,
may affirm or reverse the decision appealed from without further briefing or argument, may order the
appeal to be fully briefed and argued or submitted for decision without argument, may order that
briefing and any argument be limited to specific issues, or may direct the appeal to proceed in any
manner reasonably calculated to expedite its resolution and promote justice.
(2) Motion for Full Briefing.
(A) A party may seek leave of the Supreme Court to remove an appeal from the fast
track program and direct full briefing. The motion may not be filed solely for purposes of delay. It
may be filed in addition to or in lieu of the fast track pleading.
(B) The motion must identify specific reasons why the appeal is not appropriate for
resolution in the fast track program. Such reasons may include, but are not limited to, the following
circumstances:
(i) The case raises one or more issues that involve substantial precedential,
constitutional, or public policy questions; and/or
(ii) The case is legally or factually complex.
(C) If the issues or facts are numerous but not complex, full briefing will not be granted
but an excess page motion may be entertained.
(D) No opposition may be filed unless ordered by the court.
(3) If the Supreme Court orders an appeal to be fully briefed, and neither party objects to the
sufficiency of the rough draft transcripts to adequately inform this court of the issues raised in the
appeal, counsel are not required to file certified transcript request forms under Rule 9(a). If a partys
brief will cite to a transcript not previously included in an appendix submitted to this court, that party
shall file and serve a transcript request form in accordance with Rule 9 within the time specified for
filing the brief in the Supreme Courts briefing order. If a partys brief will cite to documents not
previously filed in the Supreme Court, that party shall file and serve an appropriately documented
supplemental appendix with the brief.
(l) Withdrawal of Appeal. If an appellant no longer desires to pursue an appeal after the notice
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of appeal is filed, counsel responsible for the appeal at that time shall file with the Supreme Court a
notice of withdrawal of appeal. The notice of withdrawal of appeal shall substantially comply with
Form 8 in the Appendix of Forms.
(m) Court Reporter or Recorder Protection and Compensation.
(1) Liability. Court reporters or recorders shall not be subject to civil, criminal or
administrative causes of action for inaccuracies in a rough draft transcript unless the court reporter
or recorder willfully:
(A) Fails to take full and accurate stenographic notes of the criminal proceeding for which
the rough draft transcript is submitted, or willfully and improperly alters stenographic notes from the
criminal proceeding, or willfully transcribes audio- or videotapes inaccurately; and
(B) Such willful conduct proximately causes injury or damage to the party asserting the
action, and that party demonstrates that appellate or post-conviction relief was granted or denied
based upon the court reporters or recorders inaccuracies.
(2) Compensation. Court reporters shall be compensated as follows:
(A) For preparing a rough draft transcript, the court reporter shall receive 100 percent of the
rate established by NRS 3.370 for each transcript page as defined by NRS 3.370 and $25 for costs.
Costs include the cost of delivery of the original and copies of the rough draft transcript. In the event
that overnight delivery is required to or from outlying areas, that cost shall be additional.
(B) In the event a certified transcript is ordered after the rough draft transcript is prepared,
the court reporter shall receive an additional fee equal to 25 percent of the amount established by
NRS 3.370 for the already prepared rough draft portion of the transcript. Any portions not included
with the rough draft transcript will be compensated by the amount established by NRS 3.370.
(n) Sanctions. Any attorney, court reporter, or court recorder who lacks due diligence in
compliance with this Rule may be subject to sanctions by the Supreme Court. Sanctionable actions
include, but are not limited to, failure of trial counsel to file a timely fast track statement or fast track
response; failure of trial counsel to fully cooperate with appellate counsel during the course of the
appeal; and failure of counsel to raise material issues or arguments in a fast track statement, response,
supplemental statement or supplemental response.
(o) Conflict. The provisions of this Rule shall prevail over conflicting provisions of any other
rule.
[Added; effective September 1, 1996; as amended; effective January 3, 2012.]
NOTE: the Form 5 reference above is included here:
Form 5. Request for Rough Draft Transcript of Proceeding in the District Court
No. ........................ Dept. No. .....................
IN THE ................ JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR
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THE COUNTY OF ................
A. B., Plaintiff }
v. }
C. D., Defendant }
REQUEST FOR ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT
TO: [Court Reporter Name]
(C.D.) , defendant named above, requests preparation of a rough draft transcript of
certain portions of the proceedings before the district court, as follows:
Specific individual dates of proceedings for which transcripts are being requested (a range of dates is
not acceptable):
Specific portions of the transcript being requested (e.g., suppression hearing, trial, closing argument,
etc.):
This notice requests a transcript of only those portions of the district court proceedings that
counsel reasonably and in good faith believes are necessary to determine whether appellate issues are
present. Voir dire examination of jurors, opening statements and closing arguments of trial counsel,
and the reading of jury instructions shall not be transcribed unless specifically requested above.
I recognize that I must serve a copy of this form on the above named court reporter and opposing
counsel, and that the above named court reporter shall have twenty (20) days from the receipt of this
notice to prepare and submit to the district court the rough draft transcript requested herein.
Dated this day of , 20 .
.......................................................................................
(Signature of Attorney)
.......................................................................................
(Nevada Bar Identification No.)
.......................................................................................
(Law Firm)
.......................................................................................
(Address)
.......................................................................................
(Telephone Number)
[Added; effective September 1, 1996; As amended; effective July 1, 2009.]
Relevant to Longoni, whom the RMC holds out as its official report: NRS 3.320 Official
reporter: Appointment; duties.
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1. The judge or judges of any district court may appoint, subject to the provisions of this chapter
and other laws as to the qualifications and examinations of the appointee, one certified court reporter,
to be known as official reporter of the court or department and to hold office during the pleasure of
the judge appointing the official reporter. The appointee may be any business organization licensed
by the Board if the person representing the business organization, who actually performs the
reporting service, is a certified court reporter.
2. The official reporter, or any one of them if there are two or more, shall:
(a) At the request of either party or of the court in a civil action or proceeding, and on the order
of the court, the district attorney or the attorney for the defendant in a criminal action or proceeding,
make a record of all the testimony, the objections made, the rulings of the court, the exceptions taken,
all arraignments, pleas and sentences of defendants in criminal cases, and all statements and remarks
made by the district attorney or judge, and all oral instructions given by the judge; and
(b) When directed by the court or requested by either party, within such reasonable time after the
trial of the case as may be designated by law or, in the absence of any law relating thereto, by the
court, transcribe the record into a written transcript. The reporter shall certify that the action or
proceeding was correctly reported and transcribed and, when directed by the law or court, shall file
the written transcript with the clerk of the court.
3. As used in this section, Board means the Certified Court Reporters Board of Nevada,
created by NRS 656.040.
[1:52:1907; A 1921, 96; NCL 8455](NRS A 1973, 1321; 1981, 245; 1993, 1410; 2007,
1035; 2011, 669)
NRS 3.340 Official reporter: Attention to duties; reporter pro tempore. The official
reporter of any district court shall attend to the duties of office in person except when excused for
good and sufficient reason by order of the court, which order shall be entered upon the minutes of the
court. Employment in his or her professional capacity elsewhere shall not be deemed a good and
sufficient reason for such excuse. When the official reporter of any court has been excused in the
manner provided in this section, the court may designate an official reporter pro tempore who shall
perform the same duties and receive the same compensation during the term of his or her
appointment as the official reporter.
[3:52:1907; RL 4910; NCL 8457](NRS A2011, 670)
NRS 3.350 Official reporter: Oath of office. The official reporter of any court, or official
reporter pro tempore, shall, before entering upon the duties of office, take and subscribe the
constitutional oath of office.
[4:52:1907; RL 4911; NCL 8458]
NRS 3.360 Official reporter: Transcript prima facie evidence. The transcript of the
official reporter, or official reporter pro tempore, of any court, duly appointed and sworn, when
transcribed and certified as being a correct transcript of the testimony and proceedings in the case, is
prima facie evidence of such testimony and proceedings.
[5:52:1907; RL 4912; NCL 8459](NRS A2011, 670)
NRS 3.370 Official reporter: Compensation.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, for his or her services the official reporter or
reporter pro tempore is entitled to the following compensation:
(a) For being available to report civil and criminal testimony and proceedings when the court is
sitting during traditional business hours on any day except Saturday or Sunday, $170 per day, to be
paid by the county as provided in subsection 4.
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(b) For being available to report civil and criminal testimony and proceedings when the court is
sitting beyond traditional business hours or on Saturday or Sunday:
(1) If the reporter has been available to report for at least 4 hours, $35 per hour for each hour
of availability; or
(2) If the reporter has been available to report for fewer than 4 hours, a pro rata amount
based on the daily rate set forth in paragraph (a),
to be paid by the county as provided in subsection 4.
(c) For transcription:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2), for the original draft and any copy to
be delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $7.50 per page for the original draft and one
copy, and $2 per page for each additional copy;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, $5.62 per page for the original draft and one
copy, and $1.50 per page for each additional copy;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, $4.68 per page for the original draft and one copy,
and $1.25 per page for each additional copy; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, $3.55 per page for the original draft and one
copy, and 55 cents per page for each additional copy.
(2) For civil litigants who are ordering the original draft and are represented by a nonprofit
legal corporation or a program for pro bono legal assistance, for the original draft and any copy to be
delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $5.50 per page and $1.10 per page for each
additional copy;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, $4.13 per page and 83 cents per page for each
additional copy;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, $3.44 per page and 69 cents per page for each
additional copy; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, $2.75 per page and 55 cents per page for each
additional copy.
(3) For any party other than the party ordering the original draft, for the copy of the draft to
be delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $1.10 per page;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, 83 cents per page;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, 69 cents per page; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, 55 cents per page.
(d) For reporting all civil matters, in addition to the compensation provided in paragraphs (a) and
(b), $30 for each hour or fraction thereof actually spent, to be taxed as costs pursuant to subsection 5.
(e) For providing an instantaneous translation of testimony into English which appears on a
computer that is located at a table in the courtroom where the attorney who requested the translation
is seated:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, in all criminal matters in which a
party requests such a translation, in addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a)
and (b), $140 for the first day and $90 per day for each subsequent day from the party who makes the
request. This additional compensation must be paid by the county as provided pursuant to subsection
4 only if the court issues an order granting the translation service to the prosecuting attorney or to an
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indigent defendant who is represented by a county or state public defender.
(2) In all civil matters in which a party requests such a translation, in addition to the
compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b) and (d), $140 for the first day and $90 per day
for each subsequent day, to be paid by the party who requests the translation.
(f) For providing a diskette containing testimony prepared from a translation provided pursuant
to paragraph (e):
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, in all criminal matters in which a
party requests the diskette and the reporter agrees to provide the diskette, in addition to the
compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b) and (e), $1.50 per page of the translation
contained on the diskette from the party who makes the request. This additional compensation must
be paid by the county as provided pursuant to subsection 4 only if the court issues an order granting
the diskette to the prosecuting attorney or to an indigent defendant who is represented by a county or
state public defender.
(2) In all civil matters in which a party requests the diskette and the reporter agrees to
provide the diskette, in addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b), (d) and
(e), $1.50 per page of the translation contained on the diskette, to be paid by the party who requests
the diskette.
2. For the purposes of subsection 1, a page is a sheet of paper 8 1/2 by 11 inches and does not
include a condensed transcript. The left margin must not be more than 1 1/2 inches from the left edge
of the paper. The right margin must not be more than three-fourths of an inch from the right edge of
the paper. Each sheet must be numbered on the left margin and must contain at least 24 lines of type.
The first line of each question and of each answer may be indented not more than five spaces from
the left margin. The first line of any paragraph or other material may be indented not more than 10
spaces from the left margin. There must not be more than one space between words or more than two
spaces between sentences. The type size must not be larger than 10 characters per inch. The lines of
type may be double spaced or one and one-half spaced.
3. If the court determines that the services of more than one reporter are necessary to deliver
transcripts on a daily basis in a criminal proceeding, each reporter is entitled to receive:
(a) The compensation set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1 and subparagraph (1) of
paragraph (e) of subsection 1, as appropriate; and
(b) Compensation of $7.50 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $2 per page for each
additional copy for transcribing a proceeding of which the transcripts are ordered by the court to be
delivered on or before the start of the next day the court is scheduled to conduct business.
4. The compensation specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1, the compensation for
transcripts in criminal cases ordered by the court to be made, the compensation for transcripts in civil
cases ordered by the court pursuant to NRS 12.015, the compensation for transcripts for parents or
guardians or attorneys of parents or guardians who receive transcripts pursuant to NRS 432B.459, the
compensation in criminal cases that is ordered by the court pursuant to subparagraph (1) of paragraph
(e) and subparagraph (1) of paragraph (f) of subsection 1 and the compensation specified in
subsection 3 must be paid out of the county treasury upon the order of the court. When there is no
official reporter in attendance and a reporter pro tempore is appointed, his or her reasonable expenses
for traveling and detention must be fixed and allowed by the court and paid in the same manner. The
respective district judges may, with the approval of the respective board or boards of county
commissioners within the judicial district, fix a monthly salary to be paid to the official reporter in
lieu of per diem. The salary, and also actual traveling expenses in cases where the reporter acts in
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more than one county, must be prorated by the judge on the basis of time consumed by work in the
respective counties and must be paid out of the respective county treasuries upon the order of the
court.
5. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, in civil cases, the compensation prescribed in
paragraph (d) of subsection 1 and for transcripts ordered by the court to be made must be paid by the
parties in equal proportions, and either party may, at the partys option, pay the entire compensation.
In either case, all amounts so paid by the party to whom costs are awarded must be taxed as costs in
the case. The compensation for transcripts and copies ordered by the parties must be paid by the party
ordering them. No reporter may be required to perform any service in a civil case until his or her
compensation has been paid to him or her.
6. Where a transcript is ordered by the court or by any party, the compensation for the transcript
must be paid to the reporter before the furnishing of the transcript.
[6:52:1907; A 1921, 96; 1921, 288; 1955, 189](NRS A 1961, 307; 1967, 1258; 1971, 646; 1975,
1472, 1816; 1981, 404; 1987, 909; 1989, 1271; 1993, 2022; 1995, 1592; 1999, 750;2001, 1705; 2005,
187; 2011, 670)
NRS 3.380 Sound recording equipment: Installation; operation; transcription of
recording; use of transcript; provision by party of certified court reporter; effect.
1. The judge or judges of any district court may, with the approval of the board of county
commissioners of any one or more of the counties comprising such district, in addition to the
appointment of a court reporter as in this chapter provided, enter an order for the installation of sound
recording equipment for use in any of the instances recited in NRS 3.320, for the recording of any
civil and criminal proceedings, testimony, objections, rulings, exceptions, arraignments, pleas,
sentences, statements and remarks made by the district attorney or judge, oral instructions given by
the judge and any other proceedings occurring in civil or criminal actions or proceedings, or special
proceedings whenever and wherever and to the same extent as any of such proceedings have
heretofore under existing statutes been recorded by the official reporter or any special reporter or any
reporter pro tempore appointed by the court.
2. For the purpose of operating such sound recording equipment, the court or judge may appoint
or designate the official reporter or a special reporter or reporter pro tempore or the county clerk or
clerk of the court or deputy clerk. The person so operating such sound recording equipment shall
subscribe to an oath that he or she will well and truly operate the equipment so as to record all of the
matters and proceedings.
3. The court may then designate the person operating such equipment or any other competent
person to listen to the recording and to transcribe the recording into written text. The person who:
(a) Transcribes the recording shall subscribe to an oath that he or she has truly and correctly
transcribed the proceedings as recorded.
(b) Operates the sound recording equipment as described in subsection 2 shall:
(1) Subscribe to an oath that the sound recording is a true and accurate recording of the
proceedings; and
(2) In the event of an error, malfunction or other problem relating to the sound recording
equipment or the sound recording, report that error, malfunction or problem to the court.
4. The transcript may be used for all purposes for which transcripts have heretofore been
received and accepted under then existing statutes, including transcripts of testimony and transcripts
of proceedings as constituting bills of exceptions or part of the bill of exceptions on appeals in all
criminal cases and transcripts of the evidence or proceedings as constituting the record on appeal in
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civil cases and including transcripts of preliminary hearings before justices of the peace and other
committing magistrates, and are subject to correction in the same manner as transcripts under existing
statutes.
5. If a proceeding is recorded and a transcript is requested, a copy of the sound recording must,
if requested, be provided with the transcript. The cost for providing the sound recording must not
exceed the actual cost of production and must be paid by the party who requests the sound recording.
6. In civil and criminal cases when the court has ordered the use of such sound recording
equipment, any party to the action, at the partys own expense, may provide a certified court reporter
to make a record of and transcribe all the matters of the proceeding. In such a case, the record
prepared by sound recording is the official record of the proceedings, unless it fails or is incomplete
because of equipment or operational failure, in which case the record prepared by the certified court
reporter shall be deemed, for all purposes, the official record of the proceedings.
[7:52:1907; added 1949, 506; 1943 NCL 8460.01](NRS A1995, 1594; 2007, 1036;2011, 673)
NOTE THE changes to such relevant NRS 3 sections made by the 2011 legislature, effective3
10/1/11 (coughlins trial was 11/30/11 in the matter on appeal in 2064, the first trial of all referenced
herein):
Assembly Bill No. 249Assemblyman Oceguera
CHAPTER 138
[Approved: May 29, 2011]
AN ACT relating to court reporters; making various changes pertaining to the appointment, duties
and work product of court reporters in the district courts and justice courts of this State; and
providing other matters properly relating thereto.
Legislative Counsels Digest:
Section 1 of this bill provides that a business organization appointed to provide to a district court
the services of a certified court reporter must be licensed by the Certified Court Reporters Board of
Nevada. (NRS 3.320) Section 2 of this bill clarifies that an official reporter pro tempore of a district
court is appointed rather than employed and, like the official reporter he or she replaces, does not
have a fixed term of employment. (NRS 3.320, 3.340) Section 3 of this bill states that prima facie
evidence of the testimony and proceedings in a district court is provided by the transcript and not the
report of the official reporter. (NRS 3.360) Section 4 of this bill makes various changes with respect
to the compensation of the official reporter of a district court. (NRS 3.370) Section 5 of this bill
provides that, when sound recording equipment is used to record proceedings in a district court and a
transcript is subsequently made: (1) the person who transcribes the recording shall subscribe to an
oath that he or she has truly and correctly transcribed the proceedings as recorded; and (2) the person
who operates the sound recording equipment shall subscribe to an oath that the sound recording is a
true and accurate recording of the proceedings and, in the event of an error, malfunction or other
problem relating to the sound recording equipment or the sound recording, report that error,
malfunction or problem to the court. Section 5 also requires a copy of a sound recording, if requested,
to be provided with a requested transcript. The cost for providing the recording must not exceed the
actual cost of producing the recording and must be paid by the party who requests the recording.
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(NRS 3.380) Section 6 of this bill states that, with regard to proceedings in a justice court,
compensation for the preparation of a transcript is to be deposited with the certified court reporter and
not with the deputy clerk of the court. (NRS 4.410) Section 7 of this bill provides that: (1) the sound
recording of each proceeding in justice court must be preserved until at least 1 year, instead of 30
days, after the time for filing an appeal expires; and (2) with respect to certain criminal proceedings
in a justice court, sound recordings must be preserved for a period of at least 8 years. (NRS 4.420)
EXPLANATION Matter in bolded italics is new; matter between brackets [omitted material] is
material to be omitted.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, REPRESENTED IN
SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
Section 1. NRS 3.320 is hereby amended to read as follows:
3.320 1. The judge or judges of any district court may appoint, subject to the provisions of this
chapter and other laws as to the qualifications and examinations of the appointee, one certified
court reporter, to be known as official reporter of the court or department and to hold office during
the pleasure of the judge appointing the official reporter.
2011 Statutes of Nevada, Page 670 (Chapter 138, AB 249)

qualifications and examinations of the appointee, one certified court reporter, to be known as official
reporter of the court or department and to hold office during the pleasure of the judge appointing the
official reporter. The appointee may be any business organization licensed by the Board if the person
representing [it,] the business organization, who actually performs the reporting service, is a
certified court reporter.
2. The official reporter, or any one of them if there are two or more, shall:
(a) At the request of either party or of the court in a civil action or proceeding, and on the order of
the court, the district attorney or the attorney for the defendant in a criminal action or proceeding,
make a record of all the testimony, the objections made, the rulings of the court, the exceptions taken,
all arraignments, pleas and sentences of defendants in criminal cases, and all statements and remarks
made by the district attorney or judge, and all oral instructions given by the judge; and
(b) [If] When directed by the court or requested by either party, within such reasonable time after
the trial of the case as may be designated by law or, in the absence of any law relating thereto, by the
court, [write out the record, or such specific portions thereof as may be requested, in plain and legible
longhand, or by typewriter or other printing machine.] transcribe the record into a written
transcript. The reporter shall certify [to that copy as being] that the action or proceeding
was correctly reported and transcribed and, when directed by the law or court, shall file [it] the
written transcript with the clerk of the court.
3. As used in this section, Board means the Certified Court Reporters Board of Nevada,
created by NRS 656.040.
Sec. 2. NRS 3.340 is hereby amended to read as follows:
3.340 The official reporter of any district court shall attend to the duties of office in person except
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when excused for good and sufficient reason by order of the court, which order shall be entered upon
the minutes of the court. Employment in his or her professional capacity elsewhere shall not be
deemed a good and sufficient reason for such excuse. When the official reporter of any court has been
excused in the manner provided in this section, the court may designate an official reporter pro
tempore who shall perform the same duties and receive the same compensation during the term of his
or her [employment] appointment as the official reporter.
3.360 The [report] transcript of the official reporter, or official reporter pro tempore, of any court,
duly appointed and sworn, when transcribed and certified as being a correct transcript of the
testimony and proceedings in the case, is prima facie evidence of such testimony and proceedings.
3.370 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, for his or her services the official reporter
or reporter pro tempore is entitled to the following compensation:
(a) For being available to report civil and criminal testimony and proceedings when the court is
sitting during traditional business hours on any day except Saturday or Sunday, $170 per day, to be
paid by the county as provided in subsection 4.
(b) For being available to report civil and criminal testimony and proceedings when the court is
sitting beyond traditional business hours or on Saturday or Sunday:

(1) If the reporter has been available to report for at least 4 hours, $35 per hour for each hour
of availability; or
(2) If the reporter has been available to report for fewer than 4 hours, a pro rata amount based
on the daily rate set forth in paragraph (a),
to be paid by the county as provided in subsection 4.
(c) For transcription:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2), for the original draft and any copy to be
delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $7.50 per page for the original draft and one copy,
and $2 per page for each additional copy;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, $5.62 per page for the original draft and one copy,
and $1.50 per page for each additional copy;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, $4.68 per page for the original draft and one copy,
and $1.25 per page for each additional copy; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, $3.55 per page for the original draft and one
copy, and 55 cents per page for each additional copy.
(2) For civil litigants who are ordering the original draft and are represented by a nonprofit
legal corporation or a program for pro bono legal assistance, for the original draft and any copy to be
delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $5.50 per page and $1.10 per page for each
additional copy;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, $4.13 per page and 83 cents per page for each
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additional copy;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, $3.44 per page and 69 cents per page for each
additional copy; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, $2.75 per page and 55 cents per page for each
additional copy.
(3) For any party other than the party ordering the original draft, for the copy of the draft to be
delivered:
(I) Within 24 hours after it is requested, $1.10 per page;
(II) Within 48 hours after it is requested, 83 cents per page;
(III) Within 4 days after it is requested, 69 cents per page; or
(IV) More than 4 days after it is requested, 55 cents per page.
(d) For reporting all civil matters, in addition to the compensation provided in paragraphs (a) and
(b), $30 for each hour or fraction thereof actually spent, to be taxed as costs pursuant to subsection 5.
(e) For providing an instantaneous translation of testimony into English which appears on a
computer that is located at a table in the courtroom where the attorney who requested the translation
is seated:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, in all criminal matters in which a party
requests such a translation, in addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a) and
(b), $140 for the first day and $90 per day for each subsequent day from the party who makes the
request. This additional compensation must be paid by the county as provided pursuant to subsection
4 only if the court issues an order granting the translation service to the prosecuting attorney or to an
indigent defendant who is represented by a county or state public defender.
(2) In all civil matters in which a party requests such a translation, in addition to the
compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b) and (d), $140 for the first day and $90 per day
for each subsequent day, to be paid by the party who requests the translation.

(d), $140 for the first day and $90 per day for each subsequent day, to be paid by the party who
requests the translation.
(f) For providing a diskette containing testimony prepared from a translation provided pursuant to
paragraph (e):
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, in all criminal matters in which a party
requests the diskette and the reporter agrees to provide the diskette, in addition to the compensation
provided pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b) and (e), $1.50 per page of the translation contained on the
diskette from the party who makes the request. This additional compensation must be paid by the
county as provided pursuant to subsection 4 only if the court issues an order granting the diskette to
the prosecuting attorney or to an indigent defendant who is represented by a county or state public
defender.
(2) In all civil matters in which a party requests the diskette and the reporter agrees to provide
the diskette, in addition to the compensation provided pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b), (d) and (e),
$1.50 per page of the translation contained on the diskette, to be paid by the party who requests the
diskette.
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2. For the purposes of subsection 1, a page is a sheet of paper 8 1/2 by 11 inches [.] and does not
include a condensed transcript. The left margin must not be more than 1 1/2 inches from the left
edge of the paper. The right margin must not be more than three-fourths of an inch from the right
edge of the paper. Each sheet must be numbered on the left margin and must contain at least 24 lines
of type. The first line of each question and of each answer may be indented not more than five spaces
from the left margin. The first line of any paragraph or other material may be indented not more than
10 spaces from the left margin. There must not be more than one space between words or more than
two spaces between sentences. The type size must not be larger than 10 characters per inch. The lines
of type may be double spaced or one and one-half spaced.
3. If the court determines that the services of more than one reporter are necessary to deliver
transcripts on a daily basis in a criminal proceeding, each reporter is entitled to receive:
(a) The compensation set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1 and subparagraph (1) of
paragraph (e) of subsection 1, as appropriate; and
(b) Compensation of $7.50 per page for the original draft and one copy, and $2 per page for each
additional copy for transcribing a proceeding of which the transcripts are ordered by the court to be
delivered on or before the start of the next day the court is scheduled to conduct business.
4. The compensation specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1, the compensation for
transcripts in criminal cases ordered by the court to be made, the compensation for transcripts in civil
cases ordered by the court pursuant to NRS 12.015, the compensation for transcripts for parents or
guardians or attorneys of parents or guardians who receive transcripts pursuant to NRS 432B.459, the
compensation in criminal cases that is ordered by the court pursuant to subparagraph (1) of paragraph
(e) and subparagraph (1) of paragraph (f) of subsection 1 and the compensation specified in
subsection 3 must be paid out of the county treasury upon the order of the court. When there is no
official reporter in attendance and a reporter pro tempore is appointed, his or her reasonable expenses
for traveling and detention must be fixed and allowed by the court and paid in the same manner.

the same manner. The respective district judges may, with the approval of the respective board or
boards of county commissioners within the judicial district, fix a monthly salary to be paid to the
official reporter in lieu of per diem. The salary, and also actual traveling expenses in cases where the
reporter acts in more than one county, must be prorated by the judge on the basis of time consumed
by work in the respective counties and must be paid out of the respective county treasuries upon the
order of the court.
5. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, in civil cases, the compensation prescribed in
paragraph (d) of subsection 1 and for transcripts ordered by the court to be made must be paid by the
parties in equal proportions, and either party may, at the partys option, pay the entire compensation.
In either case, all amounts so paid by the party to whom costs are awarded must be taxed as costs in
the case. The compensation for transcripts and copies ordered by the parties must be paid by the party
ordering them. No reporter may be required to perform any service in a civil case until his or her
compensation has been paid to him or her .[or deposited with the clerk of the court.]
6. Where a transcript is ordered by the court or by any party, the compensation for [it] the
transcript must be paid to the [clerk of the court and by the clerk paid to
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the] reporter [upon]before the furnishing of the transcript.
[7. The testimony and proceedings in an uncontested divorce action need not be transcribed
unless requested by a party or ordered by the court.]
3.380 1. The judge or judges of any district court may, with the approval of the board of county
commissioners of any one or more of the counties comprising such district, in addition to the
appointment of a court reporter as in this chapter provided, enter an order for the installation of sound
recording equipment for use in any of the instances recited in NRS 3.320, for the recording of any
civil and criminal proceedings, testimony, objections, rulings, exceptions, arraignments, pleas,
sentences, statements and remarks made by the district attorney or judge, oral instructions given by
the judge and any other proceedings occurring in civil or criminal actions or proceedings, or special
proceedings whenever and wherever and to the same extent as any of such proceedings have
heretofore under existing statutes been recorded by the official reporter or any special reporter or any
reporter pro tempore appointed by the court.
2. For the purpose of operating such sound recording equipment, the court or judge may appoint
or designate the official reporter or a special reporter or reporter pro tempore or the county clerk or
clerk of the court or deputy clerk. The person so operating such sound recording equipment shall
subscribe to an oath that he or she will well and truly operate the equipment so as to record all of the
matters and proceedings.
3. The court may then designate the person operating such equipment or any other competent
person to [read] listen to the recording and to transcribe [it] the recording into[typewriting.] written
text. The person [transcribing] who:
(a) Transcribes the recording shall subscribe to an oath that he or she has truly and correctly
transcribed [it.] the proceedings as recorded.
(b) Operates the sound recording equipment as described in subsection 2 shall:

(1) Subscribe to an oath that the sound recording is a true and accurate recording of the
proceedings; and
(2) In the event of an error, malfunction or other problem relating to the sound recording
equipment or the sound recording, report that error, malfunction or problem to the court.
4. The transcript may be used for all purposes for which transcripts have heretofore been received
and accepted under then existing statutes, including transcripts of testimony and transcripts of
proceedings as constituting bills of exceptions or part of the bill of exceptions on appeals in all
criminal cases and transcripts of the evidence or proceedings as constituting the record on appeal in
civil cases and including transcripts of preliminary hearings before justices of the peace and other
committing magistrates, and are subject to correction in the same manner as transcripts under existing
statutes.
5. If a proceeding is recorded and a transcript is requested, a copy of the sound recording must,
if requested, be provided with the transcript. The cost for providing the sound recording must not
exceed the actual cost of production and must be paid by the party who requests the sound
recording.
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6. In civil and criminal cases when the court has ordered the use of such sound recording
equipment, any party to the action, at the partys own expense, may provide a certified court reporter
to make a record of and transcribe all the matters of the proceeding. In such a case, the record
prepared by sound recording is the official record of the proceedings, unless it fails or is incomplete
because of equipment or operational failure, in which case the record prepared by the certified court
reporter shall be deemed, for all purposes, the official record of the proceedings.
4.410 1. If the person designated to transcribe the proceedings is:
(a) Regularly employed as a public employee, the person is not entitled to additional
compensation for preparing the transcript.
(b) Not regularly employed as a public employee and not a certified court reporter, the person is
entitled to such compensation for preparing the transcript as the board of county commissioners
determines.
(c) A certified court reporter, the person is entitled to the same compensation as set forth in NRS
3.370.
2. The compensation for transcripts and copies must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil
case, the preparation of the transcript need not commence until the compensation has been deposited
with the [deputy clerk of the court.] court reporter.
4.420 [The]
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section:
(a) The sound recording of each proceeding in justice court must be preserved until at least[30
days] 1 year after the time for filing an appeal expires.
(b) With respect to a proceeding in justice court that involves a misdemeanor for which
enhanced penalties may be imposed, a gross misdemeanor or a felony, the sound recording of the
proceeding must be preserved for at least 8 years after the time for filing an appeal expires.

2. If no appeal is taken, the justice of the peace may order the destruction of the recording at any
time after [that date.] the date specified in subsection 1.
3. If there is an appeal to the district court, the sound recording must be preserved until at least 30
days after final disposition of the case on appeal, but the justice of the peace may order the
destruction of the recording at any time after that date.
Sec. 8. This act becomes effective upon passage and approval.
________
http://leg.state.nv.us/Statutes/76th2011/Stats201106.html#Stats201106page673
CHAPTER 3 - DISTRICT COURTS
Chapter 3 District Courts
Chapter 4 Justice Courts
Chapter 5 Municipal Courts
Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 OARRMC invokes NRS 4.410(2), wh ich relates to Justice Courts as to a
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municipal court, and its not at all clear that such is appropriate, though:
NRS 5.073 Conformity of practice and proceedings to those of justice courts; exception;
imposition and collection of fees.
1. The practice and proceedings in the municipal court must conform, as nearly as practicable,
to the practice and proceedings of justice courts in similar cases. An appeal perfected transfers the
action to the district court for trial anew, unless the municipal court is designated as a court of record
as provided in NRS 5.010. The municipal court must be treated and considered as a justice court
whenever the proceedings thereof are called into question.
2. Each municipal judge shall charge and collect such fees prescribed in NRS 4.060 that are
within the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 903; A1991, 455; 1997, 115)
NRS 5.075 Form of docket and records. The Court Administrator shall prescribe the form
of the docket and of any other appropriate records to be kept by the municipal court, which form may
vary from court to court according to the number and kind of cases customarily heard and whether
the court is designated as a court of record pursuant to NRS 5.010.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 1997; A1991, 161)
The RMC had Chief Marshal Roper purport to personally serve Coughlin the 1/16/13 Admin
Order 2013-01 in the Dept Alt. Sentencnign Booth located within or nearto the RJC filing office, and
such admin orders purports to be provide jurisdiction for it under NV const art 6 sec 6, rather than
referencing: NRS 5.060 Process, writs and warrants.
1. Municipal judges and municipal courts may issue all legal process, writs and warrants
necessary and proper to the complete exercise of their powers.
2. All warrants issued by the municipal court must run to any sheriff or constable of the county,
the marshal or any police officer of the city, or a marshal or park ranger who is part of a unit of
specialized law enforcement established pursuant to NRS 280.125.
3. Any constable or sheriff may serve any process or make any arrest authorized to be made by
any officer of a city.
[39:19:1865; B 944; BH 2458; C 2539; RL 4859; NCL 8401](NRS A 1983, 901; 1985,
672; 1995, 159)
Such Admin Order 2013-01 by RMc Judge W. Gardner is in now way necessary to the
complete exercise of his powers"
ii
Chief Judge Pearson's recent "Administrative Order 2013-06" relates to Couglin's cases almost as
much as his 3/22/13 Administrative Order 2013-02 related to Coughlin's cross-examinations and
arguments made during the 3/19/13 trial date in RCR2013-065630, where such 3/22/13
Administrative Order 2013-02 essentially announced, nearly 18 months after the law went into effect,
AB226 and the concomitant major changes to the way summary evictions are done in Nevada (with
NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1) being a particularly bone of contention in the 7/31/12 hearing on Coughlin's
Motions in Rev2012-001048 before Judge Pearson incident to a 6/14/12 5 Day Unlawful Detainer
Notice that listed Sparks Justice Court as the court, pursuant to the requirement to list the court in
NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1), in which Coughlin must file a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit within 5 days.
Coughlin so submitted a Tenant's Answer to Sparks Justice Court within 5 judicial days of the quasi-
constructive service of such Notice on 6/14/12 (Nevada Court Services failed to mail such to
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Coughlin in any way, though it did post a copy of the Notice to the door of the "dwelling unit or
apartment" that Northwinds Apartments rented Coughlin upon NCS being unable to gain entry in its
attempts to burglarize Coughlins' rental and commit a trespass in hopes of effecting personal service
of such 5 Day Notice on Coughlin.
At such 7/31/12 hearing, Judge Pearson practiced law on behalf of Northwind's Apartments to
whatever extent was necessary to fill in the gaps where he also permitted an unauthorized practioner
of law, Nevada Court Services Jeff Chandler, to cross the bar and make arguments on behalf of his
"client", and out of state corporation, in violation of NRCP 11. Judge Pearson roundly rejected
Coughlin's NRS 40.253(b)(1) arguments relative to the 5 Day Notice being deficient for the purposes
of obtainin a summary removal order from the Reno Justice Court where it listed the Sparks Justice
Court as the place for Coughlin to file a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit. Apparently, in Judge Scott
Pearsons courtroom, unauthorized practitioner's of law have a net to fall in to save them when they
commit "malpractice".
Anyways, Judge Pearsons's 8/14/13 Administrative Order 2013-06 is noteworthy where it
purports to subject Coughlin to the threat of imprisonment of up to 25 days for each violation of it
order applying JCRRT 10 to "ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURT" whether such are submitted by Coughlin the tenant
in a "landlord tenant matter" where JCRRT 2 clearly states that JCRRT 10 does not apply to "landlord
tenant matters" and NJCRCP 81, and 83 place bright line restrictions on Judge Pearson where the
legislature has enacted a specific statutory scheme in a setting such as those landlord tenants affairs
covered by NRS 40 and NRS 118A. Further, Judge Pearsons attempts to abuse the contempt power
by, essentially, violating the spirit of WDCR 18 (no ticky tack civil law procedural rules that violate
NRCP 5(e) anyways where someone's liberty is at stake, ie, in a criminal case):
WDCR Rule 18: "Papers which do not comply with rules. Except in criminal cases
and writs arising from criminal cases, filing office personnel shall refuse to file any document or
pleading which is not properly signed by all persons, or which does not comply with these rules,
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court Rules, or applicable statutes."
Judge Pearsons AO13-06 is further interesting where, despite Pearson and his fellow lifelong
prosecutor turned Judge, Judge Clifton's insistence (along with Sferrazza) that Coughlin is not able to
issue his own subpoenas given the temporary suspension of his law license (Coughlin's law license
with the USPTO is not temporarily suspended, and Coughlin can issue subpoenas in that context, it
would seem, which extends to the defense of any disciplinary investigation ongoing therein in
G2033). However, Coughlin is representing himself in a number of criminal cases in the RJC where
the court appointed conflict counsel that Judge Clifton (and Judge Pearson) admits he directly
appointed himself, in an apparent violation of Canon 2 Rule 2.13's "Administrative Appointments"
language given the fallout from the 2006 L.A. Times articles on such appointments, R. Bruce Lindsay,
Esq., whom threatened to murder Coughlin on 3/14/13 upon Coughlin pointing out that Lindsay's
announcing his failure to appear at Coughlin's 3/19/13 trial in RCR2013-065630 would be, according
to Judge Clifton's approach with Coughlin's allegedly being late to court on 2/12/13, direct contempt
of court, whether Lindsay was appointed to represent Coughlin in such trial (Judge Clifton would say
no) or whether Lindsay agreed to appear as co-counsel and did so in fact appear (the RJC's Criminal
Division Clerk Robbin Baker and Lindsay's office's Diana Simms play it pretty fast and loose with
those appearances as attorney or record...and sometimes there is fallout to that, and Judge Clifton
should not be permitted to will that away with a dismissive glare). Anyways, where the RJC judges
take the position that Coughlin may not issue his own subpoenas, Judge Pearson's AO13-06 applies to
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Coughlin protions of JCRRT 10 that only apply to "attorneys".
Whereas JCRRT 10 reads: "B. No original pleading or paper may be amended by making
erasures or interlineations thereon, or by attaching slips thereto, except by leave of court. C. The
following information shall appear upon the first page of every paper presented for filing: (1) The
name, Nevada State Bar identification number, address and telephone number of the attorney and of
any associated attorney appearing for the party filing the paper; whether such attorney appears for the
plaintiff, defendant, or other party; or the name, address and telephone number of a party appearing in
proper person, shall be set forth to the left of center of the page beginning at line 1 and shall be single
spaced. The space to the right of center shall be reserved for the filing marks of the clerk. NAME
BAR NUMBER ADDRESS CITY, STATE, ZIP CODE TELEPHONE NUMB"
Also interesting is Judge Pearson's attempts to apply JCRRT 11(G) (rebranded as (m) of the
"PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURT") to even Coughlin's summary eviction cases. Such
attempt to apply JCRRT 11(G) therein by Judge Sferrazza has now become quite a big issue in 61383,
the appeal of the initial horrifically handled by Judge Sferrazza and the RJC, summary eviction from
Coughlin's former home law office in Rev2011-001708 (well, actually, the precursor sister case,
Rev2011-001492 might be considered the "initial" one, especially given the favorable NRS
118A.510(e) analysis such provides to Coughlin), where Judge Sferrazza "entered" a Post-It Note
Order atop one of Coughlin's filings (though such was never, like, actually mailed to Coughlin or the
opposing party or file stamped, etc...) that purported to either deny Coughlin's Motion for Stay or just
plain fail to adjudicate it based upon Judge Sferrazza's contention that JCRRT 11(G) applied in
landlord tenant matters.
Las Vegas has a JCRLV Rule 40 that just so limits the number of motions for stay, and
motions to vacate in an eviction case that a tenant can file. However, to get that Rule 20 on the books,
the Justice Court for Las Vegas Township had to, and did, comply with NV JCRCP, which required
such proposed rule be published and then approved by the Nevada Supreme Court. (the ghost of
Lippis reminds us all of the ills of allowing courts of limited jurisdiction free reign to decide just how
much due process tenant's are to be afforded, r.i.p)
So, where Judge Pearson's AO13-06 purports to enact a rule applicable only to Coughlin
(where such analog in JCRRT 11(G) does not apply to anyone else in a "landlord tenant matter" per
JCRRT 2), such is violative of Nev. Const. Art. 4 Sect. 21, where it reads: "(m) No motion once heard
and disposed of shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall the same matters therein embraced be
reheard, unless by leave of the Court."
This echoes Judge Sferrazza's approach as revealed from the transcript of the 11/7/11 hearing
before him in Rev2011-001708: "(10:06 AM)...
Judge: ...I have already denied the motion for stay which once made cannot be made again to the
court you can address that to the District Court Sir. But, what I am willing to consider this morning is
what I indicated previously is the deposit of $2275 With the Court's. And, since Mr. Coughlin this
was your motion I will allow you to argue first and then we will hear from Mr. Baker his response..."
And, really, the wording of JCRLV Rule 40 addresses a lot of the problems that occurred in
the summary eviction's Coughlin was subjected to, especially vis a vis the Motion to Stay, and the
RJC's failure to properly adjudiciate them, the RJC Clerks refusal to accept Coughlin's supersedeas
bonds, etc., etc. (not to mention the failure to timely transmit the ROA to the district court, or in any
way comply with SCR 10, 11, applicable in light of NRS 40.400).
Similarly, Judge Sferrazza responded to Coughlin's 11/2/11 Verified Complaint for Illegal
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Lockout in response to landlord Merliss's attorneys Baker and Hill, along with the WCSO
burglarizing Coughlin's property, by scrawling out on a Post-It Note "Order" that was never served on
either party and only uncovered upon the transmission of the incredibly deficient Record on appeal
some seven weeks later "11/3/11 This needs to be transmitted to the District Ct. He appealed. PS".
Actually, under Nevada law, the justice court needs to give Coughlin a hearing within 3 days
of his filing a Verified Complaint for Illegal Lockout, period. Whether or not Coughlin appealed the
matter would not change that. Judge Sferrazza knows not whether Hill and or Baker told Coughlin
they were charging him the same $900 "full rental value" for the time after their burglary (which the
rebrand as a "lockout") that previously entitled Coughlin to "full use and occupancy" sufficient to
create a new lease, or otherwise withdraw the eviction, and, regardless, even were that not the case,
an illegal lockout is an illegal lockout, and just because Judge Sferrazza may think "ah, what's the
difference if they did the lockout too soon, you were going to be locked out soon enough" does not
vitiate Coughlin's rights under NRS 118A.390(1)(a),(5)(a)-(b)..
A similar Post It Note Order (unserved, of course) by Judge Sferrazza was affixed atop the
12/22/11 Notice of Posting Supersedeas Bond as Set By Statute, Where is My Stay filing by
Coughlin, which the RJC still refuses to transmit to the 2JDC and fraudulently failed to include in
either the 1/4/12 or 4/1/13 Supplementals so transmitted. That 12/22/11 Post It Note Order by Judge
Sferrazza misapplies the plenary NRS 40.380 standard to the appeal of a summary eviction where
NRS 40.385 has not "within 10 days" requirement, where such Post It Note Order reads: "12/22/11
the stay was denied an no bond was posted within 10 days. Defendnat needs to have District Court
address this on appeal. PS". Such "ruling" is especially rich given Judge Sferrazza's order at the
conclusion of the 10/25/11 summary eviction proceeding where he rebranded the $2,275 he
impermissibly required Coughlin to deposit as a NRS 118A.355(5) "rent escrow" deposit as
Coughlin's "bond on appeal". One, the RJC retaining that $2,275 was plenty sufficient a "deposit"
where NRS 40.385 required only $250 be deposited by Coughlin to obtain a stay. Two, even had
NRS 40.380 been applicable, such involves "twice the judgment", and where there was no money
judgment against Coughlin in the "no cause summary eviction proceeding" that Judge Sferrazza kept
trying to turn into a non-payment of rent summary eviction, the required "deposit" would have been
twice of nothing.
JCRLV Rule 40. Motions to stay in eviction cases.
(a) A tenant in an eviction case may only file 1 motion to stay or 1 motion to vacate per case,
on a form approved by the court.
(b) Upon the filing of a motion to stay under subsection (a), any pending eviction order shall
be stayed until further order of the court.
(c) A motion to stay will be reviewed by the court within 1 judicial day...
[Added; effective August 11, 2010.]"
Now, why would the Justice Court of Las Vegas Township need go to the trouble to publish
and get approved by the Nevada Supreme Court JCRLV Rule 40 when it already has a nearly
identical analog to JCRRT Rule 11(G) in JCRLV Rule 11(f): "(f) No motion once heard and
disposed of shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall the same matters therein embraced be
reheard, unless by leave of the court."?
NV JCRCP RULE 81. APPLICABILITY IN GENERAL
(a) To What Proceedings Applicable. These rules do not govern procedure and practice in
any special statutory proceeding insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the procedure
and practice provided by the applicable statute. Where the applicable statute provides for procedure
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under the former statutes governing civil actions, such procedure shall be in accordance with these
rules.
(b) Chief Justices of the Peace. Rule 84, relating to chief justices of the peace, shall apply to all
proceedings in the justice courts, whether criminal, civil or otherwise."
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice: "The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure
and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the
proceedings mentioned in those sections"
Michael Jordan had to deal with the "Jordan Rules". NV JCRCP does not allow the RJC to
subject Zachary Barker Coughlin alone, in violation of Nevada Constitution Article 4 Section 21 to
the "PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURT".
NV JCRCP RULE 83. RULES BY JUSTICE COURTS: "Each justice or justice court in
a township ...by action of a majority of the justices thereof, may from time to time make and amend
the rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. Copies of rules and amendments
so made by any justice court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court, but
shall not become effective until after approval by the Supreme Court and publication. In all cases
not provided for by these rules the justice courts may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules."
And the RJC further violates NV JCRCP 83 where it ignores NRS 40.385's setting the amount
required to get a stay by making the supersedeas bond $250, per statute, in Judge Sferrazza's
admission, during the 11/7/11 hearing, that the RJC always makes such supersedeas bond "three
times the monthly rent" (which also brings to mind the question, why didn't Coughlin get a stay if
Judge Sferrazza had the RJC hold on to Coughlin's $2,275 as Coughlin's "bond on appeal" between
October 25th, 2011 until such money was finally returned to Coughlin (most of which he had to use
to put up his bail for the criminal trespass arrest he sustained at his former home law office in the
meantime) on 11/15/12. It seems Judge Sferrazza was trying to find a way to get that $2,275 to Hill
and his client, and did not realize there is no "appeal bond" in an appeal of a summary eviction, and
that the only thing he could be referring to as a "bond on appeal" was a supersedeas bond...and upon
figuring out that there was no possible way to award Hill and his client the rent escrow deposit
Sferrazza wrongfully ordered pursuant to NRS 118A.355(5) in a no-cause summary eviction, even
where the tenant set out in excruciating detail that he, if at all, invoked only NRS 118A.360, and
never did invoked NRS 118A.355(5), and that was only because Coughlin completely hammered it
home with his analogy to JCRLV Rule 44 vis a vis the "local rule" referenced in NRS 118A.355(5),
which had no applicability anyways, but, hey, its Sferrazza, so whaddyagonnado? Are you getting
an idea of a what a, uh, fluid approach Judge Sferrazza (and add to that Clifton and Pearson) have to
jurisdictional principles in their RJC day to day activities)?
"Judge: well I did specifically enter an order saying that you were to be evicted no later than 5 PM
October 31 I changed it to say that no earlier. I did review this but the last paragraph provides the
sums currently on deposit with the court in the amount of $2275 are the property of the landlord but
shall not immediately be released to him. I am going to modify that that the $2275 And I will
explain this There is no rent due in this case, this was not an action for nonpayment of rent so I
do think it was inappropriate for the court to order that that money go to the landlord. The court had
no jurisdiction over that. And so I am going to order that it be surrendered to Mr. Coughlin. With
respect to the appeal, I am going to order that's if the stay is granted by the District Court that the
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bond amount shall be three times the rents which is $2700. The District Court could amend that if
they wish but that is what we always charge in this court. Three months rent. So, if the District Court
wishes to modify that that's fine but you'll get your money back and you can proceed with the appeal
however you wish. I did grant you an informal pauperis which I believe applies to the filing fees for
the appeal. All right?
Plaintiff: may I just request clarification Your Honor. So if I understand correctly, the court is modify
the order to reflect that the $2,275 currently on the deposit is going to Mr. Coughlin, that it's going to
be released. However, if Mr. Coughlin ever appeals this case and wants to stay, he needs to post a
supersedeas bond in an amount of three months worth of rent
Judge: $2700.
Plaintiff: $2700, that would be a supersedeas bond, understood."
One really has to question whether or not Judges Pearson, Clifton, and Sferrazza (as they have
seen fit to group each other as a triumvirate in both of these embarrassing Administrative Orders)
have any conception of how slippery a slope the concept of making up different sets of rules for
different litigants truly is.
NV JCRCP RULE 84. CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE...
"(b) Responsibilities. The chief justice of the peace in a township shall:
(1) Be responsible for the administration of court rules and regulations...
(5) Oversee all administrative and clerical work and functions of the court as set forth in
NRS Chapter 4.
(6) Call and preside over meetings with the other justices of that township, ... to discuss and
set policy on procedures, planning, caseload distribution, judicial training, vacations, court
improvements, personnel and any other matters of benefit or concern to the court."
The opinion in Lippis is instructive with respect to Coughlin's criticisms of the manner in
which the RJC and WCSO's approach avoiding NRS 40.253(5)'s requirement that the tenant have
"receipt" of the summary removal order for at least 24 hours prior to the WCSO conducting a lockout,
Just as "JCRCP 106 is... violative of article 4, section 21, which provides that "all laws shall be
general and of uniform operation throughout the State" (noting "There is no reason why parties to
landlord-tenant law suits should be denied the right of appeal, while all other justices' courts' litigants
are allowed to exercise this right."), so too, is the refusal by the WCSO, WCDA, RJC, RPD, etc. to
follow NRS 40.253(5)'s "directing the sheriff to remove the tenant within twenty-four hours of
receipt of the order" language where every other county in Nevada manages to.
JCRRT Rule 11 also does not apply to "landlord tenant matters" per JCRRT 2 (and if the RJC
wishes to change its rules, it must cease doing an end run around the requirements of NV JCRCP 84
or otherwise enforcing unwritten "house rules" like it has in the past) to ALL of Coughlin's cases
(including the multitude of summary eviction based landlord tenant matters (which begat the very
wrongful criminal prosecutions of Coughlin that the RJC is now citing to in attempts to buttress its
judicial misconduct in seeking to enforce now two specious Administrative Orders against Coughlin
whilst a fifth criminal prosecution of Coughlin by the WCDA's office in the RJC is set for trial on
10/14/13 incident to an alleged violation of such initial Administrative Order of dubious legality by
Coughlin on 5/23/13, for which the out of control RJC Bailiff John Reyes (whose wife file a domestic
violence protection order against him, alleges he suffers from severe depression and is "off his
medications" and becomes hostile and violent when such is the case, and the Sheriff's deputies have
been out to the Reyes home in the past to respond to at least one domestic disturbance (also, Coughlin
filed a Stalking/Harassment TPO application against Reyes in RCP2012-000070 on 2/15/12, just
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prior to the 5/2/12 TPO application by Cathy A. Reyes)
The increased due to the RJC Judges own misconduct and failure to abide by Nevada law, and
countenancing of the burglaries the WCSO conducts instead of according tenants the "24 hours" from
the tenant's "receipt" of a summary removal order prior to the WCSO effecting a lockout...all of
which the RJC and WCDA now wish Coughlin to foot the bill for or otherwise make Coughlin atone
for their own sins)
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER OF: DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY
BARKER COUGHLIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2013-06 contains some really rich moments:
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is a party to several cases in this Court; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court
which fail to include a case number in the caption or list multiple cases in the caption; and
which fail to include a certificate of service or clearly state an exception to the ex parte rule; and
(this is really rich where there is no opposing party in these Administrative Order "cases", further, the
initial 12/20/12 Admin Order required Coughlin to do just this to even get a copy of an order or some
filing, and now, Judge Pearson, in a fraudulent attempt to get around the fact that the JCRRT Rule
11(A), requires a "proof of service" for "Motions", not for the "Request for Audio Copy of
Proceedings" that the 8/5/13 "Notice of Document Received but Not Considered by the Court" had
attached, served by Howden...so, now, realizing that JCRRT Rule 11(a) doesn't apply to such
ministerial requests, Judge Pearson adds to his 8/14/13 Admin Order: "2. ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN shall not request a copy of a document or transcript without first filing a Motion which
complies with the attached Rules. Any such motion must be supported by an affidavit of
COUGHLIN which must address the basis for the request, why simply viewing the document is not
sufficient and whether the document has been previously provided to him".
How Coughlin could (and why he should have to is a whole nother story) submit a motion just to
request an audio transcript where "Any such motion must be supported by an affidavit of
COUGHLIN which must address the basis for the request, why simply viewing (NOTE: what does
that mean as to "hearing" a audio transcript?) the document (NOTE: recording?) is not
sufficient and whether the document has been previously provided to him"".
The requirement that Coughlin "address the basis for the request" echoes Judge
Pearsons instructions to Coughlin at a 6/16/13 hearing in RCR2011-063341 where he indicated
Coughlin would need to explain why he wanted a copy of something before decision on whether
or not to provide (even for purchase) Coughlin with a copy of such a document or recording in
the public record would be permitted. That is proposterous. Judge Pearsons seems to have
spent too long being the only one who gets to decide (or know the basis for his decision) whether
to release Brady material and is applying that approach where it has no business in the
judiciary as to ministerial matters. The answer to Pearson and Clifton's current quandry is not
to limit Coughlin's access to items in the public record, but rather, to avoid violatin NRS
178.405, especially via impermissible extra-judicial communications, in addition to ceasing the
improprer administrative appointments, especially those involving R. Bruce Lindsay, Esq
The RJC failed to serve a copy of Judge Sferrazza's 7/29/13 Orders denying Coughlin's
Motions to Modify, etc. the Workplace EPOs in RCP2012-000607 and RCP2012-000599, and
now is refusing to even allow Coughlin to purchase copies of such, furhter the RJC will not
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indicate to Coughlin whether it will issue the subpoena on Bailiff Reyes wifes Cathy A. Reyes
that Coughlin submitted, and other such subpoenas, like the one on former RJC Chief Civil
Clerk now Sparks Justice Court Clerk Karen Stancil whom was one of the last RJC non-Bailiff
employees Coughlin spoke to prior to the implementation of the 12/20/12 Administrative Order
2012-01. Coughlin discussed with Stancil the circumstances of the 6/28/12 eviction in Rev2012-
001048 and concomitant arrest in RCR2012-067980 where the RJC, despite at least two phone
calls between Stancil and Coughlin and one 6/26/12 email from Coughlin to Stancil and
RJCWeb@washoecounty.us (which was at one point within the file in 1048, underneath the
docket on the left hand side, but which upon Coughlin's reviewing such on 8/1/13 was no longer
to be found) alerting the RJC to the jurisdictional deficiencies in the 6/14/12 5 Day Notice of
Unlawful Detainer allegedly "personally served" on Coughlin by Nevada Court Serves, which
listed, pursuant to NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1), the very Sparks Justice Court with which Coughlin
submitted a Tenant's Answer (Motion to Dismiss) for filing on 6/26/12 at noon, which the SJC
failed to file, where the RJC's Judge Schroeder then entered a Lockout Order on 6/27/12
despite the deficieny in the Notice. Upon Coughlin, on 8/1/13, attempting to file a Verified
Complaint for Illegal Lockout as to a rental at "Northwinds Apartments" with the same Karen
Stancil, now a counter clerk at the Sparks Justice Court, Stancil refused such document for
filing, in a non-ministerial rejection of such, by noting that "Northwinds Apartments" is
located within the confines of Reno, no Sparks.
Rule 11. Motions: Procedure for making motions; affidavits; renewal,
rehearing of motions.
A. All motions shall contain proof of the service of the same....
F. Factual contentions involved in any pre-trial or post-trial motion shall be
initially presented and heard upon affidavits. Oral testimony may be received at a
hearing with the approval of the court, or the court may set the matter for a hearing at
a time in the future and allow oral examination of the affiants to resolve factual
issues shown by the affidavits to be in dispute.
(NOTE: where was DDA Young's "Affidavit"in his Opposition to Coughlin's Motion to
Suppress of 2/21/12 or in Young's ex parte 11/26/12 emeregency Motion to Prohibit Coughlin form
faxing? Also, Biray Dogan's 11/8/13 Motion to Quash contains a Certificate of Service that is not
only fraudulent (Coughlin was never sent any such fax and can prove it), but regardless, Coughlin
never consented, in writing, to the WCPD pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2) to be so served electronically),
and similar to that is Reno City Attorney Skau's fraudulence (perhaps in conjunction with Judge
Sferrazza) in obtaining Coughlin's appearance at an insufficiently noticed 11/13/12 hearing in
RCr2011-063341 by alleging Sferrazza had "authorized service by email")
which are copies of documents previously filed with the Court that have been redacted or edited;
(NOTE: what does the WCDA's Office do when it recycles the same petty larceny criminal complaint
over and over? Further, so what, what's wrong with not reinventing the wheel? Coughlin is not
attempting to pull the wool over anyone's eyes here in any way, so what does this have to do with
anything? This is like complaining that Coughlin does not use the right eggshell white type of
printing paper).
which are not legible or otherwise fail to clearly state the relief requested; (NOTE: the WCDA's
Office Complaints failing to ever "clearly state" the facts supporting the charges has never seemed to
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be much of a problem) and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly requests copies of transcripts
or documents from the Court which have been previously provided; (even if that were true,
which it is not, the RJC is now attempting to prevent Coughlin from obtaining copies even where he
would pay money for them).
WHEREAS, several of the types of documents referenced above are attached hereto; and (it is
interesting that Pearson attaches a simple, ministerial at best "Request for Audio Copy of
Proceedings" by Coughlin, which the RJC's own unsigned, unattributed 8/5/13 round of ridiculous
"Notice of Document Received but Not Considered By The Court", uh...well, they are on pleading
paper, and have a caption, they just lack a signature by a judge, whilst also failing to have an
indication as to whom such Notice should attributed or otherwise indicate whom it was that made the
more than ministerial decision to go about suddenly rejecting Coughlin's filings, refusing to place file
stamps on them, in many cases, weeks after Coughlin submitted them for filing, especially where
Judge Pearson then drops this new Administrative Order on Thursday 8/14/13 (after weeks of the
RJC refusing to indicate to Coughlin if his filings were being file stamped, refusing to even provide
Coughlin's copies of any "received" stamped cover page of his submissions, and refusing to allow
Coughlin to view, or even purchase copies of the dockets in his cases, even in his criminal cases),
where he had put in place a Monday, 8/19/13 deadline for Coughlin to file his pre-trial motions for a
trial set for 10/14/13, where Nevada law under NRS 174.450 accordsa "fifteen days prior to trial"
deadline for Coughlin to file such pre-trial motions. Also, its Judge Elliott's former Administrative
Assistant taking over for Lori Townsend, which is arguably another conflict requiring removing the
RJC from all of Coughlin's cases considering Judge Elliott's gross misconduct in so many of
Coughlin's cases in the last 18 months. Regardless, the "Certificate of Mailing" for such 8/5/13
"Notices" is signed by Howden, and indicates "a true copy of the atached document" was provided to
WCDA DDA Young by "interoffice mail", which seems a bit off.
WHEREAS, filings by pro se petitioners, "however inartfully pleaded, " are held "to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. " Haines v. 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.
594, 30 L. Ed. 2D 652 (1972); and (NOTE: this is interesting, as if Coughlin is not a "lawyer" as
Judges Pearson, and Clifton alternately indicates he is or isn't, depending on the utility to their agenda
either characterization provides in the various instances in which they so choose to make it, then the
application of this new set of procedural rules applicable only to Coughlin (applying to Coughlin a
more stringent set of procedural rules than applies to anyone else in "landlord tenant matters" or
"criminal cases" by Pearson's Administrative Order essentially attempting to reduce to a new set of
rules or an "Order" that which Coughlin had been arguing is tantamount to criminal misconduct by
the RJC Bailiff and Clerks (ie, applying JCRRT 10 and 11 to Coughlin in "criminal cases" and
"landlord tenant matters" where JCRRT 2 is quite clear that neither JCRRT 10 nor 11 apply to
Coughlin, or anyone else, in those settings).
WHEREAS, frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses overburden limited judicial
resources (NOTE: maybe, but probably not as much as Judges Gone Wild legislating away all the
protections to tenant's rights the Legislature reduced into black letter law, as a manifestation of the
will of the people, largely motivated by a recognition of the enormous societal cost to the very
approach to summary evictions that the RJC continues to insist upon...also, clearly RCR2012-067980
was a "frivolous claim" brought by the WCDA's Office...so where is WCDA DDA Z. Young's own
special set of procedural rules?), hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase
the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public; and
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WHEREAS, the citizens of this community have a right to a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and this right is infringed if the Court allows a case, civil or criminal,
to consume more than its reasonable share of the Court's time. See, United 93 F.Supp. 190, 191 (D.
Mass.1950)("The Court has obligations to other parties who have cases to be heard."); And
WHEREAS, courts possess the inherent power (NOTE: well, Judge Pearson clearly was
taking notes when Coughlin pointed out the fraudulent misstatement by Judge Sferrazza in the initial
Admin Order of 12/20/12 vis a vis it purporting NV Const Art 6 Sec 6 to apply to "Nevada's courts"
versus "District Courts"...and really, these new citations to Jordn and Chambers have no applicability
to "courts of limited jurisdiction" because, right along with that "limited jurisdiction" is an incredibly
limited "inherent power" possessed that in no way justifies the judicial hot mess that this new
Administrativ Order 2013-06 is...some might say a tad more constructive approach would consist of
ceasing to coddle immature and irrational bailiffs, avoid playing the limit the County's civil liability
game with the WCDA's Office, and send out the sort of clarion call to local law enforcement of the
sort that the exclusionary rule does by ceasing to tolerate or enable all these stupid, ego driven arrests
and harassment of Coughlin and others, and the system-wide burglarizing of tenant's homes, offices,
and other rentals) to manage proceedings and exercise reasonable control of the conduct of those
who appear before them. See, Chambers v. 501 U.S. 32 (1991) And Jordan v. State ex reI. Of Motor
Vehicles & Pub. 110 P.3D 30, 44 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz LLC v. Of N. Las 181
P.3D 670 (2008); and WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN was admitted to the Nevada
State Bar on March 25, 2005 and later suspended on June 7, 2012;
WHEREAS, this Court has previously found in Administrative Order 2012-01 that v.
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has repeatedly caused a disturbance in the filing office of the
Reno Justice Court, disrupted the orderly business of the Court and overburdened the limited judicial
resources of this Court thereby hindering the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increasing
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been the subject of disciplinary
hearings before the State Bar of Nevada Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board wherein the Board
found Mr. Coughlin "committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional conduct" and that
Mr. Coughlin "engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process"; and (NOTE: actually,
and the the SBN's TPO Application to Pearson contained a complete copy of the it, the 12/14/12
FOFCOL contains no such "finding" but does contain somewhat similar language in the "Decision
and Recommendation" section, where such reads: "Fifth, the record clearly and convincingly
establishes that Coughlin engaged in a bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process by failing to
file the pleading required by SCR 105(2) and instead filing several lengthy, irrelevant and nonsensical
pleadings, mostly pleadings filed in other matters, and refiled in the disciplinary action under a
similar but different caption. In some instances, Coughlin simply crossed out the case name and hand
wrote the names of the parties in the disciplinary proceeding."
One, that is a ridiculous statement, as if that were true, every single attorney who ever
defaulted in a disciplinary matter would be said to have "engaged in bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary process" merely by "failing to file the pleading required by SCR 105(2)(c) (Answer not
mandatory Under a state supreme court rule governing pleadings in a formal hearing in investigation
of an attorney, an answer to an order to show cause in a disciplinary hearing is only permissive and
not mandatory, and a failure to answer is not in itself grounds for a disciplinary action. Ariz.In re
Kastensmith, 101 Ariz. 291, 419 P.2D 75 (1966).) saying such is "required" is taking it a bit far, its
like saying one is "required" to answer a lawsuit...one might face the spectre of a default being
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entered if they don't, but they are hardly "required" in the general sense of the term to file an Answer.
SCR 105(2)(c) in no way provides for such a "establish(ing)" of "bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary process" (the fact they are saying that and the RJC is repeating is makes one have no
respect at all for either, really, some might say,) where such rule reads: "A copy of the complaint shall
be served on the attorney and it shall direct that a verified response or answer be served on bar
counsel within 20 days of service; the original shall be filed with bar counsels office. The time to
respond may be extended once by the chair for not more than 20 days for good cause or upon
stipulation of the parties. In the event the attorney fails to plead, the charges shall be deemed admitted;
provided, however, that an attorney who fails to respond within the time provided may thereafter
obtain permission of the appropriate disciplinary board chair to do so, if failure to file is attributable
to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.")
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in both civil and criminal
matters before this Court including cases before the Honorable Peter Sferrazza, the Honorable Scott
Pearson, and the Honorable David Clifton wherein Mr. Coughlin has been admonished for failing
to follow the Court's orders and directives; and WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN is currently the Subject of an Extended Order for Protection against Harassment in the
Workplace requested by the Washoe County Public Defender's Office, his previous counsel in several
cases before this Court; and ,
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently the subject of an Extended
Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace requested by the State Bar of Nevada
based upon Mr. Coughlin's harassing and disruptive behavior with employees and officers of the
State Bar; and
WHEREAS, to protect the peaceful and effective operation of this Court, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED:
1. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not submit a document to this Court which does
not comply with the attached PROCEDURAL RULES FORALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURT.
2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not request a copy of a document or transcript
without first filing a Motion which complies with the attached Rules. Any such motion must be
supported by an affidavit of COUGHLIN which must address the basis for the request, why simply
viewing the document is not sufficient and whether the document has been previously provided to
him.
3. Any violation of this Order may be considered contempt of court and punished pursuant to
NRS Chapter 22 by a fine of up to $500 and/or incarceration for up to 25 days in the Washoe County
Detention Facility. (NOTE: so what now, Coughlin is going to have Chief Bailiff Michael Sexton do
an encore of his 2/12/13 threats to Coughlin (made in a holding cell shortly after Coughlin had been
taken into custody for allegedly being late to court) where Sexton taunted Coughlin that "you still
have those 5 individual violations of the Administrative Order hanging over your head...that's 25 days
in jail for each violation..."). There is no way Coughlin should be subjected to the threat that every
time he files some Request for Audio Copy of Proceeding that some RJC Bailiff will either arrest him
or serve an Order to Show cause like Judge Pearson's shameful 2/25/13 OSC in connection with the
12/20/12 Admin Order that Pearson subsequently put through a round of musical case numbers that
assisted the RJC in avoiding processing Coughlin's appeal thereto and in fraudulently foisting Bruce
Lindsay on Coughlin as his "sole counsel" in settings where Coughlin never assented to such,
resulting in more of Coughlin's filing being rejected, Lindsay bilking the system, and Pearson and
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Clifton violating Canon 2, Rule 2.13 per the "Administrative Appointments" sections...and really,
what is this new Admin Order in response to? Coughlin's requesting to be provide, even once, a copy
of the audio transcript of the 2/5/13 hearings in RCR2012-065630 (or "trial"), both portions, and the
interlude in RCR2011-063341 occurring shortly after the impermissible extra-judicial
communications between Judges Pearson and Clifton at issue in CR13-0552. "The cover up is worse
than the crime" comes to mind. The RJC and its Bailiffs playing the "blame it on 'Wendy'" whom
they allege is alleging already provided Coughlin copies of such hearings (finally the RJC caved and
provided at least some of the afternoon portion of the 3/19/13 trial in RCR2013-065630 after months
of Coughlin hounding it for such) And really, why not just tell the Bailiff's to leave Coughlin the hell
alone, quit co-signing all the WCDA's Office bs prosecutions and harassment of Coughlin, dump the
probations, and these Admin Orders, and see what sort of jurisdiction was retained where Coughlin
filed tolling motions, and get this ship righted..
3. This Order is effective upon personal service upon Mr. Coughlin.
Dated this of August, 14th, 2013. /s/ Judge Scott Pearson, Chief Justice of the Peace (NOTE:
thereafter Judge Pearson's Order includes a slightly modified, tailored to Coughlin version of JCRRT
10)"
The RJC has further, by way of a Notice of Document Received But Not Considered by the
Corut that is file stamped 8/22/13, and which contains a Certificate of Mailing by former 2JDC
Judge Elliot's former Judicial Assistant Heidi Howden indicating such was mailed on 8/22/13 (despite
the envelope it arrived in baring a postmark of 8/26/13) refused to transmit Coughlin's Notices of
Appeal of RJC Judge Sferrazz'a 7/29/13 Order's denying Coughlin's Motions to Modify/Dissolve the
specious Workplace Harassment EPO's RJC Chief Judge Pearson granted the SBN and Washoe
County in RCP2012-000607 and RCP2012-000599, both of which have caused a terribly prejudicial
impact to Coughlin's ability to, say, personally serve (or have such done) a subpoena on WCPD's
Dogan, Leslie, Goodnight, etc., much less the SBN (which is rather pressing considering the 8/28/13
trial date in the RMC for the dual prosecutions of Coughlin for alleged violations of the dubious
TPO/EPO granted by RJC Chief Judge Pearson to the SBN.
Chief Judge Pearsons's recent 8/14/13 (time of filing stamped as 11:13 a.m.) Administrative
Order 2013-06 (which lacks a case number, much like the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 the
Judge Pearsons subsequently assigned a criminal case number, RCR2013-071437 to, in a display of a
judge making a prosecutor's charging decision") reads:
" IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER OF: DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY
BARKER COUGHLIN,
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2013-06
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is a party to several cases in this Court; and
which fail to include a case number in the caption or list multiple cases in the caption; and
which fail to include a certificate of service or clearly state an exception to the ex parte rule; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly submits documents to the Court which
are copies of documents previously filed with the Court that have been redacted or edited;
which are not legible or otherwise fail to clearly state the relief requested; and WHEREAS,
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN regularly requests copies of transcripts or documents from the
Court which have been previously provided; WHEREAS, several of the types of documents
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referenced above are attached hereto; and
WHEREAS, citizens, whether or not indigent, have a constitutional right to access to the
courts with the protection of due process of law; and
WHEREAS, filings by pro se petitioners, "however inartfully pleaded, " are held "to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. " Haines v. 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.
594, 30 L. Ed. 2D 652 (1972); and
WHEREAS, "a litigant's right to access the courts in proper person and with in forma
pauperis status is not without limits", See Jordan v. State ex reI. Of Motor Vehicles & Pub. 110 P.3D
30, 44 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz LLC v. Of N. Las 181 P.3D 670 (2008); and
WHEREAS, pro se litigants must comply with procedural rules. King v. Atiyeh, F.2D 565,
567 (9th Cir. 1987);
WHEREAS, frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses overburden limited judicial
resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging
in business and providing professional services to the public; and WHEREAS, the citizens
of this community have a right to a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
this right is infringed if the Court allows a case, civil or criminal, to consume more than its
reasonable share of the Court's time. See, United 93 F.Supp. 190, 191 (D. Mass.1950)("The Court
has obligations to other parties who have cases to be heard."); And 814 States v. United States Shoe
WHEREAS, courts possess the inherent power to manage proceedings and exercise
reasonable control of the conduct of those who appear before them. See, Chambers v. 501 U.S. 32
(1991) And Jordan v. State ex reI. Of Motor Vehicles & Pub. 110 P.3D 30, 44 (2005), abrogated on
other grounds by Buzz LLC v. Of N. Las 181 P.3D 670 (2008); and WHEREAS, ZACHARY
BARKER COUGHLIN was admitted to the Nevada State Bar on March 25, 2005 and later
suspended on June 7, 2012;
WHEREAS, this Court has previously found in Administrative Order 2012-01 that v.
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has repeatedly caused a disturbance in the filing office of the
Reno Justice Court, disrupted the orderly business of the Court and overburdened the limited judicial
resources of this Court thereby hindering the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increasing
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been the subject of disciplinary
hearings before the State Bar of Nevada Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board wherein the Board
found Mr. Coughlin "committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional conduct" and that Mr.
Coughlin "engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process"; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in cases before the Reno
Municipal Court including cases before the Honorable Dorothy Nash Holmes and the Honorable
Kenneth Howard wherein Mr. Coughlin was held in contempt of court for failing to follow the
Court's orders and directives; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in both civil and criminal
matters before this Court including cases before the Honorable Peter Sferrazza, the Honorable Scott
Pearson, and the Honorable David Clifton wherein Mr. Coughlin has been admonished for failing
to follow the Court's orders and directives; and WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN is currently the Subject of an Extended Order for Protection against Harassment in the
Workplace requested by the Washoe County Public Defender's Office, his previous counsel in several
cases before this Court; and ,
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently the subject of an Extended
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Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace requested by the State Bar of Nevada
based upon Mr. Coughlin's harassing and disruptive behavior with employees and officers of the
State Bar; and
WHEREAS, to protect the peaceful and effective operation of this Court, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED:
1. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not submit a document to this Court which does
not comply with the attached PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED
BY ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURT.
2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not request a copy of a document or transcript
without first filing a Motion which complies with the attached Rules. Any such motion must be
supported by an affidavit of COUGHLIN which must address the basis for the request, why simply
viewing the document is not sufficient and whether the document has been previously provided to
him.
3. Any violation of this Order may be considered contempt of court and punished
pursuant to NRS Chapter 22 by a fine of up to $500 and/or incarceration for up to 25 days in the
Washoe County Detention Facility.
3. This Order is effective upon personal service upon Mr. Coughlin.
Dated this of August, 14th, 2013. /s/ Judge Scott Pearson, Chief Justice of the Peace (NOTE:
thereafter Judge Pearson's Order includes a slightly modified, tailored to Coughlin version of JCRRT
10)
PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY ZACHARY
BARKER COUGHLIN TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURTAll documents submitted by Zachary
Barker Coughlin must meet the following rules: (a) All pleadings and papers presented for filing must
be flat, unfolded, firmly bound together at the top, on white paper of standard quality, not less than
16-lb. Weight and 8 112 by 11 inches in size. All papers shall be typewritten or prepared by some
other process that will produce clear and permanent copies equally legible to printing. The print size
shall not be more than 12 points. Carbon or photocopies may not be filed. Only one side of the paper
may be used. (B) All papers presented for filing, receiving, or lodging with the clerk shall be
prepunched with 2 holes, centered 2 3/4 inches apart and 112 inch to 5/8 inch from the top edge of
the paper. All original papers shall be stamped ORIGINAL between the punched holes in red ink. The
lines on each page must be double spaced. Pages must be numbered consecutively at the bottom.
Lines of pages must be numbered in the left margm. (C) No original pleading or paper shall be
amended by making erasures or interlineations thereon, or by attaching slips thereto, except by leave
of the Court. (D) The following information shall appear upon the first page of every paper presented
for filing: (1) Mr. Coughlin's name, address, and telephone number shall be set forth to the left of
center of the page beginning at line 1 and shall be single spaced. The space to the right of center shall
be reserved for the filing marks of the clerk. NAME ADDRESS CITY, STATE, ZIP CODE
TELEPHONE NUMBER
3) The name of the action or proceeding shall appear below the title of the Court in the space
to the left of center at line 9, e.G.: JOHN DOE, } Plaintiff, } vs. } RICHARD ROE, } Defendant. } (4)
In the space to the right of center at lines 11 and 12 shall appear the case number and the department
number as follows: Case No.: RJC 2000 -00000 (Example) Dept. No.: 1 (Example) (5) The title of
the pleading, motion, or other document must be typed or printed on the page directly below the
names of the parties to the action or proceeding. The title must be sufficient in description to apprise
the respondent and clerk of the nature of the document filed, or the relief sought, e.G.: Defendant's
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Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff John Doe; Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories. (E) A pleading may not be filed listing multiple case numbers in the caption. Each
filing must be of an original pleading meeting each of these rules. (F) All exhibits attached to
pleadings or papers must be 8 112 by 11 inches in size. Exhibits which are smaller must be affixed to
a blank sheet of paper of the appropriate size. Exhibits which are larger than 8 112 by 11 inches must
be reduced to 8 112 by 11 inches or must be folded so as to appear 8 112 by 11 inches in size. All
exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must clearly show the exhibit number at the bottom or on the
right side. Copies of exhibits must be clearly legible and not unnecessarily voluminous. Original
documents must be retained for introduction as exhibits at the time of a hearing or at the time of trial
rather than attached to pleadings. (G) When a decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada is
cited, the citation to Nevada Reports must be given together with the citation to West's Pacific
Reporter and the year of the decision. When a decision of an appellate court of any other state is cited,
the citation to West's Regional Reporter System must be given together with the state and year of the
decision. When a decision of the United States Supreme Court is cited, the United States Reports
citation and year of decision must be given. When a decision of the court of appeals or of a district
court or other court of the United States has been reported in the Federal Reporter System, that
citation, court, and year of decision must be given. (H) All motions shall contain proof of the service
of the same. (I) Every motion or opposition thereto shall be accompanied by a memorandum of legal
authorities and any exhibits in support of or in opposition to the motion. G) Except as permitted by
the presiding judge, legal memoranda in support of a motion, opposition, or reply shall not exceed 10
pages, exclusive of exhibits. (K) Factual contentions involved in any pretrial or post-trial motion shall
be initially presented by Coughlin through an affidavit. Oral testimony may be received at a hearing
with the approval of the Court, or the Court may set the matter for a hearing at a time in the future
and allow oral examination of the affiant to resolve factual issues shown by the affidavits to be in
dispute. (1) Any affidavit shall identify the affiant, the party on whose behalf it is submitted, and the
motion or application to which it pertains and shall be served and filed with the motion, or opposition
to which it relates. Affidavits shall contain only factual, evidentiary matter, shall conform with the
requirements of NRCP 56(e), and shall avoid mere general conclusions or argument. Affidavits
substantially defective in these respects may be stricken, wholly or in part. (M) No motion once heard
and disposed of shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall the same matters therein embraced be
reheard, unless by leave of the Court (n) Coughlin must file a request for submission if he wishes the
Court to consider the merits of his motion. (0) Coughlin shall not file a request for submission of a
motion unless the motion was served on the opposition and they have been afforded at least 10 days
to respond. (P) Decision shall be rendered without oral argument unless oral argument is ordered by
the Court, in which event the individual court department shall set a date and time for hearing. (Q)
All discovery motions shall include the affidavit of Coughlin establishing that after consultation with
opposing counsel, he has been unable to resolve the matter""
Then Chief Judge Sferrazza entered an "Administrative Order 2012-01 In re Zachary
Coughlin" file stamped 12/20/12 at 4:38 p.m., which purported that Coughlin had been "admonished
by Judges including soon to be RJC Chief Judge Pearson, despite such not being at all true. At such
point Coughlin's sole interactions with Judge Pearson consisted of a 7/31/12 and 10/2/12 landlord
tenant matter hearing in Rev2012-001048 and Rev2012-078432. While Judge Pearson did commit
gross judicial misconduct in both hearings, willfully exceeding his jurisdicitonal where completely
inappropriate, whilst also failing to embrace his jurisdiction where he had a duty to, Coughlin was in
no way "admonished". Interestingly, Chief Judge Pearson indicated to Coughlin during a 6/16/13
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status conference in a trumped up probation violation charge that the WCDA's Office had the
Department of Alternative Sentencing make against Coughlin incident to an unlawful warrantless
arrest of Coughlin after 7 p.m. in his own home by DAS Officers Wickman and Ramos in violation of
NRS 171.136, in an attempt to intimidate and silence Coughlin, that he, Judge Pearson, had never had
any of Coughlin's landlord tenant cases, when, in fact, his presiding over two just such cases had an
extremely prejudicial impact on Coughlin's defense of his formal disciplinary matter and other
associated cases. Judge Pearson is fond of smiling to one's face while maintaining the status quo,
letting Judge Clifton run amuck, and just generally benefitting from giving local law enforcement
everything they want, and they want it all.
Though having been served the arguably more ridiculous Workplace Harassment TPO the
same WCDA Watts-Vial that fraudulently obstructed Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoenas on 2JDC clerks,
judges, and the 2JDC Custodian of Records (http://www.scribd.com/doc/167578177/10-30-12-0204-
62337-SCR-110-Subpoen-on-2JDC-Judges-Elliot-and-Flanagan-and-Clerk-of-Court-Hastings-and-
Wise-Custodian-of-Records-Proof-of-Service-by http://www.scribd.com/doc/154715476/11-13-12-
Fax-0204-Wcda-Watts-Vial-Response-to-Subpoena-a9 ) obtained for Washoe County in RCP2012-
000599 where involved a TPO Application WCPD Jim Leslie admits to filing for himself, where such
was actually filed by Watts-Vial (with both trying to massage there way around the problems
associated with the requirement in NRS 33.250, .270 that the employer (the WCPD is not employed
by Washoe County) file for such TPO on behalf of an employee (ie, the employee may not file for a
Workplace Harassment TPO on their own behalf, though, obviously, King's language above admits
that is just what he did where King asserted so on behalf of the staff and for our protection, I would
ask that the court extend the Order.
However, just like with Jim Leslie filling out the application himself for a Workplace
Harssment Protection Order (and WCDA Watts-Vial attempted to pass of his filing of such Workplace
TPO Application as a filing by WCPD Leslie, to get around the odious conflicts of interest that Watts-
Vial knows full well make his conduct tantamount to professional misconduct), Laura Peters actually
filled out the Workplace TPO Application in her own handwriting, only to use white out to obscure
her signature and have King add his over it upon the SBN realizing that an employee cannot apply for
such a Workplace TPO on their own behalf, at which point King decided to go with the the women
are afraid angle, though it was Peters whom pushed the TPO Application idea from the beginning
upon her growing very uncomfortable with the extent to which Coughlin was well documenting and
exposing the fraudulent conduct she was engaged in (vis a vis the fraudulent submission in FHE1 by
King of Peters 8/23/12 Affidavit of Service of the Complaint, and failure to serve on Coughlin in a
timely manner the odd 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters place in the formal hearing file
http://www.scribd.com/doc/163691392/11-7-12-0204-62337-Index-to-Bates-Stamped-3-200-Page-
Scr-105-2-c-Production-by-Sbn-With-Scribd-Link http://www.scribd.com/doc/163691036/11-7-12-
0204-62337-Bates-1-to-3-094-State-Bar-of-Nevada-Excuse-for-Failing-to-Obey-SCR-105-2-c
amongst other pleadings (though, again, in the 11/7/12 3,094 page SCR 105(2)(c) violating
production of documents to Coughlin, the bates stamping on such 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters
places such after the 10/31/12 Order by Chair Echeverria, where such filings within the Formal
Hearing Pleadings file contained filin1213fdd4-6772-46ac-879e-38c493def809general69329gs in
chronological This message was intended for zachcoughlin@hotmail.com. Want to control which
emails you receiveorder, and the bates stamps on such identified Peters 10/9/12 file stamped This
message was intended for zachcoughlin@hotmail.com. Want to control which emails you
receivefrom Voxox? Get Voxox: http://download.voxox.com and adjust your Notifications in
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theSettings/Preferences window. Voxox by TelCentris, Inc. is located at 10180 Telesis Ct., San Diego,
CA92109.Affidavit of Laura Peters as the last filing in such file, where the bates stamped 10/31/12
Order is immediately preceding such 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters.
Consider King's contradictory statements as reported by Coughlin in the 10/16/12 file
stamped Motion for Order To Show Cause (Coughlin provided a verbatim transcript of the
interactions between King, Peters, and Coughlin therein at pages 5-8), wherein King disclaims any
control of the Court Clerk in response to Coughlin's accusation that King ordered her not to file
Coughlins' 9/17/12 Motion to Dismiss (which King admitted to receiving at the time, only he did
not admit it to be an actual Motion to Dismiss because it doesn't say what it's seeking to
have dismissed), with King's 9/25/12 email to Coughlin, wherein King purports to be the one whom
decides how the SBN's Clerk of Court may have filings submitted and or what qualifies as service of
such filings on the SBN, along with King's contradictory statements on the record in the transcript
from the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing.
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number of any person.
DATED this 9/29/13
_/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin,Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473 (susp).
1471 E. 9
th
St.
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Reno, NV 89512
Pro per suspended attorney.
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PROOF OF SERVICE:
I ELECTRONICALLY SERVED THIS ON REGISTERED EFILERS EITHER WCDA DDA Z
YOUNG RCA D. WONG AND WLSS J GARIN ON 9/29/13
DATED this 9/29/13
_/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS
1. EXHIBIT 1: VARIOUS RELEVANT MATERIALS 256 PAGES (TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY SIX) PAGES.
2. Exhibit 1: 9/30/13 Declaration of Zachary Barker Coughlin seven hundred and sixty five
pages (765) pages.

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3. Deposits. Deposits required are as follows: $75.00 for arraignment/sentencing; a

records request for incident report urgent please

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