Collision in TSS

A laden product tanker was westbound in a very congested TSS in the early hours of the morning (night navigation conditions). At the appropriate stages in the passage plan, notice was given to engine room, the master took over the con and the ship continued navigating in the TSS. Positions were plotted at fre uent intervals as specified in the passage plan. The bridge team included the !!", an A# and a deck cadet. At about $%.&$, the !!" went inside the chart room to plot the vessel's position. Thereafter, he returned to the wheelhouse while the master went inside the chart room to check the vessel's position. At this time, the !!" sighted an unidentified vessel emerge from a cluster of anchored ships and crossing ahead from starboard to port at a very close range. The master was immediately alerted and due to lack of sea room on the starboard side, he ordered wheel hard over to port. The !!" noted the crossing vessel's name on the A(S and attempted to alert the crossing vessel on the )*+ about the impending danger, without success. ,eanwhile, with the port helm order, the tanker had turned almost -$deg from her original heading, but could not avoid a glancing contact on her starboard uarter with the crossing vessel. The tanker immediately reported the collision to the )TS, but no response was received from the crossing ship, which continued on her course. The port authorities instructed both the vessels to proceed to the pilot station, where they were inspected e.ternally. After confirming that both were structurally safe and there was no pollution risk, they were given pilots and escorted to a safe anchorage. +ortunately, neither vessel's hull was breached, and there was no in/ury or pollution. #oth vessels underwent repairs in port and proceeded on their respective voyages.

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1oot cause2contributory factors The bridge team on the product tanker was blinded by the bright deck lights of the large number of anchored vessels from where the crossing vessel suddenly emerged about four to five minutes before collision, and was first seen by the lookout and !!" only when she was less than $.% nautical mile away. The crossing vessel's forward working and deck lights were still lit, such that her port sidelight was not easily seen and the tanker's bridge team was misled to assuming that the crossing vessel was at anchor. The tanker's engine was ready for maneuvering but the speed was too high to take effective action to avoid collision. (nade uate risk assessment3 even though a precautionary area was marked on the chart and main engine was in a state of readiness for maneuvering, lack of reaction time and sea room were not considered. (neffective lookout and failure to take independent action to avoid collision on the part of the crossing vessel. 4ack of communication3 the crossing vessel failed to inform )TS and other traffic about her intention to leave the anchorage and cross the traffic lane. The tanker's operator conducted an in5house investigation and it was established that all S,S procedures had been properly followed. *owever, the following observations were made3 The radar was stabilised with 6PS instead of speed over water from the log 7o warning was written in the passage plan to inform the bridge team about the e.pected crossing traffic in the area, even though this information was included in the sailing direction abstract which was attached to the passage plan and also marked on nautical chart with a caution symbol. 8orrective actions on the tanker A safety meeting was held on board in the presence of company management personnel soon after the incident, to discuss the outcome of investigations and to share the lessons learned with all crewmembers. A report was circulated throughout the fleet instructing masters to maintain safe speed at all times and to promulgate the lessons learned from the incident. (ncident analysis report to be forwarded onboard all managed vessels and discussed among senior officers attending company seminars and pre5/oining briefings. An e.ternal auditor to be appointed by the company to perform a navigation audit on all company fleet. 8ompany procedures to be amended to emphasi9e the importance of maintaining an efficient lookout and safe speed while transiting precautionary areas. 8ompany procedures to be amended instructing masters to keep safe distance from anchorages. All managed vessels to be supplied with a risk assessment training video.

1isk assessment in respect of navigation in coastal congested waters to be reviewed and precautions 2 safeguards amended. 4essons learnt (n coastal waters or in traffic separation schemes, the restricted nature of the available sea room, and the high density of traffic, necessarily reduces the margins of safety. (n these situations, it becomes particularly important to consider all the options available. (f in doubt, err on the side of safety, and slow down. Ships have to keep the ma.imum distance possible from crowded anchorages. This will allow the bridge team sufficient response time in case any vessel leaves anchorage suddenly. ;amaged shell plating of the product tanker after collision <ditor's note3 As is common in very busy ports, most coasters, fishing and small craft do not report to )TS or port authorities, therefore, their movements cannot be regulated. (n this case, the crossing vessel, though a medium5si9ed cargo vessel, apparently failed to make reports to the )TS and hence was not being monitored. ,ore reports are needed to keep the scheme interesting and informative. All reports are read only by the ,A1S 8o5coordinator and are treated in the strictest confidence. To submit a report, please use the ,A1S 1eport +orm.