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3D Password

Abstract
Current authentication systems suffer from many weaknesses. Textual passwords are commonly used; however, users do not follow their requirements. Users tend to choose meanin ful words from dictionaries, which make textual passwords easy to break and vulnerable to dictionary or brute force attacks. !any available raphical passwords have a password space that is less than or equal to the textual password space. "mart cards or tokens can be stolen. !any biometric authentications have been proposed; however, users tend to resist usin biometrics because of their intrusiveness and the effect on their privacy. !oreover, biometrics cannot be revoked. #n this paper, we present and evaluate our contribution, i.e., the $%& password. The $%& password is a multifactor authentication scheme. To be authenticated, we present a $%& virtual environment where the user navi ates and interacts with various ob'ects. The sequence of actions and interactions toward the ob'ects inside the $%& environment constructs the user(s $%& password. The $%& password can combine most existin authentication schemes such as textual passwords, raphical passwords, and various types of biometrics into a $%& virtual environment. The desi n of the $%& virtual environment and the type of ob'ects selected determine the $%& password key space.

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#ndex
Introduction Authentication Biometrics Graphical passwords Multifactor Textual passwords 3-D passwords 3-D irtual en ironment

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#ntroduction
Three )asic #dentification !ethods of password
*ossession +"omethin # have, )iometrics +"omethin # am, -nowled e +"omethin # know,

*assword
#t is basically an encryption al orithm. Usually it is .%/0 character or sli htly more than that. !ostly textual passwords now a day are kept very simple say a word from the dictionary or their pet names, friends etc. Ten years back -lein performed such tests and he could crack /1%/0 passwords per day. 2ow with the technolo y chan e, fast processors and many tools on the #nternet this has become a Child3s *lay.

*assphrase
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#t(s nothin but the enhance version of password. Usually it is a combination of words or simply collection of password in proper sequence is *assphrase. #t contains any well known thou ht also. 4en th of *assphrase is about $1%01 character or more than that also. )ut it has also some limitations because $1%01 character is creates ambi uity to remember if there is no any proper sequence.

)iometrics
5efer to a broad ran e of technolo ies Automate the identification or verification of an individual )ased on human characteristics or body or ans o *hysiolo ical6 7ace, fin erprint, iris o )ehavioral6 8and%written si nature, voice Characteristics

Templates

011001010010101 011010100100110 001100010010010...

)ut biometrics has also some drawbacks. "uppose you select your fin erprint as a biometrics. )ut what to do when you have crack or wound in your fin er.
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#n this situation you mi ht be in trouble. And now days some hackers even implement exact copy of your biometrics also9 After seein all the different security scheme now it is time to do somethin advance in this security system. 8ere, the $& password comes into the picture.

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3D PA$$%&'D
The dramatic increase of computer usa e has iven rise to many security concerns. :ne ma'or security concern is authentication, which is the process of validatin who you are to whom you claimed to be. #n eneral, human authentication techniques can be classified as knowled e based +what you know,, token based +what you have,, and biometrics +what you are,. -nowled e%based authentication can be further divided into two cate ories as follows6 /, recall based and ;, reco nition based </=. 5ecall%based techniques require the user to repeat or reproduce a secret that the user created before. 5eco nition based techniques require the user to identify and reco ni>e the secret, or part of it, that the user selected before </=. :ne of the most common recall%based authentication schemes used in the computer world is textual passwords. :ne ma'or drawback of the textual password is its two conflictin requirements6 the selection of passwords that are easy to remember and, at the same time, are hard to uess. -lein <;= collected the passwords of nearly /0 111 accounts that had alphanumerical passwords, and he reached the followin observation6 ;0? of the passwords were uessed by usin a small yet well%formed dictionary of $ @ /1A words. 7urthermore, ;/? of the passwords were uessed in the first week and $A. passwords were uessed within the first /0 min. -lein <;= stated that by lookin at these results
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in a system with about 01 accounts, the first account can be uessed in ; min and 0B/0 accounts can be uessed in the first day. -lein <;= showed that even thou h the full textual password space for ei ht%character passwords consistin of letters and numbers is almost ; @ /1/C possible passwords, it is easy to crack ;0? of the passwords by usin only a small subset of the full password space. #t is important to note that -lein(s experiment was in /DD1 when the processin capabilities, memory, networkin , and other resources were very limited compared to today(s technolo y. !any authentication systems, particularly in bankin , require not only what the user knows but also what the user possesses +token%based systems,. 8owever, many reports <$=B<0= have shown that tokens are vulnerable to fraud, loss, or theft by usin simple techniques. Eraphical passwords can be divided into two cate ories as follows6 /, reco nition based and ;, recall based </=. Farious raphical password schemes have been proposed <A=B<.=, </1=B</;=. Eraphical passwords are based on the idea that users can recall and reco ni>e pictures better than words. 8owever, some of the raphical password schemes require a lon time to be performed. !oreover, most of the raphical passwords can be easily observed or recorded while the le itimate user is performin the raphical password; thus, it is vulnerable to shoulder surfin attacks. Currently, most raphical passwords are still in their research phase and require more enhancements and usability studies to deploy them in the market. !any biometric schemes have been proposed; fin erprints, palmprints, hand eometry, face reco nition, voice reco nition, iris reco nition, and retina reco nition are all
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different biometric schemes. Gach biometric reco nition scheme has its advanta es and disadvanta es based on several factors such as consistency, uniqueness, and acceptability. :ne of the main drawbacks of applyin biometrics is its intrusiveness upon a user(s personal characteristic. !oreover, retina biometrical reco nition schemes require the user to willin ly sub'ect their eyes to a low%intensity infrared li ht. #n addition, most biometric systems require a special scannin device to authenticate users, which is not applicable for remote and #nternet users. #n this paper, we comprehensively analy>e and discuss the $% & password </A=. The $%& password is a multifactor authentication scheme. #t can combine all existin authentication schemes into a sin le $%& virtual environment. This $%& virtual environment contains several ob'ects or items with which the user can interact. The type of interaction varies from one item to another. The $%& password is constructed by observin the actions and interactions of the user and by observin the sequences of such actions. #t is the user(s choice to select which type of authentication techniques will be part of their $%& password. This is achieved throu h interactin only with the ob'ects that acquire information that the user is comfortable in providin and i norin the ob'ects that request information that the user prefers not to provide. 7or example, if an item requests an iris scan and the user is not comfortable in providin such information, the user simply avoids interactin with that item. !oreover, ivin the user the freedom of choice as to what type of authentication schemes will be part of their $%& password and iven the lar e number of ob'ects and items in the environment, the number of possible $%& passwords will
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increase. Thus, it becomes much more difficult for the attacker to uess the user(s $%& password. The remainder of this paper is or ani>ed as follows6 "ection ## discusses related works. "ection ### introduces the $%& password. #t also discusses the uidelines of buildin the $%& virtual environment and its possible applications. "ection #F discusses the security analysis, includin possible attacks and countermeasures. "ection F presents the experimental results. 7inally, "ection F# concludes and discusses future work.

5G4ATG& H:5-"
!any raphical password schemes have been proposed <A=B <.=, </1=B</;=. )londer <A= introduced the first raphical password schema. )londer(s idea of raphical passwords is that by havin a predetermined ima e, the user can select or touch re ions of the ima e causin the sequence and the location of the touches to construct the user(s raphical password. After )londer <A=, the notion of raphical passwords was developed. !any raphical password schemes have been proposed. Gxistin raphical passwords can be cate ori>ed into two cate ories as follows6 /, recall based and ;, reco nition based </=. &hami'a and *erri <I= proposed &J'K Fu, which is a 5eco nition%based raphical password system that authenticates Users by choosin portfolios amon decoy portfolios. These portfolios are art randomi>ed portfolios. Gach ima e is derived from an .%) seed. Therefore, an authentication server does not need to store the whole ima e; it simply needs to store the .%) seed. Another reco nition% based raphical password is *assfaces <.=. *assfaces simply
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works by havin the user select a sub roup of k faces from a roup of n faces. 7or authentication, the system shows m faces and one of the faces belon s to the sub roup k. The user has to do the selection many times to complete the authentication process. Another scheme is the "tory scheme <D=, which requires the selection of pictures of ob'ects +people, cars, foods, airplanes, si htseein , etc., to form a story line. &avis et al. <D= concluded that the user(s choices in *assfaces and in the "tory scheme result in a password space that is far less than the theoretical entropy. Therefore, it leads to an insecure authentication scheme. The raphical password schema of )londer <A= is considered to be recall based since the user must remember selection locations. !oreover, *ass*oint </1=B</;= is a recall%based raphical password schema, where a back round picture is presented and the user is free to select any point on the picture as the user(s password +user(s *ass*oint,. &raw a "ecret +&A",, which is a recall%based raphical password schema and introduced by Lermyn et al. </$=, is simply a rid in which the user creates a drawin . The user(s drawin s, which consist of strokes, are considered to be the user(s password. The si>e and the complexity of the rid affect the probable password space. 4ar er rid si>es increase the full password space. 8owever, there are limitations in rid complexity due to human error. #t becomes very hard to recall where the drawin started and ended and where the middle points were if we have very lar e rid si>es. :ne important type of authentication is based on who you are or, in other words, biometrics. )iometric reco nition systems have been exhaustively studied as a way of authentication. 7in erprints, palmprints, face reco nition, voice reco nition, and iris and retina reco nition are all different methodolo ies
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of biometric reco nition systems. 8owever, some human properties are vulnerable to chan e from time to time due to several reasons such as a in , scarrin , face makeup, chan e of hairstyle, and sickness +chan e of voice,. !oreover, people tend to resist biometrics for different reasons. "ome people think that keepin a copy of the user(s fin erprints is not acceptable and is a threat to the user(s privacy. #n addition, some users resist the idea of a low%intensity infrared li ht or any other kind of li ht directed at their eyes, such as in retina reco nition systems. !oreover, biometrics cannot be revoked, which leads to a dilemma in case the user(s data have been for ed. Unlike other authentication schemes where the user can alter hisMher textual password in case of a stolen password or replace hisMher token if it has been stolen or for ed, a user(s biometrics cannot be revoked. !any authentication systems are based on tan ible ob'ects and are referred to as token%based systems. !any token% based systems are vulnerable to theft and loss; therefore, most token based systems require a personal identification number +*#2, for authentication. The $%& password </A= has been proposed, and initial results have been presented.

$%& *A""H:5& "C8G!G


#n this section, we present a multifactor authentication scheme that combines the benefits of various authentication schemes. He attempted to satisfy the followin requirements. /, The new scheme should not be either recall based or 5eco nition based only. #nstead, the scheme should be a
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combination of recall%, reco nition%, biometrics%, and Token%based authentication schemes. ;, Users ou ht to have the freedom to select whether the $%& password will be solely recall%, biometrics%, reco nition%, or token% based, or a combination of two schemes or more. This freedom of selection is necessary because users are different and they have different requirements. "ome users do not like to carry cards. "ome users do not like to provide biometrical data, and some users have poor memories. Therefore, to ensure hi h user acceptability, the user(s freedom of selection is important. $, The new scheme should provide secrets that are easy to remember and very difficult for intruders to uess. C, The new scheme should provide secrets that are not easy to write down on paper. !oreover, the scheme secrets should be difficult to share with others. 0, The new scheme should provide secrets that can be easily revoked or chan ed. )ased on the aforementioned requirements, we propose our contribution, i.e., the $%& password authentication scheme. $%& *assword :verview The $%& password is a multifactor authentication scheme. The $%& password presents a $%& virtual environment containin various virtual ob'ects. The user navi ates throu h this environment and interacts with the ob'ects. The $%& password is simply the combination and the sequence of user interactions that occur in the $%& virtual environment. The $%
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& password can combine reco nition%, recall%, token%, and biometrics%based systems into one authentication scheme. This can be done by desi nin a $%& virtual environment that contains ob'ects that request information to be recalled, information to be reco ni>ed, tokens to be presented, and biometrical data to be verified. 7or example, the user can enter the virtual environment and type somethin on a computer that exists in +x/, y/, >/, position, then enter a room that has a fin erprint reco nition device that exists in a position +x;, y;, >;, and provide hisMher fin erprint. Then, the user can o to the virtual ara e, open the car door, and turn on the radio to a specific channel. The combination and the sequence of the previous actions toward the specific ob'ects construct the user(s $%& password. Firtual ob'ects can be any ob'ect that we encounter in real life. Any obvious actions and interactions toward the real%life ob'ects can be done in the virtual $%& environment toward the virtual ob'ects. !oreover, any user input +such as speakin in a specific location, in the virtual $%& environment can be considered as a part of the $%& password. He can have the followin ob'ects6 /, A computer with which the user can type; ;, A fin erprint reader that requires the user(s fin erprint; $, A biometrical reco nition device; C, A paper or a white board that a user can write, si n, or &raw on; 0, An automated teller machine +AT!, that requests a token; A, A li ht that can be switched onMoff; I, A television or radio where channels can be selected; ., A staple that can be punched; D, A car that can be driven; /1, A book that can be moved from one place to another; //, Any raphical password scheme;
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/;, Any real%life ob'ect; /$, Any upcomin authentication scheme. The action toward an ob'ect +assume a fin erprint reco nition device, that exists in location +x/, y/, >/, is different from the actions toward a similar ob'ect +another fin erprint reco nition device, that exists in location +x;, y;, >;,, where x/NO x;, y/NO y;, and >/NO >;. Therefore, to perform the le itimate $%& password, the user must follow the same scenario performed by the le itimate user. This means interactin with the same ob'ects that reside at the exact locations and perform the exact actions in the proper sequence. $%& *assword "election and #nputs

4et us consider a $%& virtual environment space of si>e E x E x E. The $%& environment space is represented by the coordinates +x, y, >, </, . . . , E= x </, . . . , E= x </, . . . , E=. The ob'ects are distributed in the $%& virtual environment with unique +x, y, >, coordinates. He assume that the user can navi ate into the $%& virtual environment and interact with the ob'ects usin any input device such as a mouse, keyboard, fin erprint scanner, iris scanner, stylus, card reader, and microphone. He consider the sequence of those actions and interactions usin the previous input devices as the user(s $%& password. 7or example, consider a user who navi ates throu h the $%& virtual environment that consists of an office and a meetin room. 4et us assume that the user is in the virtual office and the user turns around to the door located in +/1, ;C, D/, and opens it. Then, the user closes the door. The user then finds a computer to the left, which exists in the position +C, $C, /.,,And the user types P7A4C:2.Q Then, the user walks to the meetin room and picks up a pen

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located at +/1, ;C, .1, and draws only one dot in a paper located in +/, /., $1,, which is the dot +x, y, coordinate relative to the paper space is +$$1, /$1,. The user then presses the lo in button. The initial representation of user actions in the $%& virtual environment can be recorded as follows6 +/1, ;C, D/, Action O :pen the office door; +/1, ;C, D/, Action O Close the office door; +C, $C, /., Action O Typin , P7Q; +C, $C, /., Action O Typin , PAQ; +C, $C, /., Action O Typin , P4Q; +C, $C, /., Action O Typin , PCQ; +C, $C, /., Action O Typin , P:Q; +C, $C, /., Action O Typin , P2Q; +/1, ;C, .1, Action O *ick up the pen; +/, /., .1, Action O &rawin , point O +$$1, /$1,. This representation is only an example. The extensive real representation will not be discussed in this paper. #n order for a le itimate user to be authenticated, the user has to follow the same sequence and type of actions and interactions toward the ob'ects for the user(s ori inal $%& password. 7i . / shows a virtual computer that accepts textual passwords as a part of a user(s $%& password. Three%dimensional virtual environments can be desi ned to include any virtual ob'ects. Therefore, the first buildin block of the $%& password system is to desi n the $%& virtual environment and to determine what ob'ects the environment will contain. #n addition, specifyin the ob'ect(s properties is part of the system desi n. The desi n of the $%& virtual environment influences the overall password space, usability,

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and performance of the $%& password system. 7i . ; shows a snapshot of an experimental $%& virtual environment.

Fig.1. Snapshot of a proof-of-concept 3-D virtual environment, where the user is typing a textual password on a virtual computer as a part of the users 3-D password.

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Fig. . Snapshot of a proof-of-concept virtual art gallery, which contains 3! pictures and six computers

To simplify the idea of how a $%& password works, 7i . $ shows a state dia ram of a possible $%& password authentication system. $%& Firtual Gnvironment &esi n Euidelines &esi nin a well%studied $%& virtual environment affects the usability, effectiveness, and acceptability of a $%& password system. Therefore, the first step in buildin a $%& password system is to desi n a $%& environment that reflects the administration needs and the security requirements. The desi n of $%& virtual environments should follow these uidelines. /, 5eal%life similarity6 The prospective $%& virtual environment should reflect what people are used to seein in real life. :b'ects used in virtual environments should be relatively similar in si>e to
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real ob'ects +si>ed to scale,. *ossible actions and interactions toward virtual ob'ects should reflect real%life situations. :b'ect responses should be realistic. The tar et should have a $%& virtual environment that users can interact with, by usin common sense. ;, :b'ect uniqueness and distinction6 Gvery virtual ob'ect or item in the $%& virtual environment is different from any other virtual ob'ect. The uniqueness comes from the fact that every virtual ob'ect has its own attributes such as position. Thus, the prospective interaction with ob'ect / is not equal to the interaction with ob'ect ;. 8owever, havin similar ob'ects such as ;1 computers in one place mi ht confuse the user. Therefore, the desi n of the $%& virtual environment should consider that every ob'ect should be distin uishable from other ob'ects. A simple real%life example is home numberin . Assume that there are ;1 or more homes that look like each other and the homes are not numbered. #t would be difficult to distin uish which house was visited a month a o. "imilarly, in desi nin a $%& virtual environment, it should be easy for users to navi ate throu h and to distin uish between ob'ects. The distin uishin factor increases the user(s reco nition of ob'ects. Therefore, it improves the system usability. $, Three%dimensional virtual environment si>e6 A $%& virtual environment can depict a city or even the world. :n the other hand, it can depict a space as focused as a sin le room or office. The si>e of a $%& environment should be carefully studied. A lar e $%& virtual environment will increase the time required by the user to perform a $%& password. !oreover, a lar e $%& virtual environment can contain a lar e number of virtual ob'ects. Therefore, the probable $%& password space broadens. 8owever, a small $%& virtual environment usually contains only a few ob'ects, and thus, performin a $%& password will take less time.

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C, 2umber of ob'ects +items, and their types6 *art of desi nin a $% & virtual environment is determinin the types of ob'ects and how many ob'ects should be placed in the environment. The types of ob'ects reflect what kind of responses the ob'ect will have. 7or simplicity, we can consider requestin a textual password or a fin erprint as an ob'ect response type. "electin the ri ht ob'ect response types and the number of ob'ects affects the probable password space of a $%& password. 0, "ystem importance6 The $%& virtual environment should consider what systems will be protected by a $%& password. The number of ob'ects and the types of ob'ects that have been used in the $%& virtual environment should reflect the importance of the protected system. $%& *assword Applications )ecause a $%& password can have a password space that is very lar e compared to other authentication schemes, the $%& password(s main application domains are protectin critical systems and resources. *ossible critical applications include the followin .

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Fig.3. State diagram of a possi"le 3-D password application

/, Critical servers6 !any lar e or ani>ations have critical servers that are usually protected by a textual password. A $%& password authentication proposes a sound replacement for a textual password. !oreover, entrances to such locations are usually protected by access cards and sometimes *#2 numbers. Therefore, a $%& password can be used to protect the entrance to such locations and protect the usa e of such servers. ;, 2uclear and military facilities6 "uch facilities should be protected by the most powerful authentication systems. The $%& password has a very lar e probable password space, and since it
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can contain token%, biometrics%, reco nition%, and knowled e% based authentications in a sin le authentication system, it is a sound choice for hi h level security locations. $, Airplanes and 'etfi hters6 )ecause of the possible threat of misusin airplanes and 'etfi hters for reli ion%political a endas, usa e of such airplanes should be protected by a powerful authentication system. The $%& password is recommended for these systems.

#n addition, $%& passwords can be used in less critical systems because the $%& virtual environment can be desi ned to fit any system(s needs. A small $%& virtual environment can be used in many systems, includin the followin 6

/, AT!s; ;, *ersonal di ital assistants; $, &esktop computers and laptop lo ins; C, Heb authentication.

"GCU5#TR A2A4R"#"
To analy>e and study how secure a system is, we have to consider how hard it is for the attacker to break such a system. A possible measurement is based on the information content of a password space, which is defined in </$= as Pthe entropy of the probability distribution over that space iven by the relative frequencies of the passwords that users actually choose.Q He have seen that textual password space may be relatively lar e; however, an attacker mi ht only need a small subset of the full password space as -lein <;= observed to successfully break such an authentication system. As a result, it is important to have a scheme that has a very lar e possible password space as one factor for increasin the
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work required by the attacker to break the authentication system. Another factor is to find a scheme that has no previous or existin knowled e of the most probable user password selection, which can also resist the attack on such an authentication scheme. #n "ection #F%A, we will discuss the si>e of the $%& password space. Then, we will study the knowled e distribution of the $%& password. Afterward, we will analy>e the possible attacks on the $%& password.

Fig.# $assword space of the 3-D password, textual password, $assfaces, and D%S with grid si&es of ' ( ' and 1) ( 1). *ength is the num"er of actions and interactions for a 3-D password, the num"er of characters for textual passwords, the num"er of selections for $assfaces, and the num"er of points that represent the stro+es for D%S. ,he length is up to eight -characters.actions, interactions, inputs.selections/. ,he 3-D password virtual environment is as specified in Section 0-%1 "it si&e is the log of the entire pro"a"le password space.
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$%& *assword "pace "i>e :ne important factor to determine how difficult it is to launch an attack on an authentication system is the si>e of the password space. To determine the $%& password space, we have to count all possible $%& passwords that have a certain number of actions, interactions, and inputs toward all ob'ects that exist in the $%& virtual environment. He assume that the len th of the $%& password is *max, and the probability of the $%& password of si>e reater than *max is >ero.

To measure the $%& password space, we will calculate +*max, 2, on a $%& virtual environment that has the space + 2 x 2 x 2, for a $%& password of a len th +number of actions, interactions, and inputs, of *max or less. #n the followin expression, %3 represents the possible actions toward the $%& virtual environment, whereas represents the total numbers of possible $%& passwords of len th *max or less6

#n the followin expression +;,, 4max is the number of ob'ects in the $%& virtual environment6

Hhere xi O x5, yi O y5, and &i O &5, only if i O 5. The desi n of the $%& environment will determine the value of 4max. The
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variable m represents all possible actions and interactions toward all existin ob'ects 4i. 8owever, g+%3, counts the total number of actions and inputs toward the $%& virtual environment, whereas m, as we mentioned before, counts the actions and interactions toward the ob'ects. An example of g+%3, can be a user movement pattern, which can be considered as a part of the user(s $%& password. The function is the number of possible actions and interactions toward the ob'ect :i based on the ob'ect type Ti. :b'ect types can be textual password ob'ects, &A" ob'ects, or any authentication scheme.

The function f is determined from the ob'ect type. #t counts the possible actions and interactions that the ob'ect can accept. #f we assume that an ob'ect P-eyboardQ is in location +x1, y1, >1, of type O textual password, f will count the possible characters and numbers that can be typed, which is around D$ possibilities. As we mentioned before, an ob'ect type is one of the important factors that affects the overall password space. Therefore, hi her outcomes of function f mean lar er $%&password space si>e. 7rom the previous equations, we observe that the number of ob'ects and the type of actions and interactions determines the probable password space. Therefore, the desi n of the $% & virtual environment is a very critical part of the $%& password system. 7i s. C and 0 illustrate the resultin password space of the proposed $%& password compared to textual password, *assfaces, and &A" of a rid of 0 x 0 and /1 x /1, respectively. 2otice the difference between a $%&
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passwords built on a simple $%& virtual environment compared to the other authentication schemes.

Fig. ' $assword space of the 3-D password, textual password, $assfaces, and D%S with grid si&es of ' ( ' and 1) ( 1). *ength is the num"er of actions and interactions for a 3-D password, the num"er of characters for textual passwords, the num"er of selections for $assfaces, and the num"er of points that represent the stro+es for D%S. ,he length is up to eight -characters.actions, interactions, inputs.selections/. ,he 3-D password virtual environment is as specified in Section 0-%1 "it si&e is the log of the entire pro"a"le password space.

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Fig. ! o"serving the num"er of possi"le actions.interactions of a 3-D password within a 3-D environment specified in Section 0-% compared to the two critical points of textual passwords. $oint 6a7 is the "it si&e of 8lein 9 : -3 ( 1)!/ dictionary of eight-character textual passwords. $oint 6"7 represents the full password space of eight-character textual passwords.

7i . A shows the points where the $%& password exceeds two important textual password points. *oint PaQ shows that by havin only two actions and interactions as a $%& password, the $%& password exceeds the number of textual passwords used by -lein <;= to break ;0? of textual passwords of ei ht characters. *oint PbQ represents the full textual password space of ei ht characters or less. #t shows that by performin only four interactions, actions, and inputs as a $%& password,

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the $%& password space exceeds the full textual passwords of ei ht characters or less. $%& *assword &istribution -nowled e "tudyin the user(s behavior of password selection and knowin the most probable textual passwords are the key behind dictionary attacks. -lein <;= used such knowled e to collect a small set of $ x /1A words that have a hi h probability of usa e amon users. The question is how has such information +hi hly probable passwords, been found and why. Users tend to choose words that have meanin , such as places, names, famous people(s names, sports terms, and biolo ical terminolo ies. Therefore, findin these different words from the dictionary is a relatively simple task. Usin such knowled e yields a hi h success rate for breakin textual passwords. Any authentication scheme is affected by the knowled e distribution of the user(s secrets. Accordin to &avis et al. <D=, *assfaces <.= users tend to choose faces that reflect their own taste on facial attractiveness, race, and ender. !oreover, /1? of male passwords have been uessed in only two uesses. Another study </C= about user selection of &A" </$= concluded that for their secret passwords, users tend to draw thin s that have !eanin , which simplifies the attacker(s task. Currently, knowled e about user behaviors on selectin their $%& password does not exist. Gvery user has different requirements and preferences when selectin the appropriate $%& password. This fact will increase the effort required to find a pattern of user(s hi hly selected $%& password. #n addition, since the $%& password combines several authentication schemes into a sin le authentication environment, the attacker has to study every sin le
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authentication scheme and has to discover what the most probable selected secrets are. 7or textual password, the hi hly probable selected textual password mi ht be determined by the use of dictionaries. 8owever, there are many authentication schemes with undiscovered probable password space. "ince every $%& password system can be desi ned accordin to the protected system requirements, the attacker has to separately study every $%& password system. This is because ob'ects that exist in one $%& password system mi ht not exist on other $%& password systems. Therefore, more effort is required to build the knowled e of most probable $%& passwords. Attacks and Countermeasures To reali>e and understand how far an authentication scheme is secure, we have to consider all possible attack methods. He have to study whether the authentication scheme proposed is immune a ainst such attacks or not. !oreover, if the proposed authentication scheme is not immune, we then have to find the countermeasures that prevent such attacks. #n this section, we try to cover most possible attacks and whether the attack is valid or not. !oreover, we try to propose countermeasures for such attacks. ;rute Force %ttac+< The attacker has to try all possible $%& passwords. This kind of attack is very difficult for the followin reasons. /, Time required to lo in6 The total time needed for a le itimate user to lo in may vary from ;1 s to ; min or more, dependin on the number of interactions and actions, the si>e of the $%& virtual
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environment, and the type of actions and interactions done by the user as a $%& password. Therefore, a brute force attack on a $%& password is very difficult and time consumin . ;, Cost of attacks6 #n a $%& virtual environment that contains biometric reco nition ob'ects and token%based ob'ects, the attacker has to for e all possible biometric information and for e all the required tokens. The cost of for in such information is very hi h; therefore, crackin the $%& password is more challen in . !oreover, the hi h number of possible $%& password spaces +as shown in Table #, leaves the attacker with almost no chance of breakin the $%& password. =ell-Studied %ttac+< The attacker tries to find the hi hest probable distribution of $%& passwords. 8owever, to launch such an attack, the attacker has to acquire knowled e of the most probable $%& password distributions. Acquirin such knowled e is very difficult because the attacker has to study all the existin authentication schemes that are used in the $%& environment. !oreover, acquirin such knowled e may require for in all existin biometrical data and may require for in token%based data. #n addition, it requires a study of the user(s selection of ob'ects, or a combination of ob'ects, that the user will use as a $%& password. !oreover, a well%studied attack is very hard to accomplish since the attacker has to perform a customi>ed attack for every different $%& virtual environment desi n. Gvery system can be protected by a $%& password that is based on a unique $%& virtual environment. This environment has a number of ob'ects and types of ob'ect responses that differ from any other $%& virtual environment. Therefore, a carefully customi>ed study is required to initiali>e an effective attack.

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,%;*> ? @>SA*,?B2 BAC;>@ 4F $4SS?;*> 3-D $%SS=4@DS 4F ,4,%* *>B2,D *max ?B % 3-D 0?@,A%* >B0?@4BC>B, %S S$>3?F?>D ?B S>3,?4B 0-%

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"houlder "urfin Attack6 An attacker uses a camera to record the user(s $%& password or tries to watch the le itimate user while the $%& password is bein performed. This attack is the most successful type of attack a ainst $%& passwords and some other raphical passwords. 8owever, the user(s $%& password may
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contain biometrical data or textual passwords that cannot be seen from behind. The attacker may be required to take additional measures to break the le itimate user(s $%& password. Therefore, we assume that the $%& password should be performed in a secure place where a shoulder surfin attack cannot be performed. Timin Attack6 #n this attack, the attacker observes how lon it takes the le itimate user to perform a correct si n%in usin the $%& password. This observation ives the attacker an indication of the le itimate user(s $%& password len th. 8owever, this kind of attack alone cannot be very successful since it ives the attacker mere hints. Therefore, it would probably be launched as part of a well%studied or brute force attack. Timin attacks can be very effective if the $%& virtual environment is poorly desi ned.

G@*G5#!G2TA4 5G"U4T"
He have built an experimental $%& virtual environment that contains several ob'ects of two types. The first type of response is the textual password. The second type of response is requestin raphical passwords. Almost $1 users volunteered to experiment with the environment. He asked the users to create their $%& password and to si n%in usin their $%& password several times over several days. SSGxperimental Firtual $%& Gnvironment #n our experiment, we have used Lava :pen E4 to build the $%& virtual environment and we have used a /..1%E8> *entium ! Centrino machine with 0/;%!) random access memory and AT# !obility 5adeon DA11 video card.

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The desi n of the experimental $%& virtual environment represents an art allery that the user can walk throu h and is depicted in 7i . ;. SSUser "tudy He conducted a user study on $%& passwords usin the experimental $%& virtual environments. The study reviewed the usa e of textual passwords and other authentication schemes. The study covered almost $1 users. The users varied in a e, sex, and education level. Gven thou h it is a small set of users, the study produced some distinct results </$=, </0=. He observed the followin re ardin textual passwords, $%& passwords, and other authentication schemes. /, !ost users who use textual passwords of DB/; character len ths or who use random characters as a password have only one to three unique passwords. ;, !ore than 01? of user(s textual passwords are ei ht characters or less. $, Almost ;0? of users use meanin ful words as their textual passwords. C, Almost I0? of users use meanin ful words or partially meanin ful words as their textual passwords. #n contrast, only ;0? of users use random characters and letters as textual passwords. 0, :ver C1? of users have only one to three unique textual passwords, and over D1? of users have ei ht unique textual passwords or less. A, :ver D1? of users do not chan e their textual passwords unless they are required to by the system.
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I, :ver D0? of users under study have never used any raphical password scheme as a means of authentication. ., !ost users feel that $%& passwords have a hi h acceptability. D, !ost users believe that there is no threat to personal privacy by usin a $%& password as an authentication scheme.

C:2C4U"#:2 A2& 7UTU5G H:5 There are many authentication schemes in the current state. "ome of them are based on user(s physical and behavioral properties, and some other authentication schemes are based on user(s knowled e such as textual and raphical passwords. !oreover, there are some other important authentication schemes that are based on what you have, such as smart cards. Amon the various authentication schemes, textual password and token%based schemes, or the combination of both, are commonly applied. 8owever, as mentioned before, both authentication schemes are vulnerable to certain attacks. !oreover, there are many authentication schemes that are currently under study and they may require additional time and effort to be applicable for commercial use. The $%& password is a multifactor authentication scheme that combines these various authentication schemes into a sin le $%& virtual environment. The virtual environment can contain any existin authentication scheme or even any upcomin authentication schemes by addin it as a response to actions performed on an ob'ect. Therefore, the resulted password space becomes very lar e compared to any existin authentication schemes.

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The desi n of the $%& virtual environment, the selections of ob'ects inside the environment, and the ob'ect(s type reflect the resulted password space. #t is the task of the system administrator to desi n the environment and to select the appropriate ob'ect that reflects the protected system requirements. Additionally, desi nin a simple and easy to use $%& virtual environment is a factor that leads to a hi her user acceptability of a $%& password system. The choice of what authentication schemes will be part of the user(s $%& password reflects the user(s preferences and requirements. A user who prefers to remember and recall a password mi ht choose textual and raphical passwords as part of their $%& password. :n the other hand, users who have more difficulty with memory or recall mi ht prefer to choose smart cards or biometrics as part of their $%& password. !oreover, users who prefer to keep any kind of biometrical data private mi ht not interact with ob'ects that require biometric information. Therefore, it is the user(s choice and decision to construct the desired and preferred $% & password. The $%& password is still in its early sta es. &esi nin various kinds of $%& virtual environments, decidin on password spaces, and interpretin user feedback and experiences from such environments will result in enhancin and improvin the user experience of the $%& password. !oreover, atherin attackers from different back rounds to break the system is one of the future works that will lead to system improvement and prove the complexity of breakin a $%& password. !oreover, it will demonstrate how the attackers will acquire the knowled e of the most probable $% & passwords to launch their attacks.

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"houlder surfin attacks are still possible and effective a ainst $%& passwords. Therefore, a proper solution is a field of research.

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