CHAPTER 9: Executive Department

A. The President- qualifications; term; compensation; disabilities; rules on vacancy and succession
Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal & Desierto De Jure vs De Facto President Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president. HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing

his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

C. The executive power Art VII sec 1; sec 17 D.

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995 FACTS: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. ARGUMENTS: Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide 2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them 3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation 4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused. HELD: 1. NO. 2. NO. 3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. 4. NO. REASONS: 1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent Judges should have conducted searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. 4. Petitioners argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis). With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. With regard to the petitioners complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In another case, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA). ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid. HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others. Veto on special provisions The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount

Philippine Constitution Association vs Enriquez Political Law Veto Power Part of the Legislative Process This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994. This case also involves the power of Congress as far as the pork barrel fund is concerned. Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only

allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc

In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the wellestablished principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker. However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC. HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the

Government of the Philippine Islands vs Milton Springer 50 Phil 259 Law on Public Officers Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch. SEE: MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS

HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the

E. Executive Immunity- sec 1; sec 17, Art XVII

Soliven vs Makasiar Constitutional Law Presidents Immunity From Suit Must Be Invoked by the President Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaintaffidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

F. Power of appointment- sec 16, ART XVII- classifications; who can be appointed; steps; limitations; discretion;
SEE: SPRINGER VS GOVT

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Ulpiano Sarmiento III et al vs Salvador Mison & Carague Political Law Appointments This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget. Their appointment was done without the concurrence of the CoA. Ulpiano, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of the two sans confirmation by the CoA. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid. HELD: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the CoA? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the CoA. Because of the conflicting extremes provided in the 2 previous Constitutions, the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the CoA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the 2nd and 3rd groups as well as those in the 4th group, i.e., officers of lower rank. As to the 4th group of officers whom the President can appoint, it was pointed out by the intervener CoA that the 3r sentence in Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies

that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the CoA; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the CoA. Ulpiano et al argued that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word alone in said third sentence The SC ruled that both arguments are not correct. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 is, more than anything else, a slip or lapse in draftsmanship. In the 1987 Constitution the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the CoA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the CoA, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article 7.

Therefore, the 3rd sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word alone in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, are not subject to confirmation by the CoA. Misons and Caragues appointments are affirmed affirmed.

G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989 TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.), LOURDES V. MASTURA, TRINIDAD A. GOMEZ, ADUL DE LEON, JOSEFINA AZARCONDELA CRUZ, TRINIDAD M. DOMINGO, MARIA MAYET T. LEDANO, LOLIT ANTONIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, AND OFFICES (C.A.), COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., respondents. FACTS: This is a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel respondent Commission on Appointments to allow petitioner TeresitaQuintos-Deles to perform and discharge her duties as a member of the House of Representatives representing the Women's Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting petitioner's appointment to the confirmation process. On April 6, 1988 (on recess), petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Executive

Secretary CatalinoMacaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter,the appointment of the said sectoral representatives to Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr. Qunitos-Deles together with 3 other sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their oaths but were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties due to opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives. Speaker Mitra suspended their oath-taking. ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments RULING: Yes. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra). Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the appointment of sectoral representatives is vested upon the President until otherwise provided by law, as follows: SEC. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others, the officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as follows: SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in

this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Calderon vs Carale Political Law Appointment Cannot Be Expanded by Law

In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA. HELD: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required. Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase and other officers required by law at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions. Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution 1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election). 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other

The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom

government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Ermita Political Law Ad Interim Appointments While Congress was in session, GMA appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in acting capacities only. Pimentel together w/ 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. During pendency, Congress adjourned and GMA re-issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity. Pimentel argues that GMA should not have appointed Yap et al as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary. Pimentel further asserts that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the CoA, without first having obtained its consent; GMA cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session because the law does not give the President such power. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid. HELD: Ermita, in behalf of the other respondents, argued that GMA is allowed under Sec. 16, Art 7 of the Constitution to make such appointments. Pursuant to the Constitution, the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CoA or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Ermita also pointed out EO 292 which allows such an appointment with the

exception that such temporary designation shall not exceed one year. Sec 17, Chap 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that *t+he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Also, Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. What Bernas Says Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But adinterim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the are not submitted to the Commission on Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. ** The SC finds no abuse in what GMA did. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from GMAs issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

H. Power of Removal
Ruben Villaluz vs Calixto Zaldivar Political Law Control Power Removal Power Appointees Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. The Exec Sec suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that she be removed. The president then issued an AO removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him. ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the president. HELD: The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the noncompetitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of RA 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint . There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service

for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that `the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.

I.

Commander- in Chief powers- military powers; suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus see sec 14. ART III; sec 18, ART VII; declaration of martial law

with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid. HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & theMontenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

Horacio Morales Jr vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al Habeas Corpus The Right to Bail In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents countered that the group of Morales were already under surveillance for some time before they were arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail. HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the States very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in this case however is that the

2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what they ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.

Aquino vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the President to Order Arrests Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law. ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.

Benigno Aquino Jr. vs Military Commission No. 2, Chief of Staff, Chief Justice et al Martial Law Open Court Theory Military Courts

Olaguer vs Military Commission Habeas Corpus In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military

In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court. Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational. ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.

personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted. HELD:

HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military courts which are authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC basically rejected the open court theory observed in the USA.

The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become

moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist. ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that theConstitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event. Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation

GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990] Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant orwarrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls andwindows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and

of Held:

human

rights.

It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income familiesare fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order

prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given. In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke suchproclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000 Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Issues: (1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review anyqualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said without

powershighlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is

totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

Lacson vs. Perez Power of the president to declare a state of rebellion In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion. FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court. Prior to resolution, the state of rebellion was lifted in Metro Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional RULING: As to warrantless arrests As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the rebellion. xxx

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

With this declaration, petitioners apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion. Was there violation of doctrine of separation of powers? Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a state of rebellion is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to determine or interpret what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers. We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that *t+he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000): xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of testual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the

evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. xxx The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.

K. Diplomatic power sec 21 ART XVII- treaty making; executive agreements; deportation of undesirable aliens
Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, GR L-10280 Facts: - May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilo Galang charged petitioners before the Deportation Board, having purchased US dollars in the sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, which was then secretly remitted to Hong Kong - Petitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua and Basilio King attempted to bribe officers of the PHL and US governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, Capt. A.P. Charak of the OSI, US Air Force) to evade prosecution for the unauthorized purchase. - A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the Deportation Board. They filed a surety bond of P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00, thereby provisionally setting them at liberty - Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss in the Deportation Board for the reason that the same does not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens, and that the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. Motion was denied by the Board on Feb. 9, 1953 - Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition to the Court, but made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. After securing and filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the DB from hearing deportation charges against petitioners pending termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. - The DB then filed its answer to the original petition, saying as an authorized agent of the President, it has jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority to order their arrest. The Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct the investigations. It also sustained the power of the DB to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the aliens temporary release pending investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Adminsistrative Code.

Hence this appeal.

Issues: 1. WON the President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently, 2. WON the delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate, carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of Held: 1. Yes. As stated in Sec 69 od Act 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code -xSEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses." -xWhile it does not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport these aliens, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President is a clear indication of such power. SC stated petitioners committed the act of profiteering which is a ground for deportation. The President may then order their deportation if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. 2. No. President Quirinos EO 398 authorizes the DB to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release. The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same. Such conditions are dependent/personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. It is an implied grant of

power that would serve as curtailment on the fundamental right of security to life and liberty, which equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. The guarantees of human rights, then, must not rest on such a shaky foundation. EO 398, as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for his temporary release, is therefore declared as illegal. Order of arrest of DB upon petitioners is declared null and void.

Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an Appropriations Bill. HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be

M. Executive legislation; Veto power

Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the

treated as item, which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power.

constitutionality of Corys veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,

Bengzon vs Drilon Political Law Veto Power of the President On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

O. Residual power
SEE: MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS

P. Immunity from suit

SEE: SOLIVEN vs MAKASIAR

SEE: PHILCONSA vs ENRIQUEZ

CHAPTER 10: The Judicial Department

Admission to the Bar:
IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954] In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners. Resoluti, 1954 on March 18 Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid. Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the

practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.