Does the promise of a less violent future lie in the cosmopolitan world view?

World peace is a catch cry repeated so often it has become the ultimate clich, but is it possible? What would world peace look like? How might it be achieved? Many argue that world peace, or at least a less violent world, can be achieved through a cosmopolitan world view. Cosmopolitanism is a word which is derived from the Greek word kosmopolits meaning citizen of the world and that is still the basis of its meaning (Kleingeld and Brown, 2013) although it is sometimes called liberal internationalism (Ikenberry, 2009). To be cosmopolitan, to hold a cosmopolitan world view, is to think of oneself first and foremost as a citizen of the world, not of any one nation. As an ideology it is the very epitome, and the logical endpoint, of the basic liberal tenet of all people being born equal. It is a belief that the things which connect us are greater than the things that divide us, that our similarities are far greater than our differences. This paper will argue that, in a globalised world, where inherently global issues abound, a cosmopolitan worldview, and a shift towards cosmopolitan global governance structures, is the only option available to us if we hope for a less violent future. While cosmopolitanism is by no means a guaranteed route to world peace, the current neoliberal Westphalian, statebased system is unable to provide lasting peace and security, and that can be guaranteed.

A Brief History of Cosmopolitanism The modern conception of cosmopolitanism has its roots in liberal Enlightenment (Jabri, 2012) and in the United Nations and its 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) but its history is in fact far longer than that. Cynic Diogenes (a fourth century BCE philosopher) is often identified as perhaps the earliest proponent. It is said that when he was asked where he came from, he replied, I am a citizen of the world (Nussbaum, 1994). The concept was further developed by the third century stoics, from where it became influential in early Christianity (Kleingeld and Brown, 2013). Emphasis on cosmopolitanism then waned for a period of hundreds of years as debates in political philosophy focused on temporal political authority and the eternal Church (Kleingeld and Brown, 2013).

In the 17th Century Grotius envisioned a great society of states and a law of nations which would bind all states (Kleingeld and Brown, 2013). In the 18th Century Anacharsis Cloots advocated the abolition of all existing states and the establishment of a single world state under which all human individuals would be directly subsu med. (Kleingeld and Brown, 2013). In 1795, in his Perpetual Peace Immanuel Kant, perhaps the most famous proponent of cosmopolitanism, argued for a league of nations, the concept of cosmopolitan law and the abolition of standing armies (Kant and Smith, 2010). In the 19th Century Marx and Engels were definitely global in their vision but saw cosmopolitanism itself as an ideological extension of capitalism due to its inherent liberalism (Kleingeld and Brown, 2013). The early twentieth century saw two world wars, the antithesis of cosmopolitanism and international security, but these tragedies also sparked the earliest attempts to implement cosmopolitan governance. Between WWI and WWII the League of Nations was formed, similar in more than name to that proposed by Kant in 1795. WWII was both caused by the failure of the League of Nations and hurried its destruction. In the wake of WWII the United Nations was formed and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was born which raised the principle of egalitarian individualism to a universal reference point: the requirement that each person be treated with equal concern and respect, irrespective of the state in which they were born or brought up (Held, 2003, p.474). From this time, the Cold War and the ideological battle between communism and capitalism halted any real progress towards a global cosmopolitan community and this period, and the final failure of communism, only served to cement the US as the dominant force in a unipolar world.

The cosmopolitan world view is an inherently peaceful one due to its valuing of all people as equal, which ultimate extends the concept of a kinship group to the entire human population. It sets out the terms of reference for the recognition of peoples equal moral worth, their active agency and what is essential for their autonomy and development; it seeks to recognise, affirm and nurture human agency (Held, 2003, p.473). It can be seen, in fact, as stemming from peace theory as it is an attempt to refine and apply in the current political landscape some of the insights of institutional pacifism (Archibugi, 2000). A

compelling idea but why do many believe that it is necessary for, or capable of, creating a less violent future? The world we now live in is unalterably changed and it is argued that the current, statebased system, which served us so well for so long after the Peace of Westphalia, is no longer the best system. The contemporary world is now, to a hitherto unknown degree, a globalised one, which requires global governance in order to solve global issues. Individual nations are incapable of solving global issues alone because unilateral action will always be insufficient. Globalisation cannot be turned back since it is driven by multiple, largely uncontrollable forces and is a multi-dimensional process of change that has irreversibly transformed the very nature of the social world and the place of states within that world (Beck and Sznaider, 2006, p.2). In the modern globalised world the Westphalian state-based system has suffered from a crippling failure to ameliorate many threatening global issues and crises including: environmental degradation (particularly climate change), health issues (particularly the AIDs pandemic), security problems (particularly transnational terrorism and organised crime), the power and influence of multi-national corporations (MNCs) and massive, and growing, global inequality (See for example Beck, 2006, Held, 2004, Scholte, 2011, Sachs, 2004, Singer, 2002). Each one of these issues, whether directly related to security or not, is dangerous to global peace and security if left unsolved because the risks of modern society are, as a matter of their internal logic, transnational and all attempts to control them unleash global conflicts and debates (Beck, 2006, p.61-2). Globalisation has seen the blurring of distinctions between matters of internal and external security (Adamson, 2005, p.33). If effective global governance does not arise we can expect that insecurity and violence will escalate as negative aspects of globalisation go unchecked whilst positive potentials go unrealized (Scholte, 2011, p.110). As Mann says, in regards to the looming environmental crisis Either states collectively negotiate and plan, or our great grandchildren perish (Mann, 2001). Current governance models are inadequate to the task of ameliorating the numerous threatening global issues for various, interrelated reasons:

Institutions and regulations of global governance inherently impinge on national sovereignty but our Westphalian system places state sovereignty as paramount. As a result, global governance rules and actions are frequently decided based, not on what is likely to produce the utilitarian greatest good for the greatest number, but on what has the least impact on national sovereignty. This dilemma is most starkly apparent on issues of peace and security where states are strong and IGOs [intergovernmental organisations] prominent only to a limited degree (Karns and Mingst, 2010, p.544).

Because states are only able to regulate within their national borders, they are almost entirely incapable of controlling the actions of multinational corporations (MNCs) and other transnational organisations, including organised criminal networks. The global system could not be better designed to give MNCs the ability to shift between countries based on regulatory competition. This has, and continues to, result in MNCs holding massive power and influence on the global stage and a global race to the bottom on regulations as nations compete to attract, or avoid losing, MNC business (Porter, 1999, Rudra, 1993).

It is often argued that wealthy and powerful nations such as the US have undue influence over global governance. How can IGOs act in the global interest when dominant states (or coalitions) tend to control agendas? (Karns and Mingst, 2010, p.541). The permanent five members (P5) of the UN Security Council and their power of veto over all decisions are the ultimate example of this state-based power imbalance. The P5 are an artefact of the period at the end of World War II and, as such, they have little legitimate claim to authority in modern global governance (Keohane, 2011, p.104).

There exists in global governance institutions a democratic deficit, both actual and perceived. These institutions are, on the whole, undemocratic and lack sufficient transparency and accountability (Nye Jr, 2001).

Ultimately, according to the assessment of many theorists (eg. Harvey, 2005, Brown, 2006, Brecher et al., 2009), the supremacy of neoliberal ideology, and its derision of all government intervention in pursuit of the ideal, pure state of the market, makes regulation inside national borders difficult and global regulation next to impossible.

Michael J. Sandel, in his book What Money Cant Buy: The Moral Limits of the Market, illustrates the impact of this market fundamentalism, arguing that somewhere along the line we drifted from having a market economy to being a market society (Sandel, 2012). In the period following the Cold War there was triumphalism in the air regarding the Western model of liberal state-based democracy. This attitude, a relatively natural response to a dramatic shift whereby the only competing model suddenly collapsed, was epitomised by Fukuyama in his The End of History (Fukuyama, 1989). According to Fukuyama, and others, liberal state-based democracy was the ultimate governance model and thus, with the fall of communism, history was ending because there would never again be any great ideological struggles over how best to govern and organise a society. In the face of contemporary global governance issues, and the failure of the global community to address numerous crises, this view looks increasingly nave. Far from the triumphalist view, there is in fact a general consensus among academics that the capitalist world-economy is in crisis because it cannot find solutions to key dilemmas (Jorgenson and Kick, 2003, p.196). The failure of the current governance model to find solutions for these issues is due to both a lack of sufficient global governance and a democratic deficit in the institutions which do exist (See for example Nye Jr, 2001, Moravcsik, 2004). Some institutions may function well despite their democratic deficit, which includes a lack of inclusiveness, transparency and accountability but, in modern times democracy has become the touchstone of legitimacy (Nye Jr, 2001, p.3), meaning that, regardless of efficacy, this deficit becomes a crisis of legitimacy. Given that ruling requires the tacit approval of the ruled, a crisis of legitimacy makes a governance institution untenable. Perhaps the greatest danger is that the lack of sufficient, legitimate global governance can lead to global governance by stealth and coercion (Scholte, 2011, p.111). There are few signs that the Westphalian system, and the nationalism it engenders, will come to an abrupt halt any time soon, but there are some signs that it may be losing its supremacy. The European Union (EU) has, some believe, demonstrated a new model of regional cooperation and transnational governance (Laffan, 1998, Schmidt, 2006) but, is slow progress towards regional blocs conducive of the required global governance, or does

it force non-aligned nations to be more aggressively nationalistic in response to the threat, real or perceived, of powerful coalitions of nations? Since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia the global system has been one in which the ultimate unit of power is the sovereign, autonomous state. The influence of particular states, and animosity between states have waxed and waned dramatically but the system of atomised, individual sovereign states has continued. The notion of autonomous nation-states was a revolutionary human concept at its inception and, in the world in which it was created, it reduced conflicts, expanded peace and encouraged the growth in international trade that allowed the global economy to explode. The state was, at the time, a means of bringing order to chaos by providing an agency claiming the legitimate right and the resources to set up and enforce rules and the norms binding the run of affairs over a certain territory (Bauman, 1998, p.39). The Westphalian system was so successful and was adopted so wholeheartedly that its logic became internalised and the human construct of autonomous nation-states has grown to be seen by many as a natural, unalterable truth. The problem is that the nationalist perspective fails to grasp that political, economic and cultural action and their (intended and unintended) consequences know no borders (Beck, 2006, p.18). It is even claimed that the state-based system not only allows conflict but is itself a source of conflict and that you can trace the overwhelming impression of global chaos to the principle of territoriality which proved to be a major source of the contemporary world disorder (Bauman, 1998, p.41). Bauman quotes studies claiming that states, despite their practical impotence: remain the only sites and agencies for the articulation and execution of laws; devoid of all real executive power, no more self sufficient, in fact unsustainable militarily, economically or culturally, those weak states, quasi states keep nevertheless claiming territorial sovereignty, capitalizing on identity wars and invoking, or rather whipping up, dormant tribal instincts (Bauman, 1998, p.41). Martha Nussbaum argues that to give support to nationalist sentiments subverts, ultimately, even the values that hold a nation together (Nussbaum, 1994, p.2) because how

can one argue for equality of all citizens regardless of class, race, religion or creed if our system creates false difference by way of the constructed barrier of the nation state? She claims that, by conceding, even encouraging, the idea that the morally arbitrary difference of place of birth, in relation to a human constructed nation-state, has significance in our decision making process, we also deprive ourselves of a principled way of arguing to citizens that they should in fact join hands across these other barriers (Nussbaum, 1994, p.6). As Balibar argues, racism is inherently linked to nationalistic discourse, it emerges from the same ideas of separateness (Balibar, 1991). Logic tells us that if we truly believe that all humans are born free and equal then our compassion must extend equally across national borders. If it does not, then why should it cross any other arbitrary divide? The laudable goals of the UDHR and human rights discourse cannot be achieved by atomised states because: it is the nature of human rights that although they are meant to be enjoyed separately (they mean, after all, the entitlement to have ones own difference recognized and so to remain different without fear of reprimand or punishment), they have to be fought for and won collectively, and only collectively can they be grante d (Bauman, 2001, p.142) The availability of the liberties outlined in liberal theory and the UDHR paradoxically need global governance because liberty requires order, and order, at some level, must be able to harness force (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006, p.20). Another way in which insufficient global governance creates global tension is through global inequality in wealth and power. This problem is a result of a trifecta of bad, or missing governance: Nationalism and the refusal of wealthy nations to share the results of decades of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity. The inability of any state to sufficiently control the actions of MNCs and lack of any global authority willing or able to fill the gap. The supremacy of neoliberal ideology which derides government intervention into the market and encourages a greed is good mentality.

The weakness of global governance, and even national governance, under neoliberal ideology is certainly no accident. It is the explicit imposition of a particular form of market rationality onto the socio-political sphere (Brown, 2006). As Bauman claims, this system exists because: weak states are precisely what the new world order needs to sustain itself. Quasi states can be easily reduced to the (useful) role of local police precincts, securing a modicum of order required for the conduct of business, but need not be feared as effective brakes on the global companies freedom (Bauman, 1998, p.42). Neoliberal ideology, with its overriding imperatives of opening markets, privatisation of public assets and maximisation of global competitiveness, was supposed to create economic growth, foster stability and strengthen civil society but instead has often increased social tension both between and within nations by exacerbating wealth inequality and removing job security (Kinnvall, 2004, Calhoun, 1994, Hoogvelt, 2001, Hurrell and Woods, 1999). A knowledge of the various impending global crises makes it clear that global governance is critical if we are to find solutions to them, but some argue that a cosmopolitan world view is not a prerequisite to achieving this. So why cosmopolitanism? Why must we think of ourselves as citizens of the world? Beck argues that the world and global politics is already going through a process of cosmopolitanization in response to the forces of globalisation . He rejects that cosmopolitanism is a conscious and voluntary choice of elites (Beck, 2006, p.19) but argues that cosmopolitanization is already occurring and that it is outside of our control. He argues that cosmopolitanization occurs as the unwanted and unobserved side effect of actions that are not intended as cosmopolitan in the normative sense (Beck, 2006, p.18). Beck calls this banal cosmopolitanism, latent cosmopolitanism, unconscious cosmopolitanism or passive cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2006). This distinction is also made by Bauman in his critique of globalization in which he marks the difference between global effects, notoriously unintended and unanticipated and global undertakings which seem increasingly rare (Bauman, 1998, p.39). This cosmopolitanization, this banal cosmopolitanism, is not sufficient to engender a less violent future. In order for cosmopolitanism to fulfil its promise of a less violent future, we

need concerted effort and leadership which embraces and encourages a cosmopolitan worldview and cosmopolitan global governance structures and institutions: normative cosmopolitanism. As Fraser argues, globalisation has already, and continues to, change the way we think about justice away from what is owed towards whom it is owed to (Fraser, 2005). All we must do is admit that globalisation and cosmopolitanization have made a cosmopolitan world view a necessity! There may be a solid argument that, theoretically at least, cosmopolitanism could provide a less violent future, but is it utopian? This question depends on ones understanding of cosmopolitanism. There is no single model for cosmopolitanism so, while world peace through a dramatic cosmopolitan shift in the near future is highly unlikely, unstoppable globalising forces make continued cosmopolitanization unavoidable. Viewed in this light normative cosmopolitanism is not utopian, but the only logical response to forces almost entirely outside our control. A more peaceful world through increasingly cosmopolitan policies and structures is achievable, but requires a shift in thinking. According to Beck: During the national phase of modernity cosmopolitanism could only be grasped intellectually, in the head, but could not be felt as a living experience. Nationalism, by contrast, took possession of the peoples hearts. This head-heart dualism is turned upside down in the second modernity. Everyday life has become cosmopolitan in banal ways; yet the insidious concepts of nationalism continue to haunt peoples minds almost unabated (Beck, 2006, p.19). The contention that a less violent future lies in the cosmopolitan world view is far from unanimous though and arguments against it come from diverse sources. The common thread behind most oppositional discourses comes down to a sociological, psychological and biological argument which posits the notions that human beings are inherently incapable of true liberal cosmopolitanism. These arguments claim that, for psychological and/or biological reasons, human beings have in-group versus out-group thinking hardwired into them and, as such, conflict between groups will exist regardless of governance structures. The sociology of this theory stems primarily from the work of Tajfel (1970, 2010) whose work seems to show that individuals have an innate tendency to prefer members of their

in-group over out-group individuals, regardless of any meaningful differences between groups. This tendency is said to stem from a self-esteem boost engendered by group membership which motivates members to give assistance to other group members in the interests of improving the status of the group as a whole (Billig and Tajfel, 1973, Hogg, 1992, Abrams and Hogg, 2012, Tajfel and Turner, 1979). These theories are interested in ascertaining how previously harmless others may suddenly become reconstructed into the stranger-enemy (Kinnvall, 2004, p.751) but are often criticised as being overly essentialist, seeing identity as something more ascribed than acquired (Kinnvall, 2004, p.750). Huddy argues that these theories dont allow for identity choice, thus discounting human agency in developing ones own identity (Huddy, 2001). It is also argued that there is a distinction between being categorized as belonging to a group because of characteristics (real or imagined), and the sort of meaningful group membership used for identity formation (Huddy, 2001). This argument comes down to one of the most basic sociological debates: that of structure versus agency. Are the members of our ingroup and the identity that we form with the help of group membership enforced on us by our situation, or does agency play a role in choosing which groups we are members of and which (of perhaps numerous) groups we allow to shape our identity? So how does this tie into a globalized world? Will we continue to create stranger-enemies unconsciously, regardless of worldview and governance structures? Do we need a national identity to help in the creation of out groups for our own psychological well-being? According to Kinvall, a globalized world is for many a world devoid of certainty and when individuals feel vulnerable and experience existential anxiety, it is not uncommon for them to wish to return to a threatened self-identity (Kinnvall, 2004, p.742). Kinnvall argues that in response to public anxiety engendered by an increasingly complex globalised world leaders are seeking to rally people around simple rather than complex causes , even consciously capitalising on the anxiety, and nationalism seems to have a particularly powerful appeal (ibid, p.742). Similarly Giddens argues that the complex contemporary world leaves the individual feeling bereft and alone crying out for the sense of security provided by more traditional settings (Giddens, 1991, p.33). We almost certainly need a

stable sense of identity and self to feel secure and thrive but is nationalism really a prerequisite for that security, or is it just grasped upon because it is readily available? According to Calhoun (2003, 2004, 2007), differences between people and nations are real and the sense of belonging engendered by the construct of the nation state is all the more important in a complex globalised world. People need the strong and secure base of a nation state in order to bear the challenges inherent in a globalised world. For Calhoun, nationalism is an integral and unavoidable building block of identity. Calhoun sees cosmopolitanism as not only a utopian fantasy but a dangerous one because it ignores the importance of nations and nationalism. He argues that, in a globalised world, nations necessary to provide solidarity, stability and a sense of identity because nationalism helps locate an experience of belonging in a world of global flows and fears (Calhoun, 2007, p.1). Aaacording to Calhoun, without the solidarity provided by the nation state, democracy will fail because membership in a society is an issue of social solidarity and cultural identity as well as legally constructed state citizenship (Calhoun, 2007, p.104-5). Nussbaum admits that cosmopolitanism does not offer quite the same comfort as nationalism, that it offers no such refuge; it offers only reason and love of humanity, which may seem at times less colourful than other sources of belonging (Nussbaum, 1994, p.6). What Calhoun fails to take into account is that solidarity and identity groups already cross national boundaries. The world is not made up of small groups which overlap and grow but ultimately end at the borders of a nation state. Identity groups exist across the world, be they religious or political or simply interest/activity-based. In a world of overlapping, global identity groups, why must the construct of the nation state provide an otherwise unachievable solidarity? Tilly elucidates how cultural globalisation can allow for transnational identity and solidarity groups (Tilly, 2005) and, as Beck argues, the national outlook is becoming false (2006, p.18). This fact is often ignored because, even when looking at inherently international issues, we tend to examine them through a frame of what Beck calls methodological nationalism. The internal logic of the nationalist view is flawed and, without internal logic, a concept cannot long continue to provide any benefit even if it does so now. A fiction can be comforting, but only so long as that fiction is stable. The fiction of the nation-state is created just like any other. In order to influence identity

formation, act as a source of stability, and create in-group solidarity, leaders must demonstrate that the nation it wishes to create has always existed (Kinnvall, 2004, p.756). It must be based upon an idealised past, a golden age and a history of chosen glories and chosen traumas: the exact same methods that form the basis of radical Islam (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008). Another response to arguments for the necessity of nations states in providing stability in a complex, globalised world is Becks claim that common threats and shared risks can and do create solidarity, meaning, perhaps, that what we require to become a united world is merely to shift our thinking on existing global risks and threats in order to find global solidarity (Beck, 2006, Beck, 2001). According to Beck perhaps we dont need an attack from Mars to unite us because in a sense that is what occurred on September 11: an attack from our internal mars (ibid, p.35). Beck claims that we live in a world risk society and that risks explode self-referential systems and national and international political agendas, overturning their priorities and producing practical interconnections among mutually indifferent or hostile parties and camps (ibid, p.p.35-6). In order to realize the potential of risks to unite us we must shift our focus, stop analysing issues through a frame of methodological nationalism, and recognise that the things that might bind us together already exist.

The realist arguments against cosmopolitanism claim that the international sphere is inherently anarchic, that nations will always do whatever is in their own best interest regardless of costs to others and no global governance can change that (See for example Grieco, 1988). This argument is inherently flawed because it presupposes the nation state as a natural, unalterable institution and, perhaps more tellingly, this same argument could be used against any form of governance (ie. People are inherently selfish and self-interested therefore all social relationships will always be anarchic and aggressive) (See for example a critique of realism by Turner, 1998). A system of democratic governance and laws shows this not to be true at the national level so why should it be true at the global? If we believe that cosmopolitanism holds the promise of a less violent future, how are we to achieve the shift from cosmopolitanism as an amorphous, academic concept into a structural governance model? There is no one route to this, and argument, even between

proponents of cosmopolitanism, is fierce. David Held is perhaps the most well-known proponent to have elucidated a realistic road map to a cosmopolitan world. He argues that having a seat at the negotiating table in a major IGO or at a major conference does not ensure effective representation and that many people are stakeholders in global political problems that affect them, but remain excluded from the political institutions and strategies needed to address these problems (Held, 2004, p.370). According to Held there are three distinct regulatory and political gaps: a jurisdictional gap, an incentive gap and a participation gap (Held, 2003, p.467). Held (2003, 2004) argues that we need to shift towards more broad, inclusive and accountable global governance and that all stakeholders should have a voice in one form or another. His roadmap for a cosmopolitan future starts with a first step of an enlightened multilateralism (2004, p.377) including reform of existing global governance structures. He also highlights the importance of creating governance structures around specific issues by creating what he calls Global Issue Networks (GINs) which would function similarly to the multistakeholder epistemic communities that already surround issues like climate change but would have a more inclusive, open membership. Held (2003) also calls for multilevel governance and multiple sites of democracy, including small local and regional parliaments able to ensure that the voices of at least the vast majority of people are heard in some way. He claims that governance is becoming increasingly a multilevel, intricately institutionalised and spatially dispersed activity, while representation, loyalty and identity remain stubbornly rooted in traditional ethnic, regional and national communities (2003, p.469). As such we must make governance more inclusive and only an international or, better still, a cosmopolitan outlook can, ultimately, accommodate itself to the political challenges of a more global era (ibid, p.469). So perhaps arriving at a cosmopolitan world could create a less violent future, and perhaps that can be achieved through a slow and difficult process. It will only happen slowly, through incremental change and only with leadership from powerful states willing to cede some of their own sovereignty. How realistic is that proposal though? Bauman claims that things today are moving sideways, aslant or across rather than forward, often backward (Bauman, 2001), meaning that progress, towards any goal, is by no means assured. Radical thinkers such as philosopher Slavoj Zizek argue that incremental change may be impossible and that

political activism often feeds the dominant hegemonic order by providing an outlet for frustration with the system, but an outlet that will ultimately achieve nothing (iek, 2006). We can only hope that this view is wrong because a Marxist style revolution on the global scale seems not only unlikely but it is difficult to imagine that such a revolution would not increase, rather than decrease global violence and insecurity, at least in the short and medium term. It has often been joked that all that is needed to bury ancient animosities, and achieve world peace, and global solidarity is an alien invasion. Since we cant hold our breath for that, it is my contention that cosmopolitanism holds the only coherent route to an imagined less violent future. Whilst by no means an easy, safe or even certain path, the need for global governance, lack of internal logic in nationalistic models, and the danger represented by creating and promoting false differences, make a cosmopolitan world view the only option available to us. Now all we need is leadership from existing powers.

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