ARTICLE I RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES

INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT

The allegations contained in Article I of the impeachment should not be sustained by the Impeachment Court since there is no factual nor legal basis to uphold the same. The alleged betrayal of public trust through Chief Justice Coronas track record supposedly marked by partiality in favor of the Arroyo administration cannot hold water when the prosecutors purposely select the partial cases decided by the !upreme Court with the mere regular participation of CJ Corona and disregarding the vote of the latter to other cases not favoring the Arroyo administration. "n the dubious appointment as midnight appointee# the same is already settled in the case of $e Castro v. Judicial and %ar Council &J%C' (.). *o. +,+--.# April .-# .-+- where such decision of the !upreme Court# in the e/ercise of its 0udicial function# must be respected by the other co1e2ual branch.

Betrayal of P !l"# Tr $t t%ro &% CJ Coro'a($ Tra#) Re#or* Mar)e* By Part"al"ty The complainants in the impeachment complaint allege that CJ Corona3s vote in decisions affecting (4A constitute betrayal of public trust. *otably# CJ Corona did not pen those decisions. It must be emphasi5ed that CJ Corona cannot be held accountable for the outcome of cases before the !upreme Court which acts as a collegial tribunal. %y mentioning the decisions and actions of the !upreme Court# complainants demonstrate their lack of understanding of the concept of a collegial body like the !upreme Court# where each member has a single vote. + !ection +6# Article 7III of the +,89 Constitution states that: Conclusions in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the

Answer to Verified Complaint for Impeachment, 12 December 2011.

opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the chief Justice shall be issued. This provision clearly embodies the concept of collegial body of the !upreme Court. %efore a decision can be made# there must first be a consultation among the Justices. It would be improbable# if not impossible# for CJ Corona to solely affect the decisions of the court since there is a mandatory process of consultation with the Justices who shall all deliberate the facts and the laws of the case. If CJ Corona did vote in favor of the Arroyo administration# he did so because it was his duty to ad0udicate and to give his own independent legal opinion on the case as a Justice of the !upreme Court. Also# his vote cannot entirely affect the decision since he is only one person as opposed to the ma0ority vote needed for a decision. 4oreover# !ection +; of the same Article provides that the decision shall state clearly and distinctively the facts and the law on which it is based. <ith this provision# it is difficult to prove the allegations of the complainants that Corona is indeed bias because the Constitution re2uires that every court decision must be supported by the correct facts and laws. It would be hard to bend the clear mandate of the law 0ust to accommodate a decision favoring the past administration. 4ore so# the Constitution is crafted in such a way that safeguards from possible abuses are placed to protect the sovereign from erring public officials.

D !"o $ a++o"'t,e't a$ M"*'"&%t A++o"'tee The allegation of the complainants that the appointment of CJ Corona is unconstitutional is already settled in the case of $e Castro v. Judicial and %ar Council &J%C' (.). *o. +,+--.# April .-# .-+-.

According to the ruling of the !upreme Court =n %anc in upholding the appointment of CJ Corona# the prohibition under !ection +># Article 7II does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the !upreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

In the decision of the court, they made mention of the two constitutional provisions that are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII ( !ecutive "epartment#, provides for a $an in ma%ing appointments $y the president two months immediately $efore the ne!t presidential elections and up to the end of his term e!cept temporary appointments to e!ecutive positions when continued vacancies therein will pre&udice pu$lic service or endanger pu$lic safety. The other, Section '

(1#, Article VIII ((udicial "epartment#, states that a ny vacancy (in the Supreme )ourt# shall $e filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
In resolving the conflict, the court too% notice of the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the *egislative (Article VI#, the !ecutive (Article VII#, and the (udicial "epartments (Article VIII# em$odied in the )onstitution. The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. he presidential power o! appointment is dealt with in "ections #$, #% and #& o! the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the 'udicial Department and de!ines the duties and (uali!ications o! )embers o! the "upreme Court, among others. "ection $*#+ and "ection , o! this Article are the provisions speci!ically providing !or the appointment o! "upreme Court 'ustices. In particular, "ection , states that the appointment o! "upreme Court 'ustices can only be made by the President upon the submission o! a list o! at least three nominees by the '-C. "ection $*#+ o! the Article mandates the President to !ill the vacancy within ,/ days !rom the occurrence o! the vacancy. 0ad the !ramers intended to extend the prohibition contained in "ection #%, Article VII to the appointment o! )embers o! the "upreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. hey could not have ignored the meticulous ordering o! the provisions. hey would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in "ection #%, Article VII as being e(ually applicable to the appointment o! )embers o! the "upreme Court in Article VIII itsel!, most li1ely in "ection $ *#+, Article VIII. hat such speci!ication was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President ma1ing appointments within two months be!ore the next presidential elections and up to the end o! the President2s or Acting President2s term does not re!er to the )embers o! the "upreme Court.
The pronouncement made by the Court in this case is a valid e/ercise of 0udicial review. It is the power of the courts to test the validity of e/ecutive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments# but merely an e/pression of the supremacy of the Constitution. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is

upheld. . And the !upreme Court simply upheld the duty of the ?resident to appoint a Justice in case of vacancy. !ettled is the rule that a co1e2ual branch of the government must respect the official duties and functions of the other branch. The doctrine of separation of powers according to Justice @aurel is intended to secure action# to forestall overaction# to prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency. 6 *o other branch must meddle with the legal e/ercise of official function of another branch. The Judiciary is an independent department of the government who has a mind of its own. Considered as court of last resort.# it cannot afford to be incomplete at any time. ; To 2uestion the decision of the !upreme Court shall run in contrast with the doctrine of separation of powers enunciated by the Constitution. And without independence and integrity# courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of 0ustice.> 4oreover# another safeguard of the Constitution in avoiding the appointment to be the sole discretion of the ?resident is the creation of the Judicial and %ar Council who shall be responsible for the nomination of at least three nominees. A The provision would curb the singling out of the choice on a particular Justice. It should also be noted that on the same provision# the Constitution provides that vacancy for the lower courts shall be filled within ninety days from the submission of the list of nominees. <hile the appointment of the members of the !upreme shall be made for every vacancy. The provision relating to !upreme Court members has no 2ualification as to the time of appointment. The filing up of vacancies in the Judiciary is for the interest of the public and there is a showing of compelling reason to 0ustify the issuance of the appointment during the period of the alleged ban. *o other than the Chief Justice of the !upreme Court retired and the need to replace the Chiefs place is of public necessity to uphold the integrity of the Court.

Antonio B. Nachura, utline re!iewer in political law, 200" , citing An#ara ! $lectoral Commission, %& 'hil. 1&". & Isa#ani Cru(, Constitutional )aw. 2d ed. *.C.+ Central )awboo, 'ub., 2000, citin# 'an#asinan -rasportation Co. !. '.C, /0 0, 1th .upp. / .upra at note 2 2 .upra at note &. % .ection ", Article VIII, 1"13 Constitution.

The appointment prescribed for the 0udiciary is intended to de1politici5e the courts of 0ustices# ensure the choice of competent 0udges# and fill e/isting vacancies as soon as possible so as not to unduly disrupt 0udicial proceedings.