12.RCBC v.

Intermediate Appellate Court 320 SCRA 279 Law in Question: PD 902-A Sec 6 Brief overview: Petitioners RCBC is one of the creditors of BF Homes who filed for Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments with the SEC. SEC ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, but unaware of such bond, the sheriffs proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was the highest bidder. BF Homes filed in the SEC a motion to annul auction sale. The petition was granted hence this case. Issue: Whether or not extra-judical foreclosure of the real estate mortgage by petitioner can be suspend under the said law? Statcon Principle: Verba Legis. *Suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a management committee or rehabilitation receiver 14.Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company Credit Union (KM/MRC) v. MRC 88 SCRA 616 Law in question: Republic Act No. 2023 Sec. 62 o A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-operative. o Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative. Brief Overview: NO FACTS (Straight to issue) Petitioner contends that the provision mentioned that the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondents employees wages and salaries. The Court ruled in favour of the respondent. StatCon Issue: (same as the one mentioned in the facts) StatCon Doctrine: verba legis the law is silent Court discussion o Nothing in the provision mentioned that obligation of labourers and employees payable to credit union shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees wages and salaries o Provision only says that employer shall make the deduction in accordance with the agreement and remit forthwith the amount so deducted to the co-operative - Only to compel the employer to make the deduction 15.Segovia v. Sandiganbayan 288 SCRA 328 Law in Question: R.A. 3019 Section 13. Questioned whether it was mandatory for courts to suspend erring public officials or whether it was up to the courts discretion. Brief overview: Petitioners Segovia et al. have been suspended for extending undue advantage to bidders during a bidding. Petitioners claim that their constitutional rights have been violated because theyve been penalized with suspension Issue: Ministerial or Subject to Discretion of the court and whether preventive suspension was a penalty in itself. Statcon Principle: Verba Legis. *Preventive Suspension is NOT a penalty. 16.Abellana v. Marave 57 SCRA 106 Law in Question: Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court. the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party ...reserves his right to institute it separately." Brief overview: The petitioners claimed that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the petitioners case to prohibit the then offended parties (of a previous case where the petitioners of Abellana v. Marave were the accused, and was found guilty as charged for the crime of reckless driving) from filing a separate civil action without reserving such right during the original criminal case. Issue: Whether or not the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion, and if Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court should apply. Statcon Principle: It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. Waiving such right through statutory construction, as done by the petitioners, would be unconstitutional based on (1) Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states that "In cases of ... physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence", and (2)

under the current Constitution, it provides that the grant of power to the Courts does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right. Statcon Doctrine: Nanay mo. (None.) 17.Maniago v. C.A. 253 SCRA 674 - almost like Abellana v Marave case except here petitioners contend that the other party should have made reservations during the criminal case to be able to file for a separate civil case. Court used Abellana among others to justify its ruling, hence you can add stare decisis as a doctrine but its mostly like Abellana. Other comment: Also, the difference would be that in this case, the criminal case didnt prosper. Goes to show why court allows civil cases to be filed independently - to ensure that some justice is given to offended party even if criminal case (where proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary) doesnt prosper - hence, principle that 18.Quisumbing v. Meralco 380 SCRA 195 Law in question: R.A. 7832 (anti-electricity and electric transmission lines/materials pilferage act of 1994) regarding requisites to constitute prima facie evidence for disconnection of illegal use of electricity Brief Overview: Inspectors from meralco found that the meter of the petitioners seal was missing, the cover was deformed, the meter was misaligned, and the meter had scratches. The inspectors took the meter to examine whether it was tampered. and having found that it was tampered disconnected the line, but reconnected it at the same day. Statcon Issue: w/n respondent complied with the requisites to allow the respondent to disconnect the electricity of the petitioner StatCon Doctrine: Verba Legis (plain meaning rule) Comments: Respondent did not comply with the requisite to constitute prima facie evidence to disconnect electrical lines being that an officer of the law or a representative of the Energy Regulation Board had to be present to personally witness and attest the discovery of tampering. 19.Melendres v. COMELEC 319 SCRA 262 Law in question: Rule 37, Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states that a docking/filing fee of 100pesos is required for courts to give due course to election contests (basta something like that hihi) Brief Overview: Melendres lost in a barangay election. He contested the results with the court. Concepcion (the winner) says case should be dismissed because Melendrez did not pay the docking/filing fee which is required for the court to obtain jurisdiction over the case. Statcon Issue: W/N the docking fee is required to acquire jurisdiction over cases. StatCon Doctrine: Contemporary Construction. Required. According to the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, docking/filing fee is required to be paid for courts to acquire jurisdiction over election contests. The Court gives great weight to the construction made by an executive agency (COMELEC) tasked to implement the law. Comments: uhhh <3 hihi!ghfghfghfghfg 20.Astorga v. Villegas 56 SCRA 714 (1974) Law in Question: R.A. 4065 - An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice Mayor of the City of Manila Brief Overview: Mayor Villegas issued circulars around the city of Manila to disregard provisions of RA 4065. Vice Mayor Astorga filed a petition for Mandamus compelling Villegas, et al. to comply with RA 4065. Villegas refused to with the claims that RA 4065 was never enacted because it was later found out that the copy signed by the Senate President and the President was the wrong version without amendments. The two withdrew and invalidated their signatures but Astorga claims that RA is still valid and that the withdrawal of signatures does not invalidate the statute. Statcon Issue: W/N the Supreme Court must look into the Journal to determine the said law was validly enacted Statcon Doctrine: Enrolled Bill Doctrine. - The journal of proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. Effects of the withdrawal of authentication Speaker and Senate President may withdraw if there is discrepancy between the text of the bill as deliberated and the enrolled bill. Effect: o Nullifies the bill as enrolled o Losses absolute verity o Courts may consult journals 21.Arroyo v. de Venecia 277 SCRA 268 (1997) Law in Question: RA 8240 or the Sin Tax law Brief Overview: . In a bicameral conference committee on November 21, 1996, Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum which was superceded with the declaration of a presence of a quorum. Arroyo appealed the ruling, but his motion was defeated when put to vote. Interpellation thereafter proceeded. During the interpellation, Rep Arroyos objection was not recognized and a motion to ratify

the committee report was approved. Rep Arroyo thereafter files that the law is invalid for not having complied with house procedures in passing law. Statcon Issue: Whether or not the law is invalid for having failed to have followed constitutional requirements Statcon Doctrine: : 1.) The courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance, courts have no concern. Courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedures made by itself. 2.)Enrolled bill doctrine: The signing of the bill makes the content conclusive of its due enactment where there is no evidence to the contrary. The journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to the matters that are required by the constitution to be recorded therein. Thus, the Supreme Court can no longer look into the matter on whether or not a quorum was actually reached as claimed by representative Arroyo. 22.Morales v. Subido 27 SCRA 131 (1969) Law in question: section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864) Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency . No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Brief Overview: Petitioner contests the fact that he was not put in the list of eligible officers to be appointed as Chief of Police. He is only a high school graduate but has rendered service in the police department for many years. He requests an investigation from the courts to determine why Senator Rodrigos amendment that would enable him to be eligible for the position of Chief of Police is not present in the current law. The amendment of Senator Rodrigo which is alleged to have been omitted by mistake is No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Statcon Issue: Whether or not the court can go behind the enrolled bill. StatCon Doctrine: Enrolled Bill Doctrine - The text of the act is deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on the courts. Furthermore, the courts decision was made with respect to the separation of powers because approval from the legislative and executive branches of government (through their signatures) is conclusive as to its contents and mode of passage. Comments: Following jurisprudence, the court also ruled following Casco Phils. Chemical Co. v Ginerez wherein the court says that if there were mistakes made, the remedy should be brought up by the legislature by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. 23.Mabanag v. Lopez Vito 78 Phil. 1 (1947) 1) Law: Congressional resolution Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto. 2) Facts Congress submitted a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. During the passage and voting for the said resolution, only 21 senators and 88 representatives were counted as a whole of the Congress, excluding 3 senators who were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of first session and 8 representatives who since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower house. Plaintiffs contend that had they been included, the resolution would have been short of the necessary threefourths vote required; hence they pray to enjoin the passing of the resolution for it is against the Constitutional provision of requiring three-fourths vote. 3) Issue WON the court has jurisdiction on the case WON the authenticated resolution or bill is binding upon the courts 4) Decision Petition was dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction on the case as hand. The ratification of an amendment, which is the issue at hand, is political in nature; hence the court has no jurisdiction in such case. Congress has the exclusive power to decide political questions. In Coleman v. Miller, it was held that the decision by Congress, in its control of Secretary of State, of whether questions of whether an amendment has been adopted is not subject to review by the court. Court held that enrolled bill imports absolute verity and is binding to the courts. Furthermore, the determination of Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the State has taken place is conclusive upon the courts. Section 313 of old Code of Civil Procedure provides that when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of legislative body, it shall be conclusive proof of the provision of the Act and its enactment.

Even if both of journals and authenticated copy of the resolution had been presented, there was still no discrepancy between the two documents. Bengzon, concurring: The court has jurisdiction on the case. Majority of state courts in US has opined that question on the manner of amendment of the Constitution belongs to the judiciary and since our Constitution is analogous to that of the Federal system, our courts must take cognizance of the said controversy. Enrolled copy of resolution and legislative journals are conclusive upon the court. The Legislature is better qualified to determine the number of its members than the Judiciary. It is clear that the measure of three-fourths votes prescribed by the Constitution is upheld with the number of congressmen who voted thereon. Hilado, concurring and dissenting: It is not proper to say that should the petitioners been included in the voting, there will be a shortage on the required number of votes as prescribed by the Constitution because it is impossible to know whether they will have voted or abstained. Perfecto, dissenting: Suspended or not suspended, the senators and representatives are congressmen anyway and ignoring them will deprive the chosen representatives of the sovereign. The doctrine that judiciary is not allowed to address political questions is not a doctrine at all. A doctrine is supposed to apply working principles, whereas political question is not susceptible of exact definition. Exactly three-fourths of the Legislative is needed; no one should be excluded. (end of downloaded cases) 24.Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Ginerez 7 SCRA 347 (1963) Law in Question: RA. No. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law Brief Overview: Casco demands tax refund for urea and formaldehyde pursuant to Sec. 2, Par. 8 of aforementioned law. Auditor General declines stating the bill specifically mentions urea-formaldehyde and not urea and formaldehyde. StatCon Issue: ???? StatCon Doctrine: Enrolled Bill; strict construction 25.Phil Consa v. Gimenez 15 SCRA 479 (1965) Law in question: RA 3836 amending Section 12 ( c) of CA No. 186 (Organic Act creating GSIS) Brief Overview: RA 3836 modifies the retirement benefits for Members of the Congress. Statcon Issue: It is unconstitutional because: 1) It falls within the Constitutional prohibition of not passing any bill which increases the emoluments for Members of the Congress under Art. VI, Sec 14 of the Constitution. 2) Violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution embodied in Art. 11, Sec 1 because it only covers Members of the Congress and disregards other elected officers. It also lowers the mandatory service of 20 years to 12 years in order to obtain retirement benefits but again, only for Members of the Congress. 3) The statute it seeks to amend is the Organic Act of the GSIS, but RA 3836 gives benefits to nonGSIS members who are part of Congress. Therefore violating the one title one subject rule of the Constitution (Art 6, Sec 21) StatCon Doctrine: One title, one subject Any statute which goes against the Constitution must be struck down. Used tools for construction: legislative history, American Jurisprudence, Philippine Jurisprudence Comments: Used 1935 Consti, thou should not be confuzzled. 26.Lidasan v. COMELEC 21 SCRA 496 (1967) Law in question: RA 4790, entitled as "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" Brief Overview: The law seeks to create the municipality of Dianaton which includes 2 towns originally in Cotabato. Statcon Issue: The petitioner, Bara Lidasan, voter and taxpayer from Cotabato, filed a complaint at the Supreme Court on the grounds that RA 4790 violates the one subject-one title rule. The petitioner argues that the title of the bill fails to highlight that the statute has a two-pronged purpose: 1) Create municipality of Dianaton, and 2) Dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato. Statcon Doctrine: One-subject one-title doctrine (Art VI, sec. 26 of 1987 Consti) . The passage of RA 4790 was declared null and void because it failed to indicate that the creation of the Dianaton municipality would also transfer 12 barrios from Cotabato into Lanao Del Sur. The provision transferring the said municipalities to Lanao del Sur cannot be separated from the 9 barrios originally included in Lanao del Sur because based on the explanatory note of the House Bill, Congress intended to create a new municipality with all 21 barrios. The judge ruled that contrary to the suggestion that the statute should be construed liberally and removing the 12 barrios in Cotabato from the provision would not render the statute null and void, the Court also highlighted the need to consider other factors that go into the creation of a municipality which would not be met if these 12 barrios would be removed from the interpretation of the statute: 1) geography, 2) population, 3) income. 27.Cordero v. Cabatuando 6 SCRA 418 (1962) 28.Insular Lumber Co. v. CTA, 104 SCRA 710 (1981)

Political Law One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill

Insular Lumber (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956, RA 1435 was passed. Sec 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions. In 1964 ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to have a tax refund of P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ICL appealed the issue to the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the ILCs right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the CTA. The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way. The title of RA 1435 is An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund. ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ICL. HELD: The SC ruled that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which passed it. 29.People v. Ferrer 48 SCRA 382 (1972) Law in question: Anti-Subversion Act Brief Overview: Feliciano Co and Tayag moved to quash that the Anti-Subversion Act, questioning the validity of the statute on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder, it is vague, it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof. HELD: it can not be a bill of attainder(legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial) for when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it does not specify the members for purpose of punishment. what it does is simply to declare the party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of government for the purposes of prohibition stated in its Section 4. The word overthrow contemplated is not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal m eans. The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently to be understood. as to the one subject one title rule: the SC stated that together with the main title, the short title of the statute unequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversion in general. the title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the act Statcon Issue: One subject one title rule StatCon Doctrine: Verba Legis-Literal meaning or plain meaning rule Intrinsic Aids used: Title (One Subject One title) Preamble Context of whole text 30.People v. Purisima 86 SCRA 542 (1978) Law in Question: Paragraph 3. Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081 Brief Overview: A man was being sued for carrying a knife outside his residence and the said weapon was not used for something that is related to his occupation. The petitioners were saying that this was against PD No.9, Par. 3. The case was dismissed by the lower courts because first, the petitioners were not able to establish that the accused had any criminal intent. Second, the said can be used as a tool for extortion if applied without keeping in mind that the legislative has good intent for enacting such law. Lastly, the knife could have been with the accused for self defense. After filing for certiorari by the petitioners, in the Supreme Court, the party of the accused argued that there was no intention of

unlawfulness and it could be found in the Whereas clause of PD No. 9 that the intention of the law is to prevent subversion, rebellion, and other crimes that is related to public disorder. The petitioners argued that intent need not to be shown since the law was mala prohibita and that the crime charged was not dependent on the Whereas clause of the said statute. The SC affirmed the dismissal but modifications can be made. Statcon Issue: 1.) If there is ambiguity, like in PD 9 Sec. 3, it is a judicial task to construe the law. 2..) Legislative is the controlling factor; if there is ambiguity in purview of the law itself, intrinsic aids can be used such as the preamble (Whereas clause). 3.) It is presumed that the intent of the law was not to cause undesirable consequences (tool of extortion) 4.) Penal statutes must be liberally construed in favor the accused Statcon Doctrine: 1.) Whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute. 2.) There is a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by the legislative. 3.) Penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. 31.Taada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 (1986) Law in Question: Solicitor General invoked Article 2 of the Civil Code: Laws shall take effect after 15 days of its complete publication in the Official Gazette unless otherwise provided. to defend his claim that publication may be dispensed with. Brief Overview: The issue of publication. unless otherwise provided does not mean that publication is dispensable and may be done other than in the Official Gazette. (Note: E.O. 200 amended Art. 2 of the Civil Code. Laws may be published now in a newspaper of general circulation). Such omission violates due process. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public. Statutes of local application, private laws, presidential decrees, administrative orders, charters of cities need publication to become effective. Laws relating to the internal regulation of agencies may not be published to become effective. Statcon Issue: Publication of laws and their effectivity. Statcon Doctrine: NONE 32.Phil. Veterans Bank v. Vega G.R. 105364, June 28, 2001 Law in Question: RA 7169 "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act 3518 Brief Overview: Central Bank pushed for the liquidation of Phil. Veterans Bank (PVB) with the help of the RTC. However RA. 7169 was later enacted by Congress for the rehabilitation of PVB. Despite the enactment of the said law, Judge Vega still continued with liquidation process. Sec 10 or RA 7169 clearly provided and mandated that its application shall be upon its approval, contrary to the contention of the respondents that the 15 day publication rule shall apply StatCon Issue: W/N or not the liquidation of the court shall continue when congress already mandated the rehabilitation and reopening of PVB StatCon Doctrine: Verba Legis 33.Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee v. CA 196 SCRA 263 (1991) Law in Question: Omnibus Rules promulgated by the Joint Ministry of Health - Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee implementing the Labor Code. Brief Overview: The Ermita Medical Center was issued a license to function as an in-house medical clinic only to Builders and Heavy Equipment Services Corporation but continued to service other clients as well. This prompted the Joint Ministry Committee to revoke the license of Ermita in accordance with its Rules and Regulations. The Supreme Court ruled that the Joint Ministry Committee had no power to revoke such license because the Rules and Regulations that the revocation was based on were never enforceable to begin with. The Court cited the case of Taada v. Tuvera, which emphasized the mandatory requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for a statute to be effective. StatCon Issue: Publication of laws and their effectivity. StatCon Doctrine: None

34.Phil. International Trading Corp. v. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421 (1996) Law in Question: PITC Administrative Order SOCPEC 89-08-01: mandating 1:1 ratio import/export between Phil and China. Brief Overview: Letter of Instruction 444 (Marcos issued- instructing Phil. International Trading Cop to regulate import and exports to Socialists and centrally planned economies), EO 144 (Cory Aquino amending LOI 444 reorganizing PITC as a line agency of DTI). In a separate case, PITC v. Remington and Firestone Ceramics, RTC ruled that PITCs Administrative Order is unconstitutional. PITC filed a petition for certiorari in SC. SC to decide if Admin Order SOCPEC 89-08-01 is a valid administrative order. StatCon Issue: W/N Admin Order SOCPEC 89-08-01 is a valid administrative order, having been filed with the UP Law Center and the National Administrative Register. StatCon Doctrine: No. Admin Order SOCPEC 89-08-01 is invalid because following Taada v. Tuvera ruling, all laws including executive and administrative orders must be published in the OG or a newspaper of general circulation. 35.Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, G.R. # 28841, June 24, 1983

Law in question: Prescriptive period of a Crime; Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure Brief Overview: The city of fiscal of QC filed before the court an information for slight physical injuries committed by Yapdiangco against Mr. Cho Ching. Yapdiangco moved to quash the case on the ground st that it was filed on the 61 day following the commission of the offense. The 60-day period has already elapsed because according to the Revised Penal Code, light felonies prescribe in 2 months, and the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day the crime was discovered by the offended party. Issue: Whether or not a criminal case may be filed on the next working day after the prescriptive period has already elapsed. th Held: No, if the 60 day falls on a Sunday or a holiday, the criminal case no longer be filed on the next working day as the crime has already prescribed. StatCon Doctrine: Criminal Statutes shall be construed in favor of the accused. Comments: It is the duty of the state to go after the criminal, but when the prescriptive period has already elapsed, the accused can no longer be penalized as it would be a deprivation of his right to life and liberty. 36.Salas v. Jarencio 46 SCRA 734 (1970) Law in Question: RA 4118 Brief Overview: Prior to the passing of RA 4118, declaring the area as an alienable/disposable land of the State, the Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requesting the President to declare a property as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants. After the bill has been passed, the Municipal Board contested the said law as unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprived the Municipality of its property without due process and just compensation. StatCon Issue: W/N RA 4118 is unconstitutional. StatCon Doctrine: a.) General welfare legislation is liberally construed in favor of the people it intended to benefit (in this case, the tenants). RA 4118 is a piece of legislation consistent with the Social Justice provision of the Constitution and to implement the land for the landless policy of the Administration. b.) Presumption of Constitutionality - RA 4118 is constitutional. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done. Manila did not acquire the property with its own funds, in its private or corporate capacity. The property is held by Manila in trust for the State, therefore legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. 37.Morfe v. Mutuc 22 SCRA 424 (1968) Law in question: The statute in question is the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act specifically its provision (section 7 of RA No. 3019) requiring public officers to file and submit periodically a sworn statement of their assets and liabilities. Brief Overview: It was challenged that the periodical submission within the month of January of every other year thereafter of such SAL after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. Issue: 1. WON the periodical submission of the SAL is an oppressive exercise of police power 2. WON it is violative of the due process clause implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination 3. WON it is an insult against the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials Held: Wherefore the lower court affirmed that such requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause, this court REVERSED the lower courts ruling Statcon: Aids to Construction to determine legislative intent look into spirit or intent of the law (extrinsic aid) *The statcon issue was not expressly stated in the case. 38.Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994) Law in question: Sec. 187 ( Procedure for approval and effectivity of tax ordinances and revenue measures) of the LGC Unconstitutional and Manila Ordinance No.7794 is the one that has the statcon rule Brief Overview: Drilon in his acting capacity as Secretary of Justice declared ordinance no.7794Manila Revenue code null and void for a. Non compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances b. Containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy Statcon Issue: whether or not the Manila Revenue Code complied with the procedure on enacting tax ordinances Held: Yes, the mere omission of posting the ordinance as approved does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. 39.Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994)

FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows: 1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987. 2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), 3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance. 4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675). 5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S -211 Trainer planes, 18 SF260 Trainer planes and 150 arm ored personnel carriers 5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. 7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi 2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional 3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional. HELD: Locus Standi We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]). HELD: The Court held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by members of Congress. In the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress. Veto of the Provisions The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a

violation of the Constitution. The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one -fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service). The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]). The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congre ssional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines. 40.IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) Law in issue: President Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000 and Letter of Instruction 02/2000 issued by the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President Estrada commanded the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis. The president, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention. The Secretary of DND, the Chief of Staff, the PNP Chief, and the Secretary of DILG were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI) which detailed the manner by which the

joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff and the PNP Chief The purpose of the order is to heighten police visibility in the metropolis. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature Issue: WON petitioner has legal standing Decision: NO. 1. IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. 2. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. 3. Expressio anius est exclusio alterius when the statute explicitly define the terms, it cannot be further extended. 41.Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 330 (1976) Constitutional Law Definition of Political Question On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after, the President issued another related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and can vass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16, 1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16. On Sep 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the SC; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question. HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable one. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. 42.Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 (1983)

Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot filed a representative suit for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which reads: (2) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term. Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of Quezon City, Metro Manila, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa; while petitioner Romeo B. Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they are "... deeply concerned about their duties as citizens and desirous to uphold the constitutional mandate and rule of law ...; that they have filed the instant petition on their own and in behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject matters are of profound and general interest. " The respondent COMELEC, represented by counsel, opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners has legal standing to file the suit Jurisdiction of the SC over COMELEC HELD: DISMISSED As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. The act complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, as is allegedly its ministerial duty under the constitutional provision above cited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public funds. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensible element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it ina form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. When the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XI IC Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof. There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC. It is not alleged that the COMELEC was asked by petitioners to perform its alleged duty under the Constitution to call a special election, and that COMELEC has issued an order or resolution denying such petition. 43.Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960) Law in question: Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works" Brief Overview: The act was for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals. But when the the said act was passed, it was private in character owned by Jose C. Zulueta. Subsequently, Zulueta donated the said property to the Government. Statcon Issue: W/N the the subsequent act cured the defect of RA no 920. StatCon Doctrine: No. The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder

roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and void. 4 The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation. 44.City of Baguio v. Marcos, 27 SCRA 342 (1969) Law in question: RA 931 Brief Overview: In 1912, a parcel of land in Baguio was instituted and was eventually declared by the cadastral court as public land in 1922. In 1961, Lutes petitioned for the reopening of the foregoing land, asserting his ownership. Lessees of the land, including the petitioner City of Baguio, filed cases opposing the reopening. The cadastral and the appellate court denied the petition ruling that the lessees do not have the legal standing on the case at bar. Statcon Issue: (1) W/N the lessees have the legal standing or the personality in this case; (2) W/N the cadastral court has the authority to reopen the land StatCon Doctrine: Issue (1) a. Spirit of the law / Legislative intent - As per previous jurisprudence, it is said that only owners can have the personality in such type of cases. However, Section 1 of RA 931 provides that land that are declared or would be declared as public land can be reopened with the condition that the same land has been disposed, leased, etc by the government. From the condition, the Court ruled that the right of the lessees to have the legal personality was implied by the statute. Issue (2) a. Title as an intrinsic aid - Apparently, the title and the purview of RA 931 are in conflict. The former provides that land that have been or about to be declared...forty years from institution while the latter provides that land that been declared...forty years from the time the decision was rendered. The Court held that the title must be given equal regards as with the purview. Title serves as the index of the clue as to what the legislators intended. Given the two constructions, the Court provided another doctrine. b. Liberal construction of remedial law - RA 931 is a remedial law by the fact that it grants relief for those who claim ownership over public lands. The Court ruled that the petition for reopening falls within the forty year period provided by RA 931. The cadastral court has the authority to reopen the case, and both Lutes and the lessees can both come under trial. 45.San Miguel Brewery Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 (1967) Law in question: Ordinance No. 26. Sec. 1. Upon the failure of any person owning any delinquent tax or delinquent revenue to pay the same, at the time required under existing ordinance, the City Treasurer, his deputy, or any of his clerks duly authorized in writing by the City Treasurer may seize or distraint any goods, chattels or effects, and other personal property, including stocks and other securities, debts, credits, bank accounts and any interest in and rights to personal property, of such person in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax, or charge, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency, and the expenses of the distraint. Brief Overview: An appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in civil case No. 46039, dismissing the complaint filed by the San Miguel Brewery, Inc., and ordering it to pay to the defendant P2,000.00 in damages, P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.Ordinance No. 11, amended Ordinance No. 7, imposing a tax of 2% on the gross sales or receipts of those engaged in the sale, trading in, or disposal of all alcoholic or malt beverages. San Miguel maintains a warehouse or branch office in the City of Butuan and is engaged in the sale of beer and softdrinks in the said city. It promptly and religiously paid taxes under Ordinance No. 11, but stopped thereafter and incurred back taxes. The City Treasurer issued verbal demands to the company with warnings that a warrant of distraint and levy will be issued against its properties unless it settles its liabilities under the said ordinance. The counsel of the company wrote the City Treasurer questioning the power of the city government to levy upon its properties pointing out that the power of distraint and levy as embodied in your Charter (RA 523) can only be exercised by your goodselves in respect to delinquencies in the payment of Real Estate Taxes. The City Treasurer responded that he may issue said warrants upon properties of delinquent taxpayers under Ordinance No 26. Statcon Issue: W/N the seizure of the plaintiffs trucks, resulting from the warrant of distraint and levy against the properties of San Miguel Corporation, was within the power of the power of the city government of Butuan under Ordiance No. 26 StatCon Doctrine: Verba Legis: Under Ordinance No. 26, the City of Butuan is empowered to distraint and levy upon the properties of delinquent tax payers (such as in the case of San Miguel Corporation) Ubi Lex non distinguit, nec non di stinguire debemus Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish doctrine also applies in the case (referring to how San Miguel argued that the city was only allowed to distraint and levy in cases of delinquencies in the payment of Real Estate Taxes under RA 523) but Ordinance No. 26 only talks about delinquent taxpayers in general 46.Sotto v. COMELEC, 76 Phil. 516 (1946)

Facts: V. Sotto filed for a review for the decision of COMELEC declaring E. Javier as the true and legitimate Pres. of the Popular Front(Sumulong) Party. Sotto contends that he is the President. Issue: W/N the Supreme Court(S.C) can review Sottos petition under sec.9 of the Commonwealth Act 657 w/c states that any decision, order or ruling of COMELEC may be reviewed by the SC by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or w/ such rules as may be promulgated by the SC Held: No. The words may be reviewed by writ of certiorari does not refer to the special civil action of certiorari. Sotto filed a special civil action of review of decision w/c means that the SC can only review the acts of the inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions when it acted in excess of his/its jurisdiction (not the review of the actual decision of the lower court w/c should be filed as an appeal) (STATCON PRINCIPLE: NECESSITY OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONALITY) A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide on it unless it is raised by the parties. If a constitutional question is raised, it should present some other ground upon w/c the court may rest its judgment. The constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in w/c the decision for it is inevitable. Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)* which has been considered as an **enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. Petitioners pray that the said resolution be prevented. Respondents argue that the same can no longer be prevented as entered in the Journals. The Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts. 47.Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969) Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state. Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional. Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence , or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author

Taada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command. 48.Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001 ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Voidfor-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit. 49.Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 (1969) - Jana Law in Question: Executive Order 386 which creates the Municipality of Balabagan. Brief Overview: The Municipality of Balabagan was formerly part of the Municipality of Malabang (petitioner), having been created under EO 386 by President Carlos P. Garcia. The petitioners relied on the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General case that the respondents must be prohibited from performing the functions of their respective offices and EO 386 should be nullified since Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code which gives the President to create municipalities is unconstitutional as (1) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, and (2) it is against Section 10 (1) of Article 7 of the Constitution, limiting the Presidents power over local government units to supervision. The respondents claim that the Pelaez ruling is inapplicable because the Municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.

StatCon Issue: Whether or not 1.) the Municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation; 2.) the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many acts done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of the municipality StatCon Doctrine: 1.) No. The mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as independently of the Administrative Code provision. There is no valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. 2.) No. Even though EO 386 created no office, this is not to say, however, that the acts done by the Municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute confers no rights, creates no office, affords no protection, imposes no duties and justifies no acts performed under it, there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects since the actual existence of the statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored and a realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine . Questions of rights claimed to have vested, of status of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. 50.De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971) De Agbayani v. PNB Law in question: Executive Order 32 (1945) o Debt Moratorium Law: suspending enforcement of payment of all debts and monetary obligation payable by war sufferers. o Prescription: 4yrs Republic Act 342 (1948) o Extends E.O. 32 o Another 8yrs (1948-1956) Brief Overview: A certain De Agbayani acquired a loan from PNB with a real estate mortgage (security). The loan eventually matured but PNB could not collect due to the war. 15 years after the maturity date, PNB instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding in the office of the Provincial Sheriff for recovery of the balance. De Agbayani countered with a suit and its main allegation is that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed. De Agbayani sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction. PNB prayed for the dismissal of the suit saying that if the period of debt memorandum under the EO and the Act subsequently found unconstitutional were to be deducted from the computation, then the right to foreclose the mortgage still subsist. But the lower court decided in favour of De Agbayani. Court Decision: decision is reversed and the suit by De Agbayani dismissed StatCon Issue: Unconstitutionality of a statute StatCon Doctrine: 2 schools of thought o Disregard the rule o As if it was valid Discussion of Court o before declaration of unconstitutionality, the act is an operative act and has legal consequences attached o there is a presumption of constitutionality (reasonableness test is satisfied)